Article

The State, Networks Studies in Indian Politics

6(2) 1–12
and Family Raj in Goa © 2018 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2321023018797408
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/inp

Parag D. Parobo1

Abstract
Goa achieved statehood in 1987. While from 1963 to 1989 there were only two legislators with
‘dynastic ties’, since 1990, there have been 23 political families contesting elections, with 10 dynastic
candidates voted to the assembly. How might we understand the rise of ‘family raj’ in Goa’s politics?
What does Goa teach us about the relationship between economy and politics? This article analyses
Goa’s changing political economy and argues that apart from ‘increasing financial returns associated
with state power’, it is the ‘networked’ contexts of these families that catapult them and sustain their
growth. Two important political families and their particular networks are discussed to show how
family raj is weaved in a wider network of power and money.

Keywords
Goa, statehood, political economy, family raj, networks

The 2012 assembly election is generally considered as marking the beginning of the end of family raj in
Goa. Competing for the 40-seat assembly in that election were 18 candidates from nine political families.
The Congress party alone had fielded 11 candidates from five families and one candidate from the
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), with whom the Congress had a pre-poll alliance. In a keenly watched
election, all four candidates from the Alemao family lost, as did two from Ravi Naik’s family and one
from the Madkaikar family. These results are often regarded as Goa’s rejection of family raj. However,
the problem with this simplistic view of the ‘end of family raj’ is that it fails to acknowledge the changing
nature of family raj. While before the 1990s family raj largely functioned to establish a secure hold over
political parties, after the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s a complex network
has emerged whose economic interests are maintained by having particular families in power. The very
notion of the ‘end’ is also something that is in question. Five years later, in the 2017 election
and by-election, Goa witnessed nine political families fielding 16 candidates. Interestingly, at least
one family member has won from each of the nine political families, irrespective of their party
affiliation.

1
  Associate Professor, Department of History, Goa University, Goa, India.

Corresponding author:
Parag D. Parobo, Associate Professor, Department of History, Goa University, Goa, India.
E-mail: parag@unigoa.ac.in
2 Studies in Indian Politics 6(2)

This article builds on works of scholars who suggest that two important factors facilitate dynastic
politics: ‘the increasing returns associated with state power’ (Chandra, 2016) and a weak party organiza-
tion (Chhibber, 2013). While the arguments of Chandra–Chibber duo focus on political advantages
resulting from family ties, it is also true that dynasties derive their power and influence through networks
that stretch beyond the family. In this article, we demonstrate how dynastic political families consolidate
and expand their influence through a large network that spans across the government, the bureaucracy
and industry.
We define a dynastic political family as one having family members in the state assembly or the
parliament, either through inheritance (from father to child) or operating through close familial bonds
(brother, wife, daughter-in-law) or having extended family ties (uncle, nephew, son-in-law). The article
is divided into three parts: the first section analyses dynastic politics from 1963 to 1989, the second
section looks at the changing nature of the state and its politics, while the third section examines family
raj and its embeddedness in larger networks.

Dynastic Politics: From 1963 to 1989

The first election to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu was held in 1963, two years after Goa’s
liberation from Portuguese rule on 19 December 1961. At that time, the Congress party had launched its
campaign much before the election was announced and was confident of a win owing to its legacy and
Jawaharlal Nehru’s role in the liberation of Goa. The United Goans Party (UGP) and the Maharashtrawadi
Gomantak Party (MGP), created only months before the election, emerged as two important regional
parties. Dayanand Bandodkar, a Gomantak Maratha (stereotyped popularly as devadasi, a caste consoli-
dating social groups skilled in poetry, song and dance, serving patrons/temples, and women intimately
related to temple rituals) by caste and a mine-owner, led the MGP and launched its election campaign on
the issues of land reforms, the empowerment of the bahujan samaj—a loose conglomeration of lower
castes—and the merger of Goa with the neighbouring state of Maharashtra. On the other hand, the UGP
was led by Dr Jack de Sequeira, a Catholic Brahmin landlord who campaigned to counter the merger
with Maharashtra and strove to protect a ‘distinct’ Goan identity. Goa’s first election surprised not only
the Congress—which was not able to win a single seat in Goa—but also the victorious MGP and brought
to power a government driven by the bahujan samaj and headed by Bandodkar (Parobo, 2015). The UGP
was the second-largest party and Dr Sequeira emerged as the leader of the opposition. The two would lead
their parties again in the 1967 and 1972 elections, to perform the same responsibilities—government and
opposition, respectively.
Bandodkar and Dr Sequeira exercised considerable hold over their parties through extensive personal
networks, and in doing so, perpetrated dynastic politics. With the expansion of mining since the 1940s,
prominent mine owners had been able to influence the colonial and postcolonial governments. While
mining continued to be a prominent industry, Bandodkar’s politics that was centred on the bahujan
samaj diminished the influence of mine owners on the government. In the 1967 election, Bandodkar’s
daughter, Shashikala Kakodkar, was elected to the assembly, while Dr Sequeira’s son, Erasmo, was
elected from the South Goa constituency to the Indian Parliament. The MGP and the UGP were seen as
extensions of Bandodkar and Sequeira families, and both countered demands for democratization of
their parties by fielding candidates from within their own families. Erasmo led the UGP (Sequeira) from
1967 when it first split up over the demand of statehood for Goa. Erasmo’s defeat in the 1977 Lok Sabha
election sealed his political career. Similarly, when the MGP witnessed a rebellion calling for a complete
change of leadership, Kakodkar was projected as a new leader.
Parobo 3

In 1973, with Bandodkar’s sudden demise, Kakodkar was elected as the party president and became
the chief minister (CM). In 1977, she led her party to victory by distributing tickets to young party
workers. During this period, Goa witnessed agitations by traditional fisherfolk against fishing trawlers,
and students demanded a halving of transport fare. Kakodkar was often occupied devising ways to calm
down her party rebels. In 1979, her government fell to a coup within the MGP. After her defeat in the
1980 election, Kakodkar joined the Congress and later founded the Bhausaheb Bandodkar Gomantak
Party. She fought and lost the 1984 election. Later, Kakodkar rejoined the MGP, won her seat in the 1989
election and was the education minister in the short-lived Progressive Democratic Front’s (PDF)
government in 1990. This was the last time Kakodkar was a minister, although she won in 1994 with the
MGP–Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) alliance.
Kakodkar and Erasmo’s defeats in the early 1980s, followed by their subsequent withdrawal from
electoral politics in the 1990s, marked the end of the first phase of political dynasticism. What is
noteworthy about these political dynasties is that although they were able to lead the parties founded by
their fathers for almost two elections, they failed to expand their support base. Their inability to reinvent
themselves with the changing nature of electoral politics meant that they lived in the shadows of their
illustrious fathers.
In the 1990s, with the advent of the neoliberal economic regime, the ties between politics and
businesses were strengthened. There was a decline in party ideology as a number of new parties emerged,
accompanied with ‘defection’ politics. These new parties were supported and sustained by larger
networks that saw a great economic advantage in having an amenable government in power. For instance,
the real estate lobby (as we shall see later) helped Churchill Alemao to topple the Pratapsingh Rane
government in 1990; Ravi Naik became the CM in 1991 with the alleged backing of the casino lobby.
The influence of these networks was so great that MLAs and ministers readily shifted sides in order to
accommodate their interests.
At a time when it seemed that party ideology and a political career were antagonistic and ‘money
power’ was becoming an instrument to win elections, Kakodkar and Erasmo, both products of the 1960s,
were still clinging to their party ideologies as the driving force to win elections. Interestingly, both the
UGP and the MGP had party ideologies centred on land, although different in their imaginations. While
the UGP favoured exclusive land ownership with the Goans for the cause of Goa’s distinct identity, the
MGP espoused the protection of mundkars (tenants) from eviction. Its major achievements were the Goa
Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 and the Goa Mundkar Act, 1975. Since the 1990s, Goa’s engagement
with the new economy, as in other Indian states, has resulted in a conceptual shift from policies of land
to the tiller and public purpose to land for a private profit (deSouza, 1999).

The Changing Nature of the State

The second phase of family raj in Goa begins with the attainment of statehood on 30 May 1987. From a
Union Territory comprising a 30-seat assembly, Goa became a state with an enlarged 40-seat assembly.
This shift has naturally had political and economic consequences. Statehood has given a greater autonomy
to political leaders reducing de jure power of the Lieutenant Governor (deSouza, 1999, p. 2434).
The state is also fiscally more independent and can decide on the items in the state list without any
approval from the bureaucracy in Delhi (Rubinoff, 1998, p. 113).
Statehood enhanced the administrative hold of politicians over the state. The advent of a neoliberal
economic regime that began in the 1990s created new opportunities for economic control over the
resources of the state. Ostensibly, the state has withdrawn from the economy through policies of
delicensing and removing barriers to private sector and de-reservation. However, the state’s control has
4 Studies in Indian Politics 6(2)

been relocated by its hold over resources such as land, raw materials, credit, entry into formerly reserved
sectors and a favourable interpretation of regulations (Chandra, 2015, p. 46). A number of studies
(Chandra, 2015; Kohli, 2012) have drawn attention to a close relationship between the state and the
business class with politicians and bureaucrats emerging as facilitators as well as partners in development.
Goa illustrates the pro-business state which is more of a facilitator of private businesses, rather than an
overseer of a larger market where competitive market dynamics determine the allocation of resources
(Kohli, 2012, p. 142). For example, government practices related to land (which is discussed in the next
section) do not reflect the interests of a larger market but instead cater to the dictates of a chosen few
players in the private sector.
What are the implications of the relocation of state powers and its patronage of the private sector on
the capitalist class? Before liberalization, a few Goan mercantile houses going back to colonial times
dominated the economy, having a considerable hold over Goa’s resources (Newman, 2001, p. 23).
Post-liberalization, we see that the capitalist class comprises players from India’s metropolitan cities,
and the growth of the economy is enabled by political networks. Unlike the earlier mercantile capitalists,
the new capitalists have the advantage of a much greater mobility. Bolstered by a pro-business stance of
the state, there appears to be a considerable convergence in goals among new capitalists to make use
of economic opportunities.

The Politics of Land

Post-liberalization, there has been a tidal surge in economic activity in Goa. Tourism has grown
exponentially; mining has expanded and seen new highs; and real estate has witnessed an explosive
growth driven by the phenomenon of ‘holiday homes’ for metropolitan vacationers. In this growth story,
land has become increasingly marketized and commodified. Access to this limited commodity is mired
by the complex nature of land ownership and restrictive land-use classifications. Let me list important
details on land that are relevant for our present discussion and the two ways in which the state facilitates
the ‘land rush’. First, Goa, India’s smallest state having a geographical area of 3,701 sq km, of which
28 per cent is forest land, while 61 per cent is under cultivation, pastures, tree crops and groves
(RSGF, 1985, p. 10). Given this, the supply of land to the private sector can either come by releasing
forest land controlled by the state or through acquiring land under cultivation and then converting it to
non-agricultural use. The latter involves land acquisition from independent owners and the communidade
(village community) or taking possession of public or vacant lands of absentee and heirless owners.
Both cases require the intervention of the state, either by legitimizing a change in land use or by providing
permissions and granting occupancy certificates. A second source of supply is the land held by mundkars
(tenants). Two major pieces of legislation mentioned earlier—the Agricultural Tenancy Act (1964) and
the Mundkars Act (1975)—created new land relations. Mundkars became deemed owners but had no
right to sell the land. In case the bhatkar (landlord) managed to sell the land, the new bhatkar had to
inherit the tenants. As agriculture became difficult, owing to the increasing cost of labour, the pressure
to move out of agriculture and orchard land increased. While the troubled bhatkar–mundkar relationship
constricted the sale of land, politicians profited from these circumstances by negotiating land sale and
sharing the spoils, although disproportionately, between bhatkar and mundkar.
For the private sector, acquiring land through the state is swifter, cheaper and assures a clear title.
This kind of land grab has also shifted the purpose of land acquisition from a purely welfare approach
towards the so-called ‘developmental agendas’ where the state does not see ordinary people as partners
in growth but recasts them as either victims or beneficiaries (Chandra, 2015; Sud, 2009).
Parobo 5

Apart from the state acting as the supplier of land, it also exercises a large discretionary role in the
process of conversion (and diversion) of land. Given the smallness of Goa and the fact that the private
sector’s land rush is targeted at non-settlement zones (forests, water bodies, coastal lands, orchards and
fields), the politicians have taken on the responsibility of providing land. In addition, the state is involved
in making, implementing or amending legislation. Consequently, as will be argued, politicians exploit
the ambiguities and complexity of legislation to expand their discretionary powers, thereby providing
opportunities for rent-seeking on both sides. While the processes discussed earlier are pan-Indian, let us
contextualize the power of the state as supplier and regulator of land use by discussing the actions that
give it discretionary influence over the economy.
Politicians, in alliance with powerful private players, influence the social or political environment to
steer economic activities. One such domain where the state acquires enormous discretionary powers is
the regional plan (RP)—decadal plans for land-use changes. A noteworthy feature of Goa’s land-use
plans, after the RP 2001 was accepted in the early 1990s, is the ad hoc decisions that bypass draft and
notified RPs. Later, in 2007, when the real estate-driven RP 2011 was notified, public outcry led to the
formation of the Goa Bachao Andolan (Save Goa Movement), a movement that came about with the
objective of getting the RP scrapped. As a consequence of these developments, Goa’s RP still remains in
planning mode.
The repeated rescheduling of the RP 2011 and the RP 2021 has clearly benefited politicians. Freezing
of the RP has set the stage for land prices to rise arbitrarily in settlement areas. Industrial zones and
hotel projects are not shown at the draft stage while forests, cultivable areas and water bodies have been
omitted from the plan. The modus operandi is to first purchase land that suits the purpose of the private
sector and later manage changes in order to regularize the new use to which they intend to put the land
(Alvares, 2002, p. 272). For example, tenanted lands of Tiracol that were identified as cultivable land in
the RP 2001 were sold to a private company, Handsel Goa, for a golf course project (Nielsen & Da Silva,
2017, p. 67). Simultaneously, as the RP 2011 was in the draft stage, the company made a request
to change the land use to settlement (Siqueira & Da Silva, 2015). With the RP 2011 withdrawn, the
RP 2021 placed the project in a new zoning scheme of eco-tourism—a firmer basis for enlisting legal
language. These instances reinforce the centrality of the state in deciding land usage and the capacity of
politicians to manoeuvre legal and governmental procedures to suit the interests of the private sector
(Alvares, 2002, p. 273).
There is a multitude of ways by which the state can formalize the grants of land to industrialists. Some
of the instruments that the state has devized include the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) and
investment promotion boards (IPBs), while also adopting expansive definitions of ‘public purpose’.
In 2006, the government led by Pratapsingh Rane allotted land for several projects under SEZs prior to the
introduction of the state’s SEZ policy. It then legalized the move by recommending 15 SEZs, of which
the central government approved 7 (Da Silva, 2014, p. 108). Lands ‘distributed’ for favoured companies
were acquired by exercising powers under the Land Acquisition Act. But serious illegalities in allotment
of lands, and a series of consequent protests, forced the government to cancel all the SEZ projects.
Similarly, new boards are set up to deepen state control over land. The Goa Khazan Land Development
Board under the principle of protection, development and regulation of the khazans (low-lying coastal
lands) was conferred the powers to acquire and hold property and to lease, sell, exchange or otherwise
transfer any property held by it (GoG, 2012, p. 14). In the same way, the Investment Promotion Act,
2014, empowered the newly created IPB to exempt land from the provisions of the RPs and zoning
regulations. Further, two recently passed bills, the Goa Requisition and Acquisition of Property Bill,
2017, and the Goa Compensation to the Project Affected Persons and Vesting of Land in the Government
Bill, 2017, are meant to facilitate speedy acquisition of land. These laws have expansive definitions of
6 Studies in Indian Politics 6(2)

‘public purpose’ that include almost all range of government activities, most prominently infrastructure,
mining and tourism—parts of the economy that are most subject to political discretion (Nielsen, Bedi,
& Da Silva, 2017).
Further, the fate of mining is completely in the hands of the government which regulates the entry into
mining through three types of licences: a reconnaissance permit, a prospecting licence and a mining
lease. The extent of discretion that the government has exercised in the renewal of mining leases and
ignored the encroachment into forest land is evident from the Shah Commission Report (2012, p. 75)
which state that all modes of illegal mining could not have been accomplished without the connivance
of politicians, bureaucrats and lessees. The state assists industry in various ways: a favourable interpreta-
tion, a suitable amendment or even conniving at a violation of a regulation. These transactions have
made the state a rent-seeking entity rather than just an enabling one.

The Politics of Family Raj

What do the increasing returns associated with the state, discussed earlier, mean to the practice of
democracy in Goa? It has made politics more competitive: now there are jumbo cabinets with over
12 ministers in the 40-seat assembly. Political defections have become common place. Almost all
government terms from 1989 onwards have witnessed defections, the highest being in the period 1999–
2002 with 44 defectors, more than the strength of the house (deSouza, 2004, p. 17). Subsequently the
Ninety-First Amendment Act, 2003, which does not recognize splits and calls for resigning and re-
contesting, has not discouraged legislators from crossing over. Also, state corporations are increasingly
being forced to accommodate legislators as chairpersons.
It is against the backdrop of a wider network leading to high returns from political office that family
raj is to be viewed. Obviously, the more the number of family members winning seats the easier it gets
to negotiate for plum ministry portfolios. The ‘family factor’ then is almost an insurance for its members
and the associated larger network against electoral defeat—individual members may lose an election, but
the family as a whole is unlikely to be out of power completely.
The next section analyses how importantly political families have established their hold on power,
wealth and influence outside of politics, and the kind of informal and hidden networks that underpin
dynasties.

The Alemaos and the Developmental Agendas

Churchill Alemao, cast as a ‘goon’ and ‘smuggler’ by his detractors, had humble beginnings. He rose in
stature, dramatically, to be counted among the rich and famous of Goa. Allegedly networked with
hoteliers, casino operators and builders, he has traversed a long way. His political career spans six
political parties, two of which he founded. He has been Goa’s first Catholic CM, thrice a minister
holding plum portfolios, five times an MLA and twice an MP.
Hailing from Varca, and the eldest of six siblings, Churchill often makes a point about his humble
beginnings. In 1984, Churchill fought and lost his first election on a Goa Congress party ticket from the
Benaulim constituency. As the demands for the statehood of Goa and the recognition of Konkani as its
official language were gaining momentum, Churchill joined these demonstrations and gained popularity
for his infamous act of bringing down the Indian flag on the eve of the silver jubilee of Goa’s liberation
Parobo 7

in 1986. By the late 1980s, Churchill had forayed in the fish-trawler business, and there were allegations
that the trawlers were a front for smuggling activities. Churchill went on to win the 1989 assembly
election on a Congress ticket from Benaulim. As Pratapsingh Rane formed the Congress government in
1990, Churchill, backed by the real estate lobby, split seven Congress MLAs to create the Goan People’s
Party and formed the PDF government in partnership with the MGP. He was the interim CM for 17 days.
In the eight-month rule of PDF, Churchill held various portfolios—fisheries, tourism and sports and
youth affairs. The tenure of the PDF government witnessed a large-scale conversion of land as well as an
intense power struggle to head Planning and Development Authorities (Fernandes, 1997, p. 133).
With Churchill’s rise to power, there was a virtual takeover of the southern Goan coast by the new
luxury hotel lobby. Until then, tourism had largely been concentrated in North Goa. From 1990 to 1992,
three luxury resorts—Ramada Renaissance (Advani Hotels & Resorts and Ramada, the UK), Radisson
(Averrina International and Carlson, the USA) and Leela Beach (Kempinski, Germany)—were built in
Churchill’s home constituency. The properties of these resorts were located partly within the coastal
regulatory zone, settlement and orchard or agricultural zones. The government tweaked various legal and
planning procedures to regularize these violations. Churchill, the interim CM, demanded flexibility in
environmental laws and facilitated the construction of hotels close to the coast (Sequeira, 1990, p. 29).
By supporting the luxury hotel lobby, Churchill became a power centre in the tourism industry and
made demands as a front for other investors (Correspondent, 1992, p. 15). In 1990, as the tourism
minister of the PDF government, he demanded permissions for the setting up of casinos in five-star
hotels, a request turned down by the central government (Kamat, 2016, p. 8). This changed when the
Congress came to power after a brief period of President’s rule in 1991. Ravi Naik, who had been a
minister in Churchill’s cabinet and who was now heading the Congress government, got the permission
for setting up a casino without mentioning the word ‘casino’ (Kamat, 2016, p. 8). He amended the
Gambling Act, authorizing ‘any game of electronic amusement/slot machines in five star hotels’
(GoG, 1992, p. 194). In 1993–1994, Goa got its first onshore casino, run by Advani Resorts in Churchill’s
home constituency. In the 1990s, while Churchill held the tourism portfolio three times, and his brother,
MLA Joaquim, once, the hotel industry grew at a breakneck speed and the number of hotels swelled
from 274 in 1988 to 1,698 in 1998 (SPG, 1989, p. 93; 1999, p. 114).
During this time, Churchill established ‘Churchill Brothers’, India’s only family football club.
The club allegedly received funding from luxury hotels. Football was from an early date tied with Goan
identity to the extent that the playing of the sport was central to Goans when abroad (Mills, 2001, p. 81).
Investing in a football team was a political masterstroke—Churchill was providing institutional means
for the immersion of young Catholics in football. He used the club to strengthen his ties with Salcete, and
Benaulim in particular. The fortunes of the club rose in tandem with the rise of Churchill’s political
career. A year after becoming the interim CM, Churchill Brothers became Goa’s first club to pay high
salaries to players, thereby destroying a type of cartel among Goa’s football clubs focused on retaining
players at a lower cost (Kapadia, 2017, p. 138).
Under the PDF government, smuggling continued to be a problem. In 1991, Churchill’s younger
brother, Alvernaz, alleged to have been carrying gold, died in a short bloody fight with a Customs
Preventive Officer. Churchill was arrested, along with his brothers Joaquim and Ciabro, and then released
on technical grounds. Just 2 months prior to the 1994 assembly election, Churchill founded the United
Goans Democratic Party (UGDP) and raised slogans of ‘Goa for Goans’ and ‘the upliftment of backward
classes’. Although the UGDP won three seats, Churchill resigned from the Goa Legislative Assembly
and contested the 1996 parliamentary election from the South Goa parliamentary constituency (Rubinoff,
1998, p. 126). Once he became an MP, Churchill declared that no Goan government could survive
without the tourism industry. He demanded that a full-fledged casino with live gaming be permitted in
8 Studies in Indian Politics 6(2)

Goa (Miranda, 1996, p. 17). This time the demand was for an offshore casino, and in 1996, when
Pratapsingh Rane was the CM, an amendment was made to the Gambling Act that authorized gaming on
offshore vessels. Advani Resorts, the first to operate an onshore casino, was also the first to float an
offshore casino aided by Casino Austria International. Later in 2007, Churchill took on the Church to
support the offshore casino of Leela ventures.
In the 1996 bye-election to Benaulim, Churchill fielded his brother Joaquim on a UGDP ticket.
Joaquim won, even though the entire government machinery was deployed to support the opposing
Congress candidate. Churchill lost the 1998 Lok Sabha election to a Congress candidate, but as the
Congress government in Goa was facing a no-trust vote, Churchill was appointed the first senior vice
president of the Congress. Joaquim joined the Congress to be inducted as a minister holding the portfo-
lios of tourism and sports and youth affairs. In 1999, the brothers exchanged their constituencies;
Churchill contested successfully on a Congress ticket from Benaulim, while Joaquim lost the South Goa
parliamentary seat to a BJP candidate. Churchill was once again inducted as a minister holding the
portfolios of industries, tourism, fisheries and sports and youth affairs.
In 2002, traditional Catholic fisherfolk voted against Churchill in favour of the NRI-turned-politician,
Mickey Pacheco, who ironically had a ticket from the UGDP, a party founded by Churchill. Joaquim
won on a Congress ticket from Cuncolim and went on to become a minister holding the portfolios for
urban development and fisheries in 2005 when the BJP-led government was brought down by disgruntled
ministers. In 2004, although Churchill won the South Goa parliamentary seat representing the Congress,
he was not given a ticket to contest the 2007 assembly election. Churchill quit the Congress and
established the Save Goa Front (SGF) allegedly funded by the real estate builder, K. Raheja Universal,
and went on to win two seats (Fernandes, 2008, p. 5). With the Congress in power, Churchill merged
SGF with the Congress to become the minister of Public Works Department (PWD) and supported the
mega-township project of Raheja in Carmona. For the first time, the two brothers were ministers in the
same government: Churchill, heading the PWD, and Joaquim, the Ministry for Urban Development.
Joaquim, like his brother, had started out with stakes in the hotel industry but soon emerged as a frontman
for mining companies. He also supplied excavation machinery to the miners. In 2006, the iron ore prices
spiked due to China’s surging demand for steel in preparation for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Joaquim, who
was then the minister of urban development, quickly acquired large tracts of iron-rich land in South Goa
(De Souza, 2015, p. 98). It was alleged that Joaquim forced owners of iron-rich lands to sell their properties
at throwaway prices and then operated mines on behalf of mining companies without a valid lease or
clearances from the forest department and other required permissions (De Souza, 2015, pp. 102–120).
For the 2012 assembly election, Churchill secured a Congress party ticket for his daughter, Valanka.
Joaquim could not manage a Congress ticket for his son, Yuri, but managed a ticket from NCP instead,
with whom Congress had an alliance. In that year, all four candidates from the Alemao family lost,
largely due to two reasons: allegations of corruption and BJP’s strategy of supporting or fielding
‘independents’. Valanka was portrayed by the opposition as an arrogant daughter who brokered deals for
her father. In 2014, Churchill fought and lost the Lok Sabha election on a Trinamool Congress ticket.
In 2015, he was arrested on charges of taking bribes from a US-based consultancy firm, Louis Berger
International, to execute water supply and sewerage projects that were commissioned under a loan
agreement between the Indian government and the Japan International Cooperation Agency. There were
also allegations that Churchill had misused his powers to float tenders in a fraudulent manner to favour
contractors. Subsequently, Joaquim was also questioned by a Special Investigation Team of the Crime
Branch in connection with illegal mining. In 2017 assembly election, Churchill won as an NCP candidate,
while Joaquim lost as an independent.
What Churchill could achieve in his political career was predominantly due to his larger ‘networked’
contexts with private players and a patron–client relationship built on an informal and accessible style.
Parobo 9

Churchill garnered votes owing to his theatrical manner: telling stories, using local metaphors to make
his point and forging close personal contacts with lower caste Catholics. For example, even though
fishing trawlers were in conflict with traditional fishing, Churchill, who was the president of the Goa
trawler owners’ association, nurtured his base among the traditional fishing community. Churchill had
identified himself with lower caste Catholics to such an extent that many people considered him a person
from the lower caste while the Alemao family is charodo (Catholic Kshatriya) (Rubinoff, 1998, p. 126).
Churchill also cashed in on identity politics by supporting and participating in various agitations: the
campaign for an independent status for Konkani language, the demand for statehood for Goa and the
movement for English as the medium of instruction at primary schools while opposing the Konkan Railway,
the RP, the SEZs and the construction of an airport at Mopa (Nielsen, 2015). When the Goa Bachao
Andolan was launched against the RP 2011, Churchill aligned himself with the movement and derived
political mileage with the formation of SGF, allegedly funded by the real estate lobby led by Raheja.
Unlike their patriarch, the Alemao dynasts have not achieved electoral success. Churchill evidently
has an excellent rapport with his electorate, and some of it rubs off on his brother. However, the name or
membership in the dynasty alone is not enough to sustain Joaquim, Yuri or Valanka. Networks with
businesses constitute the fundamental basis for political careers. They are also crucial for politicians
from royal families.

The Ranes: Royal Connections

Pratapsingh Rane hails from a princely family of Sattari, a taluka in the northeast of Goa. In the nineteenth
century, the Ranes were allied with the Portuguese in Goa and held feudal rights and privileges, although
sometimes they also led rebellions against the Portuguese. These occasional revolts transformed the
Ranes into legendary freedom fighters. The two constituencies of Sattari—Valpoi and Poriem, the latter
being carved out from the former in 1989—have been strongholds of the father–son duo, Pratapsingh
and Vishwajit Rane.
Pratapsingh fought his first election in 1972 under Bandodkar’s guidance. He was elected from Sattari
taluka and was inducted as a minister. Since then, he has been voted to the assembly in every election;
in 2017, Pratapsingh was elected for a record eleventh time. In his long political career, he remains Goa’s
longest serving CM, heading the uninterrupted Congress government for a decade in the 1980s and on
four occasions later. He has also been the leader of opposition and speaker of the Goa Legislative
Assembly.
Pratapsingh quit the MGP on the eve of the 1977 election and joined the Congress to which he has
remained loyal. In 1980, Pratapsingh became Goa’s first Congress CM. While this choice surprised Goa,
one has to consider Pratapsingh’s royal connections. His aunt, Gajraraje, was married into the royal
family of Gwalior and was the grandmother of union minister Madhavrao Scindia (Scindia & Malgaonkar,
1988, p. 120). Also, M Y Ghorpade, a former maharaja from the princely state of Sandur and a minister
in the Devraj Urs government in Karnataka, was his brother-in-law.
Although Pratapsingh appealed to his voters in ‘modern’ terms, his mass support, which is restricted
to his socio-economically backward constituencies, was the legacy of an aristocratic inheritance. Even
though it is hard to find concrete elements of development in Sattari, a constituency ruled by Pratapsingh
for over 50 years, he never had to campaign hard to win any election. During the 1980s when Pratapsingh
was the CM, he exercised control over his constituencies through a patron–client relationship, deploying
feudal networks and wresting control over panchayats. The village development works allotted to
panchayats by rural development administration in the 1980s were tailor-made schemes for money
making, with the sarpanch and panchas involved in contracting projects.
10 Studies in Indian Politics 6(2)

The formidable position of the Ranes in Goan politics was the result of their alleged networked
contexts with mining, real estate and tourism companies. Pratapsingh’s tenures as the CM from 1994 to
1999 and from 2005 to 2007 were noteworthy for the grant of offshore casino licences, rapidly escalating
land prices, distribution of land to favoured companies within the SEZs, excessive mining and formulation
of the RP 2011 (Goswami, 2008; Noronha, 1997, p. 3253). In 1996, an amendment in the Gambling Act
permitted offshore casinos, and Pratapsingh issued licences for the first two offshore casinos. Goa’s iron
ore deposits are located mainly in Sanguem, Bicholim and Sattari talukas, the latter two being the
stronghold of the Ranes. In 1999, during a brief period of President’s rule, the Mhadei and Netravali
wildlife sanctuaries were notified, effectively preventing mining in those areas. While Pratapsingh made
every effort to revoke this notification and redefine their boundaries, his son Vishwajit, a minister in the
Congress government in Goa, filed a petition before the Bombay High Court seeking scrapping of the
notification ahead of the 2012 assembly election. It is also believed that in 2000, when the Fransico
Sardinha government attempted to tax transport of iron ore, it was Vishwajit who, with the backing of
mining companies, toppled the government.
Vishwajit has allegedly negotiated the demands of the private sector and has brokered several land
deals and built his long-term network of political leaders, contractors, miners, luxury hotel owners
and bureaucrats (Narayan, 2009, p. 6). This has strengthened his political clout and has also led to a
greater influence over a whole range of actors in his network. For example, as the RP 2011 was being
drafted, it was alleged that Vishwajit got agricultural land in the Tiracol village converted into
settlement for a resort through his company Handsel Private Limited, allegedly a front for Leading
Hotels (Almeida, 2017; Narayan, 2009, p. 6).
In 2007, on being denied a Congress party ticket, Vishwajit successfully contested the Valpoi seat as
an independent candidate. He was inducted as minister for health and agriculture in the Congress-led
government. In December 2007, when the government scrapped the SEZs following a public outcry,
Vishwajit made an unsuccessful attempt to topple the government, allegedly at the behest of K. Rahejas,
one of the beneficiaries of the three notified SEZs (Narayan, 2008, p. 4). In 2010 Vishwajit resigned as
an independent MLA to join the Congress. He won the by-election and was once again inducted as a
minister. During 2007–2012, there were allegations that Vishwajit supported illegal mining and brokered
several land deals for hotels and builders by registering 14 benami real estate companies (Goswami,
2008, p. 11). De Souza’s (2015, p. 98) personal account on illegal mining in Goa describes how ministers,
namely Vishwajit and Joaquim, canvassed with the government and bureaucrats to safeguard the interests
of mining companies.
Unlike his father who never made any significant efforts to develop Sattari, the more ambitious
Vishwajit began investing in his constituency. Using his clout as a minister, he directed state resources
towards Sattari and generated government employment for his constituents. In 2012, Vishwajit was one
of the three ministers who were re-elected. In 2017, unhappy with the Congress’ failure to form the
government despite emerging as the largest party, Vishwajit quit the party and joined the BJP government.
He had to forego his seat and fight the by-election, defeating Roy Naik, son of Ravi Naik, a Congress
MLA and former CM. Thus, while his father is a Congress MLA, Vishwajit has been rewarded with a
ministry in the BJP government.

Conclusion
Politics and business in Goa are intertwined. Businesses require dependable political patronage that
gives them access to the state’s regulatory apparatus. They can then influence the social or political
Parobo 11

environment for economic gains. Successful political dynasties are those that have the ability to maintain,
serve and expand these networks, consisting of a whole range of actors from bureaucrats to a variety of
industrial players. As elections have become a high-stake game, dynasties serve as an insurance for the
prominent families. It has become a medium to sustain these networks and avoid immediate disruptions.
Churchill Alemao who has transformed himself from being a simple worker to an influential politician
and the Ranes with their royal family could not be more different. Yet, they are all part of similar
networks that operate in analogous ways. The networks are crucial for financing elections, while the
political family extends its vote base through creating and managing employment opportunities. It is
not uncommon to witness dynastic politicians defecting to protect their interests. Also, we find that the
anti-dynasty stance of some political parties compels them to, at first, reject dynastic candidates and
then re-include them in the party and government after they have proven their mettle and won.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Kenneth Bo Nielsen, Arild Ruud, Salil Chaturvedi and the anonymous reviewer for detailed
comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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