Generic ageing

characteristics of
conventional power plants
Lessons learned from data-analysis a
model for life extension planning

H.C. Wels

Arnhem, 5 February 2007

911569/07.81244/C

Under the contract of EZ

author : H.C. Wels reviewed : J.L. Brinkman

53 page(s) PPT/Wels/HGo approved : A.J. Geutjes

911569_07.81244_rapport.doc

© NRG 2007
Subject to agreement with the client, the information contained in this report may not be disclosed to any third party and NRG is
not liable for any damage arising out of the use of such information.
2 911569/07.81244
Contents

List of figures 4
Summary 5
1 Introduction 9
2 NERC data 9
2.1 Background of NERC data 9
2.2 Analysis method for NERC data 10
2.3 Statistical uncertainty in average values 11
3 NERC results 13
3.1 Total plant 13
3.2 Results for components 16
4 VGB data 24
4.1 Data for total plant 25
4.2 Dominance with regard to unavailability 29
4.3 Dominancy with regard to trips 37
5 Application of failure data for Life Extension Studies 38
6 Conclusions and recommendations 46
Literature 48
appendix A Unavailability of individual VGB plants 49

911569/07.81244 3
List of figures
figure 1 uncertainty in failure data as a function of number of data 12
figure 2 NERC, unit EFOR as a function of age 14
figure 3 NERC, uncertainty in unit EFOR as a function of age 14
figure 4 NERC, failure rate as a function of age 15
figure 5 NERC, uncertainty in failure rate as a function of age 15
figure 6 NERC feedwsater system 17
figure 7 NERC, boiler control 18
figure 8 NERC, flue gas fans, ducts, dampers, air heater 19
figure 9 Ageing rate from NERC data 21
figure 10 Ageing rate from NERC data compared with TIRGALEX data 23
figure 11 main characteristics VGB plants 25
figure 12 operating time VGB plants 25
figure 13 Average VGB plant data 26
figure 14 Individual VGB plants 28
figure 15 Components dominant to forced unavailability, VGB data 29
figure 16 Pattern in time, HAD = evaporator 30
figure 17 Pattern in time, HNC = flue gas induced draft fan 30
figure 18 Pattern in time, LBA = steam piping 31
figure 19 Pattern in time, MAA = HP turbine, MAB = IP turbine 31
figure 20 Pattern in time, MK = generator, MKA = generator rotor/stator 32
figure 21 average no of damages per year, VGB data 33
figure 22 average repair time, VGB data 33
figure 23 Minimal repair 34
figure 24 Example of HLD = air heater failures 35
figure 25 Example of HNC = flue gas induced fan failures 35
figure 26 Example of LAD = preheater failures 36
figure 27 Example of MKA Generator stator en rotor failures 36
figure 28 Pattern for trip frequency 37
figure 29 Repair time for C&I failures, VGB data 38
figure 30 Example of a Reliability Block Diagram 39
figure 31 Use of a reference block diagram model 40
figure 32 Example of a Delphi exercise 41
figure 33 Finite number of system states in a Markov Decision model 42
figure 34 System states derivable from maintenance records 43
figure 35 Condition as a function of time by Markov modelling 44
figure 36 Inspection optimisation 44
figure 37 RAM data 45

4 911569/07.81244
Summary

Background
Operation of electricity production units in the Netherlands over periods longer than 25 yrs was
uncommon in the Netherlands. However, in a liberalised market, building of new units is irregular
and existing units are used as long as possible. Life extension scenarios up to 40 yrs of operation
or more are presently considered. Centrally in these scenarios is the question whether forced
unavailability and/or frequency of failures of components will increase as a function of operation
time within this new time frame, if for those components no life extension measures are taken. In
the report observations are given from data analysis of conventional power plants between 1982
and 2006. Since in E-production units systems and components are present that are also common
to other plants (industrial, nuclear) lessons learned can be applied to other sectors of industry and
vice versa.

Data sources
To answer the question stated above, data have been used from NERC, VGB and a number of
studies that NRG carried out for its clients. These datasets are however not equivalent. NERC data
represents over 90 US power plants and can therefore well be used to establish statistical trends.
With the data available to NRG, individual power plants as well as detailed background
information on the failure could not be investigated. However in the VGB data and the data from
NRG studies this information was available. Therefore the available information in the three data
has to be combined to allow pinpointing generic trends.

Results
Analysis shows that only for a limited number of components in E-production units older than 25
years a generic increase in failure rate or a generic increase in average repair time can be expected.
On average, these increases are compensated for by decreases (especially in failure rate) of other
components. On average for the plant as a whole (when maintained properly), forced
unavailability FOR does not increase.

A type of “roller coaster” curve exists showing a reduction in FOR up to 20 years, a possible
increase between 20 and 25 years and a constant average FOR up to 35 years of age. However, the
uncertainty beyond 25 years is large, showing that problems might depend on the specific plant
and/or component.

If FOR increases, data analysis shows that this might be due to:
• certain problematic constructions (for instance cyclone burners);
• to minimal repair;
• to specific damages to a few components, or;
• to a change in operational mode (for instance daily cycling).

911569/07.81244 5
Components to investigate
Components that should be investigated when the intention is to operate longer than 25 years (due
to an increased failure rate and/or average repair time) are:
• Cold & hot reheat steam lines
• Boiler controls
• Burners
• Bottom ash system
• Desuperheaters
• Condenser (if other than titanic)
• Flue gas fans, air heater, duct expansion joints, dampers
• Generator exciter, rotor, stator
• Feedwater heaters
• LP and IP turbine
• Turbine controls
• Turbine valves
• Forced draft fans

Given sufficient attention to ageing components, analysis of life usage factors for critical boiler
and turbine components and normal preventive maintenance, the forced unavailability FOR as
well as the trip frequency does not have to rise between 25 and 40 years of operation. A large
amount of uncertainty is present with regard to the operation of older electrical machines such as
generators and transformers.

Overhaul strategy
Normal preventive maintenance at power plants during overhauls is largely related to inspection.
The normal practice in the electricity production sector is to carry out inspections on the basis of
fixed intervals, which might have been lengthened since the start of operation. Given the
uncertainty in behavior of old plant, it might however be optimal to inspect on a condition basis
and carry out inspections more often when the expected failure time comes closer.

Environmental
NERC data seem to point to an increased number of outages that are related to environmental
legislation.

Application for life extension

Power plant failures can be subdivided into “normal” failures without ageing, ageing failures and
High Impact Low Probability HILP failures. Normal failures can adequately be modeled by using
a Reliability Block Diagram for the unit and validation with plant specific data. Ageing failures
either can be deduced from trend-analysis of plant specific records or generic databases such as
presented in the report. Finally, HILP failures should be deduced taking the specific condition of
components into account.

This procedure was carried out and confirmed at life extension analysis for clients. Given the
limited amount of failure data for some failures, expert judgment is necessary. This judgment can

6 911569/07.81244
be based on a simple Delphi estimate of the failure probability over a period of time for
replacement decisions. It should be based on degradation probabilities in combination with a
Markov model for optimization of inspection frequencies.

911569/07.81244 7
8 911569/07.81244
1 Introduction
Knowledge of the forced unavailability of power production units that operate longer than 25
years is very relevant in the Netherlands. The forced unavailability of plants younger than 25 years
is very well known to NRG because of earlier data-gathering projects. However, costs per MWhr
not delivered due to failures as well as the E-price have been rising in a commercial market with
irregular newbuildings and units that are operated as long as technically and economically
feasible. Therefore data from NERC, from VGB and from NRG clients have been investigated in
order to answer 2 questions:

- Will the forced unavailability of components in power plants older than 25 years rise and, if
so, for which components and to what extent?
- Is this a generic trend present at the majority of plants?

If so, then it would be wise to take this into account when life extension scenarios and associated
activities are considered at power plants.

As a first step, data in the NERC database purchased by NRG were investigated. Next, VGB data
have been analysed. Also data from studies for NRG clients have been analysed in this respect.
For confidentiality reasons, clients and names of power plants have to be protected. Conclusions
from the investigations were compared with earlier NRG studies as well as literature research for
confirmation purposes.

2 NERC data

2.1 Background of NERC data

The North American Electric Reliability Council NERC provides the GADS Generating
Availability Data System. In this system, since 1982 failure data have been gathered from US
power production units. Standard reports can be found on the Internet, however these do not allow
making a selection over age, etc. Over 90 % of the total installed capacity in the US is contributing
to the GADS system. For the NRG analysis, data up to the year 2000 have been used. Since so
many power plants are present, the statistical uncertainty in average values is small. However, this
database for the analysis under consideration has 3 important disadvantages:
- The characteristics of specific power plants are in principle unknown. The names of power
plants that contribute to the data in a specific NERC subset are known, however Internet
investigations to find out more about these specific plants and the components in the plants
were inefficient and therefore had to be stopped. Therefore, it is uncertain that NERC plants
are sufficiently comparable to Dutch plants.
- Event data were not available to third parties without contacting NERC. Therefore, it was not
possible to check the background of any increase in the number of failures per hour or average
repair time.

911569/07.81244 9
- The Database Management System (Clarion TopSpeed) is slow, possibly due to the security
characteristics. Therefore it was not possible to transfer the data to ACCESS or Excel in order
to speed up the analysis. However, standardised reports could be transferred to Excel (so
called CSV files). This facility was used for the majority of the analysis.

2.2 Analysis method for NERC data

In the total NERC dataset, subsets have been made for the category “Conventional Steam”. In
these subsets therefore coal fired as well as oil- en gas fired units are present. It is expected that
modern Combined Cycles are not present. Single cycle gasturbines (GTs) and Jet Engines (aero
derivative GTs) are separately named in NERC and therefore are sure not to be present in the
subsets1.

Three main selections for the NERC datasets have been made:
A Units that started operation between 1960 and 1965.
B Units starting operation between 1965 and 1970.
C Units starting operation between 1970 and 1975.

The units in category A have an approximate age of 40 years at present. The units in category C
are the most relevant for Dutch Life Extension studies.

Average operating time for all categories is reasonably constant between 6000 and 7000 hours per
year. However, the operating time can differ appreciably between units. As an example: units
between 35 and 40 years old with data in the period 1995-2000 in the NERC system have an
average operation time of 5665 hours per year with a standard deviation of 2459 hrs.

The selections on start of operation implicitly are also a selection to technology applied and
between 1960 and 1970 power production units have increased in size. Installed power for this
period has risen from less than 100 MWe to over 500 MWe.

Within each selection category, failure data were averaged over 5 years of operation. Please note
that when for instance Forced Availability is plotted as a function of the age for a subset of units,
this automatically implies that calendar years differ. If for instance at a particular year an
environmental measure is enforced by authorities, the effect of this measure will show up at
different points in time in the plots.

The coding of components and subsystems in the NERC database is rather elaborate. Some 750
Cause Codes are a mixture of components and failure modes. As an example: code 265 =
“Primary air heater”, code 266 = “Primary air heater fouling”. Since with increasing depth of

1
a short analysis of the operation of older GE Fr5 gasturbines has been carried out in a recent
Failure Mode Effect Analysis.

10 911569/07.81244
coding the number of events per code becomes less and therefore the average value is statistically
less certain, NERC codes have been summed using Excel. This has resulted in 95 codes that allow
pinpointing the major components in E-production units. As an example: NERC codes 1400 to
1450 have been condensed to “Air Supply fans & Ducting”. The failures per code were added,
divided by the number of E-production-unit-years and converted to operating hours rather than
calendar hours. Since the number of components per codes is not precisely known, the failure
rates thus calculated must be regarded as system failure rates, not component failure rates.
Engineering judgement to convert to component rates is possible, however also in the Netherlands
one forced draft ventilator may be present instead of the usual 2 ventilators in a power plant.

Total repair time has also been added and allocated to the appropriate codes. Repair time is in
equivalent hours, that is: weighted with the power loss involved. Dividing of total repair time by
the number of failures results in the average failure duration. Multiplication of average failure
duration with the derived failure rate should result in the FOR. However, then adding all FORs, it
turns out that the sum is some 50 % larger than the FOR and EFOR of the unit in total. The most
probable cause is that the NERC database allows for overlap of failures between components,
contains (preventive) maintenance information and failures of redundant components (coal mills,
feedwater pumps) may be present.

2.3 Statistical uncertainty in average values

Given a discrete number of failures, the calculated average failure rate is statistically uncertain. As
shown in figure 1 (source: EPRI) for example the uncertainty in the mean time between failures =
1 / failure rate at 10 failures is - 35 % + 110 % (at 90 % confidence level). The figure can be also
be calculated with a CHI-square distribution in Excel. In the present report, a standard 10%-90%
uncertainty range was taken as standard confidence level. If one assumes a CHI-square
distribution also for the average repair time, the uncertainty in repair time can be calculated also.
In principle however, this is a crude approximation since very small repair times cannot be
present. However, also the commonly used lognormal distribution has its drawbacks: some
extreme repair times originating from this distribution cannot occur in practice due to replacement
of the component or application of spare parts.

911569/07.81244 11
figure 1 uncertainty in failure data as a function of number of data

[1] Showed that the uncertainty in FOR over a period is a function of both the occurrence of
failures and repair time. This can also be demonstrated using Monte Carlo analysis. The
occurrence of failures over a certain period is defined by failure rate. If the failure rate is high,
both failures and failure rate are relatively certain. If the failure rate is low (this is especially the
case with High Impact Low Probability HILP failures), failures are uncertain. Repair times are
described by a statistical distribution around the average repair/outage time. Please note that for
specific components such as step-up transformers or generators it may be necessary to use 2

12 911569/07.81244
distributions in order to describe extreme repair times. Especially with regard to HILP failures,
both outage times and the occurrence of failures are uncertain. FOR is therefore a function of 2
uncertain variables (failure rate and repair time) AND a function of the length of the period
analysed. Uncertainty increases even beyond this when the failure rate and average repair time are
uncertain themselves due to different manufactors. Given the above discussion, one can decide on
ageing separately on the behaviour of failure rate and the behaviour of average repair time as a
function of age.

3 NERC results

3.1 Total plant

Figure 2-4 show the number of failures per hr and Equivalent Forced Outage Rate (EFOR) for the
total plant as well as their uncertainty, given by the standard deviation. The parameters are shown
as a function of age. It is interesting that, depending on the starting years (which can be interpreted
as state of technology) units on average are getting better in terms of lower failures / hr and
EFOR. Improvement in EFOR stops beyond 25 years and uncertainty after this period rises again.
There is only 1 data point present beyond 35 years, therefore the results after 35 years are
inconclusive. Now, if the failure rate per hr is going down and EFOR stays equal, this might be
due to repair times rising. Repair times may rise because spare part unavailability problems may
occur OR the type of failure is different, having larger repair times. Since problem descriptions in
NERC are not available to NRG, this could not be checked.

911569/07.81244 13
figure 2 NERC, unit EFOR as a function of age

figure 3 NERC, uncertainty in unit EFOR as a function of age

14 911569/07.81244
figure 4 NERC, failure rate as a function of age

figure 5 NERC, uncertainty in failure rate as a function of age

911569/07.81244 15
3.2 Results for components
In this paragraph, three examples are given with regard to ageing of components: NERC’s
“Feedwater System”, “Boiler Control Systems”, and “Flue Gas Fans, Air heater, Ducts Exp Joints,
Dampers”. Per figure three parameters are given:
- average number of failures per operating hr (failure frequency, failure rate)
- average repair time
- forced unavailability.
Per component also the uncertainty range is given, using a CHI2-distribution for failure rate and
repair time and Nelson’s approximation [1] for forced unavailability. The uncertainty range can be
used to check that, given enough data material, average values are relatively sure.

In figure 6 the “Feedwater System” is shown. Independent on the category of the plant (operation
starting in 60-ties to operation 70-ties), the failure frequency decreases. All categories seem to
belong to 1 single line. The average repair time per category is not increasing as a function of age.
The uncertainty in unavailability over a period of 5 years is such that no significant statistical
differences are present. A significant statistical difference would implicate that differences cannot
be contributed to chance.

In a second example, “Boiler Control Systems” are shown in figure 7. It is clear that the average
repair time increases as a function of age. This could be related to obsolescence, resulting in
difficulties having enough spares. Trends like this also can be found at “Generator Controls” and
“Steam Turbine Controls”.

A third example is shown in figure 8 for the component “Flue Gas Fans etc.” In figure 8 one can
observe an increase in the failure frequency as well as in the average repair time as a function of
age. The failure frequency for units starting their operation in the 70-ties increases the most. The
result is an increase in forced unavailability for this component, albeit probably statistically not
significant.

16 911569/07.81244
NERC, failure frequency feedwater system

figure 6 NERC feedwater system

911569/07.81244 17
figure 7 NERC, boiler control

18 911569/07.81244
figure 8 NERC, flue gas fans, ducts, dampers, air heater

911569/07.81244 19
An interesting result is that from the NERC data analysis for the coding "continuous emission
monitoring systems", "operating environmental limitations", "regulatory" en "safety" it can be
concluded that for older units the authorities intervene more often, with results for unavailability
of the plant.

Analysis of NERC components defined above shows that sometimes the failures rate increases,
but more often the failure rate decreases as a function of age. Especially for controls, the average
repair time may increase. On a generic basis, those components should be investigated when
assessing Life Extension scenarios. The costs for modification and/or life extension for these
components should be weighed against the (increasing) costs for unbalance and replacement
energy when the component fails.

For the components where either the failure rate or repair time increased as a function of age, this
increase was read from figures like 6 to 8 and tabulated. Also, if the starting value could be
sensibly read from the figures, it was tabulated. In order to arrive at general conclusions,
components were placed into categories (f.e. control, heat exchanger, etc.) The result is shown in
figure 9.

20 911569/07.81244
figure 9 Ageing rate from NERC data

911569/07.81244 21
Figure 9 (ctnd) Ageing rate from NERC data

The category components can be compared with the TIRGALEX data, a set of data from NUREG
expert judgements from early incorporations of ageing into PSA. The comparison is given in
figure 10.

22 911569/07.81244
figure 10 Ageing rate from NERC data compared with TIRGALEX data

911569/07.81244 23
The comparison shows that the order of magnitude for the failure-ageing rate is the same for
TIRGALEX and NERC. This gives confidence in the ageing rate derived from the datasets. In the
category FAN the ageing rate is much higher, but this is only due to 1 data point. The additional
number of failures over a period of 15 years is low, compared to other possible maintenance
effects on failure data such as ineffective repair when not removing the root cause of the problem.

4 VGB data
The German institute Vereinigung Grosskraftwerk Betreiber VGB gathers already for a long time
forced unavailability data of power plants of its members. These data can be made available to
third parties under strict conditions of confidentiality. For an analysis of the effects of ageing on
plants, data were made available to NRG. Names of power plants and companies are not
recognisable from the data. Power of the unit, first year of operation, type of unit (so called
monoblock or twinblock (2 boilers on 1 turbine), fuel (hard coal, lignite), conventional v.s.
combined cycle, etc. were present in the VGB information.

VGB made available all data of units between 1988 and 1997 with an age over 25 years.
Therefore, although the amount of data is considerable (14.900 failure data), units cannot be
followed from the first year of operation until the last year. However, generic trends beyond 25
years of age (if present) should be visible from this dataset.

VGB essentially gathers 2 sets of data:

- the so called Verfugbarkeits Statistik, with data for the plant as a whole (forced and planned
unavailability, operating time, etc.). For conventional plants (with the exception of single cycle
GTs), in this database failures during starts are not gathered. Similarly, no difference is made
in trips, failures during operation and failures with the plant stopped.
- the so called Nicht-Verfugbarkeits Statistik, with data for the failure of systems and
components. Component failures can be deduced from these records if the failure results in
forced unavailability of the plant. Therefore, the majority of failures of redundant components
is not visible. With the aid of the so-called Ereignis Merkmal Schlussel (EMS, part-coding 1 &
4) one can analyse the background of the failure (damage? maintenance? operating error?) and
the consequence (automatic trip? out of operation by operator? postponed to the weekend?).
Important is an (although limited) amount of text describing the problem.

24 911569/07.81244
4.1 Data for total plant
In the VGB dataset data for 180 plants are present. The main characteristics of these plants are
given in figure 11. The operation time as a function of fuel is shown in figure 12.

figure 11 main characteristics VGB plants

figure 12 operating time VGB plants

The operation time per year for lignite fired units and (to a lesser amount) coal fired units is very
similar to that in the NERC data. This type of plants is operated in base load or with weekend
stops. From some failure descriptions, it appears that some plants are also operated seasonally.
The oil-fired units have low operating hours per year. Since the number of failures can be shown
to be dependant on operating hours, plants with less than 100 operating hours per year were not
taken into account. In total 9066 unit years with 753790 operating hours have been analysed in the
VGB dataset.

VGB defines failures as “postponable” and “direct” (in German “disponibel” and “nicht-
disponibel”). Postponable is defined as an unavailability event that can be postponed over 12 hrs
but not for more than 4 weeks. Direct is a direct failure or an event that can be postponed up to

911569/07.81244 25
12 hrs. Direct failures evidently are more important than postponable failures and have therefore
been analysed.

Per plant per year the equivalent forced unavailability EFOR was plotted. Average results are
given in figure 13, individual plants are given in Appendix A. Figure 13 shows that the average
Equivalent Forced Unavailability EFOR does not increase as a function of age. The average, the
10 % lower bound and the 50 % value rise somewhat between 30 and 40 years of age. It is the
standard deviation between 30 and 35 years that is much larger than in the years before and after
that period. From this increase it can be concluded that uncertainty in EFOR over that period is
larger, although the number of data points beyond 35 years is small. When uncertainty is large, it
means that some plants have problems and some don’t. This roller-coaster curve was found earlier
in NRG analysis of power plants.

figure 13 Average VGB plant data

It was tried to find the most meaningful way of presenting the large number of data, in such a way
that individual power plants showed up. For each 20 units, an Excel overview was made with
years and power units coloured whenever the EFOR was over 5 %. Two examples are given in
figure 14. It appears that power units are present with occasionally bad years (see R054B in figure
14) and plants that (given their coding at the same location or sister units, see K141.3-K151.5) in
general have an EFOR above average.

For those plants with years with over 5 % EFOR, the data in the VGB Nicht-Verfugbarkeits
Statistik were analysed with regard to the nature of the problems. In total over the period 1988-
1997 14.390 data were present. Given this large number of data, analysis must be structured and
therefore only components have been investigated that are dominant with regard to EFOR.

26 911569/07.81244
With modern power markets, 2 important costs are the consequence of plant failures:
A costs for replacement energy in order to fulfil power contracts that have already been signed.
B unbalance costs in order to keep up the grid frequency and supply short-term energy by other
units generally not belonging to the same company. Unbalance costs can be limited to a 2 hr
period if the company that is causing the unbalance solves this by buying additional power or
curtailing load from its customers.
The presence of term B means that not only classical (E)FOR as a fraction of time not delivering
power is present, also reliability defined by the number of failures per hr is important. Now,
components that are dominant with regard to EFOR are not necessarily dominant with regard to
reliability. An example is failures due to control and instrumentation C&I in power plants. Given
their failure rate and (small) repair times, C&I failures are dominant with regard to reliability, but
generally not dominant with regard to FOR. Therefore, in the VGB data both dominances have
been analysed.

911569/07.81244 27
figure 14 Individual VGB plants

28 911569/07.81244
4.2 Dominance with regard to unavailability
In the VGB Nicht-Verfugbarkeit database, all data were selected with EMS-code A2 = “ damage”.
In general these failures have a somewhat larger repair time compared to for instance operation
errors. Components (systems and sub-systems) are indicated with the Kraftwerk Kennzeichen
System (KKS). For this dataset, dominance with regard to unavailability was analysed. The
procedure was:
- Calculate the contribution of a KKS-code (f.i. MAA = HP turbine, MAD = turbine bearings,
etc.) to the total unavailability present in the dataset
- Sort KKS-codes on contribution
- According to the Pareto-principle, only a very limited number of components will cause the
majority of the problems

In the dataset over the period analysed, 251 KKS-codes are present. Only 21 codes (8 %!) are
responsible for 80 % of the EFOR in the dataset. This is graphically shown in figure 15.

figure 15 Components dominant to forced unavailability, VGB data

Failures at classical components such as HAD = evaporator, HAC = economiser, HAH =

superheater and HAJ = reheat define in the VGB database for plants over 25 years of age about 50
% of the forced unavailability EFOR. These components are classical since they are also dominant
with regard to FOR for younger plants. However, now other components are dominant that are
interesting for life extension analysis, such as HLD = air heaters, HNC = induced draft (flue gas)
fans, LAD = feedwater heating, LBA & LBB = steam piping, MAA & MAB = HP & IP turbine en
MK(A) generator. A full list of dominant components with KKS-codes, number of failures per hr,
average repair time and equivalent average repair time is kept at NRG offices.

911569/07.81244 29
The dominant components are components that should be investigated in any life extension plan.
Also the pattern in time was investigated. When, for the majority of units, a peak occurs in failures
(for instance at HAD = evaporator at 25 years of age), the timing of life extension activities could
be optimised. Per power plant therefore the pattern in time was investigated. From that analysis, it
can be concluded that there is no systematical pattern in the damages as a function of age. In
figures 16 to 20 a number of examples are given. These examples should not be used to calculate
the failure rate, since in the database also plants are present that do NOT have failures on these
specific components.

figure 16 Pattern in time, HAD = evaporator

figure 17 Pattern in time, HNC = flue gas induced draft fan

30 911569/07.81244
figure 18 Pattern in time, LBA = steam piping

figure 19 Pattern in time, MAA = HP turbine, MAB = IP turbine

911569/07.81244 31
figure 20 Pattern in time, MK = generator, MKA = generator rotor/stator

The average number of failures per component per year and the average repair time are shown in
figure 21 and 22. Both do not easily show trends. In the average repair time, incidents with large
repair times are visible due to HILP failures. Only for evaporator problems (code: HAD, yellow in
figure 21) there appears to be an increase between 25 years and 30 years of age. This is contrary to
the NERC data, in which boiler unavailability for the 30-year-old plants is less than for 20-25
years old plants, while evaporators are dominant with regard to forced unavailability.

The failure / damage characteristics of boilers as a function of age can be described as:
- a number of power plants older than 25 years operates without large problems at evaporators,
superheaters and reheaters
- for some plants, a large number of failures occurs on specific components (for instance
cyclone burners for "Schmelzfeuerung”, a system that is no longer used in modern plants.
Failures are solved with “minimal repair”.
- On average, a failure is not solved directly. The probability of reoccurrence is large.

32 911569/07.81244
figure 21 average no of damages per year, VGB data

figure 22 average repair time, VGB data

The occurrence of minimal repair at certain plants can easily be shown by examples such as figure
23. In both boilers of this so-called “duoblock” problems with the superheaters occur. Per
occurrence, a limited number of pipes are replaced, the problem is not solved once-and-for-all.
Also for Dutch power plants in their last years of operation such as the units A-C at Schiehaven,
given their limited operation time, at about 1998 management opted consciously for minimal

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repair instead of replacement of large superheater sections. The three units were demolished
shortly afterwards.

figure 23 Minimal repair

In figures 24-27 examples of other failures are given. It is expected that failures on components
HLD = air heater (bearing problems) and LAD preheater (pipes leaking) are a function of age. For
some components (HNC = flue gas induced draft fan), problems are specific for certain plants.
This also means that when identical units are operated, both failures and solutions can be expected
and prepared for sister units when 1 of the plants has a failure.

34 911569/07.81244
figure 24 Example of HLD = air heater failures

figure 25 Example of HNC = flue gas induced fan failures

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figure 26 Example of LAD = preheater failures

figure 27 Example of MKA Generator stator and rotor failures

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4.3 Dominancy with regard to trips
From the VGB Nicht-Verfugbarkeits Statistik all data were analysed with code SMS1 = A (direct
automatic trip) or B = (direct) manually out of operation. From the Pareto analyses, also for trips
components such as HAD = evaporator, HAH = superheater, etc. can be shown to be dominant.
For trips however, components related to control & instrumentation are present. A full list with
KKS-codes, number of failures per hr, average repair time and equivalent average repair time is
kept at NRG offices.

When carrying out Life Extension studies, for dominant components one should generically
investigate whether replacement is necessary. However, over the full operational life of a plant, C
& I problems will be dominant with regard to trips. Only for a limited number of components, the
frequency of trips will increase beyond 25 years of age, being C = process control, HFB = coal
milling control, as shown in figure 28. Also the total number of C & I problems is on an increased
level beyond 30 yrs. Both with VGB and NERC data, it can be shown that average repair time of
control failures as a function of age increased Average repair time for VGB data is shown in
figure 29.

figure 28 Pattern for trip frequency

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figure 29 Repair time for C&I failures, VGB data

5 Application of failure data for Life Extension Studies

Power plant failures can be divided into “normal” failures without ageing, failures showing an
ageing pattern (either increasing or decreasing) and High Impact Low Probability HILP failures.
Normal failures without ageing can adequately be modeled using a Reliability Block Diagram
technique. NRG uses the RBDA computer program for this purpose. An example of a block
diagram is shown in figure 30. Systems (shown in green) are nested to subsystems and
components. Components (shown in purple) are accompanied with a failure rate (/hr), and average
repair time (hr) and a capacity. For instance, when when in figure 30 TLAC = turbine driven main
feedwater pump fails, the parallel E-motor driven pump will allow the plant to carry on with 60 %
output. Failure data are sourced from plant-specific information and data from generic databases.
Bayesian updates can be used if plant-specific information is to be combined with generic
information in order to have more accurate estimates.

38 911569/07.81244
figure 30 Example of a Reliability Block Diagram

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The Block Diagram is used in a phased approach for Life Extension planning as a reference model
that can be checked with plant specific data for the period when ageing is not present. The
reference model is an auditable starting point for decision-making. An example is given in figure
31. The RBDA model is only valid for the period without ageing. In the data for these sister units,
infant mortality as well as HILP failures can be discerned. Recent plant experience for these sister
units showed ageing, for which Asset Management decisions were necessary. However, in the
figure given, recent plant experience also included “minimal maintenance” and failures due to
cycling. Therefore, ageing should be separated from these effects by analysis of the individual
failures records and the operating regime.

figure 31 Use of a reference block diagram model

Ageing failures either can be deduced from trend-analysis of plant specific records or generic
databases such as presented in the report. Trend-analysis is necessary anyway to separate infant
mortality problems and “random” failures for correct failure rates as input in the RBDA model. A
next step is optimization of replacement decisions for those components where ageing either is
present or can be expected. In a recent analysis, these components were subtracted from the
RBDA model and added as a time series in an Excel spreadsheet for optimization.

The risk on High Impact Low Probability (HILP) failures should be estimated taking the condition
of components into account. When the condition of the equipment, based on inspection and
overhaul records, is less than adequate, the failure probability over the remaining plant life might
even be high (HIHP= High Impact High Probability failures). This is easily estimated using a
Delphi technique to estimate cumulative failure probability. An example is shown in figure 32.

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During the Delphi, experts should be not in doubt on operating conditions, are not to confer on
their estimate and may change their answers in a second round. If an expert stays an outlier, he is
to state why. Clearly equipment no. 2 and 3 in figure 32 are candidates for replacement.

figure 32 Example of a Delphi exercise

HILP failures or HIHP failures are adequately modeled in a spreadsheet, allowing both for an
analytical approximation as well as Monte Carlo analysis in order to calculate uncertainty bounds.
Given their low probability, HILP failures can be optimized with f.e. strategic spare parts to lower
the consequences. HIHP failures, given their higher probability, can be optimized by both
replacement decisions and consequence control measures.

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Expert judgment can also be used in combination with a Markov Decision model. This Decision
model is based on a number of discrete system states. In practice, 4 states ranging from as good as
new to failed are sufficient to describe degradation.

figure 33 Finite number of system states in a Markov Decision model

In figure 33, over a constant time step the probability is 0.75 that in 1 time step the component still
is As Good As New (state 1, cell B2). The probability that in 1 time step the component will be
appreciable degraded is 0.05 (cell D2). Similarly, given that the component has started to degrade
(state 2, cell E3), the probability that the component over 1 time step the component has failed is
0.20.

Probabilities like this can conveniently be estimated from maintenance records as shown in figure
34 or with the help of expert judgment. The example is for an electric motor bearing driving a
gypsum pump, however exercises like this can also be carried out for steam turbines, boilers, etc.

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figure 34 System states derivable from maintenance records

The Markov model with discrete system states, when simulated with Monte Carlo analysis, results
in a probability distribution for the degradation as shown in figure 35. A next step is overhaul
and/or inspection optimization. Stochastic optimization techniques allow varying the interval
instead of using a fixed interval.

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figure 35 Condition as a function of time by Markov modelling

Some optimization results are shown in figure 36. Comparison with figure 36 shows that the
(genetic) optimization technique used tends to a first inspection about half way the 50 % failure
time, followed by subsequent inspections closer to the average failure time while still in the
degradation area, in order to replace the equipment without failure. It is recommended to use this
technique for the inspection and overhaul of ageing equipment instead of the usual interval
extensions when nothing is found during inspection.

figure 36 Inspection optimisation

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Finally, the RAM data should be input to an economical Return on Investment ROI model as
shown in figure 37.

figure 37 RAM data

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6 Conclusions and recommendations
From data analysis on generic power plant databases and from plant specific failure information it
is found that only for a limited number of power plant components one can expect an increase in
failure rate or repair time. The increase in failure rate is generally called ageing, the increase in
repair time may be due to obsolescence, spare parts that are difficult to acquire or failures with
larger consequences (for instance generator failures). Also decreases as a function of age occur in
the failure rate of specific components. On average, when maintained properly, the Forced
Unavailability FOR does not increase.

A type of roller coaster behaviour in FOR seems to exist between 20 years and 40 years of age
with a large spread between individual units. A number of power plants older than 25 years has
many problems with specific boiler components. However, failure records show that these are
more related to the vintage design and to minimal maintenance than due to ageing.

Components that are worth to investigate during formal life extension programs are:
o Cold & hot reheat steam
o Boiler controls
o Specific boiler components (f.i. bottom ash)
o Desuperheaters
o Condenser (if no titanium is applied)
o Flue gas fans, air heaters, duct expansion joints, dampers
o Preheaters
o LP en IP turbine
o Turbine controls and valves
While for most electrical component no ageing seems to occur, recent experience shows that
generators and step-up transformers are suspect.

If calculated indicators for remaining life are followed well, maintenance and inspection is
adequate, and attention is given to some typical ageing items, an increased unavailability and trip
frequency between 25 and 40 years is not to expect. When ageing is found, it should be
investigated whether this is due to ageing or to minimal maintenance in combination with cycling
operation. From unavailability data, it was found that regulation authority attention to emission
aspects of the old plant might increase.

Maintenance and inspection intervals for old power plants should not be simply extended when
nothing is found during inspection. It could be optimum to go for increased inspection near
expected failure time on the basis of measurements and/or life models. Inspection frequencies can
be optimised using a Markov model.

In order to assist in making replacement decisions in a formal Life Extension program, one should
use reliability modelling for the plant before and after “life extension” to balance the costs for
modification / renewal of components with gains in availability, efficiency, etc. The models

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should incorporate “normal” failures, ageing and High Impact Low Probabilty (HILP) failures.
Models should be validated with plant specific data. With limited amount of failure information,
expert judgement is necessary. This can be based on a Delphi estimate of the failure probability of
components.

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Literature

[1] Nelson, “A statistical Prediction Interval for Availability”, IEEE Transactions in

Reliability, vol. R-19, 1970

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appendix A Unavailability of individual VGB plants

(the plots show examples of unavailability, some 20 plants were analysed)

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