January 23, 2017
Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon accused-appellants
G.R. No. 218466
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO
NACIONAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221425
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a "JOHN,"
"KONYONG" SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL @
"INONG" @ DIONISIO NACIONAL, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:  Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the
Assailed in these consolidated cases 1 is the Decision2 dated
April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05095, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated December 8,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan,
Branch 70 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. B-243, convicting
accused-appellants Manny Ramos (Ramos), Roberto Salonga
(Salonga), and Servillano Nacional (Nacional; collectively,
accused-appellants) of the crime of Murder Aggravated with
the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation
to Republic Act No. (RA) 8294.4
The Facts
The instant cases stemmed from an Information filed before
the RTC, charging accused-appellants of the aforementioned
crime, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about January 20, 2002, in the evening, at Brgy.
Cabanaetan, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of
their superior strength and at night time, armed with an
unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot ROLANDO NECESITO y F ABRIGAS which
caused his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs. 5
The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in
the evening of January 20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo
1|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Necesito (Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of
having an altercation with the victim, Rolando Necesito
(Rolando). From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos
yell, "Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and
saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround
Rolando at an area around seven (7) meters away from where
Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four (4) successive
gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree
for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth shot
when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the
ground. To ensure Rolando's demise, Ramos approached
Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-appellants
fled the scene.6
The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree,
prompting police officers to conduct an investigation from
which were gathered the following evidence and information:
(a) a piece of bamboo was recovered three (3) meters away
from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando purportedly had a
previous misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997,
yet the same was settled before the barangay; and (c)
time of the incident. An autopsy was likewise conducted on
Rolando's body, revealing that there were four (4) incised
wounds on his left hand, a stab wound on his left chest, and
five (5) gunshot wounds on his body; that based on the
nature and sizes of his wounds, it was possible that the
firearm used was of the same caliber; and that his injuries
could not have been inflicted by a single person. 7
For their respective parts, accused-appellants similarly
invoked the defenses of denial and alibi.1âwphi1Essentially,
they insisted that they were somewhere else when the
incident occurred. In addition, Ramos maintained that the
declarations of Reynaldo against him were motivated by a
personal grudge, while Nacional claimed that the corpus
delicti was not proven with exact certainty since the cadaver
that was exhumed and examined was already in an advanced
stage of decomposition, having been interred for more than a
month. 8
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision9 dated December 8, 2010, the RTC found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole,
and ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando's heirs the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as
death indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. 10
In so ruling, the R TC gave credence to the direct,
straightforward, and categorical eyewitness testimony of
Reynaldo positively identifying each of the accused-appellants
as co-perpetrators of the crime, further noting that Reynaldo
had no ill-motive to falsely testify against them. On the other
hand, it found the defense testimonies to be untenable, as
they were riddled with various inconsistencies and
contradictions. Further, the RTC found the presence of the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualified
the killing to Murder, considering that the accused-appellants
took advantage of their combined strength and their several
weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the
success of their felonious design. In view of the foregoing, the
RTC concluded that accused-appellants "are equally guilty of
the crime of Murder aggravated with the use of unlincensed
firearm, there having been proven the existence of implied
conspiracy between them." 11
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA. 12
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 13 dated April 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused-
appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use of
an Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the
awards of civil indemnity and moral damages to ₱75,000.00
each and imposing legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on all monetary awards from finality of the judgment
until fully paid. 14 It held that Reynaldo was able to positively
identify accused-appellants as Rolando's killers, given that he
was only seven (7) meters away from the situs criminis. The
CA likewise held that the accused-appellants took advantage
of their combined superior strength as they even used several
weapons to render the unarmed victim completely
defenseless. 15
Hence, the instant consolidated cases.
Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of Appeal, 16(G.R.
No.221425) while Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466).
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not
the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction for the
crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
The Court's Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional elevated the
matter before the Court thru a Notice of Appeal 17(G.R. No.
221425) filed before the CA; on the other hand, Ramos and
Salonga filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Court (G.R. No. 218466). 18As a general rule, appeals of
criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; 19
except when the CA imposed the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in which
2|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
case, the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal
filed before the CA. 20 In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly
availed of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for
review on certiorari before the Court, despite having been
sentenced by the CA of reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, in
the interest of substantial justice, the Court will treat their
petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the
substantive issue at hand with finality.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an
appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.21
As will be explained hereunder, the accused-appellants
should only be held liable for simple Murder, and not Murder
with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following
elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed;
(b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not
parricide or infanticide. 22
In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of
eyewitness Reynaldo, had established beyond reasonable
doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and
eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that
they deliberately used weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo stick),
which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal attacks.
Thus, such killing was attended with the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, 23 which perforce
warrants accused-appellants' conviction for Murder.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in
convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the Use of an
Unlicensed Firearm.
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such
circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or
permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of
establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies
with the prosecution.24
In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five
(5) gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from
the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able
to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b)
assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether
or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the
disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent regarding this
matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants
used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution
was duty-bound to prove this allegation. 25 Having failed in this
respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby modifies accused-

appellants' conviction to simple Murder.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, 26

Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present
(except for abuse of superior strength which was used to
qualify the killing to Murder), accused-appellants must be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, to conform
with existing jurisprudence, accused-appellants must be
ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando's heirs the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal
interest per annum on all the monetary awards from the date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 27

WHEREFORE, the consolidated appeals are DENIED. The

Decision dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05095 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows: accused-appellants Manny
Ramos, Roberto Salonga, and Servillano Nacional are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to jointly and
severally pay Rolando Necesito's heirs the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages with six percent (6%) legal interest per
annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

March 7, 2018
3|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 232189
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner
vs.
CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated February 23, 2017 and the Resolution 3 dated
June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
146138, which affirmed the Orders dated May 29, 2015 4 and
March 3, 20165 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109 (RTC) in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-CV that:
(a) granted petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s (petitioner) Motion
to Withdraw; and (b) declared respondent Cynthia B. Baña’s
(respondent) Counterclaim for independent adjudication.
The Facts
On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 6 seeking that
his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on
account of his psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.7 Subsequently, respondent filed her
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim8 dated December 5,
2014.
However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and
thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw 9 his petition. In her
comment/opposition10 thereto, respondent invoked Section
2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule
1 7), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as
remaining for the court's independent adjudication. 11 In turn,
petitioner filed his reply,12 averring that respondent's
counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same
action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to
Withdraw, which - according to petitioner - was required
under the same Rules of Court provision. In particular,
petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required
manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However,
respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion
to Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence, respondent had only
until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her
desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action. 13
The RTC Ruling
In an Order14 dated May 29, 2015, the RTC granted
petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw petition. 15 Further, it
declared respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for
independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto.16
4|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 17
which was denied in an Order 18 dated March 3, 2016. Thus,
he elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari,
19
praying that the RTC Orders be set aside to the extent that
they allowed the counterclaim to remain for independent
adjudication before the same trial court.20
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated February 23, 2017, the CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. 22 It found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under Section
2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been
filed by the defendant before the service upon him of the
petitioner’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint.23
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, 24 which was
denied in a Resolution25 dated June 6, 2017; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's
counterclaim for independent adjudication before the same
trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious. Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims in
the event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the
plaintiffs instance, viz. :
Section 2.Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as
provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate
action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without
prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.1âwphi1
As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim
has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon
him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this case -
the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that
"[i]nstead of an ‘action’ shall not be dismissed, the present
rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action is
different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this
reason, since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still
prosecute his counterclaim in the same acton."26
However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17,
if the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the
same action, he is required to file a manifestation within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his
counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action. As
explained by renowned remedial law expert, former
Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the
matter:
Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the
dismissal of the complaint to which a counterclaim has been
interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate
action or to have the same resolved in the same action.
Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his
right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should
he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same
action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must
manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's
motion to dismiss. x x x27
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule
17 to that portion of its second sentence which states that
the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently,
the CA ignored the same provision's third sentence, which
provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who
interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred
therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his
counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference
therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be
prosecuted only in a separate action.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the
passing of the fifteen (15)-day period triggers the finality of
the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the
conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of
respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order
to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the
required manifestation within the aforesaid period;
otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a
separate action.
It is hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that "[t]he
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
5|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of
the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases and its meaning
may be modified or restricted by the latter."28
By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 1 7 of the Rules of Court,
the CA clearly violated the foregoing principle and in so doing,
erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders declaring
respondent’s counterclaim "as remaining for independent
adjudication" despite the latter's failure to file the required
manifestation within the prescribed fifteen (15)-day period.
As petitioner aptly points out:
[I]f the intention of the framers of the Rules of Court is a
blanket dismissal of the complaint ALONE if a counterclaim
has been pleaded prior to the service of the notice of
dismissal then there is NO EVIDENT PURPOSE for the third
(3rd) sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 17.
x x x x29
[I]t is clearly an ABSURD conclusion if the said provision will
direct the defendant to manifest within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice of dismissal his preference to prosecute
his counterclaim in the SAME ACTION when the same
AUTOMATICALLY REMAINS. If the automatic survival of the
counterclaim and the death of the complaint as being ruled
by the Court of Appeals in its questioned Decision is indeed
true, then the third sentence should have required defendant
to manifest that he will prosecute his counterclaim in a
SEPARATE [and not - as the provision reads - in the same]
ACTION.30 (Emphases and underscoring in the original)
Petitioner's observations are logically on point. Consequently,
the CA rulings, which affirmed the patently erroneous R TC
Orders, must be reversed. As it should be, the RTC should
have only granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and
hence, dismissed his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, without prejudice to, among others, the
prosecution of respondent's counterclaim in a separate
action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 23, 2017 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2017 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED solely
granting petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in Civil Case No.
R-PSY-14-17714-CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others,
without prejudice to the prosecution of respondent Cynthia
B. Baña's counterclaim in a separate action. SO ORDERED.
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 230065
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
MARCELINO CRISPO y DESCALSO alias "GOGO" and ENRICO
HERRERA y MONTES, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-
appellants Marcelino Crispo y Descalso alias "Gogo" (Crispo)
and Enrico Herrera y Montes (Herrera; collectively, accused-
appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated March 17, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 0711 7, which
affirmed the Decision3 dated October 24, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 (RTC) in Crim. Case
Nos. 12-293828 and 12-293829 finding: (a) accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002";
and (b) Crispo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of the same law.
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before
the RTC charging accused-appellants of the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portions of
which state:
Crim. Case No. 12-293828
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said [accused-appellants], conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, not
being then authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give
away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly sell one (1)
heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT
ZERO TWO THREE (0.023) gram of white crystalline substance
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.1âwphi1
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Crim. Case No. 12-293829
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, [Crispo], not being then authorized by law to
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
6|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
unlawfully, and knowingly possess or have under his control
three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance weighing zero point zero three
seven (0.037) gram, zero point zero two five (0.025) gram and
zero point zero one nine (0.019) gram or in the total weight of
zero point zero eight one (0.081) gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 1:30 in the afternoon
of November 19, 2012,8 a confidential informant (CI) tipped
the Manila Police District Station 4 (MPD) of the alleged illegal
drug activities of a certain alias "Gogo" (later identified as
Crispo) at Ma. Cristina Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Thus, after
coordinating with the operatives of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, the MPD organized a buy-bust
operation at the said area, with Police Officer (PO) 2 Dennis
Reyes (P02 Reyes) as the poseur buyer. Upon arrival at the
area at around 5:30 in the afternoon of even date, the CI and
P02 Reyes saw Crispo talking to his runner, Herrera, and
decided to approach them. As they went nearer, Herrera
approached the CI and P02 Reyes, while Crispo remained
about five (5) to six (6) meters away. P02 Reyes then signified
his intention of buying shabu, prompting Herrera to get the
marked money from him, and thereafter, approach Crispo in
order to remit the money and get a sachet containing white
crystalline substance from the latter. When Herrera handed
over the sachet to P02 Reyes, the latter performed the pre-
arranged signal, directly causing his backups to rush into the
scene and apprehend accused-appellants. Upon frisking
accusedappellants, the arresting officers recovered three (3)
other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
from Crispo. The accused-appellants and the seized items
were then taken to the barangay office where the arresting
officers, inter alia, conducted the inventory and photography
in the presence of two (2) barangay kagawads, as indicated in
the Receipt of Property/Evidence Seized. 9 After examination10
at the Crime Laboratory, it was confirmed that the sachets
seized from accused-appellants contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.11
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged 12
and offered their version of the events. According to Crispo,
he was just on board a tricycle going to his niece's house
when suddenly, a car with five (5) policemen in civilian
clothes blocked the tricycle's path. One of the policemen then
poked a gun at Crispo, and told him, "Mga pulis kami,
sumama ka sa presinto." Fearful for his life, Crispo complied.
Upon arrival at the police station, the policemen demanded
from him ₱30,000.00 for his release; otherwise, they will
plant evidence against him. The policemen then proceeded to
show him four (4) sachets of shabu which will be used against
him. For his part, Herrera averred that he was riding a bicycle
when he accidentally bumped a brown van. Three (3) men
then alighted from the van, arrested him, and took him to the
police station. Thereat, an affidavit was purportedly prepared
for him and that he signed the same even without reading it
out of confusion.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 24, 2014, the RTC found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged and, accordingly, sentenced them as follows:
(a) for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the RTC sentenced
accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine in the amount of PS00,000.00; and (b) for
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the R TC sentenced
Crispo to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as
maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00. 15
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all
the elements of the crimes charged as it was shown that
accused-appellants sold to P02 Reyes one (l) sachet of shabu
and that after their arrest, three (3) more sachets of
shabuwere found in Crispo’s possession. On the other hand,
the RTC did not give merit to accused-appellants' imputation
of ill-motive against their arresting officers after finding it
unsubstantiated.16
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed17 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated March 1 7, 2016, the CA affi1med the
RTC ruling.19 It held that the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crimes
charged. Further, the CA ruled that the absence of
representatives from the DOJ and the media during the
conduct of the inventory is not fatal to the prosecution of
accused-appellants, so long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved. 20
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction for the crimes
charged.
The Court’s Ruling
I.
During the pendency of this appeal, the Court received a
letter21 dated September 7, 2017 from the Bureau of
Corrections, informing it that Herrera had already died on
7|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
April 3, 2017. Attached thereto is a duplicate copy of
Herrera's Certificate of Death22 issued by the Officer of the
Civil Registrar General.
Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the
consequences of Herrera's death are as follows:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Jao,23 the Court eloquently summed up the
effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities,24 as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. "25
Thus, upon Herrera's death pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action against him is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. As
such, the criminal case against him is hereby dismissed, and
declared closed and terminated.26
II.
With respect to Crispo, the Court finds his appeal meritorious.
It must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the
entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing
tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.27 "The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law."28
Here, Crispo was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined
and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an
accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment.29 Meanwhile, in instances
wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the
following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused
was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.30
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order
to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same and account for each link in
the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 31
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which
the police officers must follow when handling the seized
drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.32 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA
10640,33 the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours
from confiscation for examination.34 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,35 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating
presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ],
or any elected public official during the seizure and marking
of the [seized drugs), the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate
the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
of the[said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of
custody."36
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field
conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 37
In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the
8|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
passage of RA 1064038 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team in instances of
warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under
justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the
seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 39 In
other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure
and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that
the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.40 In People v.Almorfe,41the Court explained that
for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence
had nonetheless been preserved.42 Also, in People v. De
Guzman,43 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.44
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the
arresting officers committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
drugs allegedly seized from Crispo.
An examination of the records reveals that while the
inventory and photography of the seized items were made in
the presence of two (2) elected public officials, i.e., Barangay
Kagawads Ramon Amtolim and Helen Tolentino, as evidenced
by their signatures on the Receipt of Property/Evidence
Seized,45 the same were not done in the presence of
representatives from either the DOJ and the media. This fact
was confirmed by P03 Manolito Rodriguez (P03 Rodriguez), a
member of the buy-bust team that apprehended Crispo, in
his testimony in direct and cross-examinations, to wit:
[Asst. Pros. Alexander T. Yap]: What happened at the
barangay? What barangay by the way?
[P03 Rodriguez]: I forgot the number of the barangay, sir.
Q: Who was, was there an official of the barangay with you?
A: I remember two Kagawad[s], sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened at the barangay?
A: They signed as witnesses in the inventory receipt, sir.
Q: Who signed the inventory? that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus, remove
any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or
A: [The] Barangay Kagawad[s], sir. contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a
case. However, minor deviations may be excused in situations
xxxx where a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In
this case, despite the non-observance of the witness
requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the
[Atty. Rosemarie G. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales)]: Mr. Witness,
prosecution .. In fact, the poseur-buyer, P02 Reyes, only
according to you, you already proceeded to the barangay?
feigned ignorance as to the reason why no representatives of
the DOJ and the media were present during the inventory of
[P03 Rodriguez]: Yes, ma'am. the seized items:

xxxx [Atty. Gonzales): By the way, Mr. Witness, prior to the

operation considering that you would be conducting a buy-
Q: Mr. Witness, were you able to see when the markings of bust operation, was there any coordination with the DOJ?
the evidences (sic) were done?
[P02 Reyes): I do not know if [SP03 Agapito Yadao, the buy-
A: Yes, ma'am. bust team leader,) did that, ma'am.

Q: Where were you at that time? Q: How about with any media representative?

A: At the barangay hall, ma'am. A: I do not know, ma'am.

Q: How about the accused at that time, where were they? xxxx

A: They were with us also, ma'am. Q: Mr. Witness, when these evidences (sic) were likewise
being marked was there any presence of the DOJ now?
Q: Were they assisted [by] any counsel at that time?
A: None, ma'am.
A: None, ma'am.
Q: How about the presence of the media now?
Q: Were there any members of the DOJ?
A: None, ma'am.
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Were there any members of the media?
Q: Why was there none?
A: None, ma'am.
A: When we arrested them we immediately proceeded to
Q: According to you the inventory of the evidences (sic) were the Barangay[.]
witnessed by the Kagawads?
Q: That's the only your (sic) explanation?
A: Yes, ma' am.
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: An these kagawads? Who called the kagawads?
Q: Despite the fact that it is a buy-bust operation which was
A: We, ma'am. prepared by your office?

Q: They were already at the area when they arrived? A: Yes, ma'am.

A: Yes, ma'am.46 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Q: With all documents prepared and Pre-operation Report
prepared?
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as
well as representatives from the DOJ and the media to ensure A: Yes, ma'am.
9|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Q: You just merely did not consider getting all the required
persons to comply with Sec. 21?
A: I do not know with Yadao, ma'am.47 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these
required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible.48 However, a justifiable reason for such
failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to
secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 must be adduced.49 In People v. Umipang,50 the Court
held that the prosecution must show that earnest
effortswere employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable - without so much as an
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to
look for other representatives, given the circumstances - is to
be regarded as a flimsy excuse."51 Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the
required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for
non-compliance.52 These considerations arise from the fact
that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time -
beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time
of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand
knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with
the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state
reasons for their non-compliance, but mustin fact, also
convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to
comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the
given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. [[53]]
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable
grounds or show that special circumstances exist which would
excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Crispo have been compromised. It is
settled that in a prosecution for the sale and possession of
dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy
burden of proving not only the elements of the offense, but
also to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in
which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.54
Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the arresting
officers, which were unfortunately left unjustified, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
Crispo, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised.55 It is well-settled that the
procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment
to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 56 As such, since the
10 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for
noncompliance with the aforesaid provision, Crispo’s
acquittal is perforce in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring
pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the subject
matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government
against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot
be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the
mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities,
however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 57
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have
the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set
forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended. As such,
they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but
also justify any perceived deviations from the said
procedure during the proceedings before the trial court.
Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and
ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that
any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even
threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the
records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure
had been completely complied with, and if not, whether
justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to
acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction. 58
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows: (a) Crim.
Case No. 12-293828 is hereby DISMISSED and declared
CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as accused-appellant
Enrico Herrera y Montes is concerned due to his supervening
death pending appeal; and (b) The appeal of accused-
appellant Marcelino Crispo y Descalso is GRANTED. The
Decision dated March 1 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 07117 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, he is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody
for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
March 14, 2018
G.R. No. 230070
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS, Accused-Appellant
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal 1 is the Decision2 dated
December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 06127, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated October
1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
76 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 11427 finding accused-appellant
Nestor Año y Del Remedios (Año) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information 5 filed before the RTC,
charging Año with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
Criminal Case No. 11427
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2009 in the
Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver
and give away to poseur buyer, P02 Ruel T. Ayad, 0.03 gram
of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet which substance was found
positive to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in consideration of
the amount of Php.200.00, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The prosecution alleged that at around five (5) o’clock in the
afternoon of August 3, 2005 and after receiving information
about Año’s drug activities at Daangbakal, Guitnangbayan II,
Police Officer (PO) 2 Ruel T. Ayad (P02 Ayad), PO1 Aldwin
Ortilla (POl Ortilla), and POl Jenesis A. Acuin 7 (PO1 Acuin)
formed a buy-bust team designating P02 Ayad as the poseur-
buyer, with POl Ortilla and PO1 Acuin as back-ups, and
marked two (2) ₱100.00 bills to be used in the operation. 8
Thereafter, the team headed to the house of Año where P02
Ayad knocked on the door and upon seeing Año, whispered
that he "wants to score" worth P200.00. Año replied that he
has drugs with him and gave P02 Ayad a transparent plastic
sachet, while the latter simultaneously handed the marked
11 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
money as payment. As Año placed the money inside his
pocket, P02 Ayad introduced himself as a policeman, causing
Año to flee. Fortunately, P02 Ayad caught Año and asked him
to empty his pockets which produced the two (2) ₱100.00
bills. Due to the commotion caused by Año's relatives who
were preventing his arrest, the team moved at a distance of
around 100 meters from the place of arrest, marked the
confiscated sachet, and completed the inventory thereat.
Barangay Captain Leo S. Buenviaje (Brgy. Captain Buenviaje)
witnessed and signed the Inventory of Seized/Confiscated
Items,9 photographs were also taken in the presence of Año,
P02 Ayad, and PO1 Acuin.10 On the same day, P02 Ayad
delivered the seized sachet to the Crime Laboratory where it
was turned over to Police Inspector Forensic Chemist Beaune
V. Villaraza (FC Villaraza) for examination. In Laboratory
Report No. D-198-09,11 FC Villaraza confirmed that the seized
sachet was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.12
Upon arraignment, Año pleaded not guilty and denied the
charges leveled against him. He claimed that on said date, he
was at home celebrating the 4th birthday of his nephew when
suddenly, three police officers whom he identified to be P02
Ayad, PO1 Ortilla, and PO1 Acuin, forcibly arrested him and
brought him to the police station for inquiry. The following
day, he learned that he was being charged of drug pushing. 13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found Año
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00. 15
The RTC found all the elements for the prosecution of sale of
dangerous drugs present, noting that the identity of Año as
the seller of the illegal drug was clearly established when he
was arrested in fiagrante delicto during a buy-bust
operation.16
Aggrieved, Año elevated his conviction before the Court of
Appeals (CA).17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated December 4, 2015, the CA upheld the
RTC ruling,19 likewise finding that all the elements constituting
the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs were present.
Moreover, it ruled that the apprehending officers duly
complied with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 (a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 9165, as P02 Ayad testified in detail the links in the chain
of custody of the seized drug from the time of its confiscation
until its presentation in court as evidence.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Año is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal
cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned
or unassigned.20 "The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."21
Here, Afio was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an
accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment. 22 It is likewise essential for
a conviction that the drugs subject of the sale be presented in
court and its identity established with moral certainty
through an unbroken chain of custody over the same. In cases
like this, the prosecution must be able to account for each
link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence
of the corpus delicti.23
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the
chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police
officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to
ensure that their integrity and evidentiary value are
preserved.24 Under the said section, prior to its amendment
by RA 10640,25 the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and take photographs of the seized items in the
presence of the accused or theperson from whom such
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall then
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination purposes.26 In the case of People
v. Mendoza,27 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the
insulating presence of the representative from the media or
the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure
12 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching,
‘planting’ or contamination of the evidence that had tainted
the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads
as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of
the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed,
the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."28
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field
conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21of RA9165 may not always be possible. 29 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which
is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA
1064030- provide that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under
justifiable grounds - will not automatically render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 31 In
other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165
and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and(b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 32
In People v. Almorfe,[[33]] the Court explained that for the
above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain
the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.34 Also, in People v. De
Guzman,35 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.36
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there
are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized
items from Año which were unfortunately, left unjustified,
thereby putting into question their integrity and evidentiary
value.
As the prosecution submits, upon Año's arrest, PO1 Ortilla
called Brgy. Captain Buenviaje to witness the marking and to
sign the inventory. After which, P02 Ayad marked the sachet
of shabu subject of the sale with Año's intials, "NDRA," while
PO1 Ortilla prepared an inventory of the seized items, which
was signed by Brgy. Captain Buenviaje as witness, and had
them photographed. Thereafter, the buy-bust team escorted
Año to the police station and turned over the sachet for
examination to FC Villaraza.
While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item
was established by the attached Inventory of
Seized/Confiscated Items,37 the records are glaringly silent as
to the presence of the required witnesses, namely, the
representatives from the media and the DOJ. To reiterate,
Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA
10640, as well as its IRR requires the presence of the
following witnesses during the conduct of inventory and
photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) any elected
public official; and (c) a representative from the media and
the DOJ.38 In their absence, the prosecution must provide a
credible explanation justifying the noncompliance with the
rule; otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165
(and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165)
would not apply.
Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution
to justify the procedural lapse. It then follows that there are
unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized
from Año, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which resultantly warrants his acquittal. 39
It is well-settled that the procedure under Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.40
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and
ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that
any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even
threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the
records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure
had been completely complied with, and if not, whether
justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to
acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 06127 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Nestor Año y Del Remedios is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged. The Director of Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other reason.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring

pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the subject
matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government

against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot
be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the
mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities,
however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 41

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have

the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set
forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they
must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also
justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure
during the proceedings before the trial court. Since
compliance with this procedure is determinative of the
13 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
July 17, 2017
G.R. No. 225054
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
AGAPITO DIMAALA y ARELA, Accused-Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Decision1 dated May 8, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of
Calauag, Quezon (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 4994-C found
accused-appellant Agapito Dimaala y Arela (accused-
appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court renders
judgment finding AGAPITO DIMAALA y Arela GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged for the treacherous
killing of Rodrigo Marasigan. Said accused is hereby
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole.
He is likewise ordered to pay the family of Rodrigo Marasigan
the following:
PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages;
PhP 36,000.00 as actual damages;
PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
PhP 25,000.00 as temperate damages. SO ORDERED.2
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court
of Appeals (CA). In a Decision3 dated September 23, 2015 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 05595, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision
finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged but
deleted the award of temperate damages.4
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 5 from
the CA's Decision, but later on decided not to pursue his
appeal.1avvphi1 Thus, he filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal
with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of Entry of Judgment, 6
which the Court granted in its Resolution7 dated September
21, 2016. Following the closure and termination of the case,
the Court declared the finality of the aforesaid Resolution and
issued an Entry of Judgment.8
Meanwhile, the Court received a Letter9 dated February 23,
2017 from the Bureau of Corrections informing it that
14 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
accused-appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at the New
Bilibid Prison Hospital, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Death10 attached thereto.
In view of this development, the criminal action, as well as
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto,
is ipso facto extinguished.11
It is settled that the death of accused-appellant prior to his
final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal
case against him.12 Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the criminal liability is totally extinguished by
the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished -
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Culas,13 citing People v. Layag,14 the Court
explained the effects of the death of an accused pending
appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
x x x.
xxxx
In this relation, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's
civil liability based on sources other than the subject delict
survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against
the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law
and procedural rules.15
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) DISMISS Crim. Case
No. 4994-C before the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon by reason of the death of accused-appellant Agapito
Dimaala y Arela; and (b) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED
and TERMINATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
November 29, 2017
G.R. No. 229335
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS (DPWH)
vs.
BELLY H. NG, represented by ANNABELLE G. WONG
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the Decision2 dated July 1, 2016 and the Resolution3
dated January 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 102033, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated
November 26, 2013 and the Order5 dated January 16, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 270 (RTC)
in Civil Case No. 38-V-13, fixing the just compensation for the
subject lots at ₱15,000.00/square meter (sq. m.) and the
replacement cost of the improvements thereon at
₱12.000.00/sq. m, hut deleting the award of consequential
damages and reducing the legal rate of interest on the
obligation from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per
annum (p.a.).
The Facts
On February 12, 2013, petitioner the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH; petitioner), filed before the RTC a
complaint6 against respondent Belly H. Ng (respondent),
represented by Annabelle G. Wong7 , seeking to expropriate
the lots registered in the name of respondent under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. V-921888 and V-921919 with a
total area of 1,671 sq. m. (subject lots), together with the
improvements thereon with an aggregate surface area of
2,121.7 sq. m. (collectively, subject properties), located in
Kowloon Industrial Compound, Tatalon Street, Brgy. U gong,
Valenzuela City,10 for the construction of the Mindanao
Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City to
Caloocan City).11 Petitioner manifested that it is able and
ready to pay respondent the amounts of ₱6,684,000.00 (i.e.,
at ₱4,000.00/sq. m.) and ₱ll,138,362.74,12 representing the
combined relevant zonal value of the subject lots and the
replacement cost of the improvements thereon,
respective1y.13
In her answer,14 respondent contended that the offer price is
unreasonably low, and that she should be compensated the
fair market value of her properties at the time of taking,
estimated to be at ₱25,000.00/sq. m. Moreover, the fair and
just replacement cost of the improvements on the subject
lots should be in the amount of ₱22,276,724.00,15 pursuant to
Section 10 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. (RA) 8974.16
15 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Petitioner was eventually granted a Writ of Possession, 17 after
respondent received the amount of ₱l 7,822,362.74,
representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject
properties.18
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine
the just compensation for the properties19 which, thereafter,
submitted its Commissioner's Report20 dated June 10, 2013,
recommending the amounts of ₱7,000.00/sq. m. and
₱12,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject
lots and the improvements thereon, respectively, and the
payment of six percent (6%) legal interest therefor, reckoned
from the time of taking.21
Dissatisfied, respondent objected22 to the recommended just
compensation of ₱7,000.00/sq. m. for the subject lots,
contending that the same "is not [the] real, substantial, full,
ample[,] and fair market value" of her lots, 23 considering that
the just compensation for nearby properties24 expropriated
for the C-5 Northern Link Project25 had been fixed by the
same RTC at ₱15,000.00/sq. m.26 She likewise objected to the
imposition of six percent (6%) interest, insisting that the same
should be pegged at twelve percent (12%) interest p.a., 27 in
line with the rulings in Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) v.
Imperial28 and in Republic of the Philippines (Republic) v. Ker
& Company, Limited.29 However, she accepted the value of
₱l2,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the replacement cost of the
improvements.30
On the other hand, petitioner filed its comment,31 interposing
no objection to the ₱7,000.00/sq. m. valuation for the subject
lots and the imposition of six percent (6%) legal interest
recommended by the board of commissioners,32 citing the
letter33 dated July 30, 2013 of the Office of Director Patrick B.
Gatan, Project Director, Infrastructure Right-of-Way and
Resettlement - Project Management Office, DPWH.34
However, it failed to attach a copy of the said letter.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision35 dated November 26, 2013, the RTC fixed the
just compensation for the subject lots at ₱15,000.00/sq. m. or
the total amount of ₱25,065,000.00, taking into account: (a)
the classification of the subject lots as industrial, their
location, shape, and their being not prone to flood; 36 and (b) a
previous case37 involving a neighboring property expropriated
for the C-5 Northern Link Project which was valued at
₱15,000.00/sq. m. by the same RTC.38 It adopted the
replacement cost of ₱12,000.00/sq. m. recommended by its
appointed commissioners or the total amount of
₱25,460,400.00, noting that respondent accepted said
recommendation.39 Consequently, it ordered petitioner to
pay respondent the aforesaid amounts with twelve percent
(12%) legal interest p.a., reckoned from the time of taking of
the properties, less the provisional deposit of ₱l7,822,362.74,
plus consequential damages and attorney's fees.40
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration, 41 but was
denied in an Order42 dated January 16, 2014, prompting it to
file an appeal43 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision44 dated July 1, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC
rulings, but deleted the award of consequential damages and
reduced the legal interest to six percent (6%) p.a., computed
from the date of the RTC Decision until full satisfaction. 45
The CA upheld the just compensation of ₱15,000.00/sq. m.
fixed by the RTC for the subject 1,671-sq. m. lots on the basis
of relevant factors, such as the BIR zonal valuation of the
land, tax declarations and the Commissioner's Report, as well
as the market value of the properties within the area. 46 It
likewise sustained the value of ₱12,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the
replacement cost of the improvements with an aggregate
surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m. or the total amount of
₱25,460,400.00, holding that: (a) the amount of
₱l1,138,362.74 proposed by petitioner was inconceivably
lower than the current construction cost of a
commercial/warehouse which was at ₱32,000.00/sq. m.,
even as early as November 2009; and (b) petitioner did not
interpose any objection to the said amount. 47
However, the CA ruled that the award of consequential
damages was improper, considering that the entirety of the
subject properties is being expropriated, hence, there is no
remaining portion that may suffer an impairment or decrease
in value.48 It likewise reduced the legal interest to six percent
(6%) p.a., in line with the amendment introduced by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB
Circular No. 799,49 Series of 2013.50
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 51 which
was, however, denied in a Resolution52 dated January 23,
2017; hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the
replacement cost for the improvements fixed by the RTC, and
the award of attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Project,
Stage II-C (Valenzuela City to Caloocan City) involves the
implementation of a national infrastructure project. Thus, for
purposes of determining the just compensation, RA 8974 53
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), which were
16 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
effective at the time of the filing of the complaint, shall
govern.54
Under Section 10 of the IRR, the improvements and/or
structures on the land to be acquired shall be appraised using
the replacement cost method, thus:
Section 10.Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. -
Pursuant to Section 7 of [RA 8974], the Implementing Agency
shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or
structures on the land to be acquired using the replacement
cost method. The replacement cost of the
improvements/structures is defined as the amount necessary
to replace the improvements/structures, based on the
current market prices for materials, equipment, labor,
contractor's profit and overhead, and all other attendant
costs associated with the acquisition and installation in place
of the affected improvements/structures. In the valuation of
the affected improvements/structures, the Implementing
Agency shall consider, among other things, the kinds and
quantities of materials/equipment used, the location,
configuration and other physical features of the properties,
and prevailing construction prices. (Emphasis supplied)
The replacement cost method is premised on the principle of
substitution, which means that "all things being equal, a
rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a
property than the cost of building an acceptable substitute
with like utility."55
Accordingly, the Implementing Agency should consider: (a)
construction costs or the current market price of materials,
equipment, labor, as well as the contractor's profit and
overhead; and (b) attendant costs or the cost associated with
the acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute in
place of the affected improvements/structures.56 In addition,
the case of Republic v. Mupas (Mupas)57 instructs that in using
the replacement cost method to ascertain the value of
improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant
standards provided under Section 558 of RA 8974, as well as
equity consistent with the principle that eminent domain is a
concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the
landowner whole. Thus, it is not the amount of the owner's
investment, but the "value of the interest" in land taken by
eminent domain, that is guaranteed to the owner.59
While there are various methods of appraising a property
using the cost approach, among them, the reproduction cost,
the replacement cost new, and the depreciated replacement
cost, Mupas declared that the use of the depreciated
replacement cost method60 is consistent with the principle
that the property owner shall be compensated for his actual
loss,61 bearing in mind that the concept of just compensation
does not imply fairness to the property owner alone, but
must likewise be just to the public which ultimately bears the
cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to
compensation only for what he actually loses, and what he
loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of
the taking.62 Hence, even as undervaluation would deprive
the owner of his property without due process, so too would
its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the
public.63
It must be emphasized that in determining just
compensation, the courts must consider and apply the
parameters set by the law and its implementing rules and
regulations in order to ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix
an amount as just compensation that is contradictory to the
objectives of the law.64 Be that as it may, when acting within
the parameters set by the law itself, courts are not strictly
bound to apply the formula to its minutest detail, particularly
when faced with situations that do not warrant the formula's
strict application. Thus, the courts may, in the exercise of
their discretion, relax the formula's application,65subject to
the jurisprudential limitation that the factual situation calls
for it and the courts clearly explain the reason for such
deviation.66
In this case, the RTC and the CA upheld the recommendation
of the court-appointed commissioners, fixing the just
compensation for the improvements on the expropriated
properties at ₱12,000.00/sq. m., which merely considered
their location, classification, value declared by the owner, and
the zonal valuation of the subject lots. However, there is no
competent evidence showing that it took into account the
prevailing construction costs and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation of an
acceptable substitute in place of the affected
improvements/structures as required by the IRR.
Consequently, the Court cannot uphold and must, perforce,
set aside the said valuation as the just compensation for the
subject improvements.
On the other hand, it is unclear how the parameters set by
the IRR have been factored-in in petitioner's proposed
valuation of ₱l1,138,362.74.67 Thus, the Court cannot
automatically adopt petitioner's own computation as prayed
for in the instant petition. Neither can the Court accept
respondent's submitted valuation68 which claimed to have
used the prevailing replacement cost method for lack of
proper substantiation to support the correctness of the
values or data used in such computation.
It must be emphasized that the veracity of the facts and
figures which the parties used in their respective
computations involves the resolution of questions of fact
which is, as a rule, improper in a petition for review on
certiorari since the Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, a remand
of this case for reception of further evidence is necessary in
order for the RTC to determine just compensation for the
subject improvements in accordance with the guidelines set
under RA 8974 and its IRR.
17 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In relation thereto, the Court deems it proper to correct the
award of legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid balance
of the just compensation, which shall be computed at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the date of taking, i.e.,
from April 10, 2013 when the RTC issued a writ of
possession69 in favor of petitioner,70 until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due respondent shall earn interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) p.a.,71 in line with the amendment
introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of
2013.1âwphi1
Finally, the Court finds the award of attorney's fees to be
improper and should be, accordingly, deleted. Even when a
claimant is compelled to incur expenses to protect his rights,
attorney's fees may still be withheld where no sufficient
showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's
persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction of
the righteousness of his cause.72 The case of Republic v. CA
(Republic)73 cited by the CA to justify the award is inapplicable
because, unlike in this case where petitioner only acquired
possession of the expropriated properties after paying
respondent the amount of ₱l7,822,362.74, representing the
100% zonal valuation thereof, the petitioner in Republic took
possession of the landowner's real property without initiating
expropriation proceedings, and over the latter's objection.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 1, 2016 and the Resolution dated January 23, 2017
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102033 are hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as it upheld the just compensation fixed by
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 270 (RTC)
for the subject 1,671-square meter (sq. m.) lots at
₱15,000.00/sq. m. However, the valuation of ₱12,000.00/ sq.
m. fixed by the lower courts as the replacement cost of the
subject improvements with an aggregate surface area of
2,121.7 sq. m. is hereby SET ASIDE, and Civil Case No. 38-V-13
is REMANDED to the RTC for reception of evidence on the
issue of just compensation therefor in accordance with the
guidelines set under Republic Act No. 8974 and its
implementing rules and regulations. Legal interest is hereby
imposed on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, as
determined by the RTC, at twelve percent (12%) per annum
(p.a.) reckoned from April 10, 2013 to June 30, 2013 and,
thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. Finally,
the award of attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of factual and
legal bases.
The RTC is directed to conduct the proceedings in said case
with reasonable dispatch, and to submit to the Court a report
on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty
(60) days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
January 10, 2018
G.R. No. 227215
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH)
vs.
LEONOR MACABAGDAL, represented by EULOGIA
MACABAGDAL PASCUAL (formerly John Doe "DDD")
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1assailing
the Decision2 dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104473, which affirmed the
Decision3 dated October 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 49-V-08,
imposing legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation for the subject lot at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum (p.a.) computed from the time of the taking
of the property until full payment.
The Facts
On January 23, 2008, petitioner the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways, filed4 before the RTC a
complaint5 against an unknown owner for the expropriation
of a 200-square meter (sq. m.) lot located in Barangay Ugong,
Valenzuela City, identified as Lot 1343-A-2-A-2-G, (LRC)Psd-
315943 (subject lot),6 for the construction of the C-5 Northern
Link Road Project, otherwise known as North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) Segment 8.1, traversing from Mindanao A
venue in Quezon City to the NLEX in Valenzuela City. 7
Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted 8 a writ of
possession over the subject lot on May 5, 2008, and was
required9 to deposit with the court the amount of
₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.) representing the zonal
value thereof (provisional deposit).10
On August 28, 2012, respondent Leonor Macabagdal
(respondent), represented by Eulogia Macabagdal Pascual,
was substituted as partydefendant upon sufficient showing
that the subject lot is registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate Title No. (TCT) V-103067. Respondent did not
oppose the expropriation, and received the provisional
deposit.11
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine
the just compensation for the subject lot, which thereafter
submitted its Commissioners' Report (Re: Just
Compensation)12 dated May 23, 2014, recommending a fair
18 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
market value of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation
for the subject lot, taking into consideration its location,
neighborhood and land classification, utilities, amenities,
physical characteristics, occupancy and usage, highest and
best usage, current market value offerings, as well as
previously decided expropriation cases of the same RTC
involving properties similarly situated in the same barangay. 13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 30, 2014, the RTC found the
recommendation of the commissioners to be reasonable and
just, and accordingly: (a) fixed the just compensation for the
subject lot at ₱9,000.00/ sq. m.; (b) directed petitioner to pay
the same, less the provisional deposit of ₱550,000.00; and (c)
imposed legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a.
on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking
of the subject lot until full payment. 15
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed16 before the CA, questioning
the just compensation of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. and the award of
twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a., instead of six percent
(6%) p.a.17 as provided under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. 18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed the
RTC Decision, holding that the commissioners, in their
recommendation, observed the parameters 20 set forth under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974, 21 and the findings of the
RTC was amply supported by the evidence on record.22
Hence, the instant petition claiming that the CA did not rule
on the issue of the applicable rate of interest which, in this
case, should be at twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the filing of
the complaint until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six
percent (6%) p.a. until full payment.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's
imposition of interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a.
on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking
of the subject lot until full payment.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner
for the property taken, but to compensate him for the loss
thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld
in a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the
taking, when the loss resulted.23 Indeed, the State is not
obliged to pay premium to the property owner for
appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make
good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the
property was taken.24
just compensation for the subject lot, which shall be
computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the
date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due respondent shall earn legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) p.a.

In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is
not only his property, but also its income-generating
potential.1âwphi1 Thus, when property is taken, full
compensation of its value must be immediately paid to
achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential
income lost.25 The value of the landholdings should be
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due,
and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for
the unRaid balance of this principal sum after taking has
been completed.26 This shall comprise the real, substantial,
full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and
constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate
of just compensation in eminent domain.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 1044 73 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION imposing legal interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance of the
just compensation, as determined by the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, reckoned from the date of the
taking on May 5, 2008 to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, at six
percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. The rest of the CA
Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.

In this case, from the date of the taking of the subject lot on
May 5, 2008 when the RTC issued a writ of possession 28 in
favor of petitioner,29 until the just compensation therefor was
finally fixed at ₱9,000.00/sq. m., petitioner had only paid a
provisional deposit in the amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at
₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the
"principal sum of the just compensation," warranting the
imposition of interest. It is settled that the delay in the
payment of just compensation amounts to an effective
forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on
the difference in the amount between the final amount as
adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the
government.30

However, as aptly pointed out by petitioner, 31 the twelve

percent (12%) p.a. rate of legal interest is only applicable until
June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at six percent
(6%) p.a. in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
Prevailing jurisprudence32 has upheld the applicability of BSP-
MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 to forbearances of money
in expropriation cases, contrary to respondent's contention. 33
The cases of Sy v. Local Government of Quezon City34 and
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 35 cited by respondent
are both inapplicable because they were all decided prior to
the effectivity of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 on
July 1, 2013.36

Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not

from the date of the filing of the complaint but from the date
of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008,
since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of
property can be established. As such, it is only proper that
accrual of legal interest should begin from this date. 37
Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to correct the award
of legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid balance of the
19 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
November 14, 2016
G.R. No. 219510
MARLON CURAMMENG y PABLO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Resolutions dated October 20, 20142 and June 30, 20153 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802, which
dismissed petitioner Marlon Curammeng y Pablo's
(Curammeng) petition for review for his failure to attach,
inter alia, a certification of non-forum shopping.
The Facts
The instant case arose from an Information 4 filed before the
Municipal Trial Court of Bauang, La Union (MTC), charging
Curammeng of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution alleged that on the night of September
25, 2006, a Maria De Leon bus going to Laoag, Ilocos Norte
being driven by Francisco Franco y Andres (Franco) was
traversing the northbound lane of the national highway along
Santiago, Bauang, La Union, when its rear left tire blew out
and caught fire. This prompted Franco to immediately park
the bus on the northbound side of the national highway, and
thereafter, unloaded the cargoes from the said bus. At a little
past midnight of the next day, an RCJ bus bound for Manila
being driven by Curammeng traversed the southbound lane
of the road where the stalled bus was parked and hit Franco,
resulting in the latter's death.5
In his defense, Curammeng averred that he was driving the
RCJ bus bound for Manila and traversing the southbound side
of the national highway at less than 60 kilometers per hour
(kph) when he saw from afar the stalled Maria De Leon bus at
the road's northbound side which was not equipped with any
early warning device, thus, prompting him to decelerate.
When the RCJ bus was only a few meters away from the
stalled Maria De Leon bus, a closed van suddenly appeared
from the opposite direction, causing petitioner to steer his
bus to the west shoulder, unfortunately hitting Franco and
causing the latter's death. Out of fear of reprisal, petitioner
surrendered to the Caba Police Station in the next town.
Eventually, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to
the charge.6
The MTC Ruling
20 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In a Decision7 dated November 26, 2013, the MTC found
Curammeng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and ordered him to pay Franco's heirs the
amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱200,000.00
as actual damages.8
The MTC found that Curammeng showed an inexcusable lack
of precaution in driving his bus while passing through the
stalled Maria De Leon bus, which resulted in Franco's death.
Moreover, it found untenable Curammeng's assertion that he
decreased the speed of his bus when he was nearing the
stalled bus, considering that the evidence on record showed
that he was still running at around 60 kph when he hit Franco.
In this relation, the MTC pointed out that if Curammeng had
indeed decelerated as he claimed, then he should have
noticed the barangay tanods near the stalled bus who were
manning the traffic and signalling the other motorists to slow
down.9
Aggrieved, Curammeng appealed to the Regional Trial Court
of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 (RTC).
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated June 3, 2014, the RTC affirmed
Curammeng's conviction in toto.11 It found that as a
professional public utility vehicle driver, his primary concern
is the safety not only of himself and his passengers but also
that of his fellow motorists. However, he failed to exhibit
such concern when he did not slow down upon seeing the
Maria De Leon bus stalled on the northbound side of the
national highway, especially so that the area where the
incident happened was hardly illuminated by street lights and
that there is a possibility that he might not be able to see
oncoming vehicles because his view of the road was partially
blocked by the said stalled bus. In view of the foregoing
circumstances, the RTC concluded that Curammeng was
negligent in driving his bus, and such negligence was the
proximate cause of Franco's death. As such, his liability for
the crime charged must be upheld.12
Curammeng moved for reconsideration but was denied in an
Order13 dated July 22, 2014. Dissatisfied, he filed a petition for
review14 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated October 20, 2014, the CA dismissed
outright Curammeng's petition based on procedural grounds.
Specifically, the CA found that Curammeng violated Section 2,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court as he failed to attach a
certification of non-forum shopping as well as material
portions of the record (e.g., affidavits referred to in the MTC
Decision, transcript of stenographic notes of the MTC,
documentary evidence of the parties).16
Undaunted, Curammeng filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Compliance17 dated November 6, 2014, praying for the
relaxation of procedural rules so that his petition will be
reinstated and given due course. He explained that the failure
to comply with the rules was only due to a plain oversight on
the part of his counsel's secretary. To show that such failure
was unintentional, he attached his certification of non-forum
shopping as well as copies of the pertinent records of the
case.18
In a Resolution19 dated June 30, 2015, the CA denied
Curammeng's motion for lack of merit. It held that
Curammeng failed to give any convincing explanation which
would constitute a compelling reason for a liberal application
of the procedural rules on appeal.20
Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA correctly dismissed Curammeng' s petition for
review based on procedural grounds.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction are taken by filing a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. 21 Section 2, thereof,
provides that such petitions shall be accompanied by, inter
alia, material portions of the record which would support the
allegations of said petitions as well as a certification of non-
forum shopping, viz.:
SEC. 2.Form and contents.-The petition shall be filed in seven
(7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the
court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a)
state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material
dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely
a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly
committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts,
21 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of
the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
certification under oath that he has not theretofore
commenced any other action involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is
such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of
the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or
agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
It must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form of
appeal, non-compliance with the foregoing rule may render
the same dismissible.1âwphi1 This is in furtherance of the
well-settled rule that "the right to appeal is not a natural right
or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right
must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost." 22 Verily,
compliance with procedural rules is a must, "since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims
and in the administration of justice."23
Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure
will tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests
of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case,
such as where strong considerations of substantive justice are
manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict
application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction.24 The Court's pronouncement in Heirs of
Zaulda v. Zaulda25 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but
if it would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous,
application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The
law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice.
The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is
a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a
party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on
technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this
juncture, the Court reminds all members of the bench and bar
of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v.
Villamar [16 Phil. 315, 322 (1910)]:
case), if any, pursuant to the principle that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for review. 28
In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical
rules of procedure in order to afford Curammeng the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal, rather than
to deprive him of such and make him lose his liberty on
procedural blunders which he had no direct hand in.
Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the CA for
resolution of the appeal on its merits.

Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no
vested rights in technicalities.26 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Resolutions dated October 20, 2014 and June 30, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to
the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal on its
merits.

Otherwise stated, procedural rules may be relaxed for the SO ORDERED.

most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure Associate Justice
prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the
mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly
followed where observance of it would result in the outright
deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the
interest of justice so requires.27

In the instant case, the Court notes that the dismissal of

Curammeng's appeal is based solely on his counsel's
negligence in failing to attach a certification of non-forum
shopping as well as material portions of the record.
Notwithstanding the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
with Compliance dated November 6, 2014, the CA upheld its
earlier dismissal, ratiocinating that the reasons presented by
Curammeng' s counsel were not compelling enough to relax
the technical rules on appeal.

While the Court understands and applauds the CA' s

zealousness in upholding procedural rules, it cannot simply
allow a man to be incarcerated without his conviction being
reviewed due to the negligence of his counsel. To note,
Curammeng, a public utility vehicle driver and his family's sole
breadwinner, is appealing his conviction for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide where he stands
to be sentenced with imprisonment for the indeterminate
period of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, among others. In view of these
circumstances, as well as his counsel's eventual - albeit
irregular - compliance with the technical rules of appeal, the
CA should have disregarded the rules and proceeded to make
a full review of the factual and legal bases of Curammeng's
conviction, including the attendance of modificatory
circumstances (e.g., the mitigating circumstance of voluntary August 8, 2017
surrender which Curammeng argues to be existent in his
22 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 225442
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),*
JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO
BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES,
and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as
represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR
JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by
MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the
constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The
petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph
Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective
local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending
resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of
Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to
Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of
minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their
children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999,
entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala
Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas,
Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b)
City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 8046 6 entitled "An
Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M.
of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children
and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing
Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October
14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through
Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An
23 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City
for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties
for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare
of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing
that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer
from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of
the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive
due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila
Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630. 12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew
Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed
standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators. 13
They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension
depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus,
subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual
assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances
contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the
operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
students or students with evening class, they contend that
the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out
at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a)
are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not
being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose. 17 They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not
per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of
children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance,
particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A 20 of
RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision
imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand,
and admonition. They contend that the imposition of
penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no
penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. 21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if
a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are
available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest
massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s
(closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible
patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting
children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine
that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions,
i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars
informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and
that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours. 22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is
whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised
in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition,
questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners'
direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts
doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing
to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 24 Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
24 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has
"expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for
certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under
the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to
the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited
above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.
GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 29 it was
expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural
rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for
review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules -
allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions
invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila,
and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative
powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the
Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the
right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their
children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by
imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as
amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is
grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias. "31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
although these governmental actions were not made
pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as
remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and
executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is
whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is
justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse
must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
[(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of
this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set
out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the
issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first
instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately
affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to
the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail
the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the
traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an
actual case or controversy." 35 "[A]n actual case or controversy
is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
25 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is
simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental
act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an
actual justiciable controversy in this case given the evident
clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the
Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents'
constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes
against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their
asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case
of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court
to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe
for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances
were being implemented until the Court issued the TRO 39
enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or
incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or
hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
determination of whether those assailing the governmental
act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the
court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have
a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
they have sustained or are in immediate danger of
sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the
enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "'
[I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an
interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act-
as distinguished from being merely incidental or general." 41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance,
he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged
breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of
minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and
(2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related
to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue
affecting the minor's right to travel, 43 because: (a) she was
still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this
Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew
Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent
danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances.
On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John
Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark
Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they
are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances'
coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a
consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of
whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to
rear their children as they have not shown that they stand
before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be
noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian
Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental
right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew
Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only
stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa,
whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK
still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized
by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances,
i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required
personal interest in the controversy. More particularly,
Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation
26 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation
of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the
standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court
has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal
standing, especially when paramount interest is involved.
Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of
the petitioners to show that they have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality
of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review.
Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these
issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and
the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine
the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in
the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching significance to the public, which, therefore,
impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among
others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive
aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors
to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must
first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew
Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with
unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to
the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even
though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew
offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus,
acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that
the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine
the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or
identification of the child to show his age. 47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which,
because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning
and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so
that one may act accordingly.49The void for vagueness
doctrine is premised on due process considerations,which
are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was
opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional
uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty
cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases
where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to
give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as
well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a
definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the
due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no
constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are
"void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement
parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not
assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms
related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political
branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of
curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration
in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must
show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement
stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular
conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that
ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because
agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what
conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that:
27 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and
subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and
arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the
Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no
sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly
state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as
amended, provides:
Section 7.Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may
be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence
of these documents, age may be based on information from
the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
(Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA
9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. 53
Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are
children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions. 55 It
is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one
of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances
should be read and implemented in conjunction with related
statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel
and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the
curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the
application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting
any competent proof of identification establishing their
majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes
enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of
the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done
ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law
enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and
not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances
as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their
Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this
right includes the right to determine whether minors will be
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to
stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is
primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's
interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling. 57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children
(i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are characterized not
only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means
that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising
their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to
exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this
provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to
ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free,
independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For
indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for
additional obligations to society."[T]he duty to prepare the
child for these [obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and
elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of
teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially
responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a
substantial measure of authority over one's children." 60 In
Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United
States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
28 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
basic in the structure of our society." 62 As in our Constitution,
the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only
described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
"primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the
State in the upbringing of their children. 63 The rationale for
the State's deference to parental control over their children
was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over
children is that "the child is not [a) mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations." 65 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should
be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child,
the [Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests." 66
Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental
health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or
welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests
may override the parents' qualified right to control the
upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to
support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties.
State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
complementary to parental supervision.In Nery v. Lorenzo,68
this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in
protecting minors, viz. :
[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are
in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as
they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have
the political community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty
to aid parents in the moral development of their children, 70
and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal
restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a
free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have the primary
responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71
that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable
to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons
which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental
rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared
unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
children.

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions
designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their
children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater
length, these ordinances further compelling State interests
(particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the
prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and
lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential
physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the
night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor
children are prone to making detrimental decisions during
this time.72
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim
that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny
test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a
compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile
crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's
interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing
legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 79

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours
Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of
when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality,
the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:
in public places without parental accompaniment during the
curfew hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances neither
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations
to influence or control their minors' activities. 74 As such, the
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
his or her child.
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied
to the litigants.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew
Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
better opportunities to take a more active role in their
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
(Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city government
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
"was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
children from the perils of the street but are unable to control
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
time on their studies than on the streets." 77 Reason dictates
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
29 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n
restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims,
the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US
Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 83 and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held
that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression. "'85
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it
was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on
the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to
violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are
raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm
of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under
the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person -
includes the power of locomotion 91 and the right of citizens to
30 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and
work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to
access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to
education, free expression, assembly, association, and
religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of
Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion,
speech, assembly, and association require one to move
about, such movement must necessarily be protected under
the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent
that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without
violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights.
One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment to freedom of travel and
movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to
their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall,
freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason,
people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets
of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are
sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably
involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment.
(Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public
interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental
rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State 96
may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided
that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the
probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law,"
our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's
duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, 98 as
amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA
10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential
Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603,
which explicitly authorizes local government units, through
their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children. It reads:
Article 139.Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal
councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children as
may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce
curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or
guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact
curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this
case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise
of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply
solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and
enjoy constitutional rights,108but the exercise of these rights
is not co-extensive as those of adults. 109 They are always
subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their
parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. 110 As parens
patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts
the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute
contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment. 113
With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law
to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development before they can travel to a foreign country
by themselves or with a person other than their parents. 114
These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader
authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions
of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in
the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose
limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though
these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3)
justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar
vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and
third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing: 118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children
generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults,
the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for
children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...
sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
31 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on]
the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them.x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the
upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive
of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 119
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme
Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets
to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range
of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are
the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in
public places, and the possible harms arising from other
activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
[streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's
police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of
the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people,
in the primary use of highways. But even in such use streets
afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other
uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may
be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions
on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they
are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of
judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The
intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does
not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but
requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based
on gender and legitimacy. 124 Lastly, the rational basis test
applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two
tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in
our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the
strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test. 127 At this juncture,
it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has
broader authority over minors than over adults does not
trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny. 128 In Nunez
v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile
curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary.
The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less
"fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis
of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The
Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State
has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a
greater range of interests that justify the infringement of
minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that,
when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti
test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny
for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a
juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables
courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state
interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on
adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in
regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe
that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review
burdens on minors' fundamental rights.x x x.
According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the
ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a
consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as
32 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with
the compelling State interests justifying the assailed
government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131Thus, the
government has the burden of proving that the classification
(1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and
(i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or
the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies.133This Court has ruled that
children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and
care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the State. 134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti
framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in
imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this
compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their
welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the
ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of
public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the
Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal
curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be
neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and
moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-
school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and
member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies
reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or
wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities
involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national
laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to
regulate the movement of minor children during night time
by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect,
abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these
minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the
tendency of growing number of youth spending their
nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for
furthering their nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer, 137 as regards the
information gathered by the City Council to support its
passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may
serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the present case.
Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a
safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when
left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that
its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest-that
of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council
acted on the basis of information from many sources,
including records from Charlottesville's police department, a
survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United
States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and
police reports from other localities. On the basis of such
evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that
keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night
will make for a safer community. The same streets may have
a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than
during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a
series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions.
Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their
sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or
participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to
these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their
criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe
to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials
with their finger on the pulse of their home community
clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the
opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal
33 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective
of reducing juvenile violence and crime. 138 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local
governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical
data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming
prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or
perpetrators, in their respective localities. 139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary
to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power
under the general welfare clause. 140 In this light, the Court
thus finds that the local governments have not only
conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate
concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to
minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied,
the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set
forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or
provide the least restrictive means to address the cited
compelling State interest - the second requirement of the
strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from
the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise
of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted,
the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's
compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts
with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing
standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity,
whether it be social, religious, or civic. 142 Thus, in the present
case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to
ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to
travel but also on their other constitutional rights. 143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance
unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn,
resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to
freely exercise their religion and to free speech. 145 It observed
that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending
alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman
Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various
local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them
from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the
various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents,
uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their
minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x
x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor
could not even attend the city council meetings if they ran
past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on
the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a
deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was
very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional
muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First
Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning
home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary
association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the
coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by
their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b)
those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines,
using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes
and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by
virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those
working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions,
to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at
night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those
traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those
running errands under the supervision of their parents,
guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them;
(j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also
exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve,
New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day
of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday,
Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
34 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect
the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel
at night from school or work. 148 However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent,
the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression,
among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited,
and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of
constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless,
it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail
below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church
activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-
school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and
from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or
church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and
intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the
curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively
prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities
(such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults,
similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate
activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise
their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate
avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city
council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their
right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to
engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court
finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these
legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription
does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect
minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as
becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any
reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas
Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila
Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly
drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of
the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite
the presence150 of any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the
first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the
minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following
exceptions:
Section 4.EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this
ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or
guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party,
graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other
extra-curricular activities of their school or
organization wherein their attendance are required
or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors
are out and unable to go home early due to
circumstances beyond their control as verified by
the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an
emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized
employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without
any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other
travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this
Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence
attending an official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or other similar
private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school, or other similar private civic/religious
organization/group (recognized by the community)
that supervises the activity or when the minor is
going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and
35 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying
that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a
working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of
exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
association by enabling minors to attend both official and
extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church
but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered
by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
official activities of civic or religious organizations are
allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas
Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is
sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by
exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew
hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows
the minor-participants to move to and from the places
where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous
exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to
the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within
the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage
in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding
curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental
permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", as
accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual
but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this
should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as
to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic
premise that State interference is not superior but only
complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the
Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their
children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in
passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the
welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable
of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In
one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.
This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of
fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing
the nature or import of her actions. The State, as
parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's
inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same
against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the
curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and
hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in
no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with
the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from
crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes
the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it
proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the validity of its
penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the
parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof, 154 does not
impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas
Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s
or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of
the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition
to the fine imposed therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila
Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on
the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4.Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or
youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished
as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND
for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the
offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority.
36 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand
and Admonition, and a warning about the
legal impostitions in case of a third and
subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to
ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court,PROVIDED, That the
complaint shall be filed by the
PunongBarangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments
could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community .service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine;
and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties
on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57.Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an
offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not
be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances
enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status
offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations,
truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors
against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness,
public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall
be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be
imposed on children for said violations, and they shall
instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay
official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of
their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be
recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with
the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention
programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities
for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting
education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of
regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the
similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is
the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew
ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a
wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine"; 158 "[p
]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who
commits a deliberate or negligent act." 159 Punishment, in tum,
is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty,
confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed
against a person who has violated the law." 160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to
mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the
regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A
thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate
intervention programs, such as community-based
programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community
service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare
of minors. For one, the community service programs provide
minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote
accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and
social stigma caused by jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline
and compliance with the law and legal orders. More
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become
productive members of society and thereby promote their
integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is
likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it
is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing
disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is
generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel
or warning against fault or oversight." 163 The Black's Law
Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued
warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary
defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or
oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or
warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in
administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or
admonition shall not be considered a penalty." 166
37 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-
based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as
they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less
intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear,
their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor,
and for the latter to understand, what actions must be
avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to
reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the
City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined
as "a severe or formal reproof." 167 The Black's Law Dictionary
defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not
restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law"; 168 while the
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal
censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault
by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more
than just a warning or admonition." 169 In other words,
reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to
denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply
criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn
the erring individual including the public against repeating or
committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the
erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp
disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our
jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty, 170
hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably
constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear,
categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile
status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of
reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew
violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance
directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On
the other hand, the impositions of community service
programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they
do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances
have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is,
that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least
restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that
enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights
during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", has also been construed to include parental
permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the
manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of
the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared

unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila

Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these
provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court

hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local
government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while
Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local
government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL
and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

April 24, 2017

G.R. No. 189950*

38 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON
BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF LOURDES S. BILAG,
HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE
BILAG, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO
AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., and MA. TERESA
A. RAMIREZ, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated March 19, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated
September 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86266, which set aside the Order4 dated October 10,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61
(RTC Br. 61), and consequently, remanded the case to the
latter court for trial.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint 5 dated August
12, 2004 for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction filed by respondents Estela Ay-Ay, Andres Acop, Jr.,
Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio ApAp, John Napoleon A. Ramirez, Jr.,
and Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez (respondents) against petitioners
Bernadette S. Bilag, Erlinda BilagSantillan, Dixon Bilag,
Reynaldo B. Suello, Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of Leticia
Bilag-Hanaoka, and Heirs of Nellie Bilag before the RTC Br. 61,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5881-R. Essentially, respondents
alleged that Iloc Bilag, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest,
sold to them separately various portions of a 159,496-square
meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as
Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated at Sitio
Benin, Baguio City (subject lands), and that they registered
the corresponding Deeds of Sale 6 with the Register of Deeds
of Baguio City. According to respondents, Iloc Bilag not only
acknowledged full payment and guaranteed that his heirs,
successors-in-interest, and executors are to be bound by such
sales, but he also caused the subject lands to be removed
from the Ancestral Land Claims. Respondents further alleged
that they have been in continuous possession of the said
lands since 1976 when they were delivered to them and that
they have already introduced various improvements thereon.
Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused to honor the
foregoing sales by asserting their adverse rights on the
subject lands. Worse, they continued to harass respondents,
and even threatened to demolish their improvements and
dispossess them thereof. Hence, they filed the instant
complaint to quiet their respective titles over the subject
lands and remove the cloud cast upon their ownership as a
result of petitioners' refusal to recognize the sales. 7
39 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
For their part, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 dated
November 4, 2004 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
prescription/laches/estoppel, and res judicata. Anent the first
ground, petitioners averred that the subject lands are
untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public
domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as
it is the Land Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of
Lands) which is vested with the authority to determine issues
of ownership over unregistered public lands.9
As to the second ground, petitioners argued that it is only
now, or more than 27 years from the execution of the Deeds
of Sale, that respondents seek to enforce said Deeds; thus,
the present action is already barred by prescription and/or
laches. 10
Regarding the final ground, petitioners pointed out that on
January 27, 1998, respondents had already filed a complaint
against them for injunction and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3934-R before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 5 (RTC Br. 5), wherein they principally asserted
their ownership over the subject lands. However, RTC Br. 5
dismissed Civil Case No. 3934-R for lack of merit on the
ground of respondents' failure to show convincing proof of
ownership over the same, 11 which Order of dismissal was
then affirmed by the CA on appeal. 12 Eventually, the Court
issued a Resolution dated January 21, 2004 13 declaring the
case closed and terminated for failure to file the intended
petition subject of the Motion for Extension to file the same.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners contended that due to
the final and executory ruling in Civil Case No. 3934-R, the
filing of Civil Case No. 5881-R seeking to establish the
ownership thereof is already barred by res judicata. 14
The RTC Br. 61 Ruling
In an Order 15 dated October 10, 2005, the RTC Br. 61 ruled in
petitioners' favor, and consequently, ordered the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 5881-R on the following grounds: (a) it had no
authority to do so; (b) the Deeds of Sale in respondents' favor
could not as yet be considered title to the subject lands,
noting the failure of respondents to perfect their title or
assert ownership and possession thereof for the past 27
years; and (c) the filing of the instant case is barred by res
judicata considering the final and executory Decision
dismissing the earlier filed Civil Case No. 3934-R where
respondents similarly sought to be declared the owners of
the subject lands.16
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. 17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated March 19, 2009, the CA set aside the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R, and accordingly, remanded
the case to the court a quo for trial. 19 It held that Civil Case
No. 3934-R was an action for injunction where respondents
sought to enjoin petitioners' alleged entry into the subject
lands and their introduction of improvements thereat;
whereas Civil Case No. 5881-R is an action to quiet title where
respondents specifically prayed, inter alia, for the removal of
the cloud upon their ownership and possession of the subject
lands. In this light, the CA concluded that while these cases
may involve the same properties, the nature of the action
differs; hence, res judicata is not a bar to the present suit. On
the issue of laches, prescription or estoppel, the CA pointed
out that in view of respondents' allegation that they have
been in possession of the subject lands since 1976, their
action to quiet title is imprescriptible.20
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration 21 which
was, however, denied in a Resolution 22 dated September 3,
2009; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in setting aside the
Order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R due to the
inapplicability of the grounds of res judicata and
prescription/laches, the CA notably omitted from its
discussion the first ground relied upon by petitioners, which is
lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is
defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try,
and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative
body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is the power to hear and determine the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred
by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of
the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action." 23
Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal should first
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter presented before it, considering that any act that it
performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and
without any binding legal effects. The Court's pronouncement
in Tan v. Cinco,24 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null
and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights
and produces no effect.1âwphi1It remains a basic fact in law
that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision
of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A
void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
40 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. 25
Now, on the issue of jurisdiction, a review of the records
shows that the subject lands form part of a 159,496-square
meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as
Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated at Sitio
Benin, Baguio City. Notably, such parcel of land forms part of
the Baguio Townsite Reservation, a portion of which, or 146,
428 square meters, was awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No.
211, as evidenced by a Decision 26 dated April 22, 1968
promulgated by the then-Court of First Instance of Baguio
City.
In a catena of cases, 27 and more importantly, in Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1271,28 it was expressly declared that all
orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of
Baguio and Benguet in connection with the proceedings for
the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record
211, covering lands within the Baguio Town site Reservation
are null and void and without force and effect. While PD 1271
provides for a means to validate ownership over lands
forming part of the Baguio Town site Reservation, it requires,
among others, that a Certificate of Title be issued on such
lands on or before July 31, 1973. 29 In this case, records reveal
that the subject lands are unregistered and untitled, as
petitioners' assertion to that effect was not seriously disputed
by respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3 of the
159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the
Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 -
which includes the subject lands - to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211,
is covered by the blanket nullification provided under PD
1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In
view of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to conclude that
the subject lands should be properly classified as lands of the
public domain as well.
Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and
unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued
that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award
their ownership.30 Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized
its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve
respondents' action for quieting oftitle. 31 In Heirs of Pocdo v.
Avila,32 the Court ruled that the trial court therein correctly
dismissed an action to quiet title on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction for lack of authority to determine who among the
parties have better right over the disputed property, which is
admittedly still part of public domain for being within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation, viz.:
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the
President which held that lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer
registrable under the Land Registration Act. The Office of the
President ordered the disposition of the disputed property in
accordance with the applicable rules of procedure for the
disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and
other applicable rules.
Having established that the disputed property is public land,
the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the
complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties
have better right over the disputed property which is
admittedly still part of the public domain. As held in Dajunos
v. Tandayag:
x x x The Tarucs' action was for "quieting of title" and
necessitated determination of the respective rights of the
litigants, both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of
property, admittedly public land. The law, as relied upon by
jurisprudence, lodges "the power of executive control,
administration, disposition and alienation of public lands with
the Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."
In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October
28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The court below did not have
power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were
entitled to an award of free patent title over that piece of
property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did
it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as entitled to the "true
equitable ownership" thereof, the latter's effect being the
same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs.
Pool, were not even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land
Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial
court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case. 33
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In conclusion, RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein respondents) seek
to quiet title over lands which belong to the public domain.
Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881- R must be dismissed on this
ground. It should be stressed that the court a quo's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without
authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the
merits of the case. To reiterate, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is
to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without
jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal
effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to discuss
the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 19, 2009 and the Resolution dated September 3, 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 5881-R
is DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE,
Associate Justice

In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking

for "an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property
adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger
of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to
land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist."
Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two
indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that
the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a
cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity.

In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the

disputed property, allege that respondents are unlawfully
claiming the disputed property by using void documents,
namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of Waiver of Rights.
However, the records reveal that petitioners do not have
legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which
forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio March 11, 2015
Townsite Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the case
that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo
41 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 212054
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision2 dated November 21, 2013 and the Resolution 3
dated April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 129108 which affirmed the Decision4 dated November 19,
2012 and the Resolution5 dated January 14, 2013 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No.
06-001858-12, declaring the dismissal of respondent Maria
Theresa V. Sanchez (Sanchez) illegal.
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke's
Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and was
eventually assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric Unit
until her termination on July 6, 2011 for her purported
violation of SLMC's Code of Discipline, particularly Section 1,
Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft, Pilferage,
and Misappropriation of Funds.6
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011,
Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization
Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard
inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the course
thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG
Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag and asked her to
open the same.7 When opened, said pouch contained the
following assortment of medical stocks which were
subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b)
Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore
[1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece];
(g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4 pieces]
(questioned items).8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she
could just return the pouch inside the treatment room;
however, she was not allowed to do so. 9 Instead, she was
brought to the SLMC In-House Security Department (IHSD)
where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining
why she had the questioned items in her possession. 10 She
complied11 with the directive and also submitted an undated
handwritten letter of apology12 (handwritten letter) which
reads as follows:
To In-House Security,
I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my bag.
42 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong humihingi ng tawad sa
aking pagkakasala, Alam ko po na ako ay nagkamali. Hindi ko
po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa hospital. Hindi ko po alam
kung [paano] ako magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit
alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong makapag uwi ng gamit.
Marami pang gamit dahil sa naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa
kong makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli. Hindi ko na po
naiwan sa nurse station dahil naisip kong magagamit ko rin po
pag minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at talagang may
kailangan.
Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa. Isinakripisyo ko
ang hindi pagiging "toxic" sa pagkuha ng gamit para sa bagay
na alam kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako'y naging madamot,
pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna ko ang comfort ko keysa
gumawa ng tama. Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13
In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD, Customer Affairs
Division, through Duty Officer Hernani R. Janayon, apprised
SLMC of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez expressly
admitted that she intentionally brought out the questioned
items.1awp++i1
An initial investigation was also conducted by the SLMC
Division of Nursing15 which thereafter served Sanchez a notice
to explain.16
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report
Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that the
questioned items came from the medication drawers of
patients who had already been discharged, and, as similarly
practiced by the other staff members, she started saving
these items as excess stocks in her pouch, along with other
basic items that she uses during her shift. 18 She then put the
pouch inside the lowest drawer of the bedside table in the
treatment room for use in immediate procedures in case
replenishment of stocks gets delayed. However, on the day of
the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the
medication drawer upon getting her tri-colored pen and
calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually,
she forgot about the same as she got caught up in work, until
it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC's
premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive
suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of the
investigation by SLMC's Employee and Labor Relations
Department (ELRD)19 which, thereafter, required her to
explain why she should not be terminated from service for
"acts of dishonesty" due to her possession of the questioned
items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a letter21 dated June
13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her previous
May 31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a case
conference,22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side,
SLMC, on July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to
terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6,
2011.24 This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence,
claiming that she had no intention of bringing outside the
SLMC's premises the questioned items since she merely
inadvertently left the pouch containing them in her bag as she
got caught up in work that day. She further asserted that she
could not be found guilty of pilferage since the questioned
items found in her possession were neither SLMC's nor its
employees' property. She also stressed the fact that SLMC did
not file any criminal charges against her. Anent her supposed
admission in her handwritten letter, she claimed that she was
unassisted by counsel when she executed the same and, thus,
was inadmissible for being unconstitutional.26
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly
dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in
violation of Section 1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., robbery,
theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of funds, with
termination from service.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed 31 for intentionally
taking the property of SLMC's clients for her own personal
benefit,32 which constitutes an act of dishonesty as provided
under SLMC's Code of Discipline.
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft was evinced by her
attempt to bring the questioned items that did not belong to
her out of SLMC's premises; this was found to be analogous
to serious misconduct which is a just cause to dismiss her. 33
The fact that the items she took were neither SLMC's nor her
co-employees' property was not found by the LA to be
material since the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides
that acts of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its
employees, as well as its customers, are punishable by a
penalty of termination from service. 34 To this, the LA opined
that "[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons with
whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also
answerable to the properties of its patients." 35 Moreover, the
LA observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy
regarding the taking of hospital/medical items as evidenced
by her handwritten letter,36 but nonetheless committed the
said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC's non-
filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not preclude a
determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the
filing of a criminal case is entirely separate and distinct from
43 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the determination of just cause for termination of
employment.37
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed
and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a
unique case, considering that keeping excess hospital stocks
or "hoarding" was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the
Pediatric Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC
management for a long time.40 The NLRC held that while
Sanchez expressed remorse for her misconduct in her
handwritten letter, she manifested that she only "hoarded"
the questioned items for future use in case their medical
supplies are depleted, and not for her personal benefit. 41 It
further held that SLMC failed to establish that Sanchez was
motivated by ill-will when she brought out the questioned
items, noting: (a) the testimony of SG Manzanade during the
conference before the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya masyado
nataranta,"42 and her consequent offer to return the pouch; 43
and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden underneath the
bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the punishment of
dismissal was too harsh and the one
(1) month preventive suspension already imposed on
and served by Sanchez was the appropriate
penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her
reinstatement, and the payment of backwages,
other benefits, and attorney's fees.46
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration47 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14, 2013.
Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the
NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its discretion
in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not qualify as serious
misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items found in her
possession were not SLMC property since said items were
paid for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material
or economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the retention of
excess medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst
nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; (c)
it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since
she would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez's
lack of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by
her composed demeanor upon apprehension and offer to
return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC
honestly believed that Sanchez committed theft or pilferage,
it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed
to do so.51 Moreover, while the CA recognized that SLMC had
the management prerogative to discipline its erring
employees, it, however, declared that such right must be
exercised humanely. As such, SLMC should only impose
penalties commensurate with the degree of infraction.
Considering that there was no indication that Sanchez's
actions were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful
objective, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was grossly
oppressive and disproportionate to her offense.52
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration, 53 but was
denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was
illegally dismissed by SLMC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, aptly called "management prerogative," gives
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their
discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment,
including work assignment, working methods, processes to be
followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal
and recall of workers. 55 In this light, courts often decline to
interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In
fact, labor laws discourage interference in employers'
judgment concerning the conduct of their business.56
Among the employer's management prerogatives is the right
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or
proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide
certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to
assure that the same would be complied with. At the same
time, the employee has the corollary duty to obey all
reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer;
and willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general
rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the
dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282)
of the Labor Code provides:58
Article 296.Termination by Employer. - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
44 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
representative in connection with his work;
xxxx
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this
ground, the employer's orders, regulations, or instructions
must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to
the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which
the employee has been engaged to discharge."59
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez
was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
"theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x x x or
its attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-
employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and
internal)" with termination from employment. 60 Such act is
obviously connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a staff
nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical
supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a
categorical admission61 in her handwritten letter62 - i.e.,
"[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng
gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of its express
prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still
knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It
is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the
taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty
(particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or
manner) considering that the intent to gain may be
reasonably presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another.64 Note that Section 1, Rule
1 of the SLMC Code of Discipline is further supplemented by
the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical
supplies/items for proper handling 65 and providing a
restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the SLMC
premises without the proper authorization or "pass" from the
official concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally aware
thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the
questioned items and, instead, "hoarded" them, as
purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the
Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject
of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to
the employee, and evidently connected with the latter's
work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a
just cause.
On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no
competent basis to support the common observation of the
NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies
was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric
Unit. While there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it
appears that such acts were - in similar fashion - furtively
made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found
in the concerned nurse's possession would have to be
confiscated.68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or
sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not
mean that the so-called "hoarding" practice was tolerated by
SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the
violation of the company rules regarding excess medical
supplies is immaterial since it has been established that an
infraction was deliberately committed. 69 Doubtless, the
deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him
or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the
rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. 70

Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not

suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates the
charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the
employee's liability.71 Neither is SLMC's non- filing of the
appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An
employee's guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not
determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause
for his or her dismissal.72 It is well- settled that conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for
termination of employment,73 as in this case. Criminal and
labor cases involving an employee arising from the same
infraction are separate and distinct proceedings which should
not arrest any judgment from one to the other.

As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of

Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial
evidence, and is therefore in order. By declaring otherwise,
bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a patently
and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion, which, in turn, means that the CA erred when it
affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present
petition is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 4, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's Decision dated May 27,
2012 in NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding respondent
Maria Theresa V. Sanchez to have been validly dismissed by
petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

45 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 11, 2015
G.R. No. 212054
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision2 dated November 21, 2013 and the Resolution 3
dated April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 129108 which affirmed the Decision4 dated November 19,
2012 and the Resolution5 dated January 14, 2013 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No.
06-001858-12, declaring the dismissal of respondent Maria
Theresa V. Sanchez (Sanchez) illegal.
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke's
Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and was
eventually assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric Unit
until her termination on July 6, 2011 for her purported
violation of SLMC's Code of Discipline, particularly Section 1,
Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft, Pilferage,
and Misappropriation of Funds.6
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011,
Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization
Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard
inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the course
thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG
Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag and asked her to
open the same.7 When opened, said pouch contained the
following assortment of medical stocks which were
subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b)
Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore
[1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece];
(g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4 pieces]
(questioned items).8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she
could just return the pouch inside the treatment room;
however, she was not allowed to do so. 9 Instead, she was
brought to the SLMC In-House Security Department (IHSD)
where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining
why she had the questioned items in her possession. 10 She
complied11 with the directive and also submitted an undated
handwritten letter of apology12 (handwritten letter) which
reads as follows:
To In-House Security,
46 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my bag.
Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong humihingi ng tawad sa
aking pagkakasala, Alam ko po na ako ay nagkamali. Hindi ko
po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa hospital. Hindi ko po alam
kung [paano] ako magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit
alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong makapag uwi ng gamit.
Marami pang gamit dahil sa naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa
kong makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli. Hindi ko na po
naiwan sa nurse station dahil naisip kong magagamit ko rin po
pag minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at talagang may
kailangan.
Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa. Isinakripisyo ko
ang hindi pagiging "toxic" sa pagkuha ng gamit para sa bagay
na alam kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako'y naging madamot,
pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna ko ang comfort ko keysa
gumawa ng tama. Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13
In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD, Customer Affairs
Division, through Duty Officer Hernani R. Janayon, apprised
SLMC of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez expressly
admitted that she intentionally brought out the questioned
items.1awp++i1
An initial investigation was also conducted by the SLMC
Division of Nursing15 which thereafter served Sanchez a notice
to explain.16
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report
Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that the
questioned items came from the medication drawers of
patients who had already been discharged, and, as similarly
practiced by the other staff members, she started saving
these items as excess stocks in her pouch, along with other
basic items that she uses during her shift. 18 She then put the
pouch inside the lowest drawer of the bedside table in the
treatment room for use in immediate procedures in case
replenishment of stocks gets delayed. However, on the day of
the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the
medication drawer upon getting her tri-colored pen and
calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually,
she forgot about the same as she got caught up in work, until
it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC's
premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive
suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of the
investigation by SLMC's Employee and Labor Relations
Department (ELRD)19 which, thereafter, required her to
explain why she should not be terminated from service for
"acts of dishonesty" due to her possession of the questioned
items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a letter21 dated June
13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her previous
May 31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a case
conference,22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side,
SLMC, on July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to
terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6,
2011.24 This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence,
claiming that she had no intention of bringing outside the
SLMC's premises the questioned items since she merely
inadvertently left the pouch containing them in her bag as she
got caught up in work that day. She further asserted that she
could not be found guilty of pilferage since the questioned
items found in her possession were neither SLMC's nor its
employees' property. She also stressed the fact that SLMC did
not file any criminal charges against her. Anent her supposed
admission in her handwritten letter, she claimed that she was
unassisted by counsel when she executed the same and, thus,
was inadmissible for being unconstitutional.26
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly
dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in
violation of Section 1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., robbery,
theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of funds, with
termination from service.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed 31 for intentionally
taking the property of SLMC's clients for her own personal
benefit,32 which constitutes an act of dishonesty as provided
under SLMC's Code of Discipline.
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft was evinced by her
attempt to bring the questioned items that did not belong to
her out of SLMC's premises; this was found to be analogous
to serious misconduct which is a just cause to dismiss her. 33
The fact that the items she took were neither SLMC's nor her
co-employees' property was not found by the LA to be
material since the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides
that acts of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its
employees, as well as its customers, are punishable by a
penalty of termination from service. 34 To this, the LA opined
that "[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons with
whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also
answerable to the properties of its patients." 35 Moreover, the
LA observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy
regarding the taking of hospital/medical items as evidenced
by her handwritten letter,36 but nonetheless committed the
said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC's non-
filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not preclude a
determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the
47 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
filing of a criminal case is entirely separate and distinct from
the determination of just cause for termination of
employment.37
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed
and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a
unique case, considering that keeping excess hospital stocks
or "hoarding" was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the
Pediatric Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC
management for a long time.40 The NLRC held that while
Sanchez expressed remorse for her misconduct in her
handwritten letter, she manifested that she only "hoarded"
the questioned items for future use in case their medical
supplies are depleted, and not for her personal benefit. 41 It
further held that SLMC failed to establish that Sanchez was
motivated by ill-will when she brought out the questioned
items, noting: (a) the testimony of SG Manzanade during the
conference before the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya masyado
nataranta,"42 and her consequent offer to return the pouch; 43
and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden underneath the
bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the punishment of
dismissal was too harsh and the one
(1) month preventive suspension already imposed on
and served by Sanchez was the appropriate
penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her
reinstatement, and the payment of backwages,
other benefits, and attorney's fees.46
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration47 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14, 2013.
Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the
NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its discretion
in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not qualify as serious
misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items found in her
possession were not SLMC property since said items were
paid for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material
or economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the retention of
excess medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst
nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; (c)
it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since
she would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez's
lack of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by
her composed demeanor upon apprehension and offer to
return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC
honestly believed that Sanchez committed theft or pilferage,
it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed
to do so.51 Moreover, while the CA recognized that SLMC had
the management prerogative to discipline its erring
employees, it, however, declared that such right must be
exercised humanely. As such, SLMC should only impose
penalties commensurate with the degree of infraction.
Considering that there was no indication that Sanchez's
actions were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful
objective, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was grossly
oppressive and disproportionate to her offense.52
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration, 53 but was
denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was
illegally dismissed by SLMC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, aptly called "management prerogative," gives
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their
discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment,
including work assignment, working methods, processes to be
followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal
and recall of workers. 55 In this light, courts often decline to
interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In
fact, labor laws discourage interference in employers'
judgment concerning the conduct of their business.56
Among the employer's management prerogatives is the right
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or
proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide
certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to
assure that the same would be complied with. At the same
time, the employee has the corollary duty to obey all
reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer;
and willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general
rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the
dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282)
of the Labor Code provides:58
Article 296.Termination by Employer. - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
48 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
representative in connection with his work;
xxxx
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this
ground, the employer's orders, regulations, or instructions
must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to
the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which
the employee has been engaged to discharge."59
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez
was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
"theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x x x or
its attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-
employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and
internal)" with termination from employment. 60 Such act is
obviously connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a staff
nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical
supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a
categorical admission61 in her handwritten letter62 - i.e.,
"[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng
gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of its express
prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still
knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It
is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the
taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty
(particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or
manner) considering that the intent to gain may be
reasonably presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another.64 Note that Section 1, Rule
1 of the SLMC Code of Discipline is further supplemented by
the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical
supplies/items for proper handling 65 and providing a
restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the SLMC
premises without the proper authorization or "pass" from the
official concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally aware
thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the
questioned items and, instead, "hoarded" them, as
purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the
Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject
of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to
the employee, and evidently connected with the latter's
work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a
just cause.
On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no
competent basis to support the common observation of the
NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies
was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric
Unit. While there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it
appears that such acts were - in similar fashion - furtively
made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found
in the concerned nurse's possession would have to be
confiscated.68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or
sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not
mean that the so-called "hoarding" practice was tolerated by
SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the
violation of the company rules regarding excess medical
supplies is immaterial since it has been established that an
infraction was deliberately committed. 69 Doubtless, the
deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him
or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the
rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. 70

Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not

suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates the
charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the
employee's liability.71 Neither is SLMC's non- filing of the
appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An
employee's guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not
determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause
for his or her dismissal.72 It is well- settled that conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for
termination of employment,73 as in this case. Criminal and
labor cases involving an employee arising from the same
infraction are separate and distinct proceedings which should
not arrest any judgment from one to the other.

As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of

Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial
evidence, and is therefore in order. By declaring otherwise,
bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a patently
and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion, which, in turn, means that the CA erred when it
affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present
petition is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 4, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's Decision dated May 27,
2012 in NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding respondent
Maria Theresa V. Sanchez to have been validly dismissed by
petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

49 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 13, 2017
G.R. No. 225965
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-
appellant Puyat Macapundag y Labao (Macapundag) assailing
the Decision2 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06224, which affirmed the Joint
Decision3 dated June 13, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 127 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 81014 and
81015, finding Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed
before the RTC accusing Macapundag of violating Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165, viz.:
Criminal Case No. 81014
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to P0[3] GEORGE ARDEDON 5 who
posed, as buyer, EPHEDRINE weighing 0.01 gram, a dangerous
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
therefore, knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.6
Criminal Case No. 81015
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control three
(3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing
EPHEDRINE weighing 0.02 gram, 0.01 gram & 0.02 gram,
when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive
result to the tests of Ephedrine [sic], a dangerous drug.
50 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Contrary to Law.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 to 8:30 in the
morning of March 14, 2009, an informant tipped the
Caloocan City Police that a certain individual known as alias
"Popoy" was selling shabu in Baltazar Street, 10th Avenue,
Caloocan City. Acting on the tip, Police Chief Inspector (PCI)
Christopher Prangan (PCI Prangan) ordered the conduct of a
buy-bust operation in coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), with Police Officer 3 (P03)
George Ardedon (P03 Ardedon) designated as poseur-buyer,
and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO 1) Amel Victoriano (SPOl
Victoriano) and Police Officer 2 (P02) Jeffred Pacis (P02 Pacis),
as back-up officers.8 After the team's final briefing, they
proceeded to the target area where they saw Macapundag,
who was then identified by the informant as "Popoy."
Consequently, P03 Ardedon approached Macapundag and
retorted "Brod, pakuha," followed by "Brod, paiskor naman."
Macapundag replied "Magkano?," to which P03 Ardedon
responded "Tatlong piso fang," and simultaneously handed
the three (3) marked ₱l00.00 bills. Macapundag then took
four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
gave one to P03 Ardedon, and returned the other three (3)
back to his pocket. Upon receiving the sachet, P03 Ardedon
gave the pre-arranged signal by holding his nape and then
held Macapundag, as the back-up officers rushed to the
scene. P03 Ardedon marked the plastic sachet he purchased
from Macapundag, while SPO 1 Victoriano marked the other
three (3) recovered from his pocket.9
Thereafter, they brought Macapundag to the police station,
where the seized items were turned over to P02 Randulfo
Hipolito (P02 Hipolito), the investigator on duty. 10 Later, P02
Hipolito brought the items to the crime laboratory for
physical examination.11 Eventually, Forensic Chemical
Officer-PC! Stella Ebuen (PCI Ebuen) examined the specimen,
which tested positive for ephedrine, a dangerous drug.12
In his defense, Macapundag denied the charges against him.
He testified that he was arrested on March 12, 2009, and not
on March 14, 2009 as alleged by the prosecution. At around
noon of the said date, he claimed that he was just sitting in
his house when three (3) armed men suddenly entered and
looked for a certain "Rei." He told them that "Rei" lived in the
other house, but one of the men held and handcuffed him. He
was then brought to the Sangandaan Police Station where he
was detained in a small cell. Later, he was asked to call some
relatives. When he replied that he only has his daughter, SPO
1 Victoriano hit him on the chest. After a few days, the police
demanded ₱50,000.00 from Macapundag's daughter for his
release. When he told them that he did not have that
amount, he was hit again. On March 15, 2009, he was
brought to the house of the fiscal for inquest.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision14 dated June 13, 2013, the RTC found
Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, for illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively, finding
that all the necessary elements thereof have been proven. In
particular, the prosecution was able to establish that P03
Ardedon indeed purchased a sachet of ephedrine from
Macapundag in the amount of ₱300.00. Likewise, it was
shown that three (3) other sachets of ephedrine were
recovered from Macapundag upon his arrest. 15 The RTC
further observed that the prosecution was able to
demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody over the seized
items.16 Meanwhile, the RTC gave no credence to the latter's
defenses of denial and alibi in light of his positive
identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of
regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of
their duties.17
Aggrieved, Macapundag elevated his conviction before the
CA.18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated April 22, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC
Decision in toto, finding that the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt that Macapundag illegally sold and
possessed dangerous drugs in violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165. In the same vein, the CA found that the
integrity of the seized drugs was aptly preserved and the
chain of custody was not broken, notwithstanding the fact
that the procedural requirements in Section 21 of RA 9165
were not faithfully observed.20
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
Macapundag's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Sections
5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal
cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.21 The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.22
51 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Macapundag was charged with illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165.1avvphi1 In order to secure the
conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 23 On the
other hand, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to convict an accused charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous
drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 24
Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate
any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous
drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same. It must be able to account for each
link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence
of the corpus delicti.25
In the Appellant's Brief,26 Macapundag prayed for his acquittal
in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21
of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
Particularly, he claims that they did not make any inventory
and failed to take pictures of the confiscated drugs along with
him at the scene of his arrest. There was also no justification
given as to why they failed to comply with these
requirements of law.27
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody
rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value.28 Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.29
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that P03
Ardedon (with respect to the sachet handed over by
Macapundag to him) and SPOl Victoriano (with respect to the
three sachets recovered from Macapundag upon his arrest)
marked the seized items immediately at the place of arrest.
However, the prosecution's witnesses failed to state whether
or not the police officers inventoried and photographed the ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
seized sachets in the presence of Macapundag or his suspects.42
representative. Likewise, they were silent as to the presence
of the other required witnesses, i.e., a representative from With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds
the Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected public official, petitioner's acquittal in order. As such, it is unnecessary to
and a member of the press. 30 In fact, the prosecution did not delve into the other issues raised in this case.
even offer any inventory of the seized items or photographs
thereof as evidence.31 In this relation, it is observed that the WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
Evidence Acknowledgement Receipt32 and the Affidavit of April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
Attestation,33 which form part of the evidence of the 06224 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
prosecution, likewise failed to disclose that the seized items petitioner Puyat Macapundag y Labao is ACQUITTED of the
were actually inventoried or photographed in accordance crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
with the parameters provided by Section 21 of RA 9165 and ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
its IRR; thus, their submission cannot constitute compliance lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
with the law.
SO ORDERED.
In People v. Sanchez,34the Court recognized that under varied
field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Section 21 of 9165 may not always be possible, and ruled that
Associate Justice
under the implementing guidelines of the said Section, "non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items." However, the Court added
that the prosecution bears the burden of proving justifiable
cause.35

Thus, in People v. Almorfe,36the Court stressed that for the

above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain
the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless
been preserved.37 Also, in People v. De Guzman, 38 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for noncompliance
must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist. 39

In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to

explain why the inventory and photograph of the seized
evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and
arrest or at the police station, as required by the IRR in case
of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item
was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of
Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a
representative from the DOJ, the media and an elected public
official to witness the inventory and receive copies of the
same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and
photographs of the seized items.40 Accordingly, the plurality
of the breaches of procedure committed by the police
officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised.41 It has been
repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of
RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
52 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 174113
PAZ CHENG y CHU, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated March 28, 2006 and the Resolution 3 dated
June 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
24871, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Paz Cheng
y Chu (Cheng) for three (3) counts of the crime of Estafa
defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
The instant case arose from the filing of three (3) separate
Informations4 charging Cheng of the crime of Estafa defined
and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226 (RTC),
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75440, Q-98-75441 and
Q-98-75442. According to the prosecution, private complaint
"Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered into an
agreement whereby Rodriguez shall deliver pieces of jewelry
to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis. After one
month, Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit the proceeds of
the sold jewelry; or (b) return the unsold jewelry to the
former. On different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16, 1997,
and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of
jewelry to Cheng in the respective amounts of P18,000.00,
P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery of the last batch
of jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full
security for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial security
for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to
return the unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez presented
the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored
due to insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez
re-deposited the check, but again, the same was dishonored
because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then
decided to confront Cheng, who then uttered "Akala mo,
babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was constrained to file
the instant charges.5
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from
Rodriguez or signing any document purporting to be contracts
of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a usurious
moneylender. She then admitted having an unpaid loan with
Rodriguez and that she issued a check to serve as security for
the same, but was nevertheless surprised of her arrest due to
the latter's filing of Estafa charges against her.6
53 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision7 dated December 7, 2000, the RTC found Cheng
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa
and, accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a) for the first
count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day
to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to
eight (8) years of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period (maximum); (b) for
the second count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods to six (6)
years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8)
years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (maximum); and (c) for the third
count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods to four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day to five (5) years, five (5) months, and
ten (10) days of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period (minimum).8
The RTC found that the prosecution has sufficiently proven
through documentary and testimonial evidence that: (a)
Rodriguez indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry for the
latter- to either sell and remit the proceeds or to return said
jewelry if unsold to the former; and (b) Cheng neither
returned the jewelry nor remitted their proceeds to
Rodriguez within the specified period despite the latter's
demands. In contrast, Cheng failed to substantiate her claims
through the documentary evidence she presented while her
testimony was deemed to be incredible and not worthy of
belief.9
Aggrieved, Cheng appealed10 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision11 dated March 28, 2006, the CA affirmed Cheng's
conviction for three (3) counts of Estafa, with modification as
to the penalties, as follows: (a) for the first count of Estafa
where the amount misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the second count of
Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P36,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of
prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count of
Estafa where the amount misappropriated is Pl8,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as
maximum.12
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings that the prosecution
had sufficiently established Cheng's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, pointing out that Rodriguez's testimony was "'more
candid, credible and straightforward and that 'her demeanor
in the witness stand is worthy of belief" as opposed to that of
Cheng which is highly self-serving and uncorroborated. 13
Further, the CA found that a modification of Cheng's penalties
is in order to conform with prevailing law and jurisprudence
on the matter.14
Undaunted, Cheng moved for reconsideration 15 but was
denied in a Resolution16 dated June 26, 2006; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
CA correctly affirmed Cheng's conviction for three counts of
Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit. Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC
states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos;
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be[.]
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
54 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property;
xxxx
The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1)
the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to
return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the
offender of the money or property received, or denial of
receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation,
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4)
demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.17 In the case of Pamintuan v.
People,18 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further
on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof
needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit:
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words
"convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of using or
disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed
upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.
In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a
legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the
accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return
the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.19 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that
the elements of Estafa, as defined and penalized by the afore-
cited provision, are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez
delivered the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling
them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to either
remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after
one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was
required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d)
Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as
security, but such check was dishonored twice for being
drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account;
(e) Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her
undertaking, but the latter disregarded such demand; (j)
Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the
jewelry and/or its value.
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability, Cheng
insists that Rodriguez admitted in her own testimony that the
transaction between them is not an agency on commission
basis, but a plain sale of jewelry with Rodriguez as the seller
and Cheng as the buyer.1âwphi1 As such, Cheng's non-
payment of the purchase price of the jewelry would only give
rise to civil liability and not criminal liability. 20 The pertinent
portion of Rodriguez's testimony is as follows:
Q. After the delivery of these several items totaling
P257,950.00, what happened next?
A. She issued a check worth P120,000.00.
Q. What check is that?
A. PDCP Bank, sir.
Q. What is this check for, Ms. Witness?
A. As payment for the first and second transactions, sir, for
Pl8,000.00 and P36,000.00 and the excess amount is applied
for the third transaction.
xxxx
Q. So, all in all, you have sixty (60) days period with respect to
this item, and the first delivery expired I am referring to July
12, 1997 worth P18,000.00 which will mature on September
11, so, from September 11, what happened?
A. These were considered paid because she issued me a
check for the period of August 13, so I was expecting that. 21
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Essentially, Cheng posits that since Rodriguez "admitted" in
her testimony that the check issued by the former in the
amount of Pl20,000.00 constituted full payment for the first
and second batch of jewelry and partial payment for the last
batch, the transactions entered into by the parties should be
deemed in the nature of a sale.
Cheng is sadly mistaken.
The foregoing "admission" on the part of Rodriguez did not
change the fact that her transactions with Cheng should be
properly deemed as an agency on a commission basis
whereby Rodriguez, as the owner of the jewelry, is the
principal, while Cheng is the agent who is tasked to sell the
same on commission. In the eyes of the Court, Rodriguez
merely accepted the check as full security for the first and
second batches of jewelry and as partial security for the last
batch. It was only when Cheng defaulted in her undertaking
pursuant to their agreement that Rodriguez was constrained
to treat the check as the former's remittance of the proceeds
55 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of the sale of jewelry - albeit deficient - by presenting it for
encashment on October 20, 1997, or more than two (2)
months after the delivery of the last batch of jewelry. 22
However, the check was dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds.23 This notwithstanding and with the
assurance from Cheng that the check will be cleared,
Rodriguez presented such check for the second time on
November 4, 1997; but it .was again dishonored - this time
for being drawn against a closed account. 24 As such, the fact
that Rodriguez loosely used the words "payment" and "paid"
should not be taken against her and should not in any way
change the nature of her transactions with Rodriguez from an
agency on a commission basis to a full-fledged sale.
Moreover, even Cheng does not consider such check as
payment for the jewelry, but rather, as security for the loan
she allegedly obtained from Rodriguez.
Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate from the findings
of the RTC and the CA as they have fully considered the
evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and
they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary
reasons in concluding that Cheng is indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa by
misappropriation defined and penalized under Article 315 (1)
(b) of the RPC. It is settled that factual findings of the RTC,
when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive
when supported by the evidence on record,25 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa defined and penalized
under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and is
SENTENCED as follows: (a) for the first count of Estafa where
the amount misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the second count of
Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P36,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of
prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count of
Estafa where the amount misappropriated is Pl 8,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201892               JULY 22, 2015 "representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation
of [his] father to [petitioner]." 13 After learning of the January
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner, 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount
vs. covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent. petitioner to file a complaint 14 for sum of money and
damages before the court a quo on July 2, 1998, docketed as
DECISION Civil Case No. 98-0156 (collection case).

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Respondent filed his answer, 15 contending that petitioner has
no cause of action against him. He averred that he has fully
settled Rafael's obligation and that he committed a mistake in
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
paying more than the amount due under the loan, i.e., the
Decision2 dated November 4, 2011 and the Resolution 3 dated
amount of ₱229,200.00 as adjudged by the RTC-Imus in the
May 14, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
judicial foreclosure case which, thus, warranted the return of
81258 which recalled and set aside the Orders dated
the excess payment. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of
November 3, 2003 4 and January 14, 2004 5 of the Regional
the complaint, and interposed a compulsory counterclaim for
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 202 (court a quo) in
the release of the mortgage, the return of the excess
Civil Case No. 980156, and reinstated the Decision 6 dated
payment, and the payment of moral and exemplary damages,
August 28, 2003 directing petitioner Norlinda S. Marilag
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 16
(petitioner) to return to respondent Marcelino B. Martinez
(respondent) the latter's excess payment, plus interest, and
to pay attorney's fees and the costs of suit. The Court A Quo's Ruling

The Facts In a Decision 17 dated August 28, 2003 (August 28, 2003
Decision), the court a quo denied recovery on the subject PN.
It found that the consideration for its execution was Rafael's
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's
indebtedness to petitioner, the extinguishment of which
father, obtained- from petitioner a loan in the amount of
necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the
₱160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of five
cause therefore. Considering that the RTC-Imus had adjudged
percent ( 5% ), payable within a period of (6) months. The
Rafael liable to petitioner only for the amount of
loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
₱229,200.00, for which a total of ₱400,000.00 had already
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
been paid, the court a quo found no valid or compelling
208400. Rafael failed'. to settle his obligation upon maturity
reason to allow petitioner to recover further on the subject
and despite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file a
PN. There being an excess payment of Pl 71,000.00, it
Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
declared that a quasi-contract (in the concept of solution
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 7 (RTC-lmus) on
indebiti) exists between the parties and, accordingly, directed
November 10, 1995, 8 docketed as Civil Case No. 1208-95
petitioner to return the said amount to respondent, plus 6%
(judicial foreclosure case).
interest p.a.18 reckoned from the date of judicial demand 19
on August 6, 1998 until fully paid, and to pay attorney's fees
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon petitioner's motion,
and the costs of suit. 20
was declared in default. After an ex parte presentation of
petitioner's evidence, the RTC-lmus issued a Decision 9 dated
In an Order 21 dated November 3, 2003 (November 3, 2003
January 30, 1998, (January 30, 1998 Decision) in the
Order), however, the court a quo granted petitioner's motion
foreclosure case, declaring the stipulated 5% monthly interest
for reconsideration, and recalled and set aside its August 28,
to be usurious and reducing the same to 12% per annum
2003 Decision. It declared that the causes of action in the
(p.a.). Accordingly, it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the
collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and
amount of ₱229,200.00, consisting of the principal of
respondent's failure to comply with his obligation under the
₱160,000.00 and accrued interest of ₱59,200.00 from July 30,
subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial relief. It further
1992 to September 30, 1995. 10 Records do not show that this
opined that the stipulated 5% monthly interest is no longer
Decision had already attained finality.
usurious and is binding on respondent considering the
suspension of the Usury Law pursuant to Central Bank
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, Circular 905, series of 1982. Accordingly, it directed
respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner respondent to pay the amount of ₱289,000.00 due under the
which was pegged at ₱689,000.00. After making a total subject PN, plus interest at the legal rate reckoned from the
payment of ₱400,000.00,11 he executed a promissory note 12 last extra judicial demand on May 15, 1998, until fully paid, as
dated February 20, 1998 (subject PN), binding himself to pay well as attorney's fees and the costs of suit. 22
on or before March 31, 1998 the amount of ₱289,000.00,

56 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 23
which was denied in an Order 24 dated January 14, 2004,
prompting him to elevate the matter to the CA. 25
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 26 dated November 4, 2011, the CA recalled and
set aside the court a quo 's November 3, 2003 and January
14, 2004 Orders, and reinstated the August 28, 2003 Decision.
It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the
instant case, 27 considering that both the judicial foreclosure
and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non-
payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation
secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary
consideration for the execution of the subject PN. Since res
judicata only requires substantial, not actual, identity of
causes of action and/or identity of issue, 28 it ruled that the
judgment in the judicial foreclosure case relating to Rafael's
obligation to petitioner is final and conclusive on the
collection case.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution 29 dated May 14, 2012; hence, this petition.
The Issue before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the
dismissal of the collection case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the
following elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar
the new action must be final; ( b) the decision must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be
a judgment on the merits; and ( d) there must be as between
the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.30
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds the
principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present
case. This is because the records are bereft of any indication
that the August 28, 2003 Decision in the judicial foreclosure
case had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance, by
a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case. Accordingly,
with the very first element of res judicata missing, said
principle cannot be made to obtain.
This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner's
prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead, by the
principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity
57 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the
foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior
foreclosure case barred petitioner's recourse to the
subsequent collection case.
To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation where in
another action is pending; between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to
be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; ( b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and ( c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in
the other. 31 The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the
theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than
once regarding the same subject matter and for the same
cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy
that the same subject matter should not be the subject of
controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible
conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the
stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid
the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. 32
Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the
whole cause must be determined in one action. 33To be sure,
splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but
with different prayers, where the ~round of dismissal is litis
pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).34
In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether
a cause of action is single and entire or separate is not always
easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not
by the general rules, but by reference to the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore,
is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same
act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or
the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or
contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits. 35
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule
is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action
against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt,
through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of
money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the
mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, 36 not
cumulative or successive, 37 and each remedy is complete by
itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the
real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection
of the unpaid debt,38 except only for the recovery of whatever
deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the
debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public
auction sale of the mortgaged properties. 39 Accordingly, a
deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that
the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an
amount less than the outstanding obligation.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-
mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in
order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing
discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse
to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of
the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis
pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains
pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the
promissory note executed by respondent who was not the
original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and
distinct contract of loan which would have given rise to a
separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are
bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay
Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN
extinguished by novation 40 the contract of loan between
Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or
any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation
is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally
shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the
old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that
they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, 41
which was not shown here.
On the contrary, it is significant to point out that: (a) the
consideration for the subject PN was the same consideration
that supported the original loan obligation of Rafael; (b)
respondent merely assumed to pay Rafael's remaining unpaid
balance in the latter's behalf, i.e., as Rafael's agent or
representative; 42 and (c) the subject PN was executed after
respondent had assumed to pay Rafael's obligation and made
several payments thereon. Case law states that the fact that
the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has
assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of
debtors, not novation, and the creditor may enforce the
obligation against both debtors. 43 for ready reference, the
subject PN reads in full:
February 20, 1998
PROMISSORY NOTE
₱289, 000.00
===========
I, MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ son of Mr. RAFAEL MARTINEZ, of
legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of No. 091 Anabu I-
A, Imus, Cavite, by these presents do hereby specifically and
categorically PROMISE, UNDERTAKE and bind myself in behalf
58 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of my father, to pay to Miss NORLINDA S. MARILAG,
Mortgagee-Creditor of my said father, the sum of TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (₱289,000.00),
Philippine Currency, on or before MARCH 31, 1998,
representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of
my said father to her. (Emphases supplied)
Executed at Pamplona I, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila, this
20th day of February, 1998.
Sgd.
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ
Promissory 44
Petitioner's contention that the judicial foreclosure and
collection cases enforce independent rights 45 must,
therefore, fail because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 46
and the subject PN both refer to one and the same obligation,
i.e., Rafael's loan obligation. As such, there exists only one
cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.
Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid
loan obligation by filing a petition for the judicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and,
thereafter, a personal action for the collection of the unpaid
balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising
from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against
splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for
dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this
case.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc. v. lcaranga!.47
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor
has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single
cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with
execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his
action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and
the foreclosure · of his mortgage. But both demands arise
from the same cause, the nonpayment of the debt, and, for
that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though
the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements,
the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one
and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one
cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.
Plaintiff.then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split
up his single cause of action by filing a complaint (or payment
of the debt, and thereafter another complaint (or foreclosure
of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint
will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to
file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively,
one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his
mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress
for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts
and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Further on the point, the fact that no foreclosure sale appears
to have been conducted is of no moment because the remedy
of foreclosure of mortgage is deemed chosen upon the filing
of the complaint there for.48 In Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors,
Inc. v. CA, 49 it was explained:
x x x x In sustaining the rule that prohibits mortgage creditors
from pursuing both the remedies of a personal action for
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, the Court
held in the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Esteban
Icarangal, et al. that a rule which would authorize the plaintiff
to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of
suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and equity,
but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being
sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.
Hence, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit
for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action
for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. As to extrajudicial foreclosure,
such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor
upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but
with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is
to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. (Emphases supplied)
As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure
proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now
barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for
collection,regardless of whether or not the decision in the
foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of
the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that
respondent's claim for return of excess payment partakes of
the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives
the dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should
be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
50
Records show that other than the matter of interest, the
principal loan obligation and the payments made were not
disputed by the parties.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, the Court finds
the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be excessive and
unconscionable. In a plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed
that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3°/o) per
month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable,
and exorbitant, 51 hence, illegal 52 and void for being contrary
to morals.53 In Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 54 the
Court had the occasion to rule:
Settled is the principle which this Court has affirmed in a
number of cases that stipulated interest rates of three
percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable, and exorbitant. While Central Bank Circular
No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively
59 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and
unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said
circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche
authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which
would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. Since the stipulation on the
interest rate is void for being contrary to morals, if not
against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on
said interest rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as
reason and equity demand. (Emphases supplied)
As such, the stipulated 5% monthly interest should be
equitably reduced to l % per month or 12% p.a. reckoned
from the execution of the real estate mortgage on July 30,
1992. In order to determine whether there was any
overpayment as claimed by respondent, we first compute the
interest until January 30, 1998 55 when he made a payment in
the amount of ₱300,000.00 on Rafael's loan obligation.
Accordingly, the amount due on the loan as of the latter date
is hereby computed as follows:
Principal ₱160,000.00
Add: Interest from 07/30/1992 to
01/30/1998
(₱160, 000.00 x 12% x 5.5 yrs.) 105,600.00
Amount due on the loan ₱265, 600.00
Less: Payment made on 01/30/98 (300,000.00)
Overpayment as of 01/30/98 (P 34,400.00) 56
Thus, as of January 30, 1998, only the amount of ₱265,600.00
was due under the loan contract, and the receipt of an
amount more than that renders petitioner liable for the
return of the excess. Respondent, however, made further
payment in the amount of Pl 00,000.00 57 on the belief that
the subject loan obligation had not yet been satisfied. Such
payments were, therefore, clearly made by mistake, giving
rise to the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti
under Article 2154 58 in relation to Article 2163 59 of the Civil
Code. Not being a loan or forbearance of money, an interest
of 6% p.a. should be imposed on the amount to be refunded
and on the damages and attorney's fees awarded, if any,
computed from the time of demand 60 until its satisfaction. 61
Consequently, petitioner must return to respondent the
excess payments in the total amount of ₱134,400.00, with
legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the filing of the
Answer on August 6, 1998 62 interposing a counterclaim for
such overpayment, until fully settled.
However, inasmuch as the court a quo failed to state in the
body of its decision the factual or legal basis for the award of
attorney's fees to the respondent, as required under Article
2208 63 of the New Civil Code, the Court resolves to delete the
same. The rule is well-settled that the trial court must clearly
state the reasons for awarding attorney's fees in the body of
its decision, not merely in its dispositive portion, as the
appellate courts are precluded from supplementing the bases
for such award. 64

Finally, in the absence of showing that the court a quo 's

award of the costs of suit in favor of respondent was patently
capricious, 65 the Court finds no reason to disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 4, 2011 and the Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81258 reinstating the
court a quo's Decision dated August 28, 2003 in Civil Case No.
98-0156 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS: (a)
directing petitioner Norlinda S. Marilag to return to
respondent Marcelino B. Martinez the latter's excess
payments in the total amount of ₱134,400.00, plus legal
interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on
August 6, 1998 until full satisfaction; and (b) deleting the
award of attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M.PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 169461               September 2, 2013

FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

vs.

60 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision2 dated December 6, 2004 and Resolution 3 dated
August 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67635 which annulled and set aside the Decision 4 dated
February 28, 2001 and Amended Order 5 dated September 4,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 3
(RTC) in Land Reg. Case No. N-1554 (LRA Rec. No. N-69624),
setting aside the final decree of registration issued in favor of
petitioner First Gas Power Corporation (petitioner) over the
parcels of land subject of this case.
The Facts
Through a Petition dated April 17, 1998 filed before the RTC,
petitioner sought for the original registration of two parcels
of land situated at Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City, denominated
as Lot Nos. 1298 and 1315 (subject lots), both of Cad. 264 of
the Batangas Cadastre, which consist of 4,155 and 968 square
meters, respectively.6 The case was docketed as Land Reg.
Case No. N-1554 (LRA Rec. No.N-69624) and, as a matter of
course, was called for initial hearing. No oppositor appeared
during the said hearing except Prosecutor Amelia Panganiban
who appeared in behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General
(respondent). Consequently, the RTC issued the
corresponding Order of Special Default and the reception of
evidence was delegated to the Branch Clerk of Court. 7
For land registration purposes, the subject lots were both
investigated and inspected separately by Special Land
Investigator Rodolfo A. Fernandez and Forester I Loida Y.
Maglinao of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) CENRO of Batangas City. Based on their
findings, the subject lots are within the alienable and
disposable zone under project no. 13, lc map no. 718 issued
on March 16, 1928. Also, in a letter dated January 18, 1999
from Robert C. Pangyarihan, Chief of the Surveys Division of
the DENR Region IV – Land Management Sector, copy
furnished the RTC, it is stated that the subject lots are not
portion of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey. 8
During the reception of evidence, the government, through
respondent, was given the opportunity to examine the
authenticity of the documents presented by petitioner in
support of its application for land registration as well as cross-
examine the latter’s witnesses. Without any objection from
the former, all exhibits offered by petitioner were admitted
by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not present any
evidence to contradict petitioner’s application.9
61 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
In a Decision10 dated February 28, 2001, the RTC granted
petitioner’s application for the registration of the subject lots.
It found that petitioner was able to substantiate its bona fide
claim of ownership over the subject lots as it was shown,
inter alia, that: (a) petitioner purchased Lot No. 1298 from its
previous owner, Pio Benito Aguado, by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 23, 1995, while Lot No. 1315 was
purchased from its previous owner, Glenn Manipis, as per
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 2, 1995; (b) petitioner
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, peaceful,
continuous, public, and uninterrupted possession of the
subject lots even before 1945; and (c) the subject lots had
already been declared for taxation purposes under the name
of petitioner and the corresponding realty taxes have been
equally paid by it. 11 Finding petitioner’s application to be well-
founded and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient under
the law, the RTC directed the registration of the subject lots
in favor of petitioner and the issuance of the corresponding
decree by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon finality
of its decision.12
On July 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion
(manifestation with motion), manifesting to the RTC the
existence of an LRA Report dated November 24, 1998 (LRA
Report) which states that the subject lots were previously
applied for registration and were both decided under
Cadastral Case No. 37 (Cad. Case No. 37) and, in this regard,
moved that the aforesaid decision be set aside. The said
manifestation with motion reads in part:
2. LRA Record Book of Cadastral Lots on file in this Authority
shows that lots 1298 and 1315, Cad. 264, Batangas Cadastre
were previously applied for registration of title in the
Cadastral proceedings and were both decided under
Cadastral Case No. 37, GLRO Record No. 1696, and are
subject of the following annotation, to quote:
"Lots 1298 (45-1)
1315 (61-1) Pte.De Nueva doc."
xxxx
WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles
covering the same parcels of land, the foregoing is
respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court with the
recommendation that x x x should the instant application be
granted, an order be issued setting aside the decision in the
cadastral proceeding with respect to lots 1298 and 1315,
Cad[.] 264, under Cad. Case No. 37.13 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the same pleading, petitioner maintained its prayer for the
issuance of a decree of registration in its favor. 14
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Amended Order 15 dated
September 4, 2001, (a) setting aside any decision affecting the
subject lots in Cad. Case No. 37 in view of petitioner’s
manifestation and motion and upon the LRA’s
recommendation; and (b) reiterating the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of petitioner
due to the finality of the RTC Decision, to wit:
In view of the Manifestation and Motion filed by the applicant
thru counsel and upon recommendation of the Land
Registration Authority in its Report dated November 24, 1998
together with the letter dated June 18, 1999 from Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Chief Survey[s] Division, DENR, Region IV, Land
Management Sector, stating that Lots 1298 and 1315 are not
portion of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey, this
Court hereby sets aside any decision in the cadastral
proceedings for Lots 1298 and 1315, Cad. 264, under Case No.
37, and hereby reiterates that the Land Registration Authority
may now issue the corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title as stated in the Decision dated February 28,
2001 which had attained finality. This amends the Order
dated August 6, 2001.
SO ORDERED.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Claiming that the RTC’s Amended Order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari (certiorari petition) before the CA which was initially
denied due course on November 26, 2001. Upon
reconsideration, the CA admitted respondent’s certiorari
petition and directed petitioner to file its comment thereto.
The parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. 17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated December 6, 2004, the CA granted
respondent’s certiorari petition and thereby, annulled and set
aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the
final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over
the subject lots.1âwphi1
At the outset, it noted that while the issue of the propriety of
setting aside the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 was raised, the
CA was not furnished a copy of the said decision. Thus, in a
Resolution dated September 30, 2004, it directed the LRA to
submit a copy of the same and, in relation thereto, the LRA
submitted a certification of status and certification of non-
availability of the record for the subject lots. 19 The LRA further
informed the CA that decrees of registration had already
been issued for the subject lots.20 In view of these
considerations, the CA proceeded and ruled that petitioner
should have raised in its application for registration the
existence of a decision in Cad. Case No. 37 as it is required to
prove its absolute ownership over the same and that no
62 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
controversy regarding the matter of its ownership exists. 21
Moreover, the CA pronounced that the RTC’s Amended Order
which set aside the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 was in utter
disregard of the policy of judicial stability, stating further that
only the CA can annul judgments of the RTC. 22 Finally, the CA
held that it was erroneous for the RTC to direct the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of titles without determining
the bearing of the previous decision in Cad. Case No. 37 to
petitioner as the applicant.23
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied in a Resolution dated August 23, 2005. 24
Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred
in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision and Amended
Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor
of petitioner over the subject lots.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have
a land registered in his name has the burden of proving that
he is its owner in fee simple, even though there is no
opposition thereto. As held in Republic v. Lee:25
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no
person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral
or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the
same, even though there is no opposition presented against
such registration by third persons. x x x In order that the
petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to
have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting
from the certificate of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon
him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee
simple."26 (Citation omitted)
In this case, records disclose that petitioner itself manifested
during the proceedings before the RTC that there subsists a
decision in a previous cadastral case, i.e., Cad. Case No. 37,
which covers the same lots it applied for registration.
Petitioner even posits in the present petition that it was
apprised of the existence of the foregoing decision even
before the rendition of the RTC Decision and Amended Order
through the LRA Report dated as early as November 24, 1998
which, as above-quoted, states that the subject lots "were
previously applied for registration of title in the [c]adastral
proceedings and were both decided under [Cad. Case No. 37,
GLRO Record No. 1969, and are subject to the following
annotation x x x: ‘Lots 1298 (45-1) [and] 1315 (61-1) Pte.
Nueva doc.’"27 Since it had been duly notified of an existing
decision which binds over the subject lots, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove that the said decision would not
affect its claimed status as owner of the subject lots in fee
simple.
To note, the fact that the RTC did not order petitioner to
address the matter or that it did not properly determine the
effects of the existing decision to petitioner’s application does
not justify the latter’s entitlement to have the subject lots
registered in its name. Neither can the recommendation of
the LRA to have the case set aside be perceived as an ample
justification for the RTC’s dispositions since this action is
precluded by the doctrine of judicial stability as will be
discussed below. These missteps just magnify the patent and
gross errors of the RTC in these proceedings.
jurisprudential pronouncements as herein discussed remains
staunch and unyielding. Definitively, the Court cannot
sanction the registration of the subject lots when there
stands an existing decision binding over the same. Neither
can the Court allow the RTC to set aside the ruling of a co-
equal and coordinate court. Based on these reasons, the
Court is therefore constrained to sustain the nullification of
the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the final
decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner. Notably,
this course of action is without prejudice to the re-filing of
another application for registration wherein petitioner can
prove, among others, that the decision in Cad. Case No. 37
does not affect its title to the subject lots. Petitioner may also
choose to pursue any other remedy available to it under the
law.

Further, as the CA correctly pointed out, land registration In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to
proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence, by virtue of the delve into the other ancillary issues raised before it.
publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the
subject property are deemed to be notified of the existence WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
of a cadastral case involving the subject lots. 28 In this regard, Decision dated December 6, 2004 and the Resolution dated
petitioner cannot, therefore, take refuge on the lack of any August 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
personal knowledge on its part previous to its application. 67635 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Case law dictates that a cadastral proceeding is one in rem
and binds the whole world.29 Under this doctrine, parties are SO ORDERED.
precluded from re-litigating the same issues already
determined by final judgment.30 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Moreover, as amply addressed by the CA, the RTC’s Amended
Order was issued in violation of the doctrine of judicial
stability. This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any
court of concurrent jurisdiction.31 The rationale for the same
is founded on the concept of jurisdiction – verily, a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of
all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.32 Therefore, as the RTC’s Amended Order was
issued in stark contravention of this rule, the CA correctly
ordered its nullification.

Finally, while petitioner points out to the fact that respondent

belatedly filed its certiorari petition before the CA, it must be
observed that the CA had already exercised its discretion in
giving due course to the same. Jurisprudence dictates that
the strict application of the rules on filing a petition for
certiorari may be relaxed, among others, in the exercise of
G.R. No. 179267               June 25, 2013
the sound discretion by the judge (or the CA) as guided by all
the attendant circumstances,33 as in this case.
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
Indeed, the Court can only commiserate with petitioner as it
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
has already gone through the rigors of proving its cause
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
before the RTC only to fall short of its ultimate objective. Yet,
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
the Court’s duty to uphold the principles of law and
63 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus
Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives
as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave
himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence
comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e,
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a
common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from
the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and
responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers,
prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation
of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent)
filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified
petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim
of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
64 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was
34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They
have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years
old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private
respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old;
and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful
wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other
hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from
his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took
up law, and even when she was already working part time at
a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed
upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the
fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men,
at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing
her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair
with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is
the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to
the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in
2004. He even boasted to the household help about his
sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told
private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent
on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-
Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his
paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He
beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann
begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware
of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said
that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because
of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist.
She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days
in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week
and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing
the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told
private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the
family home, that private respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner
but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she
would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he
and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to
the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations,
private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than
₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the
same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of
₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan,
where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted,
thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner
has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions
of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on
March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted
hereunder:
65 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings
from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining
Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed
by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this
order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house
is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc.
(Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private
respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling
without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the
conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides
to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things,
the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers
when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner
police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because
of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to
take her children from her when he arrives from
Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children,
mother and all her household help and driver from a
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the
gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be
temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or
otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly
or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact
directly or indirectly her children, mother and
household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters
and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be
subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM
caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the
Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives
Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel
all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also
be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in
his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and
the children, including rental of a house for them,
and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
 g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits,
bonuses and other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March
2006, which himself and as President of the
corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to
the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an
accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the
court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order
granting support pendente lite, and considering the
financial resources of the Respondent and his threat
that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single
centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private
respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20
effective for thirty (30) days, which included the
following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are
given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the
Starex Van which they are using in Negros
Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and
occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued
use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever
they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a
bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner
provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) per month until the matter of support
could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice
rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that
the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by
private respondent and returning the same to its rightful
owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a
more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
66 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet
again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed
for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the
clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and
her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of
furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the
Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight
(8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until
48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the
petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an
inventory of the household furniture, equipment and
other things in the conjugal home, which shall be
submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00
and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for
clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and
all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational
expenses of the children upon presentation of proof
of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of
financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and
committed new acts of harassment against her and their
children, private respondent filed another application 24 for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by
J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no
longer president, with the end in view of recovering the
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and
the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long
firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to
school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for
violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the
filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed
with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent
filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for
thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, acts of
violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form
with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his
friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie
J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva
Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales,
security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's
other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily
residing, as well as from the schools of the three
children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not
contact the schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay
67 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he
will have access to the children through the schools
and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .
9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental
for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006;
and support in arrears from March 2006 to August
2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-
2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan
Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with
Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to
deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to
provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the
one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or
those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua
Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially
the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other
properties which are conjugal assets or those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest
in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-
168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City
and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered
not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or
disposition of these above-cited properties to any
person, entity or corporation without the personal
presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall
affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her
signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud
her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court
extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and
gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show
cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or
modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he
has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31
dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of
said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier,
October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated
August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be
finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on
August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty
(30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing
that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity
of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an
unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day
Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement
of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate
court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise
the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court
in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to
annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
68 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT,
THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN
NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle
the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by
petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that
the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are
special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act
of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women
and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first
mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7.Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a
Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children under this
law. In the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis
supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod
City remains possessed of authority as a court of general
original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether
civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced
in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law." 46 The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that,
"plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
69 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to
the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20.Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file
an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any
cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner
that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue
of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief
which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a
statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of
R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the
non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in
nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the
same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not
need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section
25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of
a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25.Order for further hearing. - In case the court
determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that
have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to
present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both
parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent
possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity
of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis
supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to
the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or
renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time
until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the
extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed
to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the
rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP.
No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest
belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be
granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for
certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued
70 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case
from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary
manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari
before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a
judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid
only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional
or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 58 the Supreme Court of
the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in
their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in
good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity
which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo
until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk
from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have,
time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of
constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant
Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent
and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well
be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called
a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two
measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the
"Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 –
providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in
isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse, 64
nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent
portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns
and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include
domestic violence apart from against women as well as other
members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to
address domestic violence of which the main victims or the
bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the
female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that
on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of
women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused
by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the
family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective
measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in,
common-law wives, and those related with the family. 65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding
that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather
than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator
Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
71 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of
the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that
there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the
domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless
women who have not had the opportunity to file a case
against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to
include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by
the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the
already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations,
concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is
an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where
the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger,
more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the
committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure since
the other members of the family other than women are also
possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure
focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively
few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children
are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am
worried that there may not be enough protection extended
to other family members particularly children who are
excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more
or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The
same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not
available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about
granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women.
However, we should also recognize that there are established
procedures and standards in our courts which give credence
to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and
whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family
relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an
obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to
include other family members as a critical input arrived at
after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs,
experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the
other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on
the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men
and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am
not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not
because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the
amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the
amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the
rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
72 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may
maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan.
Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore.To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very
much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors.
The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children,
this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and
hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we
remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority
Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women
AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children
only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice
and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The
choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the
remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom
and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when there is a
violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently
shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of
the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
(Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we
find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men;
the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
73 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of
true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to
be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-
based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people
to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on
dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in
society. This perception leads to men gaining more power
over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a
human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination
over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and
social context of gender-based violence and developments in
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during
the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules
last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in
patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen
in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically
and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority
of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband
to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property
right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the
male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control
over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted
in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one
and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s
and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed
husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker
than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these
rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United
States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the
Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court
to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his
wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife
with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick
her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is
not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is
entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband
can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement
became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it.
These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils
of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands'
other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation
movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist
movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the
domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No
less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately
two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly
one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical Association] views
these figures as "marked underestimates," because the
nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting
them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor,
74 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
those who do not speak English well, and women who are
homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is
probably double the above estimates; or four million severely
assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-
third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or
ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in
the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely
assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes
place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical
violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers,
perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many
abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return
to their husbands, in large part because they have no other
source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be
dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics
disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality
was no less successful. The United States Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality
of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993,
the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World
conferences on the role and rights of women have been
regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status
of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full –
steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section
14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262,
entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
 Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes."
(Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence. 3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49

2,018
3 5 2 5 7 8
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,
official statistics on violence against women and children
show that –
53 37 38 46 18 54 83
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at
5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381
reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. 1,26 2,38 3,59 5,28
xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult 218 924 9,974
9 7 9 5
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608
cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total 319 223 199 182 220 208 374
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their 62 19 29 30 19 19 25
husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented 121 102 93 109 109 99 158
comparative statistics on violence against women across an
eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations
under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus: 17 11 16 24 34 152 190

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against

Women, 2004 - 2011*
16 34 23 28 18 25 22

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

90 50 59 59 83 703 183
997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042

6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,10

38 46 26 22 28 27 19 1 4 1 9 5 5 4

*2011 report covers only from January to August

194 148 185 147 204 167 268
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children
Protection Center (WCPC)

of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on
domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
75 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the
situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or
more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of
men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and
women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4
or more incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less
likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent
versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their
spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the
hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience
sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a
woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of
many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and
abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same
cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather
and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged
by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways,
streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged
as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its
application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-
drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the
reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals
that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that
the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is
not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial,
and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated
differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was
argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a
valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized
historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
76 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at
the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship
Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the
complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is
hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved
by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and
biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC
Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to
the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A.
9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her
as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate
relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and
accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks
betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender
sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or
correcting discrimination through specific measures focused
on women does not discriminate against men. 82 Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and
that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men"
law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
"(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic
violence from a private affair to a public offense will require
the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the
police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2.Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the
State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW,
which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also
ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and
their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who
suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
77 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is
not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's
body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof,
forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to
engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing
or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim
such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the
victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of
the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties
or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the
aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts
described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent
action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The
acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct
is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in
its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases like
"depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child
of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing
mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make
every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have
stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld –
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not
be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262
singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v.
Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan,
the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son
(Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
78 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in
the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due
process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts
of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to
protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur. 100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of
her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests, 103 among which is protection
of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte,
the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition
within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall
order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on
the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless
order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the
petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself
shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued. 106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
"stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds,
without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an
overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To
be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26,
2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why
the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose
not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be
an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period
(30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor.
Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.
79 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a
"blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her
conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any
stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11.Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The
protection order shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the
residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of
the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his
things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from
private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no
property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for
herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill
arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling,
the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State
to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall
not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The
reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic
and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring
parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for
protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not
a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because
the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with
the person against whom the protection order has been
sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the
exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is
placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts
as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue
and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5
(a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection
order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable
at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective
for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex
parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or
direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in
any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator
to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
80 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances,"
and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required
by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains
through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the
Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would
necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with
the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that
since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies
are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided,
an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt
in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant
case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is
an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer
of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature
is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and
for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history
of the women's movement against domestic violence shows
that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against
the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not
again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment." 118 Accordingly, the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 229826, July 30, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.PATRICIA

CABRELLOS Y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-

appellant Patricia Cabrellos y Dela Cruz (Cabrellos) assailing
the Decision2 dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02020, which affirmed the
Joint Judgment3 dated February 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45 (RTC) in Crim.
Case Nos. 05-0163-A and 05-0162-A finding Cabrellos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, respectively,
of Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

81 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations 5 filed before
the RTC charging Cabrellos with violations of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portions of which
read:
Crim. Case No. 05-0163-A
That on September 22, 2005 at about 12:45 in the afternoon
at Barangay Iniban, Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, without lawful authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously SELL and DELIVER to a
poseur buyer Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally
known as Shabu, weighing 0.08 gram, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.6
Crim. Case No. 05-0162-A
That on September 22, 2005 at 12:45 in the afternoon, more
or less, at Barangay Iniban, Ayungon, Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, control and
custody, 0.64 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, without lawful
authority.
Contrary to law.7
The prosecution alleged that on September 22, 2005 and
acting upon a tip from a confidential informant regarding
Cabrellos's alleged illegal drug activities in Ayungon, Negros
Oriental, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and the
Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group
organized a buy-bust team, with PO3 Allen June Germodo
(PO3 Germodo) acting as poseur-buyer and PO2 Glenn
Corsame (PO2 Corsame) as immediate back-up. The buy-bust
team, together with the informant, then went to Cabrellos's
house. Thereat, the informant introduced PO3 Germodo as a
shabu buyer. After PO3 Germodo gave Cabrellos the two (2)
marked P500.00 bills, Cabrellos took out two (2) plastic
sachets containing suspected shabu from her bag and handed
it over to PO3 Germodo. Upon receipt of the sachets, PO3
Germodo placed Cabrellos under arrest, with the rest of the
buy-bust team rushing to the scene. The police officers
searched Cabrellos's bag and discovered seventeen (17) more
sachets containing suspected shabu therein. The police
officers then brought Cabrellos and the seized items to the
Ayungon Police Station for the conduct of photography and
inventory of the seized items. However, since only a barangay
kagawad was present at the Ayungon Police Station at that
time, the police officers brought Cabrellos and the seized
82 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
items to the Dumaguete Police Station wherein they
conducted a second inventory, this time in the presence of a
representative each from the DOJ and the media. Thereafter,
the seized sachets were brought to the crime laboratory
where the contents thereof were confirmed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8
In her defense, Cabrellos testified that she was inside her
house tending to her child when suddenly, two (2)
unidentified persons came into their house looking for her
husband. When she told them that her husband was not
around, she was brought to the police station for selling
shabu, and there, made to sign a document already signed by
a barangay official. She was detained for three (3) months at
the Dumaguete Police Station before she was transferred to
Bais City Jail.9
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Judgment10 dated February 25, 2015, the RTC
convicted Cabrellos of the crimes charged, and accordingly,
sentenced her as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. 05-0163-A,
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 05-0162-A, to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and
to pay a fine of P300,000.00.11
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish
Cabrellos's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering that:
(a) she was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the
poseur-buyer; and (b) in the search incidental to her arrest,
she was discovered to be in possession of seventeen (17)
more sachets of shabu. On the other hand, it did not give
credence to Cabrellos' bare denial as it stood weak in the face
of the detailed and candid testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses.12
Aggrieved, Cabrellos appealed13 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 14 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed
the RTC ruling.15It held that the testimonies of the police
officers had established the fact that Cabrellos was caught in
the act of selling illegal drugs, and that in the course of her
arrest, she was found in possession of more sachets
containing illegal drugs. In this regard, the CA ruled that the
police officers substantially complied with the chain of
custody requirement as the identity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were duly established and preserved. 16
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not from confiscation for examination.24 In the case of People v.
Cabrellos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Mendoza,25 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ],
or any elected public official during the seizure and marking
The Court's Ruling of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
The appeal is meritorious. busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate
the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal
of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of
or unassigned.17 "The appeal confers the appellate court full
custody."26
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the The Court, however, clarified that under varied field
penal law."18 conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 27
In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
In this case, Cabrellos was charged with Illegal Sale and Illegal
9165 – which is now crystallized into statutory law with the
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and
passage of RA 1064028 – provide that the said inventory and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station
order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
or office of the apprehending team in instances of
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must
warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid the
and the payment.19 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an
seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.29 In
to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession
other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such
comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.20 In both
and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that
instances, case law instructs that it is essential that the
the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order
preserved.30 In People v. Almorfe,31the Court explained that
to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
chain of custody over the same and account for each link in
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence
the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
had nonetheless been preserved.32 Also, in People v. De
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 21
Guzman,33 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
the police officers must follow when handling the seized exist.34
drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.22 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the
10640,23 the apprehending team shall, among others,
police officers committed unjustified deviations from the
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
drugs allegedly seized from Cabrellos.
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be Initially, it would appear that the arresting officers complied
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a with the witness requirement during inventory, as seen in the
copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over Receipt of Property Seized35 dated September 22, 2005 which
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours contains the signatures of the required witnesses, i.e., a
83 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
public elected official, a representative from the DOJ, and a
representative from the media. However, no less than
PO3Germodo admitted in open court that they actually
conducted two (2) separate inventories in different places
and in the presence of different witnesses. Pertinent portions
of his direct testimony read:
[Pros. Yuseff Cesar Ybañez, Jr.]: After you were able to make
the said marking, were you able to take pictures with the
accused inside her house?
[PO3 Germodo]: No, sir. We only took pictures during the
inventory at the police station of Ayungon.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, after you have prepared, and signed of the
properties seized and gone with the markings of the property
seized, what did you do then, if any?
A: We conducted the inventory of the confiscated items
together with the witness, the [B]rgy. Kagawad Raul Fausto
and he signed the inventory.
Q: And after Raul Fausto signed the inventory, what
happened then, if any?
A: Since there was no report from the media [and] the
Department of Justice, we proceeded to Dumaguete City.
Q: Where did you proceed in Dumaguete City?
A: In our office.
Q: Where is your office located?
A: It is located at PNP compound, Locsin St., Dumaguete
City.
Q: After you arrived there, what happened then?
A: I called the media representative and the DOJ.
Q: And did they arrive, the media representative and the DOJ
representative?
A: Yes.
Q: After they arrived, what transpired at your office?
A: We conduct (sic) again an inventory.
Q: After conducting the second inventory, what did you do
then, if any?
A: After the inventory we made a request for PNP crime
laboratory.36
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the arresting
officers conducted two (2) separate inventories, both of
which are glaringly non compliant with the required
witnesses rule: (a) in the inventory conducted at the Ayungon
Police Station, only a public elected official – Brgy. Kagawad
84 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Raul Fausto – was present thereat; and (b) on the other hand,
the inventory conducted at the Dumaguete Police Station was
witnessed only by representatives from the DOJ and the
media. To make matters worse, the arresting officers
attempted to cover up such fact by preparing a single
inventory sheet signed by the witnesses at different times
and places. Verily, the chain of custody rule laid down by RA
9165 and its IRR contemplates a situation where the
inventory conducted on the seized items is witnessed by the
required personalities at the same time. The wordings of the
law leave no room for any piecemeal compliance with the
required witnesses rule as what happened in this case.
Otherwise, the avowed purpose of the required witnesses
rule – which is to prevent the evils of switching, planting, or
contamination of the corpus delicti resulting in the tainting of
its integrity and evidentiary value – will be greatly diminished
or even completely negated.
At this point, it is well to note that the non-compliance with
the required witnesses rule does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.37 However, a justifiable
reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and
sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced. 38 In People
v. Umipang,39 the Court held that the prosecution must show
that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable – without so
much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." 40 Verily,
mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable
as justified grounds for non-compliance. 41 These
considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning from the moment
they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing fully well that they would
have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, police officers are
compelled not only to state the reasons for their non-
compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that
they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated
procedure, and that under the given circumstance, their
actions were reasonable.42
To reiterate, PO3 Germodo admitted that they had to re-do
the inventory at the Dumaguete Police Station for it to be
witnessed by the DOJ and media representatives. However,
the re-conduct of the inventory at the Dumaguete Police
Station was no longer witnessed by the public elected official
who was left behind at the Ayungon Police Station.
Unfortunately, no excuse was offered for such mishap; and
worse, they even tried to trivialize the matter by making the
required witnesses sign a single inventory sheet despite the justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
fact that they witnessed the conduct of two (2) separate reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to
inventories. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction." 46
justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances exist
which would excuse their transgression, the Court is WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
value of the items purportedly seized from Cabrellos have H.C. No. 02020 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the Accordingly, accused-appellant Patricia Cabrellos y Dela Cruz
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the
RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving not Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause her immediate
only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any
integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders the other reason.
evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.43 It is well-settled that the SO ORDERED.
procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment
to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 44 As such, since the
prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-
compliance with the aforesaid provision, Cabrellos's acquittal
is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring

pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the subject
matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government

against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot
be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including [ GR No. 212340, Aug 17, 2016 ]
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the
mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
PEOPLE v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT +
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities,
however praiseworthy their intentions.
RESOLUTION
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of FIRST DIVISION
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 45
[ G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016 ]
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they
have the positive duty to prove compliance with the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
procedure set forth in Section 21 [, Article II] of RA 9165, as VS.GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only
acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from DECISION
the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial
court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and
ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that Before the Court is an ordinary appeal [1] filed by accused-
any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut (Manago) assailing the
threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the Decision[2] dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution [3] dated
appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure CEB-C.R. No. 01342, which affirmed the Decision [4] dated
had been completely complied with, and if not, whether March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
85 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Branch 58 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. CBU-79707, finding
Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
11, Article II[5] of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[6] otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
On April 10, 2007, an Information[7] was filed before the RTC,
charging Manago of Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined
and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 2007, at about 11:50
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, and without authority of law, did then and
there have in his possession and under his control one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic packet of white crystalline
substance weighing 5.85 grams containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride [sic], a dangerous drug,
without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
According to the prosecution, at around 9:30 in the evening
of March 15, 2007, PO3 Antonio Din (PO3 Din) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group was
waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when
two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din
identified himself as a police officer and exchanged gun shots
with the two suspects. After the shootout, one of the
suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a
red Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers of the vehicles were
noted by PO3 Din.[9]
After the incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay
Tanod Florentine Cano (Cano),[10] that the robbery suspects
were last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus, S/Insp.
George Ylanan (S/Insp. Ylanan) conducted an investigation in
the said barangay, and discovered that before the robbery
incident, Manago told Cano that three persons - namely, Rico
Lumampas, Arvin Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his
employees in his roasted chicken business, and they were to
stay in Manago's house. Further, upon verification of the
getaway vehicles with the Land Transportation Office, the
police officers found out that the motorcycle was registered
in Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was
registered in the name pf Zest-O Corporation, where Manage
worked as a District Sales Manager.[11]
With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers,
comprised of a team including PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan,
conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after the
robbery incident, or on March 16, 2007, by setting up a
checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At around 9:30 in the evening
of even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by
Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the
86 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
police officers to stop the vehicle. The police officers then
ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a
thorough search of the vehicle. As the search produced no
contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago, resulting
in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers seized the plastic
pack, arrested Manago, informed him of his constitutional
rights, and brought him and the plastic pack to their
headquarters. Upon reaching the headquarters, S/Insp.
Ylanan turned over the seized plastic pack to PO3 Joel
Taboada, who in turn, prepared a request for a laboratory
examination of the same. SPO1 Felix Gabijan then delivered
the said sachet and request to Forensic Chemist Jude Daniel
Mendoza of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who, after conducting
an examination, confirmed that the sachet contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[12]
In his defense, Manago denied possessing the plastic pack
recovered by the police officers. He claimed that at around
11:50 in the evening of March 16, 2007, he was about to start
his vehicle and was on his way home from the office when a
pick-up truck stopped in front of his car. Three (3) police
officers armed with long firearms disembarked from the said
track. One of the officers knocked on the door of Manago's
vehicle and asked for his driver's license, to which Manago
complied. When the same officer saw Manago's name on the
license, the former uttered "mao na ni (this is him)." Manago
was then ordered to sit at the back of his car as the vehicle
was driven by one of the police officers directly to the Cebu
City Police Station. After arriving at the police station,
Manago was interrogated about who the robbers were and to
divulge their whereabouts so that no criminal charges would
be filed against him. Manago claimed that he requested for a
phone call with his lawyer, as well as a copy of the warrant
for his arrest, but both requests went unheeded. After he was
dispossessed of his laptop, wallet, and two (2) mobile phones,
he was then photographed and placed in a detention cell.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Cebu City Prosecutor's
Office where he was charged with, among others, illegal
possession of shabu.[13]
Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Probable Cause and/or Motion for the Suppression of
Evidence,[14] contending, inter alia, that there is neither
probable cause nor prima facie Evidence to conduct an arrest
and search on him; as such, the item seized torn him, i.e., the
plastic sachet containing shabu, is inadmissible in evidence
pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. [15]
However, in kn Order[16] dated May 31, 2007, the RTC denied
the said motion. The RTC held that while (a) the police
officers, through PO3 Din, had no personal knowledge of
Manago's involvement in the robbery as they had to conduct
in investigation to identify him as the registered owner of the
motorcycle and (b) there was no in flagrante delicto arrest as
Manago was merely driving and gave no indication that he
was committing an offense, the RTC nevertheless held that
there was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle,
considering that PO3 Din had probable cause to believe that
Manago was part of the robbery, because the latter was
driving the getaway vehicle used in the March 15, 2007
robbery incident.[17]
On July 12, 2007, Manago was arraigned with the assistance
of counsel and pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.
[18]
During the course of the trial, the contents of the plastic
sachet were re-examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation, revealing that out of the 5.7158 grams of white
crystalline substance contained in the sachet, only 0.3852
grams is methamphetamine hydrochloride, while the rest is
potassium aluminum sulphate or tawas, which is not a
dangerous drug substance. Thus, Manago applied for and was
granted bail.[19]
The RTC Ruling
[20]
In a Decision dated March 23, 2009, the RTC found Manago
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of 0.3852
grams of shabu and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00. [21]
Echoing its earlier findings in its May 31, 2007 Order, the RTC
found that the police officers conducted a valid warrantless
search of a moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din
positively identified the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven
by Manago, as the getaway vehicle in the March 15, 2007
robbery incident. Thus, the item found in the search, i.e., the
plastic sachet containing shabu obtained from Manago, is
admissible in evidence and is enough to sustain a conviction
against him for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. [22]
Manago moved for reconsideration [23] and applied for bail
pending appeal, which were, however, both denied in an
Omnibus Order[24] dated May 12, 2009. Aggrieved, Manago
appealed his conviction before the CA.[25]
The CA Proceedings
Upon Manago's motion to post bail, the CA rendered a
Resolution[26] dated August 13, 2010, allowing Manago to post
bail in the amount of P200,000.00, noting that the quantity of
the shabu seized from him was only 0.3852 grams, thus
bailable, and that the Office of the Solicitor General did not
oppose Manago's motion.[27]
In a Decision[28] dated May 20, 2013, the CA affirmed Manago
„ conviction in toto. It held that the police officers conducted
a valid hot pursuit operation against Manago, considering
that PO3 Din personally identified him as the one driving the
87 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
red Toyota Corolla vehicle used in the March 15, 2007
robbery incident. As such, the CA concluded that the
warrantless arrest conducted against Manago was valid, and
consequently, the plastic sachet seized from him containing
shabu is admissible in evidence as it was done incidental to a
lawful arrest.[29]
Undaunted, Manago moved for reconsideration, [30] which was
denied in a Resolution[31] dated November 6, 2013; hence, the
instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
Manage's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165 should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III[32] of the 1987 Constitution mandates that
a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence
of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III [33]
of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches
and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.[34]
One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant
before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed. [35]
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant.
With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a
general rule - be complied with:
SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances
when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are:
(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of
a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped
from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. [36]
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is
essential that the element of personal knowledge must be
coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the
arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded
through the search incidental thereto will be rendered
inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the
1987 Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso,[37] the Court
explained the requirement of immediacy as follows:
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's
appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested; committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge
of facts or circumstance" under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances.
According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are
attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the
police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the
police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could
still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the
gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to
88 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police
officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to
base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances
obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the
time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to
become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the
element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily
be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the
requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating
these facts of circumstances before the police officer could
effect a valid warrantless arrest. [38] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening
of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din personally witnessed a robbery
incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at
Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After his brief shootout with the
armed robbers, the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red
Toyota Corolla. Through an investigation and verification
made by the police officers headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp.
Ylanan, they were able to: (a) find out that the armed robbers
were staying in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the
getaway vehicles to Manago. The next day, or on March 16,
2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait
where, at around 9:30 in the evening, the red Toyota Corolla
being driven by Manago passed by and was intercepted by
the police officers. The police officers then ordered Manago
to disembark the car, and from there, proceeded to search
the vehicle and the body of Manago, which search yielded the
plastic sachet containing shabu. Thereupon, they effected
Manago's arrest.
The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of
personal knowledge under Section 5 (b) above was present -
given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery
incident and even engaged the armed robbers in a shootout -
the required element of immediacy was not met. This is
because, at the time the police officers effected the
warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and
verification proceedings were already conducted, which
consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects
of the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the Court sees it,
the information the police officers had gathered therefrom
would have been enough for them to secure the necessary
warrants against the robbery suspects. However, they opted
to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which - considering the
lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal
requirements therefor. Thus, there being no valid warrantless
arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling
that Manago was lawfully arrested.
In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this
case, the CA likewise erred in ruling that the incidental search
on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said
search was made even before he was arrested and thus,
violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to lawful
arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
be made.
For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the
police officers conducted a lawful warrantless search of a
moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable.
In Caballes v. People,[39] the Court explained the concept of
warrantless searches on moving vehicles:
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing
search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction
of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place
to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. [40]
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may
entail the setup of military or police checkpoints - as in this
case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for
as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public
order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.[41]
Case law further states that routine inspections in
checkpoints are not regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable searches, and thus, permissible, if
89 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c) flashes
a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e)
where the inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.[42]
It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not
give police officers carte blanche discretion to conduct
warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When
a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search - as
opposed to a mere routine inspection - such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.[43]
In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police
officers had already conducted a thorough investigation and
verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the
identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where they
reside; and (c) the ownership of the getaway vehicles used in
the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla.
As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were
already enough for said police officers to secure the
necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects.
Consequently, there was no longer any exigent circumstance
that would have justified the necessity of setting up the
checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the
subject vehicle. In addition, it is well to point out that the
checkpoint was arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago,
who was already identified as the culprit of the robbery
incident. In this regard, it cannot, therefore, be said that the
checkpoint was meant to conduct a routinary and
indiscriminate search of moving vehicles. Rather, it was used
as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the fleeing
suspect. Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of -
nor skirt the legal requirement of - procuring a valid
search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case.
Hence, the search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and
on the person of its driver, Manago, was unlawful.
In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search
incidental thereto, including that of his moving vehicle were
all unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu
seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence
pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Manago must
necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal
liability.[44]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 20, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No. 01342 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut as hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165.

SO ORDERED.

June 28, 2017 A.C. No. 8371

SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY,

vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a complaint 1 filed by

Spouses Gerardo Montecillo and Dominga Salonoy
(complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian
(respondent) before the Office of the Bar Confidant charging
him of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for
being negligent in handling complainants' case. In a
Resolution2 dated August 9, 2010, the case was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

90 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent for an
ejectment case in which they were the defendants. 3 After
filing their Answer to the complaint, complainants received a
notice from the court setting the preliminary conference on
March 25, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants
went to respondent's office to confer with him about it, the
latter told them that he did not receive the notice and that he
could not attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict
in his schedule. Complainants expressed that they can attend
the conference even without him. He allegedly advised them
not to attend anymore as he would arrange with the court for
a new schedule when he is available. 4
Complainants relied on respondent's advice and did not
attend the preliminary conference anymore. Thereafter, they
found out that respondent not only failed to attend the
scheduled preliminary conference, but also failed to take any
steps to have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also
learned that, contrary to respondent's representation, he did
receive the notice setting the date of the preliminary
conference. Subsequently, complainant received an Order 5
dated March 25, 2009 that deemed the ejectment case
submitted for decision due to complainants' failure to appear
during the preliminary conference. When they approached
respondent about it, he belittled the matter and told them
not to worry as he would take care of it.6
Subsequently, the trial court issued a Decision 7 dated April 21,
2009 adverse to the complainants. Respondent received it on
May 4, 2009 but failed to inform complainants about the
status of the case as to enable them to prepare the next
course of action. Complainants learned about the adverse
ruling upon inquiring with the trial court only on May 13,
2009, or nine (9) days after respondent's receipt thereof,
when their period to appeal was almost about to lapse. 8
Complainants went to respondent's office wherein the latter
prepared a Notice of Appeal. Afterwards, complainants
terminated respondent's legal services and engaged another
lawyer to prepare their Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal,
the ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin. 9
In sum, complainants assail respondent's negligent and
complacent handling of their case. 10
In his Comment, 11 respondent contended that when
complainants informed him about the scheduled preliminary
conference, he told them that he would be unable to attend
due to a conflict in schedule, as he was committed to attend a
criminal case hearing in Quezon City. Nevertheless, he
instructed complainants to attend the preliminary conference
even without his appearance and inform the court about the
conflict in schedule. He denied having advised complainants
not to attend the preliminary hearing and belittled the Order
dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he alleged that the Order
dated March 25, 2009 was complainants' fault, due to their
91 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
failure to attend the preliminary conference, and upon telling
this to complainants, they terminated his legal services. 12
On June 22, 2011, while the case was pending before the IBP,
complainants filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
Complaint. 13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the IBP's Report and Recommendation14 dated August 29,
2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months for breach of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). He explained that the submission of the
ejectment case for resolution and the eventual adverse
decision against complainants were attributable to
respondent's negligence. Knowing that he had a conflict in
schedule, respondent should have prepared and filed an
appropriate motion to cause the cancellation and resetting of
the scheduled preliminary conference. Whether he advised
complainants to attend the preliminary conference on March
25, 2009 or not is immaterial. What was relevant was his
course of action when confronted with a conflict of schedule
in his court appearances. 15
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found
complainants' version of facts more in line with common
experience as opposed to respondent's version. Notably,
there was no cogent explanation why complainants would
dismiss his alleged instruction to attend the conference
without him. 16
In a Resolution17 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied m a
Resolution18 dated September 23, 2016.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and
recommendation.
Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost
diligence and competence, and never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. 19 A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients'
cause20 and, accordingly is expected to exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. 21 Consequently,
he is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote one's full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, whether it is accepted for a fee or
for free. 22 The relevant provisions of the CPR read thus:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties of
competence and diligence include not merely reviewing cases
or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of properly
representing a client before any court or tribunal, attending
scheduled hearings and conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod him to do so. 23 A
lawyer's negligence in fulfilling these duties subjects him to
disciplinary action. 24
Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed
to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in handling
complainants' case. Based on the records, he failed to file the
necessary motion to postpone the hearing due to a conflict in
his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their
opportunity to present their evidence in the ejectment case.
As complainants' counsel in the ejectment case, respondent
was expected to exercise due diligence. He should have been
more circumspect in preparing and filing the motion,
considering the serious consequence of failure to attend the
scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's
failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to a judgment, 25
as what happened in this case.
The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to
immediately inform complainants about the trial court's
adverse decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to
promptly apprise clients regarding the status of a case as
expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for
information but must advise them without delay about
matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the
present case, respondent failed to immediately notify
complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court.
Had the complainants not inquired with the trial court, they
would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason,
respondent is also administratively liable for negligence under
Rule 18.04 of the CPR.
92 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in
similar instances where lawyers neglected their clients' affairs
by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update clients
about court decisions, the Court suspended them from the
practice of law for six (6) months. In Caranza V da.de Saldivar
v. Cabanes,26a lawyer was suspended for failure to file a
pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary
conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 27 a lawyer was
likewise suspended for not attending pre-trial, failing to
inform clients about the dismissal of their case, and failing to
file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda, 28 a lawyer
suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a
scheduled hearing despite due notice, which resulted in the
submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these
cases, the Court agrees with the IBP's recommendation to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found
GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 Furthermore, let
copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
February 15, 2017 G.R. No. 222541
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner
vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
D E C I S I O N PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed the Decision 4
dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the
marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del
Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 5 of the Family Code, as
amended.6
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen
(17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in
Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. 7 Very soon, they became
romantically involved.8
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a
domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided
for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and
Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989
in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and
were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1,
1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a
church ceremony held in the Philippine Independent Church,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic
helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since, only
returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation.
Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and lot
in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija. 10
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition 11 for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In support of her
petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose
conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband
and father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and
violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days before
their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to
pay for the transportation expenses of his parents; he hit his
own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious,
which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they
were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house
in the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when
she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he
refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent
himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital
affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text
message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating:
"love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka
na lang dito."12 Another text message read: "Dumating lang
ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa
'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly,
caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their
conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse
any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly
drifted apart.13
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran
smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their
marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in
drinking sessions.14
93 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley 15 and her
sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which corroborated
her allegations, as well as the testimony 17 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag
(Dr. Tayag), who prepared the Psychological Report 18 (Report)
on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which
was primarily based on her interview with Rachel and Wesley,
stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder
(APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern
for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking
attitude that catered only to his own fancies and comfort; (c)
his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to
his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his
shortcomings.19
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition.
Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of his
marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b)
he had provided for his family's financial and emotional
needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and
maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that
although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they
nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that
their first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to
Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate
through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained
supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family
the financial aid that they need so long as she would not
sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-
marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son. 20
Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to
support his allegations.21
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the
marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and
testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes
with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties,
as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his
actions, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against
him.23
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to
seek employment, squandering of their money on vices,
violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and
permanent psychological condition that incapacitates him to
perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness,
which may be considered as grounds for legal separation
under Article 5525 of the same code.26
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling
of the RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence Rachel
presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA declared that
Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek employment, his
act of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper
and alleged propensity for violence were not so grave and
permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond sufficient to nullify
the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best,
they showed that Jose was irresponsible, insensitive, or
emotionally immature which nonetheless do not amount to
the downright incapacity that the law requires. Additionally,
the CA pointed out that the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and the
incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's
Report failed to show the relation between Jose's "deprived
childhood" and "poor home condition," on one hand, and
grave and permanent psychological malady, on the other.
Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was
detailed, it only offered a general evaluation on the supposed
root cause of Jose's personality disorder.30
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however,
denied by the CA in a Resolution 32 dated December 1, 2015;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit. The policy of the Constitution is to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution,33 and marriage as the foundation of the family. 34
Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to
nullify the marriage under Article 36 35 of the Family Code, as
amended, should refer to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.36 It should refer to no less than a mental - not
merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 37 of the Family
Code, among others,38 include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help
and support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
94 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e.,
it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved. 42 The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 in Republic v. Molina43(Molina) whose salient points
are footnoted below,44 that incorporated the basic
requirements the Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that
an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. 45 The evidence need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but
can come from persons intimately related to the spouses, i.e.,
relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the
time of the marriage.46 In other words, the Molina guidelines
continue to apply but its application calls for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. 47 To be clear,
however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the
characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and
juridical antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein
respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could
not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due
to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. 49 In Taring v.
Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as
[these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or
neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the
Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not consider
as tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other
behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning spouses in
Pesca v. Pesca,52Republic v. Encelan,53Republic v. De Gracia,54
and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a few, and thus dismissed
their petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus,
denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity
amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely
showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees;
(2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids
discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as a husband
to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and
represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an extra-
marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal
dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted
that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr.
Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized
Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with
APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw
is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply
embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood
years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component
of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair
despite any form of intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not
explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as
grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within
the jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological
incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the
concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and
to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to
what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with
his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition
has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the
law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons
why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and
how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his
marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily
concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor
home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD
equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however,
specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition
antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits
during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior
during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview
Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding
that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing
at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established
parameters do not require that the expert witness personally
95 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological
incapacity provided corroborating evidence are presented
sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters. 57
Considering that her Report was based solely on Rachel's side
whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony
deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent
standards which the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together
with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize,
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital
obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married
person.58 There must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with
the manifestations of the psychological incapacity. 59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not
a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence
establishing psychological incapacity within the context of
Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility
of the marital tie. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated
December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR.
JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR.
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m
his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE,
JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR.,
in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac,
Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and
SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the
complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore
discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before
detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American
-English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced
to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed
with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would
cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to
assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the
generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice
was later compared to the actions of American
legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor
of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration
has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists
in reference to political bills that "bring home the
bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents. 6 In a
more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an
96 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to
bring money to a representative's district. 7 Some
scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be
later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference
to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is
considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of
the funds appropriated therein were subjected to
post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in
the area of fund release, Section 3 12 provides that
the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate
and the House of Representatives. "The committee
from each House may also authorize one of its
members to approve the distribution made by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications." 14
Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same
section provides that the said secretary, "with the
approval of said joint committee, or of the
authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes
of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of
any item of appropriation under this Act to any other
item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-
enactment legislator participation broadened from
the areas of fund release and realignment to the
area of project identification. During that year, the
mechanics of the public works act was modified to
the extent that the discretion of choosing projects
was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications to legislators. "For the first
time, the law carried a list of projects selected by
Members of Congress, they ‘being the
representatives of the people, either on their own
account or by consultation with local officials or civil
leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel
process commenced with local government councils,
civil groups, and individuals appealing to
Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that
were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s
allocation, and the amount each legislator would
eventually get is determined in a caucus convened
 by the majority. The amount was then integrated
into the administration bill prepared by the
Department of Public Works and Communications.
Thereafter, the Senate and the House of
Representatives added their own provisions to the
bill until it was signed into law by the President – the
Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork
barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the
stalemate between the House of Representatives
and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was
apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law
was declared, an era when "one man controlled the
legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already
introduced a new item in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development
Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to
Local Government Units". Based on reports, 20 it was
under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate their project
preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
would release the allocation papers to the Ministry
of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue
the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the
assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported
that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the
SLDP also began to cover not only public works
projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works projects such as
those which would fall under the categories of,
among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-
1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and
the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form
of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the
"Visayas Development Fund" which were created
with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and
₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas
areas in 1989. It has been documented 23 that the
clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the
creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund"
97 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA 24 with
an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community
projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992, 25 CDF
funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing agencies but
"subject to the submission of the required list of
projects and activities."Although the GAAs from
1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of
allocations of the individual legislators, as well as
their participation in the identification of projects, it
has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives
were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each,
without any limitation or qualification, and that they
could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and
buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993, 28 the GAA explicitly
stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made
upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by, among others, individual
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article
included an allocation for the Vice-President. 29 As
such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million
each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and
the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained
the same provisions on project identification and
fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In
addition, however, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports
to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations on the releases made
from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress
and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to
submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF allocations which
shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in
the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the
House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6)
months thereafter. The same article also stated that
 the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds"
and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein
required."
The following year, or in 1998, 36 the foregoing
provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required
as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other
forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were
reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA
(called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order
to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs
"formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive
departments, they were not easily identifiable and
were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the
lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and
budget officials of the implementing agencies, as
well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the
Department of Education (DepEd) School Building
Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the
Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the
Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the
School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made
upon prior consultation with the representative of
the legislative district concerned.” 40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and
when these appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-
2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and
replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely,
the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap
Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the
"Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program
Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision
requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of
Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority
Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in
the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation
with the respective Representative of the District"
before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly
stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover,
realignment of funds to any expense category was
98 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no
amount shall be used to fund personal services and
other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF
provisions remained the same in view of the re-
enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-
2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and
straightforward as it merely contained a single
special provision ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency or local
government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003, 50 the same
single provision was present, with simply an
expansion of purpose and express authority to
realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003
budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior
consultation with Members of Congress on the
aspects of implementation delegation and project
list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA
was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF
shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects
under the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies." It also introduced the
program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently
chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA
was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the
same bases. In similar regard, the program menu
concept was consistently integrated into the 2007, 57
2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were
silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated
for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of
PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF
Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd
School Building Program and the DPWH budget,
similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior
consultation with the concerned Member of
Congress61 anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions
which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006,
 with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to
participate. For such purpose, the law stated that
"the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500
Million allotted for the construction and completion
of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs
including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its
"Operation Barrio School" program, with capability
and proven track records in the construction of
public school buildings x x x." 62 The same allocation
was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009
GAAs under the DepEd Budget. 63 Also, it was in 2007
that the Government Procurement Policy Board 64
(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29,
2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66
the Government Procurement Reform Act, to
include, as a form of negotiated procurement, 67 the
procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the
implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided
that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an
amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs." 69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to
the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an
express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken
down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30
Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was
given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President,
with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and
"soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment
of funds was included, but with the qualification that
it may be allowed only once. The same provision also
allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social
Welfare and Development, Interior and Local
Government, Environment and Natural Resources,
Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a)
realignment is within the same implementing unit
and same project category as the original project, for
infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has
not yet been obligated for the original scope of
work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated
that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x
99 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify
the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund
realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013
PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-
President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the
2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013
PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical
capability to implement the projects. 77 Legislators
were also allowed to identify programs/projects,
except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district
provided that he secures the written concurrence of
the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any
realignment of PDAF funds, modification and
revision of project identification, as well as requests
for release of funds, were all required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically
associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of Congress, the present cases and the
recent controversies on the matter have, however,
shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to
include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created
as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need
to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen,
and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic
growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the
government in the Malampaya natural gas field in
Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-
Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD
910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was
created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869,85 or
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was
similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More
than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and
 accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985, 86
amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it
stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been
described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from
the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines
have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small
part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the
"Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional
support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former
Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo
(Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid
on the huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the
form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks
were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among
legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a
high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which
could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school
buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that
Candazo identified were public funds intended for
medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale
of the money trail became the banner story of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93
"The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain
lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman,
sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens
sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the
2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately,
for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been
defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years
by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for
scores of ghost projects." 96 The investigation was
spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
100 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN"
standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy
NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds,
the whistle-blowers declared that the money was
diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. 97 Thus, after
its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)
released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF
from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years
of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the
audit was to determine the propriety of releases of
funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures
including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the
application of these funds and the implementation
of projects by the appropriate implementing
agencies and several government-owned-and-
controlled corporations (GOCCs). 101 The total
releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374
Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP,
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total
PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have
been made nationwide during the audit period. 102
Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its
Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were
made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103
● Amounts released for projects identified
by a considerable number of legislators
significantly exceeded their respective
allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects
outside of legislative districts of sponsoring
members of the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period
exceeded the total amount appropriated
under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
 ● Infrastructure projects were constructed
on private lots without these having been
turned over to the government.
● Significant amounts were released to
implementing agencies without the latter‘s
endorsement and without considering their
mandated functions, administrative and
technical capabilities to implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood
projects was not undertaken by the
implementing agencies themselves but by
NGOs endorsed by the proponent
legislators to which the Funds were
transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs
in spite of the absence of any appropriation
law or ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant
with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with
implementation of seven hundred seventy
two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion
were either found questionable, or
submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole
or in part their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as
some implementing agencies, of goods and
services reportedly used in the projects
were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers
alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in
the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." 104
According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria
Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as
of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the
CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural
antecedents in these cases are as follows:
101 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara
(Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and
Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking
any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the
"Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever
name it may be called, and from approving further releases
pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B.
Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes
San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas)
filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System,"
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013
which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-
sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional
and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad
(Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective
capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and
National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further,
they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF
and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of
the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use
of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including
the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto." 108 Also,
they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with
the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum,
discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds
from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M.
Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August
23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such
funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
the Local Development Councils in consultation with the submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven
executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of subsequently did.
Transportation, and Communication and the National
Economic Development Authority. 111 The Nepomuceno The Issues Before the Court
Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s
even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public resolution:
respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c)
issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM,
I. Procedural Issues.
National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the
persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated
remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the
petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the
GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for
issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the
standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19,
purpose of "financing energy resource development and
1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888,
exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under
entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez" 114
the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for
(Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No.
Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v.
Secretary of Budget and Management" 115 (LAMP) bar the re-
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General
litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
(OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date
System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the
partial lifting with respect to educational and medical
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO,
and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
merit.113 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their
autonomy.
respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27,
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al.
filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and
(c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes
1, 2013. as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section
8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing
to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the
Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of
technicality of the issues material to the present cases,
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor
Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute
General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
undue delegations of legislative power.
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who
would be able to competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the budgeting process
and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was
102 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they
have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law
states that the first two are the most important 119 and,
therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when
there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is embodied in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is
one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence." 122 Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised
for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
itself as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts
will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an
actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
103 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic
by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon
the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court
observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish
the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is
geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF
Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration
that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues
on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul
its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or
nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through
the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is
the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the
Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully
execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes,
Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to
implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your
Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President
has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage
over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will
continue the release of the soft projects," and that started,
Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are
anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the
releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section
38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative
Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if
the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can
he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying
to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA
Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court
can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA
Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the
President was just exercising precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA
Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and
prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF
has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in
two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court
declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish
PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence,
nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third,
when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia,
the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of
legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and
local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent
from the nature of the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and continue
to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation
of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been
lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before
104 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the
CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and
the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed
"to address the reported abuses of the PDAF" 130
demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this
finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which
is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. In Delos Santos v. CoA, 131 a recent case wherein
the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly
disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general
audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the
basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this
Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an
actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court
deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable
largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral
Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of
notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in
connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this
relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would
eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly, there is
a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative
to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of
the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so
that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional
principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by
the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of
annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the
Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free
budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course
of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim
that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different
collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 136 the
government had already backtracked on a previous course of
action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but
evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar
questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds
true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying
the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases
and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under
the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies when there
is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the
best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but
also to do them in response to the specific demands of their
constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a
solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do
not present political but legal questions which are within its
province to resolve. A political question refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
105 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that
the political branches of government are incapable of
rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only
vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer:
"The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded
concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its
effect on the political question doctrine was explained as
follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the
reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has
focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.
x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the
executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the
Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its
co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional
force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty.
Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution
of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the
endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure
that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional
grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that
each great branch of government, within its own sphere,
contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the
Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective
capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that
they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the
standing requirement given that the issues they have raised
may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during
the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves
"not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-
discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein.
Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus
standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare
decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which
means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled") are general procedural law principles which
both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar
dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the
Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation
to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle
states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
106 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however,
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively
involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF
Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call
for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel
System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal
based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to
present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate
the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the
presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the
2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the
standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the
foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the
Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the
doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152
of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge
against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was
resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context,
petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the
Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and
activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that
"the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve
the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the
only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In
deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached
the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution,
the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse,"
belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries
with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the
proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress
are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the
Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring
post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF
and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of
the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the
areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may
be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason
against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was
dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set
any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to
the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis
would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of
these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel
System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork
Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the
actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
"collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of
which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare
government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their
decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the
offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its
case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members
distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the
of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that
following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-
the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power
sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process
of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in
to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad
Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily
discretion in determining how the funds will be used or
seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows
inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a
that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority,
definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to
and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be
help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding
exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage
rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork
and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already
Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary
been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA,
public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork
has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the
recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the
Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise:
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social
"Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would
local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork
be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices
benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter,
that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated
through the respective participations of the Legislative and
the post-enactment identification authority of Members of
Executive branches of government, including its members.
Congress on the guise that the same was merely
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
discretionary funds:
inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the
ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent
case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima 155 (Abakada) has
effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-
enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the
Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing
section of this Decision.

107 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein
defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of
the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment
measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider
the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional
Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure
that allows individual legislators to wield a collective
power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein
defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its
utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit
the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed
to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in
Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government." 163 To the
legislative branch of government, through Congress, 164
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President,165 belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional
design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." 167 Thus,
"the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the
law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the
law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the
law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts
of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that
the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from
lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. 169
To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded
by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable
of independent action in exercising their respective
mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability
108 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-
interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of
powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court
decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers
may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may
interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the
doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a
function that more properly is entrusted to another." 172 In
other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily
contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase
of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects
of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual activities," the
"regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related
activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle. 174 This is
rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the
three principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them. 175 Thus, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into
the implementation of the national budget as provided under
the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget
since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of
the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on
the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress,
"in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates
an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no
money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance
with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and
passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily
comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur
the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must
"not concern it self with details for implementation by the
Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively
enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since
the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it
must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to
mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing
legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the
Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation
of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork
Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the
assignment of responsibilities between the political branches"
as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere
"way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly,
"after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and
recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration
of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield
over project implementation in complete violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers." 180 Further,
they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only
allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual
legislators limited their role to recommending projects and
not if they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of
powers principle has not been violated since the President
maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the
GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in
109 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of
members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long
as such proposal and identification are recommendatory." 183
As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions
[of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework,
and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining
feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the
authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment
phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, 185 prior
consultations186 or program menus187 – have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify
the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of
Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of
Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from
past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify
PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under
a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special
Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall,
within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a
more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and
submitted by implementing agencies from which the
legislator may make his choice. The same provision further
authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his
district for as long as the representative of the district
concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3
clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified
by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit
for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator.
Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any
modification and revision of the project identification "shall
be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement
to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be."
From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously
doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have
also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of
fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area
of fund release through congressional committees is
contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that
"all request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and
favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be";
while their statutory authority to participate in the area of
fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special
Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any
realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second ,
paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the
"Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and
Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and
Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from
this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as
Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release
of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.
The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority
is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its
ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the
same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have
nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents –
through the statements of the Solicitor General during the
Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the
legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his
PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting
the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
execution process:192
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Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s
identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be
utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the
identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is
mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that
if it is not done and then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances
when a project was implemented without the identification
by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do
not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt
very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a
need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are
triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory,
Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a
legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is
mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense,
Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot
avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to
have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares
the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement
of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices,
through which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in
fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not
been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno)
during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the
DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this
research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor
Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional
compatibility of how they were engineering the budget
process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three
lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also
been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are
now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF
provisions did was to codify in one section all the past
practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense,
we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF
Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do
not have, whether through formal measures written into the
law or informal practices institutionalized in government
agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what
the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194
legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular,
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum. 195 Based on this
provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral
body, and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and
no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power
to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b)
constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of
the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, 197 or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
111 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be
confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling
up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary
rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making). 199 The conceptual
treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative
agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of
powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative
powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate
legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making
power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF
Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which –
as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. 201 That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators
are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the
power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are
intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would
be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads
as follows:
Sec. 27.x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to
the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-
veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as
specified under the Constitution. 204 As stated in Abakada, the
final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the
bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
effect as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its
relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon,
explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the
Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the
law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known
as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions
112 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the
same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill,
except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the
legislative department of the government, but in this respect
it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be
confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the
unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge
every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in
the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of
an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases
supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on
a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as
well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary
process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s
item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of
factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good, which may happen to influence a majority of
that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it
necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which
may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field
of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the
bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an
item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item
which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation
bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his
power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of
money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for
parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of
appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the
item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President
may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and
the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be
considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully
subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an
appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each
percentage or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered
as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several
related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting
practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE
(maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case
the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for
the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally,
special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally
square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as
long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as
herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be
added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by
funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer,
or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds,
Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires
that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are
appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple
purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the
law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As
a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he
finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or
approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some
of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state
that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing authority would still have
to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended
and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the
foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of
113 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would,
in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of
the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x
system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of
the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item
later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto
power of the President mandates that appropriations bills
adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose
a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless." 213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the
Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet
the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-
sum appropriations are essential to financially address
situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted.
They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some
lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and
textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion
only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators
who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is
passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-
sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget"
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system
forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the
entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for
multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s
power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum
budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the
adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed
program, activity or project, and per implementing agency." 217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such
budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility
to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to
defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and
essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means
do not justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking
itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the
Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct,
financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly
budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-
interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has
an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-
perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the
"PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are
indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of
senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust,"
is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of
government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of
a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact
accountability from public officers.
114 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the
proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the
power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in
Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either
through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features
embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
"observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent,
the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in
effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation – a matter before another office of
government – renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate
himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel
and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of
interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a
matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and
on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the
close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this
matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not
strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute
congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability,
the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System
enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to
accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in
contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase
"as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision
does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for
legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there
appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer
from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on
this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be
able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in
Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the
1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
ARTICLE X
115 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160, 227 otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2.Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government
to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and
people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in
their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC
reveal the policy of the State to empower local government
units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-
sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl
Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment
of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is
intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement
to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self -
reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal
corporations are the small republics from which the great one
derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will
enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and
more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of
involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic.
This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the
national government in purely local affairs which are best
resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units.
The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter
of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the
Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. 230
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make
equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President
and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project." 231
Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous
legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively
small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork
Barrel complement and link the national development goals
to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed
areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23,
2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary
reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional
Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which
is to enable the representatives to identify projects for
communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford. 233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however,
finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As
a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add,
what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-
List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-
President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding
from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly
are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original
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intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the
PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective
control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole
account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are
already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within
its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, 235 their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no
law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-
enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly
put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local
development council and initiate projects on his own, and
even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of
personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district,
but has even contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the
government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to
intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel
resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and
Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of
PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and
Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental
thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12
of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental
to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the
amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. 238 In
view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are
being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when
a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same
for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and
hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative
intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not
provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the
intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held
in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or
prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in
which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time
horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past
but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress),
just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as
in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act
or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and
certainly appears from the language employed (In re
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or
in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of
Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed
in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word
appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a
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particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of
the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the
public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words
is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is
plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the
argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation
law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates
the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative
intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation
made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8.Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all
sources including receipts from service contracts and
agreements such as application and processing fees,
signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all
money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent
work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act
of 1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special
Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
reads:
Sec. 12.Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five
(5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share
of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the
Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and
shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned
principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD
910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees,
revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board
from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be
used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside,
"after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable
amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a
specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF
Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as
earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which
effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.
These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are
made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the
real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not
the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather
the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the
law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute
an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense,
only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in
violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged
the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the
same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable
amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-
making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of
(a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known
as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to
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bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent
rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure
that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are
indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness
test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second
test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence
holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners
that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to
"energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first,
the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government" states a singular
and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory
reference of specific things from which the general phrase
"for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya
Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that
it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 251
Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development is
clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under the same provision of law should nonetheless be
stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of
Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government,"
remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the
declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is
but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used –
as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed
purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been
amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘
submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to
first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines."
The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend
the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes
which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose,
however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same
fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
"priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
"priority in frastructure development projects" and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the
same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of
"infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be
deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the
underlying framework of a system, especially public services
and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and
water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as
economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to
the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of
the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions
of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel
System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context
of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners
equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be
ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their
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PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the
use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF
Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from
the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project
or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report).
Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as
follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right
to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained
in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: 256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of
public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot
be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion
of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional
duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case
before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in
the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the
writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information
sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257
(Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information
does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was
stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well
-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the
act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations,
the Court cannot grant a particular request for information.
The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted: 258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records,"
the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus
to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.
The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R.
No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard,
there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the
list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions
are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use
Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did
petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with
the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said
information be equally released to the CoA, it must be
pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party
to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to
be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official
document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations.
While the Court recognizes that the information requested is
a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to
ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted
and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important
interests of the government, it is constrained to deny
petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a
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proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only
cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list
and report and not in any way deny them, or the general
public, access to official documents which are already existing
and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and
absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these
documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte,
while the Court denied the application for mandamus
towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners
therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents
sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to
or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records
may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled
to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80
Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third
alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act
sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of
the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional
Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in
budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently,
off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not
limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund,
remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by
petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence,
lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of
Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation
accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In
response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that
enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the
year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated
September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently
reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013
GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has
been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated
by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the
TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements
thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the
continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds
as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second,
that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing
agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that
"the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of
funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the
issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such,
PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO,
should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only
covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain
that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the
implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by
the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because
they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They
conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO
by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether
or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is
a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared
herein has the consequential effect of converting the
temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the
promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining
PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently
enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of
"release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical
121 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular,
the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF
funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s
interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for
the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated
SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A
SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific
authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not
exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the
purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or
regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by
competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only
evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to
pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct
and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the
control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even
be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent
the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual
release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the
NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As
may be determined from the statements of the DBM
representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued
simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the
go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal
to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the
amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The
NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the
authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay
the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by
the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled
or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that
there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by
the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not
be treated as funds which have been "released." In this
respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds
which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this
Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.
Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013
PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot
be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court
sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an
unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the
Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910;
and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under
the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the
Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not
be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead,
respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding
special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s
pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c)
the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in
effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition
that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the
invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and
respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.
As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine
merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a
period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication." 267 "In the language of
122 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of
a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality,
is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied
prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has
persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis,
the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules
within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed
legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight,
post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution,
the system has violated the principle of separation of powers;
insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds
from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle
of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has
created a system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the
prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process,
denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it
has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by
giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an
aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor
and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again,
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as
other public funds under the broad classification of "priority
infrastructure development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of
the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms
the Court has herein pointed out should never again be
adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form,
by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally
unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the
people and its co-stewards in government to look forward
with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past.
At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate,
the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may
not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has
been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the
Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its
cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s
bounden duty and no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of
the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the
Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire
2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF
and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or
collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume
or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of
the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of
project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment,
unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal,
lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able
to fund specific projects which they themselves determine;
(d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which
the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e)
the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test
in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated
September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds
allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years,
and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social
Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not
covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by
Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated
or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds
covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds
under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund
shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special
purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
123 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of
proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘
prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the
Department of Budget and Management be ordered to
provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete
lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments
and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘
access to official documents already available and of public
record which are related to these funds must, however, not
be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on
the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the
inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of
the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch,
investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials
and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses
related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in
effect.SO ORDERED.
July 25, 2017 G.R. No. 227757
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL
A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE,
REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES,
REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, and
REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO, Petitioners
vs.
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER
RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E.
SUAREZ, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for mandamus1 filed by
petitioners Representatives Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr., (Rep.
Baguilat), Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman), Raul A. Daza, Edgar
R. Erice, Emmanuel A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin, and Gary
C. Alejano (collectively, petitioners), all members of the
House of Representatives, essentially praying that
respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker Alvarez),
Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Farifias (Rep. Fariñas), and
Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep. Suarez; collectively,
respondents), also members of the House of Representatives,
be compelled to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority
Leader of the 17th Congress of the House of Representatives;
and (b) petitioners as the legitimate members of the
Minority.
The Facts
The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17 th
Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles surfaced
about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the
adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's
Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a
"cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives (or
the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao
shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement
of President Duterte and the majority partisans. The petition
further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the
Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House
allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign
membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as
the Minority Leader.2
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, then-Acting Floor
Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had
an interchange before the Plenary, wherein the latter elicited
the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the
winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who
vote for the other candidates shall belong to the Minority;
(b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader
shall be elected by the members of the Minority. 3Thereafter,
the Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252
Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)] voting for
Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining
and one [(l)] registering a no vote," 4 thus, resulting in Speaker
Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the 17th Congress.
Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the
House - where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-
highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be
declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However,
despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat
was never recognized as such.5
On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists,"
Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon),
manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those
who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez (including the 21
"abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the
Minority Leader.6 Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now,
124 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Majority Leader) Farinas moved for the recognition of Rep.
Suarez as the Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep.
Lagman essentially on the ground that various "irregularities"
attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader,
particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the
Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez, and that his
"transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the
"abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of
Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are supposed to be
considered independent members of the House, and thus,
irregularly deemed as part of the Minority. 7 However, Rep.
Lagman's opposition was overruled, and consequently, Rep.
Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus,
insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the
Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in
the House where the candidate who garnered the second
(2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities
attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader
position.
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of
Minority Leader is an internal matter to the House of
Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot
interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of
the govemment.8 In the same vein, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez and Majority
Leader Farinas contends, inter alia, that the election of
Minority Leader is within the exclusive realm of the House of
Representatives, which the Court cannot intrude in pursuant
to the principle of separation of powers, as well as the
political question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues that the
recognition of Rep. Suarez as the House Minority Leader was
not tainted with any violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion and, thus, must be sustained.9
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for resolution is whether or not
respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to
recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only
legitimate members of the House Minority.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do the act required to be
done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such
other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw." 10 In Special
People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 11the Court explained that
the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the
ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an
adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right
to the performance of the act to be compelled.12
After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that
petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs sought.
Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held
on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas
responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to
who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives. Rep. Farinas then articulated that: (a) all
those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the
Majority and those who vote for other candidates shall
belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting
shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the
Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the
Minority.13 Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the
House proceeded without any objection from any member of
Congress, including herein petitioners. Notably, the election
of the Speaker of the House is the essential and formative
step conducted at the first regular session of the 17 th
Congress to determine the constituency of the Majority and
Minority (and later on, their respective leaders), considering
that the Majority would be comprised of those who voted for
the winning Speaker and the Minority of those who did not.
The unobjected procession of the House at this juncture is
reflected in its Journal No. 1 dated July 25, 2016, 14 which,
based on case law, is conclusive 15 as to what transpired in
Congress:
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA
Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza inquired as to who
would elect the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives.
REMARKS OF REP. FARINAS
In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the
house on membership to the Majority and the Minority. He
explained that the Members who voted for the winning
candidate for the Speaker shall constitute the Majority and
shall elect from among themselves the Majority Leader. while
those who voted against the winning Speaker or did not vote
at all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter elect
their Minority Leader.
NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE
125 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no
objection, the Members proceeded to the election of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Presiding
Officer then directed Deputy Secretary General Adasa to call
the Roll for nominal voting for the Speaker of the House and
requested each Member to state the name of the candidate
he or she will vote for.
The result of the voting was as follows:
For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez:
xxxx
For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.
xxxx
For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez
xxxx
Abstained
xxxx
With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez (P.), eight voting
for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining
and one registering a no vote, the Presiding Officer declared
Rep. Alvarez (P.) as the duly elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives for the 17th Congress.
COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION
On motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Body
constituted a committee composed of the following Members
to notify Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his election as Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to escort the Speaker-elect to
the rostrum for his oath-taking: Reps. Eric D. Singson,
Mercedes K. Alvarez, Fredenil "Fred" H. Castro, Raneo "Ranie"
E. Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A. Catamco, Elenita Milagros
"Eileen" Ermita-Buhain, Rose Marie "Baby" J. Arenas, Mylene
J. Garcia-Albano, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Marlyn L.
PrimiciasAgabas, Emmeline Aglipay-Villar, Sarah Jane I. Elago
and Victoria Isabel G. Noel.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
The Presiding Officer motu proprio suspended the session at
12:43p.m.16
After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of office, he administered
the oath of office to all Members of the House of the 17th
Congress.17 On the same day, the Deputy Speakers, and other
officers of the House (among others, the Majority Leader)
were elected and all took their respective oaths of office. 18
During his privilege speech delivered on July 26, 2016, which
was a full day after all the above-mentioned proceedings had
already been commenced and completed, Rep. Lagman
questioned Rep. Fariñas' interpretation of the Rules. 19 Aside
from the belated timing of Rep. Lagman's query, Rep. Suarez
aptly points out that the Journal for that session does not
indicate any motion made, seconded and carried to correct
the entry in the Journal of the previous session (July 25, 2016)
pertinent to any recording error that may have been made, as
to indicate that in fact, a protest or objection was raised. 20
Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show
that the House of Representatives had effectively adopted
Rep. Farinas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the
membership of the Minority, as well as the process of
determining who the Minority Leader would be. More
significantly, this demonstrates the House's deviation from
the "legal bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the
reliefs sought before this Court, namely: (a) the "long-
standing tradition" of automatically awarding the Minority
Leadership to the second placer in the Speakership Elections,
i.e., Rep. Baguilat; and (b) the rule21 that those who abstained
in the Speakership Elections should be deemed as
independent Members of the House of Representatives, and
thus, they could not have voted for a Minority Leader in the
person of Rep. Suarez.22 As will be explained hereunder, the
deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not
averse to the Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its
entire membership. Said provision also states that the House
of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these
officers are chosen is something within its sole control. 23 In
the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, 24 which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the
11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that "[w]hile
the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a
Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the
Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.'
[As such], the method of choosing who will be such other
126 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
[House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. " 25
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI 26 of the
Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws,
do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their observance
are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives].
"27 Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and
a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of
the [House of Representatives]."28
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception.
While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions
questioning an act of the political departments of
government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety
of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion.29 This stems from the expanded
concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, expressly "includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the
judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an
innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion:30
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.31
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion
brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
government."32

However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to

how the House had conducted the questioned proceedings
and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court
is hard-pressed to find any attending grave abuse of
discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By
and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal,
political branch of government which, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with.
To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the
realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the
separation of powers doctrine.33 Verily, "[i]t would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself."34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

July 26, 2017 G.R. No. 219501

POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAN LA MADRID PURISIMA,

Petitioner
vs.
HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her official capacity
as the OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by

petitioner former Police Director General Alan La Madrid
Purisima (Purisima), assailing the Decision 2 dated July 29,
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138296
and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722, which affirmed the Order 3 dated
December 3, 2014 issued by respondent Conchita Carpio
Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, preventively
suspending Purisima during the pendency of the consolidated
cases against him before the Office of the Ombudsman.
127 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The Facts
In 2011,4 the Philippine National Police (PNP) entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) with WER FAST6
Documentary Agency, Inc. (WER FAST) without going through
any public bidding. Under the MOA, the PNP undertook to
allow WER FAST to provide courier services to deliver firearm
licenses to gun owners.7 In turn, WER FAST agreed to donate
equipment for an online application system for the renewal
of firearm licenses.8 PCSupt. Napoleon R. Estilles (Estilles),
then Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) under
the Civil Security Group (CSG), signed the MOA on behalf of
the PNP. Based on the records, the incumbent PNP Chief
approved the signing of the MOA on August 24, 2011.9
Subsequently, the PNP's Legal Service (LS) was instructed to
review the signed MOA vis-a-vis a proposed revised MOA,
noting that the signed MOA had not been implemented. In a
Memorandum10 dated August 7, 2012, the LS opined that the
FEO should first formulate rules for accreditation, by which to
evaluate any company offering courier services, including
WER FAST. It further suggested that the rules should include
the qualifications of the company to be accredited, the
required scope of courier services, the creation of an
accreditation committee, provisions on strict confidentiality,
disclaimer, and grounds to terminate accreditation.11
Consequently, on November 19, 2012, the FEO Courier
Services Accreditation Board (Accreditation Board) was
constituted.12 In an undated memorandum13 entitled "Policy
on Accreditation of FEO Courier Service" (Accreditation
Policy), then CSG Director Police Director Gil Calaguio
Meneses (Meneses) laid down the criteria and procedure for
the accreditation of courier service providers, as follows:
5. QUALIFICATIONS/CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITATION
A Courier Service provided may be accredited under the
following conditions:
5.1 Applicant must be a local entity with appropriate business
permits and is duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)[;]
5.2 It has completed and submitted all its reportorial
requirements to the [SEC];
5.3 It has updated permits from [the local government unit
(LGU)] where its main office is located[;]
5.4 It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly
certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
5.5 It must have secured clearances from Directorate for
Intelligence (DI)[;]
128 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
5.6 It must have an extensive network all over the Philippines;
and
5. 7 The application shall be made in the name of the
company represented by its President or any of its key
directors as duly authorized in a board resolution for that
purpose.14 (Emphases supplied)
On December 18, 2012, Purisima was appointed as PNP
Chief.15 Thereafter, or on February 12, 2013, Meneses issued
a Memorandum16 addressed to Purisima (Meneses Memo),
stating that the CSG has accredited WER FAST as the courier
service to deliver the approved firearms license cards to gun
owners, and more importantly, recommended that the
delivery of license cards via courier be made mandatory:
7. In compliance [with] the policy guidance of the then
TACDS, now the Chief, PNP, to implement the delivery of the
approved firearms license cards to the addresses supplied by
the applicants, this office has accredited WER FAST
Documentation Agency for the purpose, after complying with
all the documentary requirements stipulated in the FEO Policy
on Accreditation.
RECOMMENDATION
8. Recommend that the delivery of firearms licenses cards of
gun owners to their registered addresses, whether newly
purchased firearms or renewed firearm licenses be made
mandatory, to give force and effect to this new intervention
to monitor and control firearms in the hands of gun owners.
9. Approval of para 8 above.17 (Emphases supplied)
Purisima approved this memorandum on February 17, 2013. 18
It was only more than a month after the Meneses Memo was
issued, or on April 1, 2013, that the Accreditation Board
issued Resolution Number 2013- 027,19 accrediting WER FAST
as a courier services provider to all FEO clients relative to the
licensing of firearms (FEO Resolution).
The Proceedings Before the Ombudsman
In 2014, two (2) complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Purisima, WER FAST, and other PNP
officials relative to the PNP's directive for gun owners to avail
of the courier delivery of firearm licenses via WER FAST. The
first complaint20 filed by a private complainant charged
Purisima, Estilles, and WER FAST of violating Republic Act (RA)
Nos. 6713,21 3019,22 7080,23 and 9184.24 He alleged, among
others, that: the MOA was not procured through competitive
bidding; it was executed before WER FAST obtained its SEC
certificate of registration; WER FAST is not authorized by the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) to
deliver mails/ parcels to the public; Purisima has close
personal ties with WER FAST's incorporator and high ranking
officer; Purisima made mandatory the use of courier service
for license delivery in favor of WER FAST; and WER FAST was
inefficient in delivering the license cards. 25 He later filed a
Manifestation and Motion26 with attached Joint-Affidavit27
executed by several PNP officials positively identifying
Purisima as the one who directed FEO-CSG to accommodate
WER FAST as the sole courier delivery service of the firearms
license cards.28 Purisima filed his Counter-Affidavit 29 on July
25, 2014.
On October 9, 2014, the second complaint 30 was filed by the
Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) - Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices (MOLEO) against several PNP officers involved in the
MOA's execution and WER FAST's accreditation as a courier
service provider. Attached to the complaint were
certifications from various government agencies attesting
that WER FAST failed to meet the qualifications for
accreditation under the Accreditation Policy. 31 As regards
Purisima, FFIB-MOLEO prayed that he be administratively
charged for gross negligence and/or gross neglect of duty,
with a prayer for preventive suspension. It alleged that
Purisima is administratively liable "for approving the
recommendation of Meneses without verifying or checking
the records and capability of [WER FAST]." 32
Purisima requested33 for additional time to file his counter-
affidavit and was granted an inextendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt of the Order34 dated December 1, 2014.
On December 3, 2014, without waiting for Purisima's counter-
affidavit, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order, 35which
preventively suspended Purisima and other PNP officers, for
six (6) months without pay.36
Purisima and another PNP official 37 filed their respective
petitions for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722, 38 which were
consolidated in a Resolution dated January 30, 2015. 39 While
these consolidated cases were pending before the CA,
Purisima resigned as PNP Chief 40 and the preventive
suspension period had lapsed.41
The CA Ruling
In a Decision42 dated July 29, 2015, the CA dismissed the
petitions and affirmed the Ombudsman's assailed
Order.1âwphi1 On the procedural aspect, the CA held that
the petitions are moot in view of the lapse of the six-month
period of preventive suspension. In particular, the CA noted
that Purisima received the Order on December 4, 2014.
Counting from this date, his period of preventive suspension
lapsed on June 4, 2015. Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to
discuss the merits of the case.43
129 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
On the merits, the CA held that the Ombudsman is authorized
under Section 24 of RA 6770 44 to preventively suspend
without pay any public officer or employee during the
pendency of an investigation. It added that the power to issue
preventive suspension order is undoubtedly a part of the
Ombudsman's investigatory and disciplinary authority. 45
The CA further held that the Ombudsman did not gravely
abuse her discretion in preventively suspending Purisima for
irregularly accrediting WER FAST as courier service provider,
noting that the two (2) requisites46 for the validity of a
preventive suspension order were present. 47First, the
Ombudsman made a prior determination that the evidence
was strong based on the documents submitted to them and
the following circumstances: (a) BIR certificate; (b) Director of
Intelligence certificate; and (c) Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) certificate.48 Particularly, WER FAST was
accredited despite non-payment of taxes for the years 2011
to 2013 as shown by the BIR certification. The Director of
Intelligence likewise issued a certification that it has not given
clearances to WER FAST. Additionally, WER FAST's business
permits for the years 2011 to 2012 indicated "consultancy" as
its business, while its Articles of Incorporation stated that the
corporation's primary purpose is to act as a business
consultant, engage in providing assistance in documentation
and registration. The DOST Postal Regulation Committee also
issued a certification that it has not accredited WER FAST as a
courier service provider. Notably, WER FAST had no proven
track record in courier service. It even engaged the services of
LBC Express, Inc. precisely because the former lacked the
capacity to deliver firearms licenses. Furthermore, it was not
compliant with the DOTC's paid-up capital requirement of
₱500,000.00 to be accredited to operate as a courier service
in two or more administrative regions in the country. To
highlight, WER FAST was accredited by PNP nationwide
despite having a paid-up capital of only ₱65,000.00. 49Second,
the charge filed against Purisima was Gross Negligence
and/or Gross Neglect of Duty, which if proven true, would
constitute a ground for his removal from public office. 50 Thus,
the CA concluded that the concurrence of the foregoing
elements rendered the preventive suspension order valid.
Aggrieved, Purisima filed the present petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not the
petition has been rendered moot and academic; and, (b) if in
the negative, whether or not the CA correctly held that the
Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in
preventively suspending Purisima.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
I.
In Ombudsman v. Capulong51 (Capulong), the Court ruled that
a case questioning the validity of a preventive suspension
order is not mooted by the supervening lifting of the same:
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive
suspension order against Capulong does not render the
petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts
from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension
order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally
mandated power and authority to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
As held in Capulong, the Court, in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, may not be precluded from passing upon the
order's validity so as to determine whether or not grave
abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the same. The
result of a finding of a grave abuse of discretion means that
the issuance is null and void from its very inception, and thus,
bars the same from producing any legal effects. Indeed, "[n]o
legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and
void."52 As such, a public officer improperly placed under
preventive suspension should be restored to his original
position, and accordingly, should have earned his salaries as if
he was not preventively suspended for the pertinent period.
"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or
use."53 In Osmeña v. Social Security System of the Phils., 54the
Court explained the consequence of a finding of mootness:
In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness - save when, among others, a compelling
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading
judicial review.55
In this case, since the propriety or impropriety of Purisima's
preventive suspension would essentially determine his
entitlement to back salaries during the six-month period
therefor, the Court holds that despite the lapse of the period
of his preventive suspension, there remains some practical
value or use in resolving his petition assailing the
Ombudsman's December 3, 2014 Order. Thus, by the same
logic in Capulong, this case cannot be considered as moot and
academic so as to obviate the Court from resolving its merits.
130 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
II.
The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue a preventive
suspension order under Section 24 of RA 6770 when two (2)
conditions are met. These are: (a) the evidence of guilt is
strong based on the Ombudsman's judgment; and (b) any of
the three (3) circumstances are present - (I) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (2) the charges would warrant removal
from service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him. Section 24 reads:
Section 24.Preventive Suspension.- The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court need not belabor on the presence of
the second condition, considering that (a) one of the charges
against Purisima is gross neglect of duty; and (b) the criminal
and administrative charges (i.e., violations of RAs 6713, 3019,
7080, and 9184, as well as gross neglect of duty) against
Purisima, if proven, would indeed warrant his removal from
office. Since Section 24 uses the disjunctive "or", 56 then the
presence of any of the three (3) stated situations would be
sufficient to comply with this condition.
As regards the first condition, case law states that the
strength of the evidence is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before her;
hence, the deliberate use of the words "in his judgment." In
Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto:57
The rule is that whether the evidence of guilt is strong, as
required in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the
evidence before him. In the very words of Section 24, the
Ombudsman may preventively suspend a public official
pending investigation if "in his judgment" the evidence
presented before him tends to show that the official's guilt is
strong and if the further requisites enumerated in Section 24
are present. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for
that of the Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion.58 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Court's deference to the Ombudsman's judgment
regarding this condition not only stems from its policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of her
prosecutorial and investigatory powers;59 it is also a conscious
recognition of the preliminary nature and purpose of a
preventive suspension order. It is well-established that: 60
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of
his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with
records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended,
removed or dismissed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a preventive measure essentially meant to ensure the
proper course of a still ongoing investigation, the
Ombudsman should thus be given ample discretion to
determine the strength of the preliminary evidence
presented before her and thereafter, decide whether or not
to issue such order against a particular respondent. In
Buenaseda v. Flavier,61 this Court explained:
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to
conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct
such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he
may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from
several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or
destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the
intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be
given the discretion to decide when the persons facing
administrative charges should be preventively suspended. 62
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
However, as in any governmental power, the Ombudsman's
authority to preventively suspend is not unlimited. When a
complaint is virtually bereft of any supporting evidence or the
evidence so cited is, on its face, clearly inadmissible, then no
deference ought to be accorded. Under these instances, the
Ombudsman may be said to have gravely abused her
discretion in finding that the first condition was met.
In the present case, the Ombudsman found that the evidence
of guilt against Purisima was strong enough to place him
under preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be said to
be tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it was based on
supporting documentary evidence, 63 none of which were
questioned to be inadmissible.1avvphi1 For one, the
Ombudsman considered the PNP officials' Joint Affidavit, 64
131 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
expressing that Purisima exerted pressure and coercion over
his subordinates to coordinate with WER FAST in relation to
the courier delivery service. The Ombudsman also cited
several circumstances sourced from the documentary
evidence that should have prodded Purisima to verify WER
FAST' s credentials and. capability to provide courier services
for the delivery of firearms licenses before he insisted on the
implementation of the MOA. These circumstances are: (a) the
absence of a public bidding before the MOA was executed;
(b) the absence of accreditation from the Accreditation Board
when Purisima approved the Meneses Memo; (c) the
Meneses Memo failed to mention the resolution supposedly
accrediting WER FAST; (d) the Accreditation Board accredited
WER FAST despite the latter's lack of proof of compliance
with the Accreditation Policy; (e) WER FAST had no proven
track record in courier services and lacked the capacity to
deliver the firearms licenses; (j) WER FAST failed to obtain the
DOTC's accreditation for authority to operate courier
services; and (g) WER FAST's failure to donate the equipment
for the online system as stated in the MOA, among others. 65
Since both conditions for the issuance of a preventive
suspension order against Purisima are present in this case,
the Court therefore holds that the Ombudsman acted within
her powers when she issued the assailed December 3, 2014
Order. In consequence, Purisima is not entitled to back
salaries during the period of his preventive suspension.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that - contrary to
Purisima's stance - the Ombudsman did not violate his right
to due process nor did she prejudge the case when she issued
the preventive suspension order before he was able to file his
counter-affidavit for the second complaint. 66
Lastimosa v. Ombudsman67already settles that the
Ombudsman may issue a preventive suspension order prior
to the filing of an answer or counter-affidavit, considering
that the same is but a preventive measure:
Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not
being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia [(106
Phil. 1031, 1034 [1960])]:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he
could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it
to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty
for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only
as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the
charges are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation
and before the charges against him are heard and be given an
opportunity to prove his innocence.
xxxx

As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier [(G.R. No. 106719, September

21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645, 655)], however, whether the
evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him.
A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving
capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar
argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court
said in that case:

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining

authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence
of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A.
No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to
the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the
administrative complaint. x x x68 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that the issuance of a

preventive suspension order does not amount to a
prejudgment of the merits of the case. 69 Neither is it a
demonstration of a public official's guilt as such
pronouncement can be done only after trial on the merits. 70

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July

29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138296
and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
June 5, 2017 G.R. No. 211166
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA, Accused-Appellant

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In a Resolution1 dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the

Decision2 dated July 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 finding accused-appellant
Porferio Culas y Raga (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and

conclusions of law in the July 25, 2013 Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 and AFFIRMS said Decision
finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under paragraph
1 (d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, with
132 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
MODIFICATIONS as to the amounts of civil indemnity and
damages awarded. Thus, [accused-appellant] is ordered to
pay the following amounts: (a) ₱l 00,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱l 00,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary awards
from the dated of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
3
However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in the
instant case, the Court received a Letter 4 dated September
16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court
of accused-appellant's death on February 8, 2014, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Death 5 attached thereto.
As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider
and set aside said Resolution dated July 18, 2014 and enter a
new one dismissing the criminal case against accused-
appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's
death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal case against him.1âwphi1 Article 89
(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
x x xx
In People v. Layag, 6the Court thoroughly explained the
effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability [,] as well as the civil liability
[,] based solely thereon.1âvvphi1 As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
133 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription. 7
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is
on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that
accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts
against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than
delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action
against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted
by law and procedural rules. 8
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's
Resolution dated July 18, 2014 in connection with this case;
(b) DISMISS Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754 before the
Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 by reason of
the death of accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga; and (c)
DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

March 13, 2017 G.R. No. 225608

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.

ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE
JESUS, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-

appellants Alberto Alejandro y Rigor (Alejandro) and Joel
Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles; collectively, accused-appellants)
assailing the Decision2 dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495, which affirmed
with modification the Joint Decision3 dated August 20, 2013
of the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 88 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96), 73-
SD(96), and 74-SD(96) convicting accused-appellants of the
crimes of Simple Rape and Homicide, defined and penalized
under Articles 3354 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
respectively.

The Facts

134 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3) separate Informations
were filed before the R TC, each charging accused-appellants
of one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1) count of
Homicide, viz.:5
Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30
o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Alejandro], with lewd design, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA 6
]gainst her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party. Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
That on or about the 5111 day of January 1996, at around
2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado],
Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with lewd design,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of one AAA against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.
Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at Brgy.
[Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro and Angeles],
together with two (2) other persons whose identities are still
unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe), conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, box, beat and stab one [BBB] on the different parts of
her body with the use of a pointed instrument, thereby
causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him as stated in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 74-
SD(96).7
While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for
the amendment of the Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-
SD(96) and 73- SD(96) to convey a conspiracy between
135 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
accused-appellants in the rape cases against AAA. The R TC
allowed the amendment of the Information in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96) to include Alejandro therein as a conspirator;
however, it disallowed the proposed amendment in Crim.
Case No. 72-SD(96) to include Angeles therein as conspirator
on the ground that Alejandro had already been arraigned in
the latter case.8 The amended Information in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96) reads:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30
o'clock in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, and in conspiracy with
one ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR @ "JESUS'', by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
[AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.9
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection
with Crim. Case Nos. 73-SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which he
pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not guilty as well.10
The prosecution alleged that on December 12, 1995, AAA
joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province of Nueva
Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they stayed at
the one-storey house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB.
Thereat, AAA would sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a
mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in the morning of
January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for
mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on the floor, AAA
saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro
and Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and
restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and
underwear down and started having carnal knowledge of her.
After Alejandro was done, he switched places with Angeles
and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to
fight back by scratching Angeles' s back, Angeles punched her
on the left side of her face while Alejandro hit her left jaw
with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke
up in a hospital, while BBB succumbed to her injuries. 11
At the hospital, the police officers interviewed AAA and
showed her several mugshots in order for her to identify her
assailants. AAA was then able to recognize Alejandro and
Angeles from said mugshots and positively identified them as
the perpetrators of the crime. Medical records also revealed
that AAA was indeed sexually assaulted, while BBB died due
to "neurogenic shock" or severe pain secondary to "multiple
blunt injury and fracture of the mandibular and facio-
maxillary bones."12
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and
presented an alibi. He averred that on the night before the
incident, he was at home with his wife and slept as early as
eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon waking up at seven (7)
o'clock in the morning of the next day, he was informed by his
brother-in-law of BBB's death. He further averred that his
relationship with BBB was like that of a mother and son. 13
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi.
He claimed that at around nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior
to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified by Noel
Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked
Alejandro to help him irrigate the rice field, but the latter
declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to Alejandro's
house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the
house was closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there
he saw Alejandro soundly asleep. Alejandro further claimed
that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing
of the charges against him.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision15 dated August 20, 2013, the RTC found
accused-appellants guilty as charged and, accordingly,
sentenced them as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96),
Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-
SD(96), accused-appellants were each sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and each ordered to pay AAA
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(c) in Crim. Case No. 7 4-SD(96), accused-appellants were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay
BBB's heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the latter's death.16
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's positive
identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crimes charged, expressly noting that AAA had no ill motive to
falsely testify against them.1âwphi1 In this light, the RTC
found untenable accused-appellants' defenses of denial and
alibi, considering too that they have failed to show that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when
the crimes against AAA and BBB were committed.17
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed18 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated June 3, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling with the following modifications: (a) in Crim. Case No.
136 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
72-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Simple Rape and, accordingly, was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Alejandro was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Simple Rape, while Angeles was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the same crime, and
accordingly, were separately sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim. Case No. 74- SD(96), accused-
appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide and, accordingly, were each sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to solidarily
pay BBB's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and P525,000.00 as temperate
damages. In addition, accused-appellants are likewise
ordered to pay legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
on all monetary awards from date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.20
It held that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable
doubt accused-appellants' complicity to the crimes charged,
as they were positively identified by AAA who had an
unobstructed view of their appearance when said crimes
were being committed. It likewise found the existence of
conspiracy in the commission of said crimes, considering that
accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and mauling
BBB, resulting in her death; and (b) took turns in having carnal
knowledge of AAA without her consent, while the other
restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting.21
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
aforesaid crimes.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that during the pendency of
the instant appeal, Alejandro filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appeal22 dated January 19, 2017, stating that despite knowing
the full consequences of the filing of said motion, he still
desires to have his appeal withdrawn. In view thereof, the
Court hereby grants said motion, and accordingly, deems the
case closed and terminated as to him. Thus, what is left
before the Court is the resolution of Angeles's appeal.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law." 23
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to
modify accused-appellants' convictions, as will be explained
hereunder.
Article 249 of the RPC states:
Article 249.Homicide.- Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the
next preceeding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide
and punished by reclusion temporal.
"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the
following elements must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed
that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4)
that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed
all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is
mortal and could cause the death of the victim without
medical intervention or attendance." 24
On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the
RPC (the controlling provision as the rapes were committed
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 8353 25 in
1997) read:
Article 335.When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
137 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) said
carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force
or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve
(12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that
if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified
Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty." 26
In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving
credence to AAA's positive identification that accused-
appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in
the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles proceeded to
rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent her
from resisting. Absent any cogent reason to the contrary, the
Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts and, thereby,
upholds Angeles's conviction for Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-
SD(96) and Homicide in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), given that
the elements of said crimes square with the established
incidents. In People v. Antonio: 27
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings,
especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this
Court, particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has
repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best
position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies because of its unique position of having observed
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity
is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can
observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the
scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant
factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process
of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally
not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect
the result of the case.28
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it
appropriate to modify Angeles's conviction in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96), as ruled by the CA. As adverted to earlier, the CA
convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of Simple Rape in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96) alone, ratiocinating that "Angeles must be
held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape in Crim. Case No.
73- SD(96) for raping AAA and for aiding (or conspiring with)
Alejandro in raping her."29
The CA erred on this matter.
The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96) states that "[Angeles], with lewd designs,
and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA]
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party." 30 Plainly, the wording of the
amended Information reveals that it charged accused-
appellants with only one (1) count of Rape. As such, it was
error for the CA to convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus,
Angeles must be convicted with one (1) count of Rape in
relation to Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96).
On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No.
73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro
as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were convicted
of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the
conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As
adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if the
rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when
it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will
be Qualified Rape, as in this instance. Notably, this will no
longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his
appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of
Qualified Rape and one (1) count of Homicide.
Anent the proper penalties to be imposed on Angeles, the CA
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
connection with Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, as regards Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96).
Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence, the Court deems it
proper to adjust the award of damages as follows: (a) in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay AAA the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(b) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay the
heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.31
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto Alejandro y Rigor's
Motion to Withdraw Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to him.
On the other hand, the appeal of accused-appellant Joel
Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles) is DENIED. The Decision dated
June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
138 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to him,
as follows:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to each
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to
pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages, with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191667               April 17, 2013
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 is the March
26, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 89732 which affirmed with modification the April 10,
2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La
Union, Branch 31, declaring inter alia the nullity of the loan
agreements entered into by petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank) and the Municipality of Agoo, La
Union (Municipality).
The Facts
From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s Sangguniang Bayan
(SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a multi-phased
plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the Agoo Public
Plaza (Agoo Plaza) where the Imelda Garden and Jose Rizal
Monument were situated.
To finance phase 1 of the said plan, the SB initially passed
Resolution No. 68-20054 on April 19, 2005, authorizing then
Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor Eriguel) to obtain a loan from
Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a 2,323.75
square meter lot situated at the southeastern portion of the
Agoo Plaza (Plaza Lot) as collateral. To serve as additional
security, it further authorized the assignment of a portion of
its internal revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly income
from the proposed project in favor of Land Bank. 5 The
foregoing terms were confirmed, approved and ratified on
October 4, 2005 through Resolution No. 139-2005. 6
Consequently, on November 21, 2005, Land Bank extended a
₱4,000,000.00 loan in favor of the Municipality (First Loan), 7
the proceeds of which were used to construct ten (10) kiosks
at the northern and southern portions of the Imelda Garden.
After completion, these kiosks were rented out. 8
On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution No. 58-2006, 9
approving the construction of a commercial center on the
Plaza Lot as part of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan. To
finance the project, Mayor Eriguel was again authorized to
obtain a loan from Land Bank, posting as well the same
securities as that of the First Loan. All previous
representations and warranties of Mayor Eriguel related to
the negotiation and obtention of the new loan 10 were ratified
on September 5, 2006 through Resolution No. 128-2006. 11 In
consequence, Land Bank granted a second loan in favor of the
Municipality on October 20, 2006 in the principal amount of
₱28,000,000.00 (Second Loan).12
Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction
of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was vehemently
objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led by
respondent Eduardo Cacayuran (Cacayuran), these residents
claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a
commercial center, as funded by the proceeds from the First
and Second Loans (Subject Loans), were "highly irregular,
violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests, and
will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and
public park."13 The foregoing was embodied in a Manifesto, 14
launched through a signature campaign conducted by the
residents and Cacayuran.
In addition, Cacayuran wrote a letter15 dated December 8,
2006 addressed to Mayor Eriguel, Vice Mayor Antonio Eslao
(Vice Mayor Eslao), and the members of the SB namely,
Violeta Laroya-Balbin, Jaime Boado, Jr., Rogelio De Vera,
James Dy, Crisogono Colubong, Ricardo Fronda, Josephus
Komiya, Erwina Eriguel, Felizardo Villanueva, and Gerard
Mamuyac (Implicated Officers), expressing the growing public
139 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
clamor against the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a
commercial center. He then requested the foregoing officers
to furnish him certified copies of various documents related
to the aforementioned conversion including, among others,
the resolutions approving the Redevelopment Plan as well as
the loan agreements for the sake of public information and
transparency.
Unable to get any response, Cacayuran, invoking his right as a
taxpayer, filed a Complaint16 against the Implicated Officers
and Land Bank, assailing, among others, the validity of the
Subject Loans on the ground that the Plaza Lot used as
collateral thereof is property of public dominion and
therefore, beyond the commerce of man. 17
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss dated December 27,
2006,18 the Implicated Officers and Land Bank filed their
respective Answers.
For its part, Land Bank claimed that it is not privy to the
Implicated Officers’ acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza. It
further asserted that Cacayuran did not have a cause of
action against it since he was not privy to any of the Subject
Loans.19
During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of
the commercial center was completed and the said structure
later became known as the Agoo’s People Center (APC).
On May 8, 2007, the SB passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-
2007,20 declaring the area where the APC stood as
patrimonial property of the Municipality.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated April 10, 2007, 21 the RTC ruled in favor of
Cacayuran, declaring the nullity of the Subject Loans. 22 It
found that the resolutions approving the said loans were
passed in a highly irregular manner and thus, ultra vires; as
such, the Municipality is not bound by the same. 23 Moreover,
it found that the Plaza Lot is proscribed from collateralization
given its nature as property for public use.24
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed its Notice of Appeal on April 23,
2007.25 On the other hand, the Implicated Officers’ appeal
was deemed abandoned and dismissed for their failure to file
an appellants’ brief despite due notice. 26 In this regard, only
Land Bank’s appeal was given due course by the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated March 26, 2010,27 the CA affirmed with
modification the RTC’s ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao
from any personal liability arising from the Subject Loans. 28
It held, among others, that: (1) Cacayuran had locus standi to
file his complaint, considering that (a) he was born, raised and
a bona fide resident of the Municipality; and (b) the issue at
hand involved public interest of transcendental importance; 29
(2) Resolution Nos. 68-2005, 139-2005, 58-2006, 128-2006
and all other related resolutions (Subject Resolutions) were
invalidly passed due to the SB’s non-compliance with certain
sections of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC); (3) the Plaza Lot,
which served as collateral for the Subject Loans, is property of
public dominion and thus, cannot be appropriated either by
the State or by private persons; 30 and (4) the Subject Loans
are ultra vires because they were transacted without proper
authority and their collateralization constituted improper
disbursement of public funds.
Dissatisfied, Land Bank filed the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for the Court’s
resolution: (1) whether Cacayuran has standing to sue; (2)
whether the Subject Resolutions were validly passed; and (3)
whether the Subject Loans are ultra vires.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
A. Cacayuran’s standing to sue
Land Bank claims that Cacayuran did not have any standing to
contest the construction of the APC as it was funded through
the proceeds coming from the Subject Loans and not from
public funds. Besides, Cacayuran was not even a party to any
of the Subject Loans and is thus, precluded from questioning
the same.
The argument is untenable.
It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that
the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. In other
words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must
be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in
doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed;
and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. 31
140 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Records reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in
the instant case.
First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily
sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which Land
Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying
that public funds derived from taxation are bound to be
expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as
a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the
Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government
unit’s just share in the national taxes, 32 is in the nature of
public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes,
however, that although these funds may be posted as a
security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective
during the incumbency of the public officers who approved
the same, else those who succeed them be effectively
deprived of its use.
In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the
Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds
by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from
private sources become impressed with the characteristics of
public funds when they are under official custody.33
Accordingly, the first requisite has been clearly met.
Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran
is directly affected by the conversion of the Agoo Plaza which
was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-
settled that public plazas are properties for public use 34 and
therefore, belongs to the public dominion. 35 As such, it can be
used by anybody and no one can exercise over it the rights of
a private owner.36 In this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest
in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for
commercial purposes through the APC’s construction.
Moreover, Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans
in order to proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, it
has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the
contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved,
people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.37
Therefore, as the above-stated requisites obtain in this case,
Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit.
B. Validity of the Subject Resolutions
Land Bank avers that the Subject Resolutions provided ample
authority for Mayor Eriguel to contract the Subject Loans. It
posits that Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC merely requires
that the municipal mayor be authorized by the SB concerned
and that such authorization need not be embodied in an
ordinance.38
A careful perusal of Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows
that while the authorization of the municipal mayor need not
be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said
local executive is authorized to enter into must be made
pursuant to a law or ordinance, viz:
Sec. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. -
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent
the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its
behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents made pursuant to law or ordinance; (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s authorization to
contract the Subject Loans was not contained – as it need not
be contained – in the form of an ordinance, the said loans and
even the Redevelopment Plan itself were not approved
pursuant to any law or ordinance but through mere
resolutions. The distinction between ordinances and
resolutions is well-perceived. While ordinances are laws and
possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are
merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary in
nature.39 As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be
conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." 40 In this
accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated Section
444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether.
Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also
tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure to
submit the Subject Resolutions to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Section 56
of the LGC;41 and (2) the lack of publication and posting in
contravention of Section 59 of the LGC.42
In fine, Land Bank cannot rely on the Subject Resolutions as
basis to validate the Subject Loans.
C. Ultra vires nature of the Subject
Loans
141 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Neither can Land Bank claim that the Subject Loans do not
constitute ultra vires acts of the officers who approved the
same.
Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the
object for which a corporation is created as defined by the
law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers
conferred upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra
vires acts. As held in Middletown Policemen's Benevolent
Association v. Township of Middletown:44
There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the
jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular
exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in
matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra
vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only
in a secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or
the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of
equity and essential justice. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In other words, an act which is outside of the municipality’s
jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act
attended only by an irregularity but remains within the
municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act
subject to ratification and/or validation. To the former
belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered into
beyond the express, implied or inherent powers of the local
government unit; and (b) do not comply with the substantive
requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds is
to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and
certificate of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs
those which (a) are entered into by the improper department,
board, officer of agent; and (b)do not comply with the formal
requirements of a written contract e.g., the Statute of
Frauds.45
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the
Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra vires acts
deemed as void.
Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the
Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the
Agoo Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the
Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of the said
plaza is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the
property’s nature as one for public use and thereby, forming
part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the
object of appropriation either by the State or by private
persons.46 Nor can it be the subject of lease or any other
contractual undertaking.47 In Villanueva v. Castañeda, Jr., 48
citing Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 49 the Court
pronounced that:
x x x Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be
devoted to public use and to be made available to the public
in general. They are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to
private parties.1âwphi1

In this relation, Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that

a contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy is considered void 50 and
as such, creates no rights or obligations or any juridical
relations.51 Consequently, given the unlawful purpose behind
the Subject Loans which is to fund the commercialization of
the Agoo Plaza pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan, they are
considered as ultra vires in the primary sense thus, rendering
them void and in effect, non-binding on the Municipality.

At this juncture, it is equally observed that the land on which

the Agoo Plaza is situated cannot be converted into
patrimonial property – as the SB tried to when it passed
Municipal Ordinance No. 02-2007 52 – absent any express
grant by the national government.53 As public land used for
public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is
subject to the administration and control of the Republic of
the Philippines.54 Hence, without the said grant, the
Municipality has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.

Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the

Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers who authorized
the passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable.
Case law states that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires,55 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the March

26, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
89732 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. March 15, 2017 G.R. No. 224834

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner

Associate Justice vs
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND
LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG
HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT
FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as
Director and Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 224871

HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND

LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN
KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods
International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director

142 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.,
Petitioners,
vs.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E.
SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE
T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON,
and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions 1 for review on
certiorari are the Decision2 dated February 15, 2016 and the
Resolution3 dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the Resolution 4
dated August 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 and,
accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to
the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the
proper legal fees.
The Facts
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited,
Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C.
Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities,
minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International,
Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of
Alliance's Board of Directors. 5 As per Alliance's by-laws, its
Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15. 6
However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at
three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board
of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a
Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM
pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering
(SRO) consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion which
was earlier approved in a Board Resolution passed on
February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29,
2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such
postponement was made "to give the stockholders of
[Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting, after
taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of
[Alliance]."7 This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the
instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 8 involving
an intra-corporate controversy against Alliance, and its other
Board members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee,
Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis,
Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance
Board). In said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally
claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the
SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to the exercise by
the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015
ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting
143 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
rights proportionate to their existing shareholdings. 9 Thus,
Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of
nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015
indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the Board
Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SR0. 10 The
Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing
fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which they paid accordingly. 11
Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended Complaint:12(a)
deleting its prayer to declare null and void the Board
Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and
(b) instead, prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from
implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a
condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.13
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay
the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have
paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO
which was valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did
not mention such capital infusion in their prayers and, as
such, were only made to pay the measly sum of ₱8,860.00.
On the other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintained that they
paid the correct filing fees, considering that the subject of
their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a
claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al.
likewise pointed out that they simply relied on the
assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to
defraud the government.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2015, the RTC dismissed
the instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to Harvest
All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees. 16 Citing Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC,17 and the Court's pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. (Lu), 18
the RTC found that the basis for the computation of filing fees
should have been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO, it being the
property in litigation. As such, Harvest All, et al. should have
paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20 Million and
not just ₱5,860.00. In this regard, the RTC also found that
Harvest All, et al.'s payment of incorrect filing fees was done
in bad faith and with clear intent to defraud the government,
considering that: (a) when the issue on correct filing fees was
first raised during the hearing on the application for TRO,
Harvest All, et al. never manifested their willingness to abide
by the Rules by paying additional filing fees when so required;
(b) despite Harvest All, et al.'s admission in their complaint
that the SRO was valued at Pl Billion, they chose to keep mum
on the meager assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and
(c) while Harvest All, et al. made mention of the SRO in the
body of their complaint, they failed to indicate the same in
their prayer, thus, preventing the Clerk of Court from making
the correct assessment of filing fees.19
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed20 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated February 15, 2016, the CA reversed the
RTC's order of dismissal and, accordingly, reinstated the case
and remanded the same to the court a quo for further
proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees. 22 Also
citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the prevailing rule is that
all intra-corporate controversies always involve a property in
litigation. Consequently, it agreed with the RTC's finding that
the basis for the computation of filing fees should have been
the ₱l Billion value of the SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et al.
should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20
Million and not just ₱5,860.00.23 However, in the absence of
contrary evidence, the CA held that Harvest All, et al. were
not in bad faith and had no intention of defrauding the
government, as they merely relied in the assessment of the
Clerk of Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, the
CA ordered the reinstatement of Harvest All, et al.' s
complaint and the remand of the same to the RTC for further
proceedings, provided that they pay the correct filing fees. 24
The parties moved for reconsideration, 25 which were,
however, denied in a Resolution 26 dated May 25, 2016.
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
The IssueBefore the Court
The primordial issues raised for the Court's resolution are: (a)
whether or not Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees
for their complaint, as the same should have been based on
the Pl Billion value of the SRO; and (b) if Harvest All, et al.
indeed paid insufficient filing fees, whether or not such act
was made in good faith and without any intent to defraud the
government.
The Court's Ruling
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition
in G.R. No. 224871 is partly granted.
I.
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct
filing fees for Harvest All, et al.'s complaint should be based
on the Pl Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially
holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary
estimation - both the RTC and the CA heavily relied on the
Court's pronouncement in Lu.In Lu, the Court mentioned that
in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which
introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
it seemed that "an intra-corporate controversy always
involves a property in litigation" and that "there can be no
144 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated."28
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest
All, et al. correctly pointed out29 that the foregoing
statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum.
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case
involving an intra-corporate controversy instituted therein,
i.e., declaration of nullity of share issuance, is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, thus, the correct docket fees were
paid.30 Despite such pronouncement, the Court still went on
to say that had the complaint therein been filed during the
effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have ruled
otherwise because the amendments brought about by the
same "seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-
corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated,"31viz.:
The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly
provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency or other cases
involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed
under Section 7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that
paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was omitted from the
reference. Said paragraph refers to docket fees for filing
"[a]ctions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated" and "all other actions not involving property."
By referring the computation of such docket fees to
paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in litigation, the value
of which is always the basis for computing the applicable
filing fees. The latest amendments seem to imply that there
can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the
value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for
a mere inspection of corporate books.
If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge
in the express phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 that
paragraph (a) alone applies.
In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed
on August 14, 2000 during which time Section 7, without
qualification, was the applicable provision. Even the Amended
Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the
applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3
shall be the basis for computing the filing fees in intra-
corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an intra-
corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated, such as an action for inspection of
corporate books. The immediate illustration shows that no
mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in
the assessment of the docket fees. 32 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in litigation" and that
"there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" are
clearly non-determinative of the antecedents involved in that
case and, hence, cannot be controlling jurisprudence to bind
our courts when it adjudicates similar cases upon the
principle of stare decisis. As it is evident, these passages in Lu
only constitute an opinion delivered by the Court as a "by the
way" in relation to a hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the
complaint was filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC, which it was not) different from the actual case before it.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, 33 the Court had the
opportunity to define an obiter dictum and discuss its legal
effects as follows:
[An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the
way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon
the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by
way of illustration, or analogy or argument. It does not
embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is
made without argument, or full consideration of the point. It
lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of
an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res
judicata."34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, therefore, the courts a quo erred in
applying the case of Lu.
II.
In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in
Lu was actually incorrect. This is because depending on the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought, an intra-
corporate controversy may involve a subject matter which is
either capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In Cabrera v. Francisco,35 the Court laid down the parameters
in determining whether an action is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation or not:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
145 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now
Regional Trial Courts). 36 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
This case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-corporate
controversy may be classified as an action whose subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A cursory perusal
of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint
reveals that its main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015
ASM on the date set in the corporation's bylaws, or at the
time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that
their voting interest with the corporation would somehow be
preserved. Thus, Harvest All, et al. sought for the nullity of
the Alliance Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which
indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM pending
completion of subscription to the SR0. 37 Certainly, Harvest All,
et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of
holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not
involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of
Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot
transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one
capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest
All, et al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement
to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was
merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the
severe dilution that their voting interest as minority
shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held
after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, a sum of money
or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be
recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it
would simply be the consequence of their principal action.
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that the Court passed
A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC38 dated October 5, 2016, which
introduced amendments to the schedule of legal fees to be
collected in various commercial cases, including those
involving intra-corporate controversies. Pertinent portions of
A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:
RESOLUTION
xxxx
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC effective 16 August 2004,
incorporated the equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed
for petitions for rehabilitation under Section 21 (i) thereof
and, furthermore, provided under Section 21(k) thereof that
the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said rule shall
apply to petitions for insolvency or other cases involving
intra-corporate controversies;
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new
schedule of filing fees as follows:
xxxx
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court is
hereby DELETED as the fees covering petitions for insolvency
are already provided for in this Resolution. As for cases
involving intra-corporate controversies, the applicable fees
shall be those provided under Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b)
(3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court depending on
the nature of the action.
xxxx
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
national circulation. The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu
thereof, the application of Section 7 (a) [fees for actions
where the value of the subject matter can be
determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for actions where the
value of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3)
[fees for all other actions not involving property] of the same
Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the
determination of the correct filing fees, as the case may be,
serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments
concretize the Court's recognition that the subject matter of
an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable of
pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were also
made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum)
implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject
matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
While the Court is not unaware that the amendments
brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only
came after the filing of the complaint subject of this case,
such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive
effect so as to make them applicable to the resolution of the
instant consolidated petitions as they merely pertained to a
procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law. In
Tan, Jr. v. CA,39 the Court thoroughly explained the retroactive
effectivity of procedural rules, viz.:
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It
has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or
146 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or
considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which
do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing, do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule
against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is
to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested
rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where
they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new
statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are
pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage.1âwphi1 Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason
is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that "a person
has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules
of procedure."40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et
al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the
appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable
fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all
other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of
Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated
October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R
TC in order:
(a) to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing
fees in the amount of ₱8,860.00, as initially assessed by the
Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M.
No. 04-02-04-SC;
(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is insufficient,
to require Harvest, et al.' s payment of any discrepancy within
a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such
payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case
with dispatch; or
(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already
sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case
with dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED,

while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED.
The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution
dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further
proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

NENITA GONZALES, SPOUSES

GENEROSA GONZALES AND
RODOLFO FERRER, SPOUSES G.R. No. 173008
FELIPE GONZALES AND
CAROLINA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES
LOLITA GONZALES AND Present:
GERMOGENES GARLITOS,
SPOUSES DOLORES GONZALES
AND FRANCISCO COSTIN,
VELASCO, JR., J.,
SPOUSES CONCHITA GONZALES
AND JONATHAN CLAVE, AND Chairperson,
SPOUSES BEATRIZ GONZALES
AND ROMY CORTES, PERALTA,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND CO- ABAD,
PETITIONER NENITA GONZALES,
Petitioners, MENDOZA, and

147 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
 PERLAS-BERNABE,JJ. to the late Imigdio Bugaay. Their children are Mariano
Bugaay, Alicia Bugaay, Amelita Bugaay, Rodolfo Bugaay,
- versus - Letecia Bugaay, Lydia Bugaay, Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen
Bugaay, respondents herein. Maximiano died single and
without issue on August 20, 1986. The spouses of petitioners,
except Nenita, a widow, and those of the respondents, except
Lydia and Belen, were joined as parties in this case.
Promulgated: In their Amended Complaint4 for Partition and
MARIANO BUGAAY AND LUCY Annulment of Documents with Damages dated February5,
BUGAAY, SPOUSES ALICIA 1991 against Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents,
BUGAAY AND FELIPE petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the only surviving children
BARCELONA, CONEY CONIE February 22, 2012 of the Spouses Ayad are Enrico and Consolacion, and that
BUGAAY, JOEY GATAN, LYDIA during the Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned several
BUGAAY, SPOUSES LUZVIMINDA agricultural as well as residential properties.
BUGAAY AND REY PAGATPATAN
AND BELEN BUGAAY, Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico executed
Respondents. fraudulent documents covering all the properties owned by
the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and respondents,
completely disregarding their rights. Thus, they prayed,
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x among others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's estate,
the nullification of the documents executed by Enrico, and
DECISION the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
As affirmative defenses5, Enrico, Consolacion and
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
respondents claimed that petitioners had long obtained their
under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
advance inheritance from the estate of the Spouses Ayad, and
dated March 23, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91381 as well as the
that the properties sought to be partitioned are now
Resolution2 dated June 2, 2006 dismissing petitioners' motion
individually titled in respondents' names.
for reconsideration. The CA reversed and set aside the
assailed Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen,
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision 6
Pangasinan, Branch 39, dated April 13, 2005 and August 8,
dated November 24, 1995, awarding one-fourth () pro-
2005, respectively, in Civil Case No. 16815, denying the
indiviso share of the estate each to Enrico, Maximiano,
demurrer to evidence filed by herein respondents and instead
Encarnacion and Consolacion as the heirs of the Spouses
dismissed petitioners' complaint.
Ayad, excluding Mariano who predeceased them. It likewise
declared the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition
The Facts executed by Enrico and respondents, as well as all other
documents and muniments of title in their names, as null and
The deceased spouses Bartolome Ayad and void. It also directed the parties to submit a project of
Marcelina Tejada (Spouses Ayad) had five (5) children: Enrico, partition within 30 days from finality of the Decision.
Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano. The
On December, 13, 1995,7 respondents filed a motion
latter, who was single, predeceased his parents on December
for reconsideration and/or new trial from the said Decision.
4, 1943. Marcelina died in September 1950 followed by
On November 7, 1996, the RTC, through Judge Eugenio
Bartolome much later on February 17, 1964.
Ramos, issued an Order which reads: in the event that within
a period of one (1) month from today, they have not yet
Enrico has remained single. Encarnacion died on
settled the case, it is understood that the motion for
April 8, 1966 and is survived by her children, Nenita Gonzales,
Generosa Gonzales, Felipe Gonzales, Lolita Gonzales, Dolores
Gonzales, Conchita Gonzales and Beatriz Gonzales, the
petitioners in this case. Consolacion, meanwhile, was married 4

1 5

2 6

3 7

148 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
reconsideration and/or new trial is submitted for resolution DISMISSING the Complaint, as
without any further hearing.8 amended.

Without resolving the foregoing motion, the RTC, No pronouncement as to costs.

noting the failure of the parties to submit a project of
partition, issued a writ of execution9 on February 17, 2003
giving them a period of 15 days within which to submit their
nominees for commissioner, who will partition the subject
estate.
SO ORDERED.15
In dismissing the Amended Complaint, the appellate
court ratiocinated in the following manner:

Subsequently, the RTC, through then Acting
Presiding Judge Emilio V. Angeles, discovered the pendency of
the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and set the
same for hearing. In the Order 10 dated August 29, 2003, Judge
Angeles granted respondents' motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial for the specific purpose of receiving and
offering for admission the documents referred to by the
[respondents].11
However, instead of presenting the documents
adverted to, consisting of the documents sought to be
annulled, respondents demurred 12 to petitioners' evidence on
December 6, 2004 which the RTC, this time through Presiding
Judge Dionisio C. Sison, denied in the Order 13 dated April 13,
2005 as well as respondents' motion for reconsideration in
the August 8, 2005 Order.14
Aggrieved, respondents elevated their case to the CA
through a petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their demurrer
notwithstanding petitioners' failure to present the documents
sought to be annulled. On March 23, 2006, the CA rendered
the assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the Orders of
the RTC disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed Orders of
the trial court dated April 13, 2006
and August 8, 2005 are hereby both
SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof,
another Order is hereby issued
8 evidence, the defendant may move
9 upon the facts and the law the
10
11
12
In the light of the foregoing
where no sufficient evidence was
presented to grant the reliefs being
prayed for in the complaint, more
particularly the absence of the
documents sought to be annulled
as well as the properties sought to
be partitioned, common sense
dictates that the case should have
been dismissed outright by the trial
court to avoid unnecessary waste
of time, money and efforts.16
Subsequently, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution17 dated June 2, 2006.
The Issues
In this petition for review, petitioners question
whether the CA's dismissal of the Amended Complaint was in
accordance with law, rules of procedure and jurisprudence.
The Ruling of the Court
The RTC Orders assailed before the CA basically
involved the propriety of filing a demurrer to evidence after a
Decision had been rendered in the case.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1.Demurrer to
evidence. - After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his
for dismissal on the ground that
plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of
15

13 16

14 17

149 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
 dismissal was reversed he shall be REINSTATED. The Decision of the RTC dated November 24,
deemed to have waived the right 1995 STANDS.
to present evidence.
SO ORDERED.

The Court has previously explained the nature of a

demurrer to evidence in the case of Celino v. Heirs of Alejo ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
and Teresa Santiago18 as follows: Associate Justice

A demurrer to evidence is a
motion to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and is
presented after the plaintiff rests
his case. It is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient
in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue. The evidence
contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to
the merits of the case.

In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence

raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
judgment.19 Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a
demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court
renders its judgment.
G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017
In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners'
evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision. While
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner, v.SPOUSES RAMON
respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was
AND ANNABELLE SABADO, Respondents.
granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and offering
for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As
respondents never complied with the directive but instead DECISION
filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed
abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in
granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended
Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer
to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to
respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC
had correctly done.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE and the
Orders of the RTC denying respondents' demurrer are
18
19
150 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (petitioner) assailing the
Decision2 dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated
April 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
135922, which reversed and set-aside the Decision 4 dated
November 28, 2013 and the Order 5 dated April 28, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 (RTC) in
SCA Case No. 13-1290 and ordered that Haus Talk Project
Managers, Inc. (HTPMI) be impleaded as an indispensable
party to the unlawful detainer case against respondents
spouses Ramon and Annabelle Sabado (respondents).
The Facts
On May 3, 2007, HTPMI and respondents entered into a
Contract to Sell6 whereby HTPMI agreed to sell a real
property located at Lot 26, Block 1, Eastview Homes,
Barangay Balimbing, Antipolo City (subject property) to
respondents. In consideration therefor, respondents paid
HTPMI the total amount of P869,400.00, consisting of a
P174,400.00 downpayment and the balance of P695,000.00
payable in 120 equal monthly instalments. The parties further
agreed that respondents' failure to pay any amount within
the stipulated period of time shall mean the forfeiture of the
downpayment and any other payments made in connection
thereto, as well as the cancellation and rescission of the
Contract to Sell in accordance with law.7 Shortly thereafter, or
on August 16, 2007, HTPMI executed a Deed of Assignment 8
in favor of petitioner assigning, among others, its rights and
interests as seller in the aforesaid Contract to Sell with
respondents, including the right to collect payments and
execute any act or deed necessary to enforce compliance
therewith.9
On October 14, 2009, petitioner, through a Notice of
Cancellation by Notarial Act,10 cancelled or rescinded
respondents' Contract to Sell due to the latter's failure to pay
their outstanding obligations thereunder. Consequently,
petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the subject
property, but to no avail. Thus, petitioner was constrained to
file the Complaint11 dated August 20, 2010 for ejectment or
unlawful detainer against respondents before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo City, Branch 1 (MTCC),
docketed as SCA Case No. 093-10. 12
In their defense,13 respondents argued that petitioner is not
the real party in interest to institute such complaint, since
ownership over the subject property remained with HTPMI.
They expounded that under the Deed of Assignment, only the
rights and interests pertaining to the receivables under the
Contract to Sell were assigned/transferred to petitioner and
not the ownership or the right to the possession of the
subject property.14
The MTCC Ruling
In a Decision15 dated April 3, 2013, the MTCC ruled in favor of
petitioner and, accordingly, ordered respondents to vacate
the subject property, and pay petitioner the amounts of
P661,919.47 as rent arrears from July 31, 2008 up to July 31,
2010, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, including costs of suit. 16
The MTCC held that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment,
petitioner was subrogated to the rights of HTPMI under the
Contract to Sell and, hence, is a real party in interest entitled
to institute the instant suit against respondents for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Contract to Sell.
Further, the MTCC found petitioner's claim for compensation
in the form of rental just and equitable, pointing out that the
same is necessary to prevent respondents from unjustly
enriching themselves at petitioner's expense. Finally, the
MTCC awarded petitioner attorney's fees and costs of suit
since it was compelled to litigate the instant complaint. 17
151 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Aggrieved, respondents appealed18 to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated November 28, 2013, the RTC affirmed
the MTCC's ruling in toto.20 It ruled that by virtue of the Deed
of Assignment executed by HTPMI in petitioner's favor, the
latter acquired not only the right to collect the balance of the
purchase price of the subject property, but also all the rights
of the assignor, including the right to sue in its own name as
the legal assignee.21
Respondents moved for reconsideration,22 which was,
however, denied in an Order23 dated April 28, 2014.
Undaunted, they elevated the case to the CA. 24
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated October 29, 2015, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC's ruling, and accordingly: (a) remanded the
case to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded therein; and (b)
directed the MTCC to proceed with the trial of the case with
dispatch.26 Initially, it upheld petitioner's right as real party in
interest to file the instant suit as HTPMI's assignee. However,
since legal title to the subject property was retained by
HTPMI pursuant to the provisions of the Deed of Assignment,
the latter is not only a real party in interest, but also an
indispensible party which should have been impleaded as a
plaintiff thereon and without which no final determination
can be had in the present case.27
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, 28 which
was, however, denied in a Resolution 29 dated April 20, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue is whether or not the CA correctly ruled
that HTPMI is an indispensable party to petitioner's ejectment
suit against respondents and, thus, must be impleaded
therein.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all
indispensable parties should be joined in a suit,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Case law defines an indispensable party as "one whose
interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and
in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the
other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the
court which is effective, complete, or equitable." 30 "Thus, the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present."31 In Regner v. Logarta,32 the Court laid down the
parameters in determining whether or not one is an
indispensable party, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An indispensable party is a party who has x x x an interest in
the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of
such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also
been considered that an indispensable party is a person in
whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
parties already before the court which is effective, complete,
or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must
be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his
interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable
from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree
which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is
not an indispensable party if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him and those already
parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject
matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party that his presence will
avoid multiple litigation.33 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Guided by the foregoing parameters and as will be explained
hereunder, the CA erred in holding that HTPMI is an
indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by petitioner
against respondents.
Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights -
save for the right of ownership - to petitioner under the
Contract to Sell:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS TO SELL. By this
assignment, the ASSIGNEE hereby acquires all rights of the
ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell and under the law,
including the right to endorse any and all terms and
conditions of the Contracts to Sell and the right to collect
the amounts due thereunder from the purchaser of the
Property. The ASSIGNOR for this purpose hereby names,
constitutes and appoints the ASSIGNEE [as its] attorney-in-
fact to execute any act and deed necessary in the exercise of
all these rights. Notwithstanding the assignment of the
Contracts to Sell and the Receivables thereunder to the
152 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
ASSIGNEE, the legal title to the Property and obligations of
the ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell, including the
obligation to complete the development of the property and
the warranties of a builder under the law, shall remain the
ASSIGNOR'S. x x x.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Verily, HTPMI's assignment of rights to petitioner must be
deemed to include the rights to collect payments from
respondents, and in the event of the latter's default, to cancel
or rescind the Contract to Sell, and resultantly, recover actual
possession over the subject property, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
b) the [respondents] herein agree to perform and undertake
the [HTPMI] Payment Plan with the following terms:
i) Downpayment x x x of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS ONLY (P174,400.00) to be
paid within twelve (12) months after payments [sic] of the
reservation. Failure to pay two (2) consecutive monthly
installments will mean cancellation of this contract and
forfeiture of all payments. Discount terms shall be based on
[HTPMI] Agreed Payment Plan.
 
x x x x
iii) Failure to pay any amount within the stimulated [sic]
period of time shall mean forfeiture of the down payment
and any other payments made and the Contract to Sell shall
be cancelled and rescinded in accordance with law. 35
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the findings of
the courts a quo that petitioner had the right to institute the
instant suit against respondents.
However, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's conclusion
that since HTPMI retained ownership over the subject
property pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, it is an
indispensable party to the case. As adverted to earlier, an
indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy which is inseparable from the
interest of the other parties, and that a final adjudication
cannot be made without affecting such interest. Here, the
only issue in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who
between the litigating parties has the better right to possess
de facto the subject property.36 Thus, HTPMI's interest in the
subject property, as one holding legal title thereto, is
completely separable from petitioner's rights under the
Contract to Sell, which include the cancellation or rescission
of such contract and resultantly, the recovery of actual
possession of the subject property by virtue of this case.
Hence, the courts can certainly proceed to determine who
between petitioner and respondents have a better right to
the possession of the subject property and complete relief
can be had even without HTPMI's participation.
In sum, both the MTCC and the RTC are correct in ruling on
the merits of the instant unlawful detainer case even without
the participation of HTPMI.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision

dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 20,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135922 are
hereby REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. The Decision dated
November 28, 2013 and the Order dated April 28, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 in SCA Case
No. 13-1290, affirming in toto the Decision dated April 3, 2013
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo City, Branch 1
in SCA Case No. 093-10, are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,*(Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

August 23, 2017 G.R. No. 222711

LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

represented by its President, JANET C. LEY, Petitioner,
vs.
MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business under the name
and style "LOLA TABA LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA
SEASIDE,", Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the

Orders dated June 15, 20152 and January 27, 20163 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 75
(Valenzuela-RTC) in Civil Case No. 40-V-12, which dismissed
petitioner Ley Construction and Development Corporation's
(as represented by its President, Janet C. Ley; petitioner)
complaint for collection of sum of money and damages,
without prejudice, on the ground of improper venue.

The Facts

On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection

of Sum of Money and Damages 4 against respondent Marvin
153 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Medel Sedano (respondent), doing business under the name
and style "Lola Taha Lalo Pata Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside,"
before the Valenzuela-RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 40-V-
12. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that on January 14,
2005, it leased5 a 50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of land
located at Financial Center Area, Pasay City (now, Lot 5-A
Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City) from respondent
third-party defendant, the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC).6 On September 11, 2006, petitioner
subleased7 the 14,659.80-sq.m. portion thereof to
respondent for a term often (10) years beginning November
15, 2005, for a monthly rent of ₱1,174,780.00, subject to a
ten percent (10%) increase beginning on the third year and
every year thereafter (lease contract). 8 Respondent allegedly
failed to pay the rent due for the period August 2011 to
December 2011, amounting to a total of P8,828,025.46, and
despite demands,9 refused to settle his obligations;10 hence,
the complaint.
In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, 11 respondent
countered that he religiously paid rent to petitioner until
PNCC demanded12 that the rent be paid directly to it, in view
of the petitioner's eviction from the subject property by
virtue of a court order.13 Thus, during the period from August
2011 until December 2011, he remitted the rentals to PNCC. 14
Should he be found liable to petitioner, respondent
maintained that the RTC should hold PNCC liable to reimburse
to him the amounts he paid as rentals; hence, the third-party
complaint.15
Respondent likewise pointed out that the venue was
improperly laid since Section 21 16 of the lease contract
provides that "[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with
this case shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, exclusive of all others."17 Hence, the complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Finally, respondent argued that he paid petitioner the
amounts of ₱3,518,352.00 as deposit and advance rentals
under the lease contract, and that he made a ₱400,000.00
overpayment, all of which amounts were not liquidated or
credited to respondent during the subsistence of the lease
contract. Thus, respondent interposed a counterclaim,
seeking petitioner to reimburse the said amounts to him, and
to pay him moral and exemplary damages, including litigation
expenses, in view of petitioner's filing of such baseless suit. 18
In its Comment/Opposition19 to respondent's affirmative
defense of improper venue, petitioner argued that Section 21
of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a
stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. 20 This is because such
stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the Municipal Trial
Courts, of jurisdiction over cases which, under the law, are
within its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an action for
unlawful detainer.21 Petitioner further posited that
respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction
154 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of the Valenzuela-RTC and had waived any objections on
venue, since he sought affirmative reliefs from the said court
when he asked several times for additional time to file his
responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims against petitioner,
and impleaded PNCC as a third-party defendant. 22
Meanwhile, in its Answer to Third Party Complaint with
Counterclaim,23 PNCC contended that respondent has no
cause of action against it, since he acknowledged PNCC’s right
to receive rent, as evidenced by his direct payment thereof to
PNCC.24 Respondent also entered into a contract of lease with
PNCC after learning that petitioner had been evicted from the
premises by virtue of a court ruling.25
The Valenzuela-RTC Ruling
In an Order26 dated June 15, 2015, the Valenzuela-RTC
granted respondent's motion and dismissed the complaint on
the ground of improper venue. It held that Section 21 of the
lease contract between petitioner and respondent is void
insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the R TC of Pasay
City, even when the subject matter jurisdiction over the case
is with the Metropolitan Trial Courts. 27 However, with respect
to the filing of cases cognizable by the RTCs, the stipulation
validly limits the venue to the RTC of Pasay City. 28 Since
petitioner's complaint is one for collection of sum of money in
an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the R TC,
petitioner should have filed the case with the RTC of Pasay
City.29
The Valenzuela-RTC also found no merit in petitioner's claim
that respondent waived his right to question the venue when
he filed several motions for extension of time to file his
answer. It pointed out that improper venue was among the
defenses raised in respondent's Answer. As such, it was
timely raised and, therefore, not waived.30
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsiderationwhich was,
however, denied by the Valenzuela-RTC in its Order 32 dated
January 27, 2016; hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly
laid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1.Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and
tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
Section 2.Venue of personal actions. -All other actions may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election
of the plaintiff.
Section 3.Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of
the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the
court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
Section 4.When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply
- The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides
otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before
the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
(Emphases supplied)
Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions
shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at
the election of the plaintiff.33 As an exception, parties may,
through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions
in a certain exclusive venue.34 In Briones v. Court of Appeals,35
the Court explained:
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the
sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon,
or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not
only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by
law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence
instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
155 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words,
such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other
venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to
the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import,
the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.36
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson,37 the Court held
that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding,
provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is
exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by
the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing
of the suit.38
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced
that all these elements are present and that the questioned
stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a
valid venue stipulation that limits the venue of the cases to
the courts of Pasay City. It states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms
and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be liable for
damages.1âwphi1All actions or case[s] filed in connection
with this lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, exclusive of all others. 39 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
limit the place where actions or cases arising from a violation
of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be
instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase
"exclusive of all others" and the specification of the locality of
Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed.
Notably, the fact that this stipulation generalizes that all
actions or cases of the aforementioned kind shall be filed with
the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts,
does not mean that the same is a stipulation which attempts
to curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is fundamental
that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to
stipulation of the parties. 40 Hence, following the rule that the
law is deemed written into every contract, 41 the said
stipulation should not be construed as a stipulation on
jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits venue.
Moreover, "[t]he parties are charged with knowledge of the
existing law at the time they enter into the contract and at
the time it is to become operative." 42 Thus, without any clear
showing in the contract that the parties intended otherwise,
the questioned stipulation should be considered as a
stipulation on venue (and not on jurisdiction), consistent with
the basic principles of procedural law.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner's action was one
for collection of sum of money in an amount 43 that falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. 44 Since the lease contract
already provided that all actions or cases involving the breach
thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, and that
petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within
the RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have
then followed the contractual stipulation and filed its
complaint before the RTC of Pasay City. However, it is
undeniable that petitioner filed its complaint with the
Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the
ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its
refiling in the proper court.
That respondent had filed several motions for extension of
time to file a responsive pleading, or that he interposed a
counterclaim or third-party complaint in his answer does not
necessarily mean that he waived the affirmative defense of
improper venue. The prevailing rule on objections to
improper venue is that the same must be raised at the
earliest opportunity, as in an answer or a motion to dismiss;
otherwise, it is deemed waived. 45 Here, respondent timely
raised the ground of improper venue since it was one of the
affirmative defenses raised in his Answer with Third-Party
Complaint.46 As such, it cannot be said that he had waived the
same.
Further, it should be pointed out that the case of Pangasinan
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Yatco (Pantranco) 47 cited in the
instant petition48 should not apply to this case, considering
that the invocation of the ground of improper venue therein
was not based on a contractual stipulation, but rather on
respondent Elpidio O. Dizon's alleged violation of the Rules of
Court, as he filed his case for damages before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV (Quezon City), despite
testifying that he was actually a resident of Dagupan City. In
that case, the Court ruled that the filing of a counterclaim and
third party-complaint, and additionally, the introduction of
evidence of petitioner Pantranco (respondent in the case for
damages) after the denial of its motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue, "necessarily implied a submission
to the jurisdiction of [the trial court therein], and, accordingly,
a waiver of such right as Pantranco may have had to object to
the venue, upon the ground that it had been improperly
laid."49 The rationale for the Pantranco ruling is that a party
cannot invoke a violation of a rule on venue against his
counter-party, when he himself is bound by the same rule,
but nonetheless, seeks his own relief and in so doing, violates
it.
In contrast, the counterclaim of respondent was alleged to be
a compulsory counterclaim,50 which he was prompted to file
only because of petitioner's complaint for collection of sum of
money, else the same would be barred.51 In fact, his
counterclaim only sought reimbursement of his overpayment
to petitioner in the amount of ₱400,000.00, as well as
damages for the filing of a purported baseless suit. Thus, his
counterclaim is not covered by the venue stipulation, since he
is not asserting a violation of the terms and conditions of the
156 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
lease contract, but rather an independent right which arose
only because of the complaint. The same goes for his third-
party complaint, whereby he only pleaded that the rental
payments remitted to PNCC for the period August 2011 to
December 2011 be reimbursed to him in the event that
petitioner's complaint is found to be meritorious. Since his
counterclaim and third-party complaint are not covered by
the venue stipulation, respondent had, therefore, every right
to invoke the same whilst raising the ground of improper
venue against petitioner's complaint, which action was, on
the contrary, covered by the stipulation. Thus, there is no
inconsistency in respondent's posturing, which perforce
precludes the application of the Pantranco ruling, as well as
negates the supposition that he had waived the defense of
improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Orders
dated June 15, 2015 and January 27, 2016 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 40-
V-12 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
July 24, 2017 G.R. No. 223610
CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY, SYLVIA UY SY, JANE UY
TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY, IRENE S. UY,* ERICSON S. UY,
JOHANNA S. UY, and JEDNATHAN S. UY, Petitioners
vs.
CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his heirs PAULITA
MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO, CESAR DEL CASTILLO, A VITO DEL
CASTILLO, NILA C. DUENAS, NIDA C. LATOSA, LORNA C.
BERNARDO, GIL DEL CASTILLO, LIZA C. GUNGOB, ALMA DEL
CASTILLO, and GEMMA DEL CASTILLO, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1filed by
petitioner Conchita S. Uy (Conchita) and her children,
petitioners Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James
Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S. Uy (Ericson), Johanna S.
Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy (Uy siblings; collectively, petitioners),
assailing the Decision2 dated May 26, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 07120, which affirmed the twin Orders 4
dated December 9, 2011 and the Order 5 dated May 1 7, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55 (RTC)
in Civil Case No. MAN-2797, denying petitioners' Omnibus
Motion,6 motion to quash the writ of execution, 7 and their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.8
The Facts
The present case is an offshoot of an action 9 for quieting of
title, reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees involving a
parcel of land, known as Lot 791 and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29129,10 filed by Crispulo Del
Castillo (Crispulo) against Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his wife,
Conchita, on November 12, 1996, docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN-2797 (Quieting of Title Case ).11 However, since Jaime
had died six (6) years earlier in 1990, 12 Crispulo amended his
complaint13 and imp leaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy
siblings, as defendants. 14 Meanwhile, Crispulo died 15 during
the pendency of the action and hence, was substituted by his
heirs, respondents Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, Cesar Del
Castillo, Avito Del Castillo, Nila C. Duenas, Nida C. Latosa,
Loma C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo, Liza C. Gungob, Alma Del
Castillo, and Gemma Del Castillo (respondents). 16
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision 17 dated
April 4, 2003 (RTC Decision) in respondents' favor, and
accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful owners
of Lot 791; (b) nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 576, 18
as well as TCT No. 29129; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay
respondents moral damages and litigation costs in the
amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of
Lot 791.19 Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA, 20
and subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for
lack of merit.21 The ruling became final and executory on April
8, 2010, thus, prompting the Court to issue an Entry of
Judgment22 dated May 4, 2010.
On August 17, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution,23 manifesting therein that since the
zonal value of Lot 791 at that time was ₱3,500.00 per square
meter (sqm.) and that Lot 791 covers an area of 15,758 sqm.,
the total zonal value of Lot 791 was ₱55,153,000.00. 24 Hence,
the attorney's fees, computed at twenty-five percent (25%)
thereof, should be pegged at ₱13,788,250.00. 25
Acting on the said motion, the RTC ordered 26 petitioners to
file their comment or opposition thereto, which they failed to
comply.27 Accordingly, in an Order28 dated November 22,
2010, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance
of a writ of execution. On December 13, 2010, a Writ of
Execution29 was issued, to which the sheriff issued a Notice of
Garnishment30 seeking to levy petitioners' properties in an
amount sufficient to cover for the ₱13,788,250.00 as
attorney's fees and ₱20,000.00 each as moral damages and
litigation costs.
157 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Threatened by the Notice of Garnishment, petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion31 praying that the writ of execution be
quashed and set aside, and that a hearing be conducted to re-
compute the attorney's fees.32 Petitioners maintained that
the Writ of Execution is invalid because it altered the terms of
the RTC Decision which did not state that the zonal value
mentioned therein referred to the zonal value of the property
at the time of execution.33 Before the RTC could act upon
petitioners' Omnibus Motion, they filed a Motion to Quash
Writ of Execution on Jurisdictional Ground(s) (motion to
quash),34 claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Uy
siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they were never
served with summons in relation thereto.35
The RTC Proceedings
On December 9, 2011, the RTC issued two (2) orders: (a) one
granting petitioners' Omnibus Motion, nullifying the Notice of
Garnishment, and setting a hearing to determine the proper
computation of the award for attorney's fees; 36 and (b)
another denying their motion to quash, since they never
raised such jurisdictional issue in the proceedings a quo.37
On January 20, 2012, a hearing was conducted for the
determination of attorney's fees.38 Thereafter, the parties
were ordered to submit their respective position papers, 39 to
which respondents complied with, 40 presenting the following
alternative options upon which to base the computation of
attorney's fees: (a) ₱3,387,970.00, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in 1996, the year
when the Quieting of Title Case was filed; (b) ₱ll,424,550.00,
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of
Lot 791 in 2003, the year when the RTC rendered its Decision
in the same case; or (c) ₱15,758,000.00, equivalent to twenty-
five percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in 2010, the
year when the RTC Decision became final and executory. 41
On the other hand, instead of filing the required position
paper, petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion for
Reconsideration42 of the RTC's December 9, 2011 twin Orders.
In said motion, petitioners contended that the RTC failed to
definitely rule on the validity of the writ of execution, and
that it erred in holding that the RTC Decision was already final
and executory despite the absence of summons on the Uy
siblings.43
In an Order44 dated May 17, 2012, the RTC: (a) pegged the
attorney's fees at ₱3,387,970.00, 45 using the zonal value of
Lot 791 in 1996, the year when the Quieting of Title Case was
instituted, it being the computation least onerous to
petitioners; and (b) denied petitioners' Consolidated Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari46with the
CA, assailing the RTC's twin Orders dated December 9, 2011
and the Order dated May 17, 2012. Petitioners argued that
instead of just declaring the Notice of Garnishment void, the
RTC should have also declared the writ of execution void
because the Uy siblings were never served with summons;
and like the Notice of Garnishment, the Writ of Execution also
altered the terms of the RTC Decision. Petitioners further
added that the writ of execution was void because it made
them liable beyond their inheritance from Jaime. They
maintain that the estate of Jaime should instead be held
liable for the adjudged amount and that respondents should
have brought their claim against the estate, in accordance
with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.47
The CA Ruling
In a Decision48 dated May 26, 2015, the CA affirmed the
assailed Orders of the RTC. The CA found no merit in the
claim that the Uy siblings were never served with summons,
pointing out that in a Manifestation/Motion 49 dated
November 26, 1997, their counsel in the trial proceedings,
Atty. Alan C. Trinidad (Atty. Trinidad), stated that petitioners
received the summons with a copy of the amended
complaint.50 It likewise refused to give credence to
petitioners' denial of Atty. Trinidad's representation,
observing that one of the Uy siblings, Ericson, even testified in
court with the former's assistance, and that none of them
showed any concern or apprehension before the court, which
they would have if indeed Atty. Trinidad was not authorized
to represent them.51
Anent petitioners' argument that they cannot be held
personally liable with their separate property for Jaime's
liability and that respondents should have filed a claim
against Jaime's estate in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, the CA held that such provision only
applies to contractual money claims and not when the subject
matter is some other relief and the collection of any amount
is merely incidental thereto, such as by way of damages, as in
this case.52 Besides, petitioners had all the opportunity to
raise such perceived error when they elevated the case to the
CA and to this Court, but they did not. 53 Following the
principle of finality of judgment, the CA can no longer
entertain such assignment of errors.54
With respect to the validity of the writ of execution, the CA
ruled that since the Writ of Execution made express reference
to the RTC Decision without adding anything else, the same
was valid, unlike the Notice of Garnishment which expressly
sought to levy ₱13,788,250.00 in attorney's fees and, in the
process, exceeded the purview of the said Decision.55
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration, 56 which
was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution 57 dated
February 22, 2016; hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court
158 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld the twin Orders dated December 9, 2011
and the Order dated May 17, 2012 of the RTC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it is well to reiterate that petitioners are
resisting compliance with the ruling in the Quieting of Title
Case, on the grounds that: (a) they were never served with
summons in relation thereto; and (b) they were merely
impleaded as substitutes to Jaime therein, and as such,
respondents should have proceeded against his estate
instead, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
However, a judicious review of the records would reveal that
such contentions are untenable, as will be discussed
hereunder.
Anent petitioners' claim that they were never served with
summons, the CA correctly pointed out that in the November
26, 1997 Manifestation/Motion,58 petitioners, through their
counsel, Atty. Trinidad, explicitly stated, among others, that
they "received the Summons with a copy of the Second
Amended Complaint" and that "the Answer earlier filed
serves as the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint." 59
Having admitted the foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert
otherwise. "It is settled that judicial admissions made by the
parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not
require further evidence to prove them. They are legally
binding on the party making it, except when it is shown that
they have been made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was actually made, neither of which was
shown to exist in this case."60
Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons
for the amended complaint, they were nonetheless deemed
to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing
an Answer61 to the amended complaint and actively
participating in the case.62 In fact, one of the petitioners and
Uy siblings, Ericson, was presented as a witness for the
defense.63 Moreover, petitioners appealed the adverse RTC
ruling in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the Court. It
is settled that the active participation of the party against
whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an invocation
of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later
on impugning the court's jurisdiction. 64 After all, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained
either by a valid service of summons upon him or by his
voluntary submission to the court's authority. 65
In this regard, petitioners cannot also deny Atty. Trinidad's
authority to represent them. As mentioned earlier, one of the
petitioners, Ericson, even testified with the assistance of Atty.
Trinidad.66 Indeed, if Atty. Trinidad was not authorized to
represent them, the natural reaction for petitioners was to
exhibit concern. Based on the records, however, there is no
indication that any of the petitioners or Ericson made even
the slightest objections to Atty. Trinidad's representation.
This only confirms the CA's finding that such denial was a
mere afterthought and a desperate attempt to undo a final
and executory judgment against them.67
As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have
proceeded against Jaime's estate pursuant to Section 20, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on
the records, the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in
Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were imp leaded in
their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the
party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case
and the claim is not extinguished, viz.:
Section 16.Death of party; duty of counsel.- Whenever a party
to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period
of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. (Emphases supplied)
Here, Jaime died on March 4, 1990, 68 or six (6) years be(ore
private respondents filed the Quieting of Title
Case.1âwphi1Thus, after Conchita filed an Answer 69 informing
the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was
amended70 to implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules
of Court provisions on substitution upon the death of a party
do not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted
in place of Jaime in the Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they
were impleaded in their personal capacities. 71 In this regard,
petitioners' argument that they cannot be held solidarily
159 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
liable for the satisfaction of any monetary judgment or award
must necessarily fail.72
In this light, petitioners can no longer invoke Section 20, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 20.Action and contractual money claims. - When the
action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
(Emphasis supplied)
A cursory reading of the foregoing provision readily shows
that like Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it applies in
cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and
not before the case was even filed in court, as in this case.
At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed
that Jaime's estate is the proper party to the Quieting of Title
Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of
action against them at the earliest opportunity. Obviously,
they did not do so; instead, they actively participated in the
case, adopted the answer earlier filed by Conchita, and even
litigated the case all the way to the Court. Petitioners cannot
now question the final and executory judgment in the
Quieting of Title Case because it happened to be adverse to
them.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay
in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters
the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere
technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of
public policy which must be faithfully complied." 73 However,
this doctrine "is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the
power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the
demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (j) that the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby."74

In this case, a punctilious examination of the records,

especially the Amended Complaint 75 in the Quieting of Title
Case reveals that the disputed Lot 791 was covered by TCT
No. 29129 in the names of Jaime and Conchita. Thus, while
the Uy siblings were indeed impleaded in their personal
capacities, the fact remains that they are merely succeeding
to Jaime's interest in the said lot and title. As successors-
heirs, they cannot be personally bound to respond to the
decedent's obligations beyond their distributive shares. 76
Verily, this is a special or a compelling circumstance which
would necessitate the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, so as to somehow limit the liability
of the Uy siblings in the payment of the monetary awards in
favor of respondents in the Quieting of Title Case - i.e., moral
damages and litigation costs in the amount of ₱20,000.00
each, as well as attorney's fees, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 77 - within the
value of their inherited shares, notwithstanding the finality of
the ruling therein.

In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy

siblings may be held answerable to the monetary awards in
the Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot exceed
whatever value they inherited from their late father, Jaime.
For this purpose, the RTC is tasked to ensure that the
satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the judgment in the
Quieting of Title Case will not result in the payment by the Uy
siblings of an amount exceeding their inheritance from Jaime.
After all, the other party, i.e., respondents, shall not be
unjustly prejudiced by the same since Jaime's spouse,
Conchita, is still alive and the rest of the monetary awards
may be applied against her, if need be.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Decision dated May 26, 2015 and the Resolution dated
February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
07120 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION limiting
the adjudged monetary liability of petitioners Christine Uy Dy,
Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy,
Ericson S. Uy, Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy to the total
value of their inheritance from Jaime Uy.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
160 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 14, 2018 G.R. No. 208651
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ROMEO ANTIDO y LANTAYAN a.k.a. ROMEO ANTIGO y
LANTAYAN alias "JON-JON", Accused-Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Resolution1 dated April 7, 2014, the Court affirmed the
Decision2 dated December 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04602 finding accused-appellant
Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan
alias "Jon-Jon" (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the December 7, 2012 Decision of the
CA in CAG. R. CR-HC No. 04602 and AFFIRMS said Decision
finding accusedappellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a.
Romeo Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape punishable under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to paragraph 5 of
Article 266-B, under RA 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
private complainant the following amounts: (a) ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, consistent with
existingjurisprudence.3
However, it appears that before the promulgation of the said
Resolution, accused-appellant had already died on December
28, 2013, as evidenced by his Certificate of Death.4
As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider
and set aside the April 7, 2014 Resolution and enter a new
one dismissing the criminal case against accused-appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's
death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment[.]
In People v. Culas,5 the Court thoroughly explained the effects
of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as
follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability[,] as well
as the civil liability[,] based solely thereon.1âwphi1
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
161 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
d) xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section l, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.6
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is
on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that
accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts
against the victim, AAA,7 may be based on sources other than
delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action
against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted
by law and procedural rules.8
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a)SET ASIDE the Court's
Resolution dated April 7, 2014 in connection with this case;
(b)DISMISS Criminal Case No. 03-212115 before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29 by reason of the death of
accused-appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo
Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon"; and (c) DECLARE the instant
case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
 G.R. No. 180969*, September 11, 2017

NOEL NAVAJA,Petitioner, v.HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO OR

HIS SUCCESSOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA & GARCIA-
HERNANDEZ, JAGNA, BOHOL, AND ATTY. EDGAR BORJE,
Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the

Decision2 dated June 26, 2007 and the Resolution 3 dated
November 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP.
No. 02354, which affirmed the Order4 dated September 21,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50
(RTC) in Sp. Civil Action No. 0357, and accordingly, sustained
the denial of petitioner Noel Navaja's (petitioner) motion to
quash filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna &
Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol (MCTC-Jagna).

The Facts

The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation

proceeding initiated by DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in
Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional Sales Manager for
Visayas, Ana Lou B. Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of
falsification of a Private Document, docketed as I.S. Case No.
04-1238.5 In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms.
Marilyn Magsigay (Ms. Magsigay), a material witness for DKT,

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was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing before the OPP-Bohol
on March 15, 2004 in order to shed light on the official
receipt allegedly falsified by Ana Navaja. 6 On March 9, 2004,
petitioner, who is Ana Navaja's husband, allegedly went to
Ms. Magsigay's workplace in Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and
told her that as per instruction from Ana Navaja's lawyer,
Atty. Orwen Bonghanoy (Atty. Bonghanoy), her attendance in
the scheduled hearing is no longer needed (March 9, 2004
incident).7 Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer attended the
scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing where petitioner and Atty.
Bonghanoy presented an affidavit purportedly executed by
Ms. Magsigay and notarized by a certain Atty. Rolando Grapa
(Atty. Grapa) in Cebu City, supporting Ana Navaja's counter-
affidavit (March 15, 2004 incident). 8 Resultantly, I.S. Case No.
04-1238 was dismissed.9
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Edgar Borje (Atty. Borje), DKT's
counsel, found out from Ms. Magsigay herself that: (a) she
would have attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing
were it not for the misrepresentation of petitioner that her
presence therein was no longer required; (b) she was merely
told by her superior in Garden Cafe to sign the affidavit and
that she did not personally prepare the same; and (c) she
could not have gone to Cebu to have it notarized before Atty.
Grapa as she was at work on that day. 10 This prompted Atty.
Borje to file the following criminal complaints before the OPP-
Bohol and the City Prosecution Office of Tagbilaran City: the
first one,11 charging petitioner of Obstruction of Justice,
specifically, for violation of Section 1 (a) of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 182912 in connection with the March 9, 2004
incident; and the second one,13 charging petitioner and Atty.
Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as well, specifically, for
violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law in connection with
the March 15, 2004 incident.14 After due proceedings,
separate Informations were filed. The case relating to the
March 9, 2004 incident was filed before the MCTC-Jagna, 15
while that relating to the March 15, 2004 incident was filed
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Tagbilaran City,
Bohol (MTCC-Tagbilaran).16
Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash
Information (Motion to Quash)17 before the MCTC-Jagna,
principally arguing that the charge of violation of Section 1 (a)
of PD 1829 pending before it should have been absorbed by
the charge of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law
pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran, considering that: (a)
the case pending before the latter court was filed first; (b) the
criminal cases filed before the MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-
Tagbilaran arose from a single preliminary investigation
proceeding, involving the same set of facts and
circumstances, and flowed from a single alleged criminal
intent, which is to obstruct the investigation of I.S. Case No.
04-1238; and (c) to allow separate prosecutions of the
foregoing cases would be tantamount to a violation of his
right to double jeopardy.18
The MCTC-Jagna Ruling
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In an Order19 dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC-Jagna
denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. It held that petitioner
had no right to invoke the processes of the court, since at the
time he filed said motion, the MCTC-Jagna has yet to acquire
jurisdiction over his person.
On reconsideration, the MCTC-Jagna issued a Resolution 20
dated January 24, 2006 upholding the denial of the Motion to
Quash. It ruled that in the criminal case before it, petitioner is
being charged with violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829, an
offense separate and distinct from violation of Section 1 (f) of
the same law, which is pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran.
As such, said offenses may be prosecuted independently from
each other.21
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated22 his case to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order23 dated September 21, 2006, the RTC denied the
petition, thereby, affirming the MCTC-Jagna Ruling. It held
that the criminal cases pending before the MCTC-Jagna for
violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 and MTCC-Tagbilaran for
violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law are two (2) separate
offenses, considering that: (a) the case in MCTC-Jagna has
only one (1) accused, i.e., petitioner, while the one pending
before the MTCC-Tagbilaran has two (2), i.e., petitioner and
Atty. Bonghanoy; and (b) the places of commission are
different, as the March 9, 2004 incident happened in Jagna,
Bohol, while the March 15, 2004 incident occurred in
Tagbilaran City, Bohol. Further, the RTC opined that while
both offenses arose from substantially the same set of facts,
each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. 24
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the CA.25
The CA Ruling
In a Decision26 dated June 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC
Ruling. It held that petitioner allegedly committed several acts
which constitute violations of different provisions of PD 1829,
namely: (a) the March 9, 2004 incident where he prevented
Ms. Magsigay from attending the scheduled hearing in I.S.
Case No. 04-1238 by means of deceit and misrepresentation,
which is a violation of Section 1 (a) of the law; and (b) the
March 15, 2004 incident where he, along with Atty.
Bonghanoy, submitted a purported spurious affidavit of Ms.
Magsigay in the scheduled hearing in I.S. Case No. 04-1238,
which is a violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law.
Moreover, the CA pointed out that the foregoing acts were
committed in distinct places and locations. As such, there is
more than enough basis to try petitioner for two (2) separate
crimes under two (2) distinct Informations. 27
Unperturbed, petitioner moved for reconsideration, 28 which
was, however, denied in a Resolution29 dated November 12,
2007; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately tried for
different acts constituting violations of PD 1829, namely,
violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same law allegedly
committed during the pendency of a single proceeding.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts
constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the pertinent
portions of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal
proceeding or from reporting the commission of any
offense or the identity of any offender/s by means
of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation,
force or threats;
xxxx  
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document,
paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and
with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal
cases;
xxxx
The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused
committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of PD 1829;
and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of
obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. 30
In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against
petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated September 22,
2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829
before the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay
from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation
hearing;31 and (b) an Information dated August 27, 2004
charging him of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law
before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false
affidavit.32 While the Informations pertain to acts that were
done days apart and in different locations, the Court holds
that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a
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single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts,
albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse -
that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation
proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact,
eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol.33 The foregoing
conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado,
which envisages a single crime committed through a series of
acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. 34 In
Santiago v. Garchitorena,35 the Court explained the principle
of delito continuado as follows:
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there
should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of
time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations
of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same
intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino,
Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed).
Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito
continuadoconsists of several crimes but in reality there is
only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator
(Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102;
Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts
arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law,
1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
x x x x
The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the
Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized
under special laws, e.g. violation of [Republic Act] No. 145
penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following
up claims for war veteran's benefits x x x.
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the
contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal
Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws.36 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed
separate crimes and thus, may be tried separately, the CA
cited the case of Regis v. People (Regis),37 wherein it was held
that the malversation committed through falsification of
document performed on different dates constitute
independent offenses which must be punished separately. 38
However, a closer perusal of Regis shows that its factual
milieu is not on all fours with the instant case. In Regis, the
accused, then municipal treasurer of Pinamungahan, Cebu,
signed payrolls on two (2) different dates, i.e., April 30, 1931
and May 2, 1931, making it appear that certain workers
worked as laborers in a municipal project when in truth, there
were no such workers and that he and his co-accused
misappropriated the payroll amounts to themselves. The
Court ruled that the accused may be held liable for two (2) 2878 pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna
separate crimes, considering that when the accused & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol is DISMISSED. SO
committed the first act constituting malversation committed ORDERED.
through falsification of document, it did not appear that he
was already predisposed to committing the second act .
constituting the same crime. 39 Clearly, when the accused in
Regis falsified the payroll of April 30, 1931, and later, the
payroll of May 2, 1931, he -though committing similar acts -
could not be said to have been motivated by a single criminal
impulse as he was working towards discernibly distinct
criminal objectives.

In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms.

Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary
investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false
affidavit were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse
in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to
obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding
in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito
continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1)
count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in
Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented
from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in
Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a
false affidavit in the same case. 40 However, since he was
already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment 41 dated
July 3, 2007 - in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna
should be dismissed as the events that transpired in Jagna,
Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of
petitioner's single criminal design. The Court's
pronouncement in Gamboa v. CA42 is instructive on this
matter, to wit:
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real)
is what is known as "delito continuado'" or "continuous
crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts
arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor,
there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits
diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character,
merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular
delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito
continuado." In order that it may exist, there should be
"plurality of acts performed separately during a period of
time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and
unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provision are united in one
and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim."43

Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be

dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to
double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

June 26, 2007 and the Resolution dated November 12, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Criminal Case No.
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