Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No.

231658, 4 July 2017

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President, on May 25, 2017, submitted to
Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. After the submission of
the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it found “no compelling reason” to revoke
Proclamation 216. The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned
the Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of martial
law.
What is the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine and where is it applicable?
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." A statute or
act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. It is best to stress
that the vagueness doctrine (and facial challenges) has a special application only to free-speech
cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes
Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 is vague and thus void because of (a) its inclusion of
"other rebel groups"; and (b) the absence of any guideline specifying its actual operational
parameters within the entire Mindanao region?
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted.
Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
that may be facially challenged. What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. It is actually a
call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. Like Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct,
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained. The term "other rebel
groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that
accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in
Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.