Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Taylor
Assistant Economist Senior Economist
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Mine K. Yücel
Senior Economist and Policy Advisor
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
5
The medical care component of the consumer price index It is possible to determine the best way to
may mismeasure medical inflation somewhat, because it is reform the health care system using the basic
difficult to adjust properly for changes in medical tech-
principles of supply and demand. If no distortions
nology and the quality of care. However, it undoubtedly
influences the public’s perceptions of health care prices.
exist, the health care market achieves the optimal
resource allocation for a given income distribution.
6
Garrison (1990). The increase in health care expenditures then
reflects either an increase in the public’s desire for
7
Levit and Cowan (1991).
health services or an increase in legitimate costs.
8
Levit et al. (1991).
Under these conditions, if society is unhappy with
the allocation, the best solution is to redistribute
9
Burman and Rodgers (1992). income without meddling in the health care market.
Businesses pay most of the nation’s increases, the total price those firms must pay
health bills, but the effect of increasing health for it decreases, and those firms’ total com-
care costs on profits is not straightforward. pensation costs can fall. Therefore, firms that
Although increases in health costs for retirees offer health insurance as a fringe benefit to
would have a negative effect on firm profitabil- their employees can be made better off—not
ity, increases in health costs for current em- worse off—by the increase in health costs.
ployees can have a positive effect on firm Unfortunately, the savings on total com-
profitability. pensation for current employees can be more
The health care costs of current workers than offset by increased costs for the health
are part of a total compensation offer that is care of retirees. After all, the increases in
determined by the worker’s contribution to the health costs for retirees cannot be offset by
firm’s output. As long as the worker’s produc- decreases in wages. The problem has be-
tivity is unaffected by increases in health care come particularly evident recently as account-
costs, the amount of total compensation the ing rule changes have forced firms to indicate
firm is willing to offer is unaffected by in- their commitments to retiree benefits on their
creases in health costs. Therefore, increases balance sheets. For example, General Mo-
in health costs should be offset by decreases tors was forced to record a $22.2 billion charge
in wages to keep the total compensation in 1992 for retiree and future retiree health
package unchanged. costs.1 Firms that respond to the increase in
Furthermore, the increase in health care health care costs by modifying or eliminating
costs increases the value to employees of the health care coverage for the retired may face
tax exemption for fringe benefits. The advan- increased wage demands by current employ-
tages of being employed by a firm that offers ees who fear being treated in a similar way
health benefits increase, so more workers are when they retire.
attracted to such firms. As the supply of labor
offered to firms that provide health benefits 1
Dallas Morning News (1993).
However, if the health care system is distorted, treatments for health problems, changes in popula-
reform is needed to eliminate the distortions. tion demographics, and society’s reluctance to
We have identified several distortions in the place limits on the value of human life.
current system of health care. First, tax subsidies for
employer-provided health insurance lead to excess The implicit tax subsidy for health insurance
demand for health insurance and, consequently,
to excess consumption of health care. Second, For nearly fifty years, employer-provided
regulations and industry practices restrict the supply fringe benefits have been exempt from both
of health care professionals, leading to higher personal income taxes and payroll taxes such as
prices for health services. Finally, the structure of those for Social Security. Thus, employees avoid
the health insurance industry promotes inefficiency. taxes by taking some of their compensation in the
These distortions of both supply and demand lead form of health insurance. If the combined marginal
to excessive expenditures on health care. tax rate is 28 percent, an employee can receive $1’s
Expenditures also are increasing for several worth of health care instead of 72 cents’ worth of
reasons that are nondistortionary. These reasons after-tax take-home pay (Table 1 ). The difference
include uncertainty about causes and appropriate represents an implied tax subsidy. As Table 1
indicates, those in the highest tax bracket receive sidized and may cause some consumers to be
the largest tax subsidy, while those in the lowest underinsured. Finally, excessive health insurance
tax bracket receive a much smaller subsidy.10 distorts medical research in favor of technologies
Because employees will naturally buy more that extend or improve life at any price rather than
health insurance at 72 cents than at $1, excluding technologies that reduce the costs of treatment.
health-related fringe benefits from taxable income By its nature, health insurance makes con-
increases expenditures on health insurance by sumers less sensitive to health care prices, thereby
those receiving the subsidy. Burman and Rodgers generating more expenditures on health care than
(1992) estimate that the subsidy costs the federal would otherwise occur. Given this relationship,
government $65 billion per year in foregone excessive insurance consumption necessarily leads
revenue and increases private health insurance to excessive health care consumption. Phelps
spending by roughly one-third. (1992) estimates that annual health care expendi-
Excessive consumption of health insurance tures are between 10 percent and 20 percent
has a number of disquieting consequences. First, higher because of the subsidy.
because health insurance leads to increased con- By leading to excessive health care expendi-
sumption of health care, excessive consumption tures, the tax subsidy also can exacerbate the
of health insurance produces excessive consump- problem of the uninsured. Because the subsidy
tion of health care. (For a discussion of the ways increases demand for health care, health care prices
in which health insurance increases health care rise, putting upward pressure on health insurer
consumption, see the box entitled “The Relation- costs. Higher payouts result in higher insurance
ship Between Health Insurance and Health Care premiums. Thus, the subsidy distorts the distribu-
Consumption.”) Second, overconsumption of health tion of health insurance so that higher income
insurance by those receiving the implicit subsidy households overconsume health insurance, while
increases the insurance premiums of the unsub- lower income households can be priced out of
the market for health insurance and health care.
Overconsumption of health insurance also
plays a role in directing technical progress in health
care and has reinforced the development of costly
technologies. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
10
Residents of cities and states with income taxes receive
technological improvements in health care generally
additional subsidies because their fringe benefits are also have not lowered costs. Rather, technological
exempt from local income taxes. innovations have brought about a higher quality
Substantial research indicates that as claims. In such a case, consumers have in-
the price to consumers decreases, health centives to limit their health care consumption
care consumption increases (Long and and submit only those claims that are worth
Rodgers 1990, Phelps 1992, Keeler and Rolph the resulting increase in premiums. In prac-
1988, Manning et al. 1987). According to the tice, however, an individual in a large health
Rand Health Insurance Experiment, the price insurance plan pays an average premium that
elasticity of demand for health care is –0.2 is almost independent of the individual’s risk
(Keeler and Rolph 1988, Manning et al. 1987). or health care consumption. Hence, consum-
In other words, every 1 percent decrease in ers do not bear the full costs of their decisions
consumer prices for health care increases about the extent of claims.
health care consumption by 0.2 percent. Furthermore, the loose connection be-
Insurance reduces the consumer’s ef- tween premiums and claims in health insur-
fective price of health care in two ways. First, ance exacerbates problems of moral hazard.
because health insurers typically pay for health Moral hazard arises when insurance changes
treatments rather than for health losses, in- the insured’s behavior in a way that increases
surance lowers the marginal price of treat- claims. For example, people who are insured
ment. If a consumer is fully insured (and, and who, therefore, know that they will bear
therefore, pays none of the billable costs of only part of the cost of illness, may not be as
treatment), then the marginal cost of health careful of their health as people who are not
care becomes the opportunity cost of the insured. Individuals will have no incentive to
consumer’s time. If a consumer is co-insured, curb unhealthy behavior if increased claims
then the marginal cost of treatment becomes are not reflected in higher premiums, espe-
a predetermined fraction of the treatment cially if behavior cannot be easily monitored.
cost, plus the consumer’s opportunity costs. Thus, health insurance increases ex-
For example, with a copayment of 20 percent, penditures on health care. In the Rand experi-
a $10 prescription antihistamine costs the ment, fully insured individuals spent 30 percent
consumer only $2. In either case, health in- more on outpatient services than individuals
surance effectively reduces the consumer’s with a 25 percent copayment. In turn, individu-
marginal cost of health care. als with a 25 percent copayment spent 28
Second, because health insurance pre- percent more than individuals with a 95 per-
miums are only loosely connected to claims, cent copayment (Manning et al. 1987).1
insurance insulates people from some of the
costs of their decisions. Theoretically, insur-
ance premiums, which reflect expected losses, 1
Both co-insurance programs had an annual cap on out-of-
are a function of health risk and the extent of pocket expenses.
product, which is most often more expensive than rather than the cost-effective technologies that
the older product. Weisbrod (1991) finds that our probably would develop if consumers were more
system of pricing (that is, paying the health care sensitive to health care prices.
provider based on costs incurred or on a fee-for- One could argue that the tax subsidy is
service basis) has led the research and develop- necessary because without it, poor people would
ment sector to develop new technologies that receive less medical care and there would be
enhance the quality of care irrespective of cost greater public health risks from communicable
Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz (1972), Downs, Anthony (1967), Inside Bureaucracy
“Production, Information Costs and Economic (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.).
Organizations,” American Economic Review
62 (December): 777– 95. Eisenstadt, David, and Thomas E. Kennedy (1981),
“Control and Behavior of Nonprofit Firms:
Association of American Medical Colleges (1993), The Case of Blue Shield,” Southern Economic
AAMC Databook: Tabulations of Statistical Journal 48 ( July): 26 –36.
Information Related to Medical Education
(Washington, D.C.: AAMC, January). Evans, Robert G., and Malcolm F. Williamson
(1978), Extending Canadian Health Insur-
Baumol, William J., John C. Panzar, and Robert D. ance: Policy Options for Pharmacare and
Willig (1988), Contestable Markets and the Denticare, Ontario Economic Council Re-
Theory of Industry Structure (Fort Worth, search Study no. 13 (Toronto: University of
Texas: Harcourt Brace). Toronto Press).
Borcherding, T.E. (1977), “One Hundred Years of Felsenthal, Edward (1993), “Curing Health Care:
Public Spending,” in Budgets and Bureau- Doctors are Spurring Effort to Remedy the
crats, T.E. Borcherding, ed. (Durham, N.C.: Nation’s Ailing Malpractice System,” Wall
Duke University Press). Street Journal , March 1, B1.
Breton, Albert (1974), The Economic Theory of Friedman, Milton (1962), Capitalism and Freedom
Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Publishing Co.).
Garrison, Louis P., Jr. (1990), “Medicaid, the
Burman, Leonard E., and Jack Rodgers (1992), Uninsured, and National Health Spending:
“Tax Preferences and Employment-Based Federal Policy Implications,” Health Care
Health Insurance,” National Tax Journal 65 Financing Review Annual Supplement, 167.
(September): 331– 56.
Haas–Wilson, Deborah (1992), “The Regulation of
Caves, Douglas W., and Laurits R. Christensen Health Care Professionals Other than Physi-
(1980), “The Relative Efficiency of Public and cians,” Regulation: The Cato Review of Busi-
Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: ness and Government, Fall, 40 – 46.
The Case of Canadian Railroads,” Journal of
Political Economy 88 (October): 958 –76. ——— (1986), “The Effect of Commercial Practice
Restrictions: The Case of Optometry,” Journal
Chan, Yuk–Shee, and Hayne Leland (1982), of Law and Economics 29 (April): 165 – 86.
“Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly
Information,” Review of Economic Statistics 49 Keeler, Emmett B., and John E. Rolph (1988),
(October): 499 – 516. “The Demand for Episodes of Treatment in
the Health Insurance Experiment, Journal of
Council of Economic Advisers (1993), Economic Health Economics 7 (December): 337– 67.
Report of the President (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office). Leland, Hayne E. (1979), “Quacks, Lemons, and
Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality
Dallas Morning News (1993), “GM To Take $22.2 Standards,” Journal of Political Economy 87
Billion Health Charge,” February 2: 1D. (December): 1328 – 46.
Manning, Willard G., Joseph P. Newhouse, Naihua ——— (1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy,
Duan, Emmett B. Keller, Arleen Leibowitz, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press).
and Susan Marquis, (1987), “Health Insurance
and the Demand for Medical Care,” American U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992), Statistical
Economic Review 77 ( June): 251–77. Abstract of the United States: 1992, 112th ed.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Goverment Printing
Niskanen, William A., Jr. (1971), Bureaucracy and Office).
Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company). Weatherby, J.L. (1971), “A Note on Administrative
Behavior and Public Policy,” Public Choice,
Phelps, Charles E. (1992), Health Economics (New Fall, 107–10.
York: HarperCollins Publishers).
Weisbrod, Burton A. (1991), “The Health Care
Shaked, Avner, and John Sutton (1981), “The Self- Quadrillemma: An Essay on Technological
Regulating Profession,” Review of Economic Change, Insurance, Quality of Care, and Cost
Studies 48 (April): 217– 34. Containment,” Journal of Economic Literature
29 ( June): 523 –52.
Sindelar, Jody L. (1988), “The Declining Price of
Health Insurance,” in Health Care in America,