Perlas Bernabe Cases

FIRST DIVISION
January 23, 2017
G.R. No. 218466
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221425
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a "JOHN," "KONYONG" SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL @
"INONG" @ DIONISIO NACIONAL, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated cases 1 is the Decision2 dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05095, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated December 8, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of
Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. B-243, convicting accused-appellants Manny Ramos
(Ramos), Roberto Salonga (Salonga), and Servillano Nacional (Nacional; collectively, accused-appellants) of the
crime of Murder Aggravated with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. (RA) 8294. 4
The Facts
The instant cases stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging accused-appellants of the
aforementioned crime, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about January 20, 2002, in the evening, at Brgy. Cabanaetan, Municipality of Mabini, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength and at night time, armed with an unlicensed
firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ROLANDO NECESITO y F ABRIGAS which
caused his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. 5
The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 20, 2002, eyewitness
Reynaldo Necesito (Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon
accused-appellants having an altercation with the victim, Rolando Necesito (Rolando). From his vantage point,
Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants
1|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
chase and eventually surround Rolando at an area around seven (7) meters away from where Reynaldo was
hiding. Reynaldo then heard four (4) successive gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree
for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down
on the ground. To ensure Rolando's demise, Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter,
accused-appellants fled the scene.6
The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree, prompting police officers to conduct an
investigation from which were gathered the following evidence and information: (a) a piece of bamboo was
recovered three (3) meters away from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando purportedly had a previous
misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997, yet the same was settled before the barangay; and (c)
Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the time of the incident. An autopsy was likewise
conducted on Rolando's body, revealing that there were four (4) incised wounds on his left hand, a stab wound
on his left chest, and five (5) gunshot wounds on his body; that based on the nature and sizes of his wounds, it
was possible that the firearm used was of the same caliber; and that his injuries could not have been inflicted
by a single person. 7
For their respective parts, accused-appellants similarly invoked the defenses of denial and alibi.1âwphi1
Essentially, they insisted that they were somewhere else when the incident occurred. In addition, Ramos
maintained that the declarations of Reynaldo against him were motivated by a personal grudge, while
Nacional claimed that the corpus delicti was not proven with exact certainty since the cadaver that was
exhumed and examined was already in an advanced stage of decomposition, having been interred for more
than a month. 8
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision9 dated December 8, 2010, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit
of parole, and ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. 10
In so ruling, the R TC gave credence to the direct, straightforward, and categorical eyewitness testimony of
Reynaldo positively identifying each of the accused-appellants as co-perpetrators of the crime, further noting
that Reynaldo had no ill-motive to falsely testify against them. On the other hand, it found the defense
testimonies to be untenable, as they were riddled with various inconsistencies and contradictions. Further, the
RTC found the presence of the circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to
Murder, considering that the accused-appellants took advantage of their combined strength and their several
weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the success of their felonious design. In view of the
foregoing, the RTC concluded that accused-appellants "are equally guilty of the crime of Murder aggravated
with the use of unlincensed firearm, there having been proven the existence of implied conspiracy between
them." 11
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.12
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 13 dated April 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder
with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages to ₱75,000.00 each and imposing legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards
from finality of the judgment until fully paid. 14 It held that Reynaldo was able to positively identify accused-
appellants as Rolando's killers, given that he was only seven (7) meters away from the situs criminis. The CA
likewise held that the accused-appellants took advantage of their combined superior strength as they even
used several weapons to render the unarmed victim completely defenseless. 15
Hence, the instant consolidated cases.
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Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of Appeal, 16 (G.R. No.221425) while Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466).
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants'
conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
The Court's Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional elevated the matter before the Court thru a Notice of Appeal 17
(G.R. No. 221425) filed before the CA; on the other hand, Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466). 18As a general rule, appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to
the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; 19 except when the CA
imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in which case, the appeal
shall be made by a mere notice of appeal filed before the CA. 20 In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly availed
of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Court, despite having been
sentenced by the CA of reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court will
treat their petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the substantive issue at hand with finality.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.21
As will be explained hereunder, the accused-appellants should only be held liable for simple Murder, and not
Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (a) that a person
was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 22
In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo, had established beyond
reasonable doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise,
it was shown that they deliberately used weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo stick), which rendered Rolando
defenseless from their fatal attacks. Thus, such killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, 23 which perforce warrants accused-appellants' conviction for Murder.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the
Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." There are two (2) requisites
to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside
his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the
prosecution.24
In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is
unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the firearm used as a
murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm
was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As
the Information alleged that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution
3|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
was duty-bound to prove this allegation.25 Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the
use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby modifies accused-appellants' conviction to simple Murder.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659,26 Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present (except for abuse of superior strength which
was used to qualify the killing to Murder), accused-appellants must be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Further, to conform with existing jurisprudence, accused-appellants must be ordered to jointly and
severally pay Rolando's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per
annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 27
WHEREFORE, the consolidated appeals are DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05095 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: accused-appellants Manny
Ramos, Roberto Salonga, and Servillano Nacional are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and accordingly,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando
Necesito's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all
the monetary awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
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SECOND DIVISION
March 7, 2018
G.R. No. 232189

ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner
vs.
CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated February 23, 2017 and the Resolution3
dated June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138, which affirmed the Orders dated
May 29, 20154 and March 3, 20165 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
R-PSY-14-17714-CV that: (a) granted petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s (petitioner) Motion to Withdraw; and (b)
declared respondent Cynthia B. Baña’s (respondent) Counterclaim for independent adjudication.
The Facts
On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 6
seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.7 Subsequently, respondent filed her Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim8 dated December 5, 2014.
However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw9 his petition. In her
comment/opposition10 thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court (alternatively,
Section 2, Rule 1 7), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent
adjudication.11 In turn, petitioner filed his reply,12 averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from
being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which - according to petitioner - was required under the same Rules of
Court provision. In particular, petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required manifestation only on
March 30, 2015. However, respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Withdraw on March
11, 2015; hence, respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her desire to
prosecute her counterclaims in the same action.13
The RTC Ruling
In an Order14 dated May 29, 2015, the RTC granted petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw petition. 15 Further, it
declared respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto.16
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,17 which was denied in an Order18 dated March 3,
2016. Thus, he elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, 19 praying that the RTC Orders be set
5|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
aside to the extent that they allowed the counterclaim to remain for independent adjudication before the
same trial court.20
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated February 23, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 22 It found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a
counterclaim has been filed by the defendant before the service upon him of the petitioner’s motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.23
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,24 which was denied in a Resolution25 dated June 6, 2017;
hence, this petition.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring
respondent's counterclaim for independent adjudication before the same trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims in the event that a
complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiffs instance, viz. :
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall
not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him
of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be
without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court.1âwphi1
As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this case - the rule is that the dismissal shall
be limited to the complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that "[i]nstead of an ‘action’ shall not be
dismissed, the present rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere
dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the
defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same acton."26
However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action. As explained by renowned
remedial law expert, former Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the matter:
Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to which a
counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to
have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render
the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint.
Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been
dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss. x x x27
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In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second sentence which
states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the same provision's
third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a counterclaim
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom,
should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference therefor
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may
be prosecuted only in a separate action.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period triggers the
finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the
prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order to obviate this finality, the
defendant is required to file the required manifestation within the aforesaid period; otherwise, the
counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
It is hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that "[t]he whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute
must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every
meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute
since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning
may be modified or restricted by the latter."28
By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 1 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA clearly violated the foregoing principle
and in so doing, erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders declaring respondent’s counterclaim "as
remaining for independent adjudication" despite the latter's failure to file the required manifestation within
the prescribed fifteen (15)-day period. As petitioner aptly points out:
[I]f the intention of the framers of the Rules of Court is a blanket dismissal of the complaint ALONE if a
counterclaim has been pleaded prior to the service of the notice of dismissal then there is NO EVIDENT
PURPOSE for the third (3rd) sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 17.
x x x x29
[I]t is clearly an ABSURD conclusion if the said provision will direct the defendant to manifest within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice of dismissal his preference to prosecute his counterclaim in the SAME
ACTION when the same AUTOMATICALLY REMAINS. If the automatic survival of the counterclaim and the
death of the complaint as being ruled by the Court of Appeals in its questioned Decision is indeed true, then
the third sentence should have required defendant to manifest that he will prosecute his counterclaim in a
SEPARATE [and not - as the provision reads - in the same] ACTION.30 (Emphases and underscoring in the
original)
Petitioner's observations are logically on point. Consequently, the CA rulings, which affirmed the patently
erroneous R TC Orders, must be reversed. As it should be, the RTC should have only granted petitioner's
Motion to Withdraw and hence, dismissed his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, without prejudice
to, among others, the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 23, 2017 and the Resolution dated June 6,
2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
ENTERED solely granting petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others, without
prejudice to the prosecution of respondent Cynthia B. Baña's counterclaim in a separate action.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
7|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
THIRD DIVISION
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 230065
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MARCELINO CRISPO y DESCALSO alias "GOGO" and ENRICO HERRERA y MONTES, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Marcelino Crispo y Descalso alias "Gogo"
(Crispo) and Enrico Herrera y Montes (Herrera; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated
March 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 0711 7, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
October 24, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 12-293828 and 12-
293829 finding: (a) accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"; and (b)
Crispo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of the same law.
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging accused-appellants of the crime of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the
accusatory portions of which state:
Crim. Case No. 12-293828
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said [accused-appellants],
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being then authorized by law to
sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
knowingly and jointly sell one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO
THREE (0.023) gram of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.1âwphi1
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Crim. Case No. 12-293829
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila, Philippines, [Crispo], not being then authorized by
law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly possess or have
under his control three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
weighing zero point zero three seven (0.037) gram, zero point zero two five (0.025) gram and zero point zero
8|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
one nine (0.019) gram or in the total weight of zero point zero eight one (0.081) gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 1:30 in the afternoon of November 19, 2012,8 a confidential informant
(CI) tipped the Manila Police District Station 4 (MPD) of the alleged illegal drug activities of a certain alias
"Gogo" (later identified as Crispo) at Ma. Cristina Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Thus, after coordinating with the
operatives of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the MPD organized a buy-bust operation at the said
area, with Police Officer (PO) 2 Dennis Reyes (P02 Reyes) as the poseur buyer. Upon arrival at the area at
around 5:30 in the afternoon of even date, the CI and P02 Reyes saw Crispo talking to his runner, Herrera, and
decided to approach them. As they went nearer, Herrera approached the CI and P02 Reyes, while Crispo
remained about five (5) to six (6) meters away. P02 Reyes then signified his intention of buying shabu,
prompting Herrera to get the marked money from him, and thereafter, approach Crispo in order to remit the
money and get a sachet containing white crystalline substance from the latter. When Herrera handed over the
sachet to P02 Reyes, the latter performed the pre-arranged signal, directly causing his backups to rush into the
scene and apprehend accused-appellants. Upon frisking accusedappellants, the arresting officers recovered
three (3) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Crispo. The accused-appellants and
the seized items were then taken to the barangay office where the arresting officers, inter alia, conducted the
inventory and photography in the presence of two (2) barangay kagawads, as indicated in the Receipt of
Property/Evidence Seized.9 After examination10 at the Crime Laboratory, it was confirmed that the sachets
seized from accused-appellants contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. 11
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged12 and offered their version of the events.
According to Crispo, he was just on board a tricycle going to his niece's house when suddenly, a car with five
(5) policemen in civilian clothes blocked the tricycle's path. One of the policemen then poked a gun at Crispo,
and told him, "Mga pulis kami, sumama ka sa presinto." Fearful for his life, Crispo complied. Upon arrival at
the police station, the policemen demanded from him ₱30,000.00 for his release; otherwise, they will plant
evidence against him. The policemen then proceeded to show him four (4) sachets of shabu which will be used
against him. For his part, Herrera averred that he was riding a bicycle when he accidentally bumped a brown
van. Three (3) men then alighted from the van, arrested him, and took him to the police station. Thereat, an
affidavit was purportedly prepared for him and that he signed the same even without reading it out of
confusion.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 24, 2014, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged and, accordingly, sentenced them as follows: (a) for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
RTC sentenced accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
PS00,000.00; and (b) for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the R TC sentenced Crispo to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00. 15
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes charged as it was
shown that accused-appellants sold to P02 Reyes one (l) sachet of shabu and that after their arrest, three (3)
more sachets of shabu were found in Crispo’s possession. On the other hand, the RTC did not give merit to
accused-appellants' imputation of ill-motive against their arresting officers after finding it unsubstantiated. 16
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed17 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated March 1 7, 2016, the CA affi1med the RTC ruling. 19 It held that the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crimes charged. Further, the CA ruled that the
absence of representatives from the DOJ and the media during the conduct of the inventory is not fatal to the
9|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
prosecution of accused-appellants, so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved.20
Hence, this appeal.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction
for the crimes charged.
I.
During the pendency of this appeal, the Court received a letter21 dated September 7, 2017 from the Bureau of
Corrections, informing it that Herrera had already died on April 3, 2017. Attached thereto is a duplicate copy of
Herrera's Certificate of Death22 issued by the Officer of the Civil Registrar General.
Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the consequences of Herrera's death are as follows:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Jao,23 the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on
his liabilities,24 as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. "25
Thus, upon Herrera's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action against him is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. As such, the criminal case against him is
hereby dismissed, and declared closed and terminated.26
II.
With respect to Crispo, the Court finds his appeal meritorious.
It must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned.27 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law."28
Here, Crispo was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the
conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the
10 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment.29 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.30
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of
the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of
custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 31
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling
the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 32 Under the said section, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640,33 the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or
the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.34 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,35 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media
or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs), the evils of
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the[said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 36
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 37 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064038 - provide that the
said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody
over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 39 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily
proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved.40 In People v.Almorfe,41 the Court explained that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 42 Also, in People v.
De Guzman, 43 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.44
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed unjustified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Crispo.
An examination of the records reveals that while the inventory and photography of the seized items were
made in the presence of two (2) elected public officials, i.e., Barangay Kagawads Ramon Amtolim and Helen
Tolentino, as evidenced by their signatures on the Receipt of Property/Evidence Seized, 45 the same were not
done in the presence of representatives from either the DOJ and the media. This fact was confirmed by P03
Manolito Rodriguez (P03 Rodriguez), a member of the buy-bust team that apprehended Crispo, in his
testimony in direct and cross-examinations, to wit:
11 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
[Asst. Pros. Alexander T. Yap]: What happened at the barangay? What barangay by the way?
[P03 Rodriguez]: I forgot the number of the barangay, sir.
Q: Who was, was there an official of the barangay with you?
A: I remember two Kagawad[s], sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened at the barangay?
A: They signed as witnesses in the inventory receipt, sir.
Q: Who signed the inventory?
A: [The] Barangay Kagawad[s], sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Rosemarie G. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales)]: Mr. Witness, according to you, you already proceeded to the
barangay?
[P03 Rodriguez]: Yes, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, were you able to see when the markings of the evidences (sic) were done?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Where were you at that time?
A: At the barangay hall, ma'am.
Q: How about the accused at that time, where were they?
A: They were with us also, ma'am.
Q: Were they assisted [by] any counsel at that time?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: Were there any members of the DOJ?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: Were there any members of the media?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: According to you the inventory of the evidences (sic) were witnessed by the Kagawads?
A: Yes, ma' am.
12 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Q: An these kagawads? Who called the kagawads?
A: We, ma'am.
Q: They were already at the area when they arrived?
A: Yes, ma'am.46 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives from the DOJ and the
media to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering,
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a case. However, minor
deviations may be excused in situations where a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In this
case, despite the non-observance of the witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the
prosecution .. In fact, the poseur-buyer, P02 Reyes, only feigned ignorance as to the reason why no
representatives of the DOJ and the media were present during the inventory of the seized items:
[Atty. Gonzales): By the way, Mr. Witness, prior to the operation considering that you would be conducting
a buy-bust operation, was there any coordination with the DOJ?
[P02 Reyes): I do not know if [SP03 Agapito Yadao, the buy-bust team leader,) did that, ma'am.
Q: How about with any media representative?
A: I do not know, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, when these evidences (sic) were likewise being marked was there any presence of the DOJ
now?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: How about the presence of the media now?
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Why was there none?
A: When we arrested them we immediately proceeded to the Barangay[.]
Q: That's the only your (sic) explanation?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Despite the fact that it is a buy-bust operation which was prepared by your office?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: With all documents prepared and Pre-operation Report prepared?
A: Yes, ma'am.
13 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Q: You just merely did not consider getting all the required persons to comply with Sec. 21?
A: I do not know with Yadao, ma'am.47 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.48 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine
and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be
adduced.49 In People v. Umipang,50 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were
employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable - without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."51
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.52 These considerations arise from the fact that police
officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly
comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, police officers are
compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but mustin fact, also convince the Court that
they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstances, their actions were reasonable.[[53]]
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances exist
which would excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Crispo have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution
for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving
not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which,
renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 54
Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the arresting officers, which were unfortunately left unjustified,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Crispo, as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.55 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.56 As such, since the prosecution
failed to provide justifiable grounds for noncompliance with the aforesaid provision, Crispo’s acquittal is
perforce in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the
subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 57
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the
procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to
not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any
issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether
14 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and
perforce, overturn a conviction.58
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:
(a) Crim. Case No. 12-293828 is hereby DISMISSED and declared CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as accused-
appellant Enrico Herrera y Montes is concerned due to his supervening death pending appeal; and
(b) The appeal of accused-appellant Marcelino Crispo y Descalso is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 1 7,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07117 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, he is
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
15 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SECOND DIVISION
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 230070

vs.
NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06127, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated October 1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 11427 finding accused-appellant Nestor Año y Del Remedios
(Año) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the RTC, charging Año with violation of Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
Criminal Case No. 11427
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2009 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to poseur buyer, P02
Ruel T. Ayad, 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet which substance was found positive to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Php.200.00, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The prosecution alleged that at around five (5) o’clock in the afternoon of August 3, 2005 and after receiving
information about Año’s drug activities at Daangbakal, Guitnangbayan II, Police Officer (PO) 2 Ruel T. Ayad
(P02 Ayad), PO1 Aldwin Ortilla (POl Ortilla), and POl Jenesis A. Acuin7 (PO1 Acuin) formed a buy-bust team
designating P02 Ayad as the poseur-buyer, with POl Ortilla and PO1 Acuin as back-ups, and marked two (2)
₱100.00 bills to be used in the operation.8 Thereafter, the team headed to the house of Año where P02 Ayad
knocked on the door and upon seeing Año, whispered that he "wants to score" worth P200.00. Año replied
that he has drugs with him and gave P02 Ayad a transparent plastic sachet, while the latter simultaneously
handed the marked money as payment. As Año placed the money inside his pocket, P02 Ayad introduced
himself as a policeman, causing Año to flee. Fortunately, P02 Ayad caught Año and asked him to empty his
16 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
pockets which produced the two (2) ₱100.00 bills. Due to the commotion caused by Año's relatives who were
preventing his arrest, the team moved at a distance of around 100 meters from the place of arrest, marked the
confiscated sachet, and completed the inventory thereat. Barangay Captain Leo S. Buenviaje (Brgy. Captain
Buenviaje) witnessed and signed the Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items, 9 photographs were also taken in
the presence of Año, P02 Ayad, and PO1 Acuin.10 On the same day, P02 Ayad delivered the seized sachet to the
Crime Laboratory where it was turned over to Police Inspector Forensic Chemist Beaune V. Villaraza (FC
Villaraza) for examination. In Laboratory Report No. D-198-09,11 FC Villaraza confirmed that the seized sachet
was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.12
Upon arraignment, Año pleaded not guilty and denied the charges leveled against him. He claimed that on said
date, he was at home celebrating the 4th birthday of his nephew when suddenly, three police officers whom he
identified to be P02 Ayad, PO1 Ortilla, and PO1 Acuin, forcibly arrested him and brought him to the police
station for inquiry. The following day, he learned that he was being charged of drug pushing.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found Año guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of ₱500,000.00.15
The RTC found all the elements for the prosecution of sale of dangerous drugs present, noting that the identity
of Año as the seller of the illegal drug was clearly established when he was arrested in fiagrante delicto during
a buy-bust operation.16
Aggrieved, Año elevated his conviction before the Court of Appeals (CA).17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated December 4, 2015, the CA upheld the RTC ruling,19 likewise finding that all the elements
constituting the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs were present. Moreover, it ruled that the
apprehending officers duly complied with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as P02 Ayad testified in detail the links in the chain of
custody of the seized drug from the time of its confiscation until its presentation in court as evidence.
Hence, this appeal.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Año is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165.
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it
is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned.20 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."21
Here, Afio was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section
5, Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 22 It is likewise essential for a conviction
17 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
that the drugs subject of the sale be presented in court and its identity established with moral certainty
through an unbroken chain of custody over the same. In cases like this, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.23
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that
police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their integrity and evidentiary
value are preserved.24 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 25 the apprehending team
shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and take
photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused or theperson from whom such items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from confiscation for examination purposes.26 In the case of People v. Mendoza,27 the Court stressed
that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, ‘planting’ or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."28
Section 21of RA9165 may not always be possible.29 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064030- provide that non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not
automatically render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 31 In
other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21
of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 32 In People v. Almorfe,[[33]]
the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.34 Also, in People v. De Guzman,35 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground
for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.36
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the
seized items from Año which were unfortunately, left unjustified, thereby putting into question their integrity
and evidentiary value.
As the prosecution submits, upon Año's arrest, PO1 Ortilla called Brgy. Captain Buenviaje to witness the
marking and to sign the inventory. After which, P02 Ayad marked the sachet of shabu subject of the sale with
Año's intials, "NDRA," while PO1 Ortilla prepared an inventory of the seized items, which was signed by Brgy.
Captain Buenviaje as witness, and had them photographed. Thereafter, the buy-bust team escorted Año to the
police station and turned over the sachet for examination to FC Villaraza.
While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the attached Inventory of
Seized/Confiscated Items,37 the records are glaringly silent as to the presence of the required witnesses,
namely, the representatives from the media and the DOJ. To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640, as well as its IRR requires the presence of the following witnesses during the
conduct of inventory and photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) any elected public official; and
(c) a representative from the media and the DOJ.38 In their absence, the prosecution must provide a credible
18 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
explanation justifying the noncompliance with the rule; otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165
(and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165) would not apply.
Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural lapse. It then follows that
there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized from Año, thereby militating against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which resultantly warrants his acquittal. 39 It is well-settled that the
procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside
as a simple procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.40
subject matter:
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x.41
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the
procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only
acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings
before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue
regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
perforce, overturn a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 06127 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Nestor Año y Del
Remedios is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
19 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Special Third DIVISION
July 17, 2017
G.R. No. 225054

vs.
AGAPITO DIMAALA y ARELA, Accused-Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Decision1 dated May 8, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 4994-
C found accused-appellant Agapito Dimaala y Arela (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court renders judgment finding AGAPITO DIMAALA y Arela GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged for the treacherous killing of Rodrigo Marasigan. Said accused
is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole.
He is likewise ordered to pay the family of Rodrigo Marasigan the following:
PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages;
PhP 36,000.00 as actual damages;
PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
PhP 25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.2
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals (CA). In a Decision 3 dated September
23, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR No. 05595, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the
crime charged but deleted the award of temperate damages.4
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal5 from the CA's Decision, but later on decided not to
pursue his appeal.1avvphi1 Thus, he filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of
Entry of Judgment,6 which the Court granted in its Resolution7 dated September 21, 2016. Following the
closure and termination of the case, the Court declared the finality of the aforesaid Resolution and issued an
Entry of Judgment.8
20 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Meanwhile, the Court received a Letter9 dated February 23, 2017 from the Bureau of Corrections informing it
that accused-appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Death10 attached thereto.
In view of this development, the criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
ex delicto, is ipso facto extinguished.11
It is settled that the death of accused-appellant prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible
the criminal case against him.12 Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the criminal liability is
totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
xxxx
In People v. Culas,13 citing People v. Layag,14 the Court explained the effects of the death of an accused
pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. x x x.
xxxx
In this relation, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources other than the
subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant,
as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.15
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) DISMISS Crim. Case No. 4994-C before the Regional Trial Court of
Calauag, Quezon by reason of the death of accused-appellant Agapito Dimaala y Arela; and (b) DECLARE the
instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
21 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SECOND DIVISION
November 29, 2017
G.R. No. 229335
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioner
vs.
BELLY H. NG, represented by ANNABELLE G. WONG, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 1, 2016 and the
Resolution3 dated January 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102033, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated November 26, 2013 and the Order5 dated January 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City, Branch 270 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 38-V-13, fixing the just compensation for the subject lots at
₱15,000.00/square meter (sq. m.) and the replacement cost of the improvements thereon at ₱12.000.00/sq.
m, hut deleting the award of consequential damages and reducing the legal rate of interest on the obligation
from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.).
The Facts
On February 12, 2013, petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH; petitioner), filed before the RTC a complaint 6 against respondent Belly H. Ng
(respondent), represented by Annabelle G. Wong 7 , seeking to expropriate the lots registered in the name of
respondent under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. V-921888 and V-921919 with a total area of 1,671 sq.
m. (subject lots), together with the improvements thereon with an aggregate surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m.
(collectively, subject properties), located in Kowloon Industrial Compound, Tatalon Street, Brgy. U gong,
Valenzuela City,10 for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City
to Caloocan City).11 Petitioner manifested that it is able and ready to pay respondent the amounts of
₱6,684,000.00 (i.e., at ₱4,000.00/sq. m.) and ₱ll,138,362.74,12 representing the combined relevant zonal value
of the subject lots and the replacement cost of the improvements thereon, respective1y. 13
In her answer,14 respondent contended that the offer price is unreasonably low, and that she should be
compensated the fair market value of her properties at the time of taking, estimated to be at ₱25,000.00/sq.
m. Moreover, the fair and just replacement cost of the improvements on the subject lots should be in the
amount of ₱22,276,724.00,15 pursuant to Section 10 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic
Act No. (RA) 8974.16
Petitioner was eventually granted a Writ of Possession,17 after respondent received the amount of ₱l
7,822,362.74, representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject properties.18
22 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the properties 19 which,
thereafter, submitted its Commissioner's Report20 dated June 10, 2013, recommending the amounts of
₱7,000.00/sq. m. and ₱12,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject lots and the improvements
thereon, respectively, and the payment of six percent (6%) legal interest therefor, reckoned from the time of
taking.21
Dissatisfied, respondent objected22 to the recommended just compensation of ₱7,000.00/sq. m. for the
subject lots, contending that the same "is not [the] real, substantial, full, ample[,] and fair market value" of her
lots,23 considering that the just compensation for nearby properties 24 expropriated for the C-5 Northern Link
Project25 had been fixed by the same RTC at ₱15,000.00/sq. m.26 She likewise objected to the imposition of six
percent (6%) interest, insisting that the same should be pegged at twelve percent (12%) interest p.a., 27 in line
with the rulings in Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) v. Imperial28 and in Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
v. Ker & Company, Limited.29 However, she accepted the value of ₱l2,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the replacement
cost of the improvements.30
On the other hand, petitioner filed its comment,31 interposing no objection to the ₱7,000.00/sq. m. valuation
for the subject lots and the imposition of six percent (6%) legal interest recommended by the board of
commissioners,32 citing the letter33 dated July 30, 2013 of the Office of Director Patrick B. Gatan, Project
Director, Infrastructure Right-of-Way and Resettlement - Project Management Office, DPWH.34 However, it
failed to attach a copy of the said letter.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision35 dated November 26, 2013, the RTC fixed the just compensation for the subject lots at
₱15,000.00/sq. m. or the total amount of ₱25,065,000.00, taking into account: (a) the classification of the
subject lots as industrial, their location, shape, and their being not prone to flood;36 and (b) a previous case37
involving a neighboring property expropriated for the C-5 Northern Link Project which was valued at
₱15,000.00/sq. m. by the same RTC.38 It adopted the replacement cost of ₱12,000.00/sq. m. recommended by
its appointed commissioners or the total amount of ₱25,460,400.00, noting that respondent accepted said
recommendation.39 Consequently, it ordered petitioner to pay respondent the aforesaid amounts with twelve
percent (12%) legal interest p.a., reckoned from the time of taking of the properties, less the provisional
deposit of ₱l7,822,362.74, plus consequential damages and attorney's fees.40
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,41 but was denied in an Order42 dated January 16, 2014,
prompting it to file an appeal43 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision44 dated July 1, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC rulings, but deleted the award of consequential
damages and reduced the legal interest to six percent (6%) p.a., computed from the date of the RTC Decision
until full satisfaction.45
The CA upheld the just compensation of ₱15,000.00/sq. m. fixed by the RTC for the subject 1,671-sq. m. lots
on the basis of relevant factors, such as the BIR zonal valuation of the land, tax declarations and the
Commissioner's Report, as well as the market value of the properties within the area. 46 It likewise sustained
the value of ₱12,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the replacement cost of the improvements with an aggregate surface
area of 2,121.7 sq. m. or the total amount of ₱25,460,400.00, holding that: (a) the amount of ₱l1,138,362.74
proposed by petitioner was inconceivably lower than the current construction cost of a
commercial/warehouse which was at ₱32,000.00/sq. m., even as early as November 2009; and (b) petitioner
did not interpose any objection to the said amount. 47
However, the CA ruled that the award of consequential damages was improper, considering that the entirety
of the subject properties is being expropriated, hence, there is no remaining portion that may suffer an
impairment or decrease in value.48 It likewise reduced the legal interest to six percent (6%) p.a., in line with the
23 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
amendment introduced by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB Circular No. 799,49
Series of 2013.50
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,51 which was, however, denied in a Resolution52 dated
January 23, 2017; hence, the instant petition.
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming
the replacement cost for the improvements fixed by the RTC, and the award of attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City to Caloocan City)
involves the implementation of a national infrastructure project. Thus, for purposes of determining the just
compensation, RA 897453 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), which were effective at the time of
the filing of the complaint, shall govern.54
Under Section 10 of the IRR, the improvements and/or structures on the land to be acquired shall be appraised
using the replacement cost method, thus:
Section 10. Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. - Pursuant to Section 7 of [RA 8974], the
Implementing Agency shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be
acquired using the replacement cost method. The replacement cost of the improvements/structures is defined
as the amount necessary to replace the improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for
materials, equipment, labor, contractor's profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs associated with
the acquisition and installation in place of the affected improvements/structures. In the valuation of the
affected improvements/structures, the Implementing Agency shall consider, among other things, the kinds and
quantities of materials/equipment used, the location, configuration and other physical features of the
properties, and prevailing construction prices. (Emphasis supplied)
The replacement cost method is premised on the principle of substitution, which means that "all things being
equal, a rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a property than the cost of building an acceptable
substitute with like utility."55
Accordingly, the Implementing Agency should consider: (a) construction costs or the current market price of
materials, equipment, labor, as well as the contractor's profit and overhead; and (b) attendant costs or the
cost associated with the acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute in place of the affected
improvements/structures.56 In addition, the case of Republic v. Mupas (Mupas)57 instructs that in using the
replacement cost method to ascertain the value of improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant
standards provided under Section 558 of RA 8974, as well as equity consistent with the principle that eminent
domain is a concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the landowner whole. Thus, it is not the
amount of the owner's investment, but the "value of the interest" in land taken by eminent domain, that is
guaranteed to the owner.59
While there are various methods of appraising a property using the cost approach, among them, the
reproduction cost, the replacement cost new, and the depreciated replacement cost, Mupas declared that the
use of the depreciated replacement cost method60 is consistent with the principle that the property owner
shall be compensated for his actual loss,61 bearing in mind that the concept of just compensation does not
imply fairness to the property owner alone, but must likewise be just to the public which ultimately bears the
cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to compensation only for what he actually loses, and
what he loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of the taking. 62 Hence, even as
24 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation
unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.63
It must be emphasized that in determining just compensation, the courts must consider and apply the
parameters set by the law and its implementing rules and regulations in order to ensure that they do not
arbitrarily fix an amount as just compensation that is contradictory to the objectives of the law.64 Be that as it
may, when acting within the parameters set by the law itself, courts are not strictly bound to apply the formula
to its minutest detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the formula's strict
application. Thus, the courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula's application, 65 subject
to the jurisprudential limitation that the factual situation calls for it and the courts clearly explain the reason
for such deviation.66
In this case, the RTC and the CA upheld the recommendation of the court-appointed commissioners, fixing the
just compensation for the improvements on the expropriated properties at ₱12,000.00/sq. m., which merely
considered their location, classification, value declared by the owner, and the zonal valuation of the subject
lots. However, there is no competent evidence showing that it took into account the prevailing construction
costs and all other attendant costs associated with the acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute
in place of the affected improvements/structures as required by the IRR. Consequently, the Court cannot
uphold and must, perforce, set aside the said valuation as the just compensation for the subject
improvements.
On the other hand, it is unclear how the parameters set by the IRR have been factored-in in petitioner's
proposed valuation of ₱l1,138,362.74.67 Thus, the Court cannot automatically adopt petitioner's own
computation as prayed for in the instant petition. Neither can the Court accept respondent's submitted
valuation68 which claimed to have used the prevailing replacement cost method for lack of proper
substantiation to support the correctness of the values or data used in such computation.
It must be emphasized that the veracity of the facts and figures which the parties used in their respective
computations involves the resolution of questions of fact which is, as a rule, improper in a petition for review
on certiorari since the Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, a remand of this case for reception of further evidence
is necessary in order for the RTC to determine just compensation for the subject improvements in accordance
with the guidelines set under RA 8974 and its IRR.
In relation thereto, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be imposed on the
unpaid balance of the just compensation, which shall be computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a.
from the date of taking, i.e., from April 10, 2013 when the RTC issued a writ of possession 69 in favor of
petitioner,70 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation
due respondent shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a., 71 in line with the amendment
introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.1âwphi1
Finally, the Court finds the award of attorney's fees to be improper and should be, accordingly, deleted. Even
when a claimant is compelled to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney's fees may still be withheld
where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a suit other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.72 The case of Republic v. CA (Republic)73 cited by the CA
to justify the award is inapplicable because, unlike in this case where petitioner only acquired possession of
the expropriated properties after paying respondent the amount of ₱l7,822,362.74, representing the 100%
zonal valuation thereof, the petitioner in Republic took possession of the landowner's real property without
initiating expropriation proceedings, and over the latter's objection.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 1, 2016 and the Resolution dated
January 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102033 are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it upheld
the just compensation fixed by the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 270 (RTC) for the subject
1,671-square meter (sq. m.) lots at ₱15,000.00/sq. m. However, the valuation of ₱12,000.00/ sq. m. fixed by
the lower courts as the replacement cost of the subject improvements with an aggregate surface area of
2,121.7 sq. m. is hereby SET ASIDE, and Civil Case No. 38-V-13 is REMANDED to the RTC for reception of
evidence on the issue of just compensation therefor in accordance with the guidelines set under Republic Act
25 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
No. 8974 and its implementing rules and regulations. Legal interest is hereby imposed on the unpaid balance
of the just compensation, as determined by the RTC, at twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) reckoned from
April 10, 2013 to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. Finally, the award of
attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of factual and legal bases.
The RTC is directed to conduct the proceedings in said case with reasonable dispatch, and to submit to the
Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
26 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SECOND DIVISION
January 10, 2018
G.R. No. 227215
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioner
vs.
LEONOR MACABAGDAL, represented by EULOGIA MACABAGDAL PASCUAL (formerly John Doe "DDD"),
Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1assailing the Decision2 dated September 13, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104473, which affirmed the Decision3 dated October 30, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 49-V-08, imposing legal interest on
the unpaid balance of the just compensation for the subject lot at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
(p.a.) computed from the time of the taking of the property until full payment.
The Facts
On January 23, 2008, petitioner the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways, filed4 before the RTC a complaint5 against an unknown owner for the
expropriation of a 200-square meter (sq. m.) lot located in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City, identified as Lot
1343-A-2-A-2-G, (LRC)Psd-315943 (subject lot),6 for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project,
otherwise known as North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) Segment 8.1, traversing from Mindanao A venue in
Quezon City to the NLEX in Valenzuela City.7
Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted8 a writ of possession over the subject lot on May 5, 2008,
and was required9 to deposit with the court the amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.) representing
the zonal value thereof (provisional deposit). 10
On August 28, 2012, respondent Leonor Macabagdal (respondent), represented by Eulogia Macabagdal
Pascual, was substituted as partydefendant upon sufficient showing that the subject lot is registered in her
name under Transfer Certificate Title No. (TCT) V-103067. Respondent did not oppose the expropriation, and
received the provisional deposit.11
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the subject lot, which
thereafter submitted its Commissioners' Report (Re: Just Compensation)12 dated May 23, 2014, recommending
a fair market value of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject lot, taking into consideration
its location, neighborhood and land classification, utilities, amenities, physical characteristics, occupancy and
usage, highest and best usage, current market value offerings, as well as previously decided expropriation
cases of the same RTC involving properties similarly situated in the same barangay.13
27 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 30, 2014, the RTC found the recommendation of the commissioners to be
reasonable and just, and accordingly: (a) fixed the just compensation for the subject lot at ₱9,000.00/ sq. m.;
(b) directed petitioner to pay the same, less the provisional deposit of ₱550,000.00; and (c) imposed legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking
of the subject lot until full payment.15
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed16 before the CA, questioning the just compensation of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. and
the award of twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a., instead of six percent (6%) p.a. 17 as provided under
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding that the commissioners,
in their recommendation, observed the parameters20 set forth under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974,21 and
the findings of the RTC was amply supported by the evidence on record.22
Hence, the instant petition claiming that the CA did not rule on the issue of the applicable rate of interest
which, in this case, should be at twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the filing of the complaint until June 30, 2013,
and thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment.
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming
the RTC's imposition of interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from
the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment.
The Court's Ruling
The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but to compensate him
for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld in a plethora of cases, is the market
value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.23 Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the
property owner for appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the
landowner, with due consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.24
In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but also its income-
generating potential.1âwphi1 Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must be
immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. 25 The value of the
landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unRaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed.
26
This shall comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and constitutes
due compliance with the constitutional mandate of just compensation in eminent domain.27
In this case, from the date of the taking of the subject lot on May 5, 2008 when the RTC issued a writ of
possession28 in favor of petitioner,29 until the just compensation therefor was finally fixed at ₱9,000.00/sq. m.,
petitioner had only paid a provisional deposit in the amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus,
this left an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the just compensation," warranting the imposition of
interest. It is settled that the delay in the payment of just compensation amounts to an effective forbearance
of money, entitling the landowner to interest on the difference in the amount between the final amount as
adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the government.30
28 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
However, as aptly pointed out by petitioner,31 the twelve percent (12%) p.a. rate of legal interest is only
applicable until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at six percent (6%) p.a. in line with BSP-MB
Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. Prevailing jurisprudence32 has upheld the applicability of BSP-MB Circular No.
799, Series of 2013 to forbearances of money in expropriation cases, contrary to respondent's contention. 33
The cases of Sy v. Local Government of Quezon City34 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 35 cited by
respondent are both inapplicable because they were all decided prior to the effectivity of BSP-MB Circular No.
799, Series of 2013 on July 1, 2013.36
Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the complaint but
from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008, since it is from this date that the fact
of the deprivation of property can be established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest should
begin from this date.37 Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be
imposed on the unpaid balance of the just compensation for the subject lot, which shall be computed at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter,
or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due respondent shall earn legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) p.a.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 1044 73 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION imposing legal interest at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, as determined by
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, reckoned from the date of the taking on May 5, 2008
to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. The rest of the CA Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
29 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
November 14, 2016
G.R. No. 219510
MARLON CURAMMENG y PABLO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated October 20, 20142 and June 30,
20153 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802, which dismissed petitioner Marlon Curammeng y
Pablo's (Curammeng) petition for review for his failure to attach, inter alia, a certification of non-forum
shopping.
The Facts
The instant case arose from an Information4 filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Bauang, La Union (MTC),
charging Curammeng of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that on the night of September 25, 2006, a Maria De Leon
bus going to Laoag, Ilocos Norte being driven by Francisco Franco y Andres (Franco) was traversing the
northbound lane of the national highway along Santiago, Bauang, La Union, when its rear left tire blew out and
caught fire. This prompted Franco to immediately park the bus on the northbound side of the national
highway, and thereafter, unloaded the cargoes from the said bus. At a little past midnight of the next day, an
RCJ bus bound for Manila being driven by Curammeng traversed the southbound lane of the road where the
stalled bus was parked and hit Franco, resulting in the latter's death. 5
In his defense, Curammeng averred that he was driving the RCJ bus bound for Manila and traversing the
southbound side of the national highway at less than 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he saw from afar the
stalled Maria De Leon bus at the road's northbound side which was not equipped with any early warning
device, thus, prompting him to decelerate. When the RCJ bus was only a few meters away from the stalled
Maria De Leon bus, a closed van suddenly appeared from the opposite direction, causing petitioner to steer his
bus to the west shoulder, unfortunately hitting Franco and causing the latter's death. Out of fear of reprisal,
petitioner surrendered to the Caba Police Station in the next town. Eventually, petitioner was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.6
The MTC Ruling
In a Decision7 dated November 26, 2013, the MTC found Curammeng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate
period of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
30 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordered him to pay Franco's heirs the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and ₱200,000.00 as actual damages.8
The MTC found that Curammeng showed an inexcusable lack of precaution in driving his bus while passing
through the stalled Maria De Leon bus, which resulted in Franco's death. Moreover, it found untenable
Curammeng's assertion that he decreased the speed of his bus when he was nearing the stalled bus,
considering that the evidence on record showed that he was still running at around 60 kph when he hit Franco.
In this relation, the MTC pointed out that if Curammeng had indeed decelerated as he claimed, then he should
have noticed the barangay tanods near the stalled bus who were manning the traffic and signalling the other
motorists to slow down.9
Aggrieved, Curammeng appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 (RTC).
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated June 3, 2014, the RTC affirmed Curammeng's conviction in toto.11 It found that as a
professional public utility vehicle driver, his primary concern is the safety not only of himself and his
passengers but also that of his fellow motorists. However, he failed to exhibit such concern when he did not
slow down upon seeing the Maria De Leon bus stalled on the northbound side of the national highway,
especially so that the area where the incident happened was hardly illuminated by street lights and that there
is a possibility that he might not be able to see oncoming vehicles because his view of the road was partially
blocked by the said stalled bus. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the RTC concluded that Curammeng
was negligent in driving his bus, and such negligence was the proximate cause of Franco's death. As such, his
liability for the crime charged must be upheld.12
Curammeng moved for reconsideration but was denied in an Order13 dated July 22, 2014. Dissatisfied, he filed
a petition for review14 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated October 20, 2014, the CA dismissed outright Curammeng's petition based on
procedural grounds. Specifically, the CA found that Curammeng violated Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court as he failed to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as well as material portions of the record
(e.g., affidavits referred to in the MTC Decision, transcript of stenographic notes of the MTC, documentary
evidence of the parties).16
Undaunted, Curammeng filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Compliance17 dated November 6, 2014,
praying for the relaxation of procedural rules so that his petition will be reinstated and given due course. He
explained that the failure to comply with the rules was only due to a plain oversight on the part of his counsel's
secretary. To show that such failure was unintentional, he attached his certification of non-forum shopping as
well as copies of the pertinent records of the case. 18
In a Resolution19 dated June 30, 2015, the CA denied Curammeng's motion for lack of merit. It held that
Curammeng failed to give any convincing explanation which would constitute a compelling reason for a liberal
application of the procedural rules on appeal.20
Hence, this petition.
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Curammeng' s
petition for review based on procedural grounds.
31 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The Court's Ruling
Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction are taken by filing a petition
for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.21 Section 2, thereof, provides that such petitions shall be
accompanied by, inter alia, material portions of the record which would support the allegations of said
petitions as well as a certification of non-forum shopping, viz.:
SEC. 2. Form and contents. -The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a
statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance
of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or
final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the
requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts
and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
It must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form of appeal, non-compliance with the foregoing rule
may render the same dismissible.1âwphi1 This is in furtherance of the well-settled rule that "the right to
appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must,
therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost." 22
Verily, compliance with procedural rules is a must, "since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice."23
Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader
interests of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where strong considerations of
substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict application of the rules of
procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.24 The Court's pronouncement in Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda25
is instructive on this matter, to wit:
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not
preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that
impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent
course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of
justice."
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property
on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
32 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this juncture, the Court reminds all members
of the bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v. Villamar [16 Phil. 315, 322 (1910)]:
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as
an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.
There should be no vested rights in technicalities.26 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Otherwise stated, procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not
be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or
property, or where the interest of justice so requires. 27
In the instant case, the Court notes that the dismissal of Curammeng's appeal is based solely on his counsel's
negligence in failing to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as well as material portions of the record.
Notwithstanding the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with Compliance dated November 6, 2014, the CA
upheld its earlier dismissal, ratiocinating that the reasons presented by Curammeng' s counsel were not
compelling enough to relax the technical rules on appeal.
While the Court understands and applauds the CA' s zealousness in upholding procedural rules, it cannot
simply allow a man to be incarcerated without his conviction being reviewed due to the negligence of his
counsel. To note, Curammeng, a public utility vehicle driver and his family's sole breadwinner, is appealing his
conviction for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide where he stands to be sentenced with
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, among others. In view of these
circumstances, as well as his counsel's eventual - albeit irregular - compliance with the technical rules of
appeal, the CA should have disregarded the rules and proceeded to make a full review of the factual and legal
bases of Curammeng's conviction, including the attendance of modificatory circumstances (e.g., the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which Curammeng argues to be existent in his case), if any, pursuant to
the principle that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review.28
In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of procedure in order to afford Curammeng
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal, rather than to deprive him of such and make him
lose his liberty on procedural blunders which he had no direct hand in. Accordingly, the case should be
remanded to the CA for resolution of the appeal on its merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated October 20, 2014 and June 30,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal on its merits.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
33 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
EN BANC
August 8, 2017
G.R. No. 225442
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO
BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself
and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR
JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the
local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order
(TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of
their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these
issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires
for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and
all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the
right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors
through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody." 3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila,
through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the
Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c)
Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic]
Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
34 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the
void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without
substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth
without substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA
9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend
and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's
apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law
enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator. 14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted
from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class,
they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons
as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; 16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny
test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their
purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4 19 thereof, contravenes Section
57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA
9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. 21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and
that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard,
they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public
streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and
preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions,
i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the
curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during
curfew hours.22
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of
the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
35 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the
hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review. 23
A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally
demandable and enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution." 27 It was explained
that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of
the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]." 28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 29
it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the]
'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of
discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court -
based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the
courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon
City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these
ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and
the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties
against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for
status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice,
ill will or personal bias. "31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial
function.
36 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of
legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct
resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is
shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's
jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out
in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the
first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral
well-being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the
existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the
presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given
the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors'
and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344.
Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below -
conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its
expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were
being implemented until the Court issued the TRO 39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or
incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
37 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners]
must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or
are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the
challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an interest that is in
issue and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general." 41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1)
the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear
their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal
provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the
issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed
before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from
Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the
Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal
age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents'
right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or
guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is
represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances
based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa,
whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action
in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it
was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case
on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but
not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the
petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a
number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially
when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act." 46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under
judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents
38 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the
State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including,
among others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this
Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They
claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and
Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities
apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted
arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to
determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to
ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not
properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails
to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent
from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due
process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate
warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a
definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine
with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly
bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the
proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines.
The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that
are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled
enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that
this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard,
that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot
39 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it
was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad
hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
impressions and personal predilections. 52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the
Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be
stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected
curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law
enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when
implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance
of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. 53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and,
therefore, covered by its provisions. 55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the
essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances
should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor
violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by
simply presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such
proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which -
needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers
disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority,
and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they
assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain
time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents
and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling. 57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in
the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
40 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic
efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also
as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over
their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this
provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow
into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that
minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these
[obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of
good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children."60 In
Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty
of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
"primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. 63 The
rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme
Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an
additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over children is that "the
child is not [a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the
child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote
these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or
to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the
parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. In
Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :
[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties.
Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after
their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in
an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their
children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it
was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important
to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71
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The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting
their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling
State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which
necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their
peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal
elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are
prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not -
whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an
explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of
parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct
during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting
that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places
without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate
an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their
authority to influence or control their minors' activities. 74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more
time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active
role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that
the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental
involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children
from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children." 76 Curfews may
also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets." 77
Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence,
these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear
their children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel.
They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of
the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the
prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means
for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that
petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related
conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere), 80
this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases," 81 viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot
areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
42 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted
to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire
statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on
third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. 82
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech
claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 83 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression. "'85
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be
raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness
relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth
and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no
claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries
or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of
every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in
lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life. 92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the
rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion. 93 The inter-relation of the right to
travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one
to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised
without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:
43 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel
and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is
impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively
blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community,
opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides
that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the
exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of
juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and
activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is
perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal
activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is
replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, 98 as
amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and
Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units,
through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for
children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon
the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done
in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient
statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, 108 but
the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority
or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. 110 As parens patriae, the State
regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful
employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or
with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority
over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults, 115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest
in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even
though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the
minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in
child rearing:118
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[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their
own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the
streets to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within
a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child
employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to
all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to
reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or
one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such
use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified. 121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests. 125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that
minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors
than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny. 128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego
(Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of
minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights
are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:
45 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of
the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower
level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti
framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we do
not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental
rights. x x x.
According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x. 130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with
the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. 132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has
ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parenspatriae
constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. 134 It is akin to the paramount interest of
the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework
shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and
care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is
to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not
totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and
influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City
Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education,
and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at
the risk of committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street
children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets
or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;
xxxx
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[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around,
loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city
ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during
night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on
the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face
of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with
potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.] 136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City Council to
support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment
of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to
implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and
potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated
interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from
many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news
reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from
other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping
unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets may
have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at
night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them
to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence.
"[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to
these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as
judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of
their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to
come into contact with criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing
juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles,
either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities. 139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their
police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments
have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare,
especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and
enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to
address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should
not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights
may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or
47 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are
still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic. 142
Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint
not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly
drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free
speech.145 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local
Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise
prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would
prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age
to the above mentioned services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council meetings
if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass
constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor
vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association activities.
(Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such
as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night
school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their
residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those
working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay
office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the
supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in
accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions:
Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of
the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate
and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances
protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. 148 However,
even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not
account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.
48 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties.
The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance;
nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual
development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day,
it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night
without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done
pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or
attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to
free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours,
but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew
hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers
of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are
merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not
narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which
are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure
protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are
merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of any separability
clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards
the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-
curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or
otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home early due to
circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of
this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
49 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community)
that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student. 152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official
and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations.
The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items given that the
minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew
hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in
the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation
to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where
these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and
loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands
or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations
on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the
Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be
understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the
reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic
premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as
the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with
the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their
incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. 153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the
same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court
finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn
exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as
the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or
modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of
scrutiny as applied in this case.
50 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the
validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof, 154
does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with
his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should
the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed
therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and
frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND
for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal
impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10)
days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the PunongBarangay with the office of
the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e.,
(a) community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections
57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such
as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult
shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile
status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and
anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not
limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance,
vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of
children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to
their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents.
Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded
as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention
programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in
parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors,
when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses).
Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
51 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof,
is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or

fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent
act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property,
right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law." 160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in
violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs161 recognized
under Section 54162 of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a
local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the
welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of
rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma
caused by jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote
their integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of
RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against
fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or
censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or
warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a
penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not
penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the
minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed
by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof." 167 The
Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability
to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe
reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than
just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to
denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly
warn the erring individual including the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may
unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others.
In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty, 170 hence, prohibited
by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various
criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
prohibits.
52 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the
Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the
strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to
achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable
minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of
accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the
Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule
that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the
local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL
and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
53 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
April 24, 2017
G.R. No. 189950*
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF LOURDES
S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE BILAG, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., and
MA. TERESA A. RAMIREZ, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March 19, 2009 and the Resolution3
dated September 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266, which set aside the Order4
dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 (RTC Br. 61), and consequently,
remanded the case to the latter court for trial.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint5 dated August 12, 2004 for Quieting of Title with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction filed by respondents Estela Ay-Ay, Andres Acop, Jr., Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio ApAp, John
Napoleon A. Ramirez, Jr., and Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez (respondents) against petitioners Bernadette S. Bilag,
Erlinda BilagSantillan, Dixon Bilag, Reynaldo B. Suello, Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of Leticia Bilag-Hanaoka,
and Heirs of Nellie Bilag before the RTC Br. 61, docketed as Civil Case No. 5881-R. Essentially, respondents
alleged that Iloc Bilag, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, sold to them separately various portions of a
159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu
189147 situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City (subject lands), and that they registered the corresponding Deeds
of Sale6 with the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. According to respondents, Iloc Bilag not only acknowledged
full payment and guaranteed that his heirs, successors-in-interest, and executors are to be bound by such
sales, but he also caused the subject lands to be removed from the Ancestral Land Claims. Respondents further
alleged that they have been in continuous possession of the said lands since 1976 when they were delivered to
them and that they have already introduced various improvements thereon. Despite the foregoing, petitioners
refused to honor the foregoing sales by asserting their adverse rights on the subject lands. Worse, they
continued to harass respondents, and even threatened to demolish their improvements and dispossess them
thereof. Hence, they filed the instant complaint to quiet their respective titles over the subject lands and
remove the cloud cast upon their ownership as a result of petitioners' refusal to recognize the sales. 7
For their part, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss8 dated November 4, 2004 on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, prescription/laches/estoppel, and res judicata. Anent the first ground, petitioners averred that the
subject lands are untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which were long
classified as lands of the public domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is the Land
54 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Lands) which is vested with the authority to determine issues of
ownership over unregistered public lands.9
As to the second ground, petitioners argued that it is only now, or more than 27 years from the execution of
the Deeds of Sale, that respondents seek to enforce said Deeds; thus, the present action is already barred by
prescription and/or laches. 10
Regarding the final ground, petitioners pointed out that on January 27, 1998, respondents had already filed a
complaint against them for injunction and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 3934-R before the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (RTC Br. 5), wherein they principally asserted their ownership over the
subject lands. However, RTC Br. 5 dismissed Civil Case No. 3934-R for lack of merit on the ground of
respondents' failure to show convincing proof of ownership over the same, 11 which Order of dismissal was
then affirmed by the CA on appeal. 12 Eventually, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 21, 200413
declaring the case closed and terminated for failure to file the intended petition subject of the Motion for
Extension to file the same. In view of the foregoing, petitioners contended that due to the final and executory
ruling in Civil Case No. 3934-R, the filing of Civil Case No. 5881-R seeking to establish the ownership thereof is
already barred by res judicata. 14
The RTC Br. 61 Ruling
In an Order 15 dated October 10, 2005, the RTC Br. 61 ruled in petitioners' favor, and consequently, ordered
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R on the following grounds: (a) it had no authority to do so; (b) the Deeds
of Sale in respondents' favor could not as yet be considered title to the subject lands, noting the failure of
respondents to perfect their title or assert ownership and possession thereof for the past 27 years; and (c) the
filing of the instant case is barred by res judicata considering the final and executory Decision dismissing the
earlier filed Civil Case No. 3934-R where respondents similarly sought to be declared the owners of the subject
lands.16
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. 17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated March 19, 2009, the CA set aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R, and accordingly,
remanded the case to the court a quo for trial. 19 It held that Civil Case No. 3934-R was an action for injunction
where respondents sought to enjoin petitioners' alleged entry into the subject lands and their introduction of
improvements thereat; whereas Civil Case No. 5881-R is an action to quiet title where respondents specifically
prayed, inter alia, for the removal of the cloud upon their ownership and possession of the subject lands. In
this light, the CA concluded that while these cases may involve the same properties, the nature of the action
differs; hence, res judicata is not a bar to the present suit. On the issue of laches, prescription or estoppel, the
CA pointed out that in view of respondents' allegation that they have been in possession of the subject lands
since 1976, their action to quiet title is imprescriptible.20
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration 21 which was, however, denied in a Resolution22 dated
September 3, 2009; hence, this petition.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in setting aside the Order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R due to
the inapplicability of the grounds of res judicata and prescription/laches, the CA notably omitted from its
discussion the first ground relied upon by petitioners, which is lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear,
try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case
55 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of
the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action." 23 Perforce, it is important that a court or
tribunal should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before it,
considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding
legal effects. The Court's pronouncement in Tan v. Cinco,24 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates
no rights and produces no effect.1âwphi1 It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is
crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. 25
Now, on the issue of jurisdiction, a review of the records shows that the subject lands form part of a 159,496-
square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147
situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City. Notably, such parcel of land forms part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation,
a portion of which, or 146, 428 square meters, was awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, as evidenced by a Decision 26 dated April 22, 1968 promulgated
by the then-Court of First Instance of Baguio City.
In a catena of cases, 27 and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1271,28 it was expressly declared
that all orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the
proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, covering lands within the
Baguio Town site Reservation are null and void and without force and effect. While PD 1271 provides for a
means to validate ownership over lands forming part of the Baguio Town site Reservation, it requires, among
others, that a Certificate of Title be issued on such lands on or before July 31, 1973. 29 In this case, records
reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and untitled, as petitioners' assertion to that effect was not
seriously disputed by respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3 of the 159,496-square meter parcel of
land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 - which includes the subject
lands - to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, is covered by
the blanket nullification provided under PD 1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In view
of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be properly classified as lands
of the public domain as well.
Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued
that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their ownership. 30 Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly
recognized its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents' action for quieting oftitle. 31 In Heirs
of Pocdo v. Avila,32 the Court ruled that the trial court therein correctly dismissed an action to quiet title on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction for lack of authority to determine who among the parties have better right over
the disputed property, which is admittedly still part of public domain for being within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, viz.:
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which held that lands within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer registrable under the Land Registration
Act. The Office of the President ordered the disposition of the disputed property in accordance with the
applicable rules of procedure for the disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and other
applicable rules.
Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in
dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine
who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the
public domain. As held in Dajunos v. Tandayag:
56 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
x x x The Tarucs' action was for "quieting of title" and necessitated determination of the respective rights of
the litigants, both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of property, admittedly public land. The law, as
relied upon by jurisprudence, lodges "the power of executive control, administration, disposition and
alienation of public lands with the Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources."
In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The court below did
not have power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of free patent title
over that piece of property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the
Tarucs as entitled to the "true equitable ownership" thereof, the latter's effect being the same: the exclusion
of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs.
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim of title or interest
in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a
cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist." Under Articles 476
and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff
has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a
cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents are
unlawfully claiming the disputed property by using void documents, namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of
Waiver of Rights. However, the records reveal that petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the
disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. It is
clear from the facts of the case that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not
even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial
court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case. 33 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In conclusion, RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein
respondents) seek to quiet title over lands which belong to the public domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881-
R must be dismissed on this ground. It should be stressed that the court a quo's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the case renders it without authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the merits of
the case. To reiterate, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to
dismiss the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal
effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to discuss the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 19, 2009 and the Resolution dated
September 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 5881-R is DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE,
Associate Justice
57 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
March 11, 2015
G.R. No. 212054
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 21, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 which affirmed the
Decision4 dated November 19, 2012 and the Resolution5 dated January 14, 2013 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 06-001858-12, declaring the dismissal of respondent Maria
Theresa V. Sanchez (Sanchez) illegal.
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and
was eventually assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric Unit until her termination on July 6, 2011 for her
purported violation of SLMC's Code of Discipline, particularly Section 1, Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e.,
Robbery, Theft, Pilferage, and Misappropriation of Funds.6
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011, Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization
Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the
course thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag
and asked her to open the same.7 When opened, said pouch contained the following assortment of medical
stocks which were subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b) Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe
3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore [1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece]; (g) Venofix 25 [2
pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4 pieces] (questioned items).8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she could just return
the pouch inside the treatment room; however, she was not allowed to do so. 9 Instead, she was brought to the
SLMC In-House Security Department (IHSD) where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining why
she had the questioned items in her possession.10 She complied11 with the directive and also submitted an
undated handwritten letter of apology12 (handwritten letter) which reads as follows:
To In-House Security,
I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my bag.
Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong humihingi ng tawad sa aking pagkakasala, Alam ko po na ako ay
nagkamali. Hindi ko po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa hospital. Hindi ko po alam kung [paano] ako
58 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong makapag uwi ng gamit. Marami
pang gamit dahil sa naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa kong makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli. Hindi ko na
po naiwan sa nurse station dahil naisip kong magagamit ko rin po pag minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at
talagang may kailangan.
Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa. Isinakripisyo ko ang hindi pagiging "toxic" sa pagkuha ng gamit
para sa bagay na alam kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako'y naging madamot, pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna ko
ang comfort ko keysa gumawa ng tama. Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13
In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD, Customer Affairs Division, through Duty Officer Hernani R.
Janayon, apprised SLMC of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez expressly admitted that she intentionally
brought out the questioned items.1awp++i1
An initial investigation was also conducted by the SLMC Division of Nursing 15 which thereafter served Sanchez
a notice to explain.16
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that
the questioned items came from the medication drawers of patients who had already been discharged, and, as
similarly practiced by the other staff members, she started saving these items as excess stocks in her pouch,
along with other basic items that she uses during her shift.18 She then put the pouch inside the lowest drawer
of the bedside table in the treatment room for use in immediate procedures in case replenishment of stocks
gets delayed. However, on the day of the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the medication drawer
upon getting her tri-colored pen and calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually, she forgot
about the same as she got caught up in work, until it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of
SMLC's premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of
the investigation by SLMC's Employee and Labor Relations Department (ELRD)19 which, thereafter, required
her to explain why she should not be terminated from service for "acts of dishonesty" due to her possession of
the questioned items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline. 20 In response, she
submitted a letter21 dated June 13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her previous May 31, 2011
letter. She likewise requested for a case conference,22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side, SLMC, on
July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6,
2011.24 This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case
No. 07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence, claiming that she had no intention of bringing
outside the SLMC's premises the questioned items since she merely inadvertently left the pouch containing
them in her bag as she got caught up in work that day. She further asserted that she could not be found guilty
of pilferage since the questioned items found in her possession were neither SLMC's nor its employees'
property. She also stressed the fact that SLMC did not file any criminal charges against her. Anent her
supposed admission in her handwritten letter, she claimed that she was unassisted by counsel when she
executed the same and, thus, was inadmissible for being unconstitutional. 26
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in
violation of Section 1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
robbery, theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of funds, with termination from service.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed31 for
intentionally taking the property of SLMC's clients for her own personal benefit, 32 which constitutes an act of
dishonesty as provided under SLMC's Code of Discipline.
59 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft was evinced by her attempt to bring the questioned items that did
not belong to her out of SLMC's premises; this was found to be analogous to serious misconduct which is a just
cause to dismiss her.33 The fact that the items she took were neither SLMC's nor her co-employees' property
was not found by the LA to be material since the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides that acts of
dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its employees, as well as its customers, are punishable by a penalty
of termination from service.34 To this, the LA opined that "[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons with
whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also answerable to the properties of its patients." 35
Moreover, the LA observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy regarding the taking of
hospital/medical items as evidenced by her handwritten letter,36 but nonetheless committed the said
misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC's non-filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not
preclude a determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the filing of a criminal case is entirely
separate and distinct from the determination of just cause for termination of employment. 37
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez
was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a unique case, considering that keeping excess
hospital stocks or "hoarding" was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric Unit which had been
tolerated by SLMC management for a long time.40 The NLRC held that while Sanchez expressed remorse for her
misconduct in her handwritten letter, she manifested that she only "hoarded" the questioned items for future
use in case their medical supplies are depleted, and not for her personal benefit. 41 It further held that SLMC
failed to establish that Sanchez was motivated by ill-will when she brought out the questioned items, noting:
(a) the testimony of SG Manzanade during the conference before the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya masyado nataranta,"42 and her consequent offer to return the
pouch;43 and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden underneath the bag. 44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that
the punishment of dismissal was too harsh and the one
(1) month preventive suspension already imposed on and served by Sanchez was the appropriate
penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of backwages, other
benefits, and attorney's fees.46
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration 47 which was, however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January
14, 2013. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse
its discretion in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not qualify as serious misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items
found in her possession were not SLMC property since said items were paid for by discharged patients, thus
discounting any material or economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the retention of excess medical supplies was
an admitted practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; (c) it was illogical for
Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since she would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez's lack
of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by her composed demeanor upon apprehension and offer
to return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC honestly believed that Sanchez committed theft
or pilferage, it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed to do so. 51 Moreover, while the CA
recognized that SLMC had the management prerogative to discipline its erring employees, it, however,
declared that such right must be exercised humanely. As such, SLMC should only impose penalties
commensurate with the degree of infraction. Considering that there was no indication that Sanchez's actions
60 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful objective, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was
grossly oppressive and disproportionate to her offense.52
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration,53 but was denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence,
this petition.
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was illegally dismissed by SLMC.
The Court's Ruling
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, aptly called "management prerogative," gives
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of
employment, including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers.55 In this light, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In fact,
labor laws discourage interference in employers' judgment concerning the conduct of their business. 56
Among the employer's management prerogatives is the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to
implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. At the same time, the employee
has the corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and willful or
intentional disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the
dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code provides: 58
Article 296. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
representative in connection with his work;
xxxx
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer's orders, regulations, or
instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection
with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge."59
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful
disregard and disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts
of dishonesty, i.e., "theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x x x or its attempt in any form or
manner from the hospital, co-employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and internal)" with
termination from employment.60 Such act is obviously connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a staff nurse, is
tasked with the proper stewardship of medical supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a
categorical admission61 in her handwritten letter62 - i.e., "[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-
uwi] ng gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of its express prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she
still knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted
in construing the taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty (particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its
attempt in any form or manner) considering that the intent to gain may be reasonably presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another.64 Note that Section 1, Rule 1 of the SLMC Code of
Discipline is further supplemented by the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical
supplies/items for proper handling65 and providing a restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the
SLMC premises without the proper authorization or "pass" from the official concerned, 66 which Sanchez was
61 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
equally aware thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the questioned items and, instead,
"hoarded" them, as purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that
the company policies subject of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to the employee, and
evidently connected with the latter's work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a just cause.
On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no competent basis to support the common observation
of the NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies was a tolerated practice among the
nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it appears that such acts were
- in similar fashion - furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found in the concerned
nurse's possession would have to be confiscated.68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or sanctioned
for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean that the so-called "hoarding" practice was tolerated
by SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the violation of the company rules regarding excess
medical supplies is immaterial since it has been established that an infraction was deliberately committed. 69
Doubtless, the deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it
may encourage him or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that
employees are required to observe.70
Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not suffered any actual damage. While damage
aggravates the charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee's liability.71 Neither is SLMC's
non- filing of the appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An employee's guilt or innocence in a
criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause for his or her dismissal. 72 It is
well- settled that conviction in a criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for termination of
employment,73 as in this case. Criminal and labor cases involving an employee arising from the same infraction
are separate and distinct proceedings which should not arrest any judgment from one to the other.
As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial
evidence, and is therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a
patently and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which, in turn, means that the
CA erred when it affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present petition is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated April
4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's
Decision dated May 27, 2012 in NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez
to have been validly dismissed by petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
62 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
March 11, 2015
G.R. No. 212054
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 21, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 which affirmed the
Decision4 dated November 19, 2012 and the Resolution5 dated January 14, 2013 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 06-001858-12, declaring the dismissal of respondent Maria
Theresa V. Sanchez (Sanchez) illegal.
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and
was eventually assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric Unit until her termination on July 6, 2011 for her
purported violation of SLMC's Code of Discipline, particularly Section 1, Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e.,
Robbery, Theft, Pilferage, and Misappropriation of Funds.6
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011, Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization
Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the
course thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag
and asked her to open the same.7 When opened, said pouch contained the following assortment of medical
stocks which were subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b) Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe
3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore [1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece]; (g) Venofix 25 [2
pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4 pieces] (questioned items). 8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she could just return
the pouch inside the treatment room; however, she was not allowed to do so. 9 Instead, she was brought to the
SLMC In-House Security Department (IHSD) where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining why
she had the questioned items in her possession.10 She complied11 with the directive and also submitted an
undated handwritten letter of apology12 (handwritten letter) which reads as follows:
To In-House Security,
I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my bag.
Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong humihingi ng tawad sa aking pagkakasala, Alam ko po na ako ay
nagkamali. Hindi ko po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa hospital. Hindi ko po alam kung [paano] ako
63 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong makapag uwi ng gamit. Marami
pang gamit dahil sa naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa kong makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli. Hindi ko na
po naiwan sa nurse station dahil naisip kong magagamit ko rin po pag minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at
talagang may kailangan.
Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa. Isinakripisyo ko ang hindi pagiging "toxic" sa pagkuha ng gamit
para sa bagay na alam kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako'y naging madamot, pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna ko
ang comfort ko keysa gumawa ng tama. Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13
In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD, Customer Affairs Division, through Duty Officer Hernani R.
Janayon, apprised SLMC of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez expressly admitted that she intentionally
brought out the questioned items.1awp++i1
An initial investigation was also conducted by the SLMC Division of Nursing 15 which thereafter served Sanchez
a notice to explain.16
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that
the questioned items came from the medication drawers of patients who had already been discharged, and, as
similarly practiced by the other staff members, she started saving these items as excess stocks in her pouch,
along with other basic items that she uses during her shift. 18 She then put the pouch inside the lowest drawer
of the bedside table in the treatment room for use in immediate procedures in case replenishment of stocks
gets delayed. However, on the day of the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the medication drawer
upon getting her tri-colored pen and calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually, she forgot
about the same as she got caught up in work, until it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of
SMLC's premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of
the investigation by SLMC's Employee and Labor Relations Department (ELRD) 19 which, thereafter, required
her to explain why she should not be terminated from service for "acts of dishonesty" due to her possession of
the questioned items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline. 20 In response, she
submitted a letter21 dated June 13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her previous May 31, 2011
letter. She likewise requested for a case conference,22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side, SLMC, on
July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6,
2011.24 This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case
No. 07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence, claiming that she had no intention of bringing
outside the SLMC's premises the questioned items since she merely inadvertently left the pouch containing
them in her bag as she got caught up in work that day. She further asserted that she could not be found guilty
of pilferage since the questioned items found in her possession were neither SLMC's nor its employees'
property. She also stressed the fact that SLMC did not file any criminal charges against her. Anent her
supposed admission in her handwritten letter, she claimed that she was unassisted by counsel when she
executed the same and, thus, was inadmissible for being unconstitutional. 26
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in
violation of Section 1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
robbery, theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of funds, with termination from service.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed 31 for
intentionally taking the property of SLMC's clients for her own personal benefit,32 which constitutes an act of
dishonesty as provided under SLMC's Code of Discipline.
64 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft was evinced by her attempt to bring the questioned items that did
not belong to her out of SLMC's premises; this was found to be analogous to serious misconduct which is a just
cause to dismiss her.33 The fact that the items she took were neither SLMC's nor her co-employees' property
was not found by the LA to be material since the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides that acts of
dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its employees, as well as its customers, are punishable by a penalty
of termination from service.34 To this, the LA opined that "[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons with
whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also answerable to the properties of its patients." 35
Moreover, the LA observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy regarding the taking of
hospital/medical items as evidenced by her handwritten letter,36 but nonetheless committed the said
misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC's non-filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not
preclude a determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the filing of a criminal case is entirely
separate and distinct from the determination of just cause for termination of employment. 37
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez
was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a unique case, considering that keeping excess
hospital stocks or "hoarding" was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric Unit which had been
tolerated by SLMC management for a long time.40 The NLRC held that while Sanchez expressed remorse for her
misconduct in her handwritten letter, she manifested that she only "hoarded" the questioned items for future
use in case their medical supplies are depleted, and not for her personal benefit. 41 It further held that SLMC
failed to establish that Sanchez was motivated by ill-will when she brought out the questioned items, noting:
(a) the testimony of SG Manzanade during the conference before the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya masyado nataranta,"42 and her consequent offer to return the
pouch;43 and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden underneath the bag. 44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that
the punishment of dismissal was too harsh and the one
(1) month preventive suspension already imposed on and served by Sanchez was the appropriate
penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of backwages, other
benefits, and attorney's fees.46
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration47 which was, however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January
14, 2013. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse
its discretion in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not qualify as serious misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items
found in her possession were not SLMC property since said items were paid for by discharged patients, thus
discounting any material or economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the retention of excess medical supplies was
an admitted practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; (c) it was illogical for
Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since she would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez's lack
of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by her composed demeanor upon apprehension and offer
to return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC honestly believed that Sanchez committed theft
or pilferage, it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed to do so.51 Moreover, while the CA
recognized that SLMC had the management prerogative to discipline its erring employees, it, however,
declared that such right must be exercised humanely. As such, SLMC should only impose penalties
commensurate with the degree of infraction. Considering that there was no indication that Sanchez's actions
65 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful objective, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was
grossly oppressive and disproportionate to her offense.52
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration,53 but was denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence,
this petition.
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was illegally dismissed by SLMC.
The Court's Ruling
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, aptly called "management prerogative," gives
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of
employment, including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers.55 In this light, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In fact,
labor laws discourage interference in employers' judgment concerning the conduct of their business.56
Among the employer's management prerogatives is the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to
implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. At the same time, the employee
has the corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and willful or
intentional disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the
dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code provides: 58
Article 296. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
representative in connection with his work;
xxxx
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer's orders, regulations, or
instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection
with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge."59
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful
disregard and disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts
of dishonesty, i.e., "theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x x x or its attempt in any form or
manner from the hospital, co-employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and internal)" with
termination from employment.60 Such act is obviously connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a staff nurse, is
tasked with the proper stewardship of medical supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a
categorical admission61 in her handwritten letter62 - i.e., "[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-
uwi] ng gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of its express prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she
still knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted
in construing the taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty (particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its
attempt in any form or manner) considering that the intent to gain may be reasonably presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another.64 Note that Section 1, Rule 1 of the SLMC Code of
Discipline is further supplemented by the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical
supplies/items for proper handling65 and providing a restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the
SLMC premises without the proper authorization or "pass" from the official concerned, 66 which Sanchez was
66 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
equally aware thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the questioned items and, instead,
"hoarded" them, as purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that
the company policies subject of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to the employee, and
evidently connected with the latter's work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a just cause.
On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no competent basis to support the common observation
of the NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies was a tolerated practice among the
nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it appears that such acts were
- in similar fashion - furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found in the concerned
nurse's possession would have to be confiscated.68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or sanctioned
for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean that the so-called "hoarding" practice was tolerated
by SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the violation of the company rules regarding excess
medical supplies is immaterial since it has been established that an infraction was deliberately committed. 69
Doubtless, the deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it
may encourage him or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that
employees are required to observe.70
Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not suffered any actual damage. While damage
aggravates the charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee's liability. 71 Neither is SLMC's
non- filing of the appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An employee's guilt or innocence in a
criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause for his or her dismissal. 72 It is
well- settled that conviction in a criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for termination of
employment,73 as in this case. Criminal and labor cases involving an employee arising from the same infraction
are separate and distinct proceedings which should not arrest any judgment from one to the other.
As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial
evidence, and is therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a
patently and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which, in turn, means that the
CA erred when it affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present petition is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated April
4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's
Decision dated May 27, 2012 in NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez
to have been validly dismissed by petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
67 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
March 13, 2017
G.R. No. 225965

vs
PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Puyat Macapundag y Labao (Macapundag)
assailing the Decision2 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06224, which
affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated June 13, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127 (RTC)
in Crim. Case Nos. 81014 and 81015, finding Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections
5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC accusing Macapundag of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, viz.:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to P0[3] GEORGE ARDEDON 5 who posed, as buyer, EPHEDRINE weighing 0.01
gram, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be
such.
Contrary to Law.6
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
each containing
EPHEDRINE weighing 0.02 gram, 0.01 gram & 0.02 gram, when subjected for laboratory examination gave
positive result to the tests of Ephedrine [sic], a dangerous drug.
68 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Contrary to Law.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 to 8:30 in the morning of March 14, 2009, an informant tipped the
Caloocan City Police that a certain individual known as alias "Popoy" was selling shabu in Baltazar Street, 10th
Avenue, Caloocan City. Acting on the tip, Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Christopher Prangan (PCI Prangan)
ordered the conduct of a buy-bust operation in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), with Police Officer 3 (P03) George Ardedon (P03 Ardedon) designated as poseur-buyer, and Senior
Police Officer 1 (SPO 1) Amel Victoriano (SPOl Victoriano) and Police Officer 2 (P02) Jeffred Pacis (P02 Pacis), as
back-up officers.8 After the team's final briefing, they proceeded to the target area where they saw
Macapundag, who was then identified by the informant as "Popoy." Consequently, P03 Ardedon approached
Macapundag and retorted "Brod, pakuha," followed by "Brod, paiskor naman." Macapundag replied
"Magkano?," to which P03 Ardedon responded "Tatlong piso fang," and simultaneously handed the three (3)
marked ₱l00.00 bills. Macapundag then took four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
gave one to P03 Ardedon, and returned the other three (3) back to his pocket. Upon receiving the sachet, P03
Ardedon gave the pre-arranged signal by holding his nape and then held Macapundag, as the back-up officers
rushed to the scene. P03 Ardedon marked the plastic sachet he purchased from Macapundag, while SPO 1
Victoriano marked the other three (3) recovered from his pocket.9
Thereafter, they brought Macapundag to the police station, where the seized items were turned over to P02
Randulfo Hipolito (P02 Hipolito), the investigator on duty.10 Later, P02 Hipolito brought the items to the crime
laboratory for physical examination.11 Eventually, Forensic Chemical
Officer-PC! Stella Ebuen (PCI Ebuen) examined the specimen, which tested positive for ephedrine, a dangerous
drug.12
In his defense, Macapundag denied the charges against him. He testified that he was arrested on March 12,
2009, and not on March 14, 2009 as alleged by the prosecution. At around noon of the said date, he claimed
that he was just sitting in his house when three (3) armed men suddenly entered and looked for a certain
"Rei." He told them that "Rei" lived in the other house, but one of the men held and handcuffed him. He was
then brought to the Sangandaan Police Station where he was detained in a small cell. Later, he was asked to
call some relatives. When he replied that he only has his daughter, SPO 1 Victoriano hit him on the chest. After
a few days, the police demanded ₱50,000.00 from Macapundag's daughter for his release. When he told them
that he did not have that amount, he was hit again. On March 15, 2009, he was brought to the house of the
fiscal for inquest.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision14 dated June 13, 2013, the RTC found Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
respectively, finding that all the necessary elements thereof have been proven. In particular, the prosecution
was able to establish that P03 Ardedon indeed purchased a sachet of ephedrine from Macapundag in the
amount of ₱300.00. Likewise, it was shown that three (3) other sachets of ephedrine were recovered from
Macapundag upon his arrest.15 The RTC further observed that the prosecution was able to demonstrate an
unbroken chain of custody over the seized items. 16 Meanwhile, the RTC gave no credence to the latter's
defenses of denial and alibi in light of his positive identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of
regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of their duties. 17
Aggrieved, Macapundag elevated his conviction before the CA. 18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated April 22, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, finding that the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt that Macapundag illegally sold and possessed dangerous drugs in
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In the same vein, the CA found that the integrity of the
69 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
seized drugs was aptly preserved and the chain of custody was not broken, notwithstanding the fact that the
procedural requirements in Section 21 of RA 9165 were not faithfully observed. 20
Hence, the instant appeal.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Macapundag's conviction for illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should
be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the
duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they
are assigned or unassigned.21 The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law.22
Macapundag was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165.1avvphi1 In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 23 On the other hand, the prosecution must
establish the following elements to convict an accused charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (a)
the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.24
Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In
order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti.25
In the Appellant's Brief,26 Macapundag prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance
with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Particularly, he claims that they
did not make any inventory and failed to take pictures of the confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of
his arrest. There was also no justification given as to why they failed to comply with these requirements of
law.27
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must
follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 28 Under the said
section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.29
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that P03 Ardedon (with respect to the sachet handed over
by Macapundag to him) and SPOl Victoriano (with respect to the three sachets recovered from Macapundag
upon his arrest) marked the seized items immediately at the place of arrest. However, the prosecution's
witnesses failed to state whether or not the police officers inventoried and photographed the seized sachets in
the presence of Macapundag or his representative. Likewise, they were silent as to the presence of the other
70 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
required witnesses, i.e., a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected public official, and
a member of the press.30 In fact, the prosecution did not even offer any inventory of the seized items or
photographs thereof as evidence.31 In this relation, it is observed that the Evidence Acknowledgement
Receipt32 and the Affidavit of Attestation,33 which form part of the evidence of the prosecution, likewise failed
to disclose that the seized items were actually inventoried or photographed in accordance with the
parameters provided by Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR; thus, their submission cannot constitute compliance
with the law.
In People v. Sanchez,34 the Court recognized that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of 9165 may not always be possible, and ruled that under the implementing
guidelines of the said Section, "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." However, the
Court added that the prosecution bears the burden of proving justifiable cause. 35
Thus, in People v. Almorfe,36 the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.37 Also, in People v. De Guzman,38 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground
for noncompliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.39
In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the inventory and photograph of the
seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the police station, as required by
the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not made at the place of
seizure in the presence of Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a representative from the DOJ, the
media and an elected public official to witness the inventory and receive copies of the same. Similarly
unexplained was the lack of inventory and photographs of the seized items.40 Accordingly, the plurality of the
breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.41 It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure
in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 42
With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds petitioner's acquittal in order. As such, it is unnecessary to
delve into the other issues raised in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 06224 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Puyat Macapundag y Labao is
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
71 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 174113
PAZ CHENG y CHU, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March 28, 2006 and the Resolution3
dated June 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871, which affirmed the conviction of
petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu (Cheng) for three (3) counts of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
The instant case arose from the filing of three (3) separate Informations 4 charging Cheng of the crime of Estafa
defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 226 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75440, Q-98-75441 and Q-98-75442. According to the
prosecution, private complaint "Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered into an agreement whereby
Rodriguez shall deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis. After one month,
Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry; or (b) return the unsold jewelry to the
former. On different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16, 1997, and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various
sets of jewelry to Cheng in the respective amounts of P18,000.00, P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery
of the last batch of jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full security for the first two (2)
deliveries and as partial security for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to return the unsold
jewelry on due date, Rodriguez presented the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due to
insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the same was
dishonored because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then decided to confront Cheng, who
then uttered "Akala mo, babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was constrained to file the instant charges. 5
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from Rodriguez or signing any document purporting to be
contracts of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a usurious moneylender. She then admitted having an
unpaid loan with Rodriguez and that she issued a check to serve as security for the same, but was nevertheless
surprised of her arrest due to the latter's filing of Estafa charges against her.6
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision7 dated December 7, 2000, the RTC found Cheng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of Estafa and, accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a) for the first count, Cheng is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years, eight (8)
72 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
months, and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (maximum); (b) for the second count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21)
days to eight (8) years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period
(maximum); and (c) for the third count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods to four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to five (5) years, five (5)
months, and ten (10) days of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period (minimum).8
The RTC found that the prosecution has sufficiently proven through documentary and testimonial evidence
that: (a) Rodriguez indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry for the latter- to either sell and remit the
proceeds or to return said jewelry if unsold to the former; and (b) Cheng neither returned the jewelry nor
remitted their proceeds to Rodriguez within the specified period despite the latter's demands. In contrast,
Cheng failed to substantiate her claims through the documentary evidence she presented while her testimony
was deemed to be incredible and not worthy of belief.9
Aggrieved, Cheng appealed10 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision11 dated March 28, 2006, the CA affirmed Cheng's conviction for three (3) counts of Estafa, with
modification as to the penalties, as follows: (a) for the first count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated
is P257,950.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum; (b) for the second count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P36,000.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the
third count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is Pl8,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as
maximum.12
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings that the prosecution had sufficiently established Cheng's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, pointing out that Rodriguez's testimony was "'more candid, credible and straightforward
and that 'her demeanor in the witness stand is worthy of belief" as opposed to that of Cheng which is highly
self-serving and uncorroborated.13 Further, the CA found that a modification of Cheng's penalties is in order to
conform with prevailing law and jurisprudence on the matter.14
Undaunted, Cheng moved for reconsideration15 but was denied in a Resolution16 dated June 26, 2006; hence,
this petition.
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Cheng's conviction for
three counts of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:
73 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be[.]
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property;
xxxx
The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or
property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.17 In the case of Pamintuan v. People,18 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate
further on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for the same,
to wit:
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate"
connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation
arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to
give an account of their whereabouts. 19 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements of Estafa, as defined and
penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered the jewelry to
Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to either remit the
proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was
required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given
by Cheng as security, but such check was dishonored twice for being drawn against insufficient funds and
against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter
disregarded such demand; (j) Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability, Cheng insists that Rodriguez admitted in her own
testimony that the transaction between them is not an agency on commission basis, but a plain sale of jewelry
with Rodriguez as the seller and Cheng as the buyer.1âwphi1 As such, Cheng's non-payment of the purchase
74 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
price of the jewelry would only give rise to civil liability and not criminal liability.20 The pertinent portion of
Rodriguez's testimony is as follows:
Q. After the delivery of these several items totaling P257,950.00, what happened next?
A. She issued a check worth P120,000.00.
Q. What check is that?
A. PDCP Bank, sir.
Q. What is this check for, Ms. Witness?
A. As payment for the first and second transactions, sir, for Pl8,000.00 and P36,000.00 and the excess
amount is applied for the third transaction.
xxxx
Q. So, all in all, you have sixty (60) days period with respect to this item, and the first delivery expired I am
referring to July 12, 1997 worth P18,000.00 which will mature on September 11, so, from September 11, what
happened?
A. These were considered paid because she issued me a check for the period of August 13, so I was expecting
that.21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Essentially, Cheng posits that since Rodriguez "admitted" in her testimony that the check issued by the former
in the amount of Pl20,000.00 constituted full payment for the first and second batch of jewelry and partial
payment for the last batch, the transactions entered into by the parties should be deemed in the nature of a
sale.
Cheng is sadly mistaken.
The foregoing "admission" on the part of Rodriguez did not change the fact that her transactions with Cheng
should be properly deemed as an agency on a commission basis whereby Rodriguez, as the owner of the
jewelry, is the principal, while Cheng is the agent who is tasked to sell the same on commission. In the eyes of
the Court, Rodriguez merely accepted the check as full security for the first and second batches of jewelry and
as partial security for the last batch. It was only when Cheng defaulted in her undertaking pursuant to their
agreement that Rodriguez was constrained to treat the check as the former's remittance of the proceeds of
the sale of jewelry - albeit deficient - by presenting it for encashment on October 20, 1997, or more than two
(2) months after the delivery of the last batch of jewelry.22 However, the check was dishonored for being
drawn against insufficient funds.23 This notwithstanding and with the assurance from Cheng that the check will
be cleared, Rodriguez presented such check for the second time on November 4, 1997; but it .was again
dishonored - this time for being drawn against a closed account.24 As such, the fact that Rodriguez loosely used
the words "payment" and "paid" should not be taken against her and should not in any way change the nature
of her transactions with Rodriguez from an agency on a commission basis to a full-fledged sale. Moreover,
even Cheng does not consider such check as payment for the jewelry, but rather, as security for the loan she
allegedly obtained from Rodriguez.
Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC and the CA as they have fully
considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they have adequately explained
the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that Cheng is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
(3) counts of Estafa by misappropriation defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC. It is settled
that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this
Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record,25 as in this case.
75 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated June 26,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa defined and
penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and is SENTENCED as follows: (a) for the first
count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the second count of Estafa where
the amount misappropriated is P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9)
years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated
is Pl 8,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty
(20) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
76 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201892 JULY 22, 2015
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner,

vs.
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 4, 2011 and the Resolution
3
dated May 14, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81258 which recalled and set aside the
Orders dated November 3, 2003 4 and January 14, 2004 5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City,
Branch 202 (court a quo) in Civil Case No. 980156, and reinstated the Decision 6 dated August 28, 2003
directing petitioner Norlinda S. Marilag (petitioner) to return to respondent Marcelino B. Martinez
(respondent) the latter's excess payment, plus interest, and to pay attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
The Facts
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained- from petitioner a loan in the amount
of ₱160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of five percent ( 5% ), payable within a period of (6)
months. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-208400. Rafael failed'. to settle his obligation upon maturity and despite repeated
demands, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the
RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 7 (RTC-lmus) on November 10, 1995, 8 docketed as Civil Case No. 1208-95
(judicial foreclosure case).
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon petitioner's motion, was declared in default. After an ex parte
presentation of petitioner's evidence, the RTC-lmus issued a Decision 9 dated January 30, 1998, (January 30,
1998 Decision) in the foreclosure case, declaring the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be usurious and
reducing the same to 12% per annum (p.a.). Accordingly, it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of
₱229,200.00, consisting of the principal of ₱160,000.00 and accrued interest of ₱59,200.00 from July 30, 1992
to September 30, 1995. 10 Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality.
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to
petitioner which was pegged at ₱689,000.00. After making a total payment of ₱400,000.00,11 he executed a
promissory note 12 dated February 20, 1998 (subject PN), binding himself to pay on or before March 31, 1998
the amount of ₱289,000.00, "representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of [his] father to
[petitioner]." 13 After learning of the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount
covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting petitioner to file a complaint 14 for sum of money and
damages before the court a quo on July 2, 1998, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0156 (collection case).
77 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Respondent filed his answer, 15 contending that petitioner has no cause of action against him. He averred that
he has fully settled Rafael's obligation and that he committed a mistake in paying more than the amount due
under the loan, i.e., the amount of ₱229,200.00 as adjudged by the RTC-Imus in the judicial foreclosure case
which, thus, warranted the return of the excess payment. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint, and interposed a compulsory counterclaim for the release of the mortgage, the return of the excess
payment, and the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 16
The Court A Quo's Ruling
In a Decision 17 dated August 28, 2003 (August 28, 2003 Decision), the court a quo denied recovery on the
subject PN. It found that the consideration for its execution was Rafael's indebtedness to petitioner, the
extinguishment of which necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the cause therefore.
Considering that the RTC-Imus had adjudged Rafael liable to petitioner only for the amount of ₱229,200.00, for
which a total of ₱400,000.00 had already been paid, the court a quo found no valid or compelling reason to
allow petitioner to recover further on the subject PN. There being an excess payment of Pl 71,000.00, it
declared that a quasi-contract (in the concept of solution indebiti) exists between the parties and, accordingly,
directed petitioner to return the said amount to respondent, plus 6% interest p.a.18 reckoned from the date of
judicial demand 19 on August 6, 1998 until fully paid, and to pay attorney's fees and the costs of suit. 20
In an Order 21 dated November 3, 2003 (November 3, 2003 Order), however, the court a quo granted
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and recalled and set aside its August 28, 2003 Decision. It declared
that the causes of action in the collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and respondent's failure to
comply with his obligation under the subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial relief. It further opined that
the stipulated 5% monthly interest is no longer usurious and is binding on respondent considering the
suspension of the Usury Law pursuant to Central Bank Circular 905, series of 1982. Accordingly, it directed
respondent to pay the amount of ₱289,000.00 due under the subject PN, plus interest at the legal rate
reckoned from the last extra judicial demand on May 15, 1998, until fully paid, as well as attorney's fees and
the costs of suit.22
Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 23 which was denied in an Order 24 dated January 14,
2004, prompting him to elevate the matter to the CA. 25
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 26 dated November 4, 2011, the CA recalled and set aside the court a quo 's November 3, 2003
and January 14, 2004 Orders, and reinstated the August 28, 2003 Decision. It held that the doctrine of res
judicata finds application in the instant case, 27 considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection
cases were filed as a consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation
secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary consideration for the execution of the subject PN. Since
res judicata only requires substantial, not actual, identity of causes of action and/or identity of issue, 28 it ruled
that the judgment in the judicial foreclosure case relating to Rafael's obligation to petitioner is final and
conclusive on the collection case.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 29 dated May 14, 2012; hence, this petition.
The Issue before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding
the dismissal of the collection case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
78 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a) the judgment
sought to bar the new action must be final; ( b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and ( d) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.30
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the
present case. This is because the records are bereft of any indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision in the
judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance, by a copy of the entry of
judgment in the said case. Accordingly, with the very first element of res judicata missing, said principle cannot
be made to obtain.
This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner's prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead,
by the principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of
action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner's recourse
to the subsequent collection case.
To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation
where in another action is pending; between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the
second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; ( b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (
c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. 31 The underlying principle of
litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same
subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible
conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also
to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. 32 Consequently, a party will not be permitted to
split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must be determined in
one action.33 To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ~round of dismissal is litis
pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be). 34
In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether a cause of action is single and entire or separate
is not always easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general rules, but by
reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire
amount arises from one and the same act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the
several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain separate
suits.35
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause
of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for
collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two
remedies are alternative,36 not cumulative or successive, 37 and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the
creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the
unpaid debt,38 except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of
the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. 39
Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold
at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial
foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In
light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a
personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering
that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
79 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not
the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have
given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that
respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN extinguished by
novation 40 the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act
of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and
unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract
must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, 41 which was not shown
here.
On the contrary, it is significant to point out that: (a) the consideration for the subject PN was the same
consideration that supported the original loan obligation of Rafael; (b) respondent merely assumed to pay
Rafael's remaining unpaid balance in the latter's behalf, i.e., as Rafael's agent or representative; 42 and (c) the
subject PN was executed after respondent had assumed to pay Rafael's obligation and made several payments
thereon. Case law states that the fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has
assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors, not novation, and the creditor may
enforce the obligation against both debtors. 43 for ready reference, the subject PN reads in full:
February 20, 1998
PROMISSORY NOTE
₱289, 000.00
===========
I, MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ son of Mr. RAFAEL MARTINEZ, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of No.
091 Anabu I-A, Imus, Cavite, by these presents do hereby specifically and categorically PROMISE, UNDERTAKE
and bind myself in behalf of my father, to pay to Miss NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Mortgagee-Creditor of my said
father, the sum of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (₱289,000.00), Philippine Currency, on or
before MARCH 31, 1998, representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of my said father to her.
(Emphases supplied)
Executed at Pamplona I, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila, this 20th day of February, 1998.
Sgd.
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ
Promissory 44
Petitioner's contention that the judicial foreclosure and collection cases enforce independent rights 45 must,
therefore, fail because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 46 and the subject PN both refer to one and the same
obligation, i.e., Rafael's loan obligation. As such, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of
that obligation. Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition
for the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal
action for the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising from
foreclosure, without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for
dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this case.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. lcaranga!. 47
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor.
This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words,
the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure · of his
mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the nonpayment of the debt, and, for that reason,
they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements,
the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there
80 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff. then, by applying the rule above
stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint (or payment of the debt, and thereafter
another complaint (or foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the
subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively,
one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural
redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression
to the debtor. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Further on the point, the fact that no foreclosure sale appears to have been conducted is of no moment
because the remedy of foreclosure of mortgage is deemed chosen upon the filing of the complaint there for. 48
In Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. CA, 49 it was explained:
x x x x In sustaining the rule that prohibits mortgage creditors from pursuing both the remedies of a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, the Court held in the case of Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc. v. Esteban Icarangal, et al. that a rule which would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against
the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result
not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and equity, but also in subjecting
the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff,
and then again in the place where the property lies. Hence, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff
of the province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118. (Emphases supplied)
As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is
now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the
decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order.
Considering, however, that respondent's claim for return of excess payment partakes of the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should be
resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support. 50
Records show that other than the matter of interest, the principal loan obligation and the payments made
were not disputed by the parties.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, the Court finds the stipulated 5% monthly interest to
be excessive and unconscionable. In a plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed that stipulated interest rates of
three percent (3°/o) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant, 51 hence,
illegal 52 and void for being contrary to morals.53 In Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 54 the Court had the
occasion to rule:
Settled is the principle which this Court has affirmed in a number of cases that stipulated interest rates of
three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant. While
Central Bank Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on
interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could
possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would
either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Since the stipulation on the interest
rate is void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on said
interest rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as reason and equity demand. (Emphases supplied)
As such, the stipulated 5% monthly interest should be equitably reduced to l % per month or 12% p.a.
reckoned from the execution of the real estate mortgage on July 30, 1992. In order to determine whether
there was any overpayment as claimed by respondent, we first compute the interest until January 30, 1998 55
when he made a payment in the amount of ₱300,000.00 on Rafael's loan obligation. Accordingly, the amount
due on the loan as of the latter date is hereby computed as follows:
Principal ₱160,000.00
81 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Add: Interest from 07/30/1992 to 01/30/1998
(₱160, 000.00 x 12% x 5.5 yrs.) 105,600.00
₱265,
Amount due on the loan
600.00
Less: Payment made on 01/30/98 (300,000.00)
56
Overpayment as of 01/30/98 (P 34,400.00)
Thus, as of January 30, 1998, only the amount of ₱265,600.00 was due under the loan contract, and the
receipt of an amount more than that renders petitioner liable for the return of the excess. Respondent,
however, made further payment in the amount of Pl 00,000.00 57 on the belief that the subject loan obligation
had not yet been satisfied. Such payments were, therefore, clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the quasi-
contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 58 in relation to Article 2163 59 of the Civil Code.
Not being a loan or forbearance of money, an interest of 6% p.a. should be imposed on the amount to be
refunded and on the damages and attorney's fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand 60 until
its satisfaction. 61 Consequently, petitioner must return to respondent the excess payments in the total
amount of ₱134,400.00, with legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on August 6,
1998 62 interposing a counterclaim for such overpayment, until fully settled.
However, inasmuch as the court a quo failed to state in the body of its decision the factual or legal basis for
the award of attorney's fees to the respondent, as required under Article 2208 63 of the New Civil Code, the
Court resolves to delete the same. The rule is well-settled that the trial court must clearly state the reasons for
awarding attorney's fees in the body of its decision, not merely in its dispositive portion, as the appellate
courts are precluded from supplementing the bases for such award. 64
Finally, in the absence of showing that the court a quo 's award of the costs of suit in favor of respondent was
patently capricious, 65 the Court finds no reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 4, 2011 and the Resolution dated May 14,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81258 reinstating the court a quo's Decision dated August 28,
2003 in Civil Case No. 98-0156 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS: (a) directing petitioner
Norlinda S. Marilag to return to respondent Marcelino B. Martinez the latter's excess payments in the total
amount of ₱134,400.00, plus legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on August 6,
1998 until full satisfaction; and (b) deleting the award of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M.PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
82 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169461 September 2, 2013
FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated December 6, 2004 and Resolution3
dated August 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67635 which annulled and set aside the
Decision4 dated February 28, 2001 and Amended Order5 dated September 4, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC) in Land Reg. Case No. N-1554 (LRA Rec. No. N-69624), setting aside the final
decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner First Gas Power Corporation (petitioner) over the parcels of
land subject of this case.
The Facts
Through a Petition dated April 17, 1998 filed before the RTC, petitioner sought for the original registration of
two parcels of land situated at Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City, denominated as Lot Nos. 1298 and 1315 (subject
lots), both of Cad. 264 of the Batangas Cadastre, which consist of 4,155 and 968 square meters, respectively. 6
The case was docketed as Land Reg. Case No. N-1554 (LRA Rec. No. N-69624) and, as a matter of course, was
called for initial hearing. No oppositor appeared during the said hearing except Prosecutor Amelia Panganiban
who appeared in behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (respondent). Consequently, the RTC issued the
corresponding Order of Special Default and the reception of evidence was delegated to the Branch Clerk of
Court.7
For land registration purposes, the subject lots were both investigated and inspected separately by Special
Land Investigator Rodolfo A. Fernandez and Forester I Loida Y. Maglinao of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) CENRO of Batangas City. Based on their findings, the subject lots are within the
alienable and disposable zone under project no. 13, lc map no. 718 issued on March 16, 1928. Also, in a letter
dated January 18, 1999 from Robert C. Pangyarihan, Chief of the Surveys Division of the DENR Region IV – Land
Management Sector, copy furnished the RTC, it is stated that the subject lots are not portion of/nor identical
to any approved isolated survey.8
During the reception of evidence, the government, through respondent, was given the opportunity to examine
the authenticity of the documents presented by petitioner in support of its application for land registration as
well as cross-examine the latter’s witnesses. Without any objection from the former, all exhibits offered by
petitioner were admitted by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not present any evidence to contradict
petitioner’s application.9
83 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
In a Decision10 dated February 28, 2001, the RTC granted petitioner’s application for the registration of the
subject lots. It found that petitioner was able to substantiate its bona fide claim of ownership over the subject
lots as it was shown, inter alia, that: (a) petitioner purchased Lot No. 1298 from its previous owner, Pio Benito
Aguado, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 23, 1995, while Lot No. 1315 was purchased from its
previous owner, Glenn Manipis, as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 2, 1995; (b) petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, peaceful, continuous, public, and uninterrupted possession of the
subject lots even before 1945; and (c) the subject lots had already been declared for taxation purposes under
the name of petitioner and the corresponding realty taxes have been equally paid by it. 11 Finding petitioner’s
application to be well-founded and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient under the law, the RTC directed
the registration of the subject lots in favor of petitioner and the issuance of the corresponding decree by the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon finality of its decision.12
On July 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion (manifestation with motion), manifesting to the
RTC the existence of an LRA Report dated November 24, 1998 (LRA Report) which states that the subject lots
were previously applied for registration and were both decided under Cadastral Case No. 37 (Cad. Case No. 37)
and, in this regard, moved that the aforesaid decision be set aside. The said manifestation with motion reads in
part:
2. LRA Record Book of Cadastral Lots on file in this Authority shows that lots 1298 and 1315, Cad. 264,
Batangas Cadastre were previously applied for registration of title in the Cadastral proceedings and were both
decided under Cadastral Case No. 37, GLRO Record No. 1696, and are subject of the following annotation, to
quote:
"Lots 1298 (45-1)

1315 (61-1) Pte. De Nueva doc."
xxxx
WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same parcels of land, the foregoing is
respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court with the recommendation that x x x should the instant
application be granted, an order be issued setting aside the decision in the cadastral proceeding with respect
to lots 1298 and 1315, Cad[.] 264, under Cad. Case No. 37.13 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the same pleading, petitioner maintained its prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration in its favor. 14
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Amended Order15 dated September 4, 2001, (a) setting aside any decision
affecting the subject lots in Cad. Case No. 37 in view of petitioner’s manifestation and motion and upon the
LRA’s recommendation; and (b) reiterating the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in favor of
petitioner due to the finality of the RTC Decision, to wit:
In view of the Manifestation and Motion filed by the applicant thru counsel and upon recommendation of the
Land Registration Authority in its Report dated November 24, 1998 together with the letter dated June 18,
1999 from Robert C. Pangyarihan, Chief Survey[s] Division, DENR, Region IV, Land Management Sector, stating
that Lots 1298 and 1315 are not portion of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey, this Court hereby
sets aside any decision in the cadastral proceedings for Lots 1298 and 1315, Cad. 264, under Case No. 37, and
hereby reiterates that the Land Registration Authority may now issue the corresponding decree of registration
and certificate of title as stated in the Decision dated February 28, 2001 which had attained finality. This
amends the Order dated August 6, 2001.
SO ORDERED.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Claiming that the RTC’s Amended Order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari (certiorari petition) before the CA which was initially denied due course on November 26, 2001.
84 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Upon reconsideration, the CA admitted respondent’s certiorari petition and directed petitioner to file its
comment thereto. The parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. 17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated December 6, 2004, the CA granted respondent’s certiorari petition and thereby, annulled
and set aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of
petitioner over the subject lots.1âwphi1
At the outset, it noted that while the issue of the propriety of setting aside the decision in Cad. Case No. 37
was raised, the CA was not furnished a copy of the said decision. Thus, in a Resolution dated September 30,
2004, it directed the LRA to submit a copy of the same and, in relation thereto, the LRA submitted a
certification of status and certification of non-availability of the record for the subject lots.19 The LRA further
informed the CA that decrees of registration had already been issued for the subject lots. 20 In view of these
considerations, the CA proceeded and ruled that petitioner should have raised in its application for registration
the existence of a decision in Cad. Case No. 37 as it is required to prove its absolute ownership over the same
and that no controversy regarding the matter of its ownership exists.21 Moreover, the CA pronounced that the
RTC’s Amended Order which set aside the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 was in utter disregard of the policy of
judicial stability, stating further that only the CA can annul judgments of the RTC. 22 Finally, the CA held that it
was erroneous for the RTC to direct the issuance of the corresponding certificate of titles without determining
the bearing of the previous decision in Cad. Case No. 37 to petitioner as the applicant. 23
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated August 23,
2005.24 Hence, this petition.
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision
and Amended Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
lots.
The petition is bereft of merit.
It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have a land registered in his name has the burden of
proving that he is its owner in fee simple, even though there is no opposition thereto. As held in Republic v.
Lee:25
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the
Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no
opposition presented against such registration by third persons. x x x In order that the petitioner for the
registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from
the certificate of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in
fee simple."26 (Citation omitted)
In this case, records disclose that petitioner itself manifested during the proceedings before the RTC that there
subsists a decision in a previous cadastral case, i.e., Cad. Case No. 37, which covers the same lots it applied for
registration. Petitioner even posits in the present petition that it was apprised of the existence of the foregoing
decision even before the rendition of the RTC Decision and Amended Order through the LRA Report dated as
early as November 24, 1998 which, as above-quoted, states that the subject lots "were previously applied for
registration of title in the [c]adastral proceedings and were both decided under [Cad. Case No. 37, GLRO
Record No. 1969, and are subject to the following annotation x x x: ‘Lots 1298 (45-1) [and] 1315 (61-1) Pte.
Nueva doc.’"27 Since it had been duly notified of an existing decision which binds over the subject lots, it was
85 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the said decision would not affect its claimed status as owner of the
subject lots in fee simple.
To note, the fact that the RTC did not order petitioner to address the matter or that it did not properly
determine the effects of the existing decision to petitioner’s application does not justify the latter’s
entitlement to have the subject lots registered in its name. Neither can the recommendation of the LRA to
have the case set aside be perceived as an ample justification for the RTC’s dispositions since this action is
precluded by the doctrine of judicial stability as will be discussed below. These missteps just magnify the
patent and gross errors of the RTC in these proceedings.
Further, as the CA correctly pointed out, land registration proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence, by
virtue of the publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the subject property are deemed to be
notified of the existence of a cadastral case involving the subject lots. 28 In this regard, petitioner cannot,
therefore, take refuge on the lack of any personal knowledge on its part previous to its application. Case law
dictates that a cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. 29 Under this doctrine, parties are
precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 30
Moreover, as amply addressed by the CA, the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in violation of the doctrine of
judicial stability. This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.31 The rationale for the same is founded on the concept
of jurisdiction – verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.32 Therefore, as the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in stark contravention of this rule, the CA
correctly ordered its nullification.
Finally, while petitioner points out to the fact that respondent belatedly filed its certiorari petition before the
CA, it must be observed that the CA had already exercised its discretion in giving due course to the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the strict application of the rules on filing a petition for certiorari may be relaxed,
among others, in the exercise of the sound discretion by the judge (or the CA) as guided by all the attendant
circumstances,33 as in this case.
Indeed, the Court can only commiserate with petitioner as it has already gone through the rigors of proving its
cause before the RTC only to fall short of its ultimate objective. Yet, the Court’s duty to uphold the principles
of law and jurisprudential pronouncements as herein discussed remains staunch and unyielding. Definitively,
the Court cannot sanction the registration of the subject lots when there stands an existing decision binding
over the same. Neither can the Court allow the RTC to set aside the ruling of a co-equal and coordinate court.
Based on these reasons, the Court is therefore constrained to sustain the nullification of the RTC Decision and
Amended Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner. Notably, this course of
action is without prejudice to the re-filing of another application for registration wherein petitioner can prove,
among others, that the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 does not affect its title to the subject lots. Petitioner may
also choose to pursue any other remedy available to it under the law.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary issues raised before
it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 6, 2004 and the Resolution
dated August 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67635 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
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EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a
total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands
to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to
prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on
the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more
than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by
the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on
March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law provides
for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC;
and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to
complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to
R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
87 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and
of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of
petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J.
Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On
the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her
from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office,
petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the
fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any
man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank,
Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private
respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations
with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman
because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally
wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with
such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on
the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had
seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on
the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged
her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are
aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up
his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17,
2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the
floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was
hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or
showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is
taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges
against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his
things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's
mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children
from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal
battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of
three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation –
of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner
over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation
88 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month
are paid for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and
enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16
After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC
Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of
access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given
private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of
pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and
her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,
which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed
by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house
is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling
without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner
decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police
officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because
of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from
Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver
from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner
may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or
indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and
household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may
be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the
Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to
cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed
firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for
them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
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g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the
corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an
accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the
financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single
centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20
effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and
the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal
of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the
three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1)
removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros
Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more
manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie
and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have
left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home
and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home,
which shall be submitted to the Court.
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d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for
clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of
proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the
TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another
application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was
purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by
private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six
or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him,
which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion,
petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was
reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of
R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal
home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after
private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding
some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a
case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of

violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any

form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all
the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother
Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales,
security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing,
as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the
schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition
or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO
will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the
Court;
91 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental
for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to
August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van
with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered
to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal
assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially
the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other
properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or
disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal
presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10)
days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however, that he has not received a copy
of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October
6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier,
October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order
issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and
renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as
may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted
product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
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Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for failure of
petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution37 dated August
14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE
TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we
shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R.
CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not
raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not
be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner
argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex
issue of constitutionality."41
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We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial
Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. 42 In
accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts
at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned
law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such
court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the
judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co.,
Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised
at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City,
which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new
kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself
shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.
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(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but
any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-
party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised
therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have
against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim
or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of
private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being
attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The
alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from
raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law
which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the
extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued.
(Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section
26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial
court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is
rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to
meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed
to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of
the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded
upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief.
However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,
95 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO
issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the
appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, 55 with more reason that a
TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to
have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and
distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No
citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts.
The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the
plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the
case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the
law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues,
or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn
duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in
her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to
rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which
could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive
the husband/father of the remedies under the law. 60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that
while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally
proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-
Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection
to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as
the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed
concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against
women as well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this
would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims
really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on
record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in
Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also
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being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties
therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law
wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to
families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a
broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I
believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a
case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden
the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it
would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men
in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we
like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we
are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would
always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than
women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason
incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also
stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that
there may not be enough protection extended to other family members particularly children who are
excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused
children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they
may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that
there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and
cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
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Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic
social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I
believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their
immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input
arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other
affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing
the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect
of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi"
Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa
lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we
remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited
to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being
abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
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Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will
enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the
children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended,
is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence,
we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on
said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative
to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is
to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative
that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when there is a
violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and
is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
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Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to
be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power
relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and
traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in
society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control
to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on
the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence
against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which
have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and
developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262
and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family
was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men.
Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient
Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they
were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his
property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been
quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in
the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to
chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their
wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal
punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
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The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In
1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of
a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her
face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In
person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues
initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife
abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon,
however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda.
They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on
the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They
succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme
Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe
assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had
assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because
surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or
in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a
partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000
women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In
families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large
part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent
Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States
are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN
General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in
Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of
Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less
than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in
nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has
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ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other
Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and
children show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases
reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which
represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women
across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among
the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape
Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape
Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness
Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries
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Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction
/Kidnapping 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
29
Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the
Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even
attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic
violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever
experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more
incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is
less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and
much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a
spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines,
the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
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In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up,
gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any
public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of
equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not
to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing
animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein
merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the
community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of
the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are
often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in
defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and
Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic
prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the
hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever
violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict
themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint
for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and
prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of
a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and
PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a
"mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of
being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks
betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate
against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-
male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW,
the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift
changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the
development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
104 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in
keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of
which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86
This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law87 and
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and
their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but
to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened
by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines
VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover
to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering
of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
105 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or
to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment
of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that
has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that
the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs
is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the
innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its
application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity,"
and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for
the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As
defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides
that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim,
were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son
(Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her
verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
106 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened." 95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children,
their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity
and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded
all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in
the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment
and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98
thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the
essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a
TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and
there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the
petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a
writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the
same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103 among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service.
Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the
respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the
notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service.
The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be
issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of
the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of
being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a
matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
107 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may
be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006,
petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the
trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the
TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would
just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a
limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can
show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he
was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife
to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so.
It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership
of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where
no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court
shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any
property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and
counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a
mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model
Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for
protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach
consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition,
mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
108 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law"
and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The pertinent
provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs)
refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications
for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of
the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the
barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain
facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of
a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very
unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already
stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to
enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
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Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to
leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable
doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by
petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic
violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep
that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
110 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 229826, July 30, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIA CABRELLOS Y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Patricia Cabrellos y Dela Cruz (Cabrellos)
assailing the Decision2 dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02020,
which affirmed the Joint Judgment3 dated February 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros
Oriental, Branch 45 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 05-0163-A and 05-0162-A finding Cabrellos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Cabrellos with violations of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portions of which read:
Crim. Case No. 05-0163-A
That on September 22, 2005 at about 12:45 in the afternoon at Barangay Iniban, Ayungon, Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without lawful
authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously SELL and DELIVER to a poseur buyer
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as Shabu, weighing 0.08 gram, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.6
Crim. Case No. 05-0162-A
That on September 22, 2005 at 12:45 in the afternoon, more or less, at Barangay Iniban, Ayungon, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, control and custody, 0.64 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, without lawful authority.
Contrary to law.7
The prosecution alleged that on September 22, 2005 and acting upon a tip from a confidential informant
regarding Cabrellos's alleged illegal drug activities in Ayungon, Negros Oriental, the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency and the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group organized a buy-bust team,
with PO3 Allen June Germodo (PO3 Germodo) acting as poseur-buyer and PO2 Glenn Corsame (PO2 Corsame)
111 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
as immediate back-up. The buy-bust team, together with the informant, then went to Cabrellos's house.
Thereat, the informant introduced PO3 Germodo as a shabu buyer. After PO3 Germodo gave Cabrellos the two
(2) marked P500.00 bills, Cabrellos took out two (2) plastic sachets containing suspected shabu from her bag
and handed it over to PO3 Germodo. Upon receipt of the sachets, PO3 Germodo placed Cabrellos under arrest,
with the rest of the buy-bust team rushing to the scene. The police officers searched Cabrellos's bag and
discovered seventeen (17) more sachets containing suspected shabu therein. The police officers then brought
Cabrellos and the seized items to the Ayungon Police Station for the conduct of photography and inventory of
the seized items. However, since only a barangay kagawad was present at the Ayungon Police Station at that
time, the police officers brought Cabrellos and the seized items to the Dumaguete Police Station wherein they
conducted a second inventory, this time in the presence of a representative each from the DOJ and the media.
Thereafter, the seized sachets were brought to the crime laboratory where the contents thereof were
confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8
In her defense, Cabrellos testified that she was inside her house tending to her child when suddenly, two (2)
unidentified persons came into their house looking for her husband. When she told them that her husband
was not around, she was brought to the police station for selling shabu, and there, made to sign a document
already signed by a barangay official. She was detained for three (3) months at the Dumaguete Police Station
before she was transferred to Bais City Jail.9
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Judgment10 dated February 25, 2015, the RTC convicted Cabrellos of the crimes charged, and
accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. 05-0163-A, to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 05-0162-A, to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and
to pay a fine of P300,000.00.11
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish Cabrellos's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
considering that: (a) she was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the poseur-buyer; and (b) in the
search incidental to her arrest, she was discovered to be in possession of seventeen (17) more sachets of
shabu. On the other hand, it did not give credence to Cabrellos' bare denial as it stood weak in the face of the
detailed and candid testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses.12
Aggrieved, Cabrellos appealed13 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 14 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. 15 It held that the testimonies of the
police officers had established the fact that Cabrellos was caught in the act of selling illegal drugs, and that in
the course of her arrest, she was found in possession of more sachets containing illegal drugs. In this regard,
the CA ruled that the police officers substantially complied with the chain of custody requirement as the
identity and evidentiary value of the seized items were duly established and preserved. 16
Hence, this appeal.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Cabrellos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling
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At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it
is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned.17 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."18
In this case, Cabrellos was charged with Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In order to properly secure the conviction
of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.19 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.20 In both instances, case law instructs that
it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.21
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling
the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 22 Under the said section, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640,23 the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or
the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.24 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,25 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media
or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."26
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 27 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064028 – provide that
the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team.29 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily
proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved.30 In People v. Almorfe,31the Court explained that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.32 Also, in People v.
De Guzman,33 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. 34
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Cabrellos.
113 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Initially, it would appear that the arresting officers complied with the witness requirement during inventory, as
seen in the Receipt of Property Seized35 dated September 22, 2005 which contains the signatures of the
required witnesses, i.e., a public elected official, a representative from the DOJ, and a representative from the
media. However, no less than PO3Germodo admitted in open court that they actually conducted two (2)
separate inventories in different places and in the presence of different witnesses. Pertinent portions of his
direct testimony read:
[Pros. Yuseff Cesar Ybañez, Jr.]: After you were able to make the said marking, were you able to take pictures
with the accused inside her house?
[PO3 Germodo]: No, sir. We only took pictures during the inventory at the police station of Ayungon.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, after you have prepared, and signed of the properties seized and gone with the markings of
the property seized, what did you do then, if any?
A: We conducted the inventory of the confiscated items together with the witness, the [B]rgy. Kagawad Raul
Fausto and he signed the inventory.
Q: And after Raul Fausto signed the inventory, what happened then, if any?
A: Since there was no report from the media [and] the Department of Justice, we proceeded to Dumaguete
City.
Q: Where did you proceed in Dumaguete City?

A: In our office.
Q: Where is your office located?

A: It is located at PNP compound, Locsin St., Dumaguete City.
Q: After you arrived there, what happened then?

A: I called the media representative and the DOJ.
Q: And did they arrive, the media representative and the DOJ representative?
A: Yes.
Q: After they arrived, what transpired at your office?

A: We conduct (sic) again an inventory.
Q: After conducting the second inventory, what did you do then, if any?
A: After the inventory we made a request for PNP crime laboratory. 36
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the arresting officers conducted two (2) separate inventories,
both of which are glaringly non compliant with the required witnesses rule: (a) in the inventory conducted at
the Ayungon Police Station, only a public elected official – Brgy. Kagawad Raul Fausto – was present thereat;
and (b) on the other hand, the inventory conducted at the Dumaguete Police Station was witnessed only by
representatives from the DOJ and the media. To make matters worse, the arresting officers attempted to
cover up such fact by preparing a single inventory sheet signed by the witnesses at different times and places.
Verily, the chain of custody rule laid down by RA 9165 and its IRR contemplates a situation where the
inventory conducted on the seized items is witnessed by the required personalities at the same time. The
wordings of the law leave no room for any piecemeal compliance with the required witnesses rule as what
happened in this case. Otherwise, the avowed purpose of the required witnesses rule – which is to prevent the
evils of switching, planting, or contamination of the corpus delicti resulting in the tainting of its integrity and
evidentiary value – will be greatly diminished or even completely negated.
114 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
At this point, it is well to note that the non-compliance with the required witnesses rule does not per se render
the confiscated items inadmissible.37 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any
genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be
adduced.38 In People v. Umipang,39 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were
employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable – without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."40
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are
unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.41 These considerations arise from the fact that police
officers are ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing fully well that they would have to
strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, police officers
are compelled not only to state the reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the
Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstance, their actions were reasonable.42
To reiterate, PO3 Germodo admitted that they had to re-do the inventory at the Dumaguete Police Station for
it to be witnessed by the DOJ and media representatives. However, the re-conduct of the inventory at the
Dumaguete Police Station was no longer witnessed by the public elected official who was left behind at the
Ayungon Police Station. Unfortunately, no excuse was offered for such mishap; and worse, they even tried to
trivialize the matter by making the required witnesses sign a single inventory sheet despite the fact that they
witnessed the conduct of two (2) separate inventories. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide
justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression, the Court
is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Cabrellos have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving not only the elements of the
offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.43 It is well-settled that the procedure in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 44 As
such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the aforesaid
provision, Cabrellos's acquittal is perforce in order.
subject matter:
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 45
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the
procedure set forth in Section 21 [, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative
to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any
issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
115 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
perforce, overturn a conviction."46
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR H.C. No. 02020 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Patricia Cabrellos y
Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause
her immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
116 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
DIVISION
[ GR No. 212340, Aug 17, 2016 ]
PEOPLE v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT +
RESOLUTION
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut (Manago) assailing
the Decision[2] dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution[3] dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No. 01342, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 58 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. CBU-79707, finding Manago guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II[5] of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[6] otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
On April 10, 2007, an Information[7] was filed before the RTC, charging Manago of Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 2007, at about 11:50 in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without
authority of law, did then and there have in his possession and under his control one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic packet of white crystalline substance weighing 5.85 grams containing Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride [sic], a dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
According to the prosecution, at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Antonio Din (PO3 Din) of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty
Parlor when two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din identified himself as a police officer and
exchanged gun shots with the two suspects. After the shootout, one of the suspects boarded a motorcycle,
while the other boarded a red Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers of the vehicles were noted by PO3 Din.[9]
After the incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay Tanod Florentine Cano (Cano), [10] that the robbery
suspects were last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus, S/Insp. George Ylanan (S/Insp. Ylanan) conducted an
117 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
investigation in the said barangay, and discovered that before the robbery incident, Manago told Cano that
three persons - namely, Rico Lumampas, Arvin Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his employees in his roasted
chicken business, and they were to stay in Manago's house. Further, upon verification of the getaway vehicles
with the Land Transportation Office, the police officers found out that the motorcycle was registered in
Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was registered in the name pf Zest-O Corporation, where
Manage worked as a District Sales Manager.[11]
With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers, comprised of a team including PO3 Din and
S/Insp. Ylanan, conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after the robbery incident, or on March 16,
2007, by setting up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At around 9:30 in the evening of even date, the red Toyota
Corolla, then being driven by Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop
the vehicle. The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a thorough
search of the vehicle. As the search produced no contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago, resulting
in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers seized the plastic pack, arrested Manago,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and brought him and the plastic pack to their headquarters. Upon
reaching the headquarters, S/Insp. Ylanan turned over the seized plastic pack to PO3 Joel Taboada, who in
turn, prepared a request for a laboratory examination of the same. SPO1 Felix Gabijan then delivered the said
sachet and request to Forensic Chemist Jude Daniel Mendoza of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who, after
conducting an examination, confirmed that the sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.[12]
In his defense, Manago denied possessing the plastic pack recovered by the police officers. He claimed that at
around 11:50 in the evening of March 16, 2007, he was about to start his vehicle and was on his way home
from the office when a pick-up truck stopped in front of his car. Three (3) police officers armed with long
firearms disembarked from the said track. One of the officers knocked on the door of Manago's vehicle and
asked for his driver's license, to which Manago complied. When the same officer saw Manago's name on the
license, the former uttered "mao na ni (this is him)." Manago was then ordered to sit at the back of his car as
the vehicle was driven by one of the police officers directly to the Cebu City Police Station. After arriving at the
police station, Manago was interrogated about who the robbers were and to divulge their whereabouts so that
no criminal charges would be filed against him. Manago claimed that he requested for a phone call with his
lawyer, as well as a copy of the warrant for his arrest, but both requests went unheeded. After he was
dispossessed of his laptop, wallet, and two (2) mobile phones, he was then photographed and placed in a
detention cell. Thereafter, he was brought to the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office where he was charged with,
among others, illegal possession of shabu.[13]
Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause and/or Motion for the
Suppression of Evidence,[14] contending, inter alia, that there is neither probable cause nor prima facie
Evidence to conduct an arrest and search on him; as such, the item seized torn him, i.e., the plastic sachet
containing shabu, is inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. [15] However,
in kn Order[16] dated May 31, 2007, the RTC denied the said motion. The RTC held that while (a) the police
officers, through PO3 Din, had no personal knowledge of Manago's involvement in the robbery as they had to
conduct in investigation to identify him as the registered owner of the motorcycle and (b) there was no in
flagrante delicto arrest as Manago was merely driving and gave no indication that he was committing an
offense, the RTC nevertheless held that there was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle, considering
that PO3 Din had probable cause to believe that Manago was part of the robbery, because the latter was
driving the getaway vehicle used in the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. [17]
On July 12, 2007, Manago was arraigned with the assistance of counsel and pleaded not guilty to the charge
against him.[18]
During the course of the trial, the contents of the plastic sachet were re-examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation, revealing that out of the 5.7158 grams of white crystalline substance contained in the sachet,
only 0.3852 grams is methamphetamine hydrochloride, while the rest is potassium aluminum sulphate or
tawas, which is not a dangerous drug substance. Thus, Manago applied for and was granted bail. [19]
118 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated March 23, 2009, the RTC found Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of
0.3852 grams of shabu and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the
amount of P300,000.00.[21]
Echoing its earlier findings in its May 31, 2007 Order, the RTC found that the police officers conducted a valid
warrantless search of a moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din positively identified the red Toyota Corolla,
then being driven by Manago, as the getaway vehicle in the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. Thus, the item
found in the search, i.e., the plastic sachet containing shabu obtained from Manago, is admissible in evidence
and is enough to sustain a conviction against him for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.[22]
Manago moved for reconsideration[23] and applied for bail pending appeal, which were, however, both denied
in an Omnibus Order[24] dated May 12, 2009. Aggrieved, Manago appealed his conviction before the CA. [25]
The CA Proceedings
Upon Manago's motion to post bail, the CA rendered a Resolution [26] dated August 13, 2010, allowing Manago
to post bail in the amount of P200,000.00, noting that the quantity of the shabu seized from him was only
0.3852 grams, thus bailable, and that the Office of the Solicitor General did not oppose Manago's motion. [27]
In a Decision[28] dated May 20, 2013, the CA affirmed Manago „ conviction in toto. It held that the police
officers conducted a valid hot pursuit operation against Manago, considering that PO3 Din personally
identified him as the one driving the red Toyota Corolla vehicle used in the March 15, 2007 robbery incident.
As such, the CA concluded that the warrantless arrest conducted against Manago was valid, and consequently,
the plastic sachet seized from him containing shabu is admissible in evidence as it was done incidental to a
lawful arrest.[29]
Undaunted, Manago moved for reconsideration,[30] which was denied in a Resolution[31] dated November 6,
2013; hence, the instant appeal.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Manage's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165 should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
Section 2, Article III[32] of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional
provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III [33] of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[34]
One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.[35]
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with:
119 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of
Rule 112.
Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of
a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.[36]
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of personal knowledge
must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the
items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the
exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso,[37] the Court explained the requirement of
immediacy as follows:
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just
been committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested;
committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under Section 5 (b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary,
"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may pertain to
events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the
scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still
make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime,
he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be
made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time
to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the
arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed
under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination
of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered
120 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the
requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police
officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.[38] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din personally witnessed
a robbery incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After his
brief shootout with the armed robbers, the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red Toyota Corolla. Through an
investigation and verification made by the police officers headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, they were
able to: (a) find out that the armed robbers were staying in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the getaway
vehicles to Manago. The next day, or on March 16, 2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint in Sitio
Panagdait where, at around 9:30 in the evening, the red Toyota Corolla being driven by Manago passed by and
was intercepted by the police officers. The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark the car, and
from there, proceeded to search the vehicle and the body of Manago, which search yielded the plastic sachet
containing shabu. Thereupon, they effected Manago's arrest.
The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under Section 5 (b) above
was present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery incident and even engaged the
armed robbers in a shootout - the required element of immediacy was not met. This is because, at the time
the police officers effected the warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and verification
proceedings were already conducted, which consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the
March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the Court sees it, the information the police officers had gathered
therefrom would have been enough for them to secure the necessary warrants against the robbery suspects.
However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which - considering the lack of immediacy -
unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements therefor. Thus, there being no valid warrantless arrest
under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling that Manago was lawfully arrested.
In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise erred in ruling that the
incidental search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said search was made even before he
was arrested and thus, violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to lawful arrests that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made.
For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the police officers conducted a lawful warrantless
search of a moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable.
In Caballes v. People,[39] the Court explained the concept of warrantless searches on moving vehicles:
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the
years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws,
provided such searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like checkpoints near the boundary
lines of the State.[40] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or police
checkpoints - as in this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for as long as its necessity
is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.[41] Case law
further states that routine inspections in checkpoints are not regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable searches, and thus, permissible, if limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a
vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected
121 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[42]
It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte blanche discretion to
conduct warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search - as opposed to a mere routine inspection - such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.[43]
In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had already conducted a thorough
investigation and verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the identities of the robbery
suspects; (b) the place where they reside; and (c) the ownership of the getaway vehicles used in the robbery,
i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla. As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were
already enough for said police officers to secure the necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects.
Consequently, there was no longer any exigent circumstance that would have justified the necessity of setting
up the checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the subject vehicle. In addition, it is well to point
out that the checkpoint was arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago, who was already identified as the
culprit of the robbery incident. In this regard, it cannot, therefore, be said that the checkpoint was meant to
conduct a routinary and indiscriminate search of moving vehicles. Rather, it was used as a subterfuge to put
into force the capture of the fleeing suspect. Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt the
legal requirement of - procuring a valid search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case. Hence, the
search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver, Manago, was unlawful.
In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his moving vehicle
were all unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu seized from him is rendered inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from criminal liability.[44]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution dated November
6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No. 01342 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut as hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION
June 28, 2017
A.C. No. 8371
SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY, Complainants

vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a complaint1 filed by Spouses Gerardo Montecillo and Dominga
Salonoy (complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian (respondent) before the Office of the Bar Confidant
charging him of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for being negligent in handling complainants'
case. In a Resolution2 dated August 9, 2010, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Facts
Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent for an ejectment case in which they were the
defendants.3 After filing their Answer to the complaint, complainants received a notice from the court setting
the preliminary conference on March 25, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants went to
respondent's office to confer with him about it, the latter told them that he did not receive the notice and that
he could not attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict in his schedule. Complainants expressed that
they can attend the conference even without him. He allegedly advised them not to attend anymore as he
would arrange with the court for a new schedule when he is available. 4
Complainants relied on respondent's advice and did not attend the preliminary conference anymore.
Thereafter, they found out that respondent not only failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference,
but also failed to take any steps to have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also learned that, contrary
to respondent's representation, he did receive the notice setting the date of the preliminary conference.
Subsequently, complainant received an Order 5 dated March 25, 2009 that deemed the ejectment case
submitted for decision due to complainants' failure to appear during the preliminary conference. When they
approached respondent about it, he belittled the matter and told them not to worry as he would take care of
it.6
Subsequently, the trial court issued a Decision7 dated April 21, 2009 adverse to the complainants. Respondent
received it on May 4, 2009 but failed to inform complainants about the status of the case as to enable them to
prepare the next course of action. Complainants learned about the adverse ruling upon inquiring with the trial
court only on May 13, 2009, or nine (9) days after respondent's receipt thereof, when their period to appeal
was almost about to lapse. 8
123 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Complainants went to respondent's office wherein the latter prepared a Notice of Appeal. Afterwards,
complainants terminated respondent's legal services and engaged another lawyer to prepare their
Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal, the ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin. 9
In sum, complainants assail respondent's negligent and complacent handling of their case. 10
In his Comment, 11 respondent contended that when complainants informed him about the scheduled
preliminary conference, he told them that he would be unable to attend due to a conflict in schedule, as he
was committed to attend a criminal case hearing in Quezon City. Nevertheless, he instructed complainants to
attend the preliminary conference even without his appearance and inform the court about the conflict in
schedule. He denied having advised complainants not to attend the preliminary hearing and belittled the
Order dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he alleged that the Order dated March 25, 2009 was complainants' fault,
due to their failure to attend the preliminary conference, and upon telling this to complainants, they
terminated his legal services. 12
On June 22, 2011, while the case was pending before the IBP, complainants filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Withdraw Complaint. 13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the IBP's Report and Recommendation14 dated August 29, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for breach of Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He explained that the submission of the ejectment case
for resolution and the eventual adverse decision against complainants were attributable to respondent's
negligence. Knowing that he had a conflict in schedule, respondent should have prepared and filed an
appropriate motion to cause the cancellation and resetting of the scheduled preliminary conference. Whether
he advised complainants to attend the preliminary conference on March 25, 2009 or not is immaterial. What
was relevant was his course of action when confronted with a conflict of schedule in his court appearances. 15
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found complainants' version of facts more in line with common
experience as opposed to respondent's version. Notably, there was no cogent explanation why complainants
would dismiss his alleged instruction to attend the conference without him. 16
In a Resolution17 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied m a Resolution 18 dated September 23, 2016.
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.
Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost diligence and competence, and never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him. 19 A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients' cause20 and, accordingly is expected to
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. 21 Consequently, he is expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote one's full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, whether it is accepted for a fee or for free. 22 The relevant provisions of the CPR read thus:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
124 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties of competence and diligence include not merely reviewing
cases or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of properly representing a client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings and conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the
client or the court to prod him to do so.23 A lawyer's negligence in fulfilling these duties subjects him to
disciplinary action. 24
Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in
handling complainants' case. Based on the records, he failed to file the necessary motion to postpone the
hearing due to a conflict in his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their opportunity to present their
evidence in the ejectment case. As complainants' counsel in the ejectment case, respondent was expected to
exercise due diligence. He should have been more circumspect in preparing and filing the motion, considering
the serious consequence of failure to attend the scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's failure
to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to a judgment, 25 as what happened in this case.
The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to immediately inform complainants about the trial
court's adverse decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly apprise clients regarding the
status of a case as expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must advise them without delay
about matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the present case, respondent failed to
immediately notify complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the complainants not
inquired with the trial court, they would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason, respondent is
also administratively liable for negligence under Rule 18.04 of the CPR.
As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their
clients' affairs by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update clients about court decisions, the Court
suspended them from the practice of law for six (6) months. In Caranza V da.de Saldivar v. Cabanes,26 a lawyer
was suspended for failure to file a pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. In Heirs of
Ballesteros v. Apiag, 27 a lawyer was likewise suspended for not attending pre-trial, failing to inform clients
about the dismissal of their case, and failing to file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda, 28 a lawyer
suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a scheduled hearing despite due notice, which resulted in
the submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these cases, the Court agrees with the IBP's
recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 Furthermore, let copies of the same be served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
125 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
February 15, 2017
G.R. No. 222541
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner

vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed
the Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
11-891 declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the
ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.6
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a
party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they became romantically involved.8
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly
provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son,
named Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony
held in the Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver and has been working there ever
since, only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a
house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija. 10
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital
obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to
avoid discharging his duties as husband and father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent;
he punched her in the shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused
to pay for the transportation expenses of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to
fall unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and he even
locked her out of their house in the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her
relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent himself
as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a
text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan,
126 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
pumunta ka na lang dito."12 Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong
magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the
other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any
chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart. 13
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in
their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.14
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley 15 and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which
corroborated her allegations, as well as the testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the
Psychological Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily
based on her interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder
(APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-
seeking attitude that catered only to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of
depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.19
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed
all of his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for his family's financial
and emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of their conjugal home. He
claimed that although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship,
pointing out that their first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they
continued to communicate through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel
and would advise her to give her family the financial aid that they need so long as she would not sacrifice her
well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son. 20
Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his allegations. 21
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's
APD interferes with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take
responsibility for his actions, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against him. 23
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering of their money on
vices, violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent psychological condition that
incapacitates him to perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At
most, they are personality defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be
considered as grounds for legal separation under Article 55 25 of the same code.26
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, 28 holding that the totality of the
evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity,
his refusal to seek employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged
propensity for violence were not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code;
at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature which nonetheless do
not amount to the downright incapacity that the law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and the incapacity itself were not
sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation between Jose's "deprived childhood"
and "poor home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent psychological malady, on the other.
Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered a general evaluation on the
supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder. 30
127 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution 32 dated December
1, 2015; hence, this petition.
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, 33 and
marriage as the foundation of the family.34 Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as
a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.36 It should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code,
among others,38 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render
help and support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.42 The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted below, 44 that incorporated the
basic requirements the Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and
may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows
that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.45 The evidence need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come
from persons intimately related to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of the marriage.46 In other words, the Molina
guidelines continue to apply but its application calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.47 To be clear, however, the totality of the
evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and juridical
antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. 49 In Taring v. Taring,50 the Court
emphasized that "irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may
only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not
consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual
promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v.
Encelan,53 Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a few, and thus dismissed their petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
128 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the totality of the
evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity,
irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in
drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father
to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself
as single; and (4) engaged in an extra-marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on
several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr.
Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose
with APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have
become deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to
be a permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form of
intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for
establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose
allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose
exhibited this disorder or how and to what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD,
sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the
law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and
grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly,
the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that
automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however, specifically
identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his
adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background
that could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was
already existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not require that the
expert witness personally examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided
corroborating evidence are presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters. 57 Considering
that her Report was based solely on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her
testimony deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that
Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify
the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough
that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.58 There must
be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how
unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological
incapacity within the context of Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie.
129 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 1,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
130 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented
by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province
of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall
heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional
challenge.
131 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to
the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would
cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from
the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American
legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. 5 While the advent of
refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that
"bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents. 6 In a more technical sense, "Pork
Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. 7 Some scholars on the subject further
use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference
to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered 11 as the earliest form of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected
to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 3 12 provides
that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects 13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The
committee from each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made
by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the
same section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the
authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the
areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the
mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects
was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first
time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the
representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or
civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government
councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions
that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator
would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then
integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the
1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the
House of Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law
was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary.
By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations
132 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National
Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving
lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00.
Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry
of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the
assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under
the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also
"soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of,
among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the
"Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and
₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas
areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund"
(CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small
local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to
be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list
of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of
allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it
has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they
could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and
buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships. 27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be
made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As
such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and
the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and
fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the
House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6)
months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
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The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required
as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called
"Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It
has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments,
they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers
themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the
DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions. 38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of
Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works
Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building
Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the legislative
district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely,
the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the
"Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision
requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the
GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District"
before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated
in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly
allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other
personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-
enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision
ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit
concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003, 50 the same single provision was
present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the
provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways 51 (DPWH) and the
DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation
delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept, 55 which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence,
operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently
integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts
allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification
of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the
DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required
prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress 61 anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
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Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In
the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were,
by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250
Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be
made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and
Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in
the construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs
in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government
Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB
Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the
Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement, 67 the
procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum
of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to
be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 2011 70 PDAF Article included
an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-
President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard
projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator as well as
the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a
provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and
Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public
Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within
the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure
projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the
request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. 71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list. 74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013
PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011
GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects. 77 Legislators
were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the
legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House. 78 Finally, any
realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for
release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. 79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however,
shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March
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22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation,
and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-
related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the
"Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been
currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85
or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was
similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and
accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it
stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from
the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. 88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small
part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional
support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former
Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on
the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators
and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be
anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92
"Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and
textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93 "The
publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain
lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in
the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support
that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores
of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for
an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the
whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. 97 Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3)
years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of
releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the
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DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate
implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The
total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP,
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have
been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its
Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as
follows:103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators

significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members
of the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007
to 2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned
over to the government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s

endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, administrative and
technical capabilities to implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing

agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds
were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772)
projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted
questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of
the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties
in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia
Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as
follows:
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On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining
respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent
Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact
legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may
be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. 106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante,
Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being
acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities
as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and
National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds.
Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a)
"the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to
2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the
proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-
budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August
23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from
releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects
identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments,
such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation,
and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority. 111 The Nepomuceno Petition was
docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring
public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO)
enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their
authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013,
and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of
even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to
educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the
Comment.
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Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on
September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October
1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013,
Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for
the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the
present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with
him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to
competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its
implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to
appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the
parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the
Court‘s resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy;
(b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c)
petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105,
113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez" 114 (Philconsa) and
Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute
undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also
tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The petitions are partly granted.
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I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 118 Of these requisites, case law states that
the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on
the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA
for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. 125 Differing
from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not
terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared
towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render
the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional
authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law
may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments: 126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct? Solicitor General
Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
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Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I
am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether
or not that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop
the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised
Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF
is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because
of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside,
outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising
precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it,
or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially
allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers,
non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a
matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the
system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to
address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as
not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v.
CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it
was emphasized that:
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The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which
is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies
are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this
Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases,
the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling
on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the
CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that
all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to
formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly,
so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with
constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage
of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. 133 The relevance of the
issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of
the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of
truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." 135 In Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court
used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re-
emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the
manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that
"the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 138 Essentially, the
foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of
Baker v. Carr,139 applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political
branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response
to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this
stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are
within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
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been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present
Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a
duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political
question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative
to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty.
Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any
manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change
are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial
restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." 146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they
possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the
taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound
to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that
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the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls" 149
amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient
locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare
decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general
procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its
prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous
case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and
second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required
identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal
based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein
failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the
Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary
support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the
standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar
as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under
Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF
Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the
power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the
CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in
implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making
of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154
In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the
Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of
appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation
law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and
identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the
Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present
cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each
other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the
area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful
countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
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In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the
main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose
and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may
be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation
is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should
exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the
prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been
passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this
wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as
it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I
am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and
current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous
ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress
on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155
(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view
of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be
discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has
not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In
fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork
Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing
discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive
branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary
powers to determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up
the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual
officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague,
overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular
part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage
benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public
funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF; 158 and, second, the
Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential
Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines
the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-
sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control
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certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In
particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since
it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court
shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means
that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the
Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional
design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has
no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy
and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from
lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. 169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must
be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to
check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government
unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with
the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words,
there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v.
Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise
the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. 175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it
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deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily
comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to
blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for
implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which
is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada: 178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In

particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
(Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article –
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual
legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed." 179
They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute
and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case
only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending
projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation. 181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final
discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the
constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such
proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special
Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional." 184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would
be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
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At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have
been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through
various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well
as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu
feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as
long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision
2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a
more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which
the legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects
outside his district for as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile,
Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators"188 and
thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification
"shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing
special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in
the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators
to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5
which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund
realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4 189 which explicitly state s, among others,
that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may
be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture,
Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry 190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to
another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of
the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr.
puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers
principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and,
as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that
the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents –
through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the
identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a
funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution
process:192
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Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the
legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I
would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the
SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How
can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must
identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and
his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed
throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we
enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that
neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they
were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM,
and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now
surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past
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practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the
PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures
written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the
body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power
and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation
(contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of
powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators
are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is
lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor 202 (Bengzon), held that the
power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
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specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power
of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators
to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not
mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process
known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power
of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-
passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is
the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in
Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral
part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative
act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature
must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this
respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact
laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will
of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise
interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto
in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature.
(Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-
rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s
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role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court
characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard
the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." 209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which
may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars,
the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation
as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money,
not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to
exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose,
otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the
same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence
Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as
"line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an
appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be
considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may
even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose,
e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed
sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and
discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they
follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added
that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify
the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to
discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-
sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type
necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of
the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said
that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper
line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or
undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally,
it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the
implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the
actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the
power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in
violation of the principle of non-delegability.
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b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation,
the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to
veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that
appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is
intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential
to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the
decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-
grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since
the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-
sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and
hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide
between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to
the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation
above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item
veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently
auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget
or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency." 217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a
greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not
justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate
defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular,
they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the
smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested
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partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-
perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such
"funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘" 220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a
public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official
functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the
people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be
checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, 222 congressional oversight may be
performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; 223
or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual
legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene
in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon
to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before
another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his
PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-
case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators
and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
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4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action. 226
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not
been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed
from the National Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and
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other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the
national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate
Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy
which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political
subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small
republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their
inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of
involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue
interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and
inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent
laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute
their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition
that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely
to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating
that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the
national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013
speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional
Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify
projects for communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of
PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits
are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have
been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the
same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and
Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional
Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become
personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their
office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions
should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-
making authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the
post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236
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With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own,
and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not
only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further
weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is
deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993),
which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of
public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation
law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and
Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that
Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is
merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise
and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used
without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b)
allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose
stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘"
an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for
as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law,"
such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress),
just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization
may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of
general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in
the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
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To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose.
The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An
appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public
purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly
manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the
"primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal
provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular
public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts
and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus;
all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under
the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share
on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy
resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or
60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the
General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of
PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development
Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of
the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal
appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal
appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-
enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate
appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but
rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences
outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law"
since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-
delegability principle as afore-discussed.
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2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."243
Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section
and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to
refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for
a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same
law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the
law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into
actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that
the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the
"sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That
the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase
is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other
purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the
Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test
since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless
be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for
the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be
used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has
already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same. 252 Nevertheless,
since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the
Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
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Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be
used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for
any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
"priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its
lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially public services and
facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well
as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the
context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary
and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of
legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the
funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use
Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds
from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x
x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" 255 (Presidential
Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus.
As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
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rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and
the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to
information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like."
In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required."
Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The
pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform
the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-
28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court
finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by
the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use
Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the
latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be
equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these
cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any
official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters
of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the
government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents
which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid
statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it
nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the
end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records
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may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to
the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally
deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released
funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF
allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM
Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to
the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of
PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by
the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve
the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation
[(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated
allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency
concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they
cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO
by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should
be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article
as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one.
Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among
others, is now permanently enjoined.
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The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has
a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of
whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be
disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by
an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in
its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is
subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by
competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public
funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be
determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments: 265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter
into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to
liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for
the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the
projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are
withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released."
In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs,
and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined
and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed
even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional
source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated
but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from
the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as
unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead,
respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
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E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the
2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto,
and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact
doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus,
entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the
recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 266 the doctrine merely
"reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of
its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the
final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent
defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in
varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power
; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill,
it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to
veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in
the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize,
the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has
likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power
to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as
well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it
has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by
any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that
a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-
stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time
of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it
may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path
forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course.
After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this
Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
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the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively
organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages
of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and
revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-
sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910
and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation
of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be
PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well
as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby
ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released
but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes
not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management
be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports
related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official
documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be
prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on
the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit
may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the
budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of
reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals
for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all
funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
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EN BANC
July 25, 2017
G.R. No. 227757
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE

RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE, REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES,
REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO, Petitioners
vs.
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO
E. SUAREZ, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for mandamus1 filed by petitioners Representatives Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr.,
(Rep. Baguilat), Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman), Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice, Emmanuel A. Billones, Tomasito S.
Villarin, and Gary C. Alejano (collectively, petitioners), all members of the House of Representatives, essentially
praying that respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker Alvarez), Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Farifias
(Rep. Fariñas), and Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep. Suarez; collectively, respondents), also members of
the House of Representatives, be compelled to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the 17th
Congress of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the legitimate members of the Minority.
The Facts
The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles
surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the House of
Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after the May 2016
Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the majority partisans. The petition further claims
that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly
"lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as
the Minority Leader.2
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then-Acting
Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the Plenary, wherein
the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong
to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who
abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be
elected by the members of the Minority.3 Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252
Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21
abstaining and one [(l)] registering a no vote,"4 thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17 th Congress.
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Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate who garnered the
second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader - Rep.
Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However, despite numerous follow-ups
from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such. 5
On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon),
manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez (including the
21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. 6 Thereafter, on August 15,
2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Farinas moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.
This was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that various "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's
election as Minority Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for
Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists" who
constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are supposed to be
considered independent members of the House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the Minority. 7
However, Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled, and consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as
the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as
the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the candidate who
garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority
Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position.
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the House of
Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the
Court cannot interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of the govemment.8 In the same vein,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez and Majority Leader Farinas contends,
inter alia, that the election of Minority Leader is within the exclusive realm of the House of Representatives,
which the Court cannot intrude in pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, as well as the political
question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues that the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the House Minority Leader
was not tainted with any violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion and, thus, must be
sustained.9
The essential issue for resolution is whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to
recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the
only legitimate members of the House Minority.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to
be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course oflaw."10 In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11 the Court explained that the
peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the
ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear
legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled. 12
After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs
sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor Leader
Rep. Farinas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then articulated that: (a) all those who vote for the
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winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for other candidates shall belong to the
Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the
Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority. 13 Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of
the House proceeded without any objection from any member of Congress, including herein petitioners.
Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House is the essential and formative step conducted at the first
regular session of the 17th Congress to determine the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on,
their respective leaders), considering that the Majority would be comprised of those who voted for the
winning Speaker and the Minority of those who did not. The unobjected procession of the House at this
juncture is reflected in its Journal No. 1 dated July 25, 2016,14 which, based on case law, is conclusive15 as to
what transpired in Congress:
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA
Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza inquired as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives.
REMARKS OF REP. FARINAS
In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the house on membership to the Majority and the
Minority. He explained that the Members who voted for the winning candidate for the Speaker shall constitute
the Majority and shall elect from among themselves the Majority Leader. while those who voted against the
winning Speaker or did not vote at all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter elect their Minority
Leader.
NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE
Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Members proceeded to the election of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Presiding Officer then directed Deputy Secretary General Adasa
to call the Roll for nominal voting for the Speaker of the House and requested each Member to state the name
of the candidate he or she will vote for.
The result of the voting was as follows:
For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez:
xxxx
For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.
xxxx
For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez
xxxx
Abstained
xxxx
With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez (P.), eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21
abstaining and one registering a no vote, the Presiding Officer declared Rep. Alvarez (P.) as the duly elected
Speaker of the House of Representatives for the 17th Congress.
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COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION
On motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Body constituted a committee composed of the
following Members to notify Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his election as Speaker of the House of Representatives and to
escort the Speaker-elect to the rostrum for his oath-taking: Reps. Eric D. Singson, Mercedes K. Alvarez, Fredenil
"Fred" H. Castro, Raneo "Ranie" E. Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A. Catamco, Elenita Milagros "Eileen" Ermita-
Buhain, Rose Marie "Baby" J. Arenas, Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Marlyn L.
PrimiciasAgabas, Emmeline Aglipay-Villar, Sarah Jane I. Elago and Victoria Isabel G. Noel.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
The Presiding Officer motu proprio suspended the session at 12:43p.m.16
After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of office, he administered the oath of office to all Members of the House of
the 17th Congress.17 On the same day, the Deputy Speakers, and other officers of the House (among others,
the Majority Leader) were elected and all took their respective oaths of office. 18
During his privilege speech delivered on July 26, 2016, which was a full day after all the above-mentioned
proceedings had already been commenced and completed, Rep. Lagman questioned Rep. Fariñas'
interpretation of the Rules.19 Aside from the belated timing of Rep. Lagman's query, Rep. Suarez aptly points
out that the Journal for that session does not indicate any motion made, seconded and carried to correct the
entry in the Journal of the previous session (July 25, 2016) pertinent to any recording error that may have been
made, as to indicate that in fact, a protest or objection was raised. 20
Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show that the House of Representatives had effectively
adopted Rep. Farinas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the membership of the Minority, as well as the
process of determining who the Minority Leader would be. More significantly, this demonstrates the House's
deviation from the "legal bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the reliefs sought before this Court,
namely: (a) the "long-standing tradition" of automatically awarding the Minority Leadership to the second
placer in the Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep. Baguilat; and (b) the rule21 that those who abstained in the
Speakership Elections should be deemed as independent Members of the House of Representatives, and thus,
they could not have voted for a Minority Leader in the person of Rep. Suarez. 22 As will be explained hereunder,
the deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not averse to the Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its
entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something
within its sole control.23 In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,24 which involved a dispute on the
rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that "[w]hile the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter
says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House of
Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. " 25
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI 26 of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws,
169 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives]. " 27 Hence, as
a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into
the internal workings of the [House of Representatives]." 28
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions
questioning an act of the political departments of government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety
of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 29 This stems from the
expanded concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike
down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:30
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.31
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government." 32
However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the questioned
proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any
attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case
concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in
the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine. 33 Verily, "[i]t would
be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure,
or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can
find their remedy in that department itself."34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
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FIRST DIVISION
July 26, 2017
G.R. No. 219501
POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAN LA MADRID PURISIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her official capacity as the OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner former Police Director General Alan La
Madrid Purisima (Purisima), assailing the Decision2 dated July 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722, which affirmed the Order3 dated December 3, 2014 issued by
respondent Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, preventively suspending Purisima
during the pendency of the consolidated cases against him before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Facts
In 2011,4 the Philippine National Police (PNP) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 5 (MOA) with WER
FAST6 Documentary Agency, Inc. (WER FAST) without going through any public bidding. Under the MOA, the
PNP undertook to allow WER FAST to provide courier services to deliver firearm licenses to gun owners. 7 In
turn, WER FAST agreed to donate equipment for an online application system for the renewal of firearm
licenses.8 PCSupt. Napoleon R. Estilles (Estilles), then Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) under
the Civil Security Group (CSG), signed the MOA on behalf of the PNP. Based on the records, the incumbent PNP
Chief approved the signing of the MOA on August 24, 2011.9
Subsequently, the PNP's Legal Service (LS) was instructed to review the signed MOA vis-a-vis a proposed
revised MOA, noting that the signed MOA had not been implemented. In a Memorandum10 dated August 7,
2012, the LS opined that the FEO should first formulate rules for accreditation, by which to evaluate any
company offering courier services, including WER FAST. It further suggested that the rules should include the
qualifications of the company to be accredited, the required scope of courier services, the creation of an
accreditation committee, provisions on strict confidentiality, disclaimer, and grounds to terminate
accreditation.11
Consequently, on November 19, 2012, the FEO Courier Services Accreditation Board (Accreditation Board) was
constituted.12 In an undated memorandum13 entitled "Policy on Accreditation of FEO Courier Service"
(Accreditation Policy), then CSG Director Police Director Gil Calaguio Meneses (Meneses) laid down the criteria
and procedure for the accreditation of courier service providers, as follows:
5. QUALIFICATIONS/CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITATION
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A Courier Service provided may be accredited under the following conditions:
5.1 Applicant must be a local entity with appropriate business permits and is duly registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)[;]
5.2 It has completed and submitted all its reportorial requirements to the [SEC];
5.3 It has updated permits from [the local government unit (LGU)] where its main office is located[;]
5.4 It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
5.5 It must have secured clearances from Directorate for Intelligence (DI)[;]
5.6 It must have an extensive network all over the Philippines; and
5. 7 The application shall be made in the name of the company represented by its President or any of its key
directors as duly authorized in a board resolution for that purpose. 14 (Emphases supplied)
On December 18, 2012, Purisima was appointed as PNP Chief.15 Thereafter, or on February 12, 2013, Meneses
issued a Memorandum16 addressed to Purisima (Meneses Memo), stating that the CSG has accredited WER
FAST as the courier service to deliver the approved firearms license cards to gun owners, and more
importantly, recommended that the delivery of license cards via courier be made mandatory:
7. In compliance [with] the policy guidance of the then TACDS, now the Chief, PNP, to implement the delivery
of the approved firearms license cards to the addresses supplied by the applicants, this office has accredited
WER FAST Documentation Agency for the purpose, after complying with all the documentary requirements
stipulated in the FEO Policy on Accreditation.
RECOMMENDATION
8. Recommend that the delivery of firearms licenses cards of gun owners to their registered addresses,
whether newly purchased firearms or renewed firearm licenses be made mandatory, to give force and effect
to this new intervention to monitor and control firearms in the hands of gun owners.
9. Approval of para 8 above.17 (Emphases supplied)
Purisima approved this memorandum on February 17, 2013.18 It was only more than a month after the
Meneses Memo was issued, or on April 1, 2013, that the Accreditation Board issued Resolution Number 2013-
027,19 accrediting WER FAST as a courier services provider to all FEO clients relative to the licensing of firearms
(FEO Resolution).
The Proceedings Before the Ombudsman
In 2014, two (2) complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Purisima, WER FAST, and
other PNP officials relative to the PNP's directive for gun owners to avail of the courier delivery of firearm
licenses via WER FAST. The first complaint20 filed by a private complainant charged Purisima, Estilles, and WER
FAST of violating Republic Act (RA) Nos. 6713,21 3019,22 7080,23 and 9184.24 He alleged, among others, that: the
MOA was not procured through competitive bidding; it was executed before WER FAST obtained its SEC
certificate of registration; WER FAST is not authorized by the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) to deliver mails/ parcels to the public; Purisima has close personal ties with WER
FAST's incorporator and high ranking officer; Purisima made mandatory the use of courier service for license
delivery in favor of WER FAST; and WER FAST was inefficient in delivering the license cards.25 He later filed a
Manifestation and Motion26 with attached Joint-Affidavit27 executed by several PNP officials positively
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identifying Purisima as the one who directed FEO-CSG to accommodate WER FAST as the sole courier delivery
service of the firearms license cards.28 Purisima filed his Counter-Affidavit29 on July 25, 2014.
On October 9, 2014, the second complaint30 was filed by the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) - Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) against several PNP
officers involved in the MOA's execution and WER FAST's accreditation as a courier service provider. Attached
to the complaint were certifications from various government agencies attesting that WER FAST failed to meet
the qualifications for accreditation under the Accreditation Policy. 31 As regards Purisima, FFIB-MOLEO prayed
that he be administratively charged for gross negligence and/or gross neglect of duty, with a prayer for
preventive suspension. It alleged that Purisima is administratively liable "for approving the recommendation of
Meneses without verifying or checking the records and capability of [WER FAST]."32
Purisima requested33 for additional time to file his counter-affidavit and was granted an inextendible period of
ten (10) days from receipt of the Order34 dated December 1, 2014.
On December 3, 2014, without waiting for Purisima's counter-affidavit, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
Order,35which preventively suspended Purisima and other PNP officers, for six (6) months without pay. 36
Purisima and another PNP official37 filed their respective petitions for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722,38 which were consolidated in a Resolution dated January 30,
2015.39 While these consolidated cases were pending before the CA, Purisima resigned as PNP Chief 40 and the
preventive suspension period had lapsed.41
The CA Ruling
In a Decision42 dated July 29, 2015, the CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed the Ombudsman's assailed
Order.1âwphi1 On the procedural aspect, the CA held that the petitions are moot in view of the lapse of the
six-month period of preventive suspension. In particular, the CA noted that Purisima received the Order on
December 4, 2014. Counting from this date, his period of preventive suspension lapsed on June 4, 2015.
Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case. 43
On the merits, the CA held that the Ombudsman is authorized under Section 24 of RA 6770 44 to preventively
suspend without pay any public officer or employee during the pendency of an investigation. It added that the
power to issue preventive suspension order is undoubtedly a part of the Ombudsman's investigatory and
disciplinary authority.45
The CA further held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in preventively suspending
Purisima for irregularly accrediting WER FAST as courier service provider, noting that the two (2) requisites 46
for the validity of a preventive suspension order were present.47 First, the Ombudsman made a prior
determination that the evidence was strong based on the documents submitted to them and the following
circumstances: (a) BIR certificate; (b) Director of Intelligence certificate; and (c) Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) certificate.48 Particularly, WER FAST was accredited despite non-payment of taxes for the
years 2011 to 2013 as shown by the BIR certification. The Director of Intelligence likewise issued a certification
that it has not given clearances to WER FAST. Additionally, WER FAST's business permits for the years 2011 to
2012 indicated "consultancy" as its business, while its Articles of Incorporation stated that the corporation's
primary purpose is to act as a business consultant, engage in providing assistance in documentation and
registration. The DOST Postal Regulation Committee also issued a certification that it has not accredited WER
FAST as a courier service provider. Notably, WER FAST had no proven track record in courier service. It even
engaged the services of LBC Express, Inc. precisely because the former lacked the capacity to deliver firearms
licenses. Furthermore, it was not compliant with the DOTC's paid-up capital requirement of ₱500,000.00 to be
accredited to operate as a courier service in two or more administrative regions in the country. To highlight,
WER FAST was accredited by PNP nationwide despite having a paid-up capital of only ₱65,000.00.49 Second,
the charge filed against Purisima was Gross Negligence and/or Gross Neglect of Duty, which if proven true,
would constitute a ground for his removal from public office.50 Thus, the CA concluded that the concurrence of
the foregoing elements rendered the preventive suspension order valid.
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Aggrieved, Purisima filed the present petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not the petition has been rendered moot and academic; and,
(b) if in the negative, whether or not the CA correctly held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her
discretion in preventively suspending Purisima.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
I.
In Ombudsman v. Capulong51 (Capulong), the Court ruled that a case questioning the validity of a preventive
suspension order is not mooted by the supervening lifting of the same:
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against Capulong does not
render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts from passing upon the validity of a
preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
As held in Capulong, the Court, in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, may not be precluded from
passing upon the order's validity so as to determine whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the
issuance of the same. The result of a finding of a grave abuse of discretion means that the issuance is null and
void from its very inception, and thus, bars the same from producing any legal effects. Indeed, "[n]o legal
rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void."52 As such, a public officer improperly placed under
preventive suspension should be restored to his original position, and accordingly, should have earned his
salaries as if he was not preventively suspended for the pertinent period.
"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use."53 In Osmeña v. Social Security System of the Phils.,54 the Court explained the
consequence of a finding of mootness:
In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would
be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
the ground of mootness - save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is capable of
repetition yet evading judicial review.55
In this case, since the propriety or impropriety of Purisima's preventive suspension would essentially
determine his entitlement to back salaries during the six-month period therefor, the Court holds that despite
the lapse of the period of his preventive suspension, there remains some practical value or use in resolving his
petition assailing the Ombudsman's December 3, 2014 Order. Thus, by the same logic in Capulong, this case
cannot be considered as moot and academic so as to obviate the Court from resolving its merits.
II.
The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue a preventive suspension order under Section 24 of RA 6770
when two (2) conditions are met. These are: (a) the evidence of guilt is strong based on the Ombudsman's
judgment; and (b) any of the three (3) circumstances are present - (I) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the
174 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
charges would warrant removal from service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him. Section 24 reads:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court need not belabor on the presence of the second condition, considering that (a) one of
the charges against Purisima is gross neglect of duty; and (b) the criminal and administrative charges (i.e.,
violations of RAs 6713, 3019, 7080, and 9184, as well as gross neglect of duty) against Purisima, if proven,
would indeed warrant his removal from office. Since Section 24 uses the disjunctive "or", 56 then the presence
of any of the three (3) stated situations would be sufficient to comply with this condition.
As regards the first condition, case law states that the strength of the evidence is left to the determination of
the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before her; hence, the deliberate use of the words "in his
judgment." In Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto:57
The rule is that whether the evidence of guilt is strong, as required in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. In the very words of
Section 24, the Ombudsman may preventively suspend a public official pending investigation if "in his
judgment" the evidence presented before him tends to show that the official's guilt is strong and if the further
requisites enumerated in Section 24 are present. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the
Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. 58 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Court's deference to the Ombudsman's judgment regarding this condition not only stems from its policy of
non-interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of her prosecutorial and investigatory powers; 59 it is also a
conscious recognition of the preliminary nature and purpose of a preventive suspension order. It is well-
established that:60
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a preventive measure essentially meant to ensure the proper course of a still ongoing investigation, the
Ombudsman should thus be given ample discretion to determine the strength of the preliminary evidence
presented before her and thereafter, decide whether or not to issue such order against a particular
respondent. In Buenaseda v. Flavier,61 this Court explained:
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for
him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the
respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering
or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The
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Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should
be preventively suspended.62 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
However, as in any governmental power, the Ombudsman's authority to preventively suspend is not unlimited.
When a complaint is virtually bereft of any supporting evidence or the evidence so cited is, on its face, clearly
inadmissible, then no deference ought to be accorded. Under these instances, the Ombudsman may be said to
have gravely abused her discretion in finding that the first condition was met.
In the present case, the Ombudsman found that the evidence of guilt against Purisima was strong enough to
place him under preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion as it was based on supporting documentary evidence, 63 none of which were questioned to be
inadmissible.1avvphi1 For one, the Ombudsman considered the PNP officials' Joint Affidavit, 64 expressing that
Purisima exerted pressure and coercion over his subordinates to coordinate with WER FAST in relation to the
courier delivery service. The Ombudsman also cited several circumstances sourced from the documentary
evidence that should have prodded Purisima to verify WER FAST' s credentials and. capability to provide
courier services for the delivery of firearms licenses before he insisted on the implementation of the MOA.
These circumstances are: (a) the absence of a public bidding before the MOA was executed; (b) the absence of
accreditation from the Accreditation Board when Purisima approved the Meneses Memo; (c) the Meneses
Memo failed to mention the resolution supposedly accrediting WER FAST; (d) the Accreditation Board
accredited WER FAST despite the latter's lack of proof of compliance with the Accreditation Policy; (e) WER
FAST had no proven track record in courier services and lacked the capacity to deliver the firearms licenses; (j)
WER FAST failed to obtain the DOTC's accreditation for authority to operate courier services; and (g) WER
FAST's failure to donate the equipment for the online system as stated in the MOA, among others.65
Since both conditions for the issuance of a preventive suspension order against Purisima are present in this
case, the Court therefore holds that the Ombudsman acted within her powers when she issued the assailed
December 3, 2014 Order. In consequence, Purisima is not entitled to back salaries during the period of his
preventive suspension.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that - contrary to Purisima's stance - the Ombudsman did not violate his
right to due process nor did she prejudge the case when she issued the preventive suspension order before he
was able to file his counter-affidavit for the second complaint.66
Lastimosa v. Ombudsman67 already settles that the Ombudsman may issue a preventive suspension order prior
to the filing of an answer or counter-affidavit, considering that the same is but a preventive measure:
Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia [(106 Phil. 1031, 1034 [1960])]:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and
misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty
of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are
heard and be given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
xxxx
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier [(G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645, 655)], however,
whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account
the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not
required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
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The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. x x
x68 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that the issuance of a preventive suspension order does not amount to
a prejudgment of the merits of the case.69 Neither is it a demonstration of a public official's guilt as such
pronouncement can be done only after trial on the merits. 70
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
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FIRST DIVISION
June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 211166

vs
PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA, Accused-Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Resolution1 dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the Decision2 dated July 25, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga (accused-
appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the July 25, 2013 Decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 and AFFIRMS said Decision finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A in relation to Article
266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, with MODIFICATIONS as to the amounts of civil indemnity and damages awarded. Thus,
[accused-appellant] is ordered to pay the following amounts: (a) ₱l 00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱l
00,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum on the monetary awards from the dated of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid. 3
However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the Court received a Letter 4 dated
September 16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of accused-appellant's death on
February 8, 2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death 5 attached thereto.
As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside said Resolution dated July 18, 2014
and enter a new one dismissing the criminal case against accused-appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court
renders dismissible the criminal case against him.1âwphi1 Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
x x xx
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In People v. Layag, 6 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on
his liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability [,] as well as the civil
liability [,] based solely thereon.1âvvphi1 As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions
of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 7
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the
recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim,
AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against
the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. 8
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated July 18, 2014 in connection
with this case; (b) DISMISS Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754 before the Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte,
Branch 15 by reason of the death of accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga; and (c) DECLARE the instant case
CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
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FIRST DIVISION
March 13, 2017
G.R. No. 225608

vs
ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE JESUS, Accused-Appellants
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Alberto Alejandro y Rigor (Alejandro) and
Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated June 3, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision 3
dated August 20, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 (RTC) in Crim.
Case Nos. 72-SD(96), 73-SD(96), and 74-SD(96) convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of Simple Rape and
Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 3354 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively.
The Facts
On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3) separate Informations were filed before the R TC, each charging
accused-appellants of one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1) count of Homicide, viz.: 5
Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado],
Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA 6 ]gainst her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
That on or about the 5111 day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado],
Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one AAA against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.
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Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva
Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro and
Angeles], together with two (2) other persons whose identities are still unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe),
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, box, beat and stab one [BBB] on the different parts of her body with the use
of a pointed instrument, thereby causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the said
victim.
Contrary to law.
Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him as stated in Crim. Case Nos. 72-
SD(96) and 74-SD(96).7
While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for the amendment of the Informations in Crim. Case
Nos. 72-SD(96) and 73- SD(96) to convey a conspiracy between accused-appellants in the rape cases against
AAA. The R TC allowed the amendment of the Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) to include Alejandro
therein as a conspirator; however, it disallowed the proposed amendment in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96) to
include Angeles therein as conspirator on the ground that Alejandro had already been arraigned in the latter
case.8 The amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) reads:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado],
Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with lewd design, and in conspiracy with one ALBERTO
ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR @ "JESUS'', by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.9
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection with Crim. Case Nos. 73-SD(96) and 74-SD(96),
to which he pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not
guilty as well.10
The prosecution alleged that on December 12, 1995, AAA joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province
of Nueva Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they stayed at the one-storey house of the latter's 62-
year old mother, BBB. Thereat, AAA would sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At
around 2:30 in the morning of January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy. Aided by the
kerosene lamp placed on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro and
Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and
underwear down and started having carnal knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places
with Angeles and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to fight back by scratching Angeles' s
back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her face while Alejandro hit her left jaw with a piece of wood.
AAA then lost consciousness and woke up in a hospital, while BBB succumbed to her injuries. 11
At the hospital, the police officers interviewed AAA and showed her several mugshots in order for her to
identify her assailants. AAA was then able to recognize Alejandro and Angeles from said mugshots and
positively identified them as the perpetrators of the crime. Medical records also revealed that AAA was indeed
sexually assaulted, while BBB died due to "neurogenic shock" or severe pain secondary to "multiple blunt
injury and fracture of the mandibular and facio-maxillary bones."12
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and presented an alibi. He averred that on the night
before the incident, he was at home with his wife and slept as early as eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon
181 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
waking up at seven (7) o'clock in the morning of the next day, he was informed by his brother-in-law of BBB's
death. He further averred that his relationship with BBB was like that of a mother and son. 13
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around nine (9) o'clock in the
evening prior to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's
relative by affinity, he asked Alejandro to help him irrigate the rice field, but the latter declined. At around
midnight, Mendoza went to Alejandro's house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the house
was closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there he saw Alejandro soundly asleep. Alejandro further
claimed that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing of the charges against him. 14
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision15 dated August 20, 2013, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty as charged and,
accordingly, sentenced them as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96), Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96),
accused-appellants were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and each ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (c) in Crim. Case No. 7 4-SD(96), accused-appellants were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay BBB's
heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter's death. 16
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's positive identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of
the crimes charged, expressly noting that AAA had no ill motive to falsely testify against them.1âwphi1 In this
light, the RTC found untenable accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi, considering too that they have
failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when the crimes against AAA
and BBB were committed.17
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed18 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated June 3, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the following modifications: (a) in Crim.
Case No. 72-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape and, accordingly, was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Simple Rape, while
Angeles was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the same crime, and accordingly, were
separately sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count of Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim. Case No. 74- SD(96), accused-appellants were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide and, accordingly, were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to solidarily pay
BBB's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and P525,000.00 as
temperate damages. In addition, accused-appellants are likewise ordered to pay legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on all monetary awards from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.20
It held that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants' complicity to the crimes
charged, as they were positively identified by AAA who had an unobstructed view of their appearance when
said crimes were being committed. It likewise found the existence of conspiracy in the commission of said
crimes, considering that accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in her
death; and (b) took turns in having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent, while the other restrained
her arms to prevent her from resisting.21
182 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Hence, the instant appeal.
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the aforesaid crimes.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that during the pendency of the instant appeal, Alejandro filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal22 dated January 19, 2017, stating that despite knowing the full consequences of the filing of
said motion, he still desires to have his appeal withdrawn. In view thereof, the Court hereby grants said
motion, and accordingly, deems the case closed and terminated as to him. Thus, what is left before the Court
is the resolution of Angeles's appeal.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based
on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."23
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify accused-appellants' convictions, as will be
explained hereunder.
Article 249 of the RPC states:
Article 249 of the RPC states:
Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceeding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and punished by reclusion temporal.
"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance;
(3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is
said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause
the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance."24
On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the RPC (the controlling provision as the rapes were
committed prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 835325 in 1997) read:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
183 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b)
said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim was deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The
provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more
persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty." 26
In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive identification that accused-
appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles
proceeded to rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. Absent any cogent
reason to the contrary, the Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts and, thereby, upholds Angeles's
conviction for Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and Homicide in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), given that the
elements of said crimes square with the established incidents. In People v. Antonio:27
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by
the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate
courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.28
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it appropriate to modify Angeles's conviction in Crim. Case
No. 73-SD(96), as ruled by the CA. As adverted to earlier, the CA convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of Simple
Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) alone, ratiocinating that "Angeles must be held liable for two (2) counts of
simple rape in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) for raping AAA and for aiding (or conspiring with) Alejandro in raping
her."29
The CA erred on this matter.
The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) states that "[Angeles], with
lewd designs, and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA] against her will and consent,
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party."30 Plainly, the wording of the amended Information
reveals that it charged accused-appellants with only one (1) count of Rape. As such, it was error for the CA to
convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus, Angeles must be convicted with one (1) count of Rape in relation to
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96).
On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include
Alejandro as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it
proper to upgrade the conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier,
Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was
committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance. Notably, this will
no longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1) count of Homicide.
184 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Anent the proper penalties to be imposed on Angeles, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in connection with Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, as regards Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96).
Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to adjust the award of damages as
follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) in Crim. Case No.
74-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.31
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto Alejandro y Rigor's Motion to Withdraw Appeal is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to him.
On the other hand, the appeal of accused-appellant Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles) is DENIED. The Decision
dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as to him, as follows:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully
paid; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
185 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191667 April 17, 2013
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 is the March 26, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV. No. 89732 which affirmed with modification the April 10, 2007 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, declaring inter alia the nullity of the loan agreements entered into
by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union (Municipality).
The Facts
From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a
multi-phased plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza (Agoo Plaza) where the Imelda
Garden and Jose Rizal Monument were situated.
To finance phase 1 of the said plan, the SB initially passed Resolution No. 68-20054 on April 19, 2005,
authorizing then Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor Eriguel) to obtain a loan from Land Bank and incidental
thereto, mortgage a 2,323.75 square meter lot situated at the southeastern portion of the Agoo Plaza (Plaza
Lot) as collateral. To serve as additional security, it further authorized the assignment of a portion of its
internal revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly income from the proposed project in favor of Land Bank. 5
The foregoing terms were confirmed, approved and ratified on October 4, 2005 through Resolution No. 139-
2005.6 Consequently, on November 21, 2005, Land Bank extended a ₱4,000,000.00 loan in favor of the
Municipality (First Loan),7 the proceeds of which were used to construct ten (10) kiosks at the northern and
southern portions of the Imelda Garden. After completion, these kiosks were rented out. 8
On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution No. 58-2006,9 approving the construction of a commercial center
on the Plaza Lot as part of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan. To finance the project, Mayor Eriguel was again
authorized to obtain a loan from Land Bank, posting as well the same securities as that of the First Loan. All
previous representations and warranties of Mayor Eriguel related to the negotiation and obtention of the new
loan10 were ratified on September 5, 2006 through Resolution No. 128-2006.11 In consequence, Land Bank
granted a second loan in favor of the Municipality on October 20, 2006 in the principal amount of
₱28,000,000.00 (Second Loan).12
Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was
vehemently objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led by respondent Eduardo Cacayuran
(Cacayuran), these residents claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center, as
funded by the proceeds from the First and Second Loans (Subject Loans), were "highly irregular, violative of
186 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and
public park."13 The foregoing was embodied in a Manifesto,14 launched through a signature campaign
conducted by the residents and Cacayuran.
In addition, Cacayuran wrote a letter15 dated December 8, 2006 addressed to Mayor Eriguel, Vice Mayor
Antonio Eslao (Vice Mayor Eslao), and the members of the SB namely, Violeta Laroya-Balbin, Jaime Boado, Jr.,
Rogelio De Vera, James Dy, Crisogono Colubong, Ricardo Fronda, Josephus Komiya, Erwina Eriguel, Felizardo
Villanueva, and Gerard Mamuyac (Implicated Officers), expressing the growing public clamor against the
conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center. He then requested the foregoing officers to furnish him
certified copies of various documents related to the aforementioned conversion including, among others, the
resolutions approving the Redevelopment Plan as well as the loan agreements for the sake of public
information and transparency.
Unable to get any response, Cacayuran, invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a Complaint 16 against the
Implicated Officers and Land Bank, assailing, among others, the validity of the Subject Loans on the ground
that the Plaza Lot used as collateral thereof is property of public dominion and therefore, beyond the
commerce of man.17
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss dated December 27, 2006, 18 the Implicated Officers and Land Bank filed
their respective Answers.
For its part, Land Bank claimed that it is not privy to the Implicated Officers’ acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza.
It further asserted that Cacayuran did not have a cause of action against it since he was not privy to any of the
Subject Loans.19
During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the commercial center was completed and the
said structure later became known as the Agoo’s People Center (APC).
On May 8, 2007, the SB passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-2007,20 declaring the area where the APC stood as
patrimonial property of the Municipality.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated April 10, 2007,21 the RTC ruled in favor of Cacayuran, declaring the nullity of the Subject
Loans.22 It found that the resolutions approving the said loans were passed in a highly irregular manner and
thus, ultra vires; as such, the Municipality is not bound by the same. 23 Moreover, it found that the Plaza Lot is
proscribed from collateralization given its nature as property for public use. 24
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed its Notice of Appeal on April 23, 2007.25 On the other hand, the Implicated Officers’
appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed for their failure to file an appellants’ brief despite due notice. 26
In this regard, only Land Bank’s appeal was given due course by the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated March 26, 2010,27 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling, excluding Vice
Mayor Eslao from any personal liability arising from the Subject Loans.28
It held, among others, that: (1) Cacayuran had locus standi to file his complaint, considering that (a) he was
born, raised and a bona fide resident of the Municipality; and (b) the issue at hand involved public interest of
transcendental importance;29 (2) Resolution Nos. 68-2005, 139-2005, 58-2006, 128-2006 and all other related
resolutions (Subject Resolutions) were invalidly passed due to the SB’s non-compliance with certain sections of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC); (3) the Plaza Lot,
which served as collateral for the Subject Loans, is property of public dominion and thus, cannot be
appropriated either by the State or by private persons;30 and (4) the Subject Loans are ultra vires because they
187 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
were transacted without proper authority and their collateralization constituted improper disbursement of
public funds.
Dissatisfied, Land Bank filed the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for the Court’s resolution: (1) whether Cacayuran has standing to sue;
(2) whether the Subject Resolutions were validly passed; and (3) whether the Subject Loans are ultra vires.
A. Cacayuran’s standing to sue
Land Bank claims that Cacayuran did not have any standing to contest the construction of the APC as it was
funded through the proceeds coming from the Subject Loans and not from public funds. Besides, Cacayuran
was not even a party to any of the Subject Loans and is thus, precluded from questioning the same.
The argument is untenable.
It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however,
must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds
derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. 31
Records reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case.
First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans,
which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that public funds derived from taxation
are bound to be expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing
loans. Needless to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government unit’s just share in the
national taxes,32 is in the nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that
although these funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective during
the incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else those who succeed them be effectively
deprived of its use.
In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public
funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the
characteristics of public funds when they are under official custody. 33
Accordingly, the first requisite has been clearly met.
Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by the conversion of the
Agoo Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas are
properties for public use34 and therefore, belongs to the public dominion.35 As such, it can be used by anybody
and no one can exercise over it the rights of a private owner.36 In this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest in
ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for commercial purposes through the APC’s construction.
Moreover, Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections thereto. In
Mamba v. Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as
long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government. 37
188 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Therefore, as the above-stated requisites obtain in this case, Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit.
B. Validity of the Subject Resolutions
Land Bank avers that the Subject Resolutions provided ample authority for Mayor Eriguel to contract the
Subject Loans. It posits that Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC merely requires that the municipal mayor be
authorized by the SB concerned and that such authorization need not be embodied in an ordinance. 38
A careful perusal of Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows that while the authorization of the municipal mayor
need not be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said local executive is authorized to enter
into must be made pursuant to a law or ordinance, viz:
Sec. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its business transactions
and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or
ordinance; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s authorization to contract the Subject Loans was not contained – as it
need not be contained – in the form of an ordinance, the said loans and even the Redevelopment Plan itself
were not approved pursuant to any law or ordinance but through mere resolutions. The distinction between
ordinances and resolutions is well-perceived. While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent
character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter and are temporary in nature.39 As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be
inferred from a resolution."40 In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of
the LGC altogether.
Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the
SB’s failure to submit the Subject Resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review
contrary to Section 56 of the LGC;41 and (2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of Section 59
of the LGC.42
In fine, Land Bank cannot rely on the Subject Resolutions as basis to validate the Subject Loans.
C. Ultra vires nature of the Subject
Loans
Neither can Land Bank claim that the Subject Loans do not constitute ultra vires acts of the officers who
approved the same.
Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined
by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law.43 There are two (2)
types of ultra vires acts. As held in Middletown Policemen's Benevolent Association v. Township of
Middletown:44
189 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the
irregular exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The
former are ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does
not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential
justice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, an act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act,
while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within the municipality’s power is considered as an
ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or validation. To the former belongs municipal contracts which (a) are
entered into beyond the express, implied or inherent powers of the local government unit; and (b) do not
comply with the substantive requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds is to be made, there
must be an actual appropriation and certificate of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs those which
(a) are entered into by the improper department, board, officer of agent; and (b)do not comply with the
formal requirements of a written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds. 45
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra
vires acts deemed as void.
Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the Municipality for the purpose of funding the
conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the
conversion of the said plaza is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as one
for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the object of
appropriation either by the State or by private persons. 46 Nor can it be the subject of lease or any other
contractual undertaking.47 In Villanueva v. Castañeda, Jr.,48 citing Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio,49
the Court pronounced that:
x x x Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to
the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties.1âwphi1
In this relation, Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy is considered void 50 and as such, creates no rights or
obligations or any juridical relations.51 Consequently, given the unlawful purpose behind the Subject Loans
which is to fund the commercialization of the Agoo Plaza pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan, they are
considered as ultra vires in the primary sense thus, rendering them void and in effect, non-binding on the
Municipality.
At this juncture, it is equally observed that the land on which the Agoo Plaza is situated cannot be converted
into patrimonial property – as the SB tried to when it passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-200752 – absent any
express grant by the national government.53 As public land used for public use, the foregoing lot rightfully
belongs to and is subject to the administration and control of the Republic of the Philippines. 54 Hence, without
the said grant, the Municipality has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.
Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers who
authorized the passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable. Case law states that public officials can
be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires,55 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the March 26, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV. No. 89732 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
190 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
March 15, 2017
G.R. No. 224834
JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner

vs
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT
HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and HEDY S.C.
YAP-CHUA, as Director and Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 224871
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG
HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a
Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE,
MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions1 for review on certiorari are the Decision2 dated February 15, 2016 and
the Resolution3 dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the
Resolution4 dated August 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE
NO. 15-234 and, accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a quo for further
proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.
The Facts
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy
S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods
International, Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of Alliance's Board of Directors. 5 As
per Alliance's by-laws, its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15. 6 However, in a Special
Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors,
over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM
pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of ₱l
Billion which was earlier approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's
Disclosure dated May 29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such postponement was made "to
give the stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting, after taking into consideration
191 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
their subscription to the [SRO] of [Alliance]." 7 This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant Complaint
(with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)8 involving an intra-corporate controversy against Alliance, and its other
Board members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz,
Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest
All, et al. principally claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot be made a
condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015 ASM;
otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting rights proportionate to their existing shareholdings. 9 Thus,
Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015
indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the
SR0.10 The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which
they paid accordingly.11 Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended Complaint:12 (a) deleting its prayer to
declare null and void the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed
that the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition
for the holding of the 2015 ASM.13
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.'s
failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have paid P20 Million, more or less, in
filing fees based on the SRO which was valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did not mention such
capital infusion in their prayers and, as such, were only made to pay the measly sum of ₱8,860.00. On the
other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintained that they paid the correct filing fees, considering that the subject of
their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All,
et al. likewise pointed out that they simply relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention
to defraud the government.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2015, the RTC dismissed the instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to
Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees.16 Citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,17 and the Court's pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. (Lu),18 the RTC found that the basis
for the computation of filing fees should have been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO, it being the property in
litigation. As such, Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20 Million and
not just ₱5,860.00. In this regard, the RTC also found that Harvest All, et al.'s payment of incorrect filing fees
was done in bad faith and with clear intent to defraud the government, considering that: (a) when the issue on
correct filing fees was first raised during the hearing on the application for TRO, Harvest All, et al. never
manifested their willingness to abide by the Rules by paying additional filing fees when so required; (b) despite
Harvest All, et al.'s admission in their complaint that the SRO was valued at Pl Billion, they chose to keep mum
on the meager assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and (c) while Harvest All, et al. made mention of the
SRO in the body of their complaint, they failed to indicate the same in their prayer, thus, preventing the Clerk
of Court from making the correct assessment of filing fees.19
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed20 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated February 15, 2016, the CA reversed the RTC's order of dismissal and, accordingly,
reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the
proper legal fees.22 Also citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the
CA held that the prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies always involve a property in litigation.
Consequently, it agreed with the RTC's finding that the basis for the computation of filing fees should have
been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of
more or less ₱20 Million and not just ₱5,860.00.23 However, in the absence of contrary evidence, the CA held
that Harvest All, et al. were not in bad faith and had no intention of defrauding the government, as they
merely relied in the assessment of the Clerk of Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, the CA
ordered the reinstatement of Harvest All, et al.' s complaint and the remand of the same to the RTC for further
proceedings, provided that they pay the correct filing fees.24
192 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The parties moved for reconsideration,25 which were, however, denied in a Resolution26 dated May 25, 2016.
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
The primordial issues raised for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not Harvest All, et al. paid
insufficient filing fees for their complaint, as the same should have been based on the Pl Billion value of the
SRO; and (b) if Harvest All, et al. indeed paid insufficient filing fees, whether or not such act was made in good
faith and without any intent to defraud the government.
The Court's Ruling
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is partly granted.
I.
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing fees for Harvest All, et al.'s complaint should
be based on the Pl Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially holding that such complaint was capable of
pecuniary estimation - both the RTC and the CA heavily relied on the
Court's pronouncement in Lu. In Lu, the Court mentioned that in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20,
2004 which introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, it seemed that "an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated." 28
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly pointed out29 that the
foregoing statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum.
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving an intra-corporate controversy instituted
therein, i.e., declaration of nullity of share issuance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus, the correct
docket fees were paid.30 Despite such pronouncement, the Court still went on to say that had the complaint
therein been filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have ruled otherwise because
the amendments brought about by the same "seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated," 31 viz.:
The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004),
expressly provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency or other cases involving intra-corporate controversies,
the fees prescribed under Section 7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7
thereof was omitted from the reference. Said paragraph refers to docket fees for filing "[a]ctions where the
value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" and "all other actions not involving property."
By referring the computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in litigation, the value of which is always the basis for computing the
applicable filing fees. The latest amendments seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of
corporate books.
If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge in the express phraseology of Section 21 (k) of
Rule 141 that paragraph (a) alone applies.
In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000 during which time Section 7,
without qualification, was the applicable provision. Even the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003
during which time the applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for
computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated, such as an action for inspection of
193 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
corporate books. The immediate illustration shows that no mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of
court in the assessment of the docket fees. 32 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation"
and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated" are clearly non-determinative of the antecedents involved in that case and, hence, cannot be
controlling jurisprudence to bind our courts when it adjudicates similar cases upon the principle of stare
decisis. As it is evident, these passages in Lu only constitute an opinion delivered by the Court as a "by the
way" in relation to a hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the complaint was filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-
2-04-SC, which it was not) different from the actual case before it.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,33 the Court had the opportunity to define an obiter dictum and
discuss its legal effects as follows:
[An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by
the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. It does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or
full consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with
no binding force for purposes of res judicata."34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, therefore, the courts a quo erred in applying the case of Lu.
II.
In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in Lu was actually incorrect. This is because
depending on the nature of the principal action or remedy sought, an intra-corporate controversy may involve
a subject matter which is either capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In Cabrera v. Francisco,35 the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether an action is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation or not:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts). 36 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
This case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-corporate controversy may be classified as an action whose
subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and
Amended Complaint reveals that its main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the
corporation's bylaws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting
interest with the corporation would somehow be preserved. Thus, Harvest All, et al. sought for the nullity of
the Alliance Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015
ASM pending completion of subscription to the SR0.37 Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as
the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of
sum of money. The mere mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature
of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do
not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was
merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting interest as minority
shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, a sum
194 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s
complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their principal action.
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that the Court passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC38 dated October 5, 2016,
which introduced amendments to the schedule of legal fees to be collected in various commercial cases,
including those involving intra-corporate controversies. Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:
RESOLUTION
xxxx
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC effective 16 August
2004, incorporated the equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed for petitions for rehabilitation under
Section 21 (i) thereof and, furthermore, provided under Section 21(k) thereof that the fees prescribed under
Section 7(a) of the said rule shall apply to petitions for insolvency or other cases involving intra-corporate
controversies;
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new schedule of filing fees as follows:
xxxx
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DELETED as the fees covering petitions for
insolvency are already provided for in this Resolution. As for cases involving intra-corporate controversies, the
applicable fees shall be those provided under Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised
Rules of Court depending on the nature of the action.
xxxx
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of national circulation. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) is directed to circularize the
same upon its effectivity. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of Section 7 (a) [fees for
actions where the value of the subject matter can be determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for actions where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3) [fees for all other actions not involving
property] of the same Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the determination of the
correct filing fees, as the case may be, serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments concretize the
Court's recognition that the subject matter of an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable of
pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were also made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum) implying that all intra-corporate cases
involved a subject matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
While the Court is not unaware that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016
only came after the filing of the complaint subject of this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given
retroactive effect so as to make them applicable to the resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as they
merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA,39 the Court
thoroughly explained the retroactive effectivity of procedural rules, viz.:
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws.
It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
195 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception
of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested
rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.1âwphi1 Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural
statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure."40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in
accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not
involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5,
2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in order:
(a) to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees in the amount of ₱8,860.00, as initially
assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;
(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.' s payment of any
discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular
proceedings of the case with dispatch; or
(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of
the case with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-
234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further proceedings as
stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
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THIRD DIVISION
NENITA GONZALES, SPOUSES GENEROSA GONZALES AND

RODOLFO FERRER, SPOUSES FELIPE GONZALES AND
CAROLINA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES LOLITA GONZALES AND G.R. No. 173008
GERMOGENES GARLITOS, SPOUSES DOLORES GONZALES AND
FRANCISCO COSTIN, SPOUSES CONCHITA GONZALES AND
JONATHAN CLAVE, AND SPOUSES BEATRIZ GONZALES AND Present:
ROMY CORTES, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
AND CO-PETITIONER NENITA GONZALES,
Petitioners,
VELASCO, JR., J.,
Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus -
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
MARIANO BUGAAY AND LUCY BUGAAY, SPOUSES ALICIA
BUGAAY AND FELIPE BARCELONA, CONEY CONIE BUGAAY,
JOEY GATAN, LYDIA BUGAAY, SPOUSES LUZVIMINDA
BUGAAY AND REY PAGATPATAN AND BELEN BUGAAY,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
February 22, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
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DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated March 23, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91381 as well as the Resolution 2 dated June 2, 2006 dismissing
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed Orders 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, dated April 13, 2005 and August 8, 2005, respectively, in
Civil Case No. 16815, denying the demurrer to evidence filed by herein respondents and instead dismissed
petitioners' complaint.
The Facts
The deceased spouses Bartolome Ayad and Marcelina Tejada (Spouses Ayad) had five (5) children:
Enrico, Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano. The latter, who was single, predeceased his
parents on December 4, 1943. Marcelina died in September 1950 followed by Bartolome much later on
February 17, 1964.
Enrico has remained single. Encarnacion died on April 8, 1966 and is survived by her children, Nenita
Gonzales, Generosa Gonzales, Felipe Gonzales, Lolita Gonzales, Dolores Gonzales, Conchita Gonzales and
Beatriz Gonzales, the petitioners in this case. Consolacion, meanwhile, was married to the late Imigdio Bugaay.
Their children are Mariano Bugaay, Alicia Bugaay, Amelita Bugaay, Rodolfo Bugaay, Letecia Bugaay, Lydia
Bugaay, Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen Bugaay, respondents herein. Maximiano died single and without issue
on August 20, 1986. The spouses of petitioners, except Nenita, a widow, and those of the respondents, except
Lydia and Belen, were joined as parties in this case.
In their Amended Complaint4 for Partition and Annulment of Documents with Damages dated
February 5, 1991 against Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the only
surviving children of the Spouses Ayad are Enrico and Consolacion, and that during the Spouses Ayad's
lifetime, they owned several agricultural as well as residential properties.
Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico executed fraudulent documents covering all the properties
owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and respondents, completely disregarding their rights.
Thus, they prayed, among others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's estate, the nullification of the
documents executed by Enrico, and the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees.
198 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
As affirmative defenses5, Enrico, Consolacion and respondents claimed that petitioners had long
obtained their advance inheritance from the estate of the Spouses Ayad, and that the properties sought to be
partitioned are now individually titled in respondents' names.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision 6 dated November 24, 1995, awarding one-fourth
() pro-indiviso share of the estate each to Enrico, Maximiano, Encarnacion and Consolacion as the heirs of the
Spouses Ayad, excluding Mariano who predeceased them. It likewise declared the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition executed by Enrico and respondents, as well as all other documents and muniments
of title in their names, as null and void. It also directed the parties to submit a project of partition within 30
days from finality of the Decision.
On December, 13, 1995,7 respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial from the
said Decision. On November 7, 1996, the RTC, through Judge Eugenio Ramos, issued an Order which reads: in
the event that within a period of one (1) month from today, they have not yet settled the case, it is understood
that the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial is submitted for resolution without any further hearing. 8
Without resolving the foregoing motion, the RTC, noting the failure of the parties to submit a project
of partition, issued a writ of execution9 on February 17, 2003 giving them a period of 15 days within which to
submit their nominees for commissioner, who will partition the subject estate.
Subsequently, the RTC, through then Acting Presiding Judge Emilio V. Angeles, discovered the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and set the same for hearing. In the Order 10
dated August 29, 2003, Judge Angeles granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for
the specific purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents referred to by the [respondents]. 11
199 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
However, instead of presenting the documents adverted to, consisting of the documents sought to be
annulled, respondents demurred12 to petitioners' evidence on December 6, 2004 which the RTC, this time
through Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison, denied in the Order 13 dated April 13, 2005 as well as respondents'
motion for reconsideration in the August 8, 2005 Order. 14
Aggrieved, respondents elevated their case to the CA through a petition for certiorari, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their demurrer notwithstanding petitioners' failure to
present the documents sought to be annulled. On March 23, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision
reversing and setting aside the Orders of the RTC disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed

Orders of the trial court dated April 13, 2006 and August 8, 2005 are hereby both
SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, another Order is hereby issued DISMISSING the
Complaint, as amended.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
In dismissing the Amended Complaint, the appellate court ratiocinated in the following manner:
In the light of the foregoing where no sufficient evidence was presented to

grant the reliefs being prayed for in the complaint, more particularly the absence of
the documents sought to be annulled as well as the properties sought to be
partitioned, common sense dictates that the case should have been dismissed
outright by the trial court to avoid unnecessary waste of time, money and efforts. 16
Subsequently, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution 17 dated June 2,
2006.
The Issues
200 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In this petition for review, petitioners question whether the CA's dismissal of the Amended Complaint
was in accordance with law, rules of procedure and jurisprudence.
The Ruling of the Court
The RTC Orders assailed before the CA basically involved the propriety of filing a demurrer to
evidence after a Decision had been rendered in the case.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the

presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal was reversed he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence.
The Court has previously explained the nature of a demurrer to evidence in the case of Celino v. Heirs
of Alejo and Teresa Santiago18 as follows:
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one
of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which
pertains to the merits of the case.
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. 19 Being considered a motion
to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment.
In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision.
While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of
receiving and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied
with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed abandoned.
Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands.
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended
Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available
remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE
and the Orders of the RTC denying respondents' demurrer are REINSTATED. The Decision of the RTC dated
November 24, 1995 STANDS.
201 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017 - PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RAMON AND
ANNABELLE SABADO, Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
202 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RAMON AND ANNABELLE SABADO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (petitioner)
assailing the Decision2 dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated April 20, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 135922, which reversed and set-aside the Decision4 dated November 28, 2013
and the Order5 dated April 28, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 (RTC) in SCA Case
No. 13-1290 and ordered that Haus Talk Project Managers, Inc. (HTPMI) be impleaded as an indispensable
party to the unlawful detainer case against respondents spouses Ramon and Annabelle Sabado (respondents).
The Facts
On May 3, 2007, HTPMI and respondents entered into a Contract to Sell 6 whereby HTPMI agreed to sell a real
property located at Lot 26, Block 1, Eastview Homes, Barangay Balimbing, Antipolo City (subject property) to
respondents. In consideration therefor, respondents paid HTPMI the total amount of P869,400.00, consisting
of a P174,400.00 downpayment and the balance of P695,000.00 payable in 120 equal monthly instalments.
The parties further agreed that respondents' failure to pay any amount within the stipulated period of time
shall mean the forfeiture of the downpayment and any other payments made in connection thereto, as well as
the cancellation and rescission of the Contract to Sell in accordance with law. 7 Shortly thereafter, or on August
16, 2007, HTPMI executed a Deed of Assignment 8 in favor of petitioner assigning, among others, its rights and
interests as seller in the aforesaid Contract to Sell with respondents, including the right to collect payments
and execute any act or deed necessary to enforce compliance therewith. 9
On October 14, 2009, petitioner, through a Notice of Cancellation by Notarial Act, 10 cancelled or rescinded
respondents' Contract to Sell due to the latter's failure to pay their outstanding obligations thereunder.
Consequently, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the subject property, but to no avail. Thus,
petitioner was constrained to file the Complaint11 dated August 20, 2010 for ejectment or unlawful detainer
against respondents before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo City, Branch 1 (MTCC), docketed as
SCA Case No. 093-10.12
In their defense,13 respondents argued that petitioner is not the real party in interest to institute such
complaint, since ownership over the subject property remained with HTPMI. They expounded that under the
Deed of Assignment, only the rights and interests pertaining to the receivables under the Contract to Sell were
assigned/transferred to petitioner and not the ownership or the right to the possession of the subject
property.14
The MTCC Ruling
In a Decision15 dated April 3, 2013, the MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and, accordingly, ordered
respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay petitioner the amounts of P661,919.47 as rent arrears
from July 31, 2008 up to July 31, 2010, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, including costs of suit.16
The MTCC held that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment, petitioner was subrogated to the rights of HTPMI
under the Contract to Sell and, hence, is a real party in interest entitled to institute the instant suit against
respondents for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Contract to Sell. Further, the MTCC found
petitioner's claim for compensation in the form of rental just and equitable, pointing out that the same is
necessary to prevent respondents from unjustly enriching themselves at petitioner's expense. Finally, the
MTCC awarded petitioner attorney's fees and costs of suit since it was compelled to litigate the instant
complaint.17
203 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Aggrieved, respondents appealed18 to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated November 28, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MTCC's ruling in toto.20 It ruled that by virtue of
the Deed of Assignment executed by HTPMI in petitioner's favor, the latter acquired not only the right to
collect the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, but also all the rights of the assignor,
including the right to sue in its own name as the legal assignee.21
Respondents moved for reconsideration,22 which was, however, denied in an Order23 dated April 28, 2014.
Undaunted, they elevated the case to the CA.24
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated October 29, 2015, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and accordingly: (a)
remanded the case to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded therein; and (b) directed the MTCC to proceed
with the trial of the case with dispatch.26 Initially, it upheld petitioner's right as real party in interest to file the
instant suit as HTPMI's assignee. However, since legal title to the subject property was retained by HTPMI
pursuant to the provisions of the Deed of Assignment, the latter is not only a real party in interest, but also an
indispensible party which should have been impleaded as a plaintiff thereon and without which no final
determination can be had in the present case. 27
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied in a Resolution29 dated April
20, 2016; hence, this petition.
The primordial issue is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that HTPMI is an indispensable party to
petitioner's ejectment suit against respondents and, thus, must be impleaded therein.
The Court's Ruling
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a suit,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Case law defines an indispensable party as "one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of
the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable." 30 "Thus, the absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present." 31 In Regner v. Logarta,32 the Court laid down
the parameters in determining whether or not one is an indispensable party, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An indispensable party is a party who has x x x an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not
only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final
decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its
final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered
that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who
must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is
204 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party
if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if
he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation. 33 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Guided by the foregoing parameters and as will be explained hereunder, the CA erred in holding that HTPMI is
an indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against respondents.
Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights - save for the right of ownership - to petitioner under
the Contract to Sell:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS TO SELL. By this assignment, the ASSIGNEE hereby acquires all rights of the
ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell and under the law, including the right to endorse any and all terms
and conditions of the Contracts to Sell and the right to collect the amounts due thereunder from the
purchaser of the Property. The ASSIGNOR for this purpose hereby names, constitutes and appoints the
ASSIGNEE [as its] attorney-in-fact to execute any act and deed necessary in the exercise of all these rights.
Notwithstanding the assignment of the Contracts to Sell and the Receivables thereunder to the ASSIGNEE, the
legal title to the Property and obligations of the ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell, including the obligation
to complete the development of the property and the warranties of a builder under the law, shall remain the
ASSIGNOR'S. x x x.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Verily, HTPMI's assignment of rights to petitioner must be deemed to include the rights to collect payments
from respondents, and in the event of the latter's default, to cancel or rescind the Contract to Sell, and
resultantly, recover actual possession over the subject property, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
b) the [respondents] herein agree to perform and undertake the [HTPMI] Payment Plan with the following
terms:
i) Downpayment x x x of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS ONLY
(P174,400.00) to be paid within twelve (12) months after payments [sic] of the reservation. Failure to pay two
(2) consecutive monthly installments will mean cancellation of this contract and forfeiture of all payments.
Discount terms shall be based on [HTPMI] Agreed Payment Plan.
xxxx
iii) Failure to pay any amount within the stimulated [sic] period of time shall mean forfeiture of the down
payment and any other payments made and the Contract to Sell shall be cancelled and rescinded in
accordance with law.35 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the findings of the courts a quo that petitioner had the right to
institute the instant suit against respondents.
However, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's conclusion that since HTPMI retained ownership over the
subject property pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, it is an indispensable party to the case. As adverted to
earlier, an indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy which is
inseparable from the interest of the other parties, and that a final adjudication cannot be made without
affecting such interest. Here, the only issue in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who between the litigating
parties has the better right to possess de facto the subject property.36 Thus, HTPMI's interest in the subject
property, as one holding legal title thereto, is completely separable from petitioner's rights under the Contract
to Sell, which include the cancellation or rescission of such contract and resultantly, the recovery of actual
possession of the subject property by virtue of this case. Hence, the courts can certainly proceed to determine
who between petitioner and respondents have a better right to the possession of the subject property and
complete relief can be had even without HTPMI's participation.
In sum, both the MTCC and the RTC are correct in ruling on the merits of the instant unlawful detainer case
even without the participation of HTPMI.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated
April 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135922 are hereby REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. The
205 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Decision dated November 28, 2013 and the Order dated April 28, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 98 in SCA Case No. 13-1290, affirming in toto the Decision dated April 3, 2013 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo City, Branch 1 in SCA Case No. 093-10, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,*(Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
August 23, 2017
G.R. No. 222711
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by its President, JANET C. LEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business under the name and style "LOLA TABA LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT
PALUTO SA SEASIDE,", Respondent.
206 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Orders dated June 15, 20152 and January 27, 20163 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 (Valenzuela-RTC) in Civil Case No. 40-V-12, which
dismissed petitioner Ley Construction and Development Corporation's (as represented by its President, Janet
C. Ley; petitioner) complaint for collection of sum of money and damages, without prejudice, on the ground of
improper venue.
The Facts
On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages 4 against
respondent Marvin Medel Sedano (respondent), doing business under the name and style "Lola Taha Lalo Pata
Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside," before the Valenzuela-RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 40-V-12. In its
complaint, petitioner alleged that on January 14, 2005, it leased 5 a 50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of land
located at Financial Center Area, Pasay City (now, Lot 5-A Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City) from
respondent third-party defendant, the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). 6 On September
11, 2006, petitioner subleased7 the 14,659.80-sq.m. portion thereof to respondent for a term often (10) years
beginning November 15, 2005, for a monthly rent of ₱1,174,780.00, subject to a ten percent (10%) increase
beginning on the third year and every year thereafter (lease contract). 8 Respondent allegedly failed to pay the
rent due for the period August 2011 to December 2011, amounting to a total of P8,828,025.46, and despite
demands,9 refused to settle his obligations;10 hence, the complaint.
In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint,11 respondent countered that he religiously paid rent to petitioner
until PNCC demanded12 that the rent be paid directly to it, in view of the petitioner's eviction from the subject
property by virtue of a court order.13 Thus, during the period from August 2011 until December 2011, he
remitted the rentals to PNCC.14 Should he be found liable to petitioner, respondent maintained that the RTC
should hold PNCC liable to reimburse to him the amounts he paid as rentals; hence, the third-party
complaint.15
Respondent likewise pointed out that the venue was improperly laid since Section 21 16 of the lease contract
provides that "[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with this case shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others."17 Hence, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
improper venue.
Finally, respondent argued that he paid petitioner the amounts of ₱3,518,352.00 as deposit and advance
rentals under the lease contract, and that he made a ₱400,000.00 overpayment, all of which amounts were
not liquidated or credited to respondent during the subsistence of the lease contract. Thus, respondent
interposed a counterclaim, seeking petitioner to reimburse the said amounts to him, and to pay him moral and
exemplary damages, including litigation expenses, in view of petitioner's filing of such baseless suit. 18
In its Comment/Opposition19 to respondent's affirmative defense of improper venue, petitioner argued that
Section 21 of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. 20
This is because such stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the Municipal Trial Courts, of jurisdiction over cases
which, under the law, are within its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer. 21
Petitioner further posited that respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Valenzuela-
RTC and had waived any objections on venue, since he sought affirmative reliefs from the said court when he
asked several times for additional time to file his responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims against petitioner,
and impleaded PNCC as a third-party defendant.22
Meanwhile, in its Answer to Third Party Complaint with Counterclaim,23 PNCC contended that respondent has
no cause of action against it, since he acknowledged PNCC’s right to receive rent, as evidenced by his direct
payment thereof to PNCC.24 Respondent also entered into a contract of lease with PNCC after learning that
petitioner had been evicted from the premises by virtue of a court ruling.25
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The Valenzuela-RTC Ruling
In an Order26 dated June 15, 2015, the Valenzuela-RTC granted respondent's motion and dismissed the
complaint on the ground of improper venue. It held that Section 21 of the lease contract between petitioner
and respondent is void insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the R TC of Pasay City, even when the subject
matter jurisdiction over the case is with the Metropolitan Trial Courts.27 However, with respect to the filing of
cases cognizable by the RTCs, the stipulation validly limits the venue to the RTC of Pasay City. 28 Since
petitioner's complaint is one for collection of sum of money in an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the
R TC, petitioner should have filed the case with the RTC of Pasay City. 29
The Valenzuela-RTC also found no merit in petitioner's claim that respondent waived his right to question the
venue when he filed several motions for extension of time to file his answer. It pointed out that improper
venue was among the defenses raised in respondent's Answer. As such, it was timely raised and, therefore, not
waived.30
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the Valenzuela-RTC in its
Order32 dated January 27, 2016; hence, the present petition.
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was
improperly laid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. -All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant
located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff
resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply -
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof. (Emphases supplied)
208 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. 33 As an exception,
parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. 34 In
Briones v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court explained:
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place
agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but
also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the
intention of the parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation
is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose
any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or
words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place.36
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson,37 the Court held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and
binding, provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is
expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit. 38
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are present and that the
questioned stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a valid venue stipulation that limits the
venue of the cases to the courts of Pasay City. It states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be
liable for damages.1âwphi1 All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others.39 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to limit the place where actions or cases arising from
a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be instituted. This is evident from the use
of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and the specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such
cases may be filed.
Notably, the fact that this stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind shall be
filed with the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that the same is a
stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is fundamental that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties.40 Hence, following the rule that the law is
deemed written into every contract,41 the said stipulation should not be construed as a stipulation on
jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits venue. Moreover, "[t]he parties are charged with knowledge of
the existing law at the time they enter into the contract and at the time it is to become operative."42 Thus,
without any clear showing in the contract that the parties intended otherwise, the questioned stipulation
should be considered as a stipulation on venue (and not on jurisdiction), consistent with the basic principles of
procedural law.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner's action was one for collection of sum of money in an amount 43
that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.44 Since the lease contract already provided that all actions
or cases involving the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, and that petitioner’s
complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have
then followed the contractual stipulation and filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City. However, it is
undeniable that petitioner filed its complaint with the Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible
on the ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its refiling in the proper court.
That respondent had filed several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, or that he
interposed a counterclaim or third-party complaint in his answer does not necessarily mean that he waived the
affirmative defense of improper venue. The prevailing rule on objections to improper venue is that the same
209 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, as in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed
waived.45 Here, respondent timely raised the ground of improper venue since it was one of the affirmative
defenses raised in his Answer with Third-Party Complaint.46 As such, it cannot be said that he had waived the
same.
Further, it should be pointed out that the case of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. Yatco (Pantranco) 47
cited in the instant petition48 should not apply to this case, considering that the invocation of the ground of
improper venue therein was not based on a contractual stipulation, but rather on respondent Elpidio O.
Dizon's alleged violation of the Rules of Court, as he filed his case for damages before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IV (Quezon City), despite testifying that he was actually a resident of Dagupan City. In
that case, the Court ruled that the filing of a counterclaim and third party-complaint, and additionally, the
introduction of evidence of petitioner Pantranco (respondent in the case for damages) after the denial of its
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, "necessarily implied a submission to the jurisdiction of
[the trial court therein], and, accordingly, a waiver of such right as Pantranco may have had to object to the
venue, upon the ground that it had been improperly laid."49 The rationale for the Pantranco ruling is that a
party cannot invoke a violation of a rule on venue against his counter-party, when he himself is bound by the
same rule, but nonetheless, seeks his own relief and in so doing, violates it.
In contrast, the counterclaim of respondent was alleged to be a compulsory counterclaim,50 which he was
prompted to file only because of petitioner's complaint for collection of sum of money, else the same would
be barred.51 In fact, his counterclaim only sought reimbursement of his overpayment to petitioner in the
amount of ₱400,000.00, as well as damages for the filing of a purported baseless suit. Thus, his counterclaim is
not covered by the venue stipulation, since he is not asserting a violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease contract, but rather an independent right which arose only because of the complaint. The same goes for
his third-party complaint, whereby he only pleaded that the rental payments remitted to PNCC for the period
August 2011 to December 2011 be reimbursed to him in the event that petitioner's complaint is found to be
meritorious. Since his counterclaim and third-party complaint are not covered by the venue stipulation,
respondent had, therefore, every right to invoke the same whilst raising the ground of improper venue against
petitioner's complaint, which action was, on the contrary, covered by the stipulation. Thus, there is no
inconsistency in respondent's posturing, which perforce precludes the application of the Pantranco ruling, as
well as negates the supposition that he had waived the defense of improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Orders dated June 15, 2015 and January 27, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 40-V-12 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
210 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
FIRST DIVISION
July 24, 2017
G.R. No. 223610
CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY, SYLVIA UY SY, JANE UY TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY, IRENE S. UY,*
ERICSON S. UY, JOHANNA S. UY, and JEDNATHAN S. UY, Petitioners
vs.
CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his heirs PAULITA MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO, CESAR DEL CASTILLO, A
VITO DEL CASTILLO, NILA C. DUENAS, NIDA C. LATOSA, LORNA C. BERNARDO, GIL DEL CASTILLO, LIZA C.
GUNGOB, ALMA DEL CASTILLO, and GEMMA DEL CASTILLO, Respondents
DECISION
211 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Conchita S. Uy (Conchita) and her
children, petitioners Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S. Uy
(Ericson), Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy (Uy siblings; collectively, petitioners), assailing the Decision2
dated May 26, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP
No. 07120, which affirmed the twin Orders4 dated December 9, 2011 and the Order5 dated May 1 7, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55 (RTC) in Civil Case No. MAN-2797, denying petitioners'
Omnibus Motion,6 motion to quash the writ of execution,7 and their subsequent motion for reconsideration.8
The Facts
The present case is an offshoot of an action9 for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees
involving a parcel of land, known as Lot 791 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29129,10 filed
by Crispulo Del Castillo (Crispulo) against Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his wife, Conchita, on November 12, 1996,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2797 (Quieting of Title Case ).11 However, since Jaime had died six (6) years
earlier in 1990,12 Crispulo amended his complaint13 and imp leaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy siblings, as
defendants.14 Meanwhile, Crispulo died15 during the pendency of the action and hence, was substituted by his
heirs, respondents Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, Cesar Del Castillo, Avito Del Castillo, Nila C. Duenas, Nida C.
Latosa, Loma C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo, Liza C. Gungob, Alma Del Castillo, and Gemma Del Castillo
(respondents).16
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision17 dated April 4, 2003 (RTC Decision) in respondents' favor,
and accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful owners of Lot 791; (b) nullified Original Certificate of
Title No. 576,18 as well as TCT No. 29129; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral damages and
litigation costs in the amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to twenty-five percent
(25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791.19 Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA,20 and subsequently, to
the Court, but the same were denied for lack of merit.21 The ruling became final and executory on April 8,
2010, thus, prompting the Court to issue an Entry of Judgment 22 dated May 4, 2010.
On August 17, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,23 manifesting therein that
since the zonal value of Lot 791 at that time was ₱3,500.00 per square meter (sqm.) and that Lot 791 covers an
area of 15,758 sqm., the total zonal value of Lot 791 was ₱55,153,000.00.24 Hence, the attorney's fees,
computed at twenty-five percent (25%) thereof, should be pegged at ₱13,788,250.00.25
Acting on the said motion, the RTC ordered26 petitioners to file their comment or opposition thereto, which
they failed to comply.27 Accordingly, in an Order28 dated November 22, 2010, the RTC granted the motion and
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. On December 13, 2010, a Writ of Execution 29 was issued, to which
the sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment30 seeking to levy petitioners' properties in an amount sufficient to
cover for the ₱13,788,250.00 as attorney's fees and ₱20,000.00 each as moral damages and litigation costs.
Threatened by the Notice of Garnishment, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion 31 praying that the writ of
execution be quashed and set aside, and that a hearing be conducted to re-compute the attorney's fees.32
Petitioners maintained that the Writ of Execution is invalid because it altered the terms of the RTC Decision
which did not state that the zonal value mentioned therein referred to the zonal value of the property at the
time of execution.33 Before the RTC could act upon petitioners' Omnibus Motion, they filed a Motion to Quash
Writ of Execution on Jurisdictional Ground(s) (motion to quash), 34 claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the Uy siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they were never served with summons in relation thereto. 35
The RTC Proceedings
On December 9, 2011, the RTC issued two (2) orders: (a) one granting petitioners' Omnibus Motion, nullifying
the Notice of Garnishment, and setting a hearing to determine the proper computation of the award for
attorney's fees;36 and (b) another denying their motion to quash, since they never raised such jurisdictional
issue in the proceedings a quo.37
212 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
On January 20, 2012, a hearing was conducted for the determination of attorney's fees. 38 Thereafter, the
parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers, 39 to which respondents complied with,40
presenting the following alternative options upon which to base the computation of attorney's fees: (a)
₱3,387,970.00, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in 1996, the year when
the Quieting of Title Case was filed; (b) ₱ll,424,550.00, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal
value of Lot 791 in 2003, the year when the RTC rendered its Decision in the same case; or (c) ₱15,758,000.00,
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in 2010, the year when the RTC Decision
became final and executory.41
On the other hand, instead of filing the required position paper, petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion for
Reconsideration42 of the RTC's December 9, 2011 twin Orders. In said motion, petitioners contended that the
RTC failed to definitely rule on the validity of the writ of execution, and that it erred in holding that the RTC
Decision was already final and executory despite the absence of summons on the Uy siblings. 43
In an Order44 dated May 17, 2012, the RTC: (a) pegged the attorney's fees at ₱3,387,970.00,45 using the zonal
value of Lot 791 in 1996, the year when the Quieting of Title Case was instituted, it being the computation
least onerous to petitioners; and (b) denied petitioners' Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari46 with the CA, assailing the RTC's twin Orders dated
December 9, 2011 and the Order dated May 17, 2012. Petitioners argued that instead of just declaring the
Notice of Garnishment void, the RTC should have also declared the writ of execution void because the Uy
siblings were never served with summons; and like the Notice of Garnishment, the Writ of Execution also
altered the terms of the RTC Decision. Petitioners further added that the writ of execution was void because it
made them liable beyond their inheritance from Jaime. They maintain that the estate of Jaime should instead
be held liable for the adjudged amount and that respondents should have brought their claim against the
estate, in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 47
The CA Ruling
In a Decision48 dated May 26, 2015, the CA affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. The CA found no merit in
the claim that the Uy siblings were never served with summons, pointing out that in a Manifestation/Motion49
dated November 26, 1997, their counsel in the trial proceedings, Atty. Alan C. Trinidad (Atty. Trinidad), stated
that petitioners received the summons with a copy of the amended complaint. 50 It likewise refused to give
credence to petitioners' denial of Atty. Trinidad's representation, observing that one of the Uy siblings, Ericson,
even testified in court with the former's assistance, and that none of them showed any concern or
apprehension before the court, which they would have if indeed Atty. Trinidad was not authorized to
represent them.51
Anent petitioners' argument that they cannot be held personally liable with their separate property for Jaime's
liability and that respondents should have filed a claim against Jaime's estate in accordance with Section 20,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the CA held that such provision only applies to contractual money claims and not
when the subject matter is some other relief and the collection of any amount is merely incidental thereto,
such as by way of damages, as in this case.52 Besides, petitioners had all the opportunity to raise such
perceived error when they elevated the case to the CA and to this Court, but they did not. 53 Following the
principle of finality of judgment, the CA can no longer entertain such assignment of errors.54
With respect to the validity of the writ of execution, the CA ruled that since the Writ of Execution made
express reference to the RTC Decision without adding anything else, the same was valid, unlike the Notice of
Garnishment which expressly sought to levy ₱13,788,250.00 in attorney's fees and, in the process, exceeded
the purview of the said Decision.55
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,56 which was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution57
dated February 22, 2016; hence, the present petition.
213 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the twin Orders dated December
9, 2011 and the Order dated May 17, 2012 of the RTC.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it is well to reiterate that petitioners are resisting compliance with the ruling in the Quieting of
Title Case, on the grounds that: (a) they were never served with summons in relation thereto; and (b) they
were merely impleaded as substitutes to Jaime therein, and as such, respondents should have proceeded
against his estate instead, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. However, a judicious review of
the records would reveal that such contentions are untenable, as will be discussed hereunder.
Anent petitioners' claim that they were never served with summons, the CA correctly pointed out that in the
November 26, 1997 Manifestation/Motion,58 petitioners, through their counsel, Atty. Trinidad, explicitly
stated, among others, that they "received the Summons with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint" and
that "the Answer earlier filed serves as the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint." 59 Having admitted the
foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert otherwise. "It is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties
in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not
require further evidence to prove them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when it is
shown that they have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually made,
neither of which was shown to exist in this case."60
Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they were
nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an Answer61 to the
amended complaint and actively participating in the case.62 In fact, one of the petitioners and Uy siblings,
Ericson, was presented as a witness for the defense.63 Moreover, petitioners appealed the adverse RTC ruling
in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the Court. It is settled that the active participation of the party
against whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later on impugning the
court's jurisdiction.64 After all, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a
valid service of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court's authority. 65
In this regard, petitioners cannot also deny Atty. Trinidad's authority to represent them. As mentioned earlier,
one of the petitioners, Ericson, even testified with the assistance of Atty. Trinidad. 66 Indeed, if Atty. Trinidad
was not authorized to represent them, the natural reaction for petitioners was to exhibit concern. Based on
the records, however, there is no indication that any of the petitioners or Ericson made even the slightest
objections to Atty. Trinidad's representation. This only confirms the CA's finding that such denial was a mere
afterthought and a desperate attempt to undo a final and executory judgment against them. 67
As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have proceeded against Jaime's estate pursuant to
Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on the records, the Uy siblings were
not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were imp leaded in their personal capacities.
Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the party to the action
dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim is not extinguished, viz.:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
214 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure
the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (Emphases supplied)
Here, Jaime died on March 4, 1990,68 or six (6) years be(ore private respondents filed the Quieting of Title
Case.1âwphi1 Thus, after Conchita filed an Answer69 informing the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint
was amended70 to implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules of Court provisions on substitution upon the
death of a party do not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in place of Jaime in the Quieting
of Title Case. Instead, they were impleaded in their personal capacities. 71 In this regard, petitioners' argument
that they cannot be held solidarily liable for the satisfaction of any monetary judgment or award must
necessarily fail.72
In this light, petitioners can no longer invoke Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. - When the action is for recovery of money arising from
contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
(Emphasis supplied)
A cursory reading of the foregoing provision readily shows that like Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it
applies in cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and not before the case was even filed in
court, as in this case.
At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed that Jaime's estate is the proper party to the
Quieting of Title Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of action against them at the
earliest opportunity. Obviously, they did not do so; instead, they actively participated in the case, adopted the
answer earlier filed by Conchita, and even litigated the case all the way to the Court. Petitioners cannot now
question the final and executory judgment in the Quieting of Title Case because it happened to be adverse to
them.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere
technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully
complied."73 However, this doctrine "is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to
relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (j) that the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby."74
215 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In this case, a punctilious examination of the records, especially the Amended Complaint 75 in the Quieting of
Title Case reveals that the disputed Lot 791 was covered by TCT No. 29129 in the names of Jaime and Conchita.
Thus, while the Uy siblings were indeed impleaded in their personal capacities, the fact remains that they are
merely succeeding to Jaime's interest in the said lot and title. As successors-heirs, they cannot be personally
bound to respond to the decedent's obligations beyond their distributive shares. 76 Verily, this is a special or a
compelling circumstance which would necessitate the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment,
so as to somehow limit the liability of the Uy siblings in the payment of the monetary awards in favor of
respondents in the Quieting of Title Case - i.e., moral damages and litigation costs in the amount of ₱20,000.00
each, as well as attorney's fees, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 79177 - within
the value of their inherited shares, notwithstanding the finality of the ruling therein.
In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy siblings may be held answerable to the monetary
awards in the Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot exceed whatever value they inherited from their late
father, Jaime. For this purpose, the RTC is tasked to ensure that the satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the
judgment in the Quieting of Title Case will not result in the payment by the Uy siblings of an amount exceeding
their inheritance from Jaime. After all, the other party, i.e., respondents, shall not be unjustly prejudiced by
the same since Jaime's spouse, Conchita, is still alive and the rest of the monetary awards may be applied
against her, if need be.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 26, 2015 and the
Resolution dated February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07120 are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION limiting the adjudged monetary liability of petitioners Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane
Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S. Uy, Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy to the total value of
their inheritance from Jaime Uy.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 208651

vs.
ROMEO ANTIDO y LANTAYAN a.k.a. ROMEO ANTIGO y LANTAYAN alias "JON-JON", Accused-Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
216 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In a Resolution1 dated April 7, 2014, the Court affirmed the Decision 2 dated December 7, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04602 finding accused-appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo
Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon" (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the December 7, 2012 Decision
of the CA in CAG. R. CR-HC No. 04602 and AFFIRMS said Decision finding accusedappellant Romeo Antido y
Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to paragraph 5 of Article 266-B, under RA 8353.
Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay private
complainant the following amounts: (a) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, consistent with existingjurisprudence.3
However, it appears that before the promulgation of the said Resolution, accused-appellant had already died
on December 28, 2013, as evidenced by his Certificate of Death.4
As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside the April 7, 2014 Resolution and
enter a new one dismissing the criminal case against accused-appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court
renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
In People v. Culas, 5 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on
his liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability[,] as well as
the civil liability[,] based solely thereon.1âwphi1 As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
217 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section l, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 6
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the
recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim,
AAA,7 may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against
the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.8
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated April 7, 2014 in connection
with this case; (b) DISMISS Criminal Case No. 03-212115 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29
by reason of the death of accused-appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan alias
"Jon-Jon"; and (c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 180969*, September 11, 2017
NOEL NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA & GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, JAGNA,
BOHOL, AND ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
218 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 26, 2007 and the Resolution3
dated November 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354, which affirmed the Order4
dated September 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50 (RTC) in Sp. Civil Action No.
0357, and accordingly, sustained the denial of petitioner Noel Navaja's (petitioner) motion to quash filed
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol (MCTC-Jagna).
The Facts
The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT)
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in Tagbilaran City, charging its then-
Regional Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana Lou B. Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of falsification of a Private
Document, docketed as I.S. Case No. 04-1238.5 In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms. Marilyn
Magsigay (Ms. Magsigay), a material witness for DKT, was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing before the OPP-
Bohol on March 15, 2004 in order to shed light on the official receipt allegedly falsified by Ana Navaja.6 On
March 9, 2004, petitioner, who is Ana Navaja's husband, allegedly went to Ms. Magsigay's workplace in Garden
Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and told her that as per instruction from Ana Navaja's lawyer, Atty. Orwen Bonghanoy
(Atty. Bonghanoy), her attendance in the scheduled hearing is no longer needed (March 9, 2004 incident). 7
Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing where petitioner and Atty.
Bonghanoy presented an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and notarized by a certain Atty.
Rolando Grapa (Atty. Grapa) in Cebu City, supporting Ana Navaja's counter-affidavit (March 15, 2004
incident).8 Resultantly, I.S. Case No. 04-1238 was dismissed.9
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Edgar Borje (Atty. Borje), DKT's counsel, found out from Ms. Magsigay herself
that: (a) she would have attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing were it not for the misrepresentation
of petitioner that her presence therein was no longer required; (b) she was merely told by her superior in
Garden Cafe to sign the affidavit and that she did not personally prepare the same; and (c) she could not have
gone to Cebu to have it notarized before Atty. Grapa as she was at work on that day. 10 This prompted Atty.
Borje to file the following criminal complaints before the OPP-Bohol and the City Prosecution Office of
Tagbilaran City: the first one,11 charging petitioner of Obstruction of Justice, specifically, for violation of Section
1 (a) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 182912 in connection with the March 9, 2004 incident; and the second
one,13 charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as well, specifically, for violation of
Section 1 (f) of the same law in connection with the March 15, 2004 incident. 14 After due proceedings,
separate Informations were filed. The case relating to the March 9, 2004 incident was filed before the MCTC-
Jagna,15 while that relating to the March 15, 2004 incident was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Tagbilaran City, Bohol (MTCC-Tagbilaran).16
Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash Information (Motion to Quash) 17 before the MCTC-
Jagna, principally arguing that the charge of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 pending before it should have
been absorbed by the charge of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran,
considering that: (a) the case pending before the latter court was filed first; (b) the criminal cases filed before
the MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-Tagbilaran arose from a single preliminary investigation proceeding, involving the
same set of facts and circumstances, and flowed from a single alleged criminal intent, which is to obstruct the
investigation of I.S. Case No. 04-1238; and (c) to allow separate prosecutions of the foregoing cases would be
tantamount to a violation of his right to double jeopardy. 18
The MCTC-Jagna Ruling
In an Order19 dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. It held that
petitioner had no right to invoke the processes of the court, since at the time he filed said motion, the MCTC-
Jagna has yet to acquire jurisdiction over his person.
On reconsideration, the MCTC-Jagna issued a Resolution20 dated January 24, 2006 upholding the denial of the
Motion to Quash. It ruled that in the criminal case before it, petitioner is being charged with violation of
Section 1 (a) of PD 1829, an offense separate and distinct from violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law, which
is pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran. As such, said offenses may be prosecuted independently from each
other.21
219 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated22 his case to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order23 dated September 21, 2006, the RTC denied the petition, thereby, affirming the MCTC-Jagna
Ruling. It held that the criminal cases pending before the MCTC-Jagna for violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829
and MTCC-Tagbilaran for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law are two (2) separate offenses, considering
that: (a) the case in MCTC-Jagna has only one (1) accused, i.e., petitioner, while the one pending before the
MTCC-Tagbilaran has two (2), i.e., petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy; and (b) the places of commission are
different, as the March 9, 2004 incident happened in Jagna, Bohol, while the March 15, 2004 incident occurred
in Tagbilaran City, Bohol. Further, the RTC opined that while both offenses arose from substantially the same
set of facts, each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. 24
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the CA.25
The CA Ruling
In a Decision26 dated June 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that petitioner allegedly committed
several acts which constitute violations of different provisions of PD 1829, namely: (a) the March 9, 2004
incident where he prevented Ms. Magsigay from attending the scheduled hearing in I.S. Case No. 04-1238 by
means of deceit and misrepresentation, which is a violation of Section 1 (a) of the law; and (b) the March 15,
2004 incident where he, along with Atty. Bonghanoy, submitted a purported spurious affidavit of Ms.
Magsigay in the scheduled hearing in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which is a violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law.
Moreover, the CA pointed out that the foregoing acts were committed in distinct places and locations. As such,
there is more than enough basis to try petitioner for two (2) separate crimes under two (2) distinct
Informations.27
Unperturbed, petitioner moved for reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied in a Resolution29 dated
November 12, 2007; hence, this petition.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately
tried for different acts constituting violations of PD 1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the
same law allegedly committed during the pendency of a single proceeding.
The Court's Ruling
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the
pertinent portions of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos,
or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays
the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of
any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit,
intimidation, force or threats;
xxxx
220 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and
with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal
cases;
xxxx
The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of PD
1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying
the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. 30
In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated
September 22, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 before the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly
preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing; 31 and (b) an
Information dated August 27, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law before the MTCC-
Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit. 32 While the Informations pertain to acts that were done
days apart and in different locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for
a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single
criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-
1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol.33 The foregoing conclusion is premised on the
principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from
one criminal intent or resolution.34 In Santiago v. Garchitorena,35 the Court explained the principle of delito
continuado as follows:
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a
period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that
two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised
Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed).
Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is
only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102;
Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution
(Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
xxxx
The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes
penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of [Republic Act] No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for
services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits x x x.
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter
provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.36 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed separate crimes and thus, may be tried separately,
the CA cited the case of Regis v. People (Regis),37 wherein it was held that the malversation committed through
falsification of document performed on different dates constitute independent offenses which must be
punished separately.38 However, a closer perusal of Regis shows that its factual milieu is not on all fours with
the instant case. In Regis, the accused, then municipal treasurer of Pinamungahan, Cebu, signed payrolls on
two (2) different dates, i.e., April 30, 1931 and May 2, 1931, making it appear that certain workers worked as
laborers in a municipal project when in truth, there were no such workers and that he and his co-accused
misappropriated the payroll amounts to themselves. The Court ruled that the accused may be held liable for
two (2) separate crimes, considering that when the accused committed the first act constituting malversation
committed through falsification of document, it did not appear that he was already predisposed to committing
the second act constituting the same crime.39 Clearly, when the accused in Regis falsified the payroll of April
30, 1931, and later, the payroll of May 2, 1931, he -though committing similar acts - could not be said to have
221 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
been motivated by a single criminal impulse as he was working towards discernibly distinct criminal objectives.
In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a
preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a
single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the
preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado,
petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in
Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-
1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case. 40
However, since he was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment41 dated July 3, 2007 - in the
MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired in Jagna, Bohol
should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design. The Court's
pronouncement in Gamboa v. CA42 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito continuado'" or
"continuous crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution
or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of
right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a
partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado."
In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity
of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two
or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."43
Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly
exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 26, 2007 and the Resolution dated November
12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
Criminal Case No. 2878 pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna,
Bohol is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
222 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9

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FIRST DIVISION

January 23, 2017

G.R. No. 218466

MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 221425

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

The RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.12

Hence, the instant consolidated cases.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

G.R. No. 232189

The RTC Ruling

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

March 14, 2018

G.R. No. 230065

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

Crim. Case No. 12-293828

Crim. Case No. 12-293829

The RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed17 to the CA.

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

With respect to Crispo, the Court finds his appeal meritorious.

[P03 Rodriguez]: I forgot the number of the barangay, sir.

Q: Who was, was there an official of the barangay with you?

A: I remember two Kagawad[s], sir.

Q: Tell the Court what happened at the barangay?

A: They signed as witnesses in the inventory receipt, sir.

Q: Who signed the inventory?

A: [The] Barangay Kagawad[s], sir.

[P03 Rodriguez]: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Where were you at that time?

A: At the barangay hall, ma'am.

Q: How about the accused at that time, where were they?

A: They were with us also, ma'am.

Q: Were they assisted [by] any counsel at that time?

Q: Were there any members of the DOJ?

Q: Were there any members of the media?

A: Yes, ma' am.

Q: They were already at the area when they arrived?

A: Yes, ma'am.46 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Q: How about with any media representative?

A: I do not know, ma'am.

Q: How about the presence of the media now?

Q: Why was there none?

A: When we arrested them we immediately proceeded to the Barangay[.]

Q: That's the only your (sic) explanation?

Q: With all documents prepared and Pre-operation Report prepared?

A: I do not know with Yadao, ma'am.47 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:

March 14, 2018

G.R. No. 230070

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

Criminal Case No. 11427

The RTC Ruling

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling