Lesson 1 For Polgov

LEARNING MATERIALS IN
PHILIPPINE POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND CITIZENSHIP

Prof. Cherry de Leon-Generoso
LESSON 1 – Basic Concepts of Politics
OVERVIEW:
This lesson will provide various concepts and definitions of politics
and governance. This also includes the importance and different
approaches on how politics can be studied. It also presents the
characteristics of good governance and importance of politics in every
individual.
OBJECTIVES:
1. Describe the meaning of politics and governance
2. Cite the importance and value of politics for the individual.
3. Familiarize the origin and basic issues in politics.
4. Enumerate the characteristics of good governance and the three legs
of governance.
COURSE MATERIALS:
1. What is the origin of politics?
• Polis – city-state
• Polites –citizens
• Politikos – government officials
(Zalde, 1983)
2. What is politics?
- Is derived from the Greek word polis which means “city-state”, a
small independent self-contained political society.
- “The heart of Political Science”
- It is the activity of people where they create, preserve and amend
laws under which they live.
- It is therefore the study of POWER relationship among the people
in a given society as well those relationships among states in the
international community. (Lazo, 2009)
Politics is…
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- Exercise of power, making of political decisions, practice of

deception, and manipulation, exercise of authority, allocation of
limited resources.
- Making of common decision
- Use of force to affect the behavior of another person or group.
Politics as the art of government.

- It defines the activity of government and of the state. All
government officials and all those working in government are
participating in politics.
Politics as public affair.

- It is played by everybody, politicians or not.
- In politics, Aristotle said that “man by nature is a political animal;”
this means that it is only within a political community that human
beings can live the good life.
- Thus politics becomes necessary to create a just society.
Politics as compromise and consensus.

- It is meant to resolve conflict.
- In politics, compromise, conciliation and negotiation become
necessary.
- It is through these means that issues and problems are being
resolved.
- Thus, politics becomes the process of conflict resolution.
Politics as power.
- Politics happens in all human interactions: within the family,
among friends, among officemates, etc.
- Politics can, therefore, be seen as struggle over scarce resources
and power can be seen as the means through which struggle is
conducted.
3. What are the basic issues of politics?

3.1 Legitimacy
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- Attitude of the people about what they consider in mind that

government is a rightful ruler over them.
- The King and Queen is the rightful throne on the basis of
legitimate succession to authority.
- LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RIGHT TO GOVERN
- Compels people to believe and follow orders.
3.2 Sovereignty
- It is the right of the government to rule and the right of a
government of leadership to exist.
- The right of a leader to rule and control not only his subjects
but also the territory over which the citizens live and prosper.
3.3 Authority
- It is the power of the leader to rule and the power to exact
obedience on his people. It is based on an acknowledged duty to
obey rather than on any form of coercion or manipulation.
- It exists when subordinates acknowledged the right of
superiors to give orders.
-Right to act rather than the power to do so.
4. Understanding Politics and Political Science
5. How politics can be studied?

a. Normative vs. Positive Approach
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o Focuses in answering the questions:

 What is?(Positive Approach)
 What should be? (Normative Approach)
b. Behavioral Approach
o Focuses on the study of the individual ( voter, leader, party
leader, etc.) particularly the actors of the political system,
their emotions, biases and predispositions.
c. Rational Choice Approach

o Focuses on the study of human behavior , wherein
individuals are motivated by their wants, their self-interest or
goals, which will explain their preferences.
6. What are the values of politics?

- Politics will help you to know your rights.
- Politics clarifies what you yourself believe.
- Politics is a living, breathing subject.
- Politics helps you to understand our nation’s parties.
- Politics prepares you for adult life.
7. What is governance?
- The action of the government
- “The process of decision-making and the process by which
decisions are implemented.” (Sheng,UNESCAP)
- “A government’s ability to make and enforce rule and to deliver
services, regardless of whether the government is democratic or
not.” (Fukuyama, 2013)
- In the early Indian history, back to at least 400 B.C., governance
includes emphasizing justice, ethics and anti-autocratic
tendencies.
- Moreover, World Bank (2007) defines governance as the manner
in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the
authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and
services.
8. What are the three legs of governance?
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a. Economic Governance – country’s economic activities and its

relationships with other economies.
b. Political Governance – to formulate policy.
c. Administrative governance – system of policy implementation
9. What are the 8 characteristics of good governance?

8.1 Participation – active involvement of all affected and
interested parties in the decision-making process.
8.2 Rule of Law – legal frameworks should be fair and enforces
impartially.
8.3 Transparency – free flow of information.
8.4 Responsiveness – serve all stakeholders.
8.5 Consensus Oriented – mediates differing interests.
8.6 Equity and Inclusiveness – all its members have
opportunities to improve or maintain their well being.
8.7 Effectiveness and efficiency – produce results that meet
needs while making the best use of resources.
8.8 Accountability – accountable to the public.
ADDITIONAL READING:
PHILIPPINE POLITICS UNDER DUTERTE: A MIDTERM ASSESSMENT
David G. Timberman
January 10, 2019
INTRODUCTION
Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in
June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte became the most internationally known
Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the country’s infamous dictator,
and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who
championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media
attention has been paid to Duterte’s murderous war on drugs as well as to
his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his
visceral disdain for the United States has garnered additional attention in
foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in media reports and
scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.
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Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted,
much less attention has been paid to his administration’s broader policy
agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its broader impact on
democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that
he would produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos,
particularly by aggressively addressing crime and corruption. Two and a
half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to assess
what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one,
with elements of change, continuity, and regression.
The Duterte government’s track record regarding human rights and
democracy is undoubtedly disturbing. It has run roughshod over human
rights, its political opponents, and the country’s democratic institutions. The
combination of the Philippines’ powerful presidency and the malleability of
most of its political institutions is resulting in significant democratic
backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to appreciate two other
important elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened
through nominally legal means, and the limited pushback to date by groups
and institutions opposed to strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-
depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to democratic backsliding
in the Philippines.
The Duterte administration’s assault on human rights and democracy

also raises the question of what the U.S. government and America’s
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and should do to defend
democracy in America’s former colony. The analysis concludes with a
discussion of America’s extremely limited support for human rights and
democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and offers
suggestions for a more robust response.
ANTECEDENTS
To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and
governing, it is necessary to understand three aspects of contemporary
Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite democracy since 1986; the
successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration
(2010–2016); and the particularities of the 2016 presidential election.
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THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY

Liberal democracy, a legacy of America’s colonization of the
Philippines (which lasted from 1898 to 1946), has always struggled to
become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this include
cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs
(Catholic fatalism); colonial legacies (America’s empowerment of a land-
owning elite); socioeconomic conditions (persistent poverty and inequality);
and institutional factors (a presidential system with winner-take-all
elections). Between 1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight
of elite competition and avarice, flawed economic policymaking, poor
governance, and armed insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand
Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986 democracy was dispensed with
in favor of a dictatorship. For nearly fifteen years, the Philippines
experienced unprecedented repression and corruption.
The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in

February 1986 restored many of the pre-martial-law era institutional
features and political elites. Although it is generally accurate to view 1986
as a return to elite democracy, Philippine society, the state, and modes of
political competition have changed since 1972. Still, even the most positive
views of democracy in the Philippines since 1986 see it as a flawed work in
progress; harsher critics see it as a sham and a failure. Commonly cited
flaws include elections tainted by violence and vote buying, widespread
rent-seeking and corruption, policies that have benefited elites and special
interests at the expense of the poor majority, and a dysfunctional justice
system.
However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many

ways, and at times has worked fairly well. Liberal values were central to the
nonviolent People Power Revolution and informed the drafting of the 1987
constitution. This resulted in constitutional guarantees of human rights;
regular, competitive elections for local and national offices; a system of
checks and balances; and a free (if flawed) media and robust civil society.
The Philippine military remains somewhat politicized, but since 1992 it has
been reluctant to directly intervene in politics. Beginning in 1986,
substantial deregulation and privatization, as well as economic integration,
set the stage for strong growth in the Philippines’ gross domestic product
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(GDP) over most of the past decade. But even observers who applaud the
post-1986 reforms have questioned if they have been broad and deep
enough to produce fundamental improvements in politics, governance, and
the economy.
PRESIDENTS, POLITICAL ELITES, AND OLIGARCHS

From 1935, when the Philippines became a semiautonomous
commonwealth, the behavior of presidents and other powerful political and
economic elites has heavily influenced the quality of the country’s
democratic politics and governance.1 The Philippines is a unitary state with
a winner-take-all electoral system, a presidency that exercises huge power
over budgets and appointments, and congenitally weak political parties. As
a result, the president plays a central role in determining policy outcomes,
as well as the norms and behavior that shape politics and governance.
The second important influence on democracy in the Philippines is

the country’s remarkably resilient political and economic elite. The
president is limited to a single six-year term, so the power and influence of
individual presidents is transitory. By contrast, political and business
families such as the Marcoses, Cojuangcos, Aquinos, and Ayalas—to
name just a few—have had noteworthy longevity and adaptability.2 They
exert a powerful influence over elections, legislation, policymaking,
regulatory bodies, jurisprudence, and the distribution of government
resources.
For decades, this elite has thwarted the development of a strong

state by limiting the government’s fiscal base and co-opting, corrupting, or
intimidating the bureaucracy. It has stunted and distorted the Philippine
economy, preferring collusion and protection over economic competition,
and has been slow and selective in opening the economy to foreign
competition. Because elites dominate legislative and policymaking
processes, successive governments have failed to adopt and implement
socioeconomic policies that address the needs of the poor and middle
class. With a Gini coefficient of 0.43, the Philippines has long been one of
the most unequal societies in Asia, with one of the highest levels of poverty
incidence among Asia’s developing economies. Even after more than a
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decade of relatively strong macroeconomic growth, the incidence of poverty

decreased only a little, to 21.6 percent in 2015.3
Today, by the World Bank’s metrics the Philippines is a lower-middle-

income country with a per capita income of $3,600 and a consumption-
driven economy that has been growing at about 6.5 percent per year for
most of the past decade, fueled by remittances and a growing business
process outsourcing sector.4 As a result, the country’s sizable,
predominantly urban, middle class now comprises 15 to 20 percent of the
population.5 In sum, over the past quarter century, the rich have become
richer, the middle class has grown but remains insecure, and about one-
quarter of the population remains poor.
THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT AND LIMITS OF REFORMISM
The “real change” promised by Rodrigo Duterte has obscured how
much positive change occurred under the administration of Benigno Aquino
III (2010–2016).6 Aquino’s promise to follow the “straight path” was an
effort to both appropriate his mother’s (Corazon Aquino) perceived integrity
and draw a sharp contrast with the pervasive corruption associated with the
administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–2010).7 Notable
successes of the Aquino government included passing reproductive health
and “sin tax” reform laws, implementing twelve years of basic education,
extending public finance reform, expanding fiscal space and social
spending, and making an effort to provide greater autonomy to Muslims in
Mindanao. GDP growth reached 6.5 percent, and by virtually every
measure the country’s international standing improved significantly. As a
result, Aquino remained popular throughout most of his term.
To be sure, there also were significant shortcomings and mistakes.

Macroeconomic growth was slow to reduce poverty, and the government
was unable to rapidly improve infrastructure, especially in traffic-clogged
Metro Manila. It did little to reform dysfunctional food and agriculture
policies, and could have done more to strengthen anticorruption institutions
and to pass a freedom of information law. In terms of governance, Aquino
was widely seen as honest, but he sometimes valued loyalty over
competence and occasionally seemed to lack the empathy that Filipinos
expect from their political leaders. His administration also suffered from
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complacency (due to the president’s personal popularity), problems

communicating its accomplishments, and its failure to make the Liberal
Party a more coherent and durable political party. And when it came time to
choose a successor, Aquino remained committed to supporting Manuel
“Mar” Roxas, his secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG)—even though opinion polls consistently indicated that
Roxas would not win.8
DUTERTE AND THE PROMISE OF REAL CHANGE

On May 10, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, then seventy-one years old, was
elected president, winning 39 percent of the vote in a five-way race.
Charismatic, blunt, and frequently profane, Duterte combined a Dirty Harry
persona with a track record as a successful mayor of Davao City,
Mindanao’s largest city. Although Duterte might appear to be
unsophisticated and crude, he is politically savvy and attuned to the
attitudes and concerns of average Filipinos. He ran on his reputation as an
effective, no-nonsense mayor of Davao who prioritized law and order over
legal protections for alleged criminals. The overarching theme of Duterte’s
campaign was that his strong leadership would produce rapid change.
During his campaign, he heaped criticism on the Manila-based elite, vowed
to undertake a nationwide assault on illegal drugs and criminality, and
promised to change the government to a federal system. His victory over
Mar Roxas, who placed a distant second, signaled that the promise of
change was more compelling than continuity. Even though Duterte had
been popular in Mindanao before he ran for president, his victory showed
that his appeal spanned regions and socioeconomic classes. The
16.6 million Filipinos who voted for him appeared to believe that he could
deliver real change.
Duterte’s victory surprised many and shocked some. In the wake of

his election, political analysts have grappled with what it says about
contemporary Philippine politics. The reasons why he won are complex,
suggesting that cautious and nuanced conclusions are warranted. First, the
incumbent, Benigno Aquino—the embodiment of reformist elite
democracy—could not run for a second term. If he had been able to run, it
might have been a very different outcome.9 Second, the Philippine election
law has no provision for run-offs, so there is no incentive to form coalition
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tickets. Had Mar Roxas and Senator Grace Poe, the two most like-minded
candidates, joined forces, they might have been able to defeat Duterte.
Third, Duterte ran a savvy and effective campaign. He announced his
candidacy late, so the media had little time to scrutinize his record as
mayor and his rivals had much less chance to attack him. His campaign
mobilized large numbers of volunteers and used social media well. Fourth,
all four of Duterte’s opponents had significant negatives. In contrast,
Duterte, because of his personality and message, was an attention-
grabbing and compelling candidate, who was able to tap into (and to some
extent manipulate) middle class frustrations and “latent anxiety,” particularly
about drugs and crime.10 Although the assertions of middle-class frustration
seem valid for anyone who has lived in Metro Manila, Cebu, or the handful
of other cities that are home to most of the Philippine middle class, the
extent to which this sense of frustration and anxiety was national in scope
is relatively less clear.
THE DUTERTE GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIES AND POLICIES

Upon assuming office on June 30, 2016, Duterte assembled an
eclectic cabinet that included law school classmates, long-time associates
from Davao, ex-military officers, business leaders, and representatives of
the communist left. His diverse coalition came together through personal
loyalty, regional affinity, and political opportunism. It included many political
figures who had been sidelined during the Aquino administration, most
notably former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and members of the
Marcos, Estrada, and Villar families.
Now seventy-three years old, Duterte’s world view is heavily

influenced by nationalist and leftist thought dating from the 1960s and
1970s, as well as by his twenty-two years of experience as mayor of Davao
City. In Davao, he combined a hardline approach to law and order with
socially progressive and pro-business policies. As mayor he was both a
paternalistic patron and a fearsome boss whose orders had to be followed.
As a result, he has little tolerance for scrutiny or challenges to this
authority. He sees the country as beset by existential threats of drugs,
crime, and corruption. As befits Philippine culture, his approach is highly
personalistic: he presents himself as the only leader strong and decisive
enough to save the nation. As for his frequently crude and threatening
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rhetoric, anthropologist Nicole Curato has called his approach “crass

politics” that, though objectionable to many, communicates multiple
messages:
Duterte may be offending the norms of respectful communication

when he prefaces his remarks with “mother fucker,” but he brings to the
surface the collective frustration many feel. He may not offer the clearest
policy, but he puts forward the sincerest discourse of sympathy. . . .
Duterte’s gutter language establishes the urgency of saving the republic.
Including “kill” and “death” is essential to the president’s vocabulary for the
country is at war, and his politics of “I will” demands quick, albeit painful,
solutions.11
KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES

The Duterte government’s top priorities include combating illegal
drugs and crime, promoting rapid infrastructure development, sustaining
economic growth and making it more inclusive, enhancing peace and
development in Mindanao, and reorienting the Philippines’ foreign relations.
To support these goals, the government has significantly increased
spending on infrastructure, raised the salaries of government employees,
expanded existing social development programs, revived the stalled peace
process with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), entered into negotiations with the
communist insurgents, and established a closer relationship with China.
Space constraints do not permit a full discussion of the government’s

domestic and foreign policies. Instead, the following sections discuss three
policy areas that offer insights into the Duterte administration—economic
policymaking, peace and development in Mindanao, and constitutional
change—and discuss in greater detail the ongoing war on drugs.
Economic policies and performance. As a candidate, Duterte showed

little interest in economic policy issues. To reassure nervous domestic and
foreign businesses, his campaign developed a ten-point economic agenda
that largely continued the Aquino government’s economic policies. Since
taking office, Duterte’s two principal economic priorities have been to
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accelerate economic growth and make it more inclusive, and to significantly

increase spending on much-needed infrastructure. Key features of the
government’s approach to the economy include running a larger deficit,
adopting a more statist approach to infrastructure development, and
continuing increases in social spending.
In 2017, GDP growth was 6.7 percent, and it is projected to be about

6.5 percent in 2018. The government, under its “Build Build Build” program,
has significantly increased spending on infrastructure and has ambitious
plans to build new rail lines, a subway, highways, and bridges in the
coming years.12 To finance spending on infrastructure and social services,
the government has embarked on a multiphase tax reform program. The
first package of reforms was signed into law in December 2017; the second
and more controversial package is with Congress. Inflation has been
increasing, averaging 4.8 percent for January to August and reaching a
nine-year high of 6.7 percent in September and October.13 Higher oil and
food prices, excise taxes associated with tax reform, and the weak peso
have all fueled inflation.
Duterte and Mindanao. Duterte is the first president from the southern
island of Mindanao, and his election was a significant political milestone for
the Philippines. Home to about 25 percent of the nation’s population,
Mindanao is a promising but vexing mix of economic opportunity and
underdevelopment, ethnic and religious diversity, and multiple forms of
armed conflict. Under Duterte, progress on the political and security front
has been mixed. This is in large measure due to the May 2017 occupation
of Marawi City, in Lanao del Sur province, by Islamist extremists affiliated
with the self-proclaimed Islamic State. It took five months of combat
operations for the Philippine military to regain control over the extensively
damaged city. In response to the Marawi crisis Duterte imposed island-
wide martial law, which remains in effect. The rehabilitation of the city is
expected to cost more than $1 billion.
But before Marawi exploded, the Duterte government had done little
either to revive the stalled effort to pass legislation providing for greater
Muslim autonomy or to adopt federalism, an approach that many in
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Mindanao consider important for the island’s future. The government had
entered into a series of on-again, off-again talks with the communist
insurgency, which still has a significant armed presence in eastern
Mindanao. Currently, the process has stalled and appears unlikely to
produce a breakthrough.
The most significant accomplishment pertaining to Mindanao was the

passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in July 2018. The BOL
translates into law many of the provisions included in the 2014 peace
agreement between the Aquino government and the MILF. Under the BOL,
a new political entity, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, would replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The BOL is an important step forward, but multiple challenges
remain, including possible objections to its constitutionality, a forthcoming
plebiscite scheduled for late January and early February 2019, and the
actual establishment of the new autonomous entity.
The fading prospects for constitutional change. As a candidate,

Duterte ran against the widely perceived political and economic dominance
of “imperial Manila” and promised to change the Philippines into a federal
state. This platform was not unprecedented: since 1992, there have been
recurring initiatives for charter change (or “Cha-Cha,” in the colloquial
expression), and all of them have failed. Duterte’s popularity and political
dominance seemed to enhance the prospects for success this time. But
during most of his first two years in office, he showed limited interest in this
complex and contentious issue of federalism. He appointed a twenty-two-
member Constitutional Commission, and received its proposed draft
constitution in early July 2018. The commission suggested eighteen
federated regions and kept the directly elected presidency. Cha-Cha is now
in the hands of the Congress. If both houses agree to change the
constitution, the revised charter will be subject to a national plebiscite.
Over the past year, opposition to both the substance and process of
Cha-Cha has grown. Senators are elected in a nationwide constituency, so
many of them see federalism as a threat to their political influence and
ambitions. Others criticize the process for being tightly controlled and
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nonparticipatory. Several of Duterte’s own economic managers have raised

concerns about the economic costs and uncertainties that would
accompany such a fundamental change. A recent Pulse Asia survey
indicated that most Filipinos have little knowledge of the 1987 constitution
and 66 percent are against changing it. The same survey also found that
69 percent have little or no knowledge of federalism and only 28 percent
favored changing to a federal system.14
As of December 2018 it appears unlikely that Cha-Cha will happen

before the May 2019 midterm elections. The outcome of these elections—
and particularly, the future composition of the Senate—may determine
whether Cha-Cha will be revived in the next legislative term.
THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICS AND

GOVERNANCE
Duterte’s principal priority has been a highly punitive approach to
illegal drug use, which he sees as an existential threat to the country’s
social fabric. His nationwide war on drugs has applied the approach that he
used in Davao City, giving the police free rein to deal with suspected drug
users and pushers with little concern for legal niceties. It also has involved
a lesser-noticed campaign against government officials allegedly complicit
in the drug trade. This approach has resulted in the deaths of thousands of
suspected drug users and pushers—mostly young males living in poor
urban neighborhoods—at the hands of the police or unidentified assailants.
The police claim that many of these deaths were the result of the suspects
resisting arrest, but evidence from journalists and human rights groups
shows that many were premeditated extra-judicial killings (EJKs).15 The
number of EJKs is difficult to determine and disputed—in part because the
government and Philippine National Police (PNP) intentionally obfuscate
the data—but estimates range from 6,000 to 12,000 deaths.16
This loss of life is the most horrific and immediate consequence of the
drug war. But the drug war itself is a sign that the Philippine government
has abdicated its responsibility to protect human rights and respect the rule
of law. EJKs violate both the Philippine Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which the Philippines is a
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signatory), particularly the provisions concerning the presumption of

innocence and adherence to due process. Given the attention that human
rights organizations and the media have paid to the drug war, it is worth
looking more closely at the reasons for it and some of its broader
consequences.17
Why is Duterte singularly focused on drugs and crime? It is not

surprising that crime is a major problem in the Philippines, given its high
level of poverty, underresourced and corruption-prone law enforcement
agencies, and glacially slow judiciary. Criminal activities, in the form of
smuggling, illegal gambling, drugs, trafficking in persons, and money
laundering, are significant features of the Philippine political
economy.18 Studies by International Alert suggest that the illicit economy in
Mindanao plays an important role in sustaining the multiple conflicts across
the island.19
Crime has been a political issue intermittently since the 1960s.

Marcos pointed to criminality and lawlessness as a justification for martial
law in 1972, and Joseph Estrada’s image as a crime fighter was an
important aspect of his political appeal in the late 1990s.20 Crime also
corrupts politics and undermines institutions. Politicians and the police have
long participated in, protected, or otherwise benefited from criminal activity.
The proceeds from these illegal activities have been an important source of
financing for some politicians as well as for terrorist groups. At the
community level, drug use and drug-related crimes have long been
recognized as serious social problems. By the late 1990s, the importation
(primarily from China), local production, and use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (known as shabu in the Philippines) was a major issue for
law enforcement and the courts.21 In public opinion surveys prior to 2016,
crime usually came just behind unemployment and food prices in the list of
people’s main concerns. Survey data also showed a complex trend during
the Aquino administration: fewer people were victims of crime, but more
were worried about encountering drug addicts. Under Duterte, the official
estimates of drug use have increased significantly—suggesting that they
were either understated before or are being overstated now.22
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Since the early 2000s, there has been a growing awareness of the
problem of narco-politics, mostly involving mayors and other local officials
thought to be complicit in the drug trade.23 However, it would be an
exaggeration to assert that the Philippines is becoming a narco-state,
where state institutions have been penetrated by the power and wealth of
drug lords and the economy depends heavily on the production or
distribution of illegal drugs. Nevertheless, Duterte sees it differently.
Although he was not the first presidential candidate to run against drugs
and crime, he was the first to frame drugs as an existential threat and to be
explicit about the brutal approach he would use to solve the problem.
Why has Duterte made illegal drugs his signature issue? In addition
to viewing drugs as a cancer on society, there is an ugly political logic.
Combating drugs and crime was central to his reputation as an effective
mayor of Davao City. Moreover, public acceptance of the Davao Death
Squad, a shadowy group that specifically targeted suspected drug dealers,
petty criminals, and homeless youth, showed the low cost and high returns
of mounting an extra-legal war on drugs and crime.24 As president,
Duterte’s nationwide war on drugs continues to play well across most
socioeconomic segments of society, particularly as long as the principal
victims are the urban poor.
The drug war also offers a potent and useful political narrative in
which Duterte alone possesses the moral authority to rescue the country
from the dangers posed by drug pushers and other criminals. As Peter
Kreuzer, a German researcher, has observed:
Duterte not only successfully established crime as the most pressing
problem, but also made the unconditional fight against this threat into a
hallmark of a comprehensive “we” group. Given the assumed absoluteness
of the evil to be combated, any criticism of the president has been silenced.
Detractors are suspected of being supporters of the criminal threat to
society, and any reference to due process can be ignored.25
This narrative of drugs as an existential threat has been used to

justify imprisoning opposition Senator Leila de Lima (a prominent critic of
17 | P a g e
Duterte’s drug war), to exercise control over local officials, and to frame the
motivation of the Islamic extremists who took over Marawi City26
Public attitudes about the war on drugs. Most Filipinos believe that
Duterte’s war on alleged drug users and pushers is a draconian but
necessary response to a serious social problem. Survey data have shown
strong but softening support for it: in December 2016, 85 percent of those
surveyed voiced satisfaction, though by June 2018, only 78 percent were
satisfied.27 At the same time, almost three out of four Filipinos (73 percent)
believe that EJKs happen, almost as many are concerned that they might
be a victim of an EJK, and a large majority think that it is important for the
police to capture suspects alive.28
Why is there such strong public support for the drug war? One
explanation offered is that it reflects widespread disillusionment with the
Philippine justice system. Certainly, rich and powerful Filipinos enjoy near-
total impunity while many poor and middle-class Filipinos see the system’s
high costs, delays, partiality, and corruption. However, the degree of
alienation should not be overstated: few Filipinos ever go to court, and
surveys indicate that the judiciary and the police both enjoy moderately
high approval ratings.
A second explanation is that Duterte has successfully dehumanized

suspected drug pushers and users and turned them into a threatening
“other” to be eradicated by any means available. As such, they do not
deserve legal protections, rehabilitation, or empathy. This view might erode
if the war on drugs expanded to target alleged drug users in the middle and
upper classes.
A third explanation is that the drug war, despite its excesses, is seen
as a welcome example of government responsiveness. It is rare for multiple
government authorities—including the PNP, national government agencies,
and local government officials—to work together to address pressing social
issues. This whole-of-government approach appears to have produced
results. According to the PNP, the national crime rate (excluding murders)
has declined more than 20 percent over the past two years, and surveys
18 | P a g e
suggest that Filipinos feel more secure. In a June 2018 Pulse Asia survey,
69 percent said that the Duterte administration’s efforts to eradicate the
drugs is his most important accomplishment, with the fight against
criminality ranking second.29
The drug war’s impact on the Philippine National Police. The PNP is
the government institution most deeply involved in implementing the drug
war—known locally as Oplan Double Barrel or Oplan Tokhang—and
therefore most directly affected by it.30 The involvement of PNP elements in
EJKs is well documented and beyond dispute.31 Some broader
consequences of the PNP’s involvement are worth examining in greater
detail.
Although largely overlooked by most analyses, the PNP, and its

predecessor the Philippine Constabulary, have long been at the nexus of
politics, crime, and the rule of law. As historian Alfred McCoy has shown,
Philippine presidents and local officials have used the police as an
essential tool to assert their authority, bolster their legitimacy, selectively
fight crime, and control dissent.32 As the principal law enforcement agency,
the PNP has a long history of being vulnerable to corruption, particularly in
the highly lucrative areas of illegal gambling, drugs, and smuggling. Some
of this corruption stems from individual greed, but it also is the product of
low salaries, the complicity of politicians, and the multifaceted shortcomings
of the justice system.
As mayor of a city that at times was wracked by political and criminal

violence, Duterte considered the police to be a central pillar of his
government. He established close relationships with many in the police and
gained an intimate understanding of how the police operate. Thus, it is not
surprising that Duterte and the PNP have a symbiotic relationship.
In the context of Duterte’s drug war, individual police officers face

difficult choices. Journalist Sheila Coronel describes the complex
considerations that influence police behavior today:
19 | P a g e
Policemen weigh the continually shifting balance of incentives and

risks as they seek to deter crime, advance their careers, please their
political patrons, and make money, while also evading exposure and
prosecution. Yet in the end, these policemen often also believe they are
upholding order and helping keep the peace. They are specialists in
violence—practitioners in the skills of lethal force—who improvise often
morally and legally questionable workarounds to the constraints of a broken
justice system.33
The longer-term consequences for law enforcement from the war on
drugs may be highly damaging. The Brookings Institution’s Vanda Felbab-
Brown has warned about its potentially corrupting influence:
Inducing police to engage in de facto shoot-to-kill policies is

enormously corrosive of law enforcement, not to mention the rule of law.
There is a high chance that the policy will more than ever institutionalize
top-level corruption, as only powerful drug traffickers will be able to bribe
their way into upper-levels of the Philippine law enforcement system. . . .
Moreover, corrupt top-level cops and government officials tasked with such
witch-hunts will have the perfect opportunity to direct law enforcement
against their drug business rivals as well as political enemies, and
themselves become the top drug capos.34
Moreover, assuming that eventually there will be a president who no

longer sanctions EJKs by the police, the seeds have been planted for a
potentially divisive and dangerous debate over how to handle human rights
abuses that the PNP carried out during the Duterte era.
Other collateral damage. Duterte’s war on drugs has had less dramatic but
significant consequences for other aspects of governance in the
Philippines, including the justice system, public health, and local
governance.
Impact on the justice system. The war on drugs has further stressed
the Philippines’ overburdened justice system. The volume of cases to be
investigated, prosecuted, and tried, as well as the number of alleged
offenders awaiting trial in detention facilities, has increased dramatically. A
comprehensive picture of the impact on the justice system is beyond the
20 | P a g e
scope of this working paper, but some of the available data point to these
burdens. In 2016, there were 28,000 drug arrests—a 44 percent increase
over 2015—and more than 47,300 drug-related cases were filed.35 During
the first 10 months of 2017, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
conducted 34,744 drug enforcement operations, with 66,672 arrests.36 In
2017, about 70,700 drug-related cases were filed in court, and about
21,400 were reviewed.37 According to the Supreme Court, as of 2017 more
than 289,000 drug cases had been filed in the country’s lower courts.38
As a result, drug suspects and convicts are crammed into the

Philippines’ already packed jails and prisons. According to the Department
of Justice’s Bureau of Corrections, in 2017 the national prison system held
41,500 inmates, more than double its capacity. Data from the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, which oversees provincial and municipal jails,
show an even more disturbing situation. As of May 2018, there were over
141,000 detainees—of which about 70 percent were drug-related cases—
held in jails that were 582 percent overcapacity.39
Ultimately, the legal dimensions of the war on drugs will test not only
the capacity of the justice system, but also the jurisprudence, values, and
autonomy of the Philippine judiciary. In November 2018, a Regional Trial
Court issued the first legal judgment against the PNP, finding three
policemen guilty of murdering Kian Delos Santos, a seventeen-year-old the
policemen claimed was a drug runner who resisted arrest. Currently, there
is one case before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of
the PNP’s official plan for eradicating illegal drugs.
Impact on public health. The government’s punitive approach to reducing
drug use also has important consequences for public health. It has
overwhelmed the country’s paltry rehabilitation capacity and is having a
negative effect on drug-linked diseases. As of mid-2017, the Philippines
had only forty-eight drug rehabilitation facilities and only about fifty medical
personnel trained in addiction medicine.40 According to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, close to 990,000 “drug personalities” voluntarily
surrendered in 2016, and by May 2017 that number had grown to
1.2 million people.
21 | P a g e
The war on drugs has had predictable negative effects on drug-

related public health problems. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown:
[A] crucial goal of drug policy should be to enhance public health and
limit the spread of diseases linked to drug use. The worst possible policy is
to push addicts into the shadows, ostracize them, and increase the chance
of overdoses as well as a rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, drug-resistant
tuberculosis, and hepatitis. In prisons, users will not get adequate treatment
for either their addiction or their communicable disease. . . . Even prior to
the [sic] Duterte’s brutal war on drugs, the rate of HIV infections in the
Philippines has been soaring due to inadequate awareness and failure to
support safe sex practices. . . . Duterte’s war on drugs will only intensify
these worrisome trends among drug users.41
Impact on local politics and government. Duterte’s almost singular

focus on the drug war has far-reaching consequences for the country’s
local politics and governance. In many respects, subnational government in
the Philippines is highly decentralized, but most local government units
(LGUs) are dependent upon central government funding and grapple with
the challenge of unfunded mandates. LGUs are key actors in the drug war,
and local officials need to juggle multiple and sometimes conflicting
priorities, including protecting their citizens, cooperating with local law
enforcement, and demonstrating results to central authorities. And as
reported by Rappler, a respected Philippine news website, the drug war
has caused a major shift in LGU priorities:
At the local level, the drug war has changed the way barangays [the
smallest LGUs] spend their funds. . . . Traditional social services such as
medical clinics or feeding programs for malnourished children are no longer
budget priorities. Through a number of policy incentives as well as strict
supervision by the DILG, the priority at the barangay level has now become
the monitoring and surveillance of drug suspects and the rehabilitation of
drug users who have surrendered.42
22 | P a g e
There also is a darker dimension to the drug war at the local level.
Peter Kreuzer notes the pressure and intimidation experienced by local
officials:
It has become highly problematic for local political elites to evade the
president’s injunction to participate in the anti-crime killing spree that is
engulfing the Philippines. . . . The various reshuffles are placing more hard-
line police officers in command positions. Furthermore, these officers are
well aware that results measured in dead bodies are expected of them. In
addition, police officers and politicians alike have been publicly denounced
as supporting and profiting from drug crimes and thus threatened not only
with being indicted, but also with becoming victims of extrajudicial
executions themselves. Most officials then choose to fall in line with the
president.43
DUTERTE’S SUBVERSION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND

NORMS
The Duterte government’s approach to eradicating illegal drugs, besides
being inhumane and misguided, has negative consequences for the rule of
law, governance, and politics. But that is not the full extent of the damage
being done to the Philippine polity. This section provides an assessment of
the Duterte government’s impact on democratic institutions and norms.
JUST HARDBALL POLITICS AS USUAL?

Some observers of Philippine politics might argue that Duterte is only
the most recent example of presidents who exercise fully the levers of
executive power to advance their political and policy agendas. In this light,
he is perpetuating and perhaps perfecting the hardball politics that every
president has practiced since 1986. To be sure, Duterte’s predecessors all
used a mix of persuasion and inducements to advance their agenda, and
no president has been above using intimidation and subterfuge to get their
way at times. Therefore, the “politics as usual” view has some superficial
validity. But a deeper assessment shows that the Duterte presidency is
qualitatively different from its post-Marcos predecessors because of its
willingness to intimidate the opposition, weaken institutional checks, and
discard democratic norms.
23 | P a g e
The Duterte presidency is fundamentally different from post-1986

administrations in its unrelenting use of intimidation to weaken any
challenges to its authority. Duterte’s brutal drug war sends a powerful
message regarding his willingness to use extra-legal means, including
EJKs, to achieve his goals. Unlike previous administrations, Duterte and his
supporters routinely use lawsuits, incarceration, and social media trolling to
intimidate opponents and critics. As sociologist Randy David has observed:
Compared to Ferdinand Marcos, Mr. Duterte has performed the art of

intimidation with consummate skill. Without warning, he calls out the name
of his prey, denouncing him or her in the strongest possible terms, and
publicly announces that he or she, or they, are in his line of fire. . . . The
public has learned to take these instances of public vilification of targeted
figures as part of the Duterte style of rule. People know these are not
empty threats. Indeed, the public takes them as synonymous with the
President’s exercise of political will.44
In some cases, Duterte’s threats may simply reflect his impetuous

personality and desire to dominate media coverage. However, his
statements and actions also send the message that no one is safe from his
attacks and that opposing him is a high-risk venture.
DISABLING DEMOCRATIC CHECKS AND BALANCES

As a former mayor, Duterte is used to governing by decree and by dint of
his personality, popularity, and unrivaled authority. In Davao City, he had
no strong political opposition, significant institutional checks, or close media
scrutiny. Peter Kreuzer, writing in 2009 (when Duterte was mayor),
presciently observed:
Duterte makes abundantly clear that there can be security, but only
he himself can provide it. Security is provided according to his personal
ideas of justice and adequateness. In his political symbolism, Duterte
clearly is above the law. It is him, who indicts, passes judgment and orders
the executioners to do their job. It is a personalized fight between those
who do not follow the rules and the rightful vigilante whose rules reign
supreme.45
24 | P a g e
As president, Duterte has repeatedly expressed his disdain for those who
oppose his policies, and has taken numerous steps to silence his critics
and weaken institutional checks:
• Led by Solicitor General Jose Calida, the government has
weaponized the legal system to attack political opponents. This
began in early 2017 when opposition Senator Leila de Lima was
imprisoned on nonbailable drug-related charges.46 Groups allied with
Duterte, as well as some leftist organizations, have filed multiple
lawsuits against former president Aquino and former budget secretary
Florencio “Butch” Abad, a longtime leader of the Liberal Party. Most
recently, in September 2018 the government arrested Senator
Antonio Trillanes IV, a vocal critic of Duterte. The government
claimed that a presidential pardon granted to Trillanes by Benigno
Aquino in 2011 was invalid, therefore making Trillanes ineligible to
serve as senator.47
• Duterte has repeatedly disparaged or threatened the leaders of key
accountability institutions like the chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the
chairwoman of the Office of the Ombudsman. Followers of Duterte
threatened to seek the impeachment of Ombudsman Conchita
Carpio-Morales, but her term ended in July 2018. Most disturbingly, in
March 2018 Solicitor General Calida filed a quo warranto petition
against then chief justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, and in May 2018,
the Supreme Court—which currently is dominated by Macapagal
Arroyo appointees and in time will be dominated by Duterte
appointees—took the unprecedented and arguably unconstitutional
step of removing its own chief justice.48
• The government has threatened the mainstream media with lawsuits
and nonrenewal of franchises.49 These threats have been directed at
media owners like the Rufino-Prieto family, which owns the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, and the Lopez family, which owns ABS-CBN, the
country’s largest TV network. In January 2018, the Securities and
Exchange Commission revoked the operating license of the highly
respected news website Rappler, alleging that it has foreign
owners and therefore is in violation of the constitution. In November,
the Department of Justice said that it had grounds to indict both
25 | P a g e
Rappler and its founder Maria Ressa for tax evasion and failure to file
tax returns.50 Meanwhile, on social media, critics of the government
are routinely harassed and threatened.
• Finally, Duterte has periodically raised the specter of declaring martial
law nationwide or forming a revolutionary government that would no
longer be bound by the constitution. Declaring martial law would be
constitutional, at least initially, but would be extremely polarizing
politically. However, declaring a revolutionary government would be
an extra-constitutional act. It seems likely that these statements are
intended as trial balloons to gauge public and elite reactions.
THE PROSPECTS FOR PUSHBACK: POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

CHECKS ON DUTERTE
President Duterte’s continued popularity is not surprising. His base of
support is rooted in his persona, his tough approach to fighting drugs and
crime, his proto-populist policies, and the Philippines’ continuing economic
growth. Moreover, Duterte and his supporters have demonstrated an
impressive ability to put their opponents on the defensive. They portray
individuals and groups associated with the Aquino administration as
incompetent or corrupt elitists. They accuse defenders of human rights of
protecting drug peddlers and criminals. They charge the mainstream media
with being partisan and disseminating “fake news.” What then, are the
existing and potential checks on Duterte?
COUNTERVAILING INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

A brief scan of the political landscape suggests that most institutions and
actors that can serve as checks on Duterte are weak, divided, or under
attack.
• Provisions in the 1987 Constitution place checks on the duration of
martial law and the powers than can be exercised under it. Today, the
powers granted to the president and the military during martial law
are limited in ways that did not exist when Ferdinand Marcos used
martial law as the foundation for his dictatorship. However, it is still
possible that the constitution will be rewritten, which could include
expanding the scope for declaring martial law and increasing the
powers exercised under it.
26 | P a g e
• Since 1986 the jurisprudence of the fifteen-member Supreme

Court has been eclectic, defying simple characterization. Based on its
decisions over the past two years, it is clear that the court does not
see itself as a bulwark against Duterte’s exercise of presidential
power. Moreover, the court’s autonomy and integrity have been
seriously compromised by the unprecedented removal of Sereno
from chief justice at the behest of Duterte’s solicitor general.
• The Commission on Human Rights has limited authority and a small
staff and budget. Without the cooperation of the PNP and
government prosecutors, its impact has been further diminished. The
dramatic increase in EJKs has highlighted the relative powerlessness
of the commission, as well as the divisions and weaknesses that
characterize human rights NGOs in the Philippines.
• The mainstream political opposition is weak and on the defensive.
This is the predictable consequence of the power of the presidency,
Duterte’s popularity, and the chronic weakness of political parties.
The Liberal Party has been decimated by defections, and its
leadership (and other members of the Aquino coalition) have
struggled to craft a counternarrative and strategy. Aquino has been
largely silent, and until recently the putative leader of the opposition,
Vice President Leonor “Leni” Robredo, has kept an intentionally low
profile.
• The national democratic left has been divided by Duterte’s
policies. Since 1986, the “Natdem” left—the legal political parties and
mass organizations associated with the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP)—has enjoyed a relatively small but well-organized
following. But it also suffers from factionalism and antiquated
leadership and doctrine. Its unity has been weakened by the
contradictions inherent in Duterte’s policies. To woo over this section
of the opposition, Duterte invited members of the left into his cabinet,
entered into peace talks with the CPP and its armed wing, New
People’s Army (NPA), and has been vociferously anti-American. At
the same time, other policies of his are anathema to the left: the
human rights abuses associated with the drug war, his empowering
of the PNP and the armed forces, his threats to declare martial law,
and his decision to break off peace talks. As a result, the left has
been slow to unify in opposition to Duterte.
27 | P a g e
• The Catholic Church is an influential voice in Philippine society and

politics, but it is not monolithic and its views do not always prevail.
Initially, Catholic bishops were divided over Duterte and how to
engage him, especially because of his popularity and the public’s
support for the drug war. But over time, their cautious response to
EJKs has become more critical.51 Duterte has openly disparaged the
church, calling it corrupt and hypocritical, and at one point ranted
about God being “stupid.”
• Civil society organizations (CSOs) and coalitions in the Philippines
can play an important political role through their policy advocacy,
efforts to make government more transparent and accountable, and
ability to mobilize protests. However, the political impact of civil
society is reduced by partisan and ideological differences, the narrow
focus of most CSOs, and inadequate financial and human resources.
Many of the CSOs that worked closely with the Aquino government
are now suspect and on the defensive. Yet major universities,
especially those in Manila, remain important centers for critical
analysis and debate.
• Philippine and foreign businesses were reassured by the Duterte
government’s ten-point economic plan, which promised considerable
continuity, as well as the appointment of Davao-based businessman
Carlos “Sonny” Dominguez as finance secretary. Most businesses
support the increased government spending on infrastructure, but
reactions to Duterte’s tax reforms have been more mixed. Businesses
also have differing views on China’s growing economic role and the
desirability of federalism. Given the power of the presidency, the
business community tends to be reluctant to criticize a sitting
president. However, this could change if businesses feel that they are
being hurt by poor macroeconomic management or excessive
cronyism or corruption.
It is important to note that there is a typical arc of presidencies, which
begins with high approval ratings, strong congressional support, and
minimal opposition. Following the midterm elections, the power of the
president often begins to diminish as political and business elites position
themselves for the next presidential election.
THE POTENTIALLY PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

28 | P a g e
The senior leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

has a tradition of generally respecting civilian primacy, but the AFP
nonetheless influences politics and policymaking in a variety of important
ways. First, if there is a leadership crisis, like there was in January 2001,
following the aborted impeachment trial of then president Joseph Estrada,
and the AFP chooses to withdraw its support from the sitting president, it
virtually guarantees the end of that presidency. Second, the AFP’s longtime
efforts to combat domestic armed insurgencies make it an influential actor
in Mindanao and other conflict-affected areas. Under Duterte, the role of
the AFP in Mindanao has been elevated further with the imposition of
island-wide martial law. Third, the AFP has a strong say in determining
national security policy. Over the past decade, the focus of the AFP’s
mission has shifted from internal security to a growing concern with
external threats, particularly from China. Finally, because of the AFP’s
long-standing ties to the U.S. military, the AFP is an important stakeholder
in the Philippines’ bilateral relationship with the United States.
In recent years, the AFP appears to have become more professional

and less political, but all presidents still cultivate the support of the AFP
leadership. Duterte has appointed numerous former officers to senior
civilian positions in his government. He knows a number of them from when
he was mayor, and he appears to believe that military officers will be more
effective administrators and less prone to corruption than civilians. He also
wants to bolster support within the military for his national security policies,
including negotiating with the communists and embracing China. He has
courted rank-and-file soldiers and police, visiting many military bases and
raising salaries.
To date, Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana and the AFP

leadership have shown they understand the constitutionally mandated role
of the military and are committed to military professionalism. The AFP has
avoided being drawn into the antidrug campaign, and to date the army
appears to have administered martial law in Mindanao with competence
and restraint. However, given mandatory retirement ages, the senior
leadership of the AFP changes fairly rapidly. Therefore, routine leadership
changes could bring to the fore senior officers who are more political.
29 | P a g e
A final potentially important issue is the uncertain extent to which

members of the AFP agree with the Duterte administration’s approach to
addressing the country’s national security challenges. Some members of
the military may likely object to his pivot to China, his willingness to
negotiate with communist insurgents, and his fixation on the drug war.
Other military officials may also feel that the AFP’s domestic role has
become unacceptably overextended by the Marawi crisis in 2017, the
administration of martial law across Mindanao, and the continuing threat of
Islamist extremism.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion in the Philippines is frequently measured by credible survey
firms and closely monitored by all politicians. As a result, public support for
the president is an important factor in perceptions of presidential power.
Duterte has remained popular because he entered office with an energized
base of support and because elements of his persona and policies appeal
across socioeconomic classes. What might cause public support for
Duterte to soften?
• Duterte promised real change within a matter of months. Although
most Filipinos probably knew that his timeframe was unrealistic, he is
now well into the third year of his administration and there has been
little or no change on many fronts. The economy continues to grow,
but the benefits of growth have not been quickly or widely shared.
Likewise, it will be years before the benefits of the government’s
infrastructure program will be widely experienced.52 Meanwhile, the
push for federalism has been erratic and appears to have stalled.
Scholar Nicole Curato suggests that support for Duterte is
“conditional not fanatical.” According to her, “He may be able to get
away with murders, but not with broken promises.”53
• Deteriorating economic conditions. The Philippine economy is likely
to continue to grow at around 6.5 percent for the foreseeable future.
But as has been the case in the past, strong GDP growth does not
necessarily result in rapid improvements in the incomes of poor
Filipinos. Instead, inflation—which currently is at a nine-year high—
has an immediate and tangible impact on consumers, especially the
poor and retirees. In addition to the spike in inflation, the depreciation
30 | P a g e
of the peso and the uncertainties associated with a change to a

federal system pose risks to the economy’s performance.
• Corruption begins to undermine Duterte’s moral authority. Every
presidency is tainted by corruption to a greater or lesser degree.
There is little evidence that Duterte enriched himself while he was
mayor of Davao City, and as president he has dismissed—though not
necessarily punished—members of his administration suspected of
corruption. But his push to rapidly increase spending on
infrastructure, combined with the weakening of accountability
mechanisms, almost guarantees more corruption and malfeasance in
government. As Joel Rocamora has observed: “People turned
against Erap [Joseph Estrada] not because of his performance as
president, but because they changed their judgment of the man.
Judgment shifted from the rational to the moral sphere.”54
• Unease with becoming “another province of China.” The rapidity,
degree and tone of Duterte’s embrace of China—and commensurate
distancing from the United States—are not without political risks.
Many Filipinos have some Chinese blood, so there is not the same
level of sensitivity about ethnic Chinese domination of the economy
as is found in Indonesia and Malaysia. However, some Filipinos have
less-than-positive views of Chinese nationals residing in the
Philippines because they are seen as being associated with the drug
trade, gambling, and illegal mining.55 Surveys indicate that Filipinos
have a high level of trust in the United States and a low level of trust
in China, and four of five Filipinos believe that it is “not right” to
accede to China in the South China Sea.56
• The emergence of an appealing alternative. To date, the opposition to
Duterte lacks a leader (or group of leaders) who offers a compelling
alternative to the president and his policies. The government’s
targeted assault on opposition leaders, including the arrests of
Senators de Lima and Trillanes, is partly to blame, but the
opposition’s weakness also stems from its limited pool of potential
leaders. After maintaining a low profile for most of the past two years,
Vice President Leni Robredo has become more vocal in her
criticisms. Besides Vice President Robredo, other potential
challengers include those whom Duterte has attacked: Senators de
Lima and Trillanes and former chief justice Sereno. Moreover, former
31 | P a g e
president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who was elevated to speaker of

the house in July 2018, also may be positioning herself as a possible
successor to Duterte.
IS DUTERTE A POPULIST? AND DOES IT MATTER?

In recent years, “populist” has become a convenient adjective to describe a
growing number of political leaders, including Duterte. But as a term
intended to categorize a particular approach to politics and governing,
populism is frustratingly expansive. Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira
Kaltwasser describe populism as a “thin-centered ideology that considers
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonist
camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite.’”57 To this can be added
Jan-Werner Muller’s observation that, “In addition to being anti-elitist,
populists are always anti-pluralist. . . . When running for office, populists
portray their political competitors as part of the immoral, corrupt elite; when
ruling, they refuse to recognize any opposition as legitimate.” Muller also
notes that populists in power tend to frame their rule as a response to a
crisis or an existential threat.58 Finally, Steven Levitsky and James Loxton
point to two additional traits of populist leaders: they claim to be political
outsiders and they establish a personalistic linkage to voters.59
Using these criteria, Duterte certainly has some populist traits. His
Mindanaowan roots, crass language, and brusque behavior set him apart
from most of the national political elite. In his campaign, he ran as a Manila
outsider, and portrayed the members of the elite associated with the
Aquino government as incompetent and corrupt. As president, he has
framed the problems of drugs and crime as an existential national crisis
and portrayed drug users as a dehumanized “other.” His efforts to
intimidate political opponents and critics clearly are anti-pluralist.
However, other aspects of Duterte’s politics do not comport with

populism. Although he portrays himself as a political outsider, he is from a
prominent political family and served as mayor of a major city for twenty-
two years. Even as he criticizes some members of the political and
business elite, in practice he has allied himself with powerful members of
the political establishment—most notably Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the
Marcos, Estrada, and Villar families. And while Duterte is more antagonistic
32 | P a g e
toward powerful taipans and conglomerates than Benigno Aquino was, he

appears more interested in ensuring that they support him than in reducing
the concentration of economic power.
Duterte has increased spending for social programs and some of the
government’s policies, such as higher salaries for government employees,
free irrigation, and tertiary public education, can be viewed as populist. But
to date his core fiscal and macroeconomic policies are more neoliberal than
populist. However, if Duterte’s popularity declines, there is a risk that his
government will adopt economic policies that are more statist and populist.
Finally, to date Duterte has not created a mass movement or highly

personalistic political party typically associated with populist leaders.
According to Joel Rocamora, “Digong [Duterte] may bring the
popular medjo bastos (rudeness) into political discourse, but he does not
bring citizens into formal processes of political participation. In contrast to
populists who mobilize people, Digong like Estrada is a demobilising
populist.”60 Reflecting this perspective, as well as the more general
challenge of building political organizations in the Philippines, efforts to
create a pro-Duterte grassroots movement, Kilusang Pagbabago
(Movement for Change), appear to have faltered. In its stead, Duterte’s
daughter, Sara Duterte-Carpio, has established Hugpong ng Pagbabago
(Faction for Change), a Mindanao-based political party widely viewed as
her vehicle for entering national politics. The putative failure of the former
and the creation of the latter demonstrate the continued dominance of
traditional dynastic politics.
In sum, describing Duterte as a populist provides a convenient but

not entirely accurate label to characterize a complex, somewhat
contradictory politician with a disparate policy agenda. Still, the growing
literature on populist leaders generally depicts them as being toxic to liberal
democracy, so the Duterte-as-populist narrative provides a valid but limited
frame for viewing his impact on democracy.
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING: HOW FAR, HOW FAST?
33 | P a g e
With the challenges currently facing liberal democracy in the United States
and elsewhere, the concept of democratic backsliding has taken on new
saliency. According to Nancy Bermeo, backsliding, in its broadest sense, is
“state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that
sustain existing democracy” (emphasis added).61 A 2015 study on
democratic backsliding, written by Ellen Lust and David Waldner for the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), suggests that
backsliding is best conceived as a change in a combination of competitive
electoral procedures, civil and political liberties, and accountability, and that
backsliding occurs through a series of discrete changes in the rules and
informal procedures that shape those elections, rights and accountability.
These discrete changes take place over time, separated by months or even
years, and the end result is not predetermined: backsliding may result in
democratic breakdown, or it may not, and can occur within both democratic
and authoritarian regimes.62
The term “backsliding” is particularly appropriate for low-quality

democracies like the Philippines, where concerted and sustained efforts
are required to improve the quality of democracy. Absent that, backsliding
is inevitable. How serious is the problem of democratic backsliding in the
Philippines, and is the country on the way to democratic breakdown? In
answering these questions, it is important to start by recognizing the
sources of democratic resiliency in the Philippines.
Democratic resiliencies. Elite democracy was practiced before martial

law was declared in 1972 and after the restoration of democracy in 1986. It
often was not pretty, and it failed in a number of important ways. But many
Filipinos take pride in people power, and norms of constitutionalism,
political competition, free speech and media, and autonomous civil society
have fairly deep roots. A variety of influential institutions, including the
Catholic Church, many schools and universities, and most of the media,
embrace and promote democratic norms. Moreover, the alternative to
democracy—authoritarianism—is not an abstraction, at least to older
Filipinos who experienced the Marcos dictatorship.
34 | P a g e
Broad support for democracy among Filipinos has been consistently

borne out in surveys. A 2018 Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey
showed that 78 percent were satisfied with how democracy works and
60 percent always preferred democracy.63 Surveys also consistently show
a high degree of satisfaction with the country’s democratic institutions,
including the Senate, House of Representatives, and Supreme Court. So
while Filipinos tend to be fairly cynical about the motivations and integrity of
politicians and government officials, they are used to enjoying political
freedoms, lively political debates, and competitive elections.
Vulnerabilities. At the same time, multiple conditions in the

Philippines make it vulnerable to democratic backsliding.
• Socioeconomic conditions. Inequality, the uneven distribution of
benefits from economic growth, and an apparent sense of middle-
class insecurity and vulnerability may make the poor and middle class
receptive to promises of simplistic quick fixes.
• Presidentialism and weak institutions. The combination of a powerful
presidency and generally weak and malleable political institutions
gives the president wide latitude. If a president does not respect
democratic institutions and norms, many other political actors will
follow suit.
• The weakness of collective action. This applies particularly to political
parties and civil society organizations. In How Democracies Die,
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt underscore the important role that
political parties historically have played in containing extremist
demagogues. But in the Philippines, parties are abysmally weak, and
to date have been unable to provide compelling alternative leaders or
narratives. Although the Philippines boasts a robust civil society, as of
yet it has not been an effective counterforce to Duterte.
• Generational change. Most Filipinos under the age of forty-five did
not directly experience either the abuses of the Marcos era or the
nonviolent People Power Revolution that forced him from office in
1986. Moreover, because school curricula have glossed over the
period and the younger members of the Marcos family (particularly
his children) have been able to revamp his image, public
understanding of the severe damage done by the Marcos dictatorship
35 | P a g e
has been diminished.64 As a result, younger Filipinos know only the

freedoms and disappointments of thirty years of elite democracy. This
may make them less protective of the democratic freedoms that were
lost during the Marcos era.
Death by a thousand cuts? In How Democracies Die, Levitsky and

Ziblatt describe the incremental demise of democracy:
Many government efforts to subvert democracy are “legal,” in the sense

that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. . . .
Because there is no single moment—no coup, declaration of martial law, or
suspension of the constitution—in which the regime obviously “crosses the
line” into dictatorship, nothing may set off society’s alarm bells. Those who
denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying
wolf. Democracy’s erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible.65
This observation is highly relevant for the Philippines under Duterte. Two
and a half years into his presidency—with the very important exception of
EJKs—his government still operates largely within the bounds of the
constitution. He has not muzzled the media, outlawed the political
opposition, or canceled elections. Despite his threats, he has not declared
nationwide martial law or created a revolutionary government.
Nevertheless, the extent to which he has used the powers of the
presidency to run roughshod over human rights and weaken democratic
checks and balances is unprecedented.
Levitsky and Ziblatt also observe that “without robust norms,

constitutional checks and balances do not serve as the bulwarks of
democracy we imagine them to be.” In particular, they point to the
importance of two norms: (1) mutual toleration, the understanding that
competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals, and (2)
forbearance, the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying
their institutional prerogatives.66 Duterte’s actions clearly violate both of
these norms. To be sure, they have been frequently disregarded in the
past, but under Duterte any pretense of honoring them has disappeared.
As Lisandro Claudio and Patricio Abinales have noted, “Duterte is the first
36 | P a g e
Philippine president to not render even the minimum obeisance to liberal

democratic politics.”67
Bermeo points to the challenge of responding to gradual or incremental

backsliding: “Slow slides toward authoritarianism often lack both the bright
spark that ignites an effective call to action and the opposition and
movement leaders who can voice that clarion.” To date, Duterte hasn’t
triggered “the bright spark,” and the opposition to him has yet to generate
compelling new leaders or political movements.
But even where there is backsliding, there may be grounds for optimism
that it can be reversed. As Bermeo notes:
Incremental and ambiguous change preserves mixed landscapes

wherein one set of institutions or ideas can correct others. As long as some
electoral competition takes place, power can be clawed back. When civil
society is allowed some space, countermobilization can occur. Because
backsliding reflects incentive structures, changed incentives can reverse
negative trends.68
The election-driven overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, as well as

the electoral defeats of then president Mahinda Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka in
January 2015 and then prime minister Najib Razak in Malaysia in June
2018, give at least some credence to Bormeo’s cautious hopefulness.
SUMMING UP: A MIXED RECORD DELIVERING CHANGE AND AN

UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Thus far, how much real change has Duterte’s presidency produced?
And what does this suggest for the future? To date, there has been real
change in several areas. The first is the drug war and the damage it has
inflicted on the rule of law, the professionalism of the PNP, and other
aspects of governance. Second is the weakening of democratic institutions
and norms. Third is a portion of the government’s economic policies,
particularly the increase in spending on infrastructure and a few populist
social programs. Fourth is the reorientation of the Philippines’ foreign
37 | P a g e
relations to move closer to China and pullback from the United States, the
United Nations, and the liberal norms espoused by the international
community. Finally, the possibility of constitutional changes, up to and
including federalism, would be highly significant for the Philippines.
Alongside these changes, there are important elements of continuity.

So far, there is considerable continuity in most macroeconomic policies and
public financial management. The government also has continued to
expand (with some tweaks or rebranding) most preexisting social
development programs. Finally, the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic
Law was the culmination of a decades-long process.
Under Duterte, there also are worrying signs of regression back to

some of the worst aspects of traditional Philippine politics. First is the
emphasis on highly personalistic leadership: Duterte’s presidency is all
about him and not about institutions. Second, little effort has been made to
reduce the entrenched power of political dynasties and oligarchs—except
those that might challenge Duterte. Instead, Duterte has been willing to ally
with traditional political leaders who have shown little interest in reforming
politics and governance. Third, his administration has adopted a somewhat
more statist approach to economic development. Finally, Duterte’s
selective pandering to 1960s-style anti-U.S. nationalism, which
exaggerates the influence of the United States and sometimes is used to
deflect public attention away from the shortcomings of far more important
domestic actors, is an unwelcome development.
Looking ahead, it seems likely that there will be a continuing struggle

between elites and other groups who desire a strongman and those who
believe in the desirability of democracy, even the flawed version that has
been practiced in the Philippines. The best-case scenario is a gradual
reassertion of checks and balances brought about by a softening of public
support for Duterte, a growing recognition of the damage being done to
Philippine democracy, and more unified and effective pushback against his
antidemocratic actions. But it is also possible that the country’s contentious
politics could move in dangerous directions. This might be the case if
Duterte declares nationwide martial law or manages to ram through major
38 | P a g e
changes to the 1987 constitution. Alternatively, if Duterte, who is in poor

health, were to resign or be incapacitated before the end of his term,
members of his coalition might try to block Vice President Robredo from
succeeding him. Under any of these scenarios, there is a risk of mass
mobilization (both for and against Duterte) that could lead to
extraconstitutional and potentially violent forms of people power. This
popular uprising, in turn, could tempt or compel the PNP and AFP to take
sides. The Philippines would then be in perilous, uncharted territory.
AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN

THE PHILIPPINES
American diplomats often boast of the strong people-to-people
connections that exist between the United States and the Philippines,
principally because of the large Filipino-American community in the United
States. But America’s institutional engagement with the Philippines is
surprisingly thin, even though the country is a former colony, a major treaty
ally, and a fellow democracy. There are two reasons for this state of affairs.
First, historically the bilateral relationship has been dominated by
military/security ties, key elements of which include the 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty, the presence of two massive U.S. military bases in the
Philippines until the early 1990s, the post-9/11 Global War on Terror, and
most recently the U.S. response to China’s assertion of sovereignty in the
South China Sea. Second, the Philippines’ moderately sized economy has
been less open to foreign investment and less export-oriented than many
other East Asian economies. As a result, though U.S.-Philippines economic
ties are not insignificant, they are small compared to the United States’
relations with larger and more open economies in the region.
U.S.-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

During the Obama and Aquino presidencies, the bilateral relationship
was the most cordial it had been since the Fidel Ramos administration
(1992–1998). During the six-month period following the election of Duterte
and before the election of Donald Trump, the bilateral relationship went into
a downward spiral. The nadir came in early September 2016, prior to the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Laos, when it
was reported that President Obama would raise human rights issues in his
39 | P a g e
one-on-one meeting with Duterte. In a news conference before the summit,

Duterte angrily rejected being lectured by Obama and famously said, “Son
of a whore, I will curse you in that forum.”69 In response, Obama canceled
the meeting with Duterte. In September 2016, $4.5 million in U.S. State
Department funding intended to assist Philippine law enforcement was
shifted to maritime security. In November of the same year, the State
Department suspended the sale of 26,000 military assault rifles to the PNP.
The arrival of a new U.S. ambassador, Sung Kim, in early December, a
month after Trump’s election, provided an opportunity to reset the bilateral
relationship.
Today, U.S. foreign policy is shaped by a president who expresses

admiration for authoritarian rulers and has shown little interest in defending
human rights and democracy. The Duterte administration is pro-China,
much more transactional in its relationship with the United States, and
intolerant of any foreign criticism of human rights abuses associated with
his drug war. Washington now finds itself with limited influence with regard
to the Duterte government. Unlike China and Japan, the U.S. government
cannot compel American corporations to fund large infrastructure
investments.70 Moreover, the Philippines is not dependent on foreign aid,
so it can take or leave US development assistance. This is exactly what it
did in December 2017, when Manila withdrew from being considered for a
second Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact worth over
$400 million. The Philippines no longer met the MCC’s minimum
requirements in the areas of rule of law and controlling corruption, so it
withdrew in order to avoid the embarrassment of being turned down by the
MCC Board of Directors.
The nongovernmental foundations of U.S.-Philippine relations are

also surprisingly weak. University-to-university ties are limited, and only a
few American universities offer Philippine studies. The involvement of
American foundations—even those that traditionally have had an interest in
Southeast Asia such as the Ford, Henry Luce, and Open Society
Foundations—is minimal. And in the realm of public diplomacy, the
passage of time has diminished the ranks and influence of champions of
close U.S.-Philippines relations such as former senators John McCain and
Richard Lugar, former representative Stephen Solarz, former secretary of
40 | P a g e
state George Shultz, and former ambassadors Stephen Bosworth and

Nicholas Platt, all of whom have died or retired.
THE TIMID AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE DUTERTE

GOVERNMENT’S SUBVERSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY
Since Donald Trump became president, the U.S. government has avoided
saying or doing anything that might alienate Duterte. During the first half of
2017, the scale and brutality of Duterte’s drug war became irrefutably clear
in major reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as
well as by powerful photojournalism by the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Reuters, and the New York Times. Despite this, in late April 2017, in a
phone conversation with Duterte, Trump told him: “I just wanted to
congratulate you because I am hearing of the unbelievable job on the drug
problem. . . . Many countries have the problem, we have a problem, but
what a great job you are doing and I just wanted to call and tell you
that.”71 He also invited Duterte to the White House—an invitation Duterte
later declined.
When the State Department was headed by Rex Tillerson and was
itself in turmoil, the U.S. government was largely silent regarding the drug
war and human rights abuses. In August 2017, when Tillerson met with
Duterte at the ASEAN summit in Manila, their discussion focused on the
Marawi crisis and terrorism and did not include the human rights violations
associated with the drug war. The State Department’s 2017 human rights
report on the Philippines acknowledged that “extrajudicial killings have
been the chief human rights concern in the country for many years and,
after a sharp rise with the onset of the antidrug campaign in 2016, they
continued in 2017. . . . Concerns about police impunity increased
significantly following the sharp increase in police killings.” However, it
seemed to suggest that the drug-related EJKs were not all that different
from other human rights abuses in the Philippines.72
In June 2018, the United States joined thirty-seven other members (out of
forty-seven total) of the United Nations Human Rights Council to sign a
statement on human rights in the Philippines issued by the government of
Iceland:
41 | P a g e
We urge the government of the Philippines to take all necessary

measures to bring killings associated with the campaign against illegal
drugs to an end and cooperate with the international community to
investigate all related deaths and hold perpetrators accountable. . . . While
acknowledging that drug use in the Philippines is a serious problem,
actions to tackle drug abuse must be carried out in full respect of the rule of
law and compliance with international human rights obligations.73
This statement appears to be the strongest public statement with

which the U.S. government has been associated, but it received little
attention in the media. On the same day this statement was issued, the
United States pulled out of the Human Rights Council.
The U.S. Congress expressed some initial concern over the situation
in the Philippines, but has not taken any meaningful action. In May 2017,
senators Ben Cardin and Marco Rubio introduced a bill, the Philippines
Human Rights Accountability and Counter Narcotics Act of 2017 (S 1055),
which would restrict arms sales to the PNP and provide up to $25 million in
fiscal years 2017 and 2018 to support human rights groups and assist the
Philippines in dealing with its drug problem. The bill was referred to the
Foreign Relations Committee and has languished there since. In the House
of Representatives, in July 2017 the Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission held a hearing on “The Human Rights Consequences of the
War on Drugs in the Philippines” that was highly critical of Duterte’s war on
drugs. But there has been no subsequent action.
Although the U.S. embassy in Manila might be engaged in quiet

diplomacy regarding human rights, conversations with Filipino human rights
leaders suggest that little has taken place. USAID’s Democracy, Human
Rights and Governance (DRG) portfolio in the Philippines funds
conventional rule-of-law, civil society, and local governance programs, but
stays well clear of anything that addresses democratic backsliding.
Because of their dependency on USAID and State Department funding,
democracy promotion organizations like Freedom House, the National
Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute have not
42 | P a g e
responded in a major way. The Asia Foundation in the Philippines, which

relies more on Australian than U.S. funding, does some work on the rule of
law, but also shies away from anything that might antagonize the Duterte
government. Only the National Endowment for Democracy has significantly
increased its funding in support of democracy in the Philippines, from under
$500,000 in 2015 to over $1 million in 2017.
THE CASE FOR A MORE ROBUST AMERICAN RESPONSE

Nancy Bermeo has observed, “When backsliding yields situations
that are fluid and ill-defined, taking action to defend democracy becomes
particularly difficult.”74 This is true for “small d” democrats both inside the
Philippines and abroad. Given the long-standing dominance of U.S. military
and security interests and the Trump administration’s lack of interest in
defending democracy, it is especially difficult for the U.S. government to
formulate a suitable response.
Still, the United States has a unique historical relationship with the
Philippines, one that needs to be considered alongside purely strategic
considerations. The Philippines’ political system is modeled after
America’s, and for more than a century the Philippine elite’s attitudes and
behavior have been shaped by America’s influence on the country’s
educational system, economy, and politics. The U.S. government has long
and influential relations with the AFP and, to a lesser extent, the Philippine
police. And when Philippine leaders have shown a commitment to
democratic politics and governance, the U.S. government has been quick
to proclaim solidarity. Therefore, at a time when human rights and
democracy are under attack in the Philippines, the U.S. government and
American NGOs ought to support Filipino-led efforts to defend human
rights and democracy. Doing so would have the added benefit of showing
Filipinos that the U.S.-Philippine relationship is not only about advancing
U.S. security and economic interests.
Moreover, the Philippines is not China, Vietnam, or Cambodia, where

the prospects for democracy are negligible in the short to medium term.
The situation in the Philippines is dynamic, and investments in human
rights and democracy have the potential to make a difference. Despite
43 | P a g e
Duterte’s efforts to weaken checks on his power, there are civil society,
media, religious, and educational organizations—and even some members
of the business elite— that are committed to defending democracy. Like
Trump in the United States, Duterte has become a catalyst for a struggle
between vastly different visions of what kind of country the Philippines can
and should be. This is a contest Filipino democrats need to win; but in
doing so, they will need to offer something better than just a return to the
pre-Duterte status quo.
Naturally, there are no quick or easy fixes. The goal of more robust
American support for democracy in the Philippines should be twofold: first
and most immediately, to promote greater solidarity among “small-d”
democrats in the Philippines, the United States, and around the world, and
second, to improve and expand the sharing of ideas and strategies for how
to defend and strengthen democratic institutions and norms. Illustratively, in
the near term, the United States could support Filipino efforts on the
following fronts:
• improve understanding in the Philippines of effective approaches to
countering illegal drugs;
• develop effective responses to the Duterte government’s anti–human
rights narrative and broaden the community of human rights
supporters and activists; and
• promote solidarity and sharing lessons for defending human rights
and democracy by supporting visits to the Philippines of human rights
advocates, democratic political leaders, and scholars on democracy.
Longer term, Americans and Filipinos should work together to address
common challenges to preserving and improving democracy. This could
include joint efforts to:
• improve the role of media/social media in democracy;
• reform political finance and strengthen political parties;
• strengthen school-based and civic education on human rights and
democracy; and
• build university-to-university ties, including scholarly collaboration on
key aspects of Philippine politics and society (such as poverty and
inequality, criminality and the illicit economy, Supreme Court
decisionmaking, and the political role of the middle class).
44 | P a g e
Finally, a U.S. House of Representatives controlled by the Democrats holds

out the possibility of greater congressional attention to the situation in the
Philippines. Members of Congress should consider pushing the Trump
administration to apply Magnitsky Global Act sanctions to current and
former PNP leaders responsible for EJKs.
A more robust American response will prompt some Filipinos to accuse the
United States of meddling in the Philippines’ domestic affairs. Duterte’s
supporters will almost certainly portray it as effort to destabilize his
government. Therefore, support must be transparent and nonpartisan, and
those providing it will need to be prepared to take some heat. Ideally, this
should not be a solely American project—it should involve democratic
groups elsewhere, including in Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan.
As long as strategic and security interests dominate U.S. policy toward the
Philippines, and with the U.S. Congress largely consumed with domestic
politics, it is unlikely that the U.S. government will take meaningful steps to
support human rights and democracy in the Philippines. Therefore,
American NGOs, foundations, and universities will need to step up and
take the lead. But ultimately, it will be the actions of Filipino democrats that
matter most.
REFERENCE:
Tadeo, Carl Patrick. “Introduction to Philippine Politics and Governance.”

LinkedIn SlideShare, 14 Mar. 2018,
www.slideshare.net/CarlPatrickTadeo1/introduction-to-philippine-politics-and-
governance.
Timberman, David G. “Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm

Assessment.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 Jan. 2019,
carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-
assessment-pub-78091.
Verone, Irish. “INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPTS OF POLITICS AND

GOVERNANCE.” LinkedIn SlideShare, 1 July 2019,
www.slideshare.net/aybipolidario/introduction-the-concepts-of-politics-and-
governance.
45 | P a g e

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LEARNING MATERIALS IN

PHILIPPINE POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND CITIZENSHIP

LESSON 1 – Basic Concepts of Politics

- Exercise of power, making of political decisions, practice of

Politics as the art of government.

Politics as public affair.

Politics as compromise and consensus.

3. What are the basic issues of politics?

- Attitude of the people about what they consider in mind that

4. Understanding Politics and Political Science

5. How politics can be studied?

o Focuses in answering the questions:

c. Rational Choice Approach

6. What are the values of politics?

8. What are the three legs of governance?

a. Economic Governance – country’s economic activities and its

9. What are the 8 characteristics of good governance?

The Duterte administration’s assault on human rights and democracy

THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY

The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in

However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many

PRESIDENTS, POLITICAL ELITES, AND OLIGARCHS

The second important influence on democracy in the Philippines is

For decades, this elite has thwarted the development of a strong

decade of relatively strong macroeconomic growth, the incidence of poverty

Today, by the World Bank’s metrics the Philippines is a lower-middle-

To be sure, there also were significant shortcomings and mistakes.

complacency (due to the president’s personal popularity), problems

DUTERTE AND THE PROMISE OF REAL CHANGE

Duterte’s victory surprised many and shocked some. In the wake of

THE DUTERTE GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIES AND POLICIES

Now seventy-three years old, Duterte’s world view is heavily

rhetoric, anthropologist Nicole Curato has called his approach “crass

Duterte may be offending the norms of respectful communication

KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES

Space constraints do not permit a full discussion of the government’s

Economic policies and performance. As a candidate, Duterte showed

accelerate economic growth and make it more inclusive, and to significantly

In 2017, GDP growth was 6.7 percent, and it is projected to be about

The most significant accomplishment pertaining to Mindanao was the

The fading prospects for constitutional change. As a candidate,

nonparticipatory. Several of Duterte’s own economic managers have raised

As of December 2018 it appears unlikely that Cha-Cha will happen

THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICS AND

signatory), particularly the provisions concerning the presumption of

Why is Duterte singularly focused on drugs and crime? It is not

Crime has been a political issue intermittently since the 1960s.

This narrative of drugs as an existential threat has been used to

A second explanation is that Duterte has successfully dehumanized

Although largely overlooked by most analyses, the PNP, and its

As mayor of a city that at times was wracked by political and criminal

In the context of Duterte’s drug war, individual police officers face

Policemen weigh the continually shifting balance of incentives and

Inducing police to engage in de facto shoot-to-kill policies is

Moreover, assuming that eventually there will be a president who no

As a result, drug suspects and convicts are crammed into the

The war on drugs has had predictable negative effects on drug-

Impact on local politics and government. Duterte’s almost singular

DUTERTE’S SUBVERSION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND

JUST HARDBALL POLITICS AS USUAL?

The Duterte presidency is fundamentally different from post-1986

Compared to Ferdinand Marcos, Mr. Duterte has performed the art of

In some cases, Duterte’s threats may simply reflect his impetuous