1. Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR No.

160261, November 10, 2003

Topic: Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution

Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by
the 11th Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on
22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.”

Issues:

1. WON, the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
2. WON, Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

3. WON, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of
the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the
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sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.

2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

2. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, GR No. 122156, February 03, 1997
Topic: Self-Executing Provisions

Facts:
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• The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder,
or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.

• In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

• Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995
petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Bid Security to match the bid of the Renong
Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

• Hence, petitioner filed a petition in Cour and invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution “Filipino first policy” and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also
argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business
of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provision of Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is
self-executing or non-self-executing?

RULING:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.

a. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found
in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

b. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the

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 constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

c. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from
which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.

3. Pamatong vs. COMELEC, GR No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Topic: Self-Executing Provisions

FACTS:

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 ● Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17,
2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s
Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however,
was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to
include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
● On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration
● The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other
aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No.
6604 dated February 11, 2004

● The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

● petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral
process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations
under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the
validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner? / WON COMELEC
rendered violation of petitioner’s right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987?

RULING: No.

1. Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely
a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. (Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates"
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the
COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
)Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
2. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

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 COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC is directed to hold
and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch

4. Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Topic: Amendment/Revision

FACTS:

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On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been
passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for
in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law –
as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so
whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:

RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this
constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation
Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional
action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for
whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA
6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads
in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when
the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a people’s initiative.

5. Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 26, 2006

Topic: Amendment/Revision of the Constitution

Facts:
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On 15 February 2006, petitioners Lambino et. al, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution.

On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at 3% of its registered voters. They
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the said 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI- Legislative Department and Sections 1-4 of Article VII- Executive Department and by adding Article
XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications
in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or Not, Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether or Not, the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and

3. Whether or Not, the subject of Lambino proposal involves an Amendment or a Revision.

Ruling:

Issue 1: The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

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The Court cited the following reasons for holding that there was failure to comply with Section 2, Art. XVII
of the Constitution: (a) the initiative petition did not present the full text of the proposed amendments;
and, (b) the proposed changes constituted revision, not amendment.

The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should
be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before
they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people
signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after
the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

Issue 2: The Court said No. The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend
the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

Issue 3: The Lambino proposal constituted a revision, not simply an amendment, of the Constitution,
because it involved a change in the form of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and a shift from the
present bicameral to a a unicameral legislature.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks and balances. There is also revision if the change
alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces, deletes, without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the Constitution; while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.

In determining whether the Lambino proposal involves an amendment or a revision, the Court considered the
two-part test. First, the quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions
as to change directly the “substance entirety” of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change. Second, the qualitative test, which inquiries into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
9
Constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far-reaching changes in the nature
of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision”. Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests,
the subject initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Whether there is an alteration in the structure
of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Quantitatively, the proposed changes overhaul two articles –
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive –affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

6. Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001

Topic: Who exercise the Power of Judicial Review

Facts:

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
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Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The
Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and to sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to
the payment of their obligations to it.

In November 1974, President Marcos issued PD 579, authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export to the US and other foreign markets. The decree further authorized PNB
to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of
other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked
petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real
properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No.
579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to
the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB
with the RTC in Bacolod City.

The RTC declared P.D. 579 unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID.

The Court of Appeals renders judgment REVERSING the appealed Decision.

Issue:

WON, the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional/ and WON, it was proper for the TC
to have exercised judicial review without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to
submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

Ruling:

It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in the Supreme Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or
treaties with the Constitution.

However, in all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order or proclamation —
and not just in actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies — notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory, as required in Sec. 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
:SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive
order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive
order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.
Thus, where, as in Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word shall is used, a mandatory duty is
imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.
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The purpose of this mandatory notice is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court.
In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the trial court
ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the
constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the
required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the
questioned presidential decrees.

7 . Loius “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010/Rep.Edcel C. Lagman, et. Al.
vs. Exec. Sec Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et. Al, GR No. 192935 & GR No. 19303, December 7, 2010

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

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PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power
of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but
a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

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RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is
governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

14
9. Lacson vs. Perez, GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Actual Case or Controversy

FACTS:
● On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang.
● President Macapagal Arroyo then, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region.

15
 ● She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests
of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
● Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave
a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court.
➢ G.R. No. 147780 –prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus
➢ G.R. No. 147781 – mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for temporary restraining prede
➢ G.R. No. 147799 – prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/
restraining order.
➢ G.R. No. 147810 – certiorari and prohibition
● On May 6, 2001, President ordered the lifting of the declaration of the “state of rebellion”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners should be dismissed for being rendered moot and academic?

RULING:
Yes, petitions are dismissed for being moot and academic.
Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no
complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for
since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to. As of the date the court
hears the pleas of the respondents, no complaints or charges have been file against any petitioners for any
crime. Furthermore, the lifting of the state of rebellion makes the case moot and academic. Petitions are
dismissed adding petitioners are enjoined from arrest without necessary judicial warrant for all acts committed
in relation or connection to the May 1 siege of Malacañang.

10. Enrile vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Pimentel, GR No. 132986, May 19, 2004

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Actual Case or Controversy

Facts:

On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest
against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections.

On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined, the SET
required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the total precints involved.
16
On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and
tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation
presented, the petitioner’s name dropped to the 15th position in the senatorial race.

On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentel’s Protest and to
Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed
separate comments alleging petitioner’s motion is premature considering the SET has not resolved
respondent’s election protest.

Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioner’s motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation.
The SET also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution that
denied petitioner’s Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest and to conduct another
Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties.

Issue:

Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said petition.

Held:

The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial position
subject to respondent’s protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot considering there is no more
actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any merit.

Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering the
resolution of no practical use or value.

11. David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Actual Case or Controversy

FACTS:

● On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency due to
the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of Oplan Hackle I to assassinate selected
targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself and is to be implemented by
General Order No. 5.
17
● The aim of the said law was to to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence and any connivance or rebellion to bring down the government.
● The following are factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
o On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento,
Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the
Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City
o On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which
detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni
Homecoming in Baguio City
o On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
province. Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalo’s D-Day
would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."
o On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the
PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect.
o By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several
cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation.
● On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist.
● In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
● In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They
also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017
● In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one
(21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael
Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of
martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed
forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that
there is necessity to do so."
● In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and
the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
● In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418
of Article III, (c)Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.
● In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and
unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really
a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of
emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017
"goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative
Code."
● And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
"unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as
freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed
18
 under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances
prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
ISSUE:

1. WON Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5)?/WON the court can excercise judicial review?

2. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

RULING:

NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY( NOT MOOT AND ACADEMIC)

1. No. The Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being moot;
second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485
(Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for
petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal
basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of
grievances.

2. PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way

● Review of Factual Bases

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming
part of the records.

● . "Facial Challenge" / Overbreadth

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.The overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the
American Law as First Amendment cases.103

● Calling-out Power Doctrine

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that
goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the
Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a
state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

19
 rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power
to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP
1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President

Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.

● "Take Care" Power

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees
similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws
which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate "decrees.”

Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."

● Power to Take Over

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can
be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress

However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124

20
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In addition,
the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

12. Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 159085, February 159085, February 3, 2004

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Actual Case or Controversy

Facts:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in
Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and
the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
21
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State
of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA
VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding
the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they
contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress
has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

RULING:

Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a
juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it
alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention
for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been
invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[]s
right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion
and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

22
13. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et. Al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 1910032, G.R.
No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Actual Case or Controversy

Facts:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement
of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
23
 thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits
the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

On February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than
February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio
Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval.
The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13,
2010.

Issues/Ruling:

1. WON, the petitioners have locus standi.

Black defines locus standi as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. The Court rules that the
petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest
them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the
people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the
petitioners), regardless of one’s personal interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the
authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice,
but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of vacancies
in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country. In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive
the requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental
importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the requirement.

2. WON, the petitions set forth an Actual Case or Controvery.

The Court held the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in
a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno
as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of
nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial

24
 determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short
list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.

The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the authority of the
JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of
nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short
list to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the
short list to the incumbent President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next
President; the strong position that the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII
from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010;
and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited are only some of the real issues for
determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy, considering that for some the short list
must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an
abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality
the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

3. May the Incumbent president may appoint his successor considering that Section 15, of Article VII-
Executive Department prohibits the her from making appointments within the two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of her term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Yes. She can appoint.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec.15, Article VII to the appointment of the members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the said prohibition does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

4. What is the relevance of Section 4(1), Article VIII – Judicial Department of the Constitution,
which provides that “Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filed within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor? May the JBC resume process of screening
the candidates nominated or being considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent President even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, of Article
VII?

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointment to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII ( Executive Department), provides:
“Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to execute positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety”.

25
The Other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
“The Supreme court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.”

The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in Judiciary, because their establishment
of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and the screening of the candidates for judicial positions
to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would be no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary. Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments
to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming election, or of satisfying
partisan considerations.

14. Atty. Elvillo C. Pormento vs. Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections, GR No.
191988, August 31, 2010

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Actual Case or Controversy

FACTS:
● On May 11, 1998, respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected as President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections.
● He was however ousted [“resigned” according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs.
Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish his term.
● He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010 to which the petitioner,
Atty. Pormento opposed the former candidacy and filed a petition for disqualifications. However, his
26
 petition was denied by the Second Division of Commission of elections. His motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
● On May 7, 2010, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. . However, under the Rules of Court,
the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered
the second highest number of votes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President shall not be eligible for re-election as the proper interpretation of the provisions of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?

RULING:
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran [in the May 2010 elections]. Since the
issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” will be premised on a person’s second
(whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case.
No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy
that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively
be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result
as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence,
one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There
is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly
elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his “reelection” will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

27
15. IBP vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Proper Party

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Ejercito
Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines
in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare

28
 the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that
petitioner has no legal standing to assail.

Issue:

Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to assist PNP to
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?

Decision: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the case.

16. Senate vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 169777, April 20 2006

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Proper Party

FACTS:

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly
the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain
department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted
that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need

29
immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO
464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and
were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

In connection with the facts above and the implementation of EO 464’s various petitions were filed:
● On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari
and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
● In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, Courage, an organization of government
employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), all claiming to have standing to file the
suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O.
464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
● In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen,
taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that
E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
● In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17
legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the
poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the
Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by
E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that
respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it.

● On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the
resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it
has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information of great
public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777
and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

30
 ● On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it
hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a
constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the persons challenging the validity of the subject are the proper party as a requisite
for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review?

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39

Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the
disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.

Standing
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and
169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive
department in the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the
constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the
exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any
specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired
by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its
committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.

As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and
that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of
the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them
as parties "injured-in-fact."

Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for
the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct
injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties
to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

31
Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin and Valmonte v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due
to the enforcement of E.O. 464.

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-
making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464, however,
allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.
Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of
the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives
as legislators.

In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel
Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela)
are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation
called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of
E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional
rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.

The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in
the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative
process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the
standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.

In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the
incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members, invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed
and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights and to the
maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of
checks and balances.

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of
laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental
issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be
accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of
the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of
32
 a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government,
and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.54
The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner
PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is
vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political
parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves
in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as
a political party does not suffice to to clothe it with legal standing.

17. Chavez vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Raised by the Proper Party

Facts:
On 24 June 2004, Congress, acting as national board of canvassers, proclaimed President Arroyo winner in the 2004
presidential elections over her rival, Fernando Poe, Jr. Sometime before June 6, 2005, the radio station dzMM
aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004
elections to favor President Arroyo.

On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he
played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman
33
and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of
the second compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to COMELEC)
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano . However, on June 9, 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s
voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all. Meanwhile, other individuals went public,
claiming possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes.

Respondent Raul M. Gonzales, the Secretary of the Department of Justice, ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The NTC then issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a
"cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.
The NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP) issued a joint press statement
expressing commitment to press freedom.

On June 1, 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the
"acts, issuances, and orders" of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1)
respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned
radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

The respondent raised threshold objections that (1) petitioner has no standing to litigate and (2) the petition
fails to meet the case or controversy requirement in constitutional adjudication. On the merits, respondents
claim that (1) the NTC's press release of 11 June 2005 is a mere "fair warning," not censorship, cautioning
radio and television networks on the lack of authentication of the Garci Tapes and of the consequences of
airing false or fraudulent material, and (2) the NTC did not act ultra vires in issuing the warning to radio and
television stations.

Issue:

WON, the petitioner has legal standing to file the petition.

Ruling:

Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the
present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government
action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such
citizen. The government action may chill into silence those to whom the action is directed. Any citizen must be
allowed to take up the cudgels for those who have been cowed into inaction because freedom of expression
is a vital public right that must be defended by everyone and anyone.

Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society,
is of transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest
opportunity. The Court held that any concerned citizen has standing to raise an issue of transcendental
importance to the nation, and thus, the petitioner in this present petition raises such issue has the legal
standing.

34
18. Ople vs. Torres 293 SCRA 141

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Proper Party

FACTS:

●President Fidel V. Ramos issues A.O. No. 308 on December 12, 1996.
●A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997.
● On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
● On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
ISSUES:

WON Administrative Order No. 308 is unconstitutional / WON there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

RULING:

Yes. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. We
will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution.

35
The court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations:
(1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services

It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But
what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode
and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may
pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

19. Matibog vs. Benipayo GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Earliest Possible Opportunity

Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the EID and was
reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made
appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and
Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the
pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of
their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum removing
petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department. Petitioner requested for
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the
right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may exercise its
power of judicial review in constitutional cases. Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites
are absent in this case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest
in the case because she has not sustained a direct injury as a result of the ad interim appointments of
36
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not
claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does
petitioner claim to be directly injured by the appointments of these three respondents.

Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments
at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact that the ad
interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the
petition was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its power of
judicial review in constitutional cases?

RULING:

Yes, Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law Department,
where she was placed on detail service.[20] Respondents claim that the reassignment was pursuant to x x x
Benipayos authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as the Commissions Chief Executive
Officer.[21] Evidently, respondents anchor the legality of petitioners reassignment on Benipayos authority as
Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of
the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis
if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution.

On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office in accordance
with the Constitution, then petitioners reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the
reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake
in the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayos assumption of office. Petitioners personal and substantial
injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the
constitutional issue in this petition.

Respondents harp on petitioners belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments
of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad
interimappointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the petition
that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity
to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same,
such that, if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.[22] Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest
opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may
determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon.[23]
There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time.

Moreover, the legality of petitioners reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of Benipayos ad interim
appointment and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayos ad interim appointment and
assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioners reassignment from the EID to the Law Department
cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

37
20. Arceta vs Judge Mangrobang, GR No. 152895, June 15, 2004

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Lis Mota (Cause of Suit or Action) of the Case

Facts:

On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued a check to Oscar Castro payable to cash for the amount of Php
740k even with full knowledge that the account has no sufficient fund for the said amount. The check was
subsequently dishonoured by the bank. The City Prosecutor of Metro Manila charged Arceta of violating BP
Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). She did not moved for the charge to be dismissed and pleaded not guilty. She
then petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 citing the
Lozano doctrine.

Issue:

Whether or not the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 is the lis mota of the case?

Decision:

Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. Every law has in its favour the presumption of constitutionality. To
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution and not one that is
speculative, doubtful or argumentative. Petitioner failed to show that BP Blg 22 by itself or by implementation
transgressed a provision of the Constitution. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners have
not come to us with sufficient cause of action.

38
21. Dante V. Liban, et. Al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review: Must be the lis mota of the case

Facts:

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter,
filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited
His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon
ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
“No Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.”

Formerly, in the Court’s Decision dated July 15, 2009, it was held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT
a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Respondent Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of
the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office
in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a
private corporation.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The
PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
39
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and
the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

Issue:

WON, the Court was correct to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC charter?

Ruling:

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the
very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.

As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by
the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis
mota of the case. The court reiterated the rule as to when will it consider the issue of constitutionality. The
Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that
a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground
upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be
left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

Under such rule, therefore, the Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should
have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the
Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this
declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more
than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

40
22. Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., GR No.
179532, May 20, 2011

Topic: Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality / Partial Unconstitutionality

FACTS:

Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. The contract of employment entered
into by Yap and Capt. Francisco B. Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for duration of 12
months.

On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or
about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
was informed about the sale on 06 December 2001 in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento. Yap, along with the
other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with
respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted
that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed
from employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.

Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Labor
Arbiter, to which the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding that the petitioner have
been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents. The NLRC affirmed the decision but held that
instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three
months as provided under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner however questions the award of wages and
assails Sec. 10 of R.A. 8042 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

41
Whether or not 5th par. Sec 10 of R.A. 8042 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

Yes. The Court declared in Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime that the clause “or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the
laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in Serrano,
pertinently held:

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim
of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs
and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; hence, the same violates not just therein petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also his right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

42
23. League of Cities of the Phils. represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et. Al. vs.
COMELEC, et. al. GR No. 176951/GR No. 177499/ GR No. 178056/ August 24, 2010

Topic: Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality / Partial Unconstitutionality

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog,
and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood
Laws

FACTS:

● During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
● During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
"the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6
● After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29,8which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
● During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
● On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June

43
 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.11
● The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
● Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share
of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code

ISSUE:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING:

1. Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

● No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in
any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units
at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

44
 (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-
three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress.

The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities
from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

2. Yes. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level
of income of a municipality.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

45
24. Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155

Topic: Police Power

Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Facts:

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities
herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese
businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed
the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to
engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it
contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause
(pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause
“does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that
the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the
statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

46
25. Tiu vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

Topic: Police Power

Facts:

The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential
Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue
Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported
blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program.”

“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent
(50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the
tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.”

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms
including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have
greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a
sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of
sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at
P450 Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.

47
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

Issues:

Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power

RULING:

The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely
venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the
authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 10

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the
realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax,
imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30%
amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but
which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the
viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the
video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax
was to favor one industry over another.

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.

48
26. Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343

Topic: Police Power

FACTS:

● G.R. No. 79777

o The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these
lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
o Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229,
and R.A. No. 6657.
o The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. In connection with the
determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a
court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines.
o The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the
agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on
the owners of other properties.
o E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure
would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their
lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
● G.R. No. 79310
o The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of
1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229.
o The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree
that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could
do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming
that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.

49
 o They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229
● G.R. No. 79744
o The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of
due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
o The petitioner argues that:
▪ (1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
▪ (2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
▪ (3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution.
o The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers
● G.R. No. 78742
o The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by
tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

ISSUE:

1.WON there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2.WON there is a violation of due process
3.Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
4.WON Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the
Constitution
5. WON Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention
limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution
6. WON E.O No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be
expressed in its title
7. WON the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of
the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
RULING:

1. No. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. No evidence
has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see.
2. No. The judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the
executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. It is worth stressing at this point

50
 that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are
retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657.
3. Yes. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial
law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on
that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the
Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. Neither is it correct to say
that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they
continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts.
A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature
that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect
of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
4. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for
that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is
to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is only incidental
to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article
VI, are not applicable.
5. No. The argument no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the
law. . This section declares:
● Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according
to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
6. No. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if
the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
7. No. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes of payment shall
be permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the just compensation is
not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to
the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the
lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land,
the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than
the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all
the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
51
 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the
retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as
to costs.

27. MMDA vs. Bel-Ait Village Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

Topic: Police Power: Who exercise’s the power

Facts:

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner
of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December
22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential
subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan
Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall
approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly
Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati
Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.

On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the RTC in Makati City for injunction.
Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the
opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order the following day.

The appellate Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's
proposed action. On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case
finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and
cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by
ordinance.

Issue:

WON, The MMDA’s Mandate to open Neptune Street to Public Traffic Pursuant to Its Regulatory and Police
Powers?

Ruling:

No.
52
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of
these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards
and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport
system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under the service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to
set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management
programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. Thus, MMDA may not order the opening of
Neptune St. in the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as it does not possess delegated police power

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary
and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public
morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs."

The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate."—
one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of
1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
53
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body
of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the
sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the
barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may
be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code . . . " The same Code gives the
sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants thereon.

54
28. Francisco vs. Fernando, GR No. 166501, November 16, 2006

Topic: Who exercises Police Power

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays
for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its wet flag scheme
(Flag Scheme). The Mandamus writ is to compel respondents to respect and uphold the rights of pedestrians
to due process and equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing body, the
Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary
punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman
punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is valid?

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that
he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress
the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under
either category.

Nor is there merit to petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the
“transcendental importance” of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the
transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it
must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.
Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation.
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On the Flag Scheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the
MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic
management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for
respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and
similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules
and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City
does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that
city.

29. MMDA vs. Viron Transportation, GR No. 170656, August 15, 2007

Topic: Who exercises the police power

Facts:

GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic
congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to “decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located
along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport
system.” The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They
alleged that the MMDA didn’t have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they
asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDA’s power under RA 7924. They also asked if the
MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.

Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the Pre-Trial
Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDA’s power to regulate
traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly
established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is
consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived
of their real properties without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality.

Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time
holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under
Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s
existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the
cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure
and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp
failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate
plan to close down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate
with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway
corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.

Issues:

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1. Is there a justiciable controversy?

2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?

Held:

Yes to both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination

It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus
terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls
thereat. Precisely, respondents claima deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process
of law.

Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they
have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.’s] enforcement." Consequently, the
established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents.

2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private investment in the
development of the country’s intermodal transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to
administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA,
which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the
authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one
so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the
limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to
MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and
regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining
to enforcement, engineering and education.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement
the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to
undertake the Project.
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MMDA’s move didn’t satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private,
concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of
Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.

Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory
measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As
such, measures calculatedto promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the
regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed
immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?

De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be
considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so
broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service
Act.

Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such conditions as
to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may
reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public
service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.

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30. Lim vs. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649

Topic: Tests for Valid Exercise: Lawful Subject

FACTS:

Sec 3 of the Presidential Decree No. 771 expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.

Judge Pacquing had earlier issued the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila,
Hon. Alfredo S. Lim:

order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of
Associated Development Corporation (ADC).

order directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order
dated 28 March 1994.

order reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated
Development Corporation (ADC).

ISSUE:

Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August
1975 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or
unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended
by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the
unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division
in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional,
since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.

And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid
franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its
officials or agents (see Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

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Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to
the City of Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No.
115044 in the exercise, not of its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental
functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare.

8. Sanggalang vs. Intermediate Appelate Court, 176 SCRA 719

Topic: Tests for Valid Exercise: Lawful Subject

FACTS:

● Jose Sangalang, joined by his wife Lutgarda Sangalang, herein petitioners are both residents of No.
110 Jupiter Street, Makati, Metro Manila. Sangalang and other petitioners who are also residents of
Jupiter Street initially filed a case against Ayala to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement
upon property, specifically the Bel- Air Village subdivision in Makati, Metro Manila, pursuant to
stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale covering the subdivision, and for damages.
● The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and spouse Gaston and spouse and Briones
and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions
and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale.
● When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the whole stretch of
the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to
Zodiac Street in the east, was still undeveloped.
● So in 1966, although it was not part of the original plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the
commercial block along Jupiter Street. In 1970, the fence or wall was partly destroyed by typhoon
"Yoling." The destroyed portions were subsequently rebuilt by the appellant. (Copuyoc TSN, pp. 31-34,
Feb. 12, 1982).
● When Jupiter Street was widened in 1972 by 3.5 meters, the fence or wall had to be destroyed. Upon
request of BAVA, the wall was rebuilt inside the boundary of the commercial block.
● On April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the
zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. 18-
A). However, under this ordinance, Bel-Air Village is simply bounded in the South-Southeast by Jupiter
Street-not anymore up to the center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. B).
● Under the above zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common boundary of Bel-Air
Village and the commercial zone.
● On January 17, 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati wrote BAVA directing that, in the interest of
public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, the streets in Bel-Air Village should be
opened for public use. BAVA voluntarily opened the streets in Bel-Air except Jupiter Street.
● Municipal Engineer and the Station Commander of the Makati Police were ordered to open for public
use Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street.
● June 10, 1977, the Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised the latter to
open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire portion of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to
Reposo Street
● On August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed and
removed the gates constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the
gates/fences located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the
entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic. (Exh. 17, BAVA Petition, pars. 16 and 17).
● On October 29, 1979, the plaintiffs-appellees Jose D. Sangalang and Lutgarda D. Sangalang brought
the present action for damages against the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both
breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict A supplemental complaint was later filed by said appellees
60
 seeking to augment the reliefs prayed for in the original complaint because of alleged supervening
events which occurred during the trial of the case.

ISSUE:

WON MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power

RULING:

Yes.

Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not
shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the
Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare.
The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the
judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no reversible error to have been committed by the Court of
Appeals.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, these petitions are DENIED

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