Rivka Feldhay

Authority, Political

Theology, and the

Politics of Knowledge

in the Transition fromm

Medieval to Early Modern

Catholicism

INTRODUCTION

ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AND LAST SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

in 1563, the council ordered discussion of the reform of the Catholid

prayer book, the Breviary and Missal. The discussion naturally drew

attention to the sour problem of the calendar that had led, in the

aftermath of Trent to the printing of a number of works on this issue

Luther's reactions to these Catholic scientific concerns were typical

enough. According to historian ]. North. Luther thought that calendars

have nothing to do with faith (North. 1983 101). But for Catholics, the

problem of the calendar had not disappeared after Trent. In fact, in

1582 Pope Gregory XIIl (1502 1585) published a papal bull, promulgat-

ing the reform of the calendar named after him, the Gre

(Ziggelaar, 1983: 201239),. The bull followed the recommendation of a

congregation nominated by the pope. whose work lasted for ten years

between 1572 and 1582 The congregation included three prominent

prelates a specialist of the Arabic language and culture from Martha named Leonardo Abel,
experts on canon law and church history, and

three mathematicians (Baldini, 1983: 137-138). The committee was

presided by the Jesuit mathematician Christoph Clavius (Clavius, 1603),

the man who was responsible more than anyone else for instituting a

mathematical program of studies as part of the curriculum in all Jesuit

universities. These became the most respected centers of mathematical

teaching in Europa.

The historical episode of the calendar catches something of the

spirit in which knowledge was bonded to faith in the Catholic tradi

tion. Despite the tensions that pervaded Christianity around this issue

the High Middle Ages bequeathed to their early modern successors

an impressive synthesis of the sacred message and natural knowl

edge that was especially associated with the work of the Dominican

theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225/6-1274) In his work. Thomas built

ontological and epistemological bridges that brought together the

transcendental, human, and physical realms of the universe. In his

monumental Summa Theologica he also touched upon though with

out elaboration the authority of the church in worldly affairs as well

as in the realm of knowledge (Feldhay, 2007). Modern historiography,

however, tended to interpret the bond of knowledge and faith in terms

of the subordination of science to the needs of religion, which eventu

ally led to inevitably tragic conflicts in carly modernity (Draper, 1875:

White, 1960). The cases of Giordano Bruno's burning at the stake, of

Campanella's long imprisonment, of the ban on Copernicanism. the

condemnation of Galileo's Dialogue and of many of Descartes' theses

have been understood to demonstrate this view More recently, the

decrees of the Council of Trent intendcd to deepen and broaden

ğirch authority as a defense against the Protestant heresy, have been

construed by historians as a radicalization of its claims, particularly

over scientific knowledge (Shea. 1986: 114135: Blackwell, 1998: 348

366) Concomitantly, luther's challenge to the ancient bond between

knowledge and faith has been seen as emancipating and leading to the

ideal of the autonomy of knowledge in Western culture (Merton. 1970

Hooykaas, 1922) Last. the emergence of early modern absolutist status has mainly remained
irrelevant for interpreting the complex relation

ship of knowledge to faith.

This paper has been conceived as a contribution to an alterna-

tive narrative, emerging in the historical literature of the last decades

and by the Catholic church of the Counter-Reformation (Jedin, 1999: 19-

45: Evennet, 1968; Zeeden, 1965; Reinhard, 1977: 226-229 1981:

1989: Schilling, 1983: 261-327: Prodi, 1982; Prodi and Reinhard, 1996:

O'Malley, 2000). The concept of cognitive and political-theological

authority as it developed from the High Middle Ages to early modern

Catholicism will constitute the thread around which my arguments

about the notion of faith and its relation to knowledge are constructed

I chose Thomas Aquinas's treatise "On Faith." situated exactly in the

middle of his Summa Theologica as a privileged textual locus to etamine

the notion of authority in his work. I then turn to the re-interpretation

of faith and authority by post-Tridentine, mainly Jesuit theologians and

relate it to the politics of knowledge promoted by the Society of Jesus.

to revise the too simple story of the repression of science

COGNITIVE AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE MIDDLE

AGES

In an essay entitled "What is Authority? written during the 1950s,

Hannah Arendt (Arendt, 1961: 91-141) conducted an investigation of

the term authority, which she deemed to be one of the most illusive

and abused concepts in political discourse. Arendt attempted to delin

eate the fine distinctions between closely related concepts such as

power, strength, force, and violence and compare them with the te

authority. Her inquiry resulted in the insight that, since authority

always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of

power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means

of coercion, where force is used. aut hority itself has failed" (Arendt.

1961: 92.93)

Arendt's perception heavily relies on the twentieth-century expe

ience with mass societies and mass-media, but also on the distin
tion, made in Roman law between the Roman Senate's auctoritas andthe potestas, or "power"
or "imperium" of the Roman magistrates or

the Roman people.1 A more recent explanation of auctoritas, deveb

oped by the philosopher Giorgio Agamben (Agamben, 2004) relates

the Roman notion of auctoritas-meaning the power to validate, or

legitimate another act on the basis of personal status credibility-with

the modern notions of Max Weber's charismatic power" and Carl

Schmitt's Fuehrerprinzip. These studies serve as a screen against which

I can lay out the classical, medieval, and early modern understandings

of authority-not only in the political sphere, but also in intellectual

discourse. With Arendt and Agamben, and against historians who prefer

to identify, or closely relate authority to power and portray Tridentine

politics of knowledge as a symbol of repression, my first step is to call

attention to the need to carefully differentiate these two concepts and

study empirically and historically the relationship between them.

However, my perspective differs from that of Arendt and Agamben in

thatIchoose authority in intellectual discourse as a starting point from

which I move to political theological authority and the relationship

between the two

To begin with, it should be emphasized that in the tradition

of Greek philosophy arguments from authority had very low status

compared with knowledge of causes, or knowledge of the reasoned

fact -namely episteme Plato drew attention to the difference between

faith that resulted from demonstration, which was thought of as epis

mere opinions

(doxa) (Maurer 1986: xvi)-Aristotle followed in his footsteps in setting

e norms for true and real knowledge. Furthermore, for both Plato

istotle there was no bridge between knowledge and opinion

As lan Hacking rightly observes (Hacking, 1975, chap. 3), contrary to

modern notions of scientific knowledge that tend to point out the

continuous spectrum of scientific truths as "justified true beliefs." for

the ancients knowledge and beliefdid not even have a common object

The first had for its objects "that which is of necessity and cannot be

otherwise" whereas the object of belief was that whose very nature

is changing, namely coming to be and passing away Likewise, theancients' conceptlon of

epistemic knowledge rested on the presup-

position that it stemmed from self-evident, utterly secure first prin

ciple and developed through syllogistic demonstration. Boethius, who

transmitted the ancient norms and classifications of knowledge to

the Middle Ages, shared the Platonic and Aristotellan view that argu

ments from authority namely opinion-was a low form of cognition

(Maurer, 1986: xvi)

One is able to tell a long story about how the status of opinion

as a source of cognition changed during the Renaissance as opinion

was transformed into evidence by the "low scientists." namely alche

mists, astrologers, miners and physicians (Hacking, 1975, chap. 5). My

aim, however, is different. I shall start by underlining how arguments

from authority were woven into an epistemic context by the prominent

philosophertheologian Thomas Aquinas, thereby acquiring a higher

status as they related not simply to human forms of knowledge but to

faith, the living heart of Thomas's Christian philosophy. In addition, I

shall point out how, through the development of an extremely sophis-

ticated and intellectualist discourse on faith. Thomas also legitimized a

connection between epistemic and political authority2

It is in fact in the very first question of his Summa Theologica that

Thomas makes clear the relevance of arguments to faith, against the

older position of Ambrosius (d.397), the bishop of Milan, whose treatise

On Faith he quoted saying; Put arguments aside where faith is sought

(Surnma Theologica, la, q 1, a. 8) On the contrary" says Thomas. the

Scripture says that a bishop should embrace that faithful word which is

according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine

and to convince the gainsayers Thomas thought that included in

what should be propesed to the intellect as relevant to faith were the

conclusions of sacred doctrine, which he identified with a special kind

of science, namely the science of theology Following Aristotle's theory

of science, he thought that like all sciences, sacred doctrine does not

proveits principles, but taking them as self evident truths goes on to

prove further things from them: "As the other sciences do not argue

in proof ot their principles, bur argue from their prineples to demonios strate other truths in
these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in

proof of its principles, which are the aricles of faith, but from them it

goes on to prove something else." He adds, later: "this doctrine argues

from articles of faith to other truths (Summa Theologica, la, q. 1, a. 8)

Unlike the other sciences, however, this doctrine is based on the most

certain principles, since these are principles revealed by God, who is

the ultimate truth and the formal object of faith.

This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from

authority, in as much as its principles are obtained by reve-

lation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those

to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take

away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argu

ment from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the

argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest

(Summa Theologica, la, q. 1, a. 8; emphasis added).

Thus, with Ila-llae, q. 1, art. 5 and ILa-Ilae, q. 1, art. 5 of the Summa

Thomas clearly distinguished between knowledge-namely science

faith-namely the special assent of the intellect commanded by the will;

and opinion-namely the philosopher's account of belief. But he also said:

Faith is a mean between science and opinion" (Ia-llae.q. 1. a. 2: emphasis

added). In what way is faith similar to science? "Because science demands

that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise. .. . Yet that

which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also

deemed impossible to be otherwise" (lla-llae, q. 1, art. 5). In other words

faith is like science as both enjoy the highest degree of certainty due to

the fact that their object is something endowed with inherent necessity

(lla-llae. q. 1, art. 5). Yet faith differs from science "because the object of

science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen" (lla

llae. q. 1, art. 5). By something seen Thomas means something known

th a perfect degree of knowledge. But God cannot be known to humans

in the here and now, for "by faith, we do not apprehend the First Truth

s it is in itself (lla-lae, q. 1.a. 2). Our knowledge of God in the here and now can never be
perfect and complete. In this respect, faith differs from

science, and is similar to opinion or belief

By the sheer insertion of faith into an epistemic context, Thomas

in fact created a "third," or, as he himself called it a "mean" between

knowledge and opinion that had not existed in antiquity. He thus broke

the dichotomy that predominated the philosophical culture since

antiquity. In the center of the noblest and most dignified science in

his scheme, that is sacred doctrine, arguments from authority though

divine, not human authority were

Simultaneously, belief was recognized as a legitimate aspect, or atleast

as a partner, of the true knowledge that is faith.

now recognized as legitimate

While speaking about the proper act of faith in terms of belief

and by depicting belief as "giving assent" to divine authority. Thomas

gave no concrete account of authority. But as he moved on to present

the material object of faith in terms of articles representing the grow

ing knowledge of faith through the ages, he brought up the authority

of the church and the pope. Thus Thomas pointed to -although he did

not develop-the option of a political-in addition to the epistemicm

discourse on faith that he did not explicitly differentiate from a schol

arly or intellectual discourse: “The universal Church cannot err." he

exclaimed, "since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, who is the Spirit

of truth" (lla-Ilae, q. 1, a. 7). Moreover, he was also quite clear about

the authority of the pope in deciding the formulation of the articles of

faith (the Symbol) as he said: The Symbol was drawn up by a general

council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the

authority ofthe Sovereign Pontiff Therefore it belongs to the author

ity of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a Symbol illa-ae, Q. 1, a 10)

In this context, it is not superfluous to mention Thomas's awareness of

the dependency of thhe power of the doctors on church authority:

The custom of the Church has very great authority and

ought to be jeato

doctrine of cathole doctors derves its authornty fromi tze Church

Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church