LXV.

RULE 65
c. Mandamus

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE,

G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010

QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel his mother (the petitioner) to produce his father’s will.
Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the will. RTC ruled in favour of petitioner. CA ruled otherwise and
ordered the production of the will. SC ruled that petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy because there
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

FACTS:

Alleging that his father passed away and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy
Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages before the RTC of
Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted. In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.

The RTC heard the case. Petitioner contends that respondent did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus. RTC ruled in favour of petitioner.

Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of
merit. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration, CA granted the motion and ordered the production of the
will. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will.

Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied
this motion.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy

RULING: NO.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do
or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will
mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists,
although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board,
or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have
a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe
production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he
seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him
from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject
will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al., vs. LTFRB and DOTC, respondents.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner sought for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding respondents to require PUVs to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Solicitor General explains that the writ of mandamus is not
the correct remedy. SC ruled that the writ of mandamus sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus is
unavailing because mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG.

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents to require public
utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

Petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and
related environmental hazards. Meantime, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.

In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, explains that the writ of mandamus
is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or
person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to
implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, Lastly,
petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE: Whether writ of mandamus is the proper remedy

RULING: NO.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against
any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty;
(2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available
only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has
been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979

QUICK SUMMARY:

Petitioner filed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to recognize that the obligation
of labourers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the
employees' wages and salaries. The lower court dismissed the petition ruling that there is nothing in the law
which provides for such first priority credit. SC ruled that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus
that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded. In the present case, petitioner was
unable to show a clear legal right. Hence, Mandamus does not lie.

FACTS:

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner seeks a reversal of such decision relying
on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the RA No. 2023, wherein it is stated, as petitioner
had interpreted, that the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll
collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries.

To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, stated that there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act
2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023
is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn
this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's
credit into a first priority credit.

ISSUE: Whether a writ of mandamus should be issued

RULING: NO.

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would
appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

Mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he
would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have
prevented him from instituting a suit of this character. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well
defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed.
The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, this court speaking through
Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the
issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and
it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.

STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY vs. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
G.R. No. 181792 April 21, 2014

QUICK SUMMARY:
A decision was rendered in favour of herein petitioners for the payment of just compensation by the
respondents. However, respondents failed to pay hence petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC. RTC
dismissed petitioner’s motion on the ground that government funds could not be subjected to execution and
levy. Aggrieved, petitioners wrote a letter to COA, however the latter reasoned that it no longer have
jurisdiction over the matter as the case was already in the execution stage. Petitioner filed a petition for
Mandamus before the SC. The SC ruled that COA erred in not acting on the claim and that it still retained its
jurisdiction to adjudicate the money claim. Further, SC ruled that petitioners should have filed a petition for
certiorari with the SC. Hence, petition for mandamus is not proper because the COA's refusal to act did not leave
the petitioners without any remedy at all.

FACTS:

Petitioners were the owners of 2 parcels of land which were used and developed as a road by the City of
Puerto Princesa. In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for Payment of Just Compensation
against respondents before the RTC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. Pursuant thereto,
respondents made an initial payment of petitioners’ claim. Eventually, respondents failed to fulfil their
obligation so petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC for the collection of unpaid just compensation.

Subsequently, petitioners filed 2 motions both asking the RTC to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to
deliver the garnished account of respondents and/or to order respondents to appropriate funds for the
payment of the money judgment rendered against them and in favor of petitioners. RTC denied both motions
on the ground that government funds could not be subjected to execution and levy unless there was a
corresponding appropriation law or ordinance.

Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit (COA) requesting that it order respondents to pay
petitioners the amount adjudged in the decision of the RTC. COA informed petitioners that it could not act
upon his request to order respondents to because it had no jurisdiction over the matter as the case was
already in the execution stage. Undaunted, petitioners filed similar complaints against respondents before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Undersecretary of the DILG praying that respondents pay the
subject money judgment and that they be suspended from office for their refusal to comply with the money
judgment. Hence, this Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the remedy of mandamus is proper to compel respondents to comply with the decision of the
RTC

RULING: NO.

The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of mandamus because they have done
everything in the books to satisfy their just and demandable claim. They went to the courts, the COA, the
Ombudsman, and the DILG. They resorted to the remedy of mandamus because in at least three (3) cases, the
Court sanctioned the remedy in cases of final judgments rendered against a local government unit (LGU).
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor

Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its favor
and against a municipality or city, as in this case. It has been held, however, that a resort to the remedy of
mandamus is improper if the standard modes of procedure and forms of remedy are still available and
capable of affording relief.

Regarding final money judgment against the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, the legal
remedy is to seek relief with the COA. Considering that a writ of execution was already issued by RTC-Br. 223,
the remedy of petitioners is to follow up their claim with the COA. Petitioners rightfully did so, but the COA
erred in not acting on the claim.

It is clear that the COA has the authority and power to settle "all debts and claims of any sort due from or
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities." This authority and
power can still be exercised by the COA even if a court’s decision in a case has already become final and
executory. In other words, the COA still retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the
issuance of a writ of execution.

Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should
have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's
refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without any remedy at all.

JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAYA v. RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., DEMOSTHENES P. ORAIZ and
RICARDO D. GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 188769, August 03, 2016

QUICK SUMMARY:
This case concerns the dismissal of an action for mandamus that sought to compel respondents to register the
transfer of shares of stock and issue the corresponding stock certificates in favor of petitioner. The
Cabadbaran City RTC ruled that petitioner Andaya was not entitled to the remedy of mandamus, since the
transfer of the subject shares of stock had not yet been recorded in the corporation's stock and transfer book,
and the registered owner had not given him a special power of attorney to make the transfer. Andaya has
filed a Rule 45 petition directly before SC, insisting that he has a cause of action to institute the suit. SC ruled
that petitioner has been able to establish that he is a bona fide transferee of the shares of stock and therefore
has legal standing to initiate an action for mandamus.

FACTS:

Andaya bought from Chute shares of stock in the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran. Chute duly endorsed and
delivered the certificates of stock to Andaya and, subsequently, requested the bank to register the transfer
and issue new stock certificates in favor of the latter. A few days later, the bank wrote Chute to inform her
that he could not register the transfer. Andaya also separately communicated with the bank reiterating
Chute's request for the issuance of new stock certificates in petitioner's favor.

The bank denied the request of Andaya. It reasoned that he had a conflict of interest, as he was then president
and chief executive officer of a competitor bank. Respondent bank concluded that the purchase of shares was
not in good faith. Consequently, Andaya instituted an action for mandamus and damages against the Rural
Bank of Cabadbaran. Petitioner sought to compel them to record the transfer in the bank's stock and transfer
book and to issue new certificates of stock in his name.

The RTC issued a Decision dismissing the complaint. The trial court ruled that Andaya had no standing to
compel the bank to register the transfer and issue stock certificates in his name. Consequently, Andaya
directly filed with this Court a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari assailing the RTC Decision on pure
questions of law.

ISSUE: Whether a writ of mandamus should issue in favour of petitioner

RULING:

It is already settled jurisprudence that the registration of a transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty on
the part of the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel
corporations that wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or to issue new certificates of stock.
This remedy is available even upon the instance of a bona fide transferee who is able to establish a clear legal
right to the registration of the transfer. We also rule that Andaya has been able to establish that he is a bona
fide transferee of the shares of stock of Chute.

In contrast, at the crux of this petition are the registration of the transfer and the issuance of the
corresponding stock certificates. Requiring petitioner to register the transaction before he could institute a
mandamus suit in supposed abidance by the ruling in Ponce was a palpable error. It led to an absurd,
circuitous situation in which Andaya was prevented from causing the registration of the transfer, ironically
because the shares had not been registered.

Accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a ministerial act may issue only when petitioner is able to
establish the presence of the following: (1) right clearly founded in law and is not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to
perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect in performing the duty enjoined by law; (4) the ministerial nature of the
act to be performed; and (5) the absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.31chanrobleslaw

After finding that petitioner has legal standing to initiate an action for mandamus, the Court now reinstates
the action he filed and remands the case to the RTC to resolve the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus.

d. Motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite; exceptions

ELSIE S. CAUSING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.

G.R. No. 199139 September 9, 2014

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner was relocated by private respondent Mayor Biron from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the
Office of the Mayor. Petitioner filed the complaint claiming that the order issued by Mayor Biron was illegal.
The Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. SC ruled that motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and since petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration, her petition for certiorari was
dismissed.

FACTS:
Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued a
Memorandum which relocated her from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor

In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the complaint-affidavit in the Office of the
Regional Election Director, claiming that the order issued by Mayor Biron being made within the election
period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of a COMELEC Resolution.
In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to
closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior had
been received and that she was not demoted to a lower position that diminished her salary and other
benefits.

The Provincial Election Supervisor (PES), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause to charge Mayor Biron with the violation. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and
recommendation of PES observing that Mayor Biron did not strip Causing of her functions as the Municipal
Civil Registrar. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether the petition for certiorari should be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to file a
motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC

RULING: YES.

Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing the petition for certiorari.

The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an
aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the
public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.

The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable herein.
Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense
cases.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs.

SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO
G.R. No. 195594 September 29, 2014

QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondents sought for the payment of just compensation from the petitioner. When respondents’ demands
were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint against petitioner. The trial court granted respondents’
complaint and issued an ex parte 72-hour TRO, the court also granted respondents’ application for preliminary
injunction. Without moving for a reconsideration, petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of the trial court. The appellate court ruled
that petition for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was filed without seeking first the reconsideration
of the trial court. SC ruled jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is
proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration and this case falls within the exceptions.

FACTS:
Respondents are the owners of Monte Vista Homes. They voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation canal that is part of
the Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project (BPIP). Subsequently, respondents found out through a Geohazard
Assessment Report (GAR), that the ground shaking and channel bank erosion are possible hazards that could
affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista.

Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay, Ilocos Sur adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR. Respondent
Rogelio Lazo brought to NIA’s attention payment of just compensation for the entire buffer zone.

When respondents’ demands were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint for just compensation
with damages against NIA. Prior to the filing of an Answer, respondents filed an Amended Complaint with
application for a TRO and preliminary injunction. The trial court issued an ex parte 72-hour TRO and granted
respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.

Without moving for a reconsideration, petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that
petition for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was filed without seeking first the reconsideration of
the trial court. It was said that petitioner omitted to show sufficient justification that there was no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE: Whether the facts of this case justified petitioner’s immediate resort to the court of appeals without
filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed orders of the trial court.

RULING: YES.

A petition for certiorari may be given due course notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was
filed in the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari with the CA is discouraged when
litigants may still resort to remedies with the trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a
petition for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the court because the technical
provisions of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice.

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for
certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed
to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute
and jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper
notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parteor in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls within instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-
mentioned. Also, the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those already raised and
passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be useless and serve no
practical purpose. There is likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.

The CA and this Court unquestionably have full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume
jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. We deem it proper to
adopt an open-minded approach in the present case.

LXVI. RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO

ERNESTO CAMPOS and FLORENCIO OROC vs. ESTEBAN DEGAMO and FELINO PALARCA
G.R. No. L-18315 September 29, 1962

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioners questioned respondent’s assumption to office and prayed that a writ quo warranto be issued
ousting and excluding respondents from the office and that they (petitioners) be declared entitled to said
offices. The lower court ruled that quo warranto cannot prosper because it fails to state a cause of action. The
SC ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties to institute the present action.

FACTS:
Petitioners were elected and proclaimed councilor No. 1 and councilor No. 2, respectively, of the municipality
of Carmen, Agusan; while respondents Esteban Degamo and Felino Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and Vice
Mayor, respectively, of the said municipality, notwithstanding that there was no valid canvass for the offices
of Mayor and Vice Mayor effected and the respondents could not legally occupy the said positions.

Petitioner made verbal demands upon respondents to stop forming the duties and functions of said offices,
but respondents denied and refused. Petitioners, therefore, prayed a that a writ quo warranto be issued
ousting and excluding respondents from the office of mayor and vice-mayor of Carmen, respectively and that
they be declared entitled to said offices and placed forthwith possession thereof.

Respondents answered that they were duly elected by the people and validly proclaimed by the said Board.
Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal personality or authority to file the present case. The lower
court ruled that quo warranto cannot prosper because it fails to state a cause of action.

Petitioners appealed directly to the Supreme Court on purely questions of law.

ISSUE: Whether the quo warranto action of herein petitioners will prosper

RULING: NO.

On the assumption that the present action is presented as an ordinary quo warranto case (Rule 68, Rules of
Court), same cannot also prosper. Section 7, Rule 68, provides:

What complaint for usurpation to set forth, and who may be made parties. - When the action is against a
person for usurping an office or franchise, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to
be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the defendant is unlawfully in
possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the office or franchise may be made parties, and
their respective rights to such office or franchise determined, in the same action.
Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, are not
parties herein. The complaint must likewise allege that plaintiffs were duly elected to such positions. Where
the office in question is an elective one, the complaint must show that the plaintiff was duly elected thereto
(Luna vs. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 401; Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18). Petitioners-appellants Campos and Oroc, having
been candidates and elected for the office of councilors and not for the office of mayor and vice-mayor, they
are not the proper parties to institute the present action.

The appeal is dismissed and the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-
appellants.

ABRAHAM C. SISON vs. HON. PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service, et al.,

G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and quo warranto for the annulment of the actions of respondents.
Petitioner contends that based on the rule of next-in-rank, he, instead of respondent Maliwanag, should have
been appointed to the position of City Assessor. SC ruled that the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is
that he came to the courts out of time. Petition herein was filed more than 1 year after the pretended right of
petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial
remedy in his favour.

FACTS:

Petition denominated as for certiorari and quo warranto and seeking the annulment of the actions of
respondents in affirming such attestation of private respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag's appointment as
Assistant City Assessor and further asking that respondent Commissioner be mandated to appoint petitioner
as such Assistant City Assessor and that private respondent Maliwanag be declared as unlawfully usurping
said position under a void and illegal appointment.

In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising
immediate administrative control and supervision over respondent the appointment of aforementioned is
illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains that upon the
promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent
Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s petition for certiorari and quo warranto may be granted

RULING: NO.

We are loathe to substitute Our own judgment for that of the Commissioner of Civil Service who is primarily
charged with the administration of the Civil Service Law and rules and regulations, absent, as in this case,
convincing showing of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.

Withal, the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is that he came to the courts out of time. As already
stated, the appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and respondent. On the other hand,
the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year after the pretended right of
petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial
remedy in his favour.

Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to
actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable.
Such contention is not correct. As earlier noted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause
or causes of action boil down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to
which she has been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor.
Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification of her appointment,
which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto.
Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes
also after one year.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON, et al., vs. HON. MENDEZ, SR., et al.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC against the officials of the Municipality of San
Andres. On the basis that EO No. 353 which created the Municipality of San Andres is a nullity because it
amounted to a usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature, petitioner now contends that the officials
of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of
their respective offices. The lower court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action. The case was
elevated to SC. SC ruled that petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. SC added that a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision must be timely raised.

FACTS:
President Garcia, issued, EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon. By virtue of EO No.
174, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially
recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality.

The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 and
prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain
from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. Petitioning municipality contended that
EO No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of
the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their
respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring that, considering the petition to
be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that
prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General.

The lower court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to
the State. The same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari."

ISSUE: Whether the petition for quo warranto may be given due course

RULING: NO.

The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any
person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is
focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the
Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and
upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an
individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he
claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another."

While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of
the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity. At any rate, in the interest
of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into
the merits of the petition.

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 may have converted the
Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo
warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right
to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act
7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was
only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to
challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the
Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local
government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of
another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not
indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, vs. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO
G.R. No. 237428 June 19, 2018

QUICK SUMMARY:

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court contending that the Court is without
jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto. SC ruled that a quo warranto proceeding is
the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. SC further ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution that says that impeachable officers are
immuned, exempted, or excluded from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined
therein is the status of an officer as such. SC denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an impartial tribunal.
She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo
warranto.

By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), seeks a denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration for being proforma. In any case, the OSG
argues that respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial of due process and that quo warranto is
the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable officer. The OSG maintains that the petition is not
time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the State and that the peculiar
circumstances of the instant case preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period.

Carefully weighing the arguments advanced by both parties, this Court finds no reason to reverse its earlier
Decision.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court is has jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto.

RULING: YES.

The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This authority is expressly
conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII which states that:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only to certain public officials or
that excludes impeachable officials therefrom.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or
the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a
judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office.

The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the qualifications of the President and
Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was
provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).

This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions. And
as Estrada and the PET Rules show, impeachable officers are not immune to quo warranto actions. Thus, a
refusal by the Court to take cognizance of this case would not only be a breach of its duty under the
Constitution, it would also accord respondent an exemption not given to other impeachable officers.

Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional remedy prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions
relating to qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to public office. Those who chose to ignore this fact are
Constitutionally blind. There is nothing in Our Constitution that says that impeachable officers are immuned,
exempted, or excluded from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined therein is the
status of an officer as such. No amount of public indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution.

LXVII. RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. THE ARELLANO LAW COLLEGES, INC.,

G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner seeks to expropriate the land of respondent for the purpose of subdivision and resale. The lower
court dismissed the action on the ground that RA No. 267empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate
lands. SC ruled that the necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. Any good that would accrue to
the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the
preparation of a young men and young women for useful citizenship.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 267 provides that cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Philippine National Bank for the purpose of purchasing or
expropriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents
of the said cities and municipalities.

The court below ruled that Republic Act No. 267empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for
the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action, which seeks to expropriate
several parcels of land situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether a necessity exists to justify the expropriation of the parcels of land

RULING: NO.

We are inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for
homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning. But this
power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions. The National Government may
not confer its instrumentalities authority which itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher than its
source.

To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a
necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes.

Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. Does not mean
an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the
public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent
with such benefits. But measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private character of
the intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown.

On the other hand, the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property but had the
plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been stopped
by the city authorities. And again, while a handful of people stand to profits by the expropriation, the
development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any good
that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in
comparison with the preparation of a young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to
the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake. The
Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep this land.

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. HON. DULAY and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987

QUICK SUMMARY:

Petitioner filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for expropriation against the private respondent. The
respondent judge issued the order of condemnation and also appointed commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. Petitioner objected on the ground that P.D. No.
1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation
through commissioners. SC ruled that the provisions of P.D. No. 1533 on just compensation are unconstitutional
and void. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle in determining just compensation
but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded.

FACTS:

The President issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated
in the City of Lapu-Lapu for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner. The proclamation
included parcels of land owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. Upon failure of the
parties to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property, the petitioner filed with the then CFI of
Cebu, a complaint for expropriation against the private respondent. The respondent judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be
condemned, upon the payment of just compensation. The respondent judge also issued a second order
appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the properties sought to
be expropriated.

Petitioner objected to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to
8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners. The trial
court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration

Petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order,
enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.

ISSUE: Whether Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed by P.D. No. 1533
insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned

RULING: NO.

We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void
and accordingly dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court
technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared
either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D.
1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the
power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this
effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose. This time, we answer in the affirmative.

We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute
the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners
pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to
undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.
 [G.R. No. 135042. September 23, 1999]

ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Br. 15; and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
took effect on July 1, 1997. Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed reversed or
modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in
eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing
to determine the provisional sum to be deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be issued prior
to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the property owner.

The Case

Before us is a Petition under Rule 45, challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] promulgated
February 27, 1998 and its Resolution promulgated July 23, 1998 in CA-GR SP-46002, which (1) dismissed the
action for certiorari and preliminary injunction filed by Robern Development Corporation ("Robern" for
brevity); and (2) effectively affirmed the Orders (dated August 13, 1997; September 11, 1997; and November
5, 1997) and the Writ of Possession (dated September 19, 1997), all issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City in Civil Case No. 25356-97.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:[2]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

In its assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in this manner: [3]

There being no compelling reason to modify, reverse or reconsider the Decision rendered in the case dated
February 27, 1998[;] the Motion for Reconsideration posted by petitioner on March 23, 1998 is DENIED, it
appearing further that the arguments raised therein were already considered and passed upon in the
aforesaid Decision.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed.

1. Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of about 17,746.50 square meters, which
the National Power Corporation ("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to expropriate. The property forms part of a
proposed low-cost housing project in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril, Davao City.
2. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern. [4] Instead of filing an
answer, petitioner countered with a Motion to Dismiss,[5] alleging (a) that the Complaint suffered a
jurisdictional defect for not showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC board of directors; (b) that
Nemesio S. Caete, who signed the verification and certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the
general manager or an officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395); (c) that the choice of
property to be expropriated was improper, as it had already been intended for use in a low-cost housing project,
a public purpose within the contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar
properties available within the area.
3. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession based
on Presidential Decree No. 42. On July 9, 1997, NPC deposited P6,121.20 at the Philippine National Bank, Davao
Branch, as evidenced by PNB Savings Account No. 385-560728-9.[6]
4. In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in this wise:

This refers to the motion to dismiss. The issues raised are matters that should be dealt with during the trial
proper. Suffice it to say that [NPC] has the privilege as a utility to use the power of eminent domain.

The motion is denied for lack of merit. The pre-trial conference shall be on August 27, 1997 at 2:30 P.M.[7]

5. On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that (a) the issues
raised in the Motion to Dismiss could be resolved without trial, as they could be readily appreciated on the face
of the Complaint itself vis--vis the applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the grounds relied upon
for dismissing the Complaint did not require evidence aliunde.
6. On September 11, 1997, the trial court denied the Motion, as follows:

The xxx motion [of the petitioner] for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. Finding the xxx motion [of
NPC] to be meritorious[,] let a writ of possession issue.[8]

7. On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of September 11,
1997, arguing among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395 was virtually amended when Caete was allowed to
verify and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in regard to the Complaint for expropriation filed by NPC.
8. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the
Writ of Possession.
9. On September 19, 1997, in spite of petitioners opposition, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession as
follows:

WHEREAS, the applicant National Power Corporation in the above-titled case has presented to this Court a
petition praying for the issuance of a Writ of Possession of the affected property of the xxx Robern
Development Corporation, described hereinbelow, as follows:

TCT No. Total Area in Area Affected in

Square Meter Square Meter

T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00

T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00

T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00

T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50

TOTAL - - 97,371.00 17,746.50 Total
affected area

WHEREAS, on September 11, 1997 the court issued an Order granting the issuance of a Writ of Possession in
favor of the xxx National Power Corporation for the immediate possession and control of the parcels of land
owned by the [petitioner] as aforestated for the construction of the Mantanao-New-Loon 138 KV
Transmission Line Project to be undertaken by the petitioner affecting 17,746.50 sq.m. of the 97,371.00 sq.
meters as shown above.

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to place [NPC] in possession and control of the affected
property consisting 17,746.50 [s]quare [m]eters of the total area of 97,371.00 square meters described above
and to eject therefrom all adverse occupants, Robern Development Corporation and [all other] persons xxx
claiming under it.[9]

10. On November 5, 1997, before counsel for the petitioner received any order from the trial court
directing the implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed property.
11. In a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), Robern assailed the Writ on the following
grounds: (a) patent on the face of the complaint were its jurisdictional defect, prematurity and noncompliance
with RA 6395; and (b) the issuance of the Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and unconstitutional, as
the trial court had yet to fix the appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering upon the property to be
expropriated.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the following grounds.
First, the verification and certification of the Complaint by someone other than the president or the general
manager of NPC was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege that the expropriating body had
the right of eminent domain. The issues of whether the expropriation was properly authorized by the board of
directors and whether Caetes verification and certification of the Complaint was likewise authorized were
evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after the reception of evidence.
Second, whether the disputed property could still be expropriated even if it had already been intended to
be used in a low-cost housing project and whether the choice of that lot was arbitrary and erroneous, given the
availability of similar properties in the area, were factual issues that would entail presentation of evidence by
both parties.
Third, the allegation in the Complaint that NPC sought to acquire an easement of right-of-way through the
disputed property did not preclude its expropriation. Section 3-A of the NPC charter allowed the power
company to acquire an easement of right-of-way or even the land itself if the servitude would injure the land.
Fourth, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in view of NPCs compliance with Section 2, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine National Bank an amount equivalent
to the assessed value of the disputed property.
Fifth, certiorari was not the proper remedy, as the Order sustaining the right to expropriate the property
was not final and could still be appealed by the aggrieved party. The availability of appeal ruled out certiorari.
Hence, this Petition.[10]

The Issues
 In their Memorandum,[11] petitioner raises the following issues:[12]

I WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED SEPTEMBER 11,
1997 DIRECTING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HIGHLY
IRREGULAR, ARBITRARY, AND DESPOTIC.

II WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE INSTANT CASE IS DISMISSIBLE ON ITS FACE FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION, BEING FLAWED WITH PREMATURITY, AND VIOLATIVE OF RA 6395.

III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A FINDING NOT BORNE OUT BY THE
COMPLAINT, THUS IT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.

IV WHETHER OR NOT THE CHOICE OF THE PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS ARBITRARY.

Simply stated, the petition raises the following issues:

1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the Complaint?
2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued, considering that the trial court had not conducted any
hearing on the amount to be deposited?

This Courts Ruling

The Court of Appeals was correct in its rulings, but in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner
should be given an opportunity to file its answer.

First Issue:

Grounds for Dismissal

Jurisdiction

Petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because, first, Atty. Caete
who signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was neither the president nor the general
manager of NPC; and second, under Section 15-A of RA 6395, only the NPC chief legal counsel, under the
supervision of the Office of the Solicitor General is authorized to handle legal matters affecting the government
power corporation. On the other hand, NPC argues that Caete, as its regional legal counsel in Mindanao, is
authorized to prepare the Complaint on its behalf.
We find the disputed verification and certification to be sufficient in form. Verification is intended to
assure that the allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or are true and correct, not mere
speculations.[13] Generally, lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. Its
absence does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction.[14] The trial court may order the correction of the pleading
or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule
may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.
The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the plaintiff or principal party to attest under oath that (1)
no action or claim involving the same issues have been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and that, to the best of the plaintiff's knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending; (2) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of its present status shall be made; and (3) if
it should be learned that the same or a similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall
report this fact to the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading was filed. [15] This rule is rooted in the
principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this
practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure.[16]Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which came before
the 1997 Rules of Court, is deemed mandatory but not jurisdictional, as jurisdiction over the subject or nature
of the action is conferred by law.[17]
In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Caete was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC
at the Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house
counsel and officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao in
legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the best position to
verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao
City. As internal legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know and to certify if an action for
expropriation had already been filed and pending with the courts.
Besides, Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the Complaint; he was joined by Comie P. Doromal, OIC-
assistant general counsel; and Catherine J. Pablo -- both of the NPC Litigation & Land and Land Rights
Department. They all signed on behalf of the solicitor general in accordance with the NPC charter. [18] Their
signatures prove that the NPC general counsel and the solicitor general approved the filing of the Complaint for
expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in holding that the Complaint was not dismissible on its face,
simply because the person who had signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not
the president or the general manager of NPC.

Legal Standing and Condition Precedent

Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal standing to file the expropriation case, because the
Complaint did not allege that its board of directors had authorized its filing. It added that under Section 6, RA
6395, only the board was vested with the corporate power to sue and be sued.
The National Power Corporation explains that, like other corporate officers and employees whose
functions are defined by the board, Atty. Caete is authorized to file the expropriation case. Even if he is not the
general counsel, he has residual authority to prepare, verify and certify the Complaint for expropriation.
We rule for the private respondent. Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SECTION 1. The complaint.The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint
which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property
sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. xxxx.

The foregoing Rule does not require that the Complaint be expressly approved by the board of directors
of a corporation. In any event, such authorization is a factual issue that can be threshed out during the trial. As
held by the appellate court, the issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings [were] authorized by the
Board of Directors or that those who signed the complaint [were] authorized representatives are evidentiary
in character determinable only in [the] trial proper.

Prematurity of the Complaint

 The same ruling applies to the argument alleging prematurity of the Complaint. Petitioner's insistence
that NPC must secure the approval of the provincial board and the municipal council is unfounded.Section 3(j),
RA 6395, merely requires that the Complaint be filed in the same manner as an expropriation case of the
national, the provincial or the municipal government. At bottom, all that is needed is compliance with Rule 67
of the Rules of Court and the prevailing jurisprudence on expropriation.

Defenses and Objections

Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be dismissed, because the subject property was already
committed to be used in a low-cost housing project. Besides, there were other available properties in the
area. Finally, the Complaint allegedly sought only an easement of a right-of-way, not essentially an
expropriation.
We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this case is premised on the old rule. Before the 1997 amendment,
Section 3 of Rule 67 allowed a defendant in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a single motion to dismiss or for
other appropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property xxx.
A motion to dismiss was not governed by Rule 15 which covered ordinary motions.Such motion was the
required responsive pleading that took the place of an answer and put in issue the plaintiff's right to
expropriate the defendant's property.[19] Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a defense in a
condemnation proceeding, such as that which tended to show that (1) the exercise of the power to condemn
was unauthorized, or (2) there was cause for not taking defendants property for the purpose alleged in the
petition, or (3) the purpose for the taking was not public in character.[20]
This old rule found basis in the constitutional provisions on the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
which were deemed to be for the protection of the individual property owner against the aggressions of the
government.[21] Under the old rule, the hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence followed.
However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer requires such extraordinary motion to
dismiss. Instead, it provides:

SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. x x x x

If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense
to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons.The answer
shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature
and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. x x
x x.

In his book on remedial law, Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes that the old Rule was a bit confusing as the
previous holdings under that former provision also allowed the filing of another motion to dismiss, as that is
understood in Rule 16, to raise additionally the preliminary objections authorized by that Rule. Further, an
answer, which is now required, gives more leeway. First, even if it still applies the omnibus motion rule, it
allows amendments to be made within ten days from its filing. [22] Second, the failure to file an answer does not
produce all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because the defendant may still
present evidence as to just compensation.[23]
When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had already taken
effect. Statutes regulating procedure in the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time those statutes were passed.[24] New court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of their
effectivity.[25] On April 8, 1997, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, declaring that the
revisions in the Rules of Court were to become effective on July 1, 1997.
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss
the allotment of the disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a mere easement of right-of-
way in the complaint for expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those specifically mentioned
in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground authorized by this
provision.[26]
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an
answer, since they require presentation of evidence aliunde.[27] Section 3 of Rule 67 provides that if a defendant
has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of
his property, he should include them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a
full-blown trial and hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss the Complaint on such grounds as claimed by
the petitioner. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due process if, from a
consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case
on the merits.[28]
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect when this case arose, we believe that in the interest of
substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to file its answer to the Complaint for
expropriation in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Order of Condemnation

The Court will now tackle the validity of the trial court's assailed Order of August 13, 1997, which
Respondent Court affirmed in this wise:

xxxx The denial of Roberns Motion to Dismiss [is tantamount] to a confirmation or a determination of
the authority of NPC to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the case. Under Section 4 of the present Rule 67, 1997 Rules, supra, an
order sustaining the right to expropriate the property is a final one and may be appealed by any
aggrieved party (Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 [1989]). xxxx.[29]

We clarify. Founded on common necessity and interest, eminent domain is the inherent right of the state
(and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public
use upon payment of just compensation. It may appear to be harsh and encompassing, but judicial review limits
the exercise of eminent domain to the following areas of concern: (1) the adequacy of the compensation, (2)
the necessity of the taking, and (3) the public-use character of the purpose of the taking.[30]
If there are objections and defenses that require the presentation of evidence and the hearing of
arguments, the trial court should not immediately issue an order of expropriation. This is clearly implied in
Section 4 of Rule 67, which mandates that [i]f the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff
to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the
court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint x x x.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there were issues that required presentation of evidence during the trial
proper; namely, whether the expropriation proceeding was authorized by the NPC board of directors, whether
the property to be expropriated was already devoted to public use, and whether the choice of the property was
arbitrary and erroneous in view of the other properties available in the area.The necessity of the taking and the
public character of the purpose of the expropriation were still in issue and pending resolution by the trial
court. To these we add the issue of whether the taking of the disputed property would require only an easement
of right-of-way or would perpetually deprive Robern of its proprietary rights. Therefore, the trial court should
not have issued the assailed Order of Expropriation which foreclosed any further objection to the NPCs right to
expropriate and to the public purpose of the expropriation, leaving the matter of just compensation as the only
remaining substantial issue.
 The nullity of the Order was glaring. While the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss, as the
issues raised by the petitioner should be dealt with during the trial proper, it nonetheless ruled that NPC had
the privilege as a [public] utility to use the power of eminent domain.

Second Issue

Requisites of a Writ of Possession

Petitioner objects to the issuance of the Writ of Possession for being highly irregular, arbitrary and
despotic, because the Motion to Dismiss was yet to be resolved. It stresses that there was no hearing on the
correct amount of just compensation for the taking of the disputed property, as required in Panes v. Visayas
State College of Agriculture.[31] We cannot uphold this contention.
There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt
adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners.[32] However, the requirements for authorizing
immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed.
To start with, in Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes,[33] the Court held that the railway corporation had
the right to enter and possess the land involved in condemnation proceedings under Section 1, Act No.
1592,[34] immediately upon the filing of a deposit fixed by order of the court.
The Rules of Court of 1964[35] sanctioned this procedure as follows:

SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with National or Provincial Treasurer.-- Upon the filing of the
complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of
the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as
provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be
held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final dispositon of the court. xxxx. (Underscoring ours.)

Subsequently, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed into law Presidential Decree No. 42 and its
companion decrees, which removed the court's discretion in determining the amount of the provisional value
of the land to be expropriated and fixed the provisional deposit at its assessed value for taxation
purposes. Hearing was not required; only notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned.
On the issue of immediate possession, PD 42 (Authorizing The Plaintiff In Eminent Domain Proceedings To
Take Possession Of The Property Involved Upon Depositing The Assessed Value, For Purposes of Taxation)
provided:

WHEREAS, the existing procedure for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is not expeditious enough
to enable the plaintiff to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved as soon as possible,
when needed for public purposes;

xxxxxxxxx

xxx [T]hat, upon filing in the proper court of the complaint in eminent domain proceedings or at anytime
thereafter, and after due notice to the defendant, plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the Philippine National Bank, xxx an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, to be held by said bank subject to
the orders and final disposition of the court.
The provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and of any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed.

Paragraph 3 of PD No. 1224 (Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized
Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation) also authorized immediate takeover of the property in this
manner:

3. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the amount of just compensation as
provided for herein, the Government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession,
control and disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon even pending resolution of the
issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First Instance or the higher courts.

Where the taking was for socialized housing, Section 3, PD 1259 (Amending Paragraphs 1, 2, And 3 Of PD
No. 1224 Further Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized Housing Upon
Payment Of Just Compensation), amending the above-quoted paragraph, provided:

Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the amount of the just compensation
provided for in Section 2 hereof, the Government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have
possession, control and disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon even pending
resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian
Relations or the higher courts.

Similarly, Section 1, PD No. 1313 (Further Amending Paragraph 3 Of Presidential Decree No. 1224 As
Amended By Presidential Decree No. 1259, Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For
Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation), amending paragraph 3 of PD 1224, decreed:

Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main
office or any of its branches of the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the just compensation provided
for in Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1259, the government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall
immediately have possession, control and disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon
with the power of demolition, if necessary, even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether
before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations, or the higher Courts.

In this connection, we also quote Section 7 of PD No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban Land Reform In The
Philippines And Providing For The Implementing Machinery Thereof), which reads:
xxxxxxxxx

Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main
office or any of its branches of the amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the declared assessment value
in 1975, the Government, or its authorized agency or entity shall immediately have possession, control and
disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon with the power of demolition, if necessary,
even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of
Agrarian Relations, or the higher Courts.

Finally, PD 1533 (Establishing A Uniform Basis For Determining Just Compensation And The Amount Of
Deposit For Immediate Possession Of The Property Involved In Eminent Domain Proceedings)mandated the
deposit of only ten percent (10%) of the assessed value of the private property being sought to be expropriated,
after fixing the just compensation for it at a value not exceeding that declared by the owner or determined by
the assessor, whichever is lower. Section 2 thereof reads:

SEC. 2. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its
main office or any of its branches of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of
compensation provided in Section 1 hereof, the government or its authorized instrumentality agency or
entity shall be entitled to immediate possession, control and disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon, including the power of demolition if necessary, notwithstanding the pendency of the
issues before the courts.

Accordingly, in San Diego v. Valdellon,[36] Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, [37] and Haguisan v.
Emilia,[38] the Court reversed itself and ruled that Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules, was repealed by
Presidential Decree No. 42. The judicial duty of ascertaining and fixing the provisional value of the property
was done away with, because the hearing on the matter had not been expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff
to take possession of the property involved as soon as possible, when needed for public purpose. [39]
In Daet, the Court clarified that the provisional value of the land did not necessarily represent the true and
correct one but only tentatively served as the basis for immediate occupancy by the condemnor.The just
compensation for the property continued to be based on its current and fair market value, not on its assessed
value which constituted only a percentage of its current fair market value.
However, these rulings were abandoned in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,[40] because [t]he
method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitute[d] impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tend[ed] to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution [was] reserved to it for final determination. The Court added:

We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed
compensation.

In Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, [41] the Court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of the
presidential decrees that fixed the just compensation in an expropriation case at the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or by the assessor, whichever was lower.
More precisely, Panes v. Visayas State College of Agriculture[42] ruled that the judicial determination of just
compensation included the determination of the provisional deposit. In that case, the Court invalidated the Writ
of Possession because of lack of hearing on the provisional deposit, as required under then Section 2 of Rule
67, pre-1997 Rules. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of PD Nos. 76, 1533 and 42, insofar as they
sanctioned executive determination of just compensation, any right to immediate possession of the property
must be firmly grounded on valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules; that is, the value of the
subject property, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court that has jurisdiction over
the proceedings, must be deposited with the national or the provincial treasurer. [43]
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure revised Section 2 of Rule 67 and clearly reverted to the San
Diego, Daet and Haguisan rulings. Section 2 now reads:

SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary.Upon the filing of the
complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. xxxx

xxxxxxxxx
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the
plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service
of copies to the parties. [Underscoring ours.]

In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the
Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered by the
1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules are given immediate effect and are applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time they are passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the
date of their effectivity.[44] Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing
and governing law in this case.[45]
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial,
once the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPCs Motion for the issuance of the Writ,
despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.
The Court nonetheless hastens to add that PD 1533 is not being revived.
Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules, the provisional deposit should be in an amount equivalent to
the full assessed value of the property to be condemned, not merely ten percent of it. Therefore, the provisional
deposit of NPC is insufficient. Since it seeks to expropriate portions, not the whole, of four parcels of land owned
by Robern, the provisional deposit should be computed on the basis of the Tax Declarations of the property: [46]

TCT No. Total Area Area Affected Assessed Provisional

in Sq. M. in Sq. M. Value Deposit

T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00 P4,250.00 P1,257.32

T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00 8,960.00 1,903.10

T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00 18,910.00 2,144.39

T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50 18,450.00 3,619.28

TOTAL 97,371.00 17,746.50 P8,924.09

Hence, the amount of the provisional deposit should be increased, in order to conform to the requirement
that it should be equivalent to the assessed value of the property. In the interest of justice, NPC should in the
meantime pay Robern reasonable rental, to be fixed by the trial court in its final decision, for the use and
occupation of the disputed property from the date of entry until the deposit of the full assessed value of the
property, as mandated by Rule 67.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP-46002
are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) petitioner is granted a period of ten days from the
finality of this Decision within which to file its answer, in accordance with Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Court;
(2) NPC shall deposit, also within ten days from the finality if this Decision, the full amount required under the
aforecited Rule; and (3) the trial court shall, in its final decision, fix the rental for the use and the occupation of
the disputed property, from the date of NPCs entry until its deposit of the full amount required under the 1997
Rules. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG and ANGELO T. ARRASTIA, G.R. No. 158609
represented herein by Attorney-in-Fact REMEDIOS
BERENGUER LINTAG, Present:
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, July 27, 2007

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal
of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated November 29, 2002 and praying that the Order[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated July 10, 2001, be reinstated and affirmed in toto.

The Facts

Petitioners-spouses Marian Berenguer-Lintag and Angelo T. Arrastia (petitioners) are the registered owners of
a property with an area of 80,001 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24855
and located at Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

On December 4, 1996, respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a Complaint [4] for Eminent Domain
against petitioners in order to acquire an easement of a right of way over a portion of the said property,
consisting of 8,050 square meters (subject property) with an initial assessed value at P2,468.09. NPC averred
that such acquisition was necessary and urgent for the construction and maintenance of NPC's 350 KV Leyte-
Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project.
On January 17, 1997, after the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject property amounting
to P2,468.09 with the Philippine National Bank, the RTC, upon an ex-partemotion of NPC, ordered the issuance
of a Writ of Possession on the subject property[5] consonant with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 42.[6]

On January 24, 1997, the Writ of Possession[7] was issued in favor of NPC.[8]

On May 25, 2000, the RTC issued an Order[9] appointing three (3) new Commissioners to appraise the value of
the subject property. They were directed to take their oath within five (5) days from receipt of said Order, to
notify the parties and their respective counsels as to the date of the conduct of ocular inspection of the subject
property, and to submit a report within fifteen (15) days from the completion of the ocular inspection.

On June 15, 2000, two commissioners filed a motion praying that the RTC use the previous Commissioners'
Report as basis in determining the amount of just compensation.[10]

On July 11, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion[11] asking the Court to order the NPC to pay them or their Attorney-
in-Fact Remedios Berenguer Lintag (Remedios Lintag) the amount of P49,665.63, as the tentative value of the
damaged improvements.

On August 28, 2000, the RTC directed Field Personnel Wenifredo A. Halcon, Jr. and Augusto V. Ramos, Jr. to
confirm that the damage to the improvements in the subject property amounted to P49,665.63.[12] NPC paid
the said amount.
On September 13, 2000, pre-trial was held and a pre-trial Order[13] was issued. The case was set for trial on the
merits on November 15, 2000.

However, on November 7, 2000, Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 entitled "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of
Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes" was
approved.

On February 14, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion[14] asking the RTC to direct the NPC to comply with RA No.
8974. In the said motion, petitioners asseverated that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA No. 8974, they are entitled to
100% of the value of the subject property based on the current relevant zonal valuation made by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), which at the time was pegged at P700.00 per square meter. Thus, petitioners prayed
that NPC be directed to pay P5,635,000.00 for the subject property.
 The Ruling of the RTC

On July 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the NPC to comply with RA No. 8974. The court held that
RA No. 8974 is procedural in nature, and, thus, may be given retroactive effect, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants the amount
equivalent to one hundred (100%) percent of the current Bureau of Internal Revenue's zonal
valuation of their property consisting of eight thousand fifty (8,050) square meters affected
by the electrical project involved in this case within fifteen (15) days after receipt of this Order.

Set the continuation of hearing for the determination of just compensation to August 31,
2001 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

NPC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in its Order [15] dated September 7, 2001.
Aggrieved, NPC went to the CA via Petition for Certiorari[16]under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The CA's Ruling

In its November 29, 2002 Decision, the CA declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be applied retroactively since an
initial deposit had already been made and possession of the subject property had already been obtained by
NPC. Moreover, the CA held that the retroactive application of said law would impose a greater burden on the
part of the State where none had existed before. It would inflict substantial injury to a substantive right. Finally,
the CA opined that RA No. 8974 itself made no mention of retroactivity. The CA disposed, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition at bench is GRANTED, and the impugned orders are SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the same bond posted by the petitioner. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

On January 14, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] which the CA denied in its
Resolution[18] dated May 15, 2003.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

1) The CA committed a reversible error when it declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be applied retroactively
because it is a substantive law and not a remedial statute; and

2) Assuming for the sake of argument that RA No. 8974 is not retroactive, how should the petitioners be
promptly paid just compensation?

Petitioners contend that the Government's deliberate delay of payment of just compensation is the evil sought
to be remedied by RA No. 8974; that despite the issuance of Administrative Order (AO) No. 50 and NPC
Resolution No. 98-184, NPC never had the intention of making prompt payment of just compensation; and that
just compensation does not only mean correct determination of the amount to be paid but also the prompt
payment thereof. Petitioners manifest that NPC, as observed by the RTC, failed to pay the initial deposit
of P32,930.00 as mandated by PD 42.[19] Thus, petitioners submit that they are entitled to the prompt payment
of just compensation and on account of NPC's delay in the payment thereof, the imposition of legal interest is
warranted.[20]

On the other hand, NPC through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that RA No. 8974 is not a
remedial statute that can be given retroactive effect, and submits that Sec. 4 thereof is a substantive provision
as it vests substantive rights; that the legislature did not intend RA No. 8974 to have retroactive application;
that the silence of the Implementing Rules of RA No. 8974 as to prospectivity does not ipso facto render it
retroactive; that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to amend its final Order dated January 17, 1997 for initial
deposit and possession; and that the valuation fixed by the RTC is improper since the case involves an
easement, and thus, NPC should be required to pay only an easement fee. [21]

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners' first ground must fail.

In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon,[22] this Court held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit:

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a

substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard,
which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the
new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases
relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the
provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession.
This ruling was reiterated in this Court's Resolution[23] of February 1, 2006, which further states that:

[I]f the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so the converse certainly holds
that if the rule or provision creates a right, it should be properly appreciated as substantive in
nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be
enjoyed by the owner of property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary
right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of
the legislature to legislate on.

It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure, and

to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of substance. Yet the absorption of the
substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right from being
superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of property rights is a matter for the
legislature to enact on, and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the
Government is sustained, it could very well lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial
branch of government may shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability simply by absorbing
the provisions of law into the rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution restored to the
judicial branch of government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it should be understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points
of procedure, and not points of substantive law.

It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication[24] because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested.[25] This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward).

In the application of RA No. 8974, the Court finds no justification to depart from this rule. First, RA No. 8974 is
a substantive law. Second, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Third, neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its
provisions. Unfortunately for the petitioners, the silence of RA No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules on the
matter cannot give rise to the inference that it can be applied retroactively. In the two (2) cases[26]wherein this
Court applied the provisions of RA No. 8974, the complaints were filed at the time the law was already in full
force and effect. Thus, these cases cannot serve as binding precedent to the case at bench.

As to petitioners' second ground, the parties may be guided by the following principles.

Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
 use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x.[27]

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The
process is not complete until payment of just compensation. [28]Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of
possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of
ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation.[29]
We observe that petitioners are not questioning the authority of the NPC to exercise the power of eminent
domain nor the propriety of its exercise. While the constitutional restraint of public use has been overcome,
the imperative just compensation is still wanting. Thus, petitioners now appeal for the prompt payment of just
compensation. Indeed, just compensation is not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just.[30]

This Court understands the plight of petitioners. It has been ten (10) years since they were divested of
possession of their property, but they still have to be paid just compensation. It may be noted that the
expropriation case still pends at the RTC, and it is in that case where a determination of the amount of just
compensation shall be made.Inasmuch as this determination necessarily involves factual matters, and
considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, at this point, we can only direct the RTC to try the case
expeditiously, so that the amount of just compensation for the subject property can be fixed and promptly paid,
as justice and equity dictate.
For this purpose, the RTC must bear in mind that it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the
time of the filing of the complaint, whichever came first, not the value of the land at the time of the rendition of
judgment which should be considered.[31] In this case, where the institution of

an expropriation action preceded the taking of the subject property, just compensation is based on the value
of the land at the time of the filing of the complaint. This is provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption
of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposit with the National or Provincial
Treasurer of the amount equivalent to the value of the property as provisionally ascertained by the court having
jurisdiction of the proceedings.[32]

Finally, this Court takes cognizance of petitioners' manifestation that the NPC, as found by the RTC, failed to
pay the initial deposit of P32,930.00 as required in PD 42.[33] The RTC had already fixed this amount on the
basis of its initial factual findings. The assailed CA Decision adopted the RTC's factual findings. NPC's Comment
filed with this Court and even its petition for certiorari before the CA did not address, much less contest, this
fact. Because this factual finding was not disputed by the NPC in its pleadings before the CA and before this
Court, it is, therefore, deemed admitted.[34] However, inasmuch as petitioners made no mention of this amount
in their prayer before this Court, the same shall simply be considered by the RTC and included in the
determination of the final just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, guided
by the foregoing principles, is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation case, docketed
as Civil Case No. 96-6295, and to resolve the issue of just compensation with utmost dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, et al.

G.R. No. 194578 February 13, 2013

QUICK SUMMARY:
Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by petitioner against respondents for disseminating the
details of the disbarment complaint against him. SC ruled that petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty.
Quinsayas, the other respondents had a hand in the dissemination and publication of the disbarment
complaint against him. Hence, only Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas if found guilty of indirect contempt.

FACTS:

A convoy of 7 vehicles carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vice-mayor Mangudadatu, as well as
lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the COMELEC office to file Mangudadatu’s Certificate of
Candidacy when they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men and were taken hostage. The
hostages were systematically killed and their bodies and vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered
with the use of a backhoe. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to RTC of Quezon
City. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., the principal accused in the murder cases.

Respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before the Supreme Court which is still pending.
Petitioner alleged the respondents actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint against him
in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.

In their Comments, respondents alleged that petitioner failed to prove that they actively participated in
disseminating details of the disbarment complaint against him. They alleged that while they were the ones
who filed the disbarment complaint against petitioner, it does not follow that they were also the ones who
caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged that petitioner did not provide the name of any
particular person, dates, days or places to show the alleged confederation in the dissemination of the
disbarment complaint.

ISSUE: Whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a
finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

RULING:
First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People v. Godoy, this
Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court
in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in
whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against
organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue
between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the
proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of
private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the
court.

The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner had been
published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media groups and personalities.

The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in
nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a
disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the
Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his
involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations
in the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre case.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to
absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a
public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and because
the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern, the
media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been different
if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to
respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other respondents had a hand in the
dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint against him. It would appear that only Atty.
Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint. Atty. Quinsayas is
bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the disbarment case against
petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty.
Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media
which act constitutes contempt of court.

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for distributing copies of
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media.