Carnap's Principle of Tolerance

Author(s): Alan Richardson and Dan Isaacson

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 68 (1994), pp. 67-
83
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Aristotelian Society
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 CARNAP'S PRINCIPLEOF TOLERANCE

Alan Richardsonand Dan Isaacson

I-Alan Richardson

THE LIMITSOF TOLERANCE:CARNAP'S

LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICALPROJECTIN LOGICAL
SYNTAXOF LANGUAGE

henone picksup a copyof Carnap's(1934;1937)Logical

W Syntax of Language and thumbs through it, one has the
distinct impressionthat one has picked up a logic book. There is,
moreover,a clear sense in which this is true. On the other hand,
these days logic books seem to be rathertoo ubiquitousandlargely
uninteresting,so we have a tendencyto hearthis claim as Logical
Syntaxis merely a logic book. This is not how things stood at the
time of the writing of Syntax, however. Syntax was, arguably,
Carnap'smost importantwork in a line of works by the founders
of the analytic traditionto place logic at the very centreof philo-
sophy. Carnap's precursorsin this included, of course, Frege,
Russell, WittgensteinandRamsey.'
Syntaxdoes not merely fall within a proudlineage-the lineage
thatgave shapeto analyticphilosophy.Rather,it is also a bold,even
radical change of orientationwithin that lineage. For the most
importantaspect of the view of logic put forward in Syntax is
pluralism.Therearetwo importantaspectsto this logical pluralism
to note straightaway: First, it is meant to solve or dissolve the
fundamentaldisputes about the foundationsof mathematicsthat
were ragingin the 1930s. Second andrelated,a pluralityof formal
logical systemstrainsthe philosopher'seye on the essentialchange
of method urged by Carnap:the domainof philosophicalenquiry

1 I would also place various members of the Southwest and Marburg Schools of
neo-Kantianismon this list. I shall make oblique reference to Carnap'sdebt to the
neo-Kantiansbelow. For more detail see Richardson1992 or Friedman(1985, 1992b).

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68 I-ALAN RICHARDSON

is the logico-syntacticstructureof linguisticsystems. No furtheror

deeper question about the relationof any such system to an ante-
cedentlyandindependentlyavailableworldcan be raised.2Logical
pluralism,thatis to say, undergirdsthe eliminationof metaphysics
throughthe use of the formal mode of speech that characterises
Carnap'santimetaphysicsof this period.
The principleguiding this pluralismis, famously, the so-called
Principleof Tolerance.The official versionof the Principleis (LSL,
p. 51): 'It is not our business to set up prohibitions,but to arriveat
conventions.' While this indicates Carnap's desire to distance
himself from any notion that languages must be checked for
accuracyagainstthe 'logic of the world',it is not veryhelpful.More
telling is Carnap'sgloss on the Principlea page later (LSL,p. 52):
In logic,thereareno morals.Everyoneis atlibertyto builduphis
own logic, i.e. his own formof languageas he wishes.All thatis
requiredof himis that,if he wishesto discussit, he muststatehis
methodsclearly, and give syntacticalrules instead of philo-
sophicalarguments.
This Principle provides the starting point for the audacious
adventureof philosophyas logical syntax.Carnapexhortshis anti-
metaphysical, amoralist logicians to explore hitherto uncharted
seas (LSL,p. xv):
Thefirstattemptsto castthe shipof logic off fromtheterrafirma
of classicalformswerecertainlybold ones, consideredfromthe
historicalpointof view. But they werehamperedby the striving
after'correctness'. Now,however,thatimpediment hasbeenover-
come, and before us lies the boundlessocean of unlimited
possibilities.
This is a characteristicallyCarnapianmove. It recalls the argu-
mentative strategy of Carnap's (1921) dissertation,Der Raum:
theredisputesover the foundationsof geometrywere to be resolved
not in favour of any of the points of view put forward by the
mathematicians,philosophersor physicists, but by showing them
thatthey each had a differentconcept of space in mind. Again, in
the Aufbau(Carnap1928), the priorepistemologicalschools were

2 Carnap's typeof antimetaphysics

particular is presented
in termslikethesein Ricketts
(forthcoming).

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 CARNAP'S PRINCIPLEOF TOLERANCE 69

to be shown to be engaged in a pseudo-dispute.These schools,

accordingto Carnap,had a core of issues about which they were
correct, but the disputes among them were shown to be mis-
conceived, metaphysical.In Syntax,Carnapwants to put an end to
'pseudo-problemsandwearisomecontroversies'(LSL,pp. xiv/xv)
in the foundationsof mathematics.This is to be done by showing
each party how to construct a language of the type they are
recommendingwhile showing them how to reconceive their per-
spectives on the foundationalissues themselves. The issue is not
getting the foundations right, but precisely delimiting various
formal systems and proposing them for use. In all these cases,
Carnapoffers the partiesin a philosophicaldisputethe opportunity
to be right about something provided they give up their under-
standingof that aboutwhich they are attemptingto be right.
This characteristicmove is very bold indeed.Carnapwas never,
I should think, under any delusion that it would be emotionally
satisfying to all the partiesin the philosophicaldisputes. Carnap
hoped, however, to find co-workers less enamouredof endless
disputationand more enamouredof a way out of it. At the end of
the day, those who could not be convinced thatthey were arguing
over nothingmay be best left to continueso to argue.
This move takes on a yet more audaciouscharacterin Syntax,
however. Indeed, it could be viewed as incredible.For the claim
that foundationaldisputesin mathematicscan be set aside just as
can metaphysicsseems not to fit otheraspectsof the project.First,
thereseems to be an obvious sense in which Carnapis takingsides
in the disputeover foundationsin Syntax.Logic and mathematics
aremeantto be shown always to be foundin the analyticsentences
of the formal systems. That is, the syntacticnotion of analyticity
seems to be doing genuine philosophicalwork for Carnap.This
would not merely be disagreeablefor any naturalist,with whom
Carnaphappily did not have to deal in Syntax, but also for the
intuitionistswho were among the disputantsat the time. Thus, the
rhetoricalassimilationof foundationalissues to pseudoproblemsof
metaphysicsmay seem disingenuous.
Moreproblematically,logic andmathematicsare not merelythe
object of study of Syntax,they also provide the perspectivefrom
which the studygoes forward.The whole pointof logical syntaxis
(LSL,p. xiii) 'to develop an exact methodfor the constructionof...

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70 I-ALAN RICHARDSON

sentences about sentences'. Thus, Camap investigates certain

languagesin orderto scouttheirlimits as possiblesyntaxlanguages,
i.e., languagesfor expressingthese exactly constructedsentences
aboutsentences.But, if we have adoptedthe attitudeof Tolerance,
then we have more thana multiplicityof objectsof study;we have
a multiplicity of languages within which our study is cast.
Moreover,the very notionof syntaxis itself given by the mathem-
aticalstrengthof ouradoptedsyntaxlanguage.Thus,ourendeavour
to provide precise syntacticalrules itself seems to become ambi-
guous-what counts as syntactic is relative to an antecedent
adoption of the syntax language. One might begin to wonder
whethergiving up on correctnessis the way to precision and the
end of fruitlessdisputes.
This paper has three parts.First, I shall make the worriesjust
expressedmoreperspicuousby looking at a disputeaboutCarnap's
projectin Logical Syntaxthatdeals with these issues. This dispute
featuresrecent work by Michael Friedman(1988, 1992a) and by
WarrenGoldfarbandThomasRicketts(1992). Second, I shalllook
at some centraltextualpassagesin which Carnapdeals with issues
in the foundationsof mathematicsin orderto see whatissue, if any,
Carnapdoes see at stake there. I shall argue that we must take
seriouslyCarnap'sinsistenceon the connectionof mathematicsto
empirical knowledge. Finally, I shall argue that this perspective
goes some way toward providing a pragmaticresponse to the
worriesof PartOne.

Tolerancevs. Syntax.There are a large numberof technical and

interpretativeissues raisedby Logical SyntaxthatI shalleitherpass
overin silence or simplytakea dogmaticstandon for sakeof getting
to the centralissue. The most importantdifficultiesfor the project
of Syntaxare twofold: First, there are technicalworries aboutthe
limitative results of Gtidel and Tarski. Second, there are philo-
sophicalworriesaboutthe place of the Principleof Tolerancein the
project.These issues aredeeply intertwined,however,so they must
be tackled in tandem. In this section I want to review the main
featuresof the view of mathematicsput forwardin Syntax.Then I
shall arguethatrecent interpretativework essentially presentsthe

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 CARNAP'S PRINCIPLEOF TOLERANCE 71

projectwith a trilemma:Carnapis attemptingsomethingeither

technicallyunfeasible,or thatin no wayresolvesor dissolvesany
foundationalissue, or that is self-undermining.Essentiallythe
questionis how to resolve ffie tensionbetweenpluralismand
* .

preclslon.
The principalgoal of ffie syntacticperspectiveis the exact
divisionwithinany linguisticframeworkof those claimswhose
truthis guaranteed by theframework andtheclaimswhosetruthis
tiedto empiricalmatters betweenthe analyticandthe synthetic.
Of course,thisprojectwouldmisElre if thesentencesof purelogic
andmathematics werenotsecuredwithintheanalytic.Thatis, for
any given language,the logicalandmathematical claimsforma
portionof theanalyticsentencesthatconstitutethelanguageitself.
Thisis how ffieirrelevanceof empiricalmattersof factis shown
forlogicandmathematics-howtheira priori statusis secured.In
ffiiswaywe canat oncerejectcrudemathematical empiricismand
theevidentiary basisof intuitionism,aswellas showthecontinuing
relevanceof logicism.
Thus,thenotionof analyticity,it seems,is doingphilosophical
workforfoundations of mathematics. Thegeneraldefinitionof the
notionof analyticityfor a languageL is, correspondingly, givena
centralplacein PartIV of Syntax.Essentially,theproblemis this:
We aregivena language,L, via a description of its vocabulary, its
formationand transformationrules. These rules are so far
undifferentiated-both logicalandphysicallawsmaybeamongthe
primitiveaxiomsandthe inferencerulesmaybe bothlogicaland
material.Thetaskis to givea sharpdistinction betweenie two-to
carveoutthepurelylogicalfromtheempirical.
Thesolution(LSL,§§5s52) proceedsin two steps.Carnapfirst
makesa distinction betweenlogicalanddescriptivevocabulary. In
essence, he defines the logical vocabularyas the smallest
(nonempty)set of vocabularyitems such that every sentence
containing justthatvocabulary is determinate,i.e.,is aconsequence
of therules.The logicaltruthsarejustthosesentencescomposed
solely of thatvocabularyffiatare such consequences.Ithemore
generalclass of analytictruthsis, ien, the set of thosesentences
whichremaintrueundereverysystematicsubstitution of descrip-
tivevocabulary fordescriptivevocabulary.

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72 I-ALAN RICHARDSON

There are threecrucial aspects to Carnap'stechnicaland philo-

sophical situationhere:
1. The standpointof the Principleof Tolerancewhich, on the one
hand,tells us thatthereis no single truelogic andmathematicsand,
on the other, entreatsus to engage in precise syntactic consider-
ations of variouslogical systems.
2. The definitionof analyticitywithingeneralsyntax,which makes
ineliminable use of notions such as logical consequence for the
object languageunderconsideration.
3. GOidel'stheorems,which makeclearthatsuch definitionswill be
formulatableonly in metalanguageswith stronger mathematics
than the object language underconsideration(for a large class of
object languages,certainlymost mathematicallyinterestingones).
What is then the relation of this syntacticproject to the issues
involved in foundationaldisputes?
The simplestanswerwouldbe thatCarnap'sstandpointof general
syntaxwas meantto be a nonquestion-beggingmetaperspectiveinto
which the people arguingfoundationalmatterscould ascend.3That
is, it could be hoped thatthe disciplineof logical syntaxitself could
be mathematicallyminimalbut could be used to expressthe syntax
of more mathematicallyrobustlanguages.This could be seen as a
continuationof the Hilbert programmeas well as a nod in the
direction of Tractarianlimitations on mathematics,now cast as
limitationson metamathematics.TherearesuggestionsthatCarnap
mighthave held to such a view at least at the startof his metalogical
thinking. In the end, however, G6del's results show that such a
projectis technicallyimpossible. Carnap'sprocedures-the intro-
ductionof indefinitetermsin syntaxandso on-indicate, moreover,
thathe realises this.
On the otherhand,if we simply abideby the technicalfacts and
ascendinto some morepowerfulsyntaxlanguageto give the syntax
of a given language,then the standpointof toleranceseems to get
us nowhere.The intuitionistmathematicianisn't suddenlygoing to
lose her scruples in ascent into the metalevel. She will no more

stanceis takenin Friedman

3 Thistypeof interpretative 1988.

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 CARNAP'SPRINCIPLE
OFTOLERANCE 73

acquiescein a classicalmathematicallanguageas a syntaxlanguage

for her intuitionistmathematicsthan acquiesce in classical math-
ematics full stop. If toleranceinsists on the antecedentavailability
of fully intelligiblelanguagesof any given strengthforuse as syntax
languages,thenit seems simplyto beg the questionagainsttheorists
who seek to restrictthe scope of genuinemathematics.This point,
moreover, does not rely on the intuitionists' insistence on an
epistemicallyprimitiverelationthatgroundsprecisely theirmath-
ematical language. Rather,all that is at stake is the limitationon
intelligiblemathematicsupon which the intuitionistinsists.4
Perhapsthis is not right,though.After all, if Carnapis insisting
that there is no issue over which the classical and intuitionist
mathematicianarefighting,thenhe may well feel free to adoptever
strongermetalanguagesin the course of syntactic investigation.
This won't beg any questionagainstthe intuitionist,as thereis no
question here to be begged. Tolerance can then be seen as an
invitationto set aside endless pseudodisputes.It is not a thesis in a
Carnapianlanguage but an expression of a kind of philosophical
attitudethatwill simply sweep the old foundationaldisputesaside.
His attitudehere would then exactly mirrorhis attitudein the old
metaphysicaldisputesamong realistsand idealists. Here, too, it is
not a matterof cajolingthe disputantsbuthelpingthemreconceive
theirphilosophicalbusiness.5
This is an attractivelydeflationaryview. But it comes at cost.
First, as pointed out recently by Goldfarband Ricketts (1992), it
induces an imprecision in any syntactic account of the analytic
statusof mathematicaltruthsin a given language,L. This is because
the syntax of L must be stated in a syntax language of greater
mathematicalstrength than L itself. Thus, the sense in which
mathematicsis meantto be shown to follow from the rules of the
languageby syntaxamounts,in practice,to:themathematicaltruths
of L follow fromtherulesof L andthe strong,informalmathematics
of the syntaxlanguage.More tellingly, if a strongmetalanguageis
requiredfor the explicitpresentationof the syntaxof L, thencertain
featuresof the syntax languagewill, in this investigation,still be

4 I takethisto be theworryraisedforCarnap's
projectin Friedman
1992a.
5 Thisis a viewof thematterfoundin Goldfarb
andRicketts1992.

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74 I-ALAN RICHARDSON

left implicit. But if acquiescencein nonprecisesyntax languageis

admissible, then we seem to lose the point of the reconstructive
project (why not rest content with object language imprecisions
also?) and the goal of the formulationof exact sentences about
sentences.
I thinkthispointcanbe castyet morewidely:Thereis a significant
tensionbetweenthe pluralismof the Principleof Toleranceandthe
call for precisesyntacticrulesratherthanphilosophicalarguments.
This is becauseanylanguagestrongenoughto capturewhatCarnap
thinks of as the importantsyntactic featuresof language, such as
logical consequenceandanalyticity,will haveto containratherlarge
portionsof arithmetic.Thus,by GOidel's results,theywill be unable
to expressfully theirown syntax-in particularthey will be unable
to induce a bivalent analytic/contradictorydichotomy for their
mathematicalsentences. Thus, our precise syntacticalrules will
haveto be castin languageswhichareimpreciseby theirown lights.
The point can also be made from the other direction. Consider
someonewho buys intothe syntacticismbutnotthe pluralismof the
Principle of Toleranceand who opts for a language of primitive
recursivearithmetic(such as Carnap'sLanguageI) as her syntax
language. Such a syntactised intuitionist will find compelling
reasons to reject Carnap's language of classical mathematics,
LanguageII. After all, no notion such as logical consequencefor
LanguageII is definablein this syntaxlanguage.Thus,LanguageII
is noteven a candidatelanguageforthis theorist-it defies syntactic
description.
We are left in an uneasy situation.Carnapcould be attemptinga
clearly foundationalbut technically hopeless project-a general
syntaxin a weak metalanguagethatis ruledout by GOdel'sresults.
Alternatively, he could be seeking to have the Principle of
Tolerancedo foundationalworkitself. But then he can reasonably
be accusedof begging the questionagainsthis foundationalrivals.
Finally,he couldbe reorientingphilosophyof mathematicsin a way
thatis meantto indicatethatno foundationaldisputesarepossible.
Butthenhe seems to be endorsinga pluralistandsyntacticapproach
to philosophyof mathematicsthatis self-undermining-Tolerance
works againstprecision,precisionagainstTolerance.

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 CARNAP'S PRINCIPLEOF TOLERANCE 75

II
Carnapon Foundationsof Mathematics in LSL.Is thereanyway
out of this for Carnap?Well,heretoforewe have beenusingthe
notionof 'foundations of mathematics' as a primitivenotion.What
doesCarnapactuallysayaboutfoundational issuesin SyntaJc?
This
may give us some new way of ffiinlcing aboutthe philosophical
trilemma justoutlined.
Well, one thing that is certainlyclear is that foundational
questionsof mathematicsdo not, for Carnap,deal eitherwith
metaphysical issuesabouttheexistenceor natureof mathematical
objectsnor with the epistemologicalcontactwe have with such
objects.Metaphysics is handledin philosophyof mathematics just
as elsewhere throughretranslation fromthe materialmodeinto
theformalmodeof speech.Inis way,vaiiousclaimsthatlookto
be about mathematicalobjects are shown to be disguised
descriptionsof languagesfor mathematics or proposalsto adopt
suchlanguages.Thus,forexample,wrangling overtheadmissibility
of impredicatively definedobjects(sets,properties) is replacedby
proposalseitherto allowcertainsyntacticformsin thelanguageof
maFematicsornot.6
Similarly,in mathematics, as elsewhere,iere areno primitive
epistemological relationsfallingwithinthepurviewof philosophy
iat governthe epistemiccontactwithmathematical objects.Just
as CarnapneverendorsedRussellianacquaintance widlempirical
objectsor sense-dataas a primitiverelafonin theepistemologyof
empiricalknowledge,he does notcountenance primitiveintuition
of matematicalobjects.Thus,hedoessimplysetasidethatversion
ofthe intuitionists'
position.Carnap'slogocentricphilosophyfinds
no roomforfundamental epistemicrelationsthatmightbe thought
to providethe subjectmatterof epistemology.Raier, all putative
epistemological relationsaremeanttobeshowntobelogical-wiffi
logicalconsequenceplayinga key role.Thetraditional notionsof
epistemologysuchas justificationandmeaningaremeantto fall
away,havingbeen recast,in so far as possible,by suchlogical
relations.

6 Compare iSL, §44.

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76 I ALANRICHARDSON

Justas iese termswithinwhiche intuitionistseeks to make

his pointaredenied,so too is anymathematically foundationalist
projectsuchasHilbert's programme. Carnap is absolutelyclearthat
Godel'sresultsruleoutanysuchendeavour.7 He notesat thereis
no definite(i.e., syntacticin the contemporary sense)accountof
consequenceformostlanguagesandthatconsequenceratherthan
deducibilityrelationsis thecrucialnotionforthelogicof languages
formathematics. Similarly,hisproofof thenoncontradictory status
of his classicallanguage,LanguageII, is put forwardwithinan
informalandmathematically strongersyntaxlanguage.Thisleads
Carnapto remark(LSL,p. 129):
Evenif it containsnoformalerrors,[theproof]givesus noabsolute
certaintythatcontradictionsin the object-language cannotarise.
For,sincetheproofis carriedoutin a syntax-language whichhas
richerresourcesthanLanguageII, we arein no wise guaranteed
againstthe appearance of contradictionsin this syntax-language,
andthusin ourproof.
So, the resultsof logical syntaxseem not to addressthe type of
foundation concernsof Hilbert'sprogramme at all.
Similarly,Carnapcompletelydisavowsie typeof mathematical
foundationalism thatone can imputeto traditionallogicism.No
attemptis madeto definemathematical vocabulary in termsof an
antecedentlyunderstoodlogical vocabulary.IndeedCarnapulti-
matelydisavowsthatany sense can be madeof this project.He
writes(LSL,p. 327):
we have in generalsyntaxmade a formaldistinctionbetween
logicalanddescriptivesymbols,buta preciseclassiElcation
of the
logicalsymbolsin oursenseintologicalsymbolsin the narrower
sense and mathematical symbolshas so far not been given by
anyone.
If the problemof foundationsof mathematics is neithermath-
ematicallyfoundationalist nor a projectwithinan independent
philosophicaldisciplinesuchas epistemology ormetaphysics,then
whatis it? Thisis ffiesubjectof Section84 of LSL.HereCarnap
mentionsFrege'sview thata foundationfor mathematics has the
taskof 'givinganaccountof themeaningof maffiematical terms'.

7 I take this to be the point of §34a of LSL.

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 OFTOLERANCE
CARNAP'SPRINCIPLE 77

He claims that the procedureof syntax combines elements of

formalism and logicism. The formalistsare correct that we need
only take the formalelementsof the languageinto account,butthe
logicists are right about what the conditions of adequacy for
succeedingin this task are. He writes (LSL,p. 327):
[T]hetaskof thelogicalfoundation of mathematics
is notfulfilled
by a metamathematics (thatis, by a syntaxof mathematics)alone,
but only by a syntaxof the totallanguage,whichcontainsboth
logico-mathematicalandsyntheticsentences.
Why is this? On Carnap'sview a syntax for pure mathematics
leaves wholly inexplicable the applicationof mathematicsin the
sciences. Mathematicaltermsfind employmentin the languagesof
empirical science; thus they must be given an interpretationthat
yields a determinatemeaningto such sentences.He writes(LSL,p.
326):
[Alogico-mathematical]calculusdoesnotcontainallthesentences
whichcontainmathematical symbolsandwhichareconcerned with
the applicationofmathematics,i.e. syntheticdescriptivesentences
with mathematical symbols...The systemmustcontaingeneral
rulesof formationconcerningtheoccurrence of themathematical
in
symbols syntheticdescriptive sentences also, togetherwith
consequence-rules for such sentences.Only in this way is the
applicationof mathematics,i.e. calculationwith numbersof
empiricalobjectsand with measuresof empiricalmagnitudes,
rendered possibleandsystematized.
This concernwith the use of mathematicalsentencesin the total
language of science is found throughoutthe work. For example,
after he shows that the Axiom of Choice (which he calls 'the
Principleof Selection') is analyticin LanguageII (againvia the use
of the resourcesof an informalsyntaxlanguagewhich containsthe
axiom of choice), Carnapremarks(p. 124):
The questionas to whetherthe Principleof Selectionshouldbe
admittedintothewholeof thelanguageof science(includingalso
allsyntactical
investigations)aslogicallyvalidornotis notdecided
thereby.Thatis a matterof choice,as areall questionsconcerning
thelanguage-form whichis to be chosen...Thefactthatby means
of its admissionthe constructionof the mathematical calculusis
obviouslyconsiderably simplifiedspeaksforit. Againstit, thereis
hardlyanythingto be said...

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78 I-ALAN RICHARDSON

This is an extraordinary claim. Carnaphimselfhad said things

againstthe axiomof choiceas a logicalprinciplein 1929in his
Abrissder Logistik.Clearlyfrom e standpointof Tolerance,
Carnaptakes such complaintsto be ill-founded.What is of
importance for ourpurposes,however,is the combinationof the
expediencyof ffie axiom for questionsof constructionof the
calculusandtheroleof theaxiomin ffielanguageof science.This
againconnectsquestionsof foundations of maffiematics
to theuse
of maiematics in the empiricallanguagesof science.Indeed,it
suggeststhatis is theonlyperspective fromwhichevenpragmatic
questionsabouttheacceptability of mathematical principlescanbe
raised.
Thus,I wouldarguethatthereis a genuineissuethatCarnapsees
at stakein the disputesoverfoundationsof mathematics. Thisis,
of course,not the issue thatie disputantsthinkis at stake- the
truthof variousprinciples-butit is implicatedin suchdisputes.It
is thequestionof theroleof mathematicsinprovidingtherepresent-
ationalschemeof empiricalknowledge.Theimportance of thisis
seenin theformof ie physicalistlanguageforCarnap: it is a pure
coordinate language in which physical laws are typically
differentialequationsand singularclaims have the form of
specificationsof valuesforquantitativestatemagnitudes at space-
time pointsor in space-timeregions.8Any restrictiveview of
mathematics will,therefore,impairie representational
capacityof
thephysicalistlanguage.

III

Tolerance,Mathematics andtheLogicof Science.Thissuggestsa

ratherdifferentpointof view withrespectto 'foundational'issues
in mathematics thanis usual.Indeed,it indicatesa perspectiveon
foundationsof mathematics akinto Kant's.ForKant,mathematics
andgeometrydidnotprovidegenuinelyobjectiveknowledge,but
did provideie formalframeworksfor the construction of such
knowledgevia ie schematismof ffiecategories.The situationis
similarinCarnap: theepistemologicalstatusof mathematicscomes

8 Seeespecially
LSL§40-

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 CARNAP'S PRINCIPLEOF TOLERANCE 79

wholly in its role in providingthe logical frameworksof objective,

scientific knowledge.9There is no epistemological question that
connects our mathematicalunderstandingto some independent
world of mathematicalexistents. Even the role of analyticity is
ratherdifferentthanone might think--Carnapis not concernedto
answer a particularquestion of epistemology for logic and math-
ematics, but ratherto uncover the logico-mathematicalresources
presupposedin variouslanguagesproposedfor science. Moreover,
as Carnap's exemplars of objective scientific knowledge lie in
mathematisednaturalscience, his own pragmaticpurposesmilitate
in favourof acceptingnoncontradictorymathematicalframeworks
of maximal strength.
Does this inherentconnectionbetweenmathematicsand science
provide any help in our worries aboutthe Principleof Tolerance,
however? To a certaindegree, yes. I think it can clarify Carnap's
connectionbetweenfoundationalissues andmetaphysicalpseudo-
questionsandprovidea clue to his curiousattitudetowardascending
into strongermetalanguages.
On the firstpoint,Carnapsurelydoes thinkthatthe disputantsin
the foundationaldebates are committingconceptualerrorsof the
same type as he sees in metaphysicalpseudo-disputesgenerally.
But, unlike most metaphysicaldebates, such as the realism and
anti-realism dispute, the foundational dispute actually has
importantconsequences.For,theunclearmetaphysicsandepistem-
ology of certainof the camps leads to restrictionson mathematics
that genuinely harm the representationof scientific knowledge.
Without classical analysis, it is, for example, hard to see how to
formulatethe RelativisticField Equations.Thus, the foundational
disputeshave a philosophicalgravitynot sharedby otherpseudo-
disputes.
Thus, I see Carnapas turningaside the purefoundationalissues
in mathematicsand reorientingthe questionstowardquestionsof
applicationand empiricalknowledge. Thus, he will not scrupleat
failing to provide an accountansweringquestionsput forwardby
the intuitionists,for example. Such alleged questions do mistake

9 Carnap'searlyconnections
withKantianphilosophyhavebeenstressedby Friedman
(1987;1992b)andRichardson1992.

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80 I-ALAN RICHARDSON

the genuine issues. Moreover,once the issue is seen as one of the

role of mathematicsin empiricalknowledge,theadvantagesof theft
over honest toil become manifest.Tolerancehas a hiddenagenda:
to remove objections to the strongest possible systems of
mathematics,since these will be the most useful-provided they
avoid contradiction.10
Perhaps more importantly,the perspective that stresses the
empiricalsciences also providessomethingof a pragmaticresponse
to our other concern. We were worried about the idea that the
perspectiveof Tolerancepresupposessyntacticallyimprecisemeta-
languagesinto which we can ascend as need arises. We noted that
this seems hardto understand:no syntacticallyinclinedintuitionist
would find this convincingand it seems to obscurethe point of the
programmeof syntax.
Here we see the trulypragmaticnatureof Carnap'sproposal,I
believe. Carnapsees classical mathematicsas providingthe frame-
work of the best theories of science we have. The idea that these
theories are unintelligibleowing to the mathematicsthey employ
seems absurd.The history of the situationpoints precisely in the
opposite direction-the physical world and the natureof physical
theorybecome clearprecisely as the role of mathematicsbecomes
more and more central.Anyone worriedaboutthe foundationsof
mathematicswho startsfromthe presumptionthathuge portionsof
our best science are unintelligible thereby rules himself out as
someone with whom we sharea frameworkof understanding.
Thus,I see the perspectiveof Toleranceas enshriningan attitude
towardphilosophicalworkthatstressesits continuitywith the pro-
ceduresof conceptualclarificationthroughmathematisationfound
in the sciences. In the work of the sciences this occurs typically in
an informal language of mathematics that is accepted by the
scientists. The business of Logical Syntax is to make as clear as
possible variouspossible languageswithin which such conceptual
workcan go forward.Moreover,absenta discoveredcontradiction,
Carnapwill feel we have pragmaticreasons to adopt whatever
formal or informallanguagewithin which such proceduresdo go

10 Contradiction
is not a negativetouchstoneof truthfor Carnap,but it is a negative
of usefulness.
touchstone

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 CARNAP'S PRINCIPLEOF TOLERANCE 81

forward.So, for example,if physics employsclassicalmathematics

andLanguageII is a standardizedaccountof classicalmathematics,
physicaltheoryshouldbe expressiblewithinLanguageII. Doing so
would be an advance, because Language II is much more well
understoodthantheinformallanguagesin whichphysicsis typically
cast. This is true, despite the fact that the syntax language for
LanguageH used in Syntaxis itself informaland of the same level
of clarity as the languagesin which physics is typically cast. One
could, indeed, view the adoptionof LanguageII afterthe informal
investigationof it as an instanceof increasingthe clarityof science
throughformalisation.
One could thinkof this type of work as 'workingfrom within'.
We start with our informalmathematics,formalise an important
portion of it, use that formalised portion both to express our
scientifictheoriesin a preciseway andto understandwhatprecision
amountsto. This workingfromwithinis not the Quinean'look and
see how things are actuallydone' notion, but ratheran attemptto
bring the conceptualclarificationfound in our best sciences into
philosophyitself.11The pointis notto beatthe psychologicalbushes
in search of an epistemological underpinningfor our scientific
claims, but to understandthe role of mathematisationin bringing
conceptualclarificationto knowledge.Onlyin this way can science
be understoodas science-as a system of objective claims into
whose epistemic statusone may legitimatelyinquire.
This is not the place to take on the difficult issues of the
Carnap/Quinedisputeover analyticity.What I have triedto show
is that Carnap's understandingof the philosophical task of the
foundationsof mathematicsis inseparablefrom his understanding
of the business of the philosophyof empiricalscience. I have also
claimed that the continuities of the philosophical task with the
clarificationof concepts via mathematisationinside the sciences
provides Carnapwith the perspective from which to finesse the
issues aboutTolerancegiven voice in PartOne of this paper.

11 Somehow,Carnap'sconcernto createa scientificphilosophythroughimportation of

modesof conceptual
clarification
fromthe sciencesintophilosophyhasreceivedlittle
his
note, despite vigourousantimetaphysical stanceand his ultimaterejectionof
epistemology.

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82 I-ALAN RICHARDSON

REFERENCES

Carnap,R. 1922. Der Raum.Kant-StudienSupplementaryVolume56.

Carnap,R. 1928. Der logische Aufbauder Welt.Berlin:Weltkreis.
Carnap,R. 1934. Die logische Syntaxder Sprache.Vienna:J. Springer.
Carnap,R. 1937. TheLogical SyntaxofLanguage. London:KeganPaul. (Trans-
lation of Carnap1934. Translatedby A. Smeaton.)
Friedman,M. 1988. 'LogicalTruthandAnalyticityin Carnap'sLogical Syntaxof
Language', in W. Aspray and P. Kitcher (eds.), History and Philosophy of
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Friedman,M. 1992a. 'CarnapandA PrioriTruth',in D. Bell and W. Vossenkuhl
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Friedman,M. 1992b. 'Epistemologyin theAufbau',Synthese,Vol. 93, Nos. 1-2,
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Goldfarb,W. andT. Ricketts. 1992. 'Camapandthe Philosophyof Mathematics',
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Verlag),pp. 61-78.
Richardson,A. 1992. 'LogicalIdealismandCarnap'sConstructionof the World',
Synthese,Vol. 93, Nos. 1-2, October/November1992.
Ricketts, T. forthcoming. 'Carnap'sPrinciple of Tolerance, Empiricism, and
Conventionalism', in P. Clark (ed.), Reading Putnam (Oxford: Oxford
UniversityPress).

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 CARNAP'S PRINCIPLEOF TOLERANCE

Alan Richardsonand Dan Isaacson

Hl-Dan Isaacson

This paperwas unavailableat

the time of going to press.

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