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2021

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Approaching the Court under Section 482 of the Indian Penal Code

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN


State of Punjab and Haryana …Petitioner
V.
Mr. Veer Singhania …Respondent

BEFORE SUBMISSION TO HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE


AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES
OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER


(Memorandum prepared on behalf of Petitioner – State of Punjab and Haryana)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SL. NO. SUBJECT PAGE NUMBER

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATION 1

2. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 3

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 4-5

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 6

6. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 7-8

7. ISSUE 1 9-11

8. ISSUE 2 12-14

9. ISSUE 3 15-20

10. ISSUE 4 21-23

11. ISSUE 5 24-26

12. PRAYER 27

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

AC Appeal Cases

AIR All India Reporter

Art. Article
All England Law Reports (United
All ER
Kingdom)
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Const. Constitution

CJ Chief Justice

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

SCW Supreme Court Weekly

MP Madhya Pradesh

UP Uttar Pradesh

WP Writ Petition

SCALE Supreme Court Almanac

J. Justice

Ori. Orissa

IPC Indian Penal Code

CrPC Criminal Procedure Code

ITPA Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. Sheikh Haidar v. lssa Syed, AIR 1938 Nagpur 235.
2. Mohamed Sajeed v. the State of Kerala, (1994) 1 KLT 464.
3. Remla v. S.P. of Police, 1993 Cri LJ 1098 (Ker).
4. Om Hemrajani v. State U.P, 2004 (9) SCALE 655.
5. Kalwati V. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1953 AIR 131, 1953 SCR 546.

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6. Narayanlal Bansilal v M.P. Mistry, 1961 AIR 29, 1961 SCR (1) 417.
7. Leo Roy V. Superintendent District Jail, 1958 AIR 119, 1958 SCR 822.
8. Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 1 SCC 284.
9. State of Rajasthan V. Hat Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 152
10. Hari Singh vs The State & Ors. 2000 (53) DRJ 255
11. Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors, AIR 2018 6 SCC 664.
12. Jewan v. Tex, AIR 1949 All 587: 50 Cr Lj 884.
13. State of Assam v. Sri Nanda Mamashi, Sessions Court of Sonipat, Case No. 39 of 2017.
14. Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1997 105 STC 421 AP.

BOOKS
1. Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law
2. S.C. Sarkar, The Code of Criminal Procedure
3. M.P. Jain’s Indian Constitutional Law
4. Courts on Military Law by Col. G.K. Sharma, Col. M.S.Jaswal
5. Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law 29 (David Ormerod ed., 13thedn., 2011)
6. K.D. Gaur Textbook on Indian Penal Code
STATUTES
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
2. Criminal Procedure Code, 1974 (CrPC)
3. Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act, 1956
4. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
5. Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
6. Constitution of India

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Counsel on Behalf of the Petitioner is approaching this Hon’ble High Court who has the
jurisdiction to hear this matter under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1956
which reads as follows –
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit
or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to

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give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” Read with,
Section 3 of the Indian Penal Code which reads –
“Any person liable, by any Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India
shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond
India in the same manner as if such act had been committed within India.” Read with,
The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner is approaching this Hon’ble Court using Section 226
of the Indian Constitution to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus which reads as follows –
“Section 226 (2) - The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to
any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories”

SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. Rohini Singh, aged 24 years and Veer Singhania aged 30 years met on a dating app
called Tinder and decided to get married within two weeks of the meeting. Rohini’s
family opposed the union, but she married Veer Singhania on 31st December without
the family’s blessings. They left for their honeymoon on the 5th of January, 2019.
Veer was a serial entrepreneur always searching for a venture capital market. During
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this trip, Veer met a wealthy oil baron, Sheikh Abdul Tayyar whose business office is
in Venice, ready to diversify his holdings. 
2. The Sheikh invited Veer and Rohini to his villa for a visit, to which Rohini and Veer
agreed and took to it three days after sightseeing in Dubai. Siting a conservative
mindset, Rohini was not allowed to indulge in business talks but was sent to enjoy the
Sheikh’s villa. After Rohini left to look around with the Sheikh’s three wives, Veer
and the Sheikh negotiated the finer details of the proposal of payments gateway
business that Veer was building. In conclusion, the Sheikh transferred a sum of 7,000
Bitcoins to Veer’s account.
3. After the meeting’s conclusion, Veer decided to leave and requested for his wife.
Abdul Tayyar informed him that he had become delusional and that he didn’t have a
wife. The three wives of the Sheikh and the cab driver who bought the couple into the
villa also validated that Rohini never accompanied veer. The hotel also claimed that
Veer was staying there alone in a business suit and not a honeymoon suite as he
claimed. The business suite had all his belongings laid out in it, but his wife’s
belongings and the camera were nowhere to be seen. The only piece of evidence he
had were a few pictures on his smartphone. 
4. Rohini’s father, Bhisham Singh, Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh flew to
Dubai fearing his daughter’s well-being as she had eloped with Veer within just two
weeks of meeting him. Mr Bisham Singh on hearing Veer’s story of his daughter’s
disappearance, immediately concluded that Veer has indulged in human trafficking
and had sold his daughter off. A case was logged in the nearest police station and the
investigation began. Simultaneously, the Chandigarh Police inquired into Veer’s
antecedents and followed up with the Immigration and Customs Bureau to verify
whether Rohini had indeed gone into the United Arab Emirates. After a lengthy
investigation, Veer was charged under Article 344 of the Penal Code and Article 2 of
the Federal Law on Combating Human Trafficking.
5. After arguments from the prosecution about Veer’s character and the pattern that he
had been married once before and his wife had disappeared was bought out with Mr
Bisham Singh testifying regarding the wrong intentions of Veer. The defence argued
that Veer and Rohini were very much in love and Veer would never do such a thing.
The court acquitted Veer and directed for an investigation on Sheikh Abdul. Veer
flew back to India on 21st December 2019 and was arrested by a special detail of the
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Chandigarh police when he landed at the Indira Gandhi International Airport. The
arrest was made based on the FIR registered by Rohini’s mother, Swapna Singh on
December 16th, 2019. The charges had been registered under Sections 363, 366, 367,
368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code, and under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. 
6. Veer was then granted bail on a bond of Rupees 20,00,000 on the 29th December
2019. To pay the legal fees, Veer approached Rahamat Saeed, a currency broker who
dealt in Bitcoins. Veer transferred 5000 bitcoins to Rahamat, for which he received
Rs. 46,00,000 in cash. The Chandigarh police arrested both Veer and Rahamat with
the special team’s help in-charge of economic offences for Bitcoin transactions.
Following this incident, Rahamat Saeed’s shop was also sealed and the special the
team ceased all electronic machines including computers, external hard drives, USB
sticks, and other documents. Post the raid and arrests, FIR No. 923 of 2019, dated
January 1, 2019, were filed under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 and Sections 3, 4, 7 and 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act,
1999.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES
1. Whether competent Court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case?
2. Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges that he had already
faced in Dubai, as that would amount to Double Jeopardy?

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3. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Sections 363, 366,
367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8 of the
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956?
4. Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian currency is
contrary to law in India?
5. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Whether competent Court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case?
Where an offence is committed beyond the limits of India but the offender is
found within its limits, then he may be given up for trial in the country where the
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offence was committed (extradition), or he may be tried in India (extraterritorial


jurisdiction) 5.1. Section 188 CrPC -When an offence is committed outside India
— • by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or • by a person,
not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India, he may be
dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place
within India at which he may be found 5.2. Thus Section 3 of the Indian Penal
Code postulates that before any person can be tried in India for an offence
committed beyond India, there must be in existence a law making him liable to
be so tried. Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges
that he had already faced in Dubai, as that would amount to Double Jeopardy?
If a person, through the same set of facts, commits different offences through the
violation of different laws, cannot plead the doctrine of double jeopardy, this was
stated by the court in the Monica Bedi Case , in this case the Respondent had
falsely obtained a passport and had been tried for the offence in Portugal, when
the Indian Courts began proceedings against her she pleaded double jeopardy,
but it was stated by the court that despite the fact that she had already been tried
in a different country, it did not bar the Indian Courts from punishing her, and
double jeopardy could not be made available. Under the provisions of the Indian
Constitution, the conditions that have to be satisfied for raising the plea of
autrefois convict are firstly; there must be a person Accused of an offence;
secondly; the proceeding or the prosecution should have taken place before a
‘court’ or ‘judicial tribunal’ in reference to the law which creates offences and
thirdly; the Accused should be convicted in the earlier proceedings.
2. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Sections 363,
366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8
of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956?
The aforementioned sections in the Indian Penal Code are applicable in this
present case because according to the facts of this case, Mr. Veer Singhania is a
habitual offender and was previously involved in a similar case. Mr. Veer has
conducted a transaction where he benefitted from the same with 7000 Bitcoins.
Thus, we can observe that there is a mens rea which is required by the Immoral
Traffic Act and Mr. Veer must be punished for the offences under the
abovementioned provisions of law.
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3. Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian
currency is contrary to law in India?
According to the Constitution of India, the authorization of the Union
government is a mandatory precedent for according a medium of exchange the
status of 'currency' or valid 'legal tender'. At present, cryptocurrencies are
created outside the legal framework of a country. They and are neither assured
nor backed by the Indian government or the government of any nation per se.
Hence, they do not have any guaranteed value as they are not backed by any
governmental authority. Each unit of the Bitcoin currency is mined from the
reserve as a result of solving encrypted mathematical problems presented by the
currency’s software.
4. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999?
According to the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services)
Regulations, 2015, goods and software are treated alike. Furthermore, software
refers to “any computer program, database, drawing, design, audio/video signals,
any information by whatever name called in or on any medium other than in or on
any physical medium”. Additionally, it is abundantly evident from Section 13(1)
of FEMA if any individual contradicts any provision of this Act, or repudiates a
direction, rule, notification, order, regulation issued by an authority by virtue of
powers conferred upon by this Act, or negates any condition subject to which an
authorisation is given by the Reserve Bank, he will, upon arbitration, be
obligated to a fine of a sum equivalent to three times the amount involved. Thus,
making Veer liable for punishment under Section 13 of FEMA.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER


ISSUE 1 - Whether competent Court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case?

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1. Analysis of Section 3 and Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code (further referred to as
IPC)
1.1. Section 3 and 4 of IPC-
Section 3 - Punishment of offences committed beyond, but which by law may be tried
within, India. — Any person liable, by any [Indian law], to be tried for an offence
committed beyond India shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code
for any act committed beyond India in the same manner as if such act had been
committed within India.
Section 4 - Extension of Code to extra-territorial offences. —The provisions of this
Code apply also to any offence committed by—
a) any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India;
b) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be.
c) any person in any place without and beyond India committing offence targeting
a computer resource located in India.
1.2. A key ingredient of this section is in the phrase “any person liable, by any
Indian law”. This section operates only where an Indian Law which specifically
provides that an act committed outside India may be dealt with under that law in
India. For such thing, there should be a provision similar to S.4 of IPC in that Act.
Thus Section 3 of the Indian Penal Code postulates that before any person can be tried
in India for an offence committed beyond India, there must be in existence a law
making him liable to be so tried.
1.3. The defence counsel relying upon section 3 and section 4 of the IPC would
submit that Veera being a citizen of India has committed offences beyond India and
such offences have been well defined under the Indian penal code and can be rightly
charged for them. There is sufficient evidence in the present matter for Veer to be
apprehended and is liable to be tried under this honourable court.
1.4. In the case of Sheikh Haidar v. lssa Syed1 a negative aspect of the above
section has been upheld; the defendant was charged with taking part in child marriage
which is a crime in India but not a crime outside British India. The Court held that the
Child Marriages Restraint Act, 1929 does not contain any provision for its
extraterritorial application (as S. 4 of IPC) and, therefore, does not apply to marriage
outside India. Similarly, if an Indian citizen commits adultery in England, which is
1
AIR 1938 Nagpur 235.
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not a crime there, he is guilty of it on the grounds that he is an Indian citizen and
adultery is a crime defined under section 497 of the Code.
2. International and National Statues regarding jurisdiction of Courts
2.1. The Geneva Conventions (Act VI of 1960) provides for jurisdiction over non-
nationals committing offences abroad. Section (4) Subsection (1) lays down the active
Nationality principle as guided by the Geneva Convention. Where an offence is
committed beyond the limits of India but the offender is found within its limits, then
he may be tried in India (extraterritorial jurisdiction)
2.2. Section 188 CrPC -When an offence is committed outside India—
 by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or
 by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India,
he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at
any place within India at which he may be found
2.3. In the case of Mohamed Sajeed v. the State of Kerala2, the Division Bench
ruled that the police can investigate into a crime committed in a foreign country. The
prior sanction of the Central Government for purposes of investigation is not
necessary. Sub Inspector of Police, Tanur 3 case a sub-inspector of police refused to
register a case of murder on the ground that the offence was committed in Sharjah,
UAE, outside his territorial limits. The Kerala High Court after examining Ss. 3 and 4
IPC and S. 188 Cr PC, held that refusal by the sub-inspector was illegal.
2.4. In the case of Om Hemrajani v. State U.P4, the Supreme Court discussed at
length the law of the jurisdiction under S. 188, Cr PC. A Dubai based bank has filed a
complaint against the petitioner and another in the Court of Special Judicial
Magistrate (CBI) under Ss. 415, 417, 418 and 420 read with S. 120-B IPC. It has
been, inter alia, alleged in the complaint that the petitioner obtained loans, executed
various documents in proof of his ability to discharge the bank liability and gave his
personal guarantee. He had no intention to pay it back. But instead of discharging the
liability, the Respondent absconded from the UAE without liquidating his liability to
the bank. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued processes against
the person arraigned in the complaint and also issued non-bailable warrants. The

2
(1994) 1 KLT 464.
3
1993 Cri LJ 1098 (Ker).
4
2004 (9) SCALE 655.
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petitioner sought quashing of the complaint case by filing a petition under S. 482 of
the Code before the high court and also challenged the order of the Magistrate taking
cognizance of the offence along with non-bailable warrants issued against him. The
question before the court was whether the court at Ghaziabad had jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint? The court held that a victim may come to India and approach
any court convenient to him and file complaint in respect of offence committed
abroad by the Indian. The convenience of a person who is hiding after committing
offence abroad and is fugitive from justice is not relevant.
2.5. Article 23. Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour –
(1) Traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour are
prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable
in accordance with law.
(2) Since the subject matter in the present case deals with violation of article 23 of the
Indian Constitution which is a fundamental right and provides for prohibition in
trafficking of human beings, then this honourable court will have jurisdiction
under article 226 of the Constitution which provides for writ jurisdiction and
original jurisdiction for the violation of fundamental rights of a human being. In
this case Rohini being a citizen of India has a right to avail protection from this
fundamental right and Veer also a citizen of India has acted in violation of this
fundamental right.

ISSUE 2 - Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges that he had
already faced in Dubai, as that would amount to Double Jeopardy?
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3. Section 26 of General Clauses act says: - About Provision as to offences punishable


under two or more enactments
3.1. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more
enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under
either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the
same offence.
3.2. According to section 26 of the general clauses act the words “prosecuted and
punished” has been put forth which means that the offender should not only be
prosecuted but also be punished from this prosecution, these two words must be taken
together and not separately. In the present case Veer has been merely subjected to
prosecution however he has not been punished, hence Veer is liable to be prosecuted
and punished under the Indian laws according to section 26 of the general clauses act
4. Doctrine of Double Jeopardy under Article 20(2) –
20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences -
(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in
force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected
to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at
the time of the commission of the offence
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once
(3) No person Accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself
The three conditions for the application of clause (2) are:
 The person should be ‘prosecuted and punished’.
 It should be for the ‘same offence’.
 The offence should be punished ‘more than once’
4.1. As per the conditions for the application of this doctrine, we cannot apply the
doctrine in a case where an acquittal has been appealed. This was stated in the
case Kalwati V. State of Himachal Pradesh5, where the Respondent and acquitted of
the charge of committing a murder. The state appealed this decision by the court and
the Respondent pleaded double jeopardy. It was held that here, since the Respondent
had not been originally punished, double jeopardy could not be applied and the appeal
was allowed.
5
1953 AIR 131, 1953 SCR 546.
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4.2. Gajendragadkar J. in Narayanlal Bansilal v M.P. Mistry6  followed the same


principle that the requirement of Article 20(2) that a person must have been
prosecuted and punished is conjunctive and not disjunctive. Thus, Article 20(3)
prohibits the prosecution and punishment of a person more than once for the same
offence. It does not, however prohibit a second prosecution and punishment for an
offence for which he was previously prosecuted and acquitted.
4.3. Next, the doctrine of double jeopardy can only be applied when the
punishment is for the same offense. If the offenses are distinct in nature then the
doctrine cannot be applied, this was stated in the case Leo Roy V. Superintendent
District Jail7, where the court said that even though the person had been prosecuted
under the Sea Customs Act, they could be prosecuted again under the IPC since there
were 2 distinct charges and offenses.
4.4. If a person, through the same set of facts, commits different offences through
the violation of different laws, cannot plead the doctrine of double jeopardy, this was
stated by the court in the Monica Bedi Case8, in this case the Respondent had falsely
obtained a passport and had been tried for the offence in Portugal, when the Indian
Courts began proceedings against her she pleaded double jeopardy, but it was stated
by the court that despite the fact that she had already been tried in a different country,
it did not bar the Indian Courts from punishing her, and double jeopardy could not be
made available. Hence, if the facts are the same but the elements of the crime are
different, this defence cannot be made available.
4.5. The Courts have gone on to clarify in the case State of Rajasthan V. Hat
Singh9 that prosecution and punishment that is carried out under 2 different sections of
the same Act, so long as the offenses in the two sections are distinct, would not
amount to double jeopardy.
“The crucial requirement for attracting Article 20(2) is that the offences are the
same, i.e., they should be identical. It is therefore, necessary to analyse and
compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the two
offences and see whether their identity is made out…”

6
1961 AIR 29, 1961 SCR (1) 417.
7
1958 AIR 119, 1958 SCR 822.
8
(2011) 1 SCC 284.
9
(2003) 2 SCC 152.
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4.6. The defence counsel based on the above submissions and after careful analysis
of the mentioned cases would like to submit that the conditions required for the
application of the doctrine of double jeopardy has not been met. Firstly, the offender
has only been merely prosecuted and not punished, with regard to the cases mentioned
it is safe to say that the words “prosecuted and punished” must be taken in a
conjunctive form and not disjunctive form. Secondly with regard to the ingredients of
the offences the Respondent has been charged; it can be deduced that the Respondent
has committed multiple offences and so charged accordingly for a set of offences
under the Indian law, however, he has not been charged accordingly for the same set
of offences under the foreign law. Under the Indian law Veer has been charged for
various other offences which was previously not charged under the foreign country.
4.7. Thus, it is important to note that the Respondent who has been charged for the
multiple offences under the Indian law has different set of ingredients based on the
same facts and does not overlap with the set of ingredients for the offences charged
under the foreign law. Hence the doctrine of double jeopardy cannot be applied in the
present matter.

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ISSUE 3 - Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Sections
363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of IPC and also under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956?
5. Analysis and Applicability of Section 363, 366, 367, 368, 367, 371 of IPC
5.1. Section 363 – Punishment for Kidnapping
Kidnapping is codified as a criminal offence under IPC, 1860. It is the unlawful
taking away or conveying of a person and wrongfully confining the person against his
or her will. Kidnapping is defined under Section 360 of the IPC and the following
ingredients must be present –
a. Victim was kidnapped when he/she was residing in India at the time of the
offence.
b. Accused committed the offence of enticing the person kidnapped.
c. Person was taken without his/her consent or consent of someone legally
authorised to give the same.
5.1.1. The offence of kidnapping under this section becomes punishable under
section 363 of the IPC when -
a. a person takes someone else beyond the limits of India, without the consent of that
person or someone legally authorized to give consent on behalf of that person.
b. the person reaches not only the foreign territory but to his destination as well.
c. If the person conveyed has been conveyed without his consent, this consent
cannot be under fear or cases where it would amount to submission and not
consent.
5.1.2. Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner believe that Rohini was taken beyond the
limits of India, without of someone legally authorized to give consent on
behalf of their person, which in this case would be Rohini’s parents. Hence
Veer should be punished for Kidnapping under Section 360 read with Section
363. In this present case, considering Veers past actions (as per Para 8 of Moot
Proposition), the Counsel would submit that his actions amount to actions of a
Habitual Offender10.
5.2. Section 366 – Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her
marriage, etc. It is defined in the IPC as follows -

10
Hari Singh vs The State & Ors. 2000 (53) DRJ 255.
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“Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or
knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her
will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it
to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined
in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any
woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely
that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be
punishable as aforesaid.”
5.2.1. The Supreme Court in the case of Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. The State of
Maharashtra & Ors11. the division bench provided the following essential
ingredients to apply Section 366 of IPC –
a. Kidnapping or abducting any woman
b. Such kidnapping or abducting must be:
i. With the intent that the woman may be compelled or knowing it to be
likely that she will be compelled to marry any person against her will,
or
ii. in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or
knowing that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse; or
c. by criminal intimidation or abuse of authority or by compulsion inducing any
woman to go from any place, with the intent that she may be or with
knowledge that it is likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse with some person.
5.2.2. That to establish an offence under Section 366 of IPC mere finding that a
woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the
Respondent abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or
knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in
order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to
be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, given that Mr.
Veer was involved in a similar case in 2011 where his ex-wife disappeared
during his honeymoon.
11
AIR 2018 6 SCC 664.
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5.3. S. 367 - Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to grievous


hurt, slavery, etc. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person
may be subjected, or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected
to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be
likely that such person will be so subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine. As established before, Rohini was kidnapped from India. She
was then sold for 7000 Bitcoins and the same amount was utilised later on to pay his
expenses. These arguments are supported by the facts provided in Paragraph 8 and
Paragraph 12 of the Moot Proposition. These actions show that Mr. Veer had an
intention to benefit from the exchange made between him and Sheik Abdul Tayyar.
5.4. Section 368 – Wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement,
kidnapped or abducted person – Essential ingredients to constitute an offence is –
a. That the person in question had been kidnapped or abducted,
b. That the Accused knew that the said person had been kidnapped or abducted, and
c. That the Accused having such knowledge wrongfully conceals or confines such
person.
5.4.1. The element of concealment or confinement should be determined form the
facts and circumstances of the case. In the case of Jewan v. Tex12 it was held
that an essential element to charge under Section 368 it must be proved that
the Respondent had knowledge of kidnapping or abduction. This element is
sufficiently proved in the arguments made by the Counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner.
5.5. Section 370 – 1) Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation,
(a) Recruits,
(b) Transports,
(c) Harbours,
(d) Transfers, or
(e) Receives, a person or persons, by –
Using threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion, or by abduction, or by
practising fraud, or deception, or by abuse of power, or by inducement, including
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in order to achieve the consent of
12
AIR 1949 All 587: 50 Cr Lj 884.
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any person having control over the person recruited, transported, harboured,
transferred or received, commits the offense of trafficking. Mr. Veer received
7000 bitcoins from Sheik Abdul. Counsel would submit to this Hon’ble court that
this satisfies an important ingredient of Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code.
5.6. Section 371 - Whoever habitually imports, exports, removes, buys, sells
traffics or deals in slaves, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine. This section is applicable to children who would be dealt as slaves.
The essentials to invoke charges against the Respondent according to Section 370 and
371 of the IPC is provided below13 -
5.6.1. To prove the charge u/s 370 of the IPC, the prosecution must prove –
a. that the Accused imported, exported, etc., the person in question as a
slave; or
b. that the Accused accepted, received or detained the person in question
as a slave.
5.7. The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner would like to submit to this Hon’ble
Court that the actions of the Respondent meet the requirements to be prosecuted under
Section 370 and 371 of the IPC. Tus, it in conclusive evidence to prove that Mr. Veer
should be prosecuted under the abovementioned sections of the Indian Penal Code
and has committed a heinous kidnapping.
5.8. According to Section 5 of the Immoral Trafficking (Preventions) Act
reads as follows –
Procuring, inducing or taking [person] for the sake of prostitution. (1) Any person
who
(a) procures or attempts to procure a [person], whether with or without his consent,
for the purpose of prostitution; or
(b) induces a person to go from any place, with the intent that he may for the purpose
of prostitution become the inmate of, or frequent, a brothel; or
(c) takes or attempts to take a person, or causes a person to be taken, from one place
to another with a view to his carrying on, or being brought up to carry on prostitution;
or
(d) causes or induces a person to carry on prostitution;
13
State of Assam v. Sri Nanda Mamashi, Sessions Court of Sonipat, Case No. 39 of 2017.
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shall be punishable on conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less
than three years and not more than seven years and also with fine which may extend
to two thousand rupees, and if any offence under this sub-section is committed against
the will of any person, the punishment of imprisonment for a term of seven years shall
extend to imprisonment for a term of fourteen years:
Provided that if the person in respect of whom an offence committed under this sub-
section,
(i) is a child, the punishment provided under this sub-section shall extend to rigorous
imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years but may extend to life; and
(ii) is a minor, the punishment provided under this sub-section shall extend to rigorous
imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years and not more than fourteen
years;
(3) An offence under this section shall be triable
(a) in the place from which a [person] is procured, induced to go, taken or caused to
be taken or from which an attempt to procure or take such [person] is made; or
(b) in the place to which he may have gone as a result of the inducement or to which
he is taken or caused to be taken or an attempt to take him is made.
5.8.1. Essential Ingredients to apply Section 5 of Immoral Trafficking Act,
a. Displacement of Person from one community to another - The relocation could be
starting with one house then onto the next, one town to another, one region to
another, one state to another or starting with one country then onto the next.
Uprooting is likewise conceivable inside a similar structure. A model will explain
the point. Presume that the brothel keeper controls several young women who are
inmates and that one of the women has a teenage daughter staying with her. On
the off chance that the brothel keeper, by pressure or pay off, figures out how to
get the mother to consent to permit the teen to be utilized for CSE, the young
person has been moved out of the ‘mother’s community’ and into the ‘brothel
community’. This relocation is sufficient to establish trafficking.
b. Exploitation of Trafficked Person - The ITPA and related laws deal with the
sexual exploitation of victims. The cycle of abuse might be shown, as in a brothel,
or inert, as in certain back rub parlours, dance bars, and so on, where it happens
under the veneer of an authentic business activity.

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c. Commercialisation of the exploitation and commodification of the victim - The


victim is misused as though she is a commodity (see the definite rundown of
infringement in the accompanying section). The exploiters produce income out of
the misuse. They may impart a piece of the income to the casualty as well. The
casualty who is getting a portion of the cash created is regularly 'marked' as an
associate and captured/charge-sheeted and even indicted. The dealt casualty,
whose opportunity even to think, not to mention move out, is directed by the
exploiters, ought to never be treated as an associate. Regardless of whether she
gets a portion of the 'profit', the way that she has been dealt to CSE doesn't modify
her status as a casualty.
5.8.2. The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner would like to submit to this
Hon’ble Court that the Respondent has met all criteria necessary to
establish that Section 5 would be applicable in this present case.
5.9. Every criminal act should have not only actus reus, but also mens rea. If mens rea
is absent, the person cannot be held guilty under ITPA. Therefore, investigation
and prosecution should see whether the person being charged under Section 8
ITPA, the most commonly used section, did have the required intention or not. It
is known that the trafficked woman/girl is made to solicit under duress, coercion,
lure, deceit or compulsion by the trafficker or other exploiters. In such cases, the
woman should be treated only as a witness and not as a Respondent. If there was
no informed intention, the person cannot and should not be prosecuted for
soliciting. Hence establish a mens rea is necessary to invoke this provision. In the
case of Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The court had said that:-
“Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence unless the statute expressly
or by necessary implication excludes it. The mere fact that the object of the statute is
to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil is by itself not
decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the
ingredients of an offence. Mens rea by necessary implication may be excluded from a
statute only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of the
statute would otherwise be defeated.”
5.10. The Counsel would like to submit to this Hon’ble Court that Mr. Veer being a
Habitual Offender committed the offence of Human Trafficking by selling his
own wife for a sum of 7000 Bitcoins. He used the same amount to pay for his
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needs. Clearly, Mr. Veer had an intention to benefit from the transaction he made.
The nature of this transaction is illegal and this Court is well aware of the same.
Thus, Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner would strongly submit to this Court that
Mr. Veer must be held liable for the aforementioned provisions of the Indian
Penal Code, 1921 and the Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act, 1956.

ISSUE 4 - Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian
currency is contrary to law in India?

6. Lack of Support from Union Government


6.1. According to the Constitution of India, the authorization of the Union
government is a mandatory precedent for according a medium of exchange the
status of 'currency' or valid 'legal tender'. Therefore, to be recognised as a currency
under the Indian law, the issue of the cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin should be in
accordance with a valid legislation or ordinance enacted by the Indian Parliament,
such as the Coinage Act, 1906 or the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. If not, the
Union government should recognise it as a currency or as valid legal tender through
an official order.
6.2. On 1st February 2018, the Finance Minister of India, in his address to the Lok
Sabha14, reiterated that the crypto-currencies including Bitcoins are not legal tender
in India. He stated that the government will take steps to discontinue the use of
cryptocurrencies and would in turn encourage blockchain technology in payment
systems dealing in currency as recognised by the RBI, without involving
intermediaries. He confirmed the stance that the government does not consider
cryptocurrency to be legal tender within India and that steps or measures will be
adopted to eliminate the utilisation of these cryptocurrencies, both as a part of the
countries payment system as well as for the financing of activities that are
illegitimate and criminal.
6.3. At present, cryptocurrencies are created outside the legal framework of a
country. They and are neither assured nor backed by the Indian government or the
government of any nation per se. Hence, they do not have any guaranteed value as
they are not backed by any governmental authority. Each unit of the Bitcoin
currency is mined from the reserve as a result of solving encrypted mathematical

14
Anuual Budget, Financial Year 2018-19.
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problems presented by the currency’s software. No manpower is required for


solving these encrypted complex mathematical problems. Instead, a predetermined
amount of computing effort and time is required.
6.4. Therefore, Bitcoins do not possess any amount of intrinsic value either. As a
result, the perceived value of Bitcoin is superficial and susceptible to volatility.
Therefore, cryptocurrencies can neither be treated as currency nor as valid legal
tender.
7. Prohibitions Installed by the Reserve Bank of India
7.1. Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the central bank of India responsible for
regulation of the Indian banking and financial system. Since 24 th December
2013, the RBI has issued circulars warning public about the risks involved in
transactions involving cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin. In a 2017 press release 15,
the RBI reiterated that cryptocurrencies including Bitcoins are in no way to qualify
as legal tender as they are not recognised by the government and the Reserve Bank.
hence not valid legal tender.
7.2. With the rapidly fluctuating prices of cryptocurrency, and their rising usage
and acceptance rates among people, authorities started to take into consideration this
emerging development. RBI’s First Press Release warning Indian consumers about
the risks associated with cryptocurrencies covered the following points:
7.2.1. No Central Bank around the world fund cryptocurrencies. 
7.2.2. Value of cryptocurrencies is a question of speculation and effects of
demand and supply, and not of an asset or a good.
7.2.3. The RBI is involved in procedures regarding the introduction of proposed
regulatory structure for cryptocurrencies in India and will give further
directions based on their review.
7.3. An April 2018 Circular of the Reserve Bank16 prohibited banks and other
financial institutions in India from facilitating transactions involving
cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies, as mentioned by the aforementioned circular.
It stated that RBI-regulated entities are prohibited from both dealing in virtual
currencies as well as arranging or providing services to facilitate the dealing and
settling in virtual currencies by any other person.

15
Press Release of the Reserve Bank of India dated 5/12/17.
16
(RBI/2017-18/154) dated 6/4/18.
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7.4. These services included trading/settling using cryptocurrencies, opening


accounts of exchanges dealing with them, and transfer or receipt of money to
accounts in relation to purchase or sale of cryptocurrencies. Hence, the transaction
was in direct contravention of this RBI order.
8. Laundering of Bitcoins
8.1. The Respondent has been allegedly awarded 7000 Bitcoins by Sheikh Abdul
as a capital investment for his start-up. However, considering the case in hand, it
can be concluded that the 7000 Bitcoins awarded by Sheikh Abdul was not for
Veer’s start-up as he claims but is his commission or remuneration for delivering
Rohini to the Sheikh and pushing her into human trafficking. By converting the
Bitcoins into Indian Rupees and using it for his personal expenses, it can be
concluded that Veer is in direct violation of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act 2002. The Act defines the offence of money laundering, which is any person
indulging or attempting to do so, whether directly or indirectly or even knowingly
forms a part of or assist any process whatsoever that involves projection of proceeds
of criminal activity as untained money is guilty of money laundering.17
8.2. In the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Section 4 18, states the punishment
for money laundering, which is rigorous imprisonment for a period between 3 and
7 years and a fine of an amount which may extend to five lakh rupees.
8.3. Upon detailed examination of the flip side, where the Respondent, Veer has
been allegedly awarded 7000 Bitcoins by Sheikh Abdul as a capital investment for
his start-up. As a result, the Bitcoins awarded by Sheikh Abdul has become an asset
of his company should have been used solely for the purpose of setting up the
business. The bail amount and legal fees can be reasonably assumed to be Veer’s
personal expenses as its occurrence is not in any way related to his start-up.
Therefore, by withdrawing the Bitcoins and exchanging it for Indian Rupees for his
personal expenses, Veer stands to be in violation of provisions of the Indian Penal
Code. Section 403 deals with Dishonest Misappropriation of Property and is
therefore liable for imprisonment for a period up to 2 years.

17
Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 Section 3.
18
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Section 4.
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Issue 5 - Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4
of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999?

9. Inclusion of the term ‘cryptocurrency’ in the existing definitions of ‘goods’


9.1. According to the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods &
Services) Regulations, 2015, goods and software are treated alike. Furthermore,
software refers to “any computer program, database, drawing, design, audio/video
signals, any information by whatever name called in or on any medium other than
in or on any physical medium”19. Since virtual currencies are information, it would
appear that they fall within the aforesaid definition of software.
9.2. The Honourable Supreme Court, in the judgement in Tata Consultancy
Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh20, heard whether certain software would come
under the definition of goods. The majority decision by the bench of the honourable
court was that the term goods as used in the Constitution of India “very wide and
includes all types of movable properties, whether those properties be tangible or
intangible”, “the moment copies are made and marketed, it becomes goods” 21. The
honourable court also remarked that the sale of software is definitely under the
common head sale of goods and “the wide term ‘all materials, articles and
commodities, will be wide enough in its own ambit to be inclusive of properties
both tangible and intangible, which is of the nature that it is capable of consumption
and abstraction and can be possessed and stored, and also transferred as well as
transmitted.
9.3. While the judgment of the aforementioned case did not refer to the exchange
and transfer of virtual currency or the process of defining what would constitute
“goods” under FEMA22, it proves to be extremely vital when the provision of
19
Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations, 2015 (Amended up to January 11,
2021) of the Reserve Bank of India.
20
1997 105 STC 421 AP.
21
Ibid.
22
Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999.
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interpretational wisdom is concerned, as “goods” have not been defined under


FEMA.
We observe that virtual currencies are:
 Intangible;
 made, marketed and stored on physical servers;
 capable of being bought and sold;
 transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed.
10. Violation of Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999
10.1. It can be argued whether cryptocurrencies provide utility or not. However,
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are used for various purposes, including being a
store of value, providing value transfer, enabling micro-payments and decentralising
applications. Furthermore, demand for such cryptocurrencies further indicates their
utility. Therefore, based on the law as it stands, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are
closest in nature to the definition of goods under FEMA.
10.2. According to Section 7(1)(a) of FEMA 23 every exporter shall outfit to the
Reserve Bank the correct and true material particulars of the goods, including the
sum addressing the full export value.
In the present case, the respondent, Veer has made no relevant declaration to the
export of Bitcoins to the Reserve Bank of India, thus placing him in clear violation of
Section 7(1)(a) of FEMA.
10.3. Additionally, it is abundantly evident from Section 13(1) of FEMA if any
individual contradicts any provision of this Act, or repudiates a direction, rule,
notification, order, regulation issued by an authority by virtue of powers conferred
upon by this Act, or negates any condition subject to which an authorisation is given
by the Reserve Bank, he will, upon arbitration, be obligated to a fine of a sum
equivalent to three times the amount involved. Thus, making Veer liable for
punishment under Section 13 of FEMA.
11. Violation of the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002
11.1. Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act , 2002 clearly
determines the act of money laundering24, where it elucidates that any person
indulging or attempting to do so, whether directly or indirectly or even knowingly
23
Foreign Exchange Management Act Section 7(1)(a).
24
Prevention of Money Laundering Act Section 3.
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forms a part of or assist any process whatsoever that involves projection of proceeds
of criminal activity as untainted money is guilty of money laundering.
11.2. As previously mentioned, the 7000 Bitcoins awarded by Sheikh Abdul was not
a capital investment for Veer’s start-up but is his remuneration for delivering Rohini
to the Sheikh to push her into human trafficking. By converting the Bitcoins into
Indian Rupees and using it for his personal expenses, it can be concluded that Veer
is in direct violation of Section 3 of the aforementioned statute.
11.3. Veer is liable to punishment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act
2002, of which section 4 states the punishment for money laundering, as 7 years of
rigorous imprisonment. The multiple violations of the statute that have been
committed by the Respondent would therefore render him liable to be punished
under the provision of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

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PRAYERS
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, the
Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana be pleased to:

1. To Punish Mr. Veer Singhania with rigorous imprisonment for a term of 7


years and pay fine.
2. To Punish Mr. Veer Singhania with rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10
years and also pay fine under Section 367, Section 368, Section 370 of the
Indian Penal Code.
3. To Punish Mr. Veer Singhania with imprisonment for life under Section 371 of
the Indian Penal Code.
4. To Punish Mr. Veer Singhania with rigorous imprisonment under Section 5
and Section 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Preventions) Act, 1956.
5. To Declare transaction done by Mr. Veer Singhania through bitcoin contrary to
Indian Laws.
6. To Punish Mr. Veer Singhania with rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7
years.
7. To Declare Mr. Veer Singhania must pay a penalty of Rs. 1,38,00,000 as per
Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 to the State.

AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

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Counsel on behalf of Petitioner

Sd/-

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