#SarilingSikapREM Batch 3 PDF

#17. Calde vs.
Court of Appeals
Will and Codicil signed with black and blue ink.
FACTS:
● This case involves the probate of the Last Will and Testament and Codicil executed by
Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang.
● Decedent left behind 9,000 pesos worth of property.
● The Last Will and Testament and the Codicil, signed by 3 attesting witnesses each and
acknowledged before Judge Tolete
● Calde filed a petition for the allowance of the will
● Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the petition filed by Calde on the
following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that decedent
did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents
because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedent's thumbmarks were
procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was not executed in
accordance with law.
● Trial Court: approved and allowed the decedent’s will and codicil. Appealed and
reversed by the CA.
● The fact being contested is whether or not the will and codicil were signed by the
witnesses and the testatrix on the same occasion.
● The signatures were in different colors (others are black and others are blue). They
appear to be of different broadness, some being finer than the others, indicating that,
contrary to what the testamentary witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only one
ballpen was used, and, therefore showing the documents were not signed by the
testatrix and instrumental witnesses in the presence of one another.
ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court erred in
concluding that both decedent's Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the
instrumental witnesses on separate occasions?
HELD: No.
● A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based
its impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in
question were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single
occasion.
● As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting
witnesses in decedent's will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were
in black. This discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6)
witnesses testified that two pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In
fact, two (2) of petitioner's witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in
signing the two testamentary documents.
#SarilingSikapRem BATCH 3
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● In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence
produced by petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent
court, show in black and white — or more accurately, in black and blue — that
more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not
erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioner's claim that
both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
IMPORTANT DISCUSSION RELATED TO THE TOPIC:
3 SOURCES from which a tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for making its
decisions:
1. Circumstancial Evidence
2. Testimonial Evidence
3. Real Evidence or Autoptic Proference
*IRON HOOK EXAMPLE: If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused
has lost his right hand and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the subject
would be the testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in believing this testimonial
evidence, there is an inference from the human assertion to the fact asserted. A second source
of belief would be the mark left on some substance grasped or carried by the accused; in
believing this circumstantial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the thing
producing it. A third source of belief remains, namely, the inspection by the tribunal of the
accused's arm. This source differs from the other two in committing any step of conscious
inference or reasoning, and in proceeding by direct self-perception, or autopsy.
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#18. People vs. Bardaje
Nagtanan
FACTS:
● On Dec. 20, 1965, MARCELINA Cuizon lodged a complaint with the CFI of Samar
against ADELINO and 5 others for Rape.
○ The following day, the fiscal filed an information against ADELINO and his 5
companions with Rape with Illegal Detention.
○ Before arraignment, the information was amended to include the charge that
MARCELINA has been deprived of liberty for a period of 3 days.
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○After trial, the trial court found ADELINO guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape
with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and aid of armed men, and
sentenced him to death.
● MARCELINA’s version of the story:
○ She is 14 years of age. she and her mother were living in the house of her
aunt, Sofia Fernandez, where she worked as a beautician.
○ At 7:00 o'clock in the evening of December 14, 1965 while she was then eating
supper, ADELINO, whom she knew when they were "still small", and who was
her classmate in Grade II (1960), accompanied by the FIVE OTHERS, entered
the house and began drinking "sho hoc tong"
○ After the liquor had been fully consumed, ADELINO and his companions broke
the kerosene lamp and forcibly took MARCELINA from her mother. They
brought her to the mountain about two kilometers from Barrio Crossing. That
was about 12 midnight.
○ On the way, ADELINO slapped her rendering her unconscious. She regained
consciousness in a hut, with ADELINO holding her hands, and removing her
panty. She bit and kicked him. Despite her struggle, ADELINO succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her while his other companions stayed outside
on guard.
○ Under cross-examination, MARCELINA declared that she did not know who
owned the hut and that it was just a one-room affair where a woman and two
small children lived; that she and Appellant slept in that same room as the
woman, while the FIVE OTHERS slept near the kitchen.
○ the following morning, December 15, ADELINO and the FIVE OTHERS brought
her to another mountain, 6 kilometers farther, arriving there past twelve o'clock
noon at the house of one called Ceferino (also called Cipriano) who lived there
with his family. She was kept in one room. Outside the room were ADELINO’s
companions who are still armed with bolos, drinking and guarding her.
○ In the evening, ADELINO had another sexual intercourse with her even though
she bit and kicked him and shouted for help which was to no avail as an
present were relatives of ADELINO, with the latter calling Ceferino "Tatay"
○ She curled the hair of Narita (daughter of Ceferino) the next day, because
ADELINO threatened to kill her if she did not. Her curling paraphernalia was
taken by Adriano Odal, upon ADELINO's instructions, from Norma Fernandez
(her cousin) who gave the equipment as she (Norma) was also threatened.
MARCELINA and her "captors" stayed in Ceferino's house for two days.
○ In the morning of December 17, two soldiers with her father, Alejo Cuizon,
arrived. The soldiers apprehended ADELINO while the FIVE OTHERS jumped
down the window and fled.
○ She and her mother, Maria Fernandez, then went to Catbalogan, where she
filed a complaint at the Fiscal's Office on December 20, 1965 and submitted to
a medical examination at the Samar Provincial Hospital.
○ When cross-examined, Complainant admitted that Ceferino, his wife and seven
children were living in the same hut where she was taken the second time,
which hut was about waist high from the ground, consisted of one room, 3 x 2
meters, a sala, 6 x 3 meters, and a kitchen. Between the room and the sala
was a wall of split bamboos so that noise inside the room could be heard
clearly from the other side.
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● Dr. Vitus Hobayan, Jr., Resident Physician at the Samar Provincial Hospital, declared
that he examine MARCELINA on December 20, 1965 and issued a Medical Certificate
with the following findings:
○ "1. No evidence of external injuries around the vulva or any part of the
body.
○ 2. Hymen no intact, presence of old healed laceration at 4, 7, 12 o'clock.
○ 3. Vagina easily admits two fingers.
○ 4. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa"
○ Explaining the "old healed laceration", the doctor stated that laceration may
have been caused by possible sexual intercourse or other factors, and if it were
intercourse, he estimated that it could have occurred "say, two weeks or one
month" or possibly more.
● ADELINO’s version:
○ For his part, ADELINO, aged 18, admitted having had carnal knowledge of
MARCELINA but denied having raped her. He claims that they eloped on
December 14 to 17, 1965 as previously planned, they having been
sweethearts since November 12, 1964.
○ In the evening of December 14, 1965, while Sofia, MARCELINA's mother and
others were eating, MARCELINA handed him a bag and beauty culture
equipment through the window, went downstairs, after which the two of them
walked to the mountains, to Ceferino Armada's house. Ceferino was a cousin
of ADELINO's mother. He and MARCELINA slept in the bedroom with 18-year
old Narita, Ceferino's daughter. MARCELINA curled Narita's hair the next day.
○ In the morning of December 17, 1965, Sgts. Terado and Gacelos,
accompanied by MARCELINA's father, Alejo Cuizon, apprehended him for
having kidnapped MARCELINA.
○ The latter ran to him and embraced him and said she was to blame.
Notwithstanding, he was boxed by the soldiers as instructed by MARCELINA's
father and taken to Maulong PC Headquarters for questioning.
○ During the investigation, he was boxed and kicked and was forced to sign a
statement implicating the FIVE OTHERS as his companions even if
untrue. He did not know who attested to his statement as one Sgt. Gacelos
took the document elsewhere.
○ The trial Court found the prosecution's version of the incident more worthy of
credence stating that Complainant had no improper motive to implicate
ADELINO in such a detestable crime as Rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: NO. On the basis of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, we find that the
guilt of ADELINO has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
● In crimes against chastity, the conviction or acquittal of an accused depends almost

entirely on the credibility of a complainant's testimony since by the intrinsic nature of
those crimes they usually involve only two persons - the complainant and the accused.
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The offended party's testimony, therefore, must be subjected to thorough scrutiny for a
determination of its veracity beyond reasonable doubt.
○ In the instant case, we find MARCELINA's charge that she was forcibly
abducted and afterwards raped by ADELINO in conspiracy with FIVE OTHERS
highly dubious and inherently improbable.
● To start with, according to the medical findings, "no evidence of external injuries was
found around the vulva or any part of the body" of Complainant, a fact which is
strange, indeed, considering that Complainant was allegedly "dragged", "slapped" into
unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally abused.
○ Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently
than all witnesses put together.
○ We are also faced with the medical finding of "old healed lacerations" in the
hymen which, according to the testimony of the examining physician would
have occurred two weeks or even one month before if said lacerations had
been caused by sexual intercourse.
○ This expert opinion bolsters the defense that MARCELINA and ADELINO
had previous amorous relations at the same time that it casts serious
doubts on the charge of intercourse by force and intimidation.
● Secondly, by Complainant's own admission, the first hut she was taken to was a small
one-room affair occupied by a woman and two small children. Her charge, therefore,
that she was ravished in that same room is highly improbable and contrary to human
experience. LL
● Thirdly, from her own lips, Complainant testified that the second hut where she was
taken, that of Ceferino Armada, consisted of a small room separated from the sala by a
wall of split bamboos. Further, that Ceferino with his wife and seven children all lived
therein.
○ It challenges human credulity that she could have been sexually abused with
so many within hearing and seeing distance.
○ The aphorism still rings true that evidence to be believed must not only
come from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.
● Additionally, Complainant admits that she even curled the hair of Narita, one of
Ceferino's daughters, a fact inconsistent with her allegation of "captivity". That she was
threatened with death if she did not accede to such an inconsequential request defies
credulity.
● The likelihood is that, as the defense maintains, MARCELINA was not forcibly
abducted but that she and ADELINO had, in fact, eloped and that she had brought her
beauty culture paraphernalia with her, or, that she herself had sent for them from her
cousin Norma Fernandez voluntarily and not under threat from ADELINO.
● The totality of the foregoing circumstances count with such great weight and
significance that they lend an aura of improbability and reasonable doubt to the
allegation that MARCELINA had been "kidnapped" or "illegally detained"
● This case also constitutes an exception to the general belief that a young girl would not
expose herself to the ordeal of public trial if she were not motivated solely by a desire
to have the culprit who had ravished and shamed her placed behind bars.
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○ As we view it, MARCELINA was confronted with a paradoxical situation as a
daughter of relatively tender age, who could not shamefacedly admit to her
parents that she had eloped and voluntarily submitted to sexual intercourse,
since that elopement must have met with righteous indignation on the part of
her parents.
○ As a result, MARCELINA was faced with no other choice but to charge
ADELINO with rape or incur the ire of her parents and social disrepute from a
small community.
● In respect of the alleged confession of ADELINO, suffice it to re-state that "an

extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti".
○ Corpus delicti is proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime
prosecuted had been committed.
○ That proof has not been met in the case at bar, the evidence establishing
more of an elopement rather than kidnapping or illegal detention or
forcible abduction, and much less rape.
○ Moreover, ADELINO, aged 18, was by himself when being investigated by
soldiers, without benefit of counsel nor of anyone to advise him of his rights.
LexLib
● Again, one of the rights of an accused is "to have compulsory process issued to secure
the attendance of witnesses on his behalf." ADELINO had stated that, while
MARCELINA was in the house of Ceferino Armada, she curled the hair of Narita, one
of the latter's children, as well as the hair of other girls in the vicinity.
○ ADELINO wanted to have Narita testify on his behalf, and a subpoena had
been issued to her. But instead of taking effective steps to have Narita brought
to Court, the lower court gave responsibility for Narita's attendance to the
defense, expressly stating that, if the defense was not able to bring her to the
Court, her testimony will be dispensed with.
○ Considering that this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the
lower Court acted precipitously in not having Narita brought to Court, by
ordering her arrest if necessary. ADELINO was deprived of his right "to have
compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses on his
behalf."
● Crucial questions should also have been asked by the trial Court of witnesses.
○ It would have been advisable if the lower Court had right then and there asked
for the production of the written statement of MARCELINA.
○ The medical report, Exhibit "B", implied that MARCELINA could have had
sexual intercourse previous to December 14th. On the other hand, ADELINO
had testified that he and MARCELINA used to go together to Tacloban, and
while there several times, "we had sexual intercourse because she likes it."
■ Considering the possible infliction of the death penalty on ADELINO, the
lower Court could have asked MARCELINA if she had had sexual
intercourse prior to December 14th and, if so, if it was with ADELINO.
● The lower Court could have asked MARCELINA if she realized that, charging
ADELINO with Rape with Illegal Detention, the latter could be sentenced to death.
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○ If that had been explained to her clearly by the lower Court, she might then
have admitted that she was neither raped nor "kidnapped" nor illegally
detained.
○ MARCELINA could had been examined on the two matters mentioned above,
with the Court excluding the public from the hearing under the provisions of
Rule 119, Section 14. MARCELINA might have testified without feeling the
pressure of her relatives or other persons, if such pressure had in fact existed.
● The trial Judge should also take a more active role by means of searching questions in
the examination of witnesses for the ascertainment of the truth and credibility of their
testimonies so that any judgment of conviction imposing the supreme penalty may rest
on firm and unequivocal grounds. The life and liberty of an individual demand no less.
WHEREFORE, upon reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from, imposing the death
penalty, is reversed and the appellant, Adelino Bardaje, acquitted of the crime with which he
is charged. His immediate release is ordered unless he is held on other charges.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
● There may be some reasonable doubt as to the commission of rape because of the
finding that the victim was no longer a virgin when the incident took place, the absence
of external injuries on the victim's body and the claim of Bardaje that he used to have
sexual intercourse with the victim in Tacloban City.
● But there is no doubt that Bardaje and his companions committed kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of a minor as well as of a "female", an offense penalized in
article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death.
● Republic Act No. 18 specifically made kidnapping of a minor and a woman a capital
offense in order to deter the kidnapping of minors and women, a crime which was very
rampant after liberation.
● The victim might have been a girl, who, like many teenagers of today, does not
safeguard her virtue or chastity and easily succumbs to the temptation of the flesh.
(Time Magazine reports that at the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Spain, there is a billboard
on which is emblazoned Oscar Wilde's witticism: 'Puedo resistir todo excepto la
tentacion.")
● Bardaje and his companions grievously and brazenly deprived the victim of her liberty
by forcibly taking her against her will and the will of her mother and detaining her in a
hut in the mountain.
● The victim, being a minor, was still under parental authority. Her parents were entitled
to her custody and to keep her in their company. They were obligated to take care of
her and to see to it that her rights were respected. Even a layman would deduce from
the manner in which the victim was snatched and detained, that the accused
committed an outrageous and wrongful act which should be drastically punished. To
acquit them would be a miscarriage of justice.
● I vote for the imposition of reclusion perpetua on the accused and the imposition of an
indemnity of P10,000.
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#19. Sison vs. People
Yellow mauled by Marcos loyalists incident captured on camera: Photographs, when

presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer (or other competent witness) as
to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The
value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the
original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of
the crime. Photographs can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent
witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. Also in this case: use of photographs by
some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the
exactness and accuracy thereof.
FACTS:
● Consolidation of seven criminal cases filed against 11 persons (Marcos loyalists),
charging them with the murder of one Stephen Salcedo.
● PROSECUTION:
○ On July 27, 1986, Marcos loyalists applied for a permit to hold their rally at
Luneta. This was was denied.
■ Despite this, around 3K gathered at the Rizal monument at around 2:30
pm. The rally was led by Lozano and Nuega, both lawyers. They started
an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches.
○ Colonel Torres (Deputy Superintendent of Western Police District) went to them
and asked for the permit. They were warned to disperse within 10 minutes for
failure to produce said permit.
■ Leaders asked for 30 minutes but were refused.
■ Atty. Lozano turned back to the group and said “Gulpihin ninyo and lahat
ng mga Cory Infiltrators!”
■ Atty. Nuega added “Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!”
■ The police dispersed the rallyists using tear gas and truncheons. The
rallyists threw stones.
■ The rallyists eventually fled to Maria Orosa Street.
○ At 4pm of the same day, a small group of Marcos loyalists converged at the
Chinese garden of Luneta and saw Annie Ferrer (also a Marcos loyalist and
popular movie starlet) jogging around the fountain.
■ Loyalists told her of their dispersal. Ferrer ordered them to “Gulpihin ninyo
ang mga Cory hecklers!, Marcos parin!”
■ After a few minutes, Ferrer was arrested by the police. When she was
being taken, someone shouted “Kailangang gumanti tayo ngayon!”
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○ The loyalists started attacking persons wearing yellow.
■ One of the witnesses (Renato Banculo), a cigarette vendor, took off his
yellow shirt.
● He then saw a man wearing yellow (Stephen Salcedo) being
chased by a group of persons.
■ Salcedo was caught and boxed and kicked and mauled.
■ Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at Luneta, rushed to aid Salcedo but the
loyalists were too many and too strong.
○ The accused mauled Salcedo.
■ (Raul Billosos boxed Salcedo on the head; Richard de los Santos also
boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him; Joel Tan boxed him on
the left side of his head and ear; Nilo Pacadar punched him o the side of
his nap; Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him;
Romeo Sison also kicked Sison on the head; Sumilang also saw Gerry
Neri approach the victim)
■ Salcedo somehow was able to get away towards Roxas Boulevard, going
to the Rizal Monument. However, the accused followed him, continuously
mauling and boxing him up to the Rizal Monument.
■ Salcedo pleaded for his life and repeatedly asked for the police. He
eventually collapsed and lost consciousness.
○ Sumilang flagged a van and brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he
was refused admission. So they took him to PGHl where he died upon arrival.
■ Cause of death: “hemorrhage, intracranial trauma”. He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds, skull fractures etc.
○ The mauling was witnessed by many people, including the press, who took
pictures and videos of the event. This garnered both local and foreign attention.
○ Because of this, Cory ordered the police to investigate the incident and a reward
of 10K was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim.
● DEFENSE:
○ Denied participation and offered alibis:
■ (IMPT) Joselito Tamayo was not in any of the photographs presented
because he was in his house in QC;
■ (IMPT) Gerry Neri was at Luneta theatre at the time;
■ Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was in his office near Luneta
waiting for his pictures to develop;
■ Richard de los Santos admits to being in Luneta but denies hitting
Salcedo--merely watched.
■ Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of “Ako’y
Pilipino Movement” but he only viewed the incident and shouted at the
people to stop hitting Salcedo.
■ Joel Tan contends that he even tried to pacify the group.
■ Other accused opted not to testify.
● Manila RTC:
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○ GUILTY of murder qualified by treachery: - Sison, Pacadar, Tan, De los Santos,
and Tamayo. Annie Ferrer was convicted as accomplice.
● CA: modified RTC decision
○ Acquitted Annie Ferrer. Increased the penalty from RT to RP, except Tamayo,
who was convicted of homicide since the information against him did not allege
the same circumstances.
● Appellants before SC claim:
○ The testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo are not reliable since they surfaced
only after the award was announced. Also, Banculo mistakenly identified a
detention prisoner in another case as one of the accused; Sumilang was evasive
and unresponsive prompting the court to remand him several times.
○ (IMPT) CA erroneously gave weight to exhibits (photographs) since these
were not properly identified by the person that took them.
○ They should have been convicted for death in a tumultuous affray.
ISSUE 1: Are the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo binding?
HELD 1: YES.
● FIRST, both testified even before the reward for money was announced. It was Sumilang
that reported the incident with the police and submitted a sworn statement 2 hours after
the incident. He informed the police that he would cooperate and identify the assailants if
he saw them again.
● SECOND, the fact that Banculo had several (3) sworn statements does not make his
testimony incredible. The additional statements were made to add more suspects who
were apprehended.
● THIRD, the fact that Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive is not enough to reject his
testimony. Except for compelling reasons, the SC refuses to disturb the ruling of the trial
court on the credibility of a witness since they are the ones that best appreciate the
dimensions of the testimony.
● FOURTH, mistake in identification by Banculo does not make him entirely untrustworthy.
An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies
cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. Such is left to court discretion.
● FIFTH, the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo corroborate, not only each other’s
testimonies, but that of the medico-legal. The medico-legal states that the
contusions/abrasions were caused by punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. The
fatal injury was to his skull. In this case the witnesses were able to establish that Salcedo
was mauled and that some of the assailants had stones in their hands.
ISSUE 2: (IMPT) Are the photographs and other exhibits admissible (Exhibits O,V, V-1 to
V-8, W, W-1 to W-3)?
HELD 2: YES.
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● Exhibit O is the joint affidavit of the police intelligence operatives who witnessed the rally
(Flores and Bautista).
○ This merely reiterates and corroborates the witnesses’ testimonies.
● Exhibit V, V-1 to V-8 are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled in
Luneta, him being chased by assailants, and pleading with them. Exhibit W, W-1 to W-3
are photographs of Salcedo published in local newspapers and magazines -
PhilStar, Mr. and Ms. Magazine, PDI and the Malaya.
○ The rule in the PH is that, photographs, when presented in evidence, must be (1)
identified by the photographer as to its production and (2) testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. The value lies in how the
photograph correctly depicts the scene at the time of the crime.
○ However, the photographer is not the only witness who can identify the pictures.
Its correctness may be proved either by (1) testimony of a person who made it, or
(2) by other competent witnesses.
● In this case, while the counsel for accused (Lazaro) objected to the admissibility for lack
of proper identification, the counsel for Tamayo and Neri used the same pictures to
prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures. The photographs were adopted as
defense exhibits.
○ The use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged
non-participation is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.
● While some of the accused were not seen in the pictures, this does not absolve them.
○ The photographs capture only segments of the killing. This must be viewed
together with the testimonies of the witnesses presented.
ISSUE 3: Liable for death in tumultuous affray? NO. Treachery? NO. Evident Premeditation?
NO. Conspiracy? YES.
● Not liable for death in tumultuous affray.
○ In this case, the quarrel was between one group and an individual. While there
was confusion when the police dispersed them, this was a different event from
the mauling since it was only later when one group picked on Salcedo.
○ There was no confusion/quarrel/aggression to warrant the liability of death in
tumultuous affray.
● No treachery.
○ While the attack was sudden and unexpected, it was only because Salcedo was
wearing a yellow shirt and allegedly flashed a “laban” sign against the rallyists.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.
● No evident premeditation. Ther attack was sudden and spontaneous spurred by the
raging animosity between the parties.
● There is conspiracy.
○ Their actions imply a show of unity of purpose--concerted effort to kill Salcedo.
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○ If the conspiracy is established, there is no need to determine who among them
inflicted more serious damage. Each of the conspirators are liable for all the acts
of the other, regardless of the intent and character of their participation.
● NOTE: Salcedo was 23 years old at the time of his death. He was set to go to Saudi
Arabia one month after the attack. He left behind a widow and three small children.
○ 100K moral damages
○ 74K actual damages
○ 50K indemnity for death
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#20. Adamczuk vs. Halloway
FACTS:
● Plaintiffs brought an action against defendants for property damage and personal
injuries arising out of a collision between a car owned and operated by plaintiff, Jack J.
Adamczuk, and a car owned by defendant, Morris Cohen, and driven by defendant,
Elmer Holloway.
● The collision happened at about 9:30 PM on January 31, 1938 in Warren County, New
Jersey.
● Adamczuk was driving southwardly on the Bridgeville Road and Holloway was driving
eastwardly on route 6.
● When Adamczuk was on the stand, he was shown "Exhibit No. 3" (a photograph of the
locus of the accident and the approach to it on highway route 6). He identified the roads
and buildings appearing in the picture and stated, in answer to his counsel, that:
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"the conditions represented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the
crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark."
● On cross-examination it was disclosed that the witness did not know who took the
picture or when it was taken. He stated that when the picture was taken the location of
the camera was on route 6 but he did not know at what distance from the intersection.
● The court then sustained the objection to the picture's introduction.
● It was offered in evidence again when Herbert C. Dillard, Civil Engineer and County
Surveyor, was on the stand.
● He was asked on cross-examination by defendant's counsel:
"If you were taking a picture, and wanted to accentuate the curve of route six to
the west, you could accomplish that by taking the picture farther away from the
intersection, that is, farther to the east of the intersection, could you not?" He
answered: "I think you could, yes." This witness was asked if he took
photographs and developed them. He answered: "Very little."
● The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Appellant's assignment of error in the
present appeal is the refusal of the court to admit in evidence the photograph of the
locus of the accident and the approach to it on highway route.
● Appellants contend that the admission of this photograph was of importance because it
would show that at the intersection a person could see to the west, if he held his head at
a 45 degree angle, only a distance of about 200 feet. The engineer testified that a
person at the intersection had a clear, unobstructed view to the west of 793 feet. Jack
Adamczuk, in explaining why he did not see the car coming from the west, said that he
had his head turned at a 45 degree angle. Appellees contend that this excuse is of no
avail to him and that had be held his head in a normal position he would have had an
unobstructed view to the west of nearly 800 feet.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the photograph is admissible in evidence despite the fact that it was
not verified by the photographer?
HELD 1: YES

● The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue
and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker.
● Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial
judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error.
● If no witness has thus attached his credit to the photograph, then it should not come in at
all, any more than an anonymous letter should be received as testimony.
● "The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be made a part of some qualified
person's testimony. Someone must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor; in other words,
it must be verified."
● In other words, if a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to
testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the lower court erred in refusing to admit the photograph in evidence?
13
HELD 2: NO
● There is also a rule giving the trial judge discretion to reject a picture on the ground that
the evidence is cumulative or that the photograph is unnecessary.
● "The question of the sufficiency of the preliminary proofs to identify a photograph and
show that it is a fair representation of the objects which it purports to portray, is a
question committed to the discretion of the trial judge."
● While the court might well have admitted the challenged photograph in evidence and
have warned the jury of a photograph's deceptive possibilities, we do not find that its
exclusion under the facts of this case amounted to reversible error, for, as the court
below pointed out, "the jury had the benefit of several other photographs showing the
intersection and the roads for some distance on which the plaintiffs and the defendant
Holloway were driving, and, in addition to that, had the lengthy testimony of County
Engineer Dillard."
● The jury had all the testimony they needed as to the crossroads and as to the road's
curvature.
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#1. State v. Tatum
FACTS:
● Ralph Tatum (hereinafter called appellant) was convicted of the crime of first-degree
forgery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual criminal.
● William Tousin, of Pasco, received monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington.
In February, 1960, Tousin did not receive his check (the checks were generally mailed to
a rooming house in Pasco where Tousin resided.) The mail was normally left on a
window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house. Appellant resided at the same place.
Tousin's February check for $28.90 was endorsed and cashed at Sherman's Food Store
in Pasco by someone other than the payee, Tousin.
● An employee of the store, Caroline Pentecost, testified that although she could not
specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction, the initials appearing on the face of
the check were hers. She also testified that whenever a check was presented to her for
payment at the store, the store manager had instructed her to initial it and then insert it
into a "Regiscope" machine. (The machine is designed to simultaneously photograph,
through two separate lenses, both the check and the person facing the machine.)
● When it was discovered that the endorsement of the payee was a forgery, the Regiscope
film of the transaction was sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be developed.
The processed film shows both the check and the person of appellant (from his waist up)
with the food store in the background
● On trial, both the negative and the print therefrom were admitted in evidence, over
appellant's objection.
14
ISSUE 1: Were the Regiscope films (the negative and the print) authenticated sufficiently to
warrant their admission into evidence?
HELD 1: Yes
● At the outset, the court has for many years encouraged the admission and use of
demonstrative evidence, including photographs. The admission or rejection of
photographs as evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
● Some witness (not necessarily the photographer) need only be able to give some
indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken,
and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated
○ Witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background shown in the
picture as that of the food store, and, she also testified as to the store's standard
procedure of "regiscoping" each individual who cashed a check at the store.
○ Phillip Dale, the Regiscope distributor, testified at length concerning the
Regiscope process.
○ The testimony of these two witnesses taken together amounted to a sufficient
authentication to warrant the admission of the photograph (both the print and the
negative) into evidence.
● Note: The authentication supplied by the testimony summarized above did not preclude
appellant from attempting to prove that the individual portrayed was someone other than
appellant, that the photograph was inaccurate in one or more respects, that appellant
was somewhere else at the moment the photograph was taken, or any other such
defense. But these arguments go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the
exhibits in question.
ISSUE 2: Did Phillip Dale, the Regiscope distributor, qualify as an expert witness with respect to
the filming process despite the fact that he was not a photographer by profession?
HELD 2: Yes
● The fact that Dale was not a professional photographer and may have not understood all
of the technical details of the process, did not, from an evidentiary standpoint, disqualify
him from expressing an opinion in his testimony as to the possibility of altering a given
Regiscope print.
● Whether a person qualified to express an expert opinion lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court
● Dale testified that he personally had developed "four to five hundred thousand" individual
Regiscope films
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#2 People v. Alejandro y Dela Cruz

FACTS:
15
● In the afternoon of September 1, 2002, a confidential informant called and told SPO1
Tan about the illegal drug activities of the appellant, alias Nog-nog. P/Supt. Fegarido
conducted a briefing, and dispatched the police to meet with the informant.
● At around 5:00 p.m., the police met with the informant at the Pio Del Pilar Elementary
School. Thereafter, SPO1 Tan, PO1 Mengote and the informant went to M. Dela Cruz
Street in Pasay City to conduct a surveillance.
○ The informant pointed to a person standing at the corner of Mary Luz Street and
M. Dela Cruz Street, and identified him as the appellant. They observed the
appellant for about half an hour, and saw that there were people approaching
him. They also observed that there was an exchange of goods between the
appellant and the people who approached him. The police returned to the station
and planned an entrapment operation. PO1 Mengote was designated as the
poseur-buyer.
● The buy-bust operation team returned to M. Dela Cruz Street at around 6:00 p.m. and
saw the appellant sitting in front of a sari-sari store.
● The informant introduced PO1 Mengote to the appellant as a buyer (i.e. , a shabu
scorer). The appellant asked, Magkano ba? PO1 Mengote answered, Halagang piso.
PO1 Mengote then gave the one hundred peso marked money to the appellant. The
appellant, in turn, pulled out a plastic sachet from his right pocket and handed it to PO1
Mengote.
● Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1 Mengote made the pre-arranged signal (i.e.,
wiped his face with a towel) to his companions. The other members of the buy-bust team
approached arrested him. They brought him and the confiscated items to the police
station. At the police station, they forwarded the seized items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where they were examined by P/Insp. Gural.
● Based on the laboratory examination, the confiscated specimen POSITIVE result to the
tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
● Appellant’s defense:
○ At around 6:00 p.m. of September 1, 2002, he was in front of his grandmother’s
store on Mary Luz Street, Pasay City, when 8 policemen arrived. PO1 Mengote
and SPO1 Tan approached and asked him about the whereabouts of a certain
Terio. When he replied that he did not know where Terio was, the police brought
him to the Pio Del Pilar Elementary School in Makati City, from where the police
apparently received a text message informing them that Terio was in Pasay City.
The police and the appellant returned to Mary Luz Street, and entered a house
owned by Terio. Inside, they saw its occupant, Enrico Yatco. The police searched
the house for about half an hour. Afterwards, they brought the appellant and
Enrico to the Sothern Police District. At the police station, PO1 Mengote and
SPO1 Tan showed 6 pieces of plastic sachets to the appellant and forced him to
admit ownership.
● Reggie’s Testimony: REGGIE MORILLA, the caretaker of the store owned by the
accused’s grandmother, have been living with the family of the accused for 3 years
16
already. The family of the accused is located at 51 Mary Luz St., M. dela Cruz, Pasay
City. On September 1, 2002, he was inside the store while the accused was standing
outside when suddenly he heard a commotion. So he peeped through a hole in the store
and saw two policemen in civilian attire handcuffing the accused. He asked assistance
from his neighbors. Then he saw the accused being taken out of Mary Luz St. Later, they
returned the accused and they led the accused inside a house and then after thirty
minutes, he was brought out and was boarded inside an owner type jeep.
● RTC Ruling: appellant guilty and sentenced to penalty of life imprisonment and payment
of a P500,000.00 fine.
● CA Ruling: RTC ruling affirmed.
○ The appellant and his counsel entered into a stipulation of facts whereby they
agreed on the admissibility of the request for laboratory examination of the
submitted specimen and on the findings of P/Insp. Gural. Hence, they cannot be
allowed to question, on appeal, the identity and integrity of the plastic sachet of
shabu seized from the appellant by members of the entrapment team.
○ Moreover, the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the
person who handed the plastic sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer.
○ The police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, in the absence of any evidence of improper motive on their part.
○ It, likewise, disregarded the appellant’s defense of denial, as it was unsupported
by reliable corroborative evidence.
● The appellant Nognog claims that:
○ the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
○ the integrity of the seized item had been compromised due to the failure of the
apprehending police to mark it.
● The Office of the Solicitor General counters:
○ the appellant cannot now question the identity and integrity of the specimen
confiscated from him as he already entered into a stipulation regarding the
admissibility of the request for laboratory examination and on the result of this
examination.
○ In addition, the appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the police
officers to falsely testify against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting alias Nognog of the crime
charged
HELD: YES
● The Court decided to ACQUIT the appellant, for the prosecutions failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
○ The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution
to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of
17
evidence required. In doing so, the prosecution must rest its case on its own
merits and cannot merely rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution
fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense does not even need
to present any evidence in its behalf; the presumption of innocence prevails and
the accused should be acquitted.
● Reasonable Doubt on the Corpus Delicti

○ The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section
5 of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
○ What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of the corpus delicti, i.e. , the body or substance of the crime
that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by
presenting the object of the illegal transaction.
○ To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized
drug, the evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is
the very same illicit drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
● a. The Chain of Custody Rule and the Marking Requirement

○ Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements
R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources
of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.
○ Junie Malillin y Lopez v. People:
■ As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be.
■ It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
■ These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
○ While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
18
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and
is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.
○ In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or
tampering - without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not -
dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
○ Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
○ Marking means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of
his/her initials and signature on the items seized.
■ Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link;
hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference.
■ The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence
from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they
are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.
● In the present case, the records do not show that the apprehending team marked the
seized items with their initials immediately upon confiscation.
○ Sanchez: consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the marking of
the seized items be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2)
immediately upon confiscation.
○ People v. Manuel Resurreccion: [m]arking upon immediate confiscation does not
exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police station or office of the
apprehending team.
● In the present case, the testimonies of the apprehending officers do not indicate that
they ever marked the seized items, either at the place of seizure or at the police station.
● Going back to what we earlier discussed, succeeding handlers of the specimen will use
the markings as reference. If at the first instance or opportunity, the apprehending team
did not mark the seized item/s, then there is nothing to identify it later on as it passes
from one hand to another.
● Curiously, the seized item already bore the markings TM-1-010902 when it was
examined by the forensic chemist. In the absence, however, of specifics on how, when
and where this marking was done, and who witnessed the marking procedure, we
cannot accept this marking as compliance with the chain of custody requirement
required by the law.
● The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the confiscated drug from PO1
Mengote to the police station. To recall, after PO1 Mengote allegedly received the plastic
sachet from the appellant, he made the pre-arranged signal to his companions. The
other members of the buy-bust team approached the appellant, introduced themselves
19
as police officers, and arrested him. Thereafter, they brought him and the confiscated
item to the police station.
● Notably, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person who
took custody of the seized item at the police station. Although the request for laboratory
examination was signed by P/Supt. Fegarido, the Chief of the District Drug Enforcement
Group, we cannot assume that he was the person who received the seized item from
PO1 Mengote, in the absence of any testimony proving such fact.
● For the succeeding links in the chain of custody, the evidence shows that the
confiscated item was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory by one SPO2 Pepano, and
then received by a certain Relos. P/Insp. Gural examined the submitted specimen, and
found it positive for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
● As previously discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the confiscated item
after it left the possession of PO1 Mengote. The police did not only fail to mark the
specimen immediately upon seizure; it likewise failed to identify the police officer
to whose custody the confiscated item was given at the police station.
● Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that the item seized from the appellant was the
same as that presented for laboratory examination and, later on, presented in court.
● That the defense admitted the existence of the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. C),
the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exh. D) and Physical Science Report No.
D-1331-02 (Exh. E) during the pre-trial did not amount to an admission of the identity of
the seized specimen.
○ What the admissions proved were merely the existence and authenticity of the
request for laboratory examination and the result of this examination, not the
required chain of custody from the time of seizure of evidence.
○ Simply put, the admission regarding the existence of Exhibits C, D and E has no
bearing on the question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical analysis
was the same as that seized from the appellant.
○ To interpret the stipulations as an admission that the appellant was the source of
the specimen would be contrary to the pre-trial order (stating that Exhibits C, D
and E were admitted as to their existence only and not as to the source); it would
also bind the appellant to an unceremonious withdrawal of his plea of not guilty.
● In like manner, the stipulation during the pre-trial regarding the non-presentation of the
forensic chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the handling of the specimen at the
forensic laboratory and the result of the examination, but not the manner the specimen
was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left his
possession
● b. Non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of

R.A. No. 9165
○ Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a), Article II of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165 give us the
procedures that the apprehending team should observe in the handling of seized
illegal drugs in order to preserve their identity and integrity as evidence.
20
○ As indicated by their mandatory terms, strict compliance with the prescribed
procedure is essential and the prosecution must show compliance in every case.
○ Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 reads:
■ (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.]
● The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the apprehending or
buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
IRR.
● Based on the narration of PO1 Mengote,the apprehending team did not photograph or
conduct a physical inventory of the item seized, whether at the place of seizure or at the
police station.
● The non-compliance by the apprehending team with the photograph and physical
inventory requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR was also evident in the
testimony of another member of the buy-bust teams, PO1 Tan, who corroborated PO1
Mengote’s testimony on material points.
● Notably, even the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of the members of the entrapment team made
no mention of any inventory or photograph.
● However, the non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements does not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid;
○ the seizure may still be held to be valid, provided that (a) there is a
justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly
preserved.
○ These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution
did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the police to follow
the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items.
○ People v. Ronaldo De Guzman y Danzil: the failure to follow the procedure
mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. The
justifiable ground for the non-compliance must be proven as a fact.
21
● No Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties
○ In convicting the appellant of the crime charged, both the RTC and the CA relied
on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed.
However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
○ The presumption of regularity, it must be emphasized, obtains only when
there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. Where the official
act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can arise.
● In the present case, the procedural lapses by the apprehending team in the handling of
the seized items from their failure to mark it immediately upon confiscation, to their
failure to inventory and photograph it in the presence of the accused, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official, without offering any justifiable ground effectively negated the
presumption of regularity.
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#3. Air France v. Carrascoso
FACTS: Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff,
as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso
was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12,
Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the first-class ticket of Carrascoso with the notation “O.K.” was
confirmed
(2) Whether or not the handwritten notebook of the purser of the plane showing that “first
class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene” in French and as translated is admissible
22
HELD: (1) Yes. Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and
Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the
ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of
said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits belie
the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a
first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first
class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. As a rule, a written document speaks a
uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in
the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a
stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight.
(2) Yes. Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an
entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's
testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of
the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
he impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had
not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the
declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous,
and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It
would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it
were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared
up the matter.
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#4. Seiler vs Lucasfilm
Strider Wars: The Empire Sues Back: The BER would ensure that proof of the infringement
claim consists of the works alleged to be infringed. Otherwise, "reconstructions" which might
have no resemblance to the purported original would suffice as proof for infringement of the
original. Furthermore, application of the rule here defers to the rule's special concern for the
contents of writings. Seiler's claim depends on the content of the originals, and the rule
23
would exclude reconstituted proof of the originals' content. Under the circumstances
here, no "reconstruction" can substitute for the original.
FACTS:
● Lee Seiler alleged copyright infringement by George Lucas et al.
○ Seiler: graphic artist and creator of science fiction creatures; contends that he
created and published Garthian Striders in 1976-77.
○ Lucas: in 1980, created and produced the movie "The Empire Strikes Back,"
which contains a battle sequence depicting giant machines called Imperial
Walkers.
● In 1981, Seiler obtained a copyright on his Striders
○ Deposited with the Copyright Office "reconstructions" of the originals (1976-77).
○ Contended that Imperial Walkers were copied from his Striders
● Lucas responds:
○ (1) Seiler did not obtain his copyrights until 1 year after the release of movie
○ (2) Seiler cannot produce documents that antedate the movie
● District Court ruling: judge held an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the
"reconstructions" of Striders applying the "best evidence rule" Fed.R.Evid. 1001-1008
○ At the end of a seven-day hearing that Seiler lost or destroyed the originals in
bad faith under Rule 1004(1)
○ No secondary evidence, such as the post-Empire Strikes Back reconstructions,
was admissible
ISSUE: (1) W/N the best evidence rule applies to Seiler's works. YES.
(2) If BER applies, W/N Rule 1008 requires a jury determination of the existence and
authenticity of the originals. NO.
(3) W/N 7 U.S.C. § 410(c) of the copyright laws overrides the Federal Rules of Evidence and
mandates admission of his secondary evidence. NO.
HELD:
(1)
● Best evidence rule (also called "original document rule") embodied in Rules
1001-1008 represented a codification of longstanding common law doctrine (1700s)
○ Requires not the best evidence but rather the production of an original document
instead of a copy.
● Best evidence rule
○ Guarded against the incompetent or fraudulent proof
■ by requiring the possessor to produce the original, it prevented the
introduction of altered copies and the withholding of originals
○ Applied to objects and writings
○ Justification of application
■ the importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal
relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the
24
terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplication are the
concerns addressed by it
● In proving the terms of a writing, where the terms are material, the original writing must
be produced unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the serious
fault of the proponent
● Seiler claims that the movie infringed his originals, yet he has no proof of those originals
○ Dangers of fraud are clear
○ Originals: no documentary evidence existing before the release of movie
○ Secondary evidence: not true copies/duplicates, rather, "reconstructions"
● We hold that Seiler's drawings were "writings" within the meaning of Rule 1001 (1)
○ consist not of "letters, words, or numbers" but of "their equivalent."
■ Rule 1002: "to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph,
the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as
otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress."
■ Rule 1001: writings and recordings are "letters, words, or numbers, or
their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic
recording, or other form of data compilation."
○ Seiler's drawings are objective manifestations of the creative mind
■ The copyright laws give legal protection to the objective manifestations of
an artist's ideas, just as the law of contract protects through its
multifarious principles the meeting of minds evidenced in the contract.
■ Comparing Seiler's drawings with Lucas' drawings is no different in
principle than evaluating a contract and the intent behind it.
■ Seiler's "reconstructions" are "writings" that affect legal relations;
their copyrightability attests to that.
(2)
● Seiler indicated that he planned to show to the jury reconstructions of his "Garthian
Striders" during the opening statement.
○ The trial judge would not allow items to be shown to the jury until they were
admitted in evidence. Hence, the court excused the jury and held a seven-day
hearing on their admissibility. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge
found that the reconstructions were inadmissible under the best evidence
rule as the originals were lost or destroyed in bad faith.
● Rule 1008 states that when the admissibility of evidence other than the original depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the trial judge generally makes the
determination of that condition of fact.
○ Advisory Committee's interpretation: "Most preliminary questions of fact in
connection with applying the rule preferring the original as evidence of contents
are for the judge ... [t]hus the question of ... fulfillment of other conditions
specified in Rule 1004 ... is for the judge."
● The condition of fact which Seiler needed to prove was that the originals were not lost
or destroyed in bad faith
25
○ Had he been able to prove this, his reconstructions would have been admissible
and then their accuracy would have been a question for the jury.
○ Since admissibility of the reconstructions was dependent upon a finding that the
originals were not lost or destroyed in bad faith, the trial judge properly held
the hearing to determine their admissibility.
(3)
● Seiler argues that this section requires the admission of the copyright certificate he
obtained on his reconstructions and, more importantly, the attached "work" that Seiler
claims is incorporated in the certificate by reference.
○ Sec. 410(c) has no application here, because the certificate of copyright has no
bearing upon the ultimate facts Seiler seeks to prove by its submission.
■ Did not speak on the ultimate issue of whether Seiler's reconstructions
are true to the supposed originals.
■ No indication appears on the certificate that the Copyright Office was
even aware that the attached "work" was reconstructed, and not a true
copy of the original work.
■ The Copyright Act does not contemplate the copyrighting of a now
non-existent original on the basis of a tendered reconstruction.
● Seiler's copyright claims are based entirely upon the original drawings. He has sought to
present his reconstructed drawings as a substitute for the originals that apparently no
longer exist. To accomplish this, he must show that the reconstructions are virtually
identical to those originals.
○ All of the recitations in the certificate pertain to the attached "work," which is
Seiler's reconstructions.
○ None of the statements in the certificate can be of any use therefore until Seiler
proves that the reconstructions are the same as the originals.
○ Prima facie evidence of statements in the certificate is irrelevant until that proof
has been made.
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#5. People v. Tandoy

FACTS:
● This is an appeal by the accused (Mario Tandoy) from the decision of the lower court
convicting him of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
● The crime charged against him was the sale of prohibited drugs concerning eight (8)
pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops
and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops.
● According to the prosecution, on May 27, 1986, at about 3:30PM, police officers from the
Makati Police Station was dispatched at Barangay Singkamas, Makati City to conduct a
buy-bust operation.
26
● One officer, Singayan, acted as the poseur-buyer and stationed himself at a store (the
target area) along Solchuaga St. The other officers strategically positioned themselves
near the area.
● Thereafter, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused who said
without preamble: “pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?” to which Singayan said yes. The
exchange was made— 2 pieces of marijuana for one P10 and 2 P5 bills marked ANU
(meaning anti-narcotics unit)
● The other officers moved in and made the arrest. When they made a body search, the
officers found 8 more rolls of marijuana and crushed leaves.
● The arresting officers brought the accused to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit in the
Makati Police Station. He was investigated by Detective Pajilan. In addition, the drugs
confiscated from him was subjected to chemical and chromotographic examination.
● The accused remained silent after having been informed of his rights.
● During the trial, arresting officers de la Cruz and Singayan, and detective Pajilan were
presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
● According to the defense, from 1:30PM to 4:00PM, the accused was playing cara y cruz
with 15 other persons along Solchuaga St. when somebody suddenly said that the
policemen were making arrests. He and some other person named Danny was caught.
They were said to be mauled by the police. Then, they were warned that if they do not
point to their fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. He also claimed that the so-called
marked money of the prosecution was the bet money grabbed from the cara y cruz
game.
● The trial court convicted the accused based on the testimonies of the police officers. In
giving credence to the testimonies, the trial court applied the presumption that duties are
performed in a regular manner. The trial court noted that the accused did not corroborate
his allegation nor submit any evidence to prove the same. The accused even admitted
that he had no quarrel with any of the officers.
● On appeal, the accused had two defenses: one, he could not have sold marijuana to
Singayan, a stranger to him, because "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another
who is a total stranger until the seller is certain of the identity of the buyer."
● And, two, the trial court erred in admitting the exhibit on the marked money which was
evidenced by a mere xerox copy.
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the allegation that a person selling
prohibited drugs may actually sell the same to a stranger.
HELD 1: No.

● Drug-pushing, when done on a small level, belongs to the class of crimes that may be
committed at anytime and at any place. What is important is that the illegal transaction
took place, in that the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made.
● The fact that the sale took place in a public place is immaterial. In fact, a transaction
taking place in that context may even serve to camouflage the illegal transaction. In
previous cases, the Supreme Court sustained convictions of selling illegal drugs even
27
when the crime was committed: in a billiard hall, in front of a store, along a street, and in
front of a house.
ISSUE 2: Whether the trial court erred in admitting the xerox copy as evidence.
HELD 2: No.

● The best evidence rule under Rule 130 only applies when the contents of the document
are the subject of inquiry.
● Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists,
or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible, as was done in this case.
● Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence,
like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the
original.
● In addition, even without admitting the xerox copy evidence, the accused may still be
convicted based on the straightforward and credible testimonies of the arresting officers.
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#6. US v. Gregorio
FACTS:
● Pedro Salazar, creditor, instituted a suit against Eustaquio Balistoy, debtor, in the justice
of the peace court of Libog, for the payment of a certain sum of money.
○ judgment was rendered, on April 4, 1908, wherein the debtor was sentenced to
pay to the plaintiff P275.92, with interest thereon, and the cost
● For the execution of the said judgment, two rural properties belonging to the debtor were
attached
● Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the
attachment, alleging that he was the owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the
properties levied upon for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from the
judgment debtor
● In order that the claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper, Bernardo
Gregorio attached thereto the document Exhibit D at the end of which and among other
particulars appears the memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905:
○ he bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it
to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, wherefore he signed as such vendor.t
○ Salazar’s claim: memorandum was in fact written on April 1908 to simulate a
conveyance in favor of Bernardo Gregorio
● For the foregoing reasons a complaint was filed in each of the two aforesaid causes in
the Court of First Instance of Albay, charging each of the defendants with the crime of
the falsification of a private document
28
ISSUE: WON guilty of falsification of private document?
HELD: No
● The sale was recorded in a memorandum, made upon a private document, according to
the alleged copy of the latter presented at trial which belonged to the owner of the land
● Sheriff testified to his having seen the original of the said document, or at least the
original memorandum of the conveyance
● Certainly the mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated public document could not
legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of the said land
● copy is not sufficient proof of the right being a mere copy of a private document whose
legality has not been proven.
● as the original document, setting forth the said memorandum, was not presented, but
merely a copy thereof, and furthermore, as it could not be ascertained who had the
original of the document containing the memorandum in question, nor the exact date
when the latter was written; the said memorandum, presumed to be simulated and false,
was not literally compared to original
○ doubt arises as to whether the original of the document, Exhibit D, really existed
at all, and whether the memorandum at the foot of the said exhibit is an exact
copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of the said original document.
● In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the
judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated,
counterfeited, or falsified
● Through the lack of the original document containing the memorandum alleged to be
false, it is improper to hold, with only a copy of the said original in view, that the crime
prosecuted was committed;
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#5. Petitioner vs. Respondent

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#7. Pacasum v. People

Pacasum, Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in ARMM, Cotabato City, was charged
before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely:

1. Subaida K. Pangilan, former Human Resource Management Officer V of ARMM
2. Laura Y. Pangilan, former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism, ARM
3. Rebecca A. Agatep: Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
29
SUBAIDA PANGILAN: testified it was her duty to receive applications for clearance of Regional
Secretaries of tARMM. an EC was required to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Director by
1. retiring employees,
2. employees leaving the country
3. those applying for leave in excess of 30 days. T
Applicant shall accomplish the same by having the different division heads sign it.
Petitioner submitted the original of an EC to her office in compliance with a memorandum issued by
Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and employees to clear themselves of property and money
accountabilities before their salaries for August and September 2000 would be paid. Noticed that
signature of Laura Pangilan in EC was not hers. Since Laura was her daughter-in-law, latter's
signature was very familiar to her. She photocopied the original EC with the intention of sending it to
Laura for confirmation. But no messenger available, so she called Laura to come to her office.Laura
came and denied signing the same after which, bearer of the EC took original and left. ICESTA
LAURA: testified that she was the Supply Officer of the DOT — ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. on
9 August 2002, Marie Cris Batuampar, officemate and niece of petitioner Pacasum, went to her
house and requested her to sign EC of petitioner but she refused because petitioner had not yet turned
over all the office properties issued to her.Few days later she was called by her mother-in-law to inspect
EC submitted by the representative of petitioner. she denied the signature. Thereupon, Marie Cris took
the EC and left.
AGATEP, she has been telegraph operator for 19 years. On 31 May 2005, She received 2 telegrams for
transmissions. One was addressed to petitioner and the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. The telegram
addressed to petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto, in her residence on 1 June 2005,
while that addressed to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and received in, Cotabato City on 1 June
2005. 24
Prosecution formally offered 25 its documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A-1-a, A-2,
A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9
NOTE: accused filed her objections. The trial court admitted all the exhibits
TTY. JOSE I. LORENA, former ARMM Regional Solicitor

For the defense, PETITIONER AND A
General, took the stand.
Petitioner: testified
1. she was appointed by Gov. Misuari as Regional Secretary in 1999.
2. was familiar with the Memorandum. At first, she said the memorandum applied to her but later
she said same did not apply to her because she had no cash advances because Only those with
cash advances were required to get an EC before receiving salaries. She then instructed her staff
to work on her salary.
3. she did not know where the original of her EC was or WON signature of Laura had been
imitated or forged
4. although the EC was in her name, she did not cause Laura's signature to be affixed thereto.
5. Was able to get her salary for the month of August 2000 sometime in said month, because
ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance
before she could get her salary because she was re-appointed.
30
6. when she first saw the photocopy of the EC, the signature of Laura was not there. She was
able to see the photocopy of the EC again after this case had been filed with SV, already with the
alleged signature of Laura
7. Her staff worked on her clearance. She was able to get all the needed signatures except for
Laura's signature. With the refusal of Laura to sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary
Parcasio and explained the situation. IAaCST
8. denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano
ordering her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original of the EC
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she believed that an EC was
necessary, and for this reason she had this document prepared by her staff. She said her EC was
always in the possession of Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris who showed her the
document twice. 31
ATTY. JOSE I. LORENA, former ARMM SolGen, testified that he was familiar with the Memorandum
because the same was the product of consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive
Secretary Parcasio. Memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash advances and was not a
requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in the memorandum, because
what was required for the purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from the Resident
Auditors of the Commission on Audit.
SB convicted petitioner. It found petitioner’s denial unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no
direct evidence to show that petitioner herself "actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura, there were
circumstances that indicated she was the one who committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked
somebody else to falsify/forge. It added that considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and
profited from the use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the material author of
the falsification.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her EC had no probative value in proving its contents and
was inadmissible because the original thereof was not presented by the prosecution.
Petitioner prayed that her motion for new trial be granted in order that the testimony of Marie Cris
Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly discovered evidence.
SB denied both MR for lack of merit; and the MNT, because the evidence sought to be presented did
not qualify as newly discovered evidence. 39
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of falsification of public document?

HELD: YES
MEMORANDUM READS:
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other emoluments of all ARMM officials/employees with
unliquidated cash advance shall be withheld until they have settled their accounts and a corresponding
Credit Notice is issued to them by the COA.
True, what was required from officers/employees who had unliquidated cash advances was the
corresponding Credit Notice issued by the COA after they had settled their accounts. However, on her
31
contention that the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a
non-issue", we disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated or not is the main
issue in this case for falsification.
Information charges petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying
her EC. Credit Notice requirement was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of
salaries prior to 1 September 2000.
THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED ARE:

1. Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioner's Employees Clearance imitated?
2. If yes, Who imitated or caused the imitation of said signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the signature in petitioner's
Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an imitation. When a person whose signature was
affixed to a document denies his/her signature therein, a prima facie c ase for falsification is
established which the defendant must overcome. 48
There was a need for petitioner to file an EC not only for compliance with the Misuari memorandum but,
more importantly, because her term of office was about to end, since her position was coterminous
with the term of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority. How could she have been re-appointed by Gov.
Alvarez, whom she claims re-appointed her sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still the
Regional Governor of the ARMM when she had her EC prepared. her statement that she did not need
an EC because she was re-appointed does not inspire belief. ADaEIH
Petitioner faults the SB for applying presumption that if a person had in his position a falsified
document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is
presumed to be the material author of the falsification. She argues there was no evidence to prove she
made use of EC, because there was no evidence that she submitted it — if not, at least caused it to be
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. she said there were no "receipt marks" in the EC to
show that the Office of the Regional Governor received said documents.
"use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the "falsification" of a public document.
Falsification was consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the
falsification of a public document, it is immaterial WON the contents set forth therein were false. What is
important is the f act that the signature of another was counterfeited.
NOTE: Petitioner actually "used" or uttered the EC. The fact that the same was circulated to the
different division heads for their signatures is already considered use of falsified documents. Lack
of the stamp mark "Received" in the EC does not mean that said document was not received by the
Office of the Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, as
contained in the EC, to be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the Regional
Governor.
Petitioner said she had no knowledge about the falsification because it was her assistant secretary,
Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees Clearance.
Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence,
which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. petitioner did not even present as Marie Cris, the person whom she instructed to
32
work for her Employees Clearance. the defense never intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a
witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order, because the defense never listed her as a witness.
Attempt to present her is already too late and her testimony cannot be considered newly discovered
evidence as to merit the granting of her MNT.
aDE
In cases of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence
to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on circumstantial evidence consisting of
pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged the signature of
Laura in EC in question, the following circumstances establish that she was the one who committed the
forgery or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura, to wit
1. accused instructed Maricris to work for her EC and that the forged signature of Laura was
affixed on her clearance and that possession by Maricris of the falsified clearance of the
accused is possession by the accused herself because the former was only acting upon
the instructions and in behalf of the latter
2. accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the falsification as she admitted
that she was able to collect her salary after falsified EC was submitted
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his possession or control a falsified
document and who makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such
person is the forger or the one who caused the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification.
Effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail. 62 A
prima facie case of falsification having been established, petitioner should have presented clear and
convincing evidence to overcome such burden. This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by SB to the testimonies of the two Pangilans when they failed to
report the alleged falsification to the police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor of said
falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting her salaries.
Ø Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings,
are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect determination of the credibility of witnesses is
the domain of the trial court, as it is in the best position to observe the witnesses' demeanor
Photocopy of EC is ADMISSIBLE
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The purpose of the
rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence if the prevention of fraud.
However, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:

Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice
and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may
be presented as in the case of loss.
33
Offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the
said party to produce the document which may be in the form
1. motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party
2. subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such
party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.
Prosecution sent thru the COA Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas
addressed to accused and Marie Cris ordering them to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor
on or before June 8, 2005, the original of the EC. Notwithstanding receipt by her uncle Manso Alonto in
her residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not appear before or submit the original of the said EC,
much less offered to produce the same.
Since there was proof of the existence of the EC as evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite
the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her assistant secretary to produce
the original of said employees clearance they ignored the notice and refused to produce the original
document, the presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the questioned
Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof was justified.
even though original of an alleged falsified document is not, or may no longer be produced in court, a
criminal case for falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to establish the contents of said
document via secondary evidence or substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the the
original is not available for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3, 66Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Petitioner was not denied due process by allowing her only two hearing dates, thus resulting in her failure
to present another important witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio.
(Basically the hearings were postponed initially for absence of prosec and then absence of lawyer of
accused. Later, her first lawyer withdrew so she had no lawyer. She was given ample time by court to get
new lawyer so hearings were again postponed but she still failed to secure services of lawyer, counsel
de officio was appointed. Later she got new lawyer but this lawyer was changed again. When the 3rd
lawyer appeared, he was not prepared and asked for resetting of hearing despite previous order by court
which stated that those dates were to be the last dates for petitioner to present her evidence.
“With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to present its evidence
today and tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its evidence, the Court is constraint to consider the
accused's right to present evidence as waived.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their r espective memoranda. Thereafter, the
case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.”
She filed MR of order but during the hearing, she was ABSENT again. So court denied MR. BUT
ultimately, court gave favorable order to the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of
Prosecution's Memorandum (And for a Second Look on the Matter of Accused's Right to Present
Defense Evidence). Court granted and case was set for hearing for the accused's l ast chance to present
34
n February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning
and/or complete the presentation of her evidence o
in SB.
Despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the Court gave her ample
opportunity to present her evidence. failure of the defense to present Atty. Parcasio was its own
doing.
For one to be convicted of falsification of public document, the followings elements must concur
1. that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a notary public
2. that he takes advantage of his official position;
3. that he falsifies a document by counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
No dispute that petitioner was a public officer when she caused the preparation of her EC (a public
document) for the release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. She being a
public officer, was duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it not for her
position and employment in the ARMM, she could not have accomplished said Employees Clearance.
In a falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official
position
1. he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document;
2. he had official custody of the document which he falsified.
It being her duty to prepare and submit said document, she clearly took advantage of her position
when she falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by imitating the
signature of Laura Pangilan
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#8. Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Workers Union
Underfed Arrastre Operators: A n audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like.
FACTS:
● On August 11, 1952 the Compañia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered
into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring
work for the consignees’ vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one
month counted from August 12, 1952.
● It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the
term if the union failed to render proper service. The contract could be renewed by
agreement.
35
● At the time the contract was entered into, the union had just been organized. Its
primordial desire was to find work for its members. The union agreed to the stipulation
that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the union "for the
loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such
services would be paid "by the owners and consigness of the cargoes.”
● The union found out later that that stipulation was oppressive and that the company was
unduly favored by that arrangement.
● Under the contract, the work of the union consisted of arrastre and stevedoring service.
Arrastre comprehends the handling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment
of the consignee or shipper and the ship's tackle. The service is usually performed by
longshoremen.
● On the other hand, stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the
vessel or between the ship's tackle and the holds of the vessel. The shippers and
consignees paid the union for the arrastre work. They refused to pay for the stevedoring
service. They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the
stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo
was at the shipowner's expense.
● On the other hand, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service because the
contract explicitly provided that the compensation for both arrastre and stevedoring work
should be paid by the shippers and consignees and that the shipowner would not be
liable for the payment of such services.
● Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract was disadvantageous to the union, it did
not terminate the contract because its members were in dire need of work which was not
adequately compensated. Upon the expiration of the one-month period, the said contract
was verbally renewed.
● On July 23, 1954 the union sent a letter to the company requesting that it be recognized
as the exclusive bargaining unit to load and unload the cargo of its vessels at Iligan City.
The company ignored that demand. So, the union filed on August 6, 1954 in the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition praying that it be certified as the sole collective
bargaining unit.
● Despite that certification case, the company on August 24, 1954 served a written notice
on the union that, in accordance with payment of the 1952 contract, the same would be
terminated on August 31, 1954. Because of that notice, the union on August 26, 1954
filed in the CIR charges of unfair labor practice against the company.
36
● On August 31, 1954 the company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract
with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. On the following day, September 1, the union
members picketed the wharf and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from
performing arrastre and stevedoring work. The picket lasted for nine days.
● On September 8, 1954 the company sued the union and its officers in the Court of First
Instance of Lanao for the rescission of the aforementioned 1952 contract. On the
following day, September 9, the lower court issued ex parte a writ of preliminary
injunction after the company had posted a bond in the sum of P20,000. On that same
day the union, was allowed to file a counterbond. The injunction was lifted. The union
members resumed their arrastre and stevedoring work.
● After trial, the lower court rendered a decision (1) declaring the arrastre and stevedoring
contract terminated on August $1, 1954; (2) dismissing the union's counterclaim; (3)
ordering the union and its officers to pay solidarily to the company P520,000 as
damages, with six percent interest per annum f rom September 9, 1954; (4) permanently
enjoining the union from performing any arrastre and stevedoring work for the company
at Iligan City, and (5) requiring the union to post a supersedeas bond in the sum of
P520,000 to stay execution.
● The union filed a motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, the company filed a
motion for the execution pending appeal of the money judgment.
● The union on January 6, 1961 had perfected an appeal from the lower court's original
decision. It did not appeal from the amended decision. On March 24, 1962 the lower
court issued an order declaring its amended decision final and executory in view of the
union's failure to appeal therefrom.
● On May 16, 1962 this Court dissolved the injunction at the instance of the company
which had filed a counterbond. Thereupon, the 225 members of the union yielded their
ten-year old jobs to the new set of workers contracted by the company.
● This Court reserved to the members of the union the right to secure restitution under
sections 2 and 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
● Pursuant to that reservation, the union on December 16, 1966 filed a motion for
restitution, praying that its 225 members be restored to their jobs.
● On the other hand, the company in its motion of January 18, 1967 reiterated its 1960
motion for the execution of the lower court's judgment as to the damages, of P520,000
and the permanent injunction.
37
● On September 15, 1954 the company added a fourth cause of action to its complaint. It
alleged that by reason of the acts of harassment and obstruction perpetrated by the
union in the loading and unloading of cargo the company suffered additional damage in
the form of lost and unrealized freight and passenger charges in the amount of P10,000
for September 9 and 10, 1954.
● On November 2, 1954 the company attached to its motion for the revival of the injunction
against the union an auditor's report dated September 15, 1954 wherein it was indicated
that the company lost freight revenues amounting to P178,579.20 during the period from
January 1 to September 7, 1954.
● On November 27, 1954 the company filed another motion for the restoration of the
injunction. In support of that motion the company attached a trip operation report
showing the unloaded cargoes on the consignees’ vessels.
● On March 5, 1955 the company added a fifth cause of action too its complaint. It alleged
lost freight charges on unloaded cargoes in the sum of P62,680.12 and that it incurred
an estimated amount of P20,000 for overhead expenses for the delay in the dismissal of
its vessels attributable to the union's unsatisfactory stevedoring and arrastre work.
● On March 9, 1960 the company filed a third supplemental complaint. It alleged that the
continuation of the stevedoring and arrastre work by the union for the company from
1955 to date had caused losses to the company at the rate of P25,000 annually in the
form of lost freight on shutout cargoes and the expenses for the equipment used to
assist the union members in performing their work.
○ Plaintiff company's evidence. - Jose C. Teves, the consignees’ branch manager
at Iligan City, testified that on August 24, 1954 he terminated the arrastre and
stevedoring contract with the union upon instruction of the head office. The
contract was terminated in order to avoid further losses to the company caused
by the union's inefficient service.
○ The members of the union allegedly harassed the company with the help of
goons. The cargoes could not be unloaded in spite of the fact that the company
had sought the protection of the law-enforcing authorities. The consignees’ last
recourse was to go to court.
● The company supposedly suffered losses as a result of the union's inefficient service
since September 1, 1954. The trial court awarded actual damages, amounting to
P450,000 on the basis of the auditor's reports, Exhibits A to I. It did not carefully examine
the said exhibits.
● Contrary to the trial court's impression, Exhibits B, C and D are not auditors' reports. The
trial court did not bother to make a breakdown of the alleged damages, totalling
P450,000. The reports of the two hired accountants, Demetrio S. Jayme and M. J. Siojo,
show the following alleged damages, in the aggregate amount of P349,245.37 (not
38
P412,663.17, as erroneously added by the consignees’ counsel) (refer to the original for
the computation).
● We tabulated the alleged damages, to show that the trial court's award to the company
of P450,000 as damages, is not supported by the evidence. On the other hand, the
statement of the consignees’ counsel that the damages, totalled P412,663.17 is wrong.
● Teves, the consignees. branch manager, submitted a statement showing the alleged
cost of three forklifts, 200 pieces of pallet boards, 530 pieces of wire rope slings and two
pieces of tarpaulins in the total sum of P27,215. In that statement, he claims that the
damages, to the company by reason of the depreciation of the said items of equipment
amounted to P38,835 or more than the cost thereof.
● The company's counsel, in his summary of the damages, ignored the alleged damages,
of P38,835 indicated by Teves in Exhibit K. The consignees. counsel relied on the
auditors' reports, Exhibits A and E to I and on Exhibit B, the chief clerk's statement. As
already noted, those documents show that the total damages, claimed by the company
amounted to P349,245.37.
● The best evidence on the cost of the said equipment would have been the sales invoices
instead of the oral testimony of Teves. He did not produce the sales invoices.
● Teves further testified that Salvador T. Lluch was the president of the union; Nicanor
Halibas, the treasurer; Mariano Badelles, the general manager, and Luarentino Badelles,
a vice president.
● Facts according to the appellant (deficient, accdg. to the SC):

○ Sometime in the month of August, 1954, defendant, Allied Free Workers Union
filed an unfair labor practice case against defendant (should be plaintiff) and its
branch manager, Mr. Jose Teves, with the Court of Industrial Relations, Manila;
defendant union also filed a petition for certification election docketed against
plaintiff; defendant union also filed a notice of strike dated August 27, 1954; the
Secretary of Labor wired the public defender, Iligan City, on August 27, 1954
(see annexes 1-4, motion to dismiss, Record on Appeal, pp. 54-65).
● Plaintiff filed the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 577 in the Court of First Instance
of Lanao (now Lanao del Norte) for damages, and/or resolution of contract with writ of
preliminary injunction. On a decision adverse to their interests, defendants take this
appeal.
ISSUE:
39
● The trial court erred in awarding to the company actual damages, amounting to
P450,000, moral damages of P50,000, and attorney's fees of P20,000; and in holding
that the four officers of the union are solidarily liable for the said damages. Appellants'
counsel assailed the award of actual damages, on the ground that the auditors' reports,
on which they were based, were hearsay.
HELD:
● The first assignment of error meritorious.
● We have already stress that, on the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the
damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of simple addition, does not reach the
sum of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the accountants'
reports and in the statement made by the consignees. chief clerk (who did not testify)
amount to P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000.
(Evidence Issue)
● The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because
of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is the general result of the whole", the original writings need not
be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).
● That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the
records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established.
● It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should
be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the summary may be
tested on cross-examination.
● What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of,
a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of
accounts, reports or the like."
● That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a
preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the
records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court.
A close scrutiny of the accountants' reports reveals their lack of probative value. The
propriety of allowing the different items of damages, is discussed below.
● Unrealized freight and passenger revenue for 1954 ascertained by Accountant Demetrio
S. Jayme. - In his report , Jayme used the pronouns "we" and "our" and made reference
40
to the examination made by the "auditors" and his accounting office. He did not disclose
the names of other "auditors" who assisted him in making the examination of the
consignees. records.
● He gave the impression that he was an independent accountant hired by the company to
make a "special investigation" of the consignees. losses for the period from January 1 to
September 7, 1954.
○ The truth is that Jayme was a "personal friend" of Teves, the consignees’
branch manager at Iligan City. Teves was the consignees’ principal witness in
this case. He verified the complaint herein. He signed for the company the
stevedoring and arrastre contract which he later rescinded. In fact, Teves
intervened in the drafting of the contract. It was his Idea that the company should
not pay the arrastre and stevedoring and that those charges should be borne by
the shippers and consignees.
● Jayme was not only the friend of Teves but was also his co-employee. Jayme was the
consignees’ branch manager at Ozamis City and later at Cagayan de Oro City. He
suppressed that fact in his report of examination. Apparently, the practice of accounting
was his sideline or he practised accounting and, as the saying goes, he moonlighted as
the consignees’ branch manager. Obviously, Jayme would be biased for the company.
He violated a rule of the accountants' code of ethics by not disclosing in his report of
examination that he was an employee of the company.
● Accountant Jayme allegedly found from the consignees’ records at Iligan City that its
freight and passenger revenue for the eight- month period from January 1 to August 31,
1953 amounted to P373,333.14 and that for the same period in 1954, that revenue
amounted to P470,716.29, or an increase of P97,383.12.
● Jayme interpreted those figures as signifying that the company would have realized
more revenue if the union had rendered better service. He reasoned out that there was a
big volume of business in Iligan City due to the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant, Iligan Steel
Mill and NPC Hydroelectric Plant. He imagined that the consignees. freight revenue
during the first eight months of 1954 could have amounted to at least P600,000 and that
since it actually realized P 470,716.29, its loss of freight revenue for that period could be
"conservatively" estimated at least P100,000.
● He stated that he attached to his report on the comparative statement of gross revenue
a certificate of the captain of the vessel Panay showing the delays in its dismissal in
Iligan City as indicated in its logbook. No such document was attached to Jayme's
report.
● And from the fact that the total fares received by the company during the eight-month
period were reduced in the sum of P3,951.58 (Jayme fixed the reduction at the round
41
figure of P4,000), he calculated that the company suffered a loss of at least P20,000 in
passenger revenue up to December 31, 1954 (Item 8 of the tabulation of damages).
● Jayme also included in his report (a) damages, amounting to P10,000 as his estimate o f
losses "based on interviews with disinterested parties at the wharf and city proper
customers"; (b) damages, amounting to P3,764.50 allegedly suffered in the operation of
the vessels Mindoro a nd Panay, , and (e) the sum of P4,407.50 as alleged additional
subsistence incurred for the crew of the Panay a nd Mindoro from January 1 to August
31, 1954. The records of the purser and chief steward were allegedly examined in
ascertaining
those damages.
● It would not be proper to allow Jayme's estimates as recoverable damages. They are not
supported by reliable evidence. The rule is that the auditor's summary should not
include his conclusions or inferences. His opinion is not evidence.
● The trial court unreservedly gave credence to the conjectures of Jayme. Obviously, his
inflated guesses are inherently speculative and devoid of probative value.
● The foregoing discussion shows Jayme's unreliable modus operandi i n ascertaining the
1954 losses which the company claimed to have suffered in consequence of the union's
alleged inefficiency or poor service.
● The same observations apply with equal cogency to the damages, amounting to
P40,407.20 as lost freight revenue also for the year 1954 which were computed by
Accountant Jayme.
○ Jayme allegedly based his computations on the records of the company which
were not produced in court. The union objected to Jayme's report as inadmissible
under the hearsay rule or as not being the best evidence.
○ Even if the presentation of the records themselves as exhibits should have been
dispensed with, yet the complaint to show good faith and fair dealing, could have
brought the records in court (manifests, bills of lading, receipts for the freights, if
any, etc.) and enabled the court and the union's counsel and its expert
accountant to verify the accuracy of Jayme's summaries.
● Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of lading proving that the company was
not able to collect the stipulated freight on the alleged shutout cargoes should have been
proforma in evidence as supporting papers for Jayme's report.
● The flaw or error in relying merely on Jayme's summaries is that cargoes were shutout
deliberately by the company because they could not be loaded in one vessel, or a
shipper had no allotment, or because the company did not want to load cargoes like
bananas. Jayme's summaries did not take into account the probability that a part of the
cargo booked in the consignees’ vessel for a certain date might not have been loaded on
42
that date but was loaded in another vessel of the company which docked at the port a
few days later, In that case, there would be no loss of freight revenue. The mere shutting
out of cargo in a particular voyage did not ipso facto produce loss of freight revenue.
● Our conclusion is that an injustice would be perpetrated if the damages, aggregating
P178,579 computed and estimated in the report of Jayme, a biased witness, should be
accepted at their face value.
● Damages computed by Salvador M. Magante. - The company also claims as damages

for lost freight charges on shutout cargoes in the sum of P62,680.12, and the sum of
P20,000 as "overhead expenses for delay of vessels in port."
Magante did not testify on his statement. Instead, accountant Jayme, substituting for
● The trial court erred in allowing the damages, totalling P82,680.12 because Magante's
Exhibit B, is hearsay. Jayme was not competent to take his place since the statement
was prepared by Magante, not by Jayme. More appropriate still, the documents and
records on which the statement was based should have been proforma as evidence or
at least brought to the court for examination by the union's counsel and its accountant.
The trial court required the production of the manifests supporting Magante's statement.
Only one such manifest was produced. The nonproduction of the other records was not
explained.
● Lost freight revenue and operating expenses for the forklifts. - The company claimed as
damages, the sum of P87,986.05 consisting of supposed unrealized freight charges for
shutout or unloaded cargoes for the year 1955 to 1959.
The company alleged that due to the acts of the union and its officers the company had
suffered damages.
● The said damages, were computed in the reports of Miguel J. Siojo, an accountant who,
for two days and nights, March 8 to 10, 1960, or shortly before and during the trial,
allegedly examined the consignees’ record at Iligan City Those records were not
produced in court. Their non production was not explained. If the accountant was
able to summarize the contents of those records in two days, they could not have
been very voluminous. They should have been offered in evidence.
● The union contends that Siojo's reports were inadmissible evidence because they were
hearsay, meaning that the original documents, on which the reports were based, were
not presented in evidence. We are of the opinion that, to avoid fraud or fabrication, the
documents evidencing the alleged expenses should have been proforma. Siojo's reports
were not the best evidence of the said operating expenses.
● The union's witness, Mariano LI. Badelles, testified that the consignees. forklifts were not
used exclusively on the wharf. They were used in the fertilizer and carbide plants.
43
Sometimes, the union supplied the driver and the gasoline for the operation of the
forklifts.
● Moreover, as stated earlier, the company was not paying the union a single centavo for
arrastre and stevedoring work. The shippers and consignees paid for the arrastre service
rendered by the union. The union did not receive any compensation for stevedoring
work.
● The company complained that the union had been rendering unsatisfactory arrastre and
stevedoring services. That grievance was controverted by the union. The use of the
forklifts, tarpaulins pallet boards and wire rope slings immeasurably benefited the
company. It is not proper nor just that the consignees investment in those pieces of
equipment should be considered damages just because it was able to bind the union to
a one-sided contract
○ If the service was unsatisfactory, it must be because the poor stevedores were
underfed and underpaid. They were underfed and underpaid because the
company was astute enough to insure that it would obtain stevedoring service
without paying for it.
○ If to improve the arrastre and stevedoring service, the company had to incur
expenses for the purchase of forklifts, pallet boards, tarpaulins and wire rope
slings and for the operation of the forklifts, the union should not be required to
reimburse the company for those expenses. The company should bear those
expenses. because the same redounded to its benefit.
● The trial court erred in ordering the union and its officials to pay the amount of the said
expenses as damages to the company.
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#9. Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer
FACTS:
● Jose Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation, under the business name of Villa
Rey Transit. He was authorized by the Public Service Commission (PSC), under two
certificates, to operate a total of 32 units on various routes or lines from Pangasinan to
Manila, and vice-versa.
● He sold the two certificates to Pangasinan Transportation Company (Pantranco) for
P350K.
o The condition was that Villarama shall not apply for any TPU service identical
or competing with Pantranco for a period of 10 years from the sale.
44
● Barely three months later, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit Inc. (Corporation) was
organized.
o It had a capital stock of P500K.
o Natividad Villarama, the wife of Jose, was one of the incorporators and the
treasurer of the corporation. The brother and sister-in-law of Jose were also
incorporators.
o The corporation bought 5 certificates of public convenience, 49 buses, tools
and equipments from one Valentin Fernando for the sum of P249K.
o On the day of the aforementioned sale, the company immediately applied to
the PSC for approval of the sale and for issuance of a provisional authority to
operate.
o PSC granted the provision permit conditioned on the fact that the commission
may modify or revoke such permit.
● While the PSC has yet to take final action, the Sheriff of Manila levied on two of the five
certificates pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the CFI of Pangasinan.
o The CFI case was between Valentin Fernando (seller of certificates/buses to
the corporation) and Eusebio Ferrer.
o Court ruled in favor of Eusebio and a public sale was conducted, with Ferrer
being the highest bidder.
● Ferrer sold the two certificates to Pantranco and submitted the sale for approval with the
PSC. Pantranco also asked that it provisionally operate.
● The applications by the corporation and Pantranco were scheduled for hearing. In
the meantime, the PSC ruled that Pantranco shall be the one to operate provisionally
under the two certificates while the case was pending.
o This was questioned by the corporation and such was raised to the SC.
o The SC held that until the issue of ownership over the certificate attains finality,
it is the corporation that shall be the one to operate the lines provisionally.
● The corporation filed in the CFI of Manila a complaint for the cancellation of the
sheriff’s sale of the two certificates and the subsequent sale to Ferrer, then to Pantranco.
● Ferrer and Pantranco contend that: The corporation had no valid title to the certificate
since the contract of sale it had with Fernando was subject to a suspensive condition,
which is the approval of the PSC, which has not been fulfilled yet.
o Given this, the sheriff’s levy and sale were valid and regular.
● Pantranco filed a third-party complaint against Villarama. They allege that:
o Villarama and the corporation are one and the came.
o Villarama is disqualified from operating the certificates since in the original
contract of sale between Villarama and Pantranco, the former cannot have a
business identical or competing with Pantranco for 10 years.
● CFI held that:
1. The sheriff’s sale was null and void
2. Villa Rey transit inc. is the lawful owner of said certificates
● All three parties appealed the decision:
45
o Pantranco argues that the company and Villarama are one entity, and that the
restriction clause in the contract is valid
o Ferrer contends that the sheriff’s sale is valid.
o Corporation asks that the award for attorney’s fees and exemplary damages be
increased.
ISSUES:
Is the corporation a mere alter ego of Villarama? - YES

● While Villarama was not an incorporator or stockholder in the corporation, his wife was
an incorporator with the lease subscribed number of shares and was elected as
treasurer.
● It was shown that the finances of the corporation was manipulated and disbursed by
Villarama as if it were his private funds.
1. The initial capital was mostly financed by Villarama. Of the P105K deposited,
P85K was from his personal check.

2. There was no actual payment by the original subscribers to him, as appearing in
the books.
3. Villarama purchased Ford trucks for the corporation, using his own personal
checks by Philippine Bank of Commerce.

4. Exhibits were shown to prove that Villarama co-mingled his personal funds and
transactions with those of the corporation.
● These exhibits are photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers.
● Villarama assailed the admission of these, saying that they should have no evidentiary
value since they were merely photostatic copies. The best evidence would still be the
originals themselves.
● He contends that Pantranco was the most likely possessor of the original because they
were stolen from the files of the corporation.
Are these exhibits admissible? - YES

● SC held that:
o Section 5 Rule 130 of the RoC, provides for the requisites for the
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody
of the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent has possession of the
original, (2) reasonable notice was made to opponent, (3) satisfactory
proof of its existence, and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce
the original in court.
● In this case, the second and fourth requisites were already established by Villarama.
● As to the third, he admitted that they existed in the files of the corporation and he
personally saw some of them.
● As to the first element, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary
evidence, to show that the original is in the possession of the adverse party. It is enough
that the circumstances show that the writing is in his possession or under his control.
46
● The party calling for the evidence may introduce a copy thereof, as in the case of loss,
since the loss, destruction, or non-production of the evidence is also an exception to
thecbest evidence rule.
o In this case, the presumption is that the originals of the vouchers are lost,
since eventhe corporation admits to such loss.
● In this case, the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced since it is used as a means of
perpetrating fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation
etc.
● Since Villa Rey Transit Inc. is a mere alter ego of Villarama, the restrictive clause in the
first contract of sale with Pantranco is binding against it.
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#10. National Power Corporation vs. Codilla

FACTS:
● M/V Dibena Win, a foreign registered vessel owned and operated by Bangpai Shipping
Co.,
● It allegedly bumped and damaged the Power Barge 209 of National Power Corporation
(NPC) which at that time, was moored at the Cebu International Port.
● As a result, NPC filed before the RTC of Cebu a complaint for damages. This was later
amended to include Wallem Shipping Inc. as an additional defendant.
○ Wallem is the ship agent of Bangpai
● Both Wallem and Bangpai filed motions to dismiss, but both were denied.
● NPC then filed a formal offer of evidence consisting of Exhibits “A” to “V”. These include:
(Not all are listed)
○ (1) Photocopies of a list of estimated cost of damages, (2) Photocopies of letters
manually signed by certain persons, with “RECEIVED” stamped thereon,
together with a handwritten date, (3) Photocopy of the break down of the cost
estimate manually signed together with other handwritten annotations, (4)
Photocopies of letters of termination, (5) Photocopy of the incident reports.
○ Basically, these were all photocopies of certain letters or lists. Most, if not all,
contain manual signatures, and handwritten notations.
○ ARGUMENT of NPC: It contends that these photocopies are equivalent to the
original of the document on the basis of the Electronic Evidence Rule.
■ It argues that the photocopies constitute electronic evidence since
“electronic document” is not limited to information that is received,
recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
■ An “electronic document” can also refer to other modes of written
expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as
included in the section’s catch-all proviso: “any print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means”.
● Bangpai and Wallem objected to the formal offer of evidence.
● The RTC denied the admission and excluded some of the exhibits. It held that:
47
○ NPC has been given every opportunity to present the originals of these
documents instead of mere photocopies.
○ Its reliance on the Electronic Evidence Rule is misplaced since the photocopies
do not constitute electronic evidence.
1. The information therein was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically.
2. Such electronic evidence must be authenticated, which the NPC failed to
do.
3. It also failed to provide for an affidavit to prove admissibility and
evidentiary weight.
4. The loss of the originals were not established by any competent proof.
● NPC filed a petition for certiorari (R65) with the CA alleging that the judge (Codilla Jr. )
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the exhibits.
● CA dismissed the petition. It held that:
○ The judge acted correctly and within his sound discretion when he issued the
assailed order:
1. Some of the documentary evidence were not properly identified by any
competent witness. The witnesses presented do not have personal
knowledge or participation in the preparation and making of the
documents.
2. These evidence were mere photocopies of the originals. The rule is that
when the subject of an inquiry is the contents of the document, no other
evidence shall be admissible other than the original.
3. These evidence do not constitute as electronic evidence. The
informations therein were not received, retrieved or produced
electronically.
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Furthermore, assuming that they are electronic evidence, NPC failed to
properly authenticate and show an affidavit pursuant to the
requirements on the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Are the documents presented as evidence covered under the definition of an “electronic
document”? - NO
● An electronic document refers to:
1. Information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or however represented
2. By which right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed,
3. Which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
● An electronic document is similar to a paper-based document, because both are relevant
only in terms of the information contained therein. (Subject of the inquiry is the contents)
48
● The main difference is the MANNER by which the information is processed. In an
electronic document, the information is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
1. In this case, not all the contents, such as the signatures made in the
documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. A person’s
signature, affixed manually, is far from being information that is
electronically received.
2. Since these documents are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
not considered as the functional equivalent of the original. To admit them
as evidence would be a violation of the best evidence rule.
-
The main function of the rule was to guard against (1) incomplete or
fraudulent proof and (2) the introduction of altered copies and the
withholding of the originals.
-
However, this function has expanded from the prevention of fraud to
the recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law, the
reason being: (Concerns addressed by the best evidence rule)
a. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world
of legal relations
b. The fallibility of human memory as reliable evidence of the
terms, and
c. The hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate
2. Can these documentary evidence still be admitted? - NO

● As required by the RoC, when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of
its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a,
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.
● The offeror, before presenting secondary evidence, is burdened to prove:
1. The loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on his part which
can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of
destruction of documents;
2. Prove by preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
of loss or destruction of the original copy, and
3. It must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search
has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
● In this case, the NPC never established the loss/destruction of the original document and
the requirements before secondary evidence may be offered. They merely insisted that
the photocopies are documentary evidence based on their misplaced reliance on the
Rules of Electronic Evidence.
● The NPC were given several opportunities by the court to present the original copies but
they failed to do so. It is absurd that they now come to the SC praying that they be
allowed to present the originals of the exhibits.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49
#11. MCC Industrial v. Ssangyong Corporporation
Facts:
● MCC Industrial, a domestic corp is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling
stainless steel products. Its supplier, Ssangyong Corporation, is an international trading
company with head office in Seoul and regional HQs in Makati. They conducted
business through telephone calls and fax or telecopy transmissions.
● Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC
Manager (also President of Sanyo) to confirm MCC’s and Sanyo’s order of 220 metric
tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of US$1, 860 per MT.
Chan assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.
Ssangyong then purchased its steel from its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel
Corporation (POSCO) and paid the same in full. It also forwarded to MCC a Pro Forma
Invoice containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to
Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. Payment would be
made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong.
● Ssangyong informed Chan that it was able to secure a US$30/MT price adjustment on
the contracted price and the goods were to be shipped in 2 tranches (100 MT each).
Ssangyong sent a series of letters to Sanyo requesting for the opening of L/C.
● Ssangyong received, by fax, a letter requesting an extension of time to open the L/C
because MCC’s credit line with the bank had been fully availed of. To maintain their
good business relationship and to support MCC in its financial predicament, Ssangyong
offered to negotiating with POSCO another US$20/MT discount on the price of its
stainless steel ordered. However, despite Ssangyong’s letters, MCC failed to open a
letter of credit. Consequently, Ssangyong wrote Sanyo that if the L/C’s were not opened,
Ssangyong would be compelled to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages
for breach amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of warehousing expenses, related
interested and charges.
● MCC finally opened an L/C/ with PCIBank covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel
coil. The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC,
who then faxed to Ssangyong a letter requesting for price adjustment of the order in the
second Pro Forma Invoice considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was
US$1,700/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a recent strike. Ssangyong
rejected the request and sent a demand letter with the same warning but this time
US$64,066.99 cost of damages. Chan failed to reply. Ssangyong then filed a civil action
for damages due to breach of contract against MCC and Sanyo and Chan before the
RTC of Makati.
● After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that
Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma i nvoices on which the
civil action was based. The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary
evidence presented had already been admitted and their admissibility finds support in
RA 8762 (Electronic Commerce Act of 2000).
50
● After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Ssangyong and ruled
that when platinfidd agreed to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel
products for the price of US$1,860/MT, the contract was perfected. The CA rendered its
Decision affirming the RTC ruling, but absolving Chan of any liability for damages ruling
that Ssangyong was not entitled to damages, and that the damages were of an
unconscionable amount.
Issues:
1. WoN the CA decision is final and executory -- NOT YET
2. WoN the print-out and/or photocopies of fax transmissions and electronic evidence are
admissible -- NO [MAIN]
3. WoN there was a perfected contract of sale between MCC and Ssangyong, and, if in the
affirmative, WoN MCC breached the said contract -- YES
4. WoN the award of actual damages and attorney’s fees in favor of Ssangyong is proper
and justified.
HELD: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision of the CA is MODIFIED in that the award of actual damages is DELETED. However,
petition is ORDERED to pay Ssangyong NOMINAL DAMAGES in the amount of P200k and
ATTORNEY’S FEES as awarded by the trial court.
THE CA DECISION IS NOT YET FINAL AND EXECUTORY

1. Albano v. CA: receipt of a copy of the decision by one of several counsels on record 1.
notice to all, and the period to appeal commences on such date even if the other counsel
has not yet received a copy of the decision.”
2. We note, however, that the arrangement between the 2 counsels was for the
collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal brief and subsequent pleadings
in the CA. This explains why it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the MR of the
CA decision, and they did so on October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from
September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the CA decision.
FAX PRINTOUTS -- NOT ADMISSIBLE; PHOTOCOPIES -- MORE ADMISSIBLE [MAIN]

1. Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original fax transmissions are
"electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic
Commerce Act (the MCC merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the
said fax transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax
transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether
the photocopies thereof are covered by the law.
2. The CA ruled as follows:
a. The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are
admissible in evidence, although they are mere electronic fax printouts of
appellant's orders. Such fax printouts are considered Electronic Documents
51
under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence. (Rule 2, Sec. 1 [h], A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC).
b. An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. (Rule 4,
Sec. 1, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
3. The ruling of the CA is incorrect. The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an
electronic document as1 admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in
the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent
of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
a. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an
"electronic document."
4. The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's definition of "electronic data message" is copied
from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). While Congress deleted this
phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it.
5. While “data message” has reference to to information electronically sent, stored or
transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an
obligation, unlike an electronic document. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the following manner:2
1
SEC. 5 Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means.
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
IRR of RA 8792:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with
"electronic document."
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be
equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
2
SEC. 1 Definition of Terms. – For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
52
6. The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression that fax transmissions are
electronic data messages or electronic documents because they are sent by electronic
means. The expanded definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR,
consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory considering that
the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a document from one place to
another via a fax machine. However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy," and
replaced the term "data message" with "electronic data message."
7. Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. sponsored the bill on second
reading, he proposed to adopt the term "data message" as formulated and defined in the
UNCITRAL Model Law. During the period of amendments, however, the term evolved
into "electronic data message," and the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model
Law was deleted. Furthermore, the term "electronic data message," though maintaining
its description under the UNCITRAL Model Law, except for the aforesaid deleted phrase,
conveyed a different meaning as it was consonant with the explanation of Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic
commerce. " In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned after the E-Commerce
Law of Canada, Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term "electronic data
message."
8. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or
faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce
Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach"
that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions
on paperless and digital transactions. Fax transmissions are not, in this sense,
"paperless," but verily are paper-based.
a. Garvida v. Sales, Jr.: A fax is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is
no way of determining on its face whether the fax pleading is genuine and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact,
be a sham pleading.
9. Accordingly, in an ordinary fax transmission there exists an original paper-based
information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data
message."
53
receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to
have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct
printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as
originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as
aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included fax
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based fax
copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal
effects.
10. We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a fax
transmission. Accordingly, a fax transmission cannot be considered as electronic
evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule
and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Since a fax transmission is not an
"electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as
electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax
transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere
photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the
position of both the trial and the CAs.
THERE WAS A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE

1. In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is essential that the claimant
proves (1) the existence of a perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by the other
contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she sustained due to such breach. Sale,
being a consensual contract, follows the general rule that it is perfected at the moment
there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price.
2. In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale between the
parties, Ssangyong formally offered in evidence the testimonies of its witnesses and
numerous exhibits. Significantly, among these documentary evidence presented by
Ssangyong, MCC, in its petition before this Court, assails the admissibility only of Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2. These invoices are
mere photocopies of their original fax transmittals. Because these documents are mere
photocopies, they are simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon compliance with
Rule 130, Sec. 5.
3. It is observed, however, that Ssangyong also introduced in evidence a variety of other
documents together with the testimonies of its witnesses. Notable among them are Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 which were issued by
Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. These invoices slightly varied the terms of the
earlier invoices such that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and the price
54
reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. The copies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices
submitted to the court bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
a. Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1, however, is a mere photocopy of its
original. But MCC does not assail the admissibility of this document in the instant
petition. Evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court.
b. As to Pro Forma I nvoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2, which was certified by PCIBank
as a true copy of its original, it was, in fact, MCC which introduced this document
in evidence.
c. These invoices, along with the other unchallenged documentary evidence of
Ssangyong, preponderate in favor of the claim that a contract of sale was
perfected by the parties.
4. With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when MCC did not
open the L/C for the first half of the transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands
from Ssangyong, MCC breached its contractual obligation.
NO ACTUAL DAMAGES
1. This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages is not in accord with the
evidence on record. It is axiomatic that actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.
2. In the instant case, the trial court and CA 1. CA awarded to Ssangyong US$93,493.87
as actual damages. Noticeably, however, the trial and the CA, in making the said award,
relied on: (1) the Statement of Account; (2) the details of the said Statement of Account;
(3) the contract of the alleged resale of the goods to a Korean corporation; and (4) the
authentication of the resale contract from the Korean Embassy and certification from the
Philippine Consular Office.
3. The statement of account and the details of the losses sustained by Ssangyong due to
the said breach are, at best, self-serving. It was Ssangyong itself which prepared the
said documents. The items therein are not even substantiated by official receipts.
Furthermore, the sales contract and its authentication certificates, allegedly evidencing
the resale at a loss of the stainless steel subject of the parties' breached contract, fail to
convince this Court of the veracity of its contents.
4. From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC that Ssangyong did not
adequately prove that the items resold at a loss were the same items ordered by the
MCC. Therefore, as the claim for actual damages was not proven, the Court cannot
sanction the award.
5. Nonetheless, the Court finds that MCC knowingly breached its contractual obligation and
obstinately refused to pay despite repeated demands from Ssangyong. MCC even
asked 1. for several extensions of time for it to make good its obligation. But in spite of
Ssangyong's continuous accommodation, MCC completely reneged on its contractual
duty. For such inattention and insensitivity, MCC must be held liable for nominal
damages. Accordingly, the Court awards nominal damages of P200,000.00 to
Ssangyong.
55
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#12. De Vera vs. Aguilar
FACTS:
● Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and
respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of
the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960.
● Decedent owned a parcel of land situated at Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, (4,195
square meters) (Cadastral Lot NO. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan Cadastre)
○ Land was mortgaged by respondents Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty.
Leonardo Bordador.
○ Aguilars later redeemed the property and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same
to them (deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956)
● On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan
○ cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe
issuance of new one in the name of the Aguilars
● On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land and
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356 (M) was issued in his name.
● On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents
○ as children of Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property
○ demanded partition
○ threats to charge them perjury and/or falsification
○ claimed that the respondents resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April
28, 1959
● On September 27, 1980, the respondents replied that they were the sole owners of the
disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe.
● A falsification case was filed against the respondents.
○ Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended
dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the
respondents for lack of a prima facie case.
● Petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot
● Trial court rendered its decision ordering respondents:
1. To reconvey the property
2. To pay P10,000 as litigation expenses;
3. To pay P5,000 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay P10,000 as attorney's fees.
● Trial court admitted Exhibit A, a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on
April 28, 1959 by the respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa
Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1,500.00.
● Respondents appealed to the CA
56
○ Respondents contended that since the petitioners have failed to produce the
original of the alleged deed of sale, the same was not the best evidence of the
alleged sale hence it should have been excluded and should not have been
accorded any evidentiary value.
● On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the document of sale
had been duly established by the testimony of the notary public and by Luis de Vera who
was present during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been
proven by the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and
the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan.
● CA reversed the trial court's decision.
○ loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of
sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same. -NO
HELD:
Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence
states:
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the
original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon
proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may
be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the recollection of witnesses.
● Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed.
○ prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument.
○ The correct order of proof is: Existence; execution; loss; contents
■ order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
■ The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court
● Trial court merely ruled on the existence and due execution but failed to look into the
loss or destruction of the original copies.
○ Existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of
a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
○ Execution may be established by:
■ person or persons who executed it
■ person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or
■ any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or
■ person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed
the execution thereof.
57
○ Petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution through the testimony
of the notary public
○ The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact.
○ The loss may be shown by:
■ person who knew the fact of its loss, or
■ one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination
in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was,
and has been unable to find it; or
■ one who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost.
● HOWEVER, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies.
○ since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved,
no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established
until it appears that ALL of its parts are unavailable.
● Notary public testified to four or five original copies.
○ Petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies.
● Original of the deed of sale in question has not been lost or destroyed. It was submitted
to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration.
○ secondary evidence of it is inadmissible
● Testimony of notary public that his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street,
Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 establish the loss or destruction of but one of
the duplicate original copies on file with him.
● Testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan, that
he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the tax declaration
● Testimony of David Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to the effect that his office
had no copy of the document in question because the notary public might not have
submitted a copy; or that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that most of
the record before 1960 were destroyed by termites.
● These testimonies do not prove loss or destruction of the original and of ALL the
duplicate original copies of the document in question.
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#13. Ebreo vs. Ebreo
FACTS:
● Felipe Ebreo died intestate, leaving behind his 5 children as heirs: Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio and Felipa. Petitioner-spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraa are the son and
daughter-in-law, of petitioner Felino.
● Felipe left to his children an untitled parcel of land, Lot 9046, in Batangas.
58
○ Pursuant to the subdivision by Felipe, this was subdivided into 6 lots.
○ The 5 heirs extrajudicially partitioned the lot except a portion Lot No. 9046-F, the
latter to remain under the co-ownership of the children and the heirs of Felipa.
● It was discovered that Lot 9046-F was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Antonio Ebreo.
○ Defendants allege that the lot was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, with the
Real Property Tax Declaration transferred in his name as owner.On this tax
declaration, the alleged sale of the lot was annotated.However, the deed of sale
of this transaction, allegedly executed and ratified before an attorney, was never
presented.
○ Upon the sale by Santiago Puyo of the lot to Antonio Ebreo, a new tax
declaration was issued, and later revised to reflect the name of Evelyn Beraa.
■ Antonio and Evelyn thus paid taxes due on the land religiously.
● The lower court ruled in favor of defendants, saying that petitioners failed to produce the
alleged Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
ISSUE: Whether an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently prove
conveyance of title to a property.
HELD: NO.
● The mere fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes
does not necessarily prove ownership. Neither does payment of taxes conclusively prove
ownership.
● Petitioners presented 3 testimonies:
○ Antonio Pajilan, employee of the City Assessor’s Office, who testified on the tax
declaration – inconclusive because he did not make nor did he witness the
causing of the annotation as he was not yet employed in the office at the time,
not present during execution of the deed and did not personally see the deed
○ Felino, who alleged that his niece, Felipa’s daughter, borrowed and refused to
return the deed – from this account, there are 3 copies of the deed but petitioners
failed to present any of them
○ Asuncion Aguado, step-daughter of Santiago, who testified that Santiago bought
the lot from the heirs and paid real estate taxes for his properties – cannot be
given weight because she was not present when the deed was executed
● At most, these testimonies are secondary evidence, and thus inadmissible since
petitioners failed to prove any of the exceptions in Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.
● The factual findings of the trial court are worth repeating:
○ The sale was directly controverted by Felino’s supposed co-sellers and
co-owners, Gil and Flaviano. It also appears unusual for the heirs to retain the lot
in co-ownership and then sell the same the very same year.
59
○ While the sale allegedly took place in 1967, the deed was annotated on the tax
declaration in Santiago’s name which however only begins in 1973. While the
sale allegedly, too, place in 1967, the original tax declaration in the name of the
heirs was issued in 1968.
○ It is not a widely accepted practice to make such an annotation. All the other tax
declarations in this case do not have a similar entry to identify the documentary
basis for the issuance of the latest tax declaration.
○ Gil categorically stated that it was Felino who authored the transfer, as he was
the caretaker of the lot and in-charge of the payment of taxes. He sold the lot in
favor of his son Antonio.
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#15. Canuto vs. Mariano
An alleged oral agreement for the extension of the redemption period
FACTS:
● On Dec. 4, 1913, plaintiff Espiridiona Canuto executed a deed of sale of the parcel of
land described described in the complaint, to defendant Juan Mariano, for P860.
● Canuto reserved the right to repurchase the land for that amount within one year
from the date of the deed of sale.
● The redemption period elapsed with Canuto having failed to exercise her right to
repurchase. As such, Mariano set up a claim of absolute ownership to the land, despite
Canuto’s insistent demand to be permitted to exercise her reserved right for repurchase
in accordance with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the redemption
period down to the end of the month of Dec. 1914.
● Canuto claims:
○ That in the morning of Dec. 2, 1914 (two days before the expiration of the original
redemption period), while washing her clothes near a well, Canuto seized the
opportunity when Mariano passed by, and asked (even begged) him for an
extension of time for the repurchase of the land, and that upon her promise to
make the repurchase during the month of Dec. 1914, Mariano agreed to extend
the redemption period set out in the written contract, to the end of that month;
○ That after the expiration of the original redemption period, she sought to make
the repurchase in accordance with the agreement as to the extension of the time
therefor; but that Mariano failed to appear at the time and place agreed upon for
the payment of the purchase price, and has refused since that time to execute a
deed of resale, or to reserve the purchase price agreed upon, despite Canuto’s
60
repeated demands and tender of the purchase price. NOT SO IMPORTANT
DETAILZ, in case sir asks:
■ The Sunday following Dec. 2, Canuto went to the house of the defendant and
that he promised to meet her at the house of Mercado, an attorney, at 4 o'clock
of the next day, there to receive the purchase price and execute the necessary
documents evidencing the transaction;
■ Canuto took the money to the lawyer's ofce at the time appointed, and waited
there until dark, but that the defendant failed to meet his engagement;
■ Canuto also went to Mariano’s house, but was told that he was not at home; and
that since that time defendant has refused to carry out his oral agreement,
claiming that the redemption period set out in the original deed of sale expired on
Dec. 4, 1914, and that she had no right to repurchase the land after that date.
■ Severino Pascual, who was present when the oral agreement to extend the time
for the repurchase of the land was made, corroborated her testimony in this
regard, and SC nds nothing in the record which would justify disturbing the
ndings of the trial court who accepted her testimony as a substantially true
account of all that occurred, and declined to believe the conicting testimony of
the defendant which he characterizes as vague and incredible.
ISSUE: Whether Canuto should be permitted to alter, vary or contradict the terms of the original
written instrument by the introduction of oral evidence?
HELD: YES
● Mariano did extend the time within which Canuto could repurchase the land on condition
that she would find the money and make the repurchase within the extended period. It is
thus clear that Mariano cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that
Canuto was ready to make the payment within the extended period and was only
prevented from doing so by the conduct of Mariano himself.
● Mariano’s contention not to permit Canuto to alter, vary or contradict the terms of the
original written instrument by the introduction of oral evidence is untenable given the
following basis:
○ The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter,
vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties in writing,
entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was
executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding
to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the
parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any
way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the
writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have
exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and
independent contract.
61
○ It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract
the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise
unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced.
● Likewise untenable is Mariano’s contention that Canuto lost her right to redeem because
she failed to make judicial deposit of the purchase price when the defendant declined to
receive it because:
○ a bona de offer or tender of the price agreed upon for the repurchase is
sufcient to preserve the rights of the party making it, without the necessity of
making judicial deposit, if the offer or tender is refused; and
○ when diligent effort is made by the vendor of the land to exercise the right to
repurchase reserved by him in his deed of sale "and fails by reason of
circumstances over which he has no control, he does not lose his right to
repurchase the land, by reason of his failure to repurchase on the day of
maturity."
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#1. Robles v. Hermanos

Facts:
● Anastasia de la Rama died leaving six children all surnamed Robles, and some
properties, among which is house No. 4 on Iznart Street in the city of Iloilo, concerning
which a controversy arose which developed into the three cases now under
consideration.
● The children and heirs of Anastasia de la Rama entered into partnership with Lizarraga
Hermanos in liquidation and settlement of their accounts, by virtue of which the
competent court awarded to said partnership the properties left by the deceased,
including the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street.
● Evarista Robles, one of the aforesaid heirs, has been with her husband occupying the
aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street, at the beginning, by permission of her mother,
62
later on by the consent of her coheirs, and lastly by agreement with the partnership,
Lizarraga Hermanos, to whom it had been awarded.
○ Evarista had made some improvements on the house, the value of which is
fixed at P4,500, and Evarista pays to said partnership P40 monthly as rent of
the upper story.
● On March 1918, Hermanos noti ed Evarista that beginning April the rent of the upper
story of the house would be raised to P60 a month, and that, if she did not agree to the
new rate of rent, she might vacate the house.
○ Evarista refused to pay such a new rate of rent and to vacate the house, and
Hermanos brought suit against her for ejectment.
○ Evarista sued Hermanos afterwards to recover the value of the improvements,
and demanded, in another action, that said value be noted on the certi ficate of
title as an encumbrance.
● Evarista contends that she entered into a contract with Hermanos whereby:
○ It was agreed to sell her the said building on Iznart Street, the deed of sale to be
executed as soon as the title deeds of the property were transferred to the name
of said partnership;
○ She remained in the occupation of the building and made the improvement;
○ Evarista assumed the liability of an encumbrance of P14,000 on the estate and
another one in favor of the Agricultural Bank and its successor, the National
Bank, all of which payments were made through the same firm of Hermanos
who, as a result of the liquidation of accounts, held funds in their possession
belonging to Evarista.
○ These payments are evidenced by Exhibits A, B, C, F, H, and I.
○ Note: Evarista Robles does not seek the execution of the proper instrument to
evidence this contract of sale, nor the performance thereof. She only claims the
cost of the improvements made at her expense and that this be recorded in the
corresponding certificate of title.
● The firm of Hermanos denies, however, having entered into any agreement with
Evarista Robles for the sale of the building in question.
● The trial court found such a verbal contract of sale to have been proven not only by
Exhibit A, which leads to such a conclusion, but by the oral evidence, which, in its
opinion, had a preponderance in favor thereof, and by the corroborative evidence
consisting in the fact of Hermanos having executed the deed of sale of the warehouse
mentioned in the said Exhibit A
Issue: Whether Evarista was a possessor in good faith? (Whether Exhibit A is admissible as
evidence?)
Held: Yes
● One of the proofs establishing the fact that Evarista Robles' possession was in good
faith is found in Exhibit A, which textually is as follows:
63
● The conclusion that was inferred from the phrases "Value of house — of warehouse —
For Evarista P16,500 — Evarista pays them in this way," was that Evarista Robles was
to become the owner of the house (which is the one in question) and the warehouse for
P16,500, which sum she was to pay by assuming the liability of all the amounts
enumerated in the said memorandum all the way through.
● As to the admissibility of this document
○ Sec 335, Case No. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
■ "SEC. 335.Agreements invalid unless made in writing. — In the following
cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action
unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore,
of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary
evidence of its contents:
■ "No. 5. An agreement for . . . the sale of real property, etc."
○ This rule of evidence does not go to the extent of rendering invalid any verbal
contract for the sale of real property, but declares inadmissible any evidence of
such a contract other than the document itself of the sale or some memorandum
signed by the party charged, in so far as the object of the action instituted is to
enforce performance of said contract of sale.
○ However in this case, this document was introduced only to reinforce the proofs
relative to the good faith characterizing the possession of Evarista when she
made the improvements in question, to the effect that if she made them, it was
because she entertained the well-founded, any certain belief that she was
making them on a building that was to become her property by virtue of the
verbal contract of sale.
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#17. Calde vs.

Will and Codicil signed with black and blue ink.

IMPORTANT DISCUSSION RELATED TO THE TOPIC:

#18. People vs. Bardaje

● In crimes against chastity, the conviction or acquittal of an accused depends almost

● In respect of the alleged confession of ADELINO, suffice it to re-state that "an

AQUINO, ​J.,​ ​dissenting:

#19. Sison vs. People

Yellow mauled by Marcos loyalists incident captured on camera: ​Photographs, when

ISSUE 1:​ Are the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo binding?

HELD 1:​ YES.

HELD 2:​ ​YES.

#20. Adamczuk vs. Halloway

HELD 1:​ YES

#1. State v. Tatum

#2 People v. Alejandro y Dela Cruz

● Reasonable Doubt on the ​Corpus Delicti

● a. The Chain of Custody Rule and the Marking Requirement

● b. Non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of

#3. Air France v. Carrascoso

#4. Seiler vs Lucasfilm

#5. People v. Tandoy

HELD 1:​ No.

HELD​ ​2​: No.

#5. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#6. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#7. Pacasum v. People

Petitioner pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely:

​ TTY. JOSE I. LORENA​, former ARMM ​Regional Solicitor

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of falsification of public document?

THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED ARE:

However, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:

#8. Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Workers Union

● Facts according to the appellant (deficient, accdg. to the SC):

● The first assignment of error meritorious.

● Damages computed by Salvador M. Magante.​ - The company also claims as damages

#9. Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer

Is the corporation a mere alter ego of Villarama? - YES

P85K was from his personal check.

checks by Philippine Bank of Commerce.

Are these exhibits admissible? - YES

#10. National Power Corporation vs. Codilla

2. ​Can these documentary evidence still be admitted? - NO

HELD: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

THE CA DECISION IS NOT YET FINAL AND EXECUTORY

FAX PRINTOUTS -- NOT ADMISSIBLE; PHOTOCOPIES -- MORE ADMISSIBLE [MAIN]

THERE WAS A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE

#12. De Vera vs. Aguilar

#13. Ebreo vs. Ebreo

#14. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#15. Canuto vs. Mariano

An alleged oral agreement for the extension of the redemption period

#16. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#17. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#18. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#19. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#20. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#1. Robles v. Hermanos

#2. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#4. Petitioner vs. Respondent

#6. Petitioner vs. Respondent

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AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Yellow mauled by Marcos loyalists incident captured on camera: Photographs, when

ISSUE 1: Are the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo binding?

HELD 1: YES.

HELD 2: YES.

HELD 1: YES

● Reasonable Doubt on the Corpus Delicti

HELD 1: No.

HELD 2: No.

TTY. JOSE I. LORENA, former ARMM Regional Solicitor

● Damages computed by Salvador M. Magante. - The company also claims as damages

2. Can these documentary evidence still be admitted? - NO