Ang Tibay (synthesis)

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court
must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due
process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp
the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this
case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove.

Acuzar

In administrative proceedings, proceduraldue process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor,
and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.

Paterok
A notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the BOC in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner
of the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice
and procedural due process.

In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said procedure is
premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown. This is clear from the
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code relied upon by the BOC, namely, Sections 2304 and 2306, captioned
"Notification of Unknown Owner and "Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to Unknown Parties,"
respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the bulletin board is specifically allowed.
But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that Paterok could not have been unknown. Paterok had previous
transactions with the BOC and in fact, the latter had earlier released the first container consisting of household
goods and the Bourgetti car to the former at her address. Moreover, there was a similar seizure case that had been
instituted by the Manila International Container Port, docketed as S.I. No. 86-224, covering the same
Mercedes Benz in question and involving the same owner. Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity
aforementioned, for which the Court expresses its rebuke, the petition
nonetheless cannot be granted.

Carbonell

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner's capacity to represent herself, and no duty
rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner
during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify
her dismissal.

Adamson
While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. However, the standard of due process
that must be met in administrative tribunals allows certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not
ignored. Hence, there is no denial of due process where records show that hearings were held with prior notice
to adverse parties. But even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of procedural due process as
long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard.

We rule that petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural due process in the
BOI. In the first place, it was notified of the May 14, 1980 hearing. The notice specified that the hearing was on
the petition although it also stated therein with particularity, petitioner's prayer for a stop and desist order.
Necessarily, it is immaterial that said notice was sent before Johnson filed its answer to the petition and there
was yet no joinder of issues considering that the proceeding was before an administrative tribunal where
technicalities that should be observed in a regular court may be dispensed with.

Secondly, during the hearing, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, including its prayer for a
stop and desist order. As clearly enunciated in the minutes of the hearing which We have painstakingly studied
and set forth herein to determine if any irregularity attended the questioned BOI proceeding, it was conducted for
the purpose of hearing the arguments and receiving evidence of the parties "to resolve the case expeditiously."
Having been given the opportunity to put forth its case, petitioner has only itself, or, better still, its counsel and
officers who were present therein, to blame for its failure to do so. Petitioner's right to procedural due process
was not violated when the hearing was conducted before a director of the BOI and not before the members of
the board themselves who decided the case. The requirements of a fair hearing do not mandate that the actual
taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence be before the same officer who will make the decision on the
case.

Dela Cruz
although the petitioners were not given the opportunity to be
heard when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in his Order dated April 19, 1989 ordered the cancellation of
Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an
emancipation patent, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the validity of the
cancellation of the said CLT, which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated
October 21, 1992,and also in their (petitioners) motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis supplied). Further, the petition filed by landowner
Herminio Abille, which was for exemption of his property from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer,
cognizable by Region I Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, did not require
notice to petitioners. The subsequent Order dated April 19, 1989 of Regional Director Nuesa denying the petition
for exemption and instead granting to Herminio Abille the right of retention of not more than seven (7) hectares,
and to select the retention area, and cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to the tenants on the
retained area, including CLT No. 0-064711, directing the MARO of Infanta, Pangasinan to prepare Agricultural
Leasehold Contracts between the petitioner and the tenants, and directing the PARO to implement said Order,
became final even before Herminio Abille selected on July 24, 1989 the 7 hectares retained area which includes
the 2.84 hectares covered by Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz.
Nevertheless, petitioners were able to question the validity of said Order (cancelling CLT No. 0-064711) in their
petition for issuance of emancipation patent, which was resolved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his
Decision dated June 20, 1994. Hence, petitioners were given an opportunity to be heard.

Mendoza
Time and again, we have held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as.
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what
is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be
heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
process.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of
the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due
course to the Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an
opportunity to explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of
administrative due process."28cral

Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule.” Otherwise stated, a finding
of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.

The question of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold Valencia liable for the charges against him is one of
fact, which is not generally subject to review by the Court. A review of the facts, however, is in order not only
because the findings of fact of the Ombudsman and the CA were diametrically opposed, but also because the
Ombudsman decision was alleged to have been grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures.
It should be noted that other than the SALNs of Valencia, the evidence of the prosecution consists of
photocopies of 1] the unsigned letters of agreement alluding to Valencia’s dollar time deposit accounts; and 2]
the monthly statements of the BPJ Mastercard transactions of Valencia.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. This presupposes, however, that the
evidence proferred is admissible under the rules. With respect to photocopied private documents, the
rule is that before it can be considered admissible in evidence, its due execution or genuineness should
be first shown. Failing in this, the photocopies are inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no
probative value.
As the records beawl