Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Causes Of Flare Load
3.0 Design Guidelines
3.1 Radiation
3.2 Noise
3.3 Glc Of Toxic Combustion Products
4.0 Types Of Flares
4.1 Elevated Flares
4.2 Ground Flares
5.0 Flare System Components And Concepts
6.0 Design Of Flare Systems
6.1 Flare Load
6.2 Flare Header
6.3 Flare Stack
6.4 Knock Out Drum
6.5 Blow Down Pump
6.6 Water Seal Drum
6.7 Purge Gas Requirement
6.8 Smokeless Operation Of Flare
7.0 Inhouse Software Available For Design Of Flare System
8.0 Sample Calculations
9.0 Comparative Study Of Flare Systems Of Different Refineries
10.0 Flare Load Reduction Based On Interlocks
11.0 Flare Gas Recovery Systems
11.1 Introduction
11.5 Attachments
12.0 Umoe’s Concept Of Flare Gas Recovery
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Primary function of Flare is to convert flammable, toxic or corrosive vapours to less
objectionable components by combustion. Disposal of combustible gases, vapours and
liquids by burning is accomplished in flare. This serve as an emergency disposal system to
eliminate excess hydrocarbons coming to it due to:
a) Release from safety valves because of an equipment failure or because of major
plant emergency such as a power failure, cooling water failure or a plant fire.
b) Leakages from safety valves or control valves.
c) Disposal of flammable liquid-vapour products or by products which can not be
marketed.
Process flares are used primarily in the oil and petrochemical industries from initial
production through transportation, storage, refining and processing. Flares are also used
for other process applications where hydrocarbon emissions must be controlled. A few
examples include: Sewage digestors, coal gasification and liquefaction, rocket engine
testing and heavy water plants.
The main objective of the flare has been to discharge flammable and waste gases at a safe
location and burn them in order to protect the environment from pollution and hazards.
Flaring, being a critical operation in many plants its design must be governed on strict
safety principles.
The various problems associated with flare are:
a) Glare:
The flare generates a considerable amount of glare particularly during emergencies. This
causes inconvenience to the surrounding population and also gives the impression of
unnecessary waste of resources.
b) Smoke:
Smoke from flares causes a considerable amount of environmental pollution. The smoke
does occur in most of the flare system due to incomplete combustion of gases.
c) Noise:
High noise levels are created by flare system during plant upset conditions. This again
causes inconvenience to the surrounding population. Prolonged exposure to excessive
noise may cause mental irritation, fatigue and even deafness. Now sophisticated design of
flare tips have greatly reduced the noise pollution.
d) Radiation:
During peak flare, the radiation level from the flame could be high. This affects the
surrounding vegetation and habitation.
e) Ground level concentration (GLC)
High GLC of combustion products or unburnt hydrocarbons causes damage to human
health, deterioration of materials and structures or creation of an area where plant/animal
species cannot survive. With the growing consciousness of people in every country
regarding environmental protection, there is a lot of pressure to come up with better flare
systems to eliminate the problems mentioned above.
ATMOSPHERIC VENTING:
Another widely used disposal method is venting or direct discharge to atmosphere. There
is some difference of opinion on the question of what may and what may not be vented to
atmosphere. It is usually considered safe to vent hydrocarbon vapours or gases lighter
than air, except hydrocarbon vapours or gases lighter than air, except hydrogen. Some
designers recommend venting of vapours even as heavy as propane, provided it is vented
from an elevated vent stack at a high velocity. The vent stack height is selected so that the
concentration of vapour at grade is well below the lower flammable limit of the vapours.
The reliability for estimation of ground level concentrations is questionable and therefore
flaring is the only satisfactory method for safe disposal of hydrocarbons heavier than air.
o Partial Failure:
Partial preotectice credit can be taken for normally operating parallel equipments or stand
by services that have two unrelated source of energy to the drivers. Standby services
cannot be considered totally reliable hence it does not suffice insurance against
overpressure.
o Electrical or Mechanical Failure:
The failure of electrical or mechanical equipment that provides cooling or condensation in
process streams can cause overpressure in process vessels.
o Reflux Failure:
Reflux failure causes condensers flooding or loss of coolant resulting in an overpressure.
o Heat exchanger tube failure:
When tube side pressure of an exchanger is much lower than the shell side, rupture of tube
will overpressure the tube side. Thermal shock, vibration, corrosion may also cause tube
failure. This must be protected with a pressure relief valve.,
o Chemical reaction:
Over pressure may occur because of unbalance reaction in a reactor. Sophisticate safety
valves are used in these cases.
o Hydraulic Expansion:
Thermal relief valves are provided to overcome overpressure because of rise in
temperature.
o Plant Fires:
Any process equipment in an operating plant that handles or processes fluid may get
exposed to fire. Continuous vapour generation will lead to over pressure in system.
Pressure relief valve is required to protect the vessels releasing the generated vapor.
o Local Power Failure:
There might be local power failures in units/equipments which will cause disturbances to
local equipments. This may result in over pressure in system.
The heat radiation level for personnel are with account taken of reaction time and human
mobility time of between 8 and 15 seconds from the onset of heat radiation. In emergency
release, a reaction time 3 - 5 seconds may be assumed and 5 - 10 seconds would elapsed
before individual could seek cover or deport from the area, which would result exposure
time 8 - 15 seconds.
Exposure time necessary to reach the Pain threshold.
Radiation intensity Time to pain threshold
BTU/hr-ft2 KW/m2 Seconds
550 1.74 60
740 2.33 40
920 2.90 30
1500 4.73 16
2200 6.94 9
3000 9.46 6
4700 11.67 4
6300 19.87 2
The radiation levels take into account the influence of clothing, but excludes the
contribution of wind chill factor, ability of personnel to face away from the radiation
source and lack of large open areas on offshore platforms.
The heat radiation figures are exclusive of an allowance for solar radiation. In our country
solar radiation would account for about 350 Btu/Hr ft2 heat and it is recommended that
for continuous exposure solar radiation should be taken into consideration. In that case
allowable heat radiation by combustion should be taken as 500 - 350 = 150 Btu/Hr - ft2.
For other conditions for calculations solar radiation should not be subtracted.
3.2 Noise:
The exposure 1 minutes for noise prescribed in some of the well accepted standards
are given below:
Daily exposureOSHA Noise Regulations NIOSH Noise Regulations
Hrs dBa dBa
8 90 85
4 95 90
2 100 95
1 105 100
0.5 110 105
0.25 115 110
3.3 GLC of toxic combustion products:
Threshold limits of GLC for certain toxic substances (gases and vapors) are as follows:
Gas or Vapor PPM Gas or Vapor PPM
Acetaldehyde 200 Acetic acid 10
Acetic anhydride 5 Acetone 1,000
Acrolein 0.5 Acrylonitire 20
Ammonia 100 Amyl acetate 200
Amyl alcohol 100 Aniline 5
Arsinic 0.005 Benzene 35
Benzyl chloride 1 Bromide 1
Butadiene 1000 Butyl alcohol 100
Butylamine 5 Carbon dioxide 5000
Carbon disulfide 20 Carbon monoxide 100
Carbon tetrachloride 25 Chlorine 1
Chlorobenzene 75 Chloroform 100
Cresol (all isomers) 5 Cyclohexane 400
Cyclohexanol 100 Cyclohexanone 100
This type of flare systems are simple, proven and suitable for varying loads. The noise
level is also very less due to low exit velocities.
Air-Assisted Flares:
These flares incorporating special mixing heads that increase gas to air interface. Air is
blown into the central duct allowing unrestricted passage for the low pressure relief gas
flowing up the annular duct. The air is blown with the help of a axial fan. The only utility
required are power for the fan and fuel gas for the pilot burner.
Air assisted flares can handle heavier gases, gives low radiation and glare and having
longer tip life. The disadvantages of this type of flare are, it requires utility source, having
high operating cost and complex controls are required for efficient operation.Inclusion of a
rotating equipment to supply combustion air reduces the system reliability.
Steam Assisted Flares:
These flares achieve their smokeless capabilities by mixing steam with the flare gases. The
steam is introduced at one or several points to induce secondary air and turbulence to
improve mixing. In addition to rendering the flame smokeless, steam reduces the flame
temperature, thus reducing thermal radiation.
Steam assisted flares also can handle heavier gases and have longer tip life. The steam
requirement would depend on flare gas molecular weight. The operating costs are higher
due to steam consumption.
Multi-burner flares:
The gas stream is split and burnt in multiple burners installed on common stack. This
reduces flame length and thickness while increasing the flame surface and helps air or
steam to penetrate the flame easily, ensuring efficient and improved flame characteristics.
The number of flare headers required is decided based on temperature, allowable pressure
drop, properties of hydrocarbon, moisture content etc.
If there is a possibility of liquid discharge into the flare system a K.O. Drum is provided
immediately adjacent to process unit. For process plant handling light hydrocarbons like
C1, C2, C3, C4 the liquid blow down is also sent to Flare I.S.B.L. knock out drum. A
suitable Vaporizer Armstong type or indirect methanol is used for vaporizing the liquid
hydrocarbon. In case, very low temperature gases from a particular unit is put to a
common flare header in offsites due to economic reasons, a flare gas superheater on the
low temperature header may be required to heat the gases. In addition to this a K.O.
Drum is needed near the flare stack to trap any liquid condensed en route to the flare.
This is provided to prevent hazards associated with burning liquid droplets escaping from
the flare stack. Considerable quantities of liquids can accumulate in flare systems because
of the dew point characteristics of the complex mixture of vapours discharged at high
temperatures. “As the high temperatures vapours move through the system, there is drop
in temperature due to heat loss to system and surroundings. When these vapours cools to
their dew point, liquid droplets are formed, K.O. Pot is designed for removal of
liquid and also adequate space is provided for removed liquid.
A water seal drum is provided at or near the base of the flare stack as a safeguard against
ingress of air in the flare system. Air upon entering the flare system mixes with the
combustible gases within the system and mixture may be with in the explosive range
resulting in some serious explosion. There are numerous sources of entry of air to the
flare system. When the flare system is fairly static and flow is either very small or non
existent and flares stack is filled with either low molecular weight gases or gases at high
temperature the draft would exist at the base of the stack. With this state of less than
atmospheric pressure with the flare system it is obvious that air will leak into the system if
there is opportunity for it to do so. The water seal prevents damage to the system
upstream of the water seal drum.
For protection of flare system downstream of the water seal, i.e. flare stack itself, entry of
air from the flare outlet is prevented by:
- Continuous purge with oxygen free gas and
- Use of gas seal.
To avoid a static condition of flow through the flare stack, continuous purge is maintained.
Purge gases may be any oxygen free gas which would not reach its dew point under any
condition of flare operation. Natural gas, inert gases and nitrogen are commonly used, but
steam is not at all satisfactory as a purge gas. Calculated volumes of purge gas should
enter the flare system to ensure sweeping of the system. There is divergent opinion as to
the volume of purge gas which may be required. The use of gas seals installed
immediately below the flare tip are capable to restrict entry of the air into the flare system.
Various types of seals are available as discussed below:
The fluidic seal consists of a series of fixed baffles shaped like open ended cones (Ref. Fig
- 5.2) within a flare tip. Each succeeding baffle encountered by waste or purge gas
traveling aperture than below it. The resultant effect is similar to that of venturi with little
drop in gas pressure. To force the air into the flare stack about 4 to 5 times the pressure
of purge gas is required and hence atmospheric air can not enter the stack through the
fluidic seal.
The molecular seal is shown in fig. 5.3. The purge gas is forced to make two 180 o bends
as it flows through the seal. The air thus encounters a trap caused by the difference in
molecular weight between air and the purge gas. If the purge gas is lighter than air, the
trap forms in the upper portion of the inverted cylinder. If the purge gas is heavier than
air, the trap is formed in the lower portion of the outer cylinder. The seal is effective even
when nitrogen is used as a purge gas.
The molecular seal is heavier and large as compared to the fluidic seal because of the
complexity of its internal passage. This necessitates a stronger and costlier support
structure to carry the additional weight and wind resistance. Molecular seal operates at
reduced efficiency if its baffles are partially filled with water or pieces of refractory from
the flare tip. A drain is used for water removal, but the refractory removal could require
costly maintenance. Fluidic seal due to its simplicity of construction, light weight and
lower initial cost, is preferred. However for very large diameter flare stacks (48" and
higher) there is a belief that molecular seal reduces oxygen ingress in flare stack.
Flare tip a proprietary item, made of heat resistant alloy steel is specially designed to
provide a stable and quiet flame of the desired smokeless capacity.
Calculation of Diameter
Mach No. = 3.23 * 10-5 ( W / ( P2 * d2 )) (Z *T )/ ( K*MW)) 0.5
Flare stack dia is generally sized on velocity basis , although pressure drop should be
checked. Velocity upto 0.5 Mach may be permitted for peak load and short term. 0.2
Mach is maintained for more normal and possibly more frequent conditions for low
pressure flares, which depends on following criteria:
a)Volume ratio of maximum conceivable flare flow to anticipated average flare flow.
b) The probable timing , frequency, and duration of those flows.
c) The design criteria adopted for the project to stabilize flare burning.
However , for high pressure flares, a higher Mach no. can be taken.
Calculation of flare length
The heat liberated, Q is calculated as follows:
Q = Flow rate x heat of combustion
= (W/3600)* ( H)
D = min distance from the mid point of flame to object being considered
(in meters)
= fraction of heat intensity transmitted
F = fraction of heat radiated
Q = heat release (lower heating value) (KW)
K = Allowable radiation (KW/m2)
For initial calculation may be assumed 1.0
According to Brzustowbsui & Summer, use of the fraction of heat intensity transmitted,
to correct the radiation impact.
= 0.79 ( 100 / r ) 1/16 (30.5 / D) 1/16
= fraction of heat intensity transmitted through the atmosphere.
r = relative humidity, percent
D = Distance from flares to illuminated area (m) ( see fig. C)
Above equation satisfy most of flare gases except H2 & H2S which burn with little or no
luminous radiation.
The F factor allows for the fact that not all the heat released in a flame can be transferred
by radiation. Measurement of radiation from frames indicate that the fraction of heat
radiation (radiant energy per total heat of combustion) increases towards a limit, similar to
the increase in the burning rate with increasing flame diameter.
For peak flare load F = 0.1
normal flare load F = 0.3
Estimate flame length from Fig A indicates flame radiation center being at the flame mid
point. A flame under influence of wind will tilt in the direction of wind is blowing. The
lateral wind effect can be estimated from Fig.B which relates horizontal and vertical
displacement of flame center to the ratio of lateral wind velocity to stack velocity.
Flame length varies with emission velocity and heat release.
Flow in (m3/s) Can be estimated based on ideal gas law:
U = Wind velocity
Uj Flare tip velocity
Uj = Flow (m3/s) (( *d 2 )/4)
From Fig. B
H’ = H+½ Y
R’ = R-½ x
D2 = (R’) 2 + (H’) 2
Apart from above programs, Designer may refer to various packages available on
PRODES.
In a large chemical plant or Refineries having a very reliable power supply. Cooling
water failure mostly governs the maximum flare load. In the following example, system
has been segregated into two parts. Cooling Tower one supply CW to U-01, U-02, U-03,
U-04 and CT-2 supplies to U-05, U-06, U-08. Cooling water failure is the governing
case in each unit. Maximum fire load comes from CT-1 failure. So far design of flare
header & stack maximum load corresponding to CT-1 is the governing load.
According to governing load, flare stack dia and KOD have been sized. Individual unit
location is specified based on plot plan. Accordingly, unit back pressure is calculated
moving from KOD to individual units. Various headers & sub-headers sizes are optimized
meeting the unit back pressure requirement.
Power substation Cooling water failure is the For main flare header sizing
MSS-5 failure is the governing governing case for flare and flare stack design, general
case for Flare system design. header sizing. Only single electric power failure is
largest local power failure is considered.
considered for checking the
Governing load = 449 TPH flare header sizing.
Governing load = 457 TPH Governing load = 750 TPH.
Maximum allowable back
pressure at unit B/L = 0.61 Max allowable back pressure Max allowable back press. At
kg/cm2g = 1.5 kg/cm2g at unit B/L unit B/L = 1.0 kg/cm2g
MRPL - II
FLARE SYSTEM
10. FLARE SYSTEM
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Flare system shall be installed to burn the flammable, toxic or corrosive vapors safely
which is discharged during startup, shutdown, normal operation and emergency cases.
Dedicated flare system for Phase-2 is provided.
Two flare collecting systems are provided. One is main (LP) flare header and the other is
sour flare header. Hydrocarbon and sour flares released from the following units are
discharged to the main (LP) flare header.
- CDU/VDU/NSU
- Visbreaker unit
- Merox units
- Hydrocracker unit
- Hydrogen unit
- GO-HDS unit
- CCR/NHT unit (future)
Sour flares released from the following units are discharged to the sour flare header.
These two flare headers are connected at main flare knockout drum which is located near
the flare stack.
For flare system design, following cases are studied. Flare load for the various cases is
summarized in the attached sheet.
- Fire case
- Blocked outlet
- Reflux failure
- Emergency Depressure
For the main flare header sizing and flare stack design, general electric power failure case
is considered.
Individual flare outlet from each units are sized as listed below.
Pressure profile and velocity for the flare header design shall be as follows.
Pressure profile for the main (LP) flare header at general power failure case and for the
sour flare header at ATU fire case is shown in the attached sheets.
Five (5) Nos. Of Flare Knock out drums are provided in phase-2 as per following
groupings:
- VBU
- VBU/BLENDER
- MEROX
- GO-HDS
- NHDT
- CCR
- ATU
- SWS
- SRU
5) Main knock out drum is receiving flare gas from all of above knock out drums.
Flare knock out drums are sized as per API RP 521. Design load for each KO drum is
summarized as below:
Flare stack shall be designed based on the general power failure case of 750 t/h. Diameter
and height of the flare stack shall be determined considering the ground level heat intensity
in accordance with API RP 521. Maximum heat intensity at ground level shall be less than
4,000 kcal/m2.hr excluding solar radiation.
Flare tip shall be designed considering smokeless capacity of 110 t/h which is
corresponding to 15% of maximum flare load.
- Sour flare header : Stress relieved killed carbon steel with 6mm CA
- Main (LP) flare header : Stress relieved carbon steel with 3mm CA
- All the knockout drum : Stress relieved killed carbon steel with 6mm CA
- Water seal drum : Stress relieved killed carbon steel with 6mm CA and
epoxy cement coating
- Flare stack : Stress relieved carbon steel with 3mm CA
FLARE LOAD SUMMARY (PHASE-II REFINERY)
937,249 kg/h
General Power
failure
741.274 kg/hr
MW
43.0 Temp.
133 oC
CW failure total 314,212
Local power failure of HYC
288.349 kg/h
DESIGN BASIS
FOR
IOCL - PANIPAT
FLARE SYSTEM
FLARE SYSTEM
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The flare system will be provided for safe disposal of combustible, toxic gases which are
relieved from process plants and offsites during start-up, shutdown, normal operation or in
case of an emergency such as:
The flare loads from the following plants have been considered for the design of flare
system:
Process Unit
Capacity, MMTPA
1. CDU
6.0
2. VDU
3.3
3. OHCU
1.7
4. FCCU
0.7
5. H2 UNIT
0.038
6. CRU
0.5
7. VBU
0.4
8. BBU
0.5
9. Kerosine Merox
10. SR LPG Merox
11. FCC LPG Merox
12. FCC Gasoline Merox
13. Sulphur Block
9.3 FLARE LOADS
9.3.1 CDU/VDU
9.3.2 OHCU
The loads given above are taken from safety valves relief summary for the OHCU given by
UOP.
9.3.3 FCCU
The flare loads are taken from the preliminary estimates available form the licensor.
9.3.4 H2 UNIT
The loads given below are taken from hydrogen unit flare load summary for GHP and the
flare loads are prorated.
The flare load for different contingencies shall be updated when data from the hydrogen
unit licensor M/s., HTAS is available.
9.3.5 CRU
The data for the following contingencies is taken from the package:
9.3.6 VBU
The following are the flare loads given for Visbreaker Unit and are taken from the process
package.
9.3.7 BBU
The offgases from this unit shall be incinerated in the incinerator provided near the unit.
This unit shall not be connected to the flare system.
9.3.8 MEROX
These unit are not considered to add-on to the flare load in the contingencies considered
above. The flare load for these units will be furnished when data from the respective
licensors are available.
The flare loads given below for this block for different contingencies are as per the
estimates available for this block (consisting of ARU, SWS unit and sulphur unit). The
flare gases from the block shall be routed to the sour flare. The estimated flare loads are
as follows:
ARU.
SWS Unit
Cooling Local Fire Case
Water Power
System Failure
Load Mol Temp Load Mol wt. Temp Load Mol Temp
o o o
kg/hr wt. C kg/hr C kg/hr wt. C
1284.2 24.23 86.85 13250 18.01 160 5685 46.2 140
Sulphur Unit
The unit shall have its own incinerator and shall not be connected to the flare header.
9.4 FLARE LOAD SUMMARY
9.5.1 The cooling water failure becomes the governing load for the flare header sizing.
9.5.2 Only single largest Local Power failure shall be considered for checking the flare header
sizing.
9.5.3 For different units the General electric failure shall not be considered as governing load as
the feed to the furnace/feed pumps shall also cease leading to a low flare load. The only
exceptions are OHCU and CRU, releasing high load. However this load is not governing.
9.5.4 There shall be two separate flare headers. One carrying the discharges from equipments
handling high H2S contents hydrocarbons i.e. Sour flare header (carrying reliefs from the
sulphur block) and the second one carrying rest of the hydrocarbon reliefs i.e. Main flare.
9.5.5 A maximum allowable back pressure of 1.5 kg/cm2g at unit battery limit shall be
considered for sizing the flar header. However a maximum allowable back pressure of 1.7
kg/cm2g shall be considered at PSV outlet.
9.5.6 For sour flare a maximum allowable back pressure of 0.5 kg/cm2g shall be considered at
Sulphur Block battery limit for SRU down case, however for Local power failure case and
fire case a back pressure of 1.5 kg/cm2g shall be considered at sulphur block battery limit.
9.5.7 EIL had suggested routing all H2S bearing streams to the sour flare but IOCL decided to
route only the Sulphur block reliefs to the sour flare header.
9.5.8 Smokeless Capacity: The flare shall be designed for a smokeless capacity equivalent to
15% of maximum anticipated fuel gas production (i.e. 15% of 12.3 TPH mol wt. 8.95) i.e.
- 2 TPH.
9.5.9 Flare header shall be purged by all units maintaining a purge velocity of 0.1 fps in
respective unit headers with fuel gas.
9.5.10 For monitoring flare losses, metering instrument will be provided in each unit block area
and also on the main flare header. Type of instruments will be decided during P&ID stage.
The main flare header shall collect the emergency hydrocarbon reliefs from all the
equipments (except equipment discharging to the sour flare header) and shall route it to
main flare stack. The size of this flare header works out to be 54". To take care of the
short term H2S rich reliefs the flare header shall be post weld heat treated and hardness of
200 BHN maintained. The flare stack diameter shall be 54" and height 100m. This Flare
system shall have its own dedicated set of flame front generators and flame pilots.
The length of this flare header is ~3 KM. To keep the height of flare header within
reasonable limits and to reduce the cost of associated flare header structure, it is proposed
to have one knock out drum enroute flare stack. The knock out drum shall be located
near BBU. It shall have second knock out drum near flare stack. A vertical water seal
drum shall be provided at the bottom of the stack. The water seal drum is an integral part
of the flare stack. It is not possible to take water seal drum under maintenance without
shutdown of entire complex. Thus to avoid any such situation all the internals of water
seal drum shall be of SS-304.
The sour flare header shall have a knock out drum in the Sulphur block. The gases will
then be routed to the flare area. The gases shall be burnt alongwith the main flare gases
through a separate header near the tip of the main flare.
Sour flare header shall be post weld heat treated and shall have minimum 200 BHN
hardness. This flare header shall have a KOD near flare stack. This will not have any
water seal drum. A separate fluidic seal, separate Flame Pilots shall be provided for this
flare. The flame front generators shall be common for two flares.
FLARE SYSTEM
8.0 FLARE SYSTEM
8.1 INTRODUCTION
At present several safety valves from existing units are venting to atmosphere. The
existing flare system is incapable of handling this additional load.
A new flare system is envisaged to handle safety valve reliefs from the existing units
presently connected to flare as well as venting to atmosphere and DHDS block.
Safety valve discharges for cooling water failure case from various units are given below:
Units
FRE APS 220 70 150 -
FRE VPS 7.8 20.3 150 -
HMU 36.5 70 100 -
T-1701 27.3 70 150 -
FR-APS 272 70 150 -
FR-VPS 7.8 20.3 150 -
FCCU 139 70 100 -
Propane Unit 5.5 35 50 -
11.6 50 50
T-801 (Deeth) 15.2 32.2 77.7 Lean oil failure
T-802 (Debut) 85 50.5 68.1 -
MEA Regeneration* 4.5 22.5 125 -
T-701 (PG VPLG) 52 70 150 -
DHDS 2.7 37 75 -
Hydrogen 19.2 12.32 35 -
SWS*
ARU* 3.5 31.5 65
SRU*
Notes: 1. For Blocked outlet/fire case flare load details refer flare study
report (dated Sept 1996) submitted to HPCL - Mumbai.
8.3 GOVERNING FLARE LOAD
Power is distributed in different units in the fuel refinery & FR cooling towers through
various substations viz. MSS-1, MSS-4 & MSS-5.
After MS maximisation, total flare loads envisaged for MSS-1, MSS-4 & MSS-5 failure
are as follows:
MSS-1 FAILURE
MSS-1 supplies power to FR APS, FR VPS, T-701 (PG VLPG) units & 3 pumps of FR
cooling tower. Therefore, MSS-1 failure will result the power failure in the above said
units & three FR cooling water pump trip. Since there is only one common CWE supply
header from FR cooling tower, due to trip of three CW pumps the pressure in the header
will be so low that the other pumps will also trip leading to FR cooling water system
failure.
FRE CT
Not
affected
FRE APS
-
- -
Not
affected
FRE VPS
-
- -
Not
affected
HMU
-
- -
Not
affected
T-701 (BH VLPG)
-
- -
Not
affected
FR CT
FR CWS will trip
FR APS
-
- -
Both
CW & unit power
failure
FR VPS
-
-
-do-
FCCU
139
43.7 93
CW
failure
PROPANE UNIT 5.5
35 50
11.6 50 50
T-801 (DEETH)
15.2
32.2 77.7
Lean
oil failure
T-802 (DEBUT)
85
50.5 68.1
CW
failure
MEA REGEN. 4.5
22.5 125
T-701 (PG VLPG)
51.5
70 150
Both
CW & Unit power
failure*.
MSS-4 supplies power to FR APS, FR VPS, HMU, T-1701 (BH VLPG). Propane units,
one pump in FR cooling tower. Therefore, MSS-1 failure will result the power failure in
the above said units & all pumps in FR cooling tower. Therefore MSS-4 failure will
result in power failure in the above said units & FRE cooling water system failure. Since
only one pump in FR cooling water system will trip it will not affect the FR cooling water
system.
FRE CT
FRE
CWS will trip
FRE APS
-
- -
Both
CW & Unit power
failure
FRE VPS
-
- -
-do-
HMU
100
70 100
-do-
T-701 (BH VLPG)
27.3
70 150
-do-
FR CT
Not
affected
FR APS
-
- -
Not
affected
FR VPS
-
- -
Not
affected
FCCU
-
- -
Not
affected
PROPANE UNIT -
- -
T-801 (DEETH)
-
- -
Not
affected
T-802 (DEBUT)
-
- -
Not
affected
MEA REGEN.
-
- -
Not
affected
T-701 (PG VLPG)
-
- -
Not
affected
MSS-5 supplies power to FCCU, T-801 (Deethaniser), T-802 (Debutaniser), MEA Regenerator &
Two pumps of FR cooling water system. Therefore, MSS-5 failure will result the power failure in
the above said units & two FR cooling water pump trip. Since there is only one common CW
supply header from FR cooling tower, due to trip of two CW pumps the pressure in the header
will be so low that the other pumps will also trip leading to FR cooling water system failure.
FRE CT
Not
affected
FRE APS
-
- -
Not
affected
FRE VPS
-
- -
Not
affected
HMU
-
- -
Not
affected
T-701 (BH VLPG)
-
- -
Not
affected
FR CT
FR
CWS will trip
FR APS
272
70 150
CW
failure
FR VPS
7.8
20.3 150
CW
failure
FCCU
-
- -
Both
CW & Unit power
failure
PROPANE UNIT 5.5
35 50
11.6 50 50
T-801 (DEETH)
15.2
32.2 77.7
Lean
oil failure
T-802 (DEBUT)
85
50.5 68.1
Both
CW & Unit power
failure*
MEA REGEN.
4.5
22.5 12.5
*Since steam will be on in the reboiler, over pressurisation will be there. Therefore load
should be considered.
It is evident from the above load distributions that MSS-5 failure is the governing case for
flare design.
8.4 PROPOSED SYSTEM
8.4.1 Hydrocarbon & sour flare headers will be segregated. Sour flare header will be steam
traced.
8.4.2 Separate H/C flare KODs will be provided for FRE Unit (88-D-01); Combination Unit
(88-D-02), LEU (88-D-03), DHDS Unit (By licensor) and Hydrogen Unit (By licensor).
8.4.3 A main H/C flare KOD (88-D-07) will be provided at flare stack area.
8.4.4 A common sour flare KOD (88-D-08) will be provided at the flare stack area.
8.4.5 A vertical water seal drum (88-D-09) for H/C flare will be provided.
8.4.6 No water seal drum is provided for sour flare to avoid corrosion problem caused by moist
H2S/NH3.
8.4.8 Hydrocarbon flare stack will have a molecular seal and sour flare riser will have a fluidic
seal.
8.4.9 A 36" H/C flare header is taken from FRE Unit. This is joined by a 30" H/C flare header
from LEU. A 42" H/C flare header is taken from combination unit which expands to 48"
just before the joining of 36" H/C flare header from FRE Unit to it. A 24" H/C flare
header from DHDS Block is joined to the 48" main header running upto main flare KOD.
It exits the KOD as 54" header before it enters the water seal drum.
A 10" sour flare header will be provided from LEU, which will be connected to the 10"
sour flare header from DHDS unit. The flare header runs upto sour flare KOD. After
KOD the line runs upto the top of the flare stack through fluidic seal.
Temp.
o
C
1. Hot/Wet flare header
315390 33.75
2. Intermediate Flare
Header 68855
42.08
3. Low temperature flare
header 86503 28.86
TOTAL LOAD 470748 33.67
Being a complex unit with inbuilt margins for instrumented trips, total flare load has been
considered for the design of flare system.
CSU/C2-C3 Uunit:
Control scheme has provided a number of shutdown valves at different locations to close
during power/cooling water failure. The details are as follows:
o Two quick shutdown valves (one redundant) on inlet feed gas to UPPC. Actuation is due
to high high/low low pressure and power failure. The gas will be diverted to lean gas
despatch header.
o Shutdown valve upstream of GSU absorber to close during power failure due to tripping
of lean amine pump. During power failure, GSU shutdown valve shall close and this in
turn will close the feed gas shutdown valve due to upstream line pressurization.
o Shutdown valve in C2/C3 plant on suction line of lean gas compressor. The shutdown
valve will actuate during power failure due to low low pressure in the suction side/high
high pressure in the discharge/high high temp in the discharge.
There is a remote possibility of failure of all shutdown valves to actuate during power
failure situation. Still the possibility of pressurization upto 14 kg/cm2a has been
considered. For lean gas suction line normal operating pressure is 12 kg/cm2a and PSV is
set at 15 kg/cm2a. The estimated flare load due to pressurization is 2 T/Hr. For flare
design, conservative figure of 5 T/hr has been considered.
LLD/HDPE
Flare load summary by licensor proposal is as under
Kg/Hr
1. Comonomer Column 159849
2. High boils column 149690
3. Low boils columns 64242
4. FE column 4850
TOTAL 378631
The flare load from various columns is for the conditions when unit power has failed but
steam/BFW is continuous.
During complex power failure, steam generation/.BFW shall also trip. Supply of steam to
unit reboilers shall be limited to the system hold up/surge available.
With the limited steam holdup the simultaneous release of hydrocarbons from various
columns is not envisaged. For the flare design the single largest PSV release from CM
Column and 10% of balance PSV release has been considered as follows:
Flare load, kg/Hr MW
Temp.
o
C
1. CM Column
159849
51.9
89.6
2. HB Column
14969
108.4
241.0
3. LB Column
6424
58.1
146.0
4. FE Column
485
58.1
138.1
Total 181727 Avg.
54.46
GUJARAT REFINERY FLARE SYSTEM
The existing flare system of Gujarat Refinery is integrating GR, GREP and GRSPF in a
single flare system due to separate dedicated cooling water systems. GHP is having its
dedicated flare system. GR flare is connected to GHP for flexibility of using GHP flare
system when GR flare is under maintenance.
Recently IOCL has given a study to connect atmospheric vents of various crude units,
incorporating new units viz AU-V, DHDS, H2 Unit, Sulphur block , MTBE unit and
Butene- 1. Several alternatives were studied. The least cost option has emerged by
considering the following basis:
- Stagger GR cooling water system with dedicated substations so that cooling water failure
of AU-V, DHDS, H2 Unit and sulphur block can be considered separate from existing AU-
I, AU-II, CRU, PDF and Food Grade Hexane unit.
- Use GHP flare system for GR atmospheric vents etc by following the philosophy of single
cooling water failure at a time.
- Provision of GHP to GR side flexibility to take GHP flare system under maintenance.
- Use of shell philosophy by considering tripping of source of heat whenever pressure of
cooling water supply header is very low.
11.0 FLARE GAS RECOVERY SYSTEM
11.1 INTRODUCTION
Excess hydrocarbons being wasted to flare system can be recovered by using a simple but
effective flare gas recovery system.
11.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Flare gas recovery system in its most basic form is simply a compressor to compress the
flared gases for its subsequent use at fuel gas in the refinery/petrochemical complex. The
objective of the system is to recover excess hydrocarbons being flared and also
reduction/containment of radiation, light and glare, smoke and noise in the adjoining areas.
The critical aspect of the system is selection of appropriate capacity for compressor and to
set its operating specifications so that it can safely and efficiently handle as wide a range of
possible compositions and rates as practical. Apart from this, designed system should
maintain the integrity of existing flare lines/flare stack system. To achieve this, flare
system must be left as it had been. No valves automatic or manual should be place din the
flare lines to divert gas from flare stack to compressor. Such mechanical devices can fail
to operate when required during emergency. Experience shows that they will fail
eventually then we will have no operable emergency system. Recovery system should be
controlled so that it does not lower flare system pressure to that level at which air could
ingress into the system. For this, suction pressure of the compressor is maintained with
compressor capacity control backed up by discharge recycle control.
11.3 DESCRIPTION OF RECOVERY SYSTEM
Typical recovery system is shown in figure-1. Part of flared gases from main flare header
downstream of stack area flare gas knock out drum are diverted to compressor through a
compressor suction knock out drum to prevent any liquid which may condense in the
intake line or entrained liquid from being pulled into the compressor. The knock out drum
is provided with mist eliminator to allow only liquid free gases to compressor suction. For
noise suppression, silencers are installed at both the suction and discharge ends of the
compressor. As the gases get heated up in the compressor, these are cooled in the
compressor after cooler before being led to the fuel gas header. The liquid condensate if
any is removed in the knock out vessel.
Design of suction and discharge knock out drum and also of after cooler are simple and
will not pose any problem due to fluctuation in flared gas composition and temperature.
Critical area of the flare recovery system is the selection of compressor and the scheme to
maintain suction pressure.