BLAZA, AARON JOSHUA P.

Politics, Governance and Citizenship

BSA 1-1 Prof. Sumadsad

PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

PART I

ELECTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Elections are integral to democratic governance. Through the mechanism of elections,
politicians are held accountable for their actions, and are compelled to introduce policies that are
reflective of and responsive to public opinion. In the Philippines, the plurality system has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973, and 1987 constitutions. Under the 1987 constitution, all elective
officials – president, vice-president, senators, members of the House of Representatives, local
chief executives and local legislators – are chosen by a direct vote of the people through a ‘first-
past-the-post system’ (Agra, 1997b: 1). The Philippine electoral system has generally been
consistent throughout history.
The Philippine experience with electoral politics is instructive in the process of democratic
development in the Asia-Pacific region. Nearly a century since American colonial authorities
introduced electoral and party politics, the quality of democratic representation as an outcome of
elections has always been held in doubt. Clientelism, nepotism, fraud and violence, among others,
have reinforced the elitist nature of Philippine electoral politics. This was exacerbated during the
period of Marcos’ authoritarian rule as democratic elections were briefly replaced by
‘demonstration elections’ held under duress. The ouster of the Marcos dictatorship in February
1986 has ushered in a period of re-democratization. Nonetheless, the election and subsequent
removal of President Joseph Estrada in January 2001 remains a constant reminder of the continuing
‘defects’ of Philippine democracy. (Teehankee, J., Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia,
2002)

ELECTORAL HISTORY
ELECTIONS UNDER AMERICAN OCCUPATION
After establishing total control of the Philippines by 1901, the American colonizers
governed their newly acquired territory through the appointive Philippine Commission under the
supervision of the United States governor general. The commission performed both executive and
legislative functions, with token Filipino participation, until 1907. The first election in the country
was held in Baliwag, Bulacan on May 1898 under American supervision. This was followed by
four Cavite municipalities, in compliance with General Order No. 40, Series of 1900, issued by
the military governor, for establishing municipalities in the Philippine Islands. Upon the
establishment of civilian government in 1901, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 60 to
serve as the organic law for all municipal governments in the country. The Act required voters to
be:
1. Male, aged 23 and above;
 2. A resident of the municipality where they were to vote for a period of six months
immediately preceding the elections; and
3. Any of the following three classes: individuals who speak, read and write English/Spanish,
own real property worth at least P500, or have held local government positions prior to the
occupation of the country in 1898 (Tancangco, 1988: 81).

The first legislative election was held on 30 July 1907 and was administered under the first
General Election Law of the Philippines (Act No. 1532), enacted on 9 January 1907. It provided
for the election of members of the unicameral Philippine Assembly, elective provincial officials,
and all municipal officials, by direct vote of qualified electors. There were two major parties – the
Partido Nacionalista and the Partido Nacional Progresista. The Nacionalista Party (NP) was
formed on 12 March 1907 as a merger of several nationalist movements and organizations pushing
for Philippine independence. The Progresista Party was formerly the Partido Federalista – the
country’s first political party organized in 1900 by a group of prominent, mostly Manila-based
ilustrados2 to push for the annexation to and statehood within the United States (Liang, 1970;
Tancangco, 1988; Lande, 1996). The Federalistas were the original recipients of American colonial
patronage who initially gravitated around the clientelist ties between Governor General William
Howard Taft and party founder Commissioner T.H. Pardo de Tavera. However, this support shifted
to the younger, provincially based political leaders of the Nacionalistas – Sergio Osmeña and
Manuel Quezon – despite their nationalist posturing. Ironically, the Partido Progresista would later
merge with a nationalist party to form the Partido Democrata in 1917 (Liang, 1970).
Between 1907 and 1934, ten legislatures were elected at three-year intervals during the
American colonial period. The Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act) of 1916 transformed the
unicameral Philippine legislature into a bicameral legislature composed of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The Nacionalistas, or one of its factions, since it was divided between the Quezon and
Osmeña camps in 1922 and 1933, dominated electoral politics throughout the pre-war period. It
continued its dominance from the inauguration of the Commonwealth government in 1935 until
the establishment of the Third Philippine Republic in 1946. (Teehankee, J., Electoral Politics in
Southeast and East Asia, 2002)

ELECTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH PERIOD

The 1935 constitution that established the Philippine Commonwealth provided for a
presidential form of government patterned on the United States model. The constitution originally
introduced a unicameral National Assembly, but an amendment in 1940 re-established the
bicameral legislature, which remained until 1972 (Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001). The right
of suffrage was granted to all Filipinos who were: (1) 21 years and above; (2) able to read and
write English or Spanish; and (3) residents of the Philippines for at least one year and of the
municipality in which they proposed to vote for at least six months prior to the date of the elections.
It also provided for the extension of the right of suffrage to women. By 1939, all existing election

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laws were consolidated into an Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357) that empowered the
secretary of the interior to supervise all types of election. However, in order to insulate the electoral
process from partisan politics, a constitutional amendment was passed and approved in a plebiscite
to create an independent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) (Tancangco, 1988: 82-83). Five
elections were held in the Commonwealth period: the presidential and legislative elections of 1935;
the local elections of 1937; the legislative elections of 1938; the local elections of 1940; and the
presidential and legislative elections of 1941. (Teehankee, J., Electoral Politics in Southeast and
East Asia, 2002)

ELECTIONS IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC (INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES)
Philippine post-war politics was characterized by an ‘indistinct two party system’ with
intense competition between the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP). The LP was
formerly the ‘liberal wing’ of the NP that formally split off after an intense leadership struggle in
1946. The United States-backed LP became the ruling party in 1946 after it won the presidency
and vice presidency, as well as the majority of the seats in the bicameral Congress and most of the
local positions (Liang, 1970; Tancangco, 1988; Lande, 1996).
The rivalry between the two parties dominated Philippine politics from 1946 until 1971.
Both took turns to capture the presidency and controlling both chambers of Congress. The Liberals
won the presidential elections of 1946, 1949 and 1961. The Nacionalistas won them in 1953, 1957,
1965 and 1969. There were 14 senatorial elections in the post-war period. These included the
regular and mid-term elections between 1946 and 1971. The LP dominated the first three (1946,
1947 and 1949), while the NP continuously won the most number of seats in the succeeding five
elections (1951, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1959). Interestingly, the party that captured the presidency
also won the most senatorial seats. Hence, the LP managed to regain its dominance in 1961 when
it won the presidency. The election of 1963 was the only time that both parties split the seats
equally at four each. Again, the NP captured the most seats in 1965, 1967 and 1969 under the
Marcos administration. After the notorious Plaza Miranda bombing, the LP nearly swept the
senatorial race of 1971. The mid-term senatorial election of 1971 was the last free elections in the
Philippines as Marcos declared martial law the following year and abolished Congress.
(Teehankee, J., Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia, 2002)

ELECTIONS IN THE MARCOS REGIME (MARTIAL LAW AND THE NEW

SOCIETY/FOURTH REPUBLIC)
The declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in September 1972 halted
all party activities and intra-elite competition. Elections were cancelled for the first six years of
martial law. Martial law was declared amid the efforts of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to
draft a new constitution. Although the process was already mired with gross presidential
interference, martial law hastened the completion of a charter that was tailored to the needs of the

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authoritarian regime. Despite protests and controversies, barangay (village) citizen assemblies
were convened and ratified the 1973 constitution (Wurfel, 1988).
The 1978 election for members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa reactivated traditional
political forces. The election was held under a system of region-wide voting districts in lieu of the
single-member district system originally provided by the 1973 constitution (Kimura, 1997).
Marcos began to institutionalize one-party dominance with the organization of the New Society
Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, KBL) in 1978 (Tancangco, 1988). The KBL was originally
established as a coalition movement of members of the pre-martial law NP, LP and other political
personalities who were supportive of Marcos’ ‘New Society’. However, it simply revived the old
clientelistic network that distributed patronage through local governments. On the other hand,
various opposition groups in the country established new parties. However, most of these parties
were organized as regional parties that fielded candidates for specific regions instead of a national
constituency. The emergence of regional parties was an indication of the consolidation of the
dictatorial regime and the splintering of opposition forces (Wurfel, 1988).
The KBL continued to dominate succeeding electoral exercises such as the 1980 local
elections, the 1981 presidential election and the 1984 Regular Batasang Pambansa (National
Legislature) elections. The Marcos regime also introduced barangay elections in 1982 to replace
the pre-martial law barrio as the basic unit of local governance. In addition, elections were held in
1979 and 1982 for members of the autonomous Regional Assembly in Mindanao (Regions IX and
XII) in an attempt to placate the separatist movement led by the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF). The Marcos regime allowed these electoral exercises to give itself a semblance of
political legitimacy. However, it utilized its authoritarian powers to manipulate the electoral rules
and institutions. For example, Presidential Decree No. 1296 (the election code that governed the
conduct of the 1978 elections) allowed the block voting system which counts the vote for a party
as a vote for all the individual candidates in the official ticket. The system gave the KBL undue
advantage since it was the only party capable of mounting a nationwide campaign. In addition, the
system was prone to electoral fraud since it was easier to stuff ballot boxes with pre-filled ballots
(Tancangco, 1988: 96).
In the wake of the massive outpouring of protest and discontent following the assassination
of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. in August 1983, the leading opposition parties participated
and performed relatively better in the May 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections. The opposition was
led by the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and the Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine Democratic Party-People’s Power, PDP-Laban). The 1984
Batasang Pambansa election was conducted under a multi-member, multiple-vote system in which
district allocation of representation ranged from one to six representatives, depending on the
number of registered voters in a given district. Each voter was given as many votes as there were
members of parliament to be elected in the district. This system gave some room for the anti-
Marcos segment of the elites to reconstruct their grassroots machinery.
In an effort to again demonstrate his political legitimacy, Marcos called for a snap
presidential election in 1985. Corazon C. Aquino, widow of the assassinated opposition leader,

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was the presidential candidate of the united opposition. Massive cheating by the administration
triggered a failed military coup that led to a people’s uprising at EDSA. The ouster of the Marcos
dictatorship in February 1986, and the subsequent dismantling of its authoritarian infrastructure
have resulted in the restoration of formal democratic institutions that include the pre-martial law
presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature. (Teehankee, J., Electoral Politics in
Southeast and East Asia, 2002)

POST-EDSA REVOLUTION ELECTIONS (1986-1998)

Under the 1987 constitution, the president and the vice-president are separately elected by
a direct vote of the people through simple plurality nationwide. Both serve a term of six years. The
president is not eligible for any re-election while the vice-president sits one term out after serving
for two successive terms. Since 1935, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has
administered all electoral exercises in the Philippines.
The Philippine Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Half of
the 24 senators are nationally elected at large every six years through simple plurality. At least one
term out is imposed on senators who have served two consecutive terms. On the other hand,
members of the House of Representatives are elected from single-member districts every three
years. This electoral system, combined with a personalist party system, grossly over-represents the
largest parties and excludes minor parties. The inclusion of proportional representation
(implemented through a party-list ballot) for a small portion of the lower chamber is an attempt to
shift the focus from personalities to political parties (Wurfel, 1997).
The 1991 Local Government Code provides for the election of local government officials.
The governor, vice-governor, city mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal mayor, municipal vice-
mayor and punong barangay (village head) are elected at large in their respective areas. Elections
are conducted through simple plurality every three years. Likewise, members of the local
legislative assemblies such as the provincial board, city and municipal councils are elected by
district and plurality vote. However, members of the village assembly are elected at large in their
respective areas. Representatives and local government officials are allowed a maximum of three
consecutive terms before they can again seek reelection. (Teehankee, J., Electoral Politics in
Southeast and East Asia, 2002)
In the first elections held under the 1987 Constitution, pro-Aquino parties had formed the
“LABAN” or Lakas ng Bayan coalition and faced off against the opposition coalition Grand
Alliance for Democracy (GAD). President Aquino’s fledgling government faced a crucial test of
legitimacy. While her rule was largely ratified by the overwhelming support of the 1987
Constitution, the Senate remained the battleground to thwart the opposition’s attempt to discredit
her presidency. The result was a 22-2 LABAN sweep of the Senate, with only two GAD bets,
former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and San Juan Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, making
it to the cut. The 1987 Senate elections would go down as one of the most lopsided upper house
victories in Philippine electoral history.

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 For the first time, the Philippines had a presidential election under the multiparty system,
as opposed to the two-party system which had been in place since 1935. Seven candidates
contested the first presidential election following the restoration of democracy in 1986. President
Corazon C. Aquino had chosen Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos of the newly minted Lakas ng
Tao party as her successor. Challenging Ramos were Senate President Jovito Salonga of the
Liberal Party (LP), House Speaker Ramon Mitra of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago of the People’s Reform Party (PRP), Vice
President Salvador H. Laurel of the Nacionalista Party (NP), former Ambassador Eduardo
“Danding” Cojuangco Jr. of the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), and former First Lady
Imelda Marcos of her husband’s Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).
Traditional geopolitical considerations resurfaced, with the presidential and vice presidential
candidates hailing from different regions of the country. Ramos chose Governor Emilio “Lito”
Osmeña from Cebu as his running mate while Mitra recruited Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan, also
from Cebu; Defensor-Santiago, a native of Iloilo, was joined by former Congressman Ramon
Magsaysay Jr. of Zambales; Salonga entered into an alliance with former Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government Aquilino Pimentel Jr. from Cagayan de Oro, who headed PDP-LABAN;
Marcos, who grew up in Leyte, ran in tandem with Zambales Governor Vicente “Vic” Magsaysay.
Two candidates took exception. Laurel picked former Senator Eva Estrada-Kalaw, his
erstwhile foe in the vice presidential race of 1986, to form a solid Batangueño ticket. It is widely
known, however, that the vice president had originally intended to run with former Senator
Rodolfo Ganzon of Iloilo. For his part, Cojuangco partnered with then Senator Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a former matinee idol with nationwide appeal, the eventual winner by a landslide.
Ramos won the election with the smallest plurality in Philippine electoral history with only
23 percent of the vote, followed by Defensor-Santiago with 19 percent, Cojuangco 18 percent, and
Mitra 14 percent. Candidates of the three older parties—KBL, LP, and NP—finished last with
Marcos and Salonga each getting a little over 10 percent and Laurel a distant 3.4 percent.
In the Senate, LDP dominated, with 16 of its bets making it to the 24 vacant seats. The rest
of the slots were won by NPC (5), Lakas (2), and LP-PDP-LABAN (1).
The 12 senators with the highest number of votes would serve a full six-year term until
1998, while the remaining 12 senators would serve only until 1995. Thereafter, senators would be
elected on a staggered basis of 12 every three years.
The first midterm poll in the post-EDSA era, the 1995 election was a test for President
Fidel V. Ramos’ administration, which had come into power with a minority vote and only a few
allies in the legislature. Ramos’ Lakas ng Tao-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-
NUCD) had coalesced with with Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), led by his 1992 foe,
former House Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr., to form the Lakas-Laban coalition. The opposition was
composed of the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) of Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco Jr., the
People’s Reform Party (PRP) of Miriam Defensor-Santiago, and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
(KBL), represented by the son of the strongman himself, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. After
a hard-fought campaign, Ramos and the Lakas-Laban coalition won 9 out of the 12 Senate seats

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in contention, leaving the opposition with three. (Presidential Communications Development and
Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), Philippine Electoral Almanac Revised and Expanded
Edition, 2015)

ELECTIONS INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1998-PRESENT)

Attempts of President Fidel V. Ramos to amend the Constitution and establish a
unicameral, parliamentary system of government was met with stiff, multisectoral opposition. His
charter change initiatives appeared to heavily favor his chosen successor—Speaker Jose de
Venecia Jr., an expert coalition-builder in the House of Representatives. Failing to amend the
charter, the second presidential elections under the 1987 Constitution pushed through with even
more candidates compared to 1992. Eleven hopefuls slugged it out for the presidency: Vice
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP); House
Speaker Jose de Venecia of Lakas ng Tao-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim
Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP); Senators Raul Roco of Aksyon
Demokratiko, Miriam Defensor-Santiago of the People’s Reform Party (PRP), and Juan Ponce
Enrile (independent); Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim of the Liberal Party (LP); Defense Secretary
Renato de Villa of Partido ng Demokratikong Reporma-Lapiang Manggagawa (Reporma-LM);
former Cebu Governor Emilio Osmeña of Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives (PROMDI);
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Chairman Manuel Morato; and Santiago Dumlao.
With the rising influence of mass media, traditional geopolitical considerations no longer
held sway. Of the major tandems, there were three all-Luzon partnerships: Estrada of San Juan
with Senator Edgardo Angara of Aurora; de Venecia of Pangasinan with Senator Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo of Pampanga; and de Villa of Batangas with Governor Oscar Orbos of
Pangasinan. Three followed the traditional North-South dynamic: Roco of Bicol with former
Davao City Vice Mayor Inday Santiago; Lim of Manila with Senator Sergio Osmeña III of Cebu;
and Santiago of Iloilo with Senator Francisco Tatad of Catanduanes. Notably, the tandem of
PROMDI was from Visayas and Mindanao, the first in mainstream Philippine electoral politics,
with Osmeña of Cebu with former Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Governor of Cotabato Ismael Sueño.
Estrada led opinion poll surveys from the beginning, with de Venecia and Roco making
little headway toward the tail-end of the campaign. Civil society leaders and others in the broad
political spectrum made much ado about his incompetence to lead the country but did little to unite
anti-Estrada forces. In the end, Vice President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Senator Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo won the presidency and vice presidency, respectively, by a landslide. Both
garnered twice the number of votes of their nearest rivals.
In the Senate, five seats were won by the outgoing administration party Lakas, and seven
seats were won by Estrada’s LAMMP allies (four by LDP, one by PMP, one by NPC, and one by
PDP-LABAN).
In the run-up to the May 2001 polls, anti-Estrada forces, badly divided in 1998, coalesced
as the People Power Coalition (PPC) and campaigned for a 13-0 sweep in the Senate. PPC,
composed of Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Liberal Party, Aksyon Demokratiko, PROMDI, Reporma-

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LM, and other smaller parties, presented a formidable lineup of incumbent and former Senators,
civil society leaders, and key personalities in the Estrada impeachment trial. Meanwhile, Estrada
and his allies organized the Pwersa ng Masa (PnM) made up of remnants of his erstwhile LAMMP
coalition.
What would have been Estrada’s midterm would turn out to be the first test of popular
support for the newly installed Macapagal-Arroyo administration. The result was a clear victory
for the PPC, winning eight seats against PnM’s five.
Facing recurrent challenges to her legitimacy as President, the elections of 2004 was the
chance Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had to win the presidency in her own right. Despite a public
statement that she would not seek re-election, she assembled a formidable coalition—Koalisyon
ng Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan (K-4)—led by her adoptive party Lakas ng Tao-
Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) and parties that were in opposition to the Estrada
regime in support of her bid. Arroyo picked 2001 Senate topnotcher and former broadcaster
Manuel “Noli” de Castro Jr. to be her running mate.
The People Power Coalition (PPC) that had helped her administration win an outright
Senate majority three years earlier, however, had disbanded; three smaller parties of the coalition,
namely Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma-LM, and Partido ng Demokratikong Reporma-Lapiang
Manggagawa (Reporma-LM), and Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives (PROMDI), threw
their support behind former Senator and Education Secretary Raul Roco, who formed the Alyansa
ng Pag-asa. Roco had chosen former Tarlac Rep. Herminio Aquino to be his vice president and
ran as an alternative to Arroyo, distinct from the mainstream opposition which was dominated by
sympathizers of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Meanwhile, the opposition fielded matinee idol Fernando Poe Jr. and Senator Loren
Legarda, a recent recruit from the ruling party. Their political union was backed by the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP), composed of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Estrada’s Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP), and other minority parties. The once-formidable
LDP, however, had split into the Angara wing that supported Poe and the Aquino wing, led by
former Senator and Makati Representative Agapito “Butz” Aquino, who supported partymate
Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson for the presidency. Another contender, televangelist Eduardo
“Eddie” Villanueva, also threw his hat into the race.
The result was victory for President Arroyo and de Castro amid allegations of vote-rigging
and electoral fraud. K-4 scored a majority in the Senate with seven of its bets winning against five
from the KNP.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s first official midterm election took place amidst
serious allegations of poll fraud and a series of mass demonstrations against her regime. Anti-
Arroyo forces, now more consolidated against the juggernaut Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim
Democrats (Lakas-CMD), had formed the Genuine Opposition (GO) and adopted a compelling
messaging line: “Isang boto lang po LABAN sa nakaupo (a vote against the incumbent)”.
Seemingly unperturbed, Arroyo and her loyalists mainly from Lakas-CMD, Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI), and Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) formed

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Team Unity (TU) and boasted that party machinery coupled with command votes would trump the
opposition’s overwhelming popularity. But even the much-vaunted administration advantage
showed vulnerability early on with KAMPI, Arroyo’s original party, raiding the ranks of the
Lakas-CMD for members. In some areas, only Lakas and KAMPI candidates were in contention.
The inability of TU to come up with a strong slate was made even more obvious with its admission
of two opposition stalwarts who were excluded from the GO lineup.
The sweeping victory of the opposition was a repudiation of President Arroyo’s
administration. GO won ten seats while only two administration bets made it—re-electionist
Senators Joker Arroyo and Edgardo Angara, known more as political mavericks instead of Arroyo
loyalists.
Coalitions among the major parties did not materialize in the election of 2010, the first time
since the restoration of democracy in 1986. Nine candidates vied for the presidency: Defense
Secretary Gilbert Teodoro of Lakas ng Tao-Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino-Christian Muslim
Democrats (Lakas-KAMPI-CMD); Senators Benigno “Noynoy” S. Aquino III of the Liberal Party
(LP), Manuel “Manny” Villar Jr. of the Nacionalista Party (NP), Richard “Dick” Gordon of
Bagumbayan, and Ma. Ana Consuelo “Jamby” Madrigal (independent); former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada of Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP); Councilor John Carlos de los Reyes of Ang
Kapatiran; and environmentalist Nicanor Perlas (Independent).
Their choice of running mates showed a further waning of traditional geopolitical bases in
favor of nationwide appeal. It was also the first time there were guest candidates for vice president.
Teodoro, a former Tarlac Representative, picked television host Edu Manzano while Villar, a
former Senate President from Las Piñas, picked Senator and former broadcaster Loren Legarda
(NPC); Estrada joined forces with Makati Mayor Jejomar C. Binay of Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN) for an all-Metro Manila ticket; and Gordon, a former
Olongapo City mayor, ran with Bayani Fernando, Metro Manila Development Authority Chairman
and himself a former mayor of Marikina City. Only the LP ticket featured a Luzon-Visayas tandem
with Aquino running with Senator Manuel Mar Roxas, a former Capiz representative and son of
the late Senator Gerardo Roxas.
The Aquino-Roxas tandem ran on an anti-corruption platform that was first heavily favored
in opinion polls; but while Aquino stayed in the lead, the polls indicated Binay was catching up
with Roxas. On Election Day, Aquino was elected by a landslide, but his running mate Roxas lost
to Binay by a mere 800,000 votes or a little over 2% of the vote.
In the Senate, the Liberals captured four seats (including independent guest candidate,
former Senator Sergio Osmeña III); NP, Lakas-KAMPI-CMD, and PMP got two each; while the
Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) and the People’s Reform Party (PRP) got one apiece.
The 2013 midterm elections saw the return of coalitions. The administration’s Team
PNoy—composed of the Liberal Party (LP), Akbayan Citizens’ Action Party (Akbayan), the
Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), the Nacionalista Party (NP), and the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)—went up against the opposition coalition, the United Nationalist
Alliance (UNA), which was composed of former President Joseph Estrada’s Pwersa ng Masang

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Pilipino (PMP) and Vice President Jejomar Binay’s Partido Demokratiko Pilipino – Lakas ng
Bayan (PDP-Laban). UNA was the only officially registered coalition during the elections.
The elections took place on May 13, 2013. The victory of the administration’s Team PNoy
was considered an affirmation of the policies of the administration in power. President Benigno S.
Aquino III saw the elections as a referendum on his Daang Matuwid (the Straight Path)—a policy
that put emphasis on good governance practices and combating corruption. Team PNoy won 75
percent of the seats in the Senate. The remaining 25 percent went to UNA. Grace Poe, one of Team
PNoy’s senatorial candidates, received the most number of votes at 20,337,327. In the House of
Representatives, the administration’s Liberal Party won a plurality (37.11 percent) of the seats
with 108 representatives. (Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning
Office (PCDSPO), Philippine Electoral Almanac Revised and Expanded Edition, 2015)
Riding on his platform of Change, Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte, of PDP-Laban,
won the Elections of 2016 as the 16th President of the Philippines, with more than 16 million votes,
over five other Presidential candidates, which are Interior and Local Government Secretary
Manuel “Mar” Roxas (Liberal Party), Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Independent), Vice
President Jejomar C. Binay (UNA), Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago (PRP) and Roy Señeres
(Independent, withdrawn from race before the elections but his name appeared in the ballots).
Meanwhile the Vice Presidency was a close race. Camarines Sur Representative Maria Leonor
“Leni” G. Robredo (LP) narrowly won as the country’s 14th Vice President, defeating her closest
rival, Senator Ferdinand “Bong Bong” R. Marcos, Jr. (Independent) by as much as 200,000 votes.
She also bested four other contenders: Senator Alan Peter Cayetano (Independent), Senator Francis
Joseph Escudero (Independent), Senator Antonio Trillanes IV (Independent) and Senator Gregorio
Honasan II (UNA).
Months after, Marcos filed an Electoral Protest against Vice President Robredo over an
alleged fraud on the 2016 Elections in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). He pushed for a
recount of votes of several precincts in identified cities and provinces. The recount still proceeds
as of press time.

PEOPLE POWER INSTITUTIONALIZED

The “spirit of people power” was institutionalized in the legislature with the election of the
first sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives in May 1998. While slow to
participate at first—only thirteen of fifty-two seats reserved for party-list organizations were filled
in this election—reformists soon found reason to move into electoral politics. Although the
executive branch of the state was permeated by their discourse of “democratization,” “popular
empowerment,” and even “revolution,” their reformist agenda had stalled from lack of money.
Massive government deficit, mandatory pay down of foreign and domestic debt, and corruption
hindered the social welfare agencies that were meant to symbolize “state strength.”
Two forces have defied this trend of demobilization. The first is the Communist Party of
the Philippines. The factional battles, executions, and purges of the late 1980s gave way to a leaner
movement in the 1990s under the firm control of founder-in-exile Jose Maria Sison and his

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Philippines-based allies. The New People’s Army, whose 1987 peak of 25,000 guerrillas declined
to 6,000 in 1994, grew back to 11,255 armed forces in 2000. Deepening rural poverty and increased
migration of poor lowlanders to mountainous areas was as much a reason for the CPP’s
resurrection as its claim to have cleansed itself of “deviationists” and “renegades.” The
government indirectly contributed to CPP growth by transferring counter-insurgency operations
to municipally controlled police and assigning the main bulk of its forces to contain Islamic
separatism in Mindanao. The party remains weaker in urban areas, however; in a setting where
coalition politics and elections have become the norm, the CPP is hampered by its antipathy toward
rival leftist groups (many established by CPP expellees) and lingering suspicion of contaminating
the purity of “armed struggle” with electoral politics.
The second exception to the waning of reform activism is the rise of religious movements.
These include “old” movements such as the independent Philippine church Iglesia ni Kristo
(Church of Christ). Under the leadership of the Manalo family, the Iglesia has played a quiet but
often decisive role in elections through its membership of one million. The Iglesia was joined in
size and importance in the 1990s by the Catholic charismatic movement El Shaddai, headed by
former real estate agent Brother Mike Velarde, and the Protestant group Jesus Is Lord, led by
former Communist Brother Eddie Villanueva. The political significance of these lay organizations
is their strong presence and encouragement of bloc voting among the “working poor and working
class,” groups the Catholic Church is increasingly unable to mobilize. El Shaddai, for example,
although officially part of the Church, holds its prayer rallies outside Church buildings and
spiritually outside the hierarchy’s control, a representation of “popular Christianity which has been
the bane of the institutional Church throughout most of Philippine history.” The middle class is
represented in this trend by the Church-affiliated Couples for Christ, which professes “allegiance
to traditional Catholic teachings.” Along with El Shaddai, Jesus Is Lord, and smaller evangelical
groups, Couples has entered the “democratic space” once dominated by secular reformist forces
with a “pro-family, nationalist and civic-minded discourse.”
Politicians who sensed the growing importance of the new formula “turned to television to
maintain a high profile or boost their flagging popularity.” At the same time, the marriage of news
and entertainment turned newscasters into celebrities and entertainment figures into political
pundits, as movie and television stars recognized their power to influence public opinion. As one
business executive admitted: “A lot of your life is sometimes governed by what actors and
actresses do. Maybe they’re out there talking to people about moral standards which might be
followed by your kid!” The leap from moral to political was relatively easy. To the criticism that
movie stars lacked the skill to be political leaders, many simply pointed to Corazon Aquino—the
“mere housewife” who brought down a dictatorship and restored democracy. (Abinales, P. and
Amorosa, D., States and Society in the Philippines, 2005)

THE ERAP PRESIDENCY

Estrada’s campaign slogan was simple: “Erap para sa Mahihirap” (Erap for the poor). On
Election Day, he won an unprecedented 46.4 percent of votes cast; his closest rival, House Speaker

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Jose de Venecia, received 17.1 percent. After being sworn in as the country’s thirteenth president,
Estrada promised a government that would exercise transparency and professionalism, assured
critics that he would disallow family involvement in his administration, and vowed to continue the
economic reforms of the Ramos years.
Despite his election day promises, in less than half a term in office, Estrada transformed
the presidency from a respected symbol of the nation into a rogue’s court of family members,
“mistresses, bastard children, denizens of show-business, gambling partners, business partners
both established and obscure,” and late-night drinking buddies who made major decisions
regarding affairs of state. Corruption under Estrada was distinct in “the leveraging of government
assets and authority to undertake deals that were ultimately mediated by the market.”
Estrada’s popularity dropped as stories of governance by “midnight cabinet”circulated.
The stories were fueled by his bad relationship with the media, the failure of an anticorruption
drive, and his administration’s slow implementation of antipoverty programs. Critics began to refer
to Estrada as the second coming of Ferdinand Marcos, especially after he forced a critical
newspaper to shut down.
In 1999, Estrada sought to project decisiveness by ordering the destruction of Moro Islamic
Liberation Front camps and the takeover of Jolo Island to destroy the Abu Sayyaf Group. He and
the Congress approved the return of American military forces to the Philippines to train and advise
the AFP in these campaigns. To show his new commitment to governance, Estrada gave his cabinet
secretaries autonomy to run their offices without interference, prompting the Far Eastern
Economic Review to comment that he had metamorphosed into “a savvy politician [who] had
found a way to get things done.” The performance of certain government agencies, some under the
management of ex-leftists, popular activists, and academics, did offset the erratic leadership at the
top. Despite limited funds and the surrounding corruption, the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Bureau of Immigration, Civil Service Commission, and Bureau of Treasury performed credibly.
These modest economic and governance improvements were outweighed by negatives.
Estrada began to lose allies in the House, and Congress refused to pass the next series of reforms
needed to sustain economic recovery. The political points won in early 2000 by taking a strong
stand against Islamic rebels were wiped out by the military’s lack of a decisive victory.
Government coffers were also hurt by the war in Mindanao: Unofficial estimates ranged from
$500,000 to $2.3 million daily, forcing budget officials to divert monies from other programs.
Finally, accusations of government complicity in drug smuggling and illegal gambling led
to Estrada’s downfall. Jueteng (pronounced WHET-ting), an illegal lottery, is the centerpiece of
the nation’s thriving informal economy. Because millions of ordinary Filipinos regularly place a
one-peso bet on a combination of numbers hoping for a four-hundred-peso winning, jueteng can
net a local operator as much as 1.2 million pesos and provincial bosses about 4.8 million pesos
monthly. Its profitability spawned a complex, nationwide network of alliances between operators,
politicians, and law enforcement agencies. Political campaigns and poorly paid military officers
alike have come to depend on jueteng revenues.

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 In early October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Jose Singson—a longtime Estrada crony,
gambling partner, and drinking companion—revealed that he had personally delivered $8 million
in illegal gambling money to the president over a twenty-one month period, plus an additional $2.5
million as the president’s “cut” of the tobacco excise taxes allotted to his province. Singson went
public after Estrada allegedly tried to have him assassinated, although he had already decided to
reveal all when he learned that the president planned to set up a bingo network to rival his jueteng
organization.
With Singson’s revelations, anti-Estrada forces coalesced to drive him from office. The
alliance of conservative church and business sectors, “traditional” politicians from opposition
parties, NGOs, middle-class associations, and different factions of the Left brought back memories
of the Aquino years. The CPP, learning its lesson from 1986, made sure its legal organizations
acted with the anti-Estrada front. Of course, the president was not without his own supporters. The
core of Estrada’s alliance—former Marcos cronies, the movie industry, provincial and town
officials grateful for hastily released internal revenue allocations, Christian fundamentalist groups
whose leaders sought to evade Church control, and former Communists in government—remained
steadfast behind him.
Initial skirmishes began when the House of Representatives passed the first articles of
impeachment against Estrada, charging him with plunder, graft, and corruption. In early December
2000, the Senate, where Estrada controlled a majority, formed itself into a tribunal to deliberate
the charges. Meanwhile, the jueteng expose and impeachment plunged the economy into crisis.
The peso had depreciated 22 percent from the start of the year, investments were down 20 percent,
and the scandal-plagued stock market continued to sink. When pro-Estrada senators blocked
prosecutors from revealing a critical piece of incriminating evidence, the battle moved to the
streets. On January 16, 2001, anti-Estrada forces—one million strong—gathered at the Edsa
Shrine. In a festive atmosphere, they vowed not to leave until Estrada resigned the presidency.
The composition of “Edsa 2” ranged from core “veterans” of the 1986 Revolution to
members of Couples for Christ and Iglesia ni Kristo, who did not hesitate to demand a role on the
“coordinating committee.” As expected, Estrada rebuffed the protestors, and his supporters staged
their own show of force in a similarly large rally. The impasse was broken on January 20, when
the AFP leadership withdrew its support and Estrada had to abandon the presidential palace. Vice
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was immediately sworn in as president and Edsa 2 was widely
praised as “a massive exercise in direct democracy after the institutions of impeachment had
failed.” (Abinales, P. and Amorosa, D., States and Society in the Philippines, 2005)

EDSA 2 VERSUS EDSA 3 (POOR PEOPLE’S POWER)

On April 25, 2001, the government arrested Joseph Estrada on charges of plunder, violation
of the anti-graft law, perjury, and illegal use of an alias. The perceived discourtesy of the arresting
authorities angered the ex-president’s supporters, who mobilized up to three million people at the
Edsa Shrine, a gathering notable for including “no Church symbols [and] no Church personnel.”
After four days of speeches and rallies, about three hundred thousand people broke away from the

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main group and marched on the presidential palace, where they fought a bloody street battle with
police and military forces. Declaring a “state of rebellion,” President Arroyo ordered a full
military-police counterattack. By May 1, the “rebels” were in full retreat, with five killed and more
than a hundred arrested. Edsa 2 groups declared victory over “the mob” with a “triumphant Mass”
at the Edsa Shrine, symbolizing their recovery of the sacred site.
While easily routed, “Edsa 3” had reverberations that shook the new government. State
officials and anti-Estrada intellectuals insisted that the pro-Estrada mobilization was not an
example of people power because its violence contradicted the peaceful nature of people power.
But Arroyo supporters could not dismiss the importance of the class divide: Edsa 3 was
predominantly a poor people’s movement, while Edsa 2, despite the presence of pro-poor groups,
was mainly urban middle class and elite in composition.
As a result of Edsa 3, the optimism that followed Edsa 2 was short-lived, replaced by
apprehension and questioning of the value of people power as a political act. Even Estrada’s critics
had second thoughts about the wisdom of resorting to popular uprising. “People Power as a method
of political change and of ousting leaders,” wrote journalist Amando Doronila, “has made Filipino
democracy volatile, unstable, and unpredictable. More dangerously, it has brought Philippine
democracy to the edge of mob rule, even if exercised in the name of social change.” (Abinales, P.
and Amorosa, D., States and Society in the Philippines, 2005)

REFERENCES:
Teehankee, J., (2002) Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia. Retrieved February 24,
2019, from https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/01361006.pdf/
Abinales, P., Amorosa D. (2005) State and Society in the Philippines, Rowman and Littelfeld
Publishers, Inc., 390 pp. Retrieved February 24, 2019, from
http://academia.edu/15745428/Abinales_Patricio_N_and_Donna_J_Amoroso_-
_State_and_Society_in_the_Philippines/
Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), (2015)
Philippine Electoral Almanac Revised and Expanded Edition, 298 pp., Retrieved
February 27, 2019, from https://archive.org/details/philippine-electoral-almanac-revised-
and-expanded/page/n3

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