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OSAC Ciudad Juarez VBIED Used Against Police
OSAC Ciudad Juarez VBIED Used Against Police
Incident Overview
A nacro-banner found near the scene of the explosion indicated that the attack was carried out by La
Linea, a gang of enforcers allied with the Juarez cartel. A translation of the banner stated, “What
happened on 16 (de Septiembre avenue) will keep happening to all the authorities who keep
supporting El Chapo (reference to Chapo Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa cartel). Sincerely- the Juarez
cartel. We still have car bombs.” Earlier in the day a top leader of the La Linea drug gang, Jesus
Acosta Guerrero, was arrested, prompting claims by media outlets that the bombing was a retaliatory
attack.
High-ranking Mexican officials, including the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, have confirmed that a car
bomb was used in the July 15 attack. Preliminary reports indicate that the device consisted of 10
kilograms (22 pounds) of Tovex, a commercial grade water gel explosive, and was most likely
detonated remotely using a cell phone.
On July 19 a second narco-banner was discovered in Ciudad Juarez. The banner threatened a
second car bombing if U.S. authorities failed to launch an investigation into alleged corruption
among Mexican officials. A translation of the narco-banner is below:
“FBI and DEA, investigate the authorities that are giving support to the Sinaloa cartel
because if you don’t we’re going to use other car bombs against those federales [reference to
Mexican police]. If in 15 days there is no response by [in the form] of detention of corrupt
federal police we’re going to use a car bomb with 100 kilos of C-4.”
The contents of this (U) presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department o f
State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation
was compiled from various open sources and (U) embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S.
private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent
with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.
Second narco-banner discovered in Ciudad Juarez
July 19, 2010
Background
The Sinaloa and Juarez cartels remain engaged in a violent turf battle for control of Ciudad Juarez which
has caused the city’s murder rate to skyrocket. Some estimates now put the city’s murder rate at 191 per
100,000 inhabitants, causing it to be labeled by the media as the most violent city on Earth. Most of the
actual violence in Ciudad Juarez is carried out by enforcers and street gangs employed by and allied with
the cartels. La Linea is widely considered to be the armed branch of the Juarez cartel.
Innovative Tactics
The use of a VBIED by a Mexican cartel marks a notable shift in tactics among the cartels. While
grenades, grenade launchers, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) have been previously employed by
Mexican cartels, this would be the first successful cartel-affiliated VBIED attack in the recent era and
would represent a serious escalation in the level of violence used by Mexican cartels. The use of VBIEDs
is not a completely new tactic in the region as they were commonly used by Colombian drug-trafficking
organizations and paramilitary groups in the 1990’s.
Furthermore, the VBIED may have been detonated as a follow-on attack to target first responders who
arrived on scene following the report that a municipal police officer had been shot. Complex attacks
directed at first responders are more indicative of the types of attacks employed by groups in other
regions of the world. A complex, multi-layered attack by a Mexican cartel would represent a significant
shift towards greater tactical complexity by the groups.
That the explosion occurred in a heavily populated area of downtown Ciudad Juarez reiterates the
disregard demonstrated by Mexican cartels for the impact their activities might have on innocent
bystanders. The potential collateral damage associated with explosive device attacks poses a significant
risk to individuals and facilities within the blast radius.
The potential use of VBIEDs by a Mexican cartel would represent an increase to the risk that wrong-
place, wrong-time violence could impact the facilities, personnel, and/or operations of OSAC constituents.
The contents of this (U) presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department o f
State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation
was compiled from various open sources and (U) embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S.
private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent
with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.
OSAC constituents remain concerned about the potential for their operations to be impacted by cartel
violence in Ciudad Juarez. OSAC has received numerous reports from constituents who’ve indicated that
cartel shootouts have occurred in close proximity to their facilities. OSAC recently received two separate
reports of U.S. private sector employees being murdered in Ciudad Juarez.
Outlook
In the claim of responsibility the perpetrators indicate that they have additional VBIEDs at their disposal
so it’s possible that similar tactics may be used in future attacks. As is evident by the frequent use of
decapitations, mutilation, and torture, Mexican cartels have shown a propensity for employing tactics to
intimidate and provoke fear in their adversaries.
On July 14 at 11:45 a.m., a large-scale shootout occurred at the Misiones Mall in Ciudad Juarez,
where Westerners frequently shop. Initial, unconfirmed reports indicate that the incident may have
begun as an attempted kidnapping that escalated when the intended victim’s bodyguards intervened.
The bodyguards managed to repel the assailants, forcing them to flee the scene. Multiple police units
responded to the incident but the perpetrators managed to avoid apprehension.
Shootouts can occur with little or no notice, have taken place in broad daylight, and some have lasted
for several hours. Many of the shootouts employ a range of weapons and the expenditure of
significant amounts of ammunition which is often fired indiscriminately, thereby posing a considerable
threat to personnel and facilities in areas surrounding the shootout location.
The contents of this (U) presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department o f
State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation
was compiled from various open sources and (U) embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S.
private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent
with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.
For Further Information
Please direct any questions regarding this incident or the general security situation in Mexico to OSAC’s
Regional Coordinator for the Western Hemisphere.
Further information on the security situation is also available in the active Travel Warning for Mexico and
in the 2010 OSAC Ciudad Juarez Crime & Safety Report .
The contents of this (U) presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department o f
State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation
was compiled from various open sources and (U) embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S.
private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent
with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.
Location of Bombing
Intersection of Bolivia and 16 de
Septiembre
The contents of this (U) presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department o f State, or the United States Government, except as
otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and (U) embassy reporti ng. Please note that all OSAC
products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distri buting OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may
result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.