Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Before
V.
STATE ............................................................................... RESPONDENT
8. PRAYER .......................................................................................................................... 19
Art. Article
Hon’ble Honorable
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
v. Versus
1. LEGISLATIONS
3. Constitution of India,1949.
3. CASES
1. Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal 1955
AIR 65, 1955 SCR (1) 941
2. Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State Of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211, 217 para 10
3. Mohd. Namaz v. Emperor(1942) 44 BOMLR 8
4. Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 77, 2004 (1) ALD Cri 75, 2004
CriLJ 36, 2004 (2) JCR 28 SC, JT 2003 Suppl 2 SC 344, 2003 (8) SCALE 243, (2003)
12 SCC 395, 2004 (1) UJ 429 SC
5. Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India1987 AIR 38, 1987 SCR (1) 295
6. Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR 1971 SC 460, 1971 CriLJ 422, (1970) 3
SCC 474, 1971 III UJ 6 SC
7. Durjoy Debnath Alias Dulal v. State of Tripura (2017) 1 TLR 208
4. Websites.
1. www.manupatrafast.in
2. www.scconline.com
3. www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in
The Appellant in the present case has approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to
initiate the present Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 1of the Indian Constitution,
1949. The appellant most humbly and respectfully submits to the jurisdiction of the
Hon'ble Court in the present matter.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble SC that the present Special Leave to Appeal against the
judgment of the Trial Court, an appeal for which, also stood dismissed in the HC, is maintainable
under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution, 1949. The appeal is maintainable as the said Article
gives discretion to the Supreme Court to grant “special leave to appeal” from any judgment,
decree, determination, sentence or order “in any cause or matter” “passed or made” by “any court
or tribunal” in the territory of India in case of grave injustice. In the present case, The Judgment of
the Trial Court for convicting the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10
years was erroneous.
If there is a violation of the principle of natural justice or if there is any failure of justice by any
courts within the territory of India, then in such cases the Supreme Court of India may grant for
appeal by special leave to any person. This appeal by special leave is granted to the aggrieved
party or the appellant i.e; the party who has suffered grave injustice by any of the courts of India
which in the present case is Isha Singh who was prejudicially and wrongfully convicted both by
the Trial Court and High Court.
In Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal 2 the Court
went on to state as - “the whole intent and purpose of this article is that it is the duty of this court
to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of courts and tribunals because
certain laws have made the decisions of these courts or tribunals final and conclusive…”
In the case of Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State Of Bihar, 3 the Supreme Court has put in place
self-imposed restrictions when it comes to criminal appeals and will not entertain special leave
petitions in criminal cases particularly when there are concurrent findings of fact, save in
Which is clearly the case in the present matter as the High Court dismissed the Appeal of Isha
Singh without putting reliance on evidence, which were found to be none and at the same time
allowed the appeal of the parents of the Appellant in the very same matter. It is thus prima facie
that grave injustice has been caused to the Appellant in addition to the violation of principles of
natural justice. Thus, erroneous judgement calls for the maintainability of this matter before the
Hon’ble Court.
In the case of Mohd. Namaz v. Emperor (1941)4 the events or the points where the Supreme
Court can interfere if the decision is given by the lower courts and the high courts which are as
follows:
➢ If the accused was not given any chance to speak which becomes a grave injustice in
the legal system of India.
➢ When the court did not allow the accused to call any witnesses.
➢ When the court declared the judgment without understanding the language of the
accused then in such cases also the supreme court of India can interfere.
➢ When it was proved that the court which gave the judgment did not have the
jurisdiction to try such a case.
➢ So in such cases, the supreme court has the power to interfere but it is not limited to
these points.
It was also held in the case of Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors.5 that a private party can file
an appeal under Article 136 if there has been some error in the decision of the High court and the
state has made no appeal against such errors of the High court which is also true in the present
4 (1942) 44 BOMLR 8
5 AIR 2004 SC 77, 2004 (1) ALD Cri 75, 2004 CriLJ 36, 2004 (2) JCR 28 SC, JT 2003 Suppl 2 SC 344, 2003 (8)
SCALE 243, (2003) 12 SCC 395, 2004 (1) UJ 429 SC
The Counsel yet again respectfully submits that the purpose and scope of Article 136 was also
discussed by a Bench of five Judges in Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India6,
where the Court observed: “It may, however, be pointed out that this Court was never intended to
be a regular court of appeal against orders made by the High Court or the sessions court or the
magistrates. It was created as an Apex Court for the purpose of laying down the law for the entire
country and extraordinary jurisdiction for granting special leave was conferred upon it under
Article 136 of the Constitution so that it could interfere whenever it found that law was not
correctly enunciated by the lower courts or tribunals and it was necessary to pronounce the correct
law on the subject. This extraordinary jurisdiction could also be availed for the purpose of
correcting grave miscarriage of justice, but such cases would be exceptional by their very nature
as is the present case of Isha Singh.
In Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of A.P.7, the Supreme Court has defined the scope of interference
under Article 136 in criminal matters a follows:
“Although the powers of this Court under that article are very wide, this Court, following the
practice adopted by the Judicial Committee has prescribed limits on its own power and in criminal
appeals, except under exceptional circumstances it does not interfere with the findings of fact
reached by the High Court unless it is of the opinion that the High Court had disregarded the
forms of legal process or had violated the principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial and
grave injustice has resulted. This Court does not ordinarily reappraise the evidence if the High
Court has approached the case before it in accordance with the guidelines laid down by this Court
unless some basic error on the part of the High Court is brought to the notice of this Court.”
In light of the above stated it is evident that the High Court dismissed the Appeal without giving
regard to the fact that the forensic report proves that no poison was administered. Thus, this is
prima facie an erroneous judgement and violates the very principles of natural justice. Therefore,
the Appellant fulfills the criteria given under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution, 1950 as great
hardship, irreparable loss and injury and most of all injustice has been caused to the accused and
2.1 Are Essential Ingridients of Section 498-A , 304-B of IPC and 113 B of 1EA
satisfied?
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court that in the present case, the
Trial Court has erroneously convicted the appellant. The Prosecution has failed to establish
the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Additionally, the Court in its judgment
has failed to appreciate the evidence and, prejudicially held Isha Singh guilty of the
offence u/s 304 B and 498 A of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Moreover, the Counsel for Accused would humbly submit before the Learned Judicial Magistrate
Court, that, the essential elements to attract the provisions of 498A I.P.C, 1860 are below:
“Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman to
cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extent to three years and
shall also be liable to fine.
For the purpose of this section, ‘Cruelty’ means: -
a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman
to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman, or
In Durjoy Debnath Alias Dulal v. State of Tripura 8 it was held that definite evidence required to
hold one guilty of the offence under section 498A – [Conviction of the appellant based on the
omnibus statements of the wife and her parents alleging torture on the wife.]
In addition to this, as per S. 113B9 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 the appellant cannot
be made guilty as the very essential of Presumption of Dowry Death under the said S. of
the Act is not satisfied, as there is no circumstantial evidence so as to prove that the wife of
the Appellant was subjected to cruelty at the hands of the husband and family. Moreover,
there is no chain of evidence that can make Isha singh liable for the murder of Anamika as
there is no evidence for the same.
Most importantly, none of the prosecution witnesses aver, not even a whisper, about any cruel
conduct of the accused which was of such a nature so as to drive the deceased to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or healthof the woman nor of any harassment of the
woman which is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable scrutiny or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand, even remotely, which is mandatorily necessary to support
the prosecution version of the facts.
Thus, the specific allegations of dowry demand laid in charge sheet, do not attract the provisions
of 498A I.P.C and S. 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with respect to the accused.
The accused persons had also not caused any dowry death to the death to attract provisions
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death
shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death. Explanation. — For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have
the samemeaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
In the celebrated judgment from Apex Court, M. Srinivasulu v. State of A.P.10 , it was held that -
The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials:
• The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry
death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is
being tried for the offence under Section 304-BIndian Penal Code.)
• The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husbandor his relatives.
• Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry.
Same principle is held correct in these subsequent Supreme Court judgments of Surinder Singh v.
State Of Haryana 11 & Amrutlal Liladharbhai Kotak and Ors. v. State of Gujarat12
Limited similarities between the sections were identified in Durga Prasad & Anr. v. The State
of M .P ,13 where the Court held that the nature of the cruelty required to satisfy both sections
304-B IPC and 498-A IPC was the same and needed to be cruelty in connection with demands
10 [(2007) 12 SCC 443]
11 [AIR 2014 SC 817]
12 [AIR 2015 SC 1355]
13 [(2010) 9 SCC 73]
Thus, the specific allegations of dowry demand laid in charge sheet, also do not attract the
provisions of 304 B I.P.C. with respect to all the accused. Thus, the Conviction of the appellant
under the said sections is not appropriate as the very essential of the 3 said provisions relating to
dowry death, cruelty and presumption as to dowry death are not satisfied in this case which
demands the occasion of the acquittal of Isha Singh .
The Council humbly submits before the Hon'ble court that it is necessary to show that no
circumstantial evidence was discovered. The Court in its judgment failed to appreciate the
evidences and, prejudicially held the appellant and family guilty of the offence u/s 498 A
and 304 B of the IPC, 1860, against Anamica Singh (deceased) a crime never committed
by him. There exists a reasonable doubt as per the facts of the cases which shows that Isha
Singh didn't kill Anamika. Even the chain of causation cannot be proved as the Forensic
Laboratory Report clearly shows that there was no poisonous substance administered to
Anamika and hence it makes the fact highly improbable u/s 1115 of the Indian Evidence
Act that the Appellant administered poisonous substances to his wife leading to her death
and that there was no conclusive proof of the same. Isha Singh should be provided with the
benefit of doubt in such a case.
In case of Jose Luis Quintanilla Sacristan v. the State of UP16, it was held that, as per the
provision of Section 293 Cr.P.C., the report of State Forensic Science Laboratory is admissible in
evidence and there is no requirement to call the Director of that laboratory to get the report
In light of the above stated and the present case, the report of State Forensic Science Laboratory
must have been admissible as a conclusive evidence , yet the HC and Trial court failed to consider
the same and wrongfully convicted the appellant.
In S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat17, It was held that in case of murder in which the
conclusion of guilt is drawn by prosecution it must be fully established beyond all
reasonable doubt and consistent with the guilt of the accused.
In the case of H.D. Sikand (d) Th: lrs. v. C.B.I. & Anr.18, the HC acquitted the person
who had been convicted of crime by the trial court, for the simple reason of lack of
evidence and benefit of doubt. Then the appeal was made to the SC and even the SC held
after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the record of this
matter, including the evidence, dismissed the appeal.
In the present case as well, there is an actual want of evidence because except from the
made up case of the prosecution, there are no actual facts connecting the appellant to the
crime. Therefore, the acquittal of the appellant should hereby be maintained by the Hon’ble
court.
In Raghunath v. State of Haryana 19 , the Hon’ble S.C held that it is a well settled principle
of law that if two views are possible, one in favor of the accused and the other adversely
against it, the view favoring the accused must be accepted.
The Doctrine of circumstantial evidence was once again discussed and summarized in Sattatiya
Satish Rajanna Kartalla v. State of Maharashtra 20 in the following terms: - "It is settled law that
an offence can be proved not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence where
In fact, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish close link between discovery of the
material objects and its use in the commission of the offence and what is admissible under
S. 304 B and 498 A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The fact that thereafter, the burden lies
on the prosecution to establish a close link between discovery of the material objects and
its use in the commission of the offence was dissatisfied in this particular case. No
evidence was found against the accused and that the Forensic report which is a conclusive
proof of evidence also negated the involvement of the accused in the death of the deceased.
In spite of which the appellant was wrongly convicted.
If the courts entertain reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of
doubt should be given to the Accused. - Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra and Kali
Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh21.
The prosecution’s arguments are leaning towards the fact that the crime ‘may have been
committed by the accused’, however they have failed to make the link between ‘may have
committed the crime’ and ‘must have committed the crime’ and that gap must be filled by
the prosecution by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence before a conviction can be
sustained.22
In light of all the aforementioned arguments, the accused humbly submits that there exists
reasonable doubt and hence he should be acquitted of the alleged crime. Therefore, it is
humbly submitted before this court that the charge under S. 304 B, 498 A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and S. 113 B of IEA, 1872 has not been made out as the very essentials
of the same are not met and the accused should be acquitted of the same. Hence, the
Prosecution has failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction of
the appellant was thereof not appropriate.
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, it
is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India may be pleased to adjudge
and declare:
1. The acquittal of Isha Singh for the commission of offence under section 304 B, IPC and
498A of the IPC as levelled against him.
2. The de facto complainant who brought a false case to the Court, be levied with heavy
cost for bringing upon false litigation on to Isha Singh and family under Section 250
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which talks about Compensation for accusation without
reasonable cause. .
AND/OR
Pass any other order, direction, or relief that this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India may
deem fit in the interests of equity, justice, and good conscience.
SUBMITTED BY-
SUHASINI KAPOOR
B.B.A.LL.B IX- SEMESTER
1813861