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Semantics of Darou: Likelihood and Quantification Over Reasoning
Semantics of Darou: Likelihood and Quantification Over Reasoning
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Yurie Hara
Waseda University
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The Japanese sentence-final modality auxiliary darou has been understood as an expression that indicates
a 50-80% probability of the proposition (Masuoka 1991). The probability can also be specified by the adverb
tabun ‘probably’ as in (1-b).
In the standard theory of modality, the possibility modal is implemented as an existential quantification over
epistemic possible worlds. However, as noted in (Sugimura 2004), it can co-occur with the adverb kitto
‘certainly’ that seems to have a universal quantificational force as in (2-a) and cannot co-occur with a pure
existential adverb, moshikasuruto ‘maybe’ as in (2-b).
Following Kratzer’s (1991) framework and Izvorski’s (1997) analysis on Present-Perfect, this paper will
argue that darou asserts that the embedded proposition is more likely than the alternative. Thus, it is not
compatible with mere existential. Darou also contributes to the communication background but the quan-
tificational force is not specified. Unlike existential, therefore, universal quantification is possible, since it is
compatible with the assertion of the likelihood. The intuition of uncertainty about the asserted proposition
as in (1-a) comes from the presuppositional requirement of darou, that the speaker does not have observable
evidence for the assertion. In other words, the quantification domain of darou is restricted to the speaker’s
inference, and the propositions which are implied by observable evidence are excluded from the domain.
In the following, I will show several empirical data that supports the claim above.
R EASONING /E VIDENCE Takubo (2001) notes that darou constructs possible worlds distinct from the ac-
tual world given the relevant facts. As the following examples show, in other words, darou can be attached
to the inferences derived by epistemic reasoning.
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(4) a. Context: It has been seven years since I broke up with my ex-girlfriend. (Takubo 2001)
b. kanojo-wa mou kekkon-shita darou.
she-Top already marriage-did DAROU
‘Probably, she had already been married.’
(5) a. Context: John likes wine very much.
b. John-wa kinou wain-o zenbu nonda darou.
John-Top yesterday wine-Acc all drank DAROU
‘Probably, John has drank all the wine yesterday.’
On the other hand, darou cannot be used when evidence is available for the proposition.
F IRST P ERSON Darou cannot be used with a first person pronoun as in (8), since the speaker would have
the direct evidence for the propositional content, which conflicts with the presupposition of darou.
Darou with a first person is possible if the speaker does not have a control over his/her action as in (9).
Doumo ‘ SOMEWHAT / SOMEHOW ’ Morimoto (1994) showed that Doumo ‘somewhat/somehow’ presup-
poses that the speaker actually saw the evidence of the propositional content.
Doumo cannot co-occur with darou, since the presuppositions of them conflict each other.
N OT A C ONVERSATIONAL I MPLICATURE As shown above, the use of darou presupposes that the speaker
does not have observable evidence for the asserted proposition. Therefore, it is interpreted weaker than pure
necessity, although it could contain the universal quantificational force. One might wonder whether this
weaker meaning can be due to a conversational implicature. Namely, the speaker chose to say p darou
even though the speaker has a choice of just asserting p. Therefore, the speaker conversationally indicates
that there is no evidence available. This analysis would predict that this weakening by lack of evidence
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is cancellable, since conversational implicatures are cancellable. However, this is a wrong predication as
witnessed in (12).
R AMIFICATION The analysis above has an interesting ramification regarding comparison with evidentials.
All the infelicitous examples above with darou can be saved by evidential morpheme no (except for the case
of ‘first person pronoun’, probably because the speaker does not need to indicate evidence for a proposi-
tion about himself/herself.) It suggests that a finer distinction is needed between epistemic reasoning and
evidential inference.
R EFERENCES : Izvorski, R. (1997) “The Present Perfect as an Epistemic Modal” the proceedings of SALT
7. Kratzer, A. (1991), “Modality.” In A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich, eds., Semantics: An iternational
handbook of contemporary research, Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 639–650. Masuoka, T. (1991), Modality
no Bunpo [The Grammar of Modality’]. Kuroshio, Tokyo. Morimoto, J. (1994), Hanashite no shukan
o Arawasu Fukushi ni Tusite [On Adverbs that Represent the Speaker’s Subjectivity’]. Kuroshio, Tokyo.
Sugimura, Y. (2004), “Gaizensei o Arawasu Fukushi to Bunmatsu no Modality Keishiki [Adverbs of Prob-
ability and Sentence-Final Modality Expressions].” Gengo Bunka Ronshuu 25(2). Takubo, Y. (2001),
“Gendai Nihongo ni Okeru Nishu no Modal Jodoshi ni Tsuite [On Two kinds of Modal Auxiliaries in Mod-
ern Japanese].” Kannichigo Bungaku Ronsou