Mark Clemente y Martinez v.

People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 194367
15 June 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioners
appeal. The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner
gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail bakery but was
refused because it was found out that it was fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the matter to jail officers. Consequently,
the jail guards conducted a surprise inspection and found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the accused. The
defense of the accused was the defense of frame up. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the counterfeit money were
discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money were
planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces involved. As to the elements of the
crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in petitioner’s possession were forgeries was confirmed by
the certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On appeal before the CA, petitioner
argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner
contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the
informant Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.

Issue: Whether all the elements of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note in this case are present?

Resolution: Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession
and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other
obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to
bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or
falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. In this
case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit
bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in
court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy
soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal
knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based
on the personal knowledge. In this case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's
evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit
bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it
did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it evidence of an essential element of the crime.
 People of the Philippines v. Urban Salcedo, et al
G.R No. 186523
22 June 2011
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: This is a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals about kidnapping case of Abu Sayyaf Group of Shiela Tabunag,
Reina Malonzo, Ediborah Yap and Joel Guillo. In Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of Joel Guillo,
accused-appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua; in Criminal Case No. 3608-1164, for the kidnapping of Reina
Malonzo, they were sentenced to Death; in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for the kidnapping of Sheila Tabuñag, they
were sentenced to Death; and in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the kidnapping of Ediborah Yap, they were also
sentenced to Death. In the Brief for Accused-Appellants filed with the CA, it was argued that the prosecution’s evidence
was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It was further averred that some of the accused-appellants were
merely forced to join the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) for fear for their lives and those of their relatives, while four (4) of
them, namely, Wahid Salcedo, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Nadzmer Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar, were supposedly minors
at the time the alleged kidnapping took place; hence, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344 (otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), should apply to said accused-appellants. It was then prayed that accused-appellants
Nadzmer Isnani Madangan, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Wahid Salcedo, Kamar Jaafar, Abdulajid Ngaya, Lidjalon Sakandal
and Sonny Asali be acquitted, while the sentence for the rest of the accused-appellants be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether to change the penalty imposed because the State had not been able to prove accused-appellants' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that the defense failed to adduce proof of minority of the four accused-appellants.

Resolution: The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Records reveal that the prosecution witnesses were unwavering
in their account of how accused-appellants worked together to abduct and guard their kidnapped victims, fight-off
military forces who were searching and trying to rescue said victims, and how ransom was demanded and paid. The
prosecution likewise presented two former members of the ASG who testified that they were part of the group that
reinforced the kidnappers and helped guard the hostages. They both identified accused-appellants as their former
comrades. In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accused-appellants could muster are denial and alibi, and for
accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, their alleged minority. Accused-appellants' proffered
defense are sorely wanting when pitted against the prosecution’s evidence. It is established jurisprudence that denial and
alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive identification of the accused-appellants. The detention of the hostages
lasted for several months and they were transferred from one place to another, being always on the move for several days.
Thus, in this case, for accused-appellants' alibi to prosper, they are required to prove their whereabouts for all those
months. This they were not able to do, making the defense of alibi absolutely unavailing.
 People of the Philippines v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.
G.R No. 178771
8 June 2011
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: This is an appeal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
and of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. About the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia,
Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, Lando and Al, being then armed with a hand gun,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and
superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas, hog
tied him, brought to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave. In his defense, Lando denied having committed
the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in
Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia,
Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his
companions if any person or vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow
what was ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed, including the
members of his family who were in Cebu.

Issue: Are the appellants guilty of murder and kidnapping and serious illegal detention?

Resolution: The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
For Murder:
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of May
7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial
evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime. Moreover, there was a
conspiracy between the perpetrators and the defense of denial was not given weight since there was a positive
identification of the accused by the witness, AAA. As to the defense of alibi, aside from the testimony of appellant Lando
that he was in Tarlac at the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for
Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime.

For Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention:

The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape. The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants Lando and Al,
both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the Estrellas and held her captive against
her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was deprived of her
liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in
an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. The crime of rape was also
established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of
threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred
and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and
Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando raped her.
 People of the Philippines v. Efren Patelan Lambarte et al
G.R No. 182918
6 June 2011
BRION, J.:

Facts: At about 6:00 p.m. of September 22, 2004, Eulalia Garcia was tending her sari-sari store along the National Highway in
San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union when the appellant and Lamberte came to borrow her gas lamp. She noticed that both
were drunk and armed. They said they were looking for a bullet that fell on the ground. After finding the bullet, she asked
them where they were going and they answered, “We are going to kill the doctor.” The two then waited under a mango
tree. Shortly thereafter, the victim, on board a truck, passed by Garcia’s store on the way to his poultry farm. The
appellant and Lamberte followed on foot. Ten minutes later, Garcia heard two gunshots coming from the direction of the
poultry farm. It appears that the victim arrived at his poultry farm at around 7:00 p.m. to deliver medicines and bread to
his workers, Alvin Manolong, Crispino Yaranon and Ferrer Anasario. After the delivery, the victim instructed the workers
to resume their work. The workers then proceeded to Building 1 and left the victim standing beside his truck near
Building 5. Subsequently, the workers heard gunfire coming from the victim’s direction. Manolong went down to
investigate. On hearing a second shot, Manolong ran towards the parked truck and saw the victim lying on the ground
with a gunshot wound in his stomach. Manolong called his companions, yelling that the victim had been shot.
Both the Regional trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the perpetrators guilty.

Issue: Whether the qualifying, aggravating and mitigating circumstances were properly appreciated or not?

Resolution: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly prove that a conspiracy existed in the commission of the crime.
Garcia testified that the appellant and Lamberte had the common design of killing the victim. The fact that each one was
armed with a firearm shows that they acted with the singular purpose of killing the victim. Both accused threatened
workers Manolong, Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they tell anyone that they (accused) killed the victim. Under
these facts, it does not matter who actually shot the victim because of the conspiracy that existed. In conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all; each of the accused is equally guilty of the crime committed. The CA correctly appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery as the victim was shot at the back. However, the CA misappreciated the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the
evidence of the crime itself, of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and
execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Moreover, the CA erred in crediting the
appellant with the mitigating circumstance of intoxication simply because Garcia testified that “the accused were both
drunk. In this case, there is no convincing proof of the nature and effect of the appellant’s intoxication. The mitigating
circumstance of intoxication cannot be appreciated in the appellant’s favor merely on the testimony of a prosecution
witness that he was drunk during the incident. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of
the felony, the proper imposable penalty on the appellant is reclusion perpetua.
 People of the Philippines v. Joseph Mostrales y Abad
G.R No.184925
15 June 2011
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: On April 18, 2002, the accused Joseph Mostrales, Diosdado Santos, Ronnie Tan conspiring and confederating together
with @ JOHN-JOHN, @ KUMANDER AGUILA, @ KUMANDER KIDLAT AND TEN (10) JOHN DOES, kidnapped
MA. ANGELA VINA DEE PINEDA and threatening to kill her if the ransom amounting to eleven million pesos will not
be given to them. Upon arraignment on July 30, 2002, Joseph Mostrales (Mostrales) pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Both his co-accused, Diosdado Santos (Santos) and Ronnie Tan (Tan), remained at-large as of the date of promulgation of
the CA Decision.The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty and was sentenced to suffer Death. Moreover, he was
ordered to pay eleven million pesos for the unrecovered ransom money, two million pesos for moral damages, and
P268,093.37 as compensatory damages. On the other hand, the decision of the Court of Appeals is they affirmed with the
Regional Trial Court’s decision with modifications of lowering the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.

Issue: Whether all the elements of kidnapping are present in this case?

Resolution: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals with the sole MODIFICATION that the award
of moral damages to private complainant and her parents is increased to P200,000.00.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of kidnapping:
(1) The offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim or a public officer who has a duty under
the law to detain a person;
(2) He kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) The act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4) In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority;
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.
Moreover, as the CA emphatically stated, “the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the
assailant has been established by the witnesses. The accused failed to sufficiently prove that it was physically impossible
for him to have been present at the place where the crime was committed. The accused himself testified that if traffic was
light, it would only take three to four hours to commute from Umingan, Pangasinan to Manila. Travel time may even be
reduced significantly to less than three hours if one would travel using a private vehicle. Thus, as the CA concluded, it
was physically possible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime in Mandaluyong City in the early hours of
November 12, 2001, and in Umingan, Pangasinan on the same day before noon.
 People of the Philippines v. Angelito Esquibel y Jesus
G.R No. 192465
8 June 2011
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: On February 7, 2003 in Manila, Angelito Esquibel y Jesus stabbed and hit CLARK BALOLOY y TACSAGON thereby
inflicting upon the latter a stab wound on the abdomen which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
The accused pleaded not guilty and asserted self defense. The prosecution and the defense presented two different
versions of the facts and witnesses. In its Decision dated 24 October 2007, the RTC found Esquibel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The RTC accorded full faith and credence to the
testimony of Gaboy and disregarded Esquibel’s claim of self-defense. The RTC stated that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was duly established by direct and positive evidence. Gaboy, the eyewitness, convincingly narrated the details
and circumstances of how Baloloy was killed, showing that Esquibel knowingly chose the mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of the crime without risk to himself. The RTC further stated that Esquibel’s version of self-defense was
self-serving and cannot be given credence over the positive and credible testimony of Gaboy.
The accused filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, affimed the decision of the Regional Trial Court stating
that they found no cogent reason to depart from the rule that matters concerning the credibility of the witnesses in
criminal cases are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Since the trial court is in the best position to assess and
observe the witness’ demeanor, conduct and attitude under a grueling examination, the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. The CA stated that Gaboy’s testimony was consistent, unwavering and
straightforward. Esquibel’s defense that there were alleged inconsistencies in Gaboy’s testimony are trivial and
insignificant and do not contravene Gaboy’s testimony that she directly witnessed Esquibel stabbing Baloloy.

Issue: Whether treachery as a qualifying circumstance is present in the case?

Resolution: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the
crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus, insuring its commission without
risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim. The sudden attack by Esquibel with a bladed
weapon, with Baloloy’s back against him, was undoubtedly treacherous. Baloloy was washing his hands outside his house
when Esquibel appeared out of nowhere and stabbed him. Baloloy was unprepared and had no means to put up a defense.
Such aggression insured the commission of the crime without risk on Esquibel. The Supreme Court agreed with the
decision of the lower courts with modifications on the amounts of civil indemnity, temperate damages, and exemplary
damages are increased to P75,000, P25,000, and P30,000, respectively.
 People of the Philippines v. Jonie Dominguez
G.R No. 191065
13 June 2011
SERENO, J.:

Facts: Jonie Dominguez, the accused, molested his grandnieces AAA and BBB, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
while armed with a knife. AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the instances of rape, until their mother accidentally
discovered the commission of the crimes from the accused himself. Overhearing Dominguez in one of his drinking
sessions, boasting that the children's vaginas were already wide, she confronted her daughters and asked them about the
remark. The children reluctantly confided to her what had happened. As a result, the girls were brought to a doctor for
examination and found AAA’s hymen intact, but did not discount the fact that the child could have been molested. In
contrast, BBB was found to have old hymenal lacerations. According to their testimonies, the accused had employed
trickery so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone with him and thereafter raped, with threats of harm to her person
or her family. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecutor’s evidence was doubtful.The charges against him, he says,
were just fabricated, since the parents of the victims had an axe to grind against him. He claims that he had loaned an
amount to the victim’s aunt, who is the sister of the victims’ father. When he demanded the return of the money, the
victims’ parents got mad at him. He insinuates that these ill feelings were the reason why he was falsely charged by AAA
and BBB. Another point being raised by the accused-appellant concerns the consistency of AAA's testimony. He
argues that the inconsistencies in her testimony taint her credibility. In effect, he claims that since rape is a traumatic
event for the victim, there was no way AAA could have forgotten or been mistaken about it, including its place of
occurrence, had rape really happened. Specifically, the accused is arguing that since AAA mentioned two places -- their
house and the back of the school – her testimony was not credible.

Issue: Whether elements of rape are present at this case?

Resolution: The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d)When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person.

Before and after the violations, the intimidation took the form of threats that the victims’ family would be killed by the
accused. The accused also employed trickery and took advantage of his authority over his grandnieces. Under these
circumstances, the accused was able to have carnal knowledge of BBB and commit a series of sexual assaults against
both her and AAA. The two incidents of rape against AAA happened before she reached 12 years of age, she being 9 and
10 then. For those incidents, proof of threats, force or intimidation, is not necessary. Contrary to the claim of the
prosecution, the accused’s relationship to the victims cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. For
relationship to aggravate or qualify the crime of rape committed against a minor, the accused must be a relative of the
victim within the third civil degree. As a brother of the victim's paternal grandmother, he is but a relative within the fourth
civil degree. This relationship cannot qualify the crime as to merit the punishment of reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Thus, the rape of BBB by means of carnal knowledge was simple
rape, and the amount of civil indemnity should be decreased from P75,000 to P50,000. With respect to the manner of
rape committed against AAA twice and against BBB six times, which was rape by digital insertion, jurisprudence from
2001 up to the present yields the information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple
rape committed by means other than penile insertion is P30,000.
 People of the Philippines v. Feliciano “Saysot” Cias
G.R No.194379
1 June 2011
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: On April , 2000 the accused Feliciano Cias forced and intimidated by holding a scythe AAA and removed her underwear
while resting inside the house with her child and while AAA’s husband was away. Cias, with the assistance of his
counsel, was arraigned, and he pleaded “not guilty” to the charge against him. During the trial, the prosecution offered the
testimonies of the private complainant; Dr. Stephen S. Estacion (Dr. Estacion), who conducted the medico-legal
examination on AAA; and Senior Police Officer 3 Georgen Barot Sefe (SPO3 Sefe). On the other hand, the defense
presented as witnesses accused Cias and his wife, Felina Cias.

Issue: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct or not?

Resolution: In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles:
an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons
are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and
(3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim
who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility
of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victim’s testimony meets the
test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be
acquitted of the crime.
More importantly, appellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with regard to the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses. The reason for this is that trial courts have the “unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first
hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.”
The exceptions to this rule are when the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence
on record, or when certain facts of substance and value, likely to change the outcome of the case, have been overlooked
by the trial court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. However, the Supreme Court finds
none of these exceptions present in the instant case.
 People of the Philippines v. Carlo Dumadag y Romio
G.R No.176740
22 June 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: “AAA”, a young barrio lass, 16 years of age at the time she testified on February 21, 2000, declared that in the early morning of
December 25, 1998, she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass at “BBB”, “CCC”, “DDD”. She was a little bit behind
Thelma, Carlos and Clarence, all surnamed Dumadag. All of a sudden, appellant approached her from behind and poked a Batangas
knife on her threatening to stab her if she shouts. He pulled her towards the house of Joel “Boyet” Ursulum (Boyet). Once inside, she
was forced to remove her pants and panty because of fear. Appellant also removed his pants and brief and pushed her on a bamboo bed.
Pointing the knife at the left portion of her abdomen, appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina. Appellant succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her. After appellant was through, they stayed inside the house until six o’clock in the morning of December
25, 1998. All this time, appellant continued to hold the knife. Pleading that she be allowed to go home, appellant finally let her go after
threatening to kill her if she reports the incident to her parents. “AAA” decided not to disclose what transpired because of fear.
Nevertheless, “AAA’s” uncle, “EEE” learned from appellant himself that the latter had sexual intercourse with her. Her uncle relayed
the information to her father who confronted her about the incident. After confirming the same from “AAA”, they decided to report the
matter to the police where she was investigated and her sworn statement taken. However, the accused claimed that it was voluntary and
without the use of force since they were lovers. To support his claim that “AAA” was his girlfriend, appellant presented Boyet and
Nieves Irish Oandasan (Nieves Irish) who both corroborated his sweetheart defense.

Issue: Whether the sexual congress between appellant and the private complainant was done through force and intimidation or was voluntary
and consensual.

Resolution: The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. On the basis of the
records, the Supreme Court finds “AAA” candidly and categorically recounted the manner appellant threatened her and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her against her will. “AAA” consistently testified that while she was on her way home after hearing the
midnight mass on December 24, 1998, appellant suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed her, placed his right hand around her neck and
poked a knife at the left portion of her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she shouts. He made her walk towards the house of Boyet
where she was forced to lie on a bed and with the knife aimed at her side succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. The failure of
“AAA” to flee despite opportunity does not necessarily deviate from natural human conduct. It bears emphasis that human reactions
vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault. There is no uniform behavior
expected of victims after being raped. The fact that there is no evidence of resistance on the part of “AAA” does not cloud her credibility.
“The failure of a victim to physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon [her] and the latter submits herself,
against her will, to the rapist’s assault because of fear for life and physical safety.” In this case, “AAA” was dragged by appellant with a
knife pointed on her neck and warned not to shout or to reveal the incident to anyone or else she would be killed. That warning was
instilled in “AAA’s” mind such that even when appellant was just holding his weapon after the intercourse, she did not attempt to flee.
The intimidations made by the appellant are sufficient since it instilled fear in her mind that if she would not submit to his bestial
demands, something bad would befall her. Appellant’s claim that they are lovers is untenable. Besides, even if it were true that appellant
and “AAA” were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape. “Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a
fiancée and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.”
 People of the Philippines v. Lucresio Espina
G.R No.183564
29 June 2011
BRION, J.:

Facts: On December 7, 1997, AAA attended a benefit dance together with her stepmother and stepsister. When she went out to
find her friends, her father, the accused, called her and said that there is an errand for her. When they were in the dark
place, the accused ordered AAA to remove her pants and underwear and inserted his private part on her vagina. After the
said event, the accused ordered her to change clothes and went back to the benefit dance. The stepsister notice that AAA
has hard time of climbing the stairs and so, she said it to her mother and the mother checked AAA and found out that her
private part was bleeding. They went to the clinic for check up and medico legal. The prosecution charged the
appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape. The appellant denied the charge against him and claimed that he had a
drinking session with his friends at the house of Melanio Velasco on the day of the incident. According to him, he fell
asleep on a grassy area and woke up at 8:00 a.m. of the next day. The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified rape, and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. It also ordered the appellant to pay the victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
judgment, with the following modifications: (1) the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua; (2) the amount of
civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00; (3) the amount of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00; and (4) the
appellant is further ordered to pay the victim P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of rape or statutory rape?

Resolution: For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must
prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or
intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. In this type of rape, force and intimidation
are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. In her
testimony dated May 19, 1999, AAA positively identified the appellant as the one who raped her. Her testimony was clear
and straightforward; she was consistent in her recollection of the details of her sexual abuse. In addition, her testimony
was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Cerillo. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death
penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim. As earlier stated, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial that AAA was 11 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. The parties likewise stipulated that AAA is the appellant’s legitimate daughter. During trial,
AAA, BBB and the appellant testified to this fact. The Supreme Court however, cannot impose the death penalty in view
of R.A. No. 9346, signed into law on June 24, 2006. Pursuant to this law, the Supreme Court affirm the CA’s reduction of
the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, with the modification, however, that the appellant shall not be eligible for
parole.