You are on page 1of 34

The Comparison of Audience Demographics, Size, and

Response of National Review and The Rush Limbaugh

Show

Stephan Jaksch

Dr. Simone Caron


2

Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries there were two major conservative

movements in the media. The first movement began in the 1950s and was grounded in academics

and policy. The creation of Human Events, The Freeman, The Manion Forum, and National

Review are examples of some of the premier conservative media outlets of this period. The

second movement began in the 1990s and continued into the early 2000s. Notable commentators

include Sean Hannity, Glenn Beck, Bill O’Reilly, and Rush Limbaugh. This period focused more

on the mediums of talk radio and cable news, specifically the establishment of Fox News in

1996. This second movement focused more on entertainment than policy. No research, however,

has compared William F. Buckley and his creation of National Review with Rush Limbaugh and

The Rush Limbaugh Show. The central inquiry of this paper will revolve around an analysis and

comparison of the audiences of these two different conservative outlets by these two leaders in

the conservative movement. This examination will focus on the size as well as demographics of

their respective audiences including educational status, gender, race, political ideology, and

socioeconomic status. Significant attention will also be paid to how the audiences responded to

the views of each respective media leader and the influence on the publication on the audience.

This paper will argue that although there were some demographic differences between the two

audiences in regards to socioeconomic status and education, individuals from both audiences had

a general distrust of mainstream media and were interested in politics.

This paper will add to historiography, as no research papers have been completed that

compare William F. Buckley and Rush Limbaugh and their audiences through their respective

media outlets. There has been no in-depth study, which examines and compares the

demographics of these two audiences as well as how they were impacted by the ideas and

rhetoric of these mediums. George H. Nash in Reappraising the Right: The Past & Future of
3

American Conservatism argues that the vast volume of works that Buckley created through

National Review and other mediums fundamentally altered the conservative movement. Nash

briefly mentions Limbaugh, and states that Limbaugh has made it easier to mobilize regular

citizens in the conservative movement. Nicole Hemmer in Messengers of the Right:

Conservative Media and the Transformation of American Politics argues that Buckley and

National Review was a part of the first conservative movement, while Limbaugh was a part of

the second conservative movement in the United States. Kathleen Hall Jamieson in Echo

Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment demonstrates that

Limbaugh, Fox News, and the Wall Street Journal are the main conservative voices in the

conservative movement today. Linda Bridges in Strictly Right: William F. Buckley Jr. and the

American Conservative Movement argues that National Review and Buckley were both behind

the rise of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan. Bridges also emphasizes that Buckley laid the

framework for the modern conservative movement. All of these sources included some brief

information on audience size while describing the audience of these mediums, but none dove

into the demographics of these readers or listeners. Thus, this paper will fill in a gap of

knowledge in comparing two of the most prominent conservative figures in the twentieth century

and the media outlets these two men crafted.

William F. Buckley was born into a wealthy family in 1925 where his father was a Texas

oilman.1 After he graduated Yale University, Buckley followed the advice of his college advisors

and joined the Central Intelligence Agency to avoid the draft.2 His national notoriety commenced

when he published his first book titled God and Man at Yale in 1951, in which he argued that

Yale University altered the original religious mission of the university through their antichristian

1
George H. Nash, Reappraising the Right: The Past & Future of American Conservatism (Wilmington, DE: ISI
2
Carl T. Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism (New York: Bloomsbury
Press, 2011), 89.
4

and anticapitalist messages.3 Buckley was only 24 years old when he published this book in

October of 1951. By the end of November of that year, it was already number 16 on the New

York Times bestseller list.4 In only six months, with 35,000 copies sold, the book was a

tremendous success.5

Buckley originally founded National Review in opposition to the mainstream media as he

felt that they excluded conservative thought from their coverage.6 Buckley understood the

importance of The Nation and The New Republic, two liberal journals founded in 1865 and 1914

respectively, in establishing and defining liberalism in the United States.7 From Buckley’s view,

conservatism lacked a strong publication that advocated for conservative policies. Other

conservative magazines existed at the time such as The American Mercury and The Freeman, but

there were several problems with the scope and content of these magazines in Buckley’s mind.8

Thus, Buckley set out to create his own conservative magazine that would differ from the few

that were in existence. He did not wish to create a magazine that would educate those who

already agreed with conservatism. Rather, he wanted this magazine to bring new readers into the

conversation and engage individuals with different beliefs.9 In order to execute his vision of a

conservative magazine, Buckley needed funds. His father donated $100,000 toward this project

and Buckley raised an additional $290,000 by the fall of 1955 from several wealthy

individuals.10


3
Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 22.
4
Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism, 82.
5
Ibid.
6
Nicole Hemmer, Messengers of the Right: Conservative Media and the Transformation of American Politics
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 43.
7
Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism, 105.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 12.
10
Ibid., 106.
5

Once Buckley had funding to launch a magazine, he began to recruit employees for the

new venture. Buckley wanted a range of conservative voices in National Review, but did not

want to further divisions in conservatism. Buckley weaved together three different types of

conservatism in National Review: traditionalism, anti-Communism, and libertarianism.11

Buckley himself believed in each of these strands of conservatism and thus was able to

accommodate them in National Review.12 Writers for the magazine held a spectrum of beliefs.

Individuals on the National Review editorial board included James Burnham, political theorist

and American philosopher, Whittaker Chambers, a former Soviet spy turned conservative, Yale

University political scientist Willmoore Kendall, editor of The Freeman Frank Chodorov, and

novelist and artist John Dos Passos.13 Frank Chodorov was a libertarian while Russell Kirk a

traditionalist.14 James Burnham was a pragmatist in his political ideology while William Rusher

did not believe it was possible to brand the Republican Party into a conservative party.15 Buckley

specifically recruited Russell Kirk, a political theorist, to write for the magazine. Whereas

Buckley believed that conservatism should be based on individualism, Kirk believed that

conservatism revolved around the community.16 Thus in hiring Kirk, not only did Buckley

diversify the opinion at National Review, but he also ensured that Kirk was not able to attack or

critique this early magazine.17 This mix of views concerning conservatism, enabled the reader to


11
Susan Currie Sivek, "Editing Conservatism: How National Review Magazine Framed and Mobilized a Political
Movement," Mass Communication & Society 11, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 250.
12
Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism, 21.
13
Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency: How the GOP Right Made Political History, 22.
14
Ibid., 22-23.
15
Ibid., 22-23.
16
Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism, 111.
17
Ibid.
6

engage in the discourse instead of following a set political ideology.18 This in turn established a

conversation between the writers and the readers.

Marketed towards a general conservative audience instead of smaller sub-sections of

conservatism, with time National Review became the main conservative outlet. The Freeman, a

magazine established in 1950, for example, targeted libertarians. In addition to the small scope of

The Freeman, internal dissent overwhelmed the publication.19 Meanwhile, The American

Mercury, a magazine founded in 1924, became anti-Semitic with time.20 Thus, the establishment

of National Review renewed traditional conservatism in the United States as it was one of the

few publications that focused on conservatism in a broad sense.21 This renewal took time,

however, as conservatism was a minority philosophy in the United States until the 1970s.22

Through this growth of National Review and conservatism, audience demographics of the

magazine will give a deeper understanding of those interested in conservatism at this time

period. The demographics of gender, education, income, political involvement, ideology, and age

of National Review’s audience is based on data from a 1971 subscriber survey filled out by

1,000 subscribers of National Review. Overwhelmingly, men were the majority of readers: 80.6

percent of readers were male in 1971 and women constituted 19.4 percent of readers.23 Married

individuals were much more likely to be readers of the magazine: 68 percent were married while

22.7 percent were single.24 The median age of a reader was 44.5.25 The main audience of


18
David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2010), 41.
19
Linda Bridges, Strictly Right: William F. Buckley Jr. and the American Conservative Movement (Hoboken, N.J.:
John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 29.
20
Sivek, “Editing Conservatism,” 267.
21
Irving Kristol, "American Conservatism 1945-1995," Public Interest no. 121 (Fall 1995): 80-81.
22
Patrick M. Garry, "A Turning Point for Modern Conservatism," Modern Age 49, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 24.
23
Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109, Folder 4, Rusher Papers,
31.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 32.
7

National Review was conservative, with 72.7 percent of readers identifying as conservatives,

while 21.9 percent identified their political ideology as middle-of-the-road, and 3 percent

identifying as liberal.26 This statistic is likely the reason why 87.6 percent of the audience did not

consider the media fair to their point of view while only 8.3 percent did.27 Most readers did not

feel that their viewpoint was represented in the media because of their conservative beliefs.

Because so few readers trusted the mainstream media and other news sources, National Review

was an important source of information to 76.6 percent of readers.28 Not only was National

Review an important source of information, but 51.3 percent of readers reported that the

magazine influenced their opinions and attitudes while only 9.3 percent reported that it has no

influence on them.29

Many of National Review’s readers were politically active. In the five years before this

survey took place, 55.2 percent of readers wrote a letter to at least one government official while

47.1 percent gave a speech or addressed a public meeting;30 4.1 percent were elected to a public

office.31 Because of the opinions expressed in National Review, 16.3 percent took a specific

action or made a decision in their business or social life.32 This political action also extended to

the family and friends of the readers as 79.5 percent had talked to someone else about National

Review in the previous 12 months.33

National Review subscribers were also very educated as 42.4 percent of readers pursued a

graduate degree, 21.9 percent graduated from college, 21.6 percent attended college, 9.8 percent


26
Ibid., 9.
27
Ibid., 9.
28
Ibid., 6.
29
Ibid., 6.
30
Ibid., 10.
31
Ibid., 10.
32
Ibid., 7.
33
Ibid., 7.
8

graduated from high school, and 3.1 percent attended high school.34 Thus, over 60 percent of

readers of the National Review had graduated college, while over 80 percent had attended

college in some fashion. In addition to their formal education, the average National Review

reader bought 29 books in the year prior to the survey.35 Thus, these readers were not only

interested in the information provided to them through this magazine, but were also interested in

expanding their knowledge through a variety of other sources. Readers were not just interested in

confirming their own beliefs; they wanted to study other sources of information. The crowd that

Buckley attracted was one that was well-educated and interested in true debate and information.

Lastly, National Review subscribers were upper class. 4.8 percent of readers earned over

$75,000 annually,36 which equates to $456,000 in 2018 dollars with inflation.37 Only 6.6 percent

of readers earned under $7,500 a year,38 $45,000 with inflation.39 Meanwhile 31.6 percent of

readers annually made between $15,000 and $24,99940 or $91,000 and $152,000 with inflation.41

Because readers were upper class, it likely allowed many of them to participate in their

communities politically as these readers had the financial resources to take off time and become

engaged with the political process in a variety of forms.

Overall, Buckley’s magazine attracted an upper class, well-educated crowd that enjoyed

academics and political news. Most readers were married men and most subscribers were fairly

politically active. These readers, however, also had a deep distrust of other media sources and


34
Ibid., 32.
35
Ibid., 12.
36
Ibid., 37.
37
“CPI Inflation Calculator,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed March 31,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
38
Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109, Folder 4, Rusher Papers,
37.
39
“CPI Inflation Calculator,” Bureau of Labor Statistics.
40
Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109, Folder 4, Rusher Papers,
37.
41
“CPI Inflation Calculator,” Bureau of Labor Statistics.
9

likely subscribed to National Review as it labeled itself a conservative magazine in a time when

few other conservative outlets existed. Interestingly, there was a disconnect between who

Buckley wanted to reach with this magazine and the actual audience of this magazine. Buckley

in February 1974 opposed increasing the cost of the magazine, even though it would increase

profits, because it would “cut from our readership fifty thousand students, teachers, civil

servants, and gentry employed and unemployed, who either cannot afford, or would not pay,

quadruple what they pay for other magazines.”42 This audience that Buckley discussed, however,

is not evident based on an analysis of subscribers in 1971.

The first issue of National Review was released on November 19, 195543 and 30,000

individuals received a promotional copy of the first issue of National Review as donors paid for

these subscriptions.44 10,000 charter subscribers also received the first issue.45 When National

Review first began, its circulation was very small and unstable as it only reached 17,000 readers

by 1957.46 By its fifth birthday, total circulation reached almost 32,000, which made the

magazine one of the leading journals of opinion at that time.47 Established decades before, other

journals of opinion such as the New Republic had similar circulation to National Review making

the circulation of National Review an impressive feat. Just a year later in 1961, circulation

reached an audience of 56,000.48 National Review hit 100,000 subscribers in 1968, 13 years after

the release of the first issue.49 In 1969, circulation hit over 128,000 and by 1970, it was the


42
William F. Buckley, Letter, 25 February, 1974. Library of Congress, Box 113, Folder 5, Rusher Papers, 3.
43
Bridges, Strictly Right: William F. Buckley Jr. and the American Conservative Movement, 40.
44
Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism, 145.
45
Ibid.
46
Hemmer, Messengers of the Right, 183.
47
"Angry Voice on the Right." Time 76, no. 18 (October 31, 1960): 56.
48
Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism, 186.
49
Ibid., 334.
10

second most read journal.50 By the end of the 1970s, however, this figure declined to just

85,000.51 This large decrease in circulation coincided with journalist and political commentator

George Will’s condemnation of President Richard Nixon and those repulsed by sympathy for

Nixon in the magazine.52 Although, readership declined in the 1970s, the magazine was still

influential when compared to others at that time such as the New Republic which held a

circulation of 100,000 in 1974.53 In 1993, Rush Limbaugh helped to push the number of

subscribers of the magazine to over 200,000 through his anti-Bill Clinton messaging on his radio

program.54 At its fifty year anniversary in 2005, circulation would move to 170,000.55

In addition to the size of its audience, the influence of National Review can be further

shown through the important figures that read the magazine as well as how the magazine

bolstered or undermined certain conservative ideas or certain individuals. Overall, Buckley

wanted National Review to be a magazine that engaged readers who did not necessarily agree

with conservative ideas.56 He never envisioned the magazine as lecturing to those who already

believed in conservatism. This was especially true for one of National Review’s most important

readers—Ronald Reagan. An avid reader of the National Review, Reagan read it extensively

when he switched from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party.57

In order to craft true debate in National Review, the magazine also helped to establish an

enemy against whom both the readers and writers could fight. Buckley dedicated much space to


50
William F. Meehan II, Conversations with William F. Buckley Jr., (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi,
2009), 41.
51
Hemmer, Messengers of the Right, 234.
52
Bridges, Strictly Right: William F. Buckley Jr. and the American Conservative Movement, 162.
53
"NR's New Angel," Time 103, no. 12 (March 25, 1974): 57.
54
"At 60, National Review Declares Victory (Sort of)," Media Industry Newsletter (November 16, 2015): 10.
55
Jeffrey Hart, The Making of the American Conservative Mind: National Review and Its Times, (Intercollegiate
Studies Institute, 2006), 9.
56
Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism, 12.
57
Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency: How the GOP Right Made Political History, 187.
11

outlining the liberal argument so that he could then artificially create a fight.58 For example, in

the first issue of National Review, the editors included a sidebar of what they believed regarding

liberals and their ideology.59 National Review consistently labeled liberals as foolish and dumb.

In a March 1976 issue of National Review it was written that: “[e]lementary logic, however, is

not a characteristic strength of liberal politicians”60 and in the same issue the author, W.H. von

Dreele, also commented that he “could not believe that liberal Democrats were so stupid…”61

Writers of the journal frequently described liberals and Democrats as unintelligent during the

discussion of political issues or policy. These attacks also extended to other ideas or individuals

that are generally associated with liberalism. In the same issue, it was stated: “Don’t think the

Democrats are the only ones with radical-chick problems…”62 Thus, the writer associated

feminism with a negative radicalism that only creates troubles. In another instance, Russell Kirk,

a writer for National Review remarked:

“nearly all the active pro-union instructors at Hillsdale were people who had never

obtained their doctoral degrees and presumably hoped that a triumphant union would

freeze them into lifelong tenure, despite their lack of the doctoral requirement. […]

They’ve not burned any cities yet, but they seem to aspire to set the world on fire by

indoctrinating the young.”63

Kirk claims that pro-union professors, and by association—liberals, cannot achieve success on

their own and need government intervention in order to be successful. It is also stated that these

professors are a detriment to society and are likely to brainwash the youth of the United States.


58
Michael J. Lee, "WFB: The Gladiatorial Style and the Politics of Provocation," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 13, no.
2 (Summer 2010): 47.
59
Sivek, “Editing Conservatism,” 257.
60
Joseph F. Johnston Jr., "The Leader as Mass Man," National Review 28, no. 9 (March 19, 1976): 271.
61
W.H. von Dreele, "The Week," National Review 28, no. 9 (March 19, 1976): 248.
62
Ibid.
63
Russell Kirk, "Sending the Sheriff," National Review 28, no. 9 (March 19, 1976): 274.
12

In addition to liberalism, the magazine even attacked other prominent right-leaning

figures and organizations such as Ayn Rand and Robert Welch.64 The writers at National Review

did not support Welch and the John Birch Society as they were irresponsible65 and could thus

harm the prospects of nominating a conservative candidate in 1964.66 National Review created a

distinction between Welchites and conservatives, which allowed conservative politicians, such as

then Governor Ronald Reagan, to state that he did not care if the John Birch Society supported

him as he did not support them.67 Thus, National Review was able to turn readers and politicians

against supporting the John Birch Society and their ideas.

Less than a decade after the election of Ronald Reagan as president, Rush Limbaugh

would rise as a national figure in the conservative movement. Rush Limbaugh was born in 1951

and grew up in Missouri in an upper class family.68 He was interested in radio at a young age and

this interest became a fascination as time passed on.69 In high school, his father acquired for him

a position at the local radio station. He attended Southeast Missouri State University for two

semesters, but dropped out as his only interest was radio.70 Similarly, other conservative leaders

of this generation such as Glenn Beck and Sean Hannity did not attend college either. Limbaugh

moved to Pittsburgh to work at a radio station in 1971, but management fired Limbaugh because

the station manager did not believe that Limbaugh had any talent.71 Finally in 1984, he secured a

job in Sacramento, California working for the radio station KFBK.


64
David W. Noble, "Conservatism in the USA," Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 4 (October 1978): 647.
65
Ibid.
66
Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency: How the GOP Right Made Political History, 58.
67
Hart, The Making of the American Conservative Mind, 168.
68
Paul D. Colford, The Rush Limbaugh Story: Talent on Loan from God (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 3.
69
Ibid., 5-6.
70
Ibid.,15.
71
Mark Goodman, "Rush Limbaugh," People 38, no. 16 (October, 1992): 112.
13

The Rush Limbaugh Show started in Sacramento in 1984 and broadcasted nationally in

1988.72 The main outlet for conservatives in the United States from 1988 to 1996, until the

creation of Fox News, Limbaugh’s radio show was even more influential than National

Review.73 Known for his provocative style and his deep rejection of liberals and liberal ideology,

Limbaugh labeled his enemies “feminazis,” “eco-terrorists,” and “animal rights enviro-

wackos.”74 “Environmentalist wackos,” one of Limbaugh’s most used characterizations of

individuals who supported certain environmental policies, was utilized heavily on his radio

program. Limbaugh on August 2, 2002 on his radio show stated: “[t]he extremist

environmentalist wackos will not let you people in Oregon and California and Colorado and

Arizona clean out the underbrush that provides fuel to these fires.”75 Limbaugh used these names

to target specific liberal groups with whom he did not agree. Limbaugh was unwilling to allow

his radio show to be connected with liberal ideology whatsoever and thus even the individuals

who called into his show were almost all conservative. From October 15 to November 11, 1996,

91.72 percent of callers were supporters of Limbaugh, while 4.48 percent were liberal or

unfriendly to Limbaugh. Only 3.79 percent of callers were neutral to Limbaugh.76 Thus,

Limbaugh built his radio show to promote conservatism as well as his opinions. When liberalism

or Democrats were discussed, it was in negative terms. Limbaugh regularly labeled Democrats as

liars:


72
Hemmer, Messengers of the Right, 260.
73
Ibid., 265.
74
Lattin Bohn David, "Rush to Praise and Blame: An Analysis of the ‘Paranoid’ Ego-Function Of Limbaugh's
Rhetoric," Journal of the Northwest Communication Association 29 (Spring 2000): 6.
75
“Daschle Sneaks S. Dakota Exemption from Wacko Rules into Spending Bill,” The Rush Limbaugh Show, last
modified August 2, 2002, accessed April 22, 2018,
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/08/02/daschle_sneaks_s_dakota_exemption_from_wacko_rules_into_sp
ending_bill/.
76
Edward C. Appel, "Rush to Judgment: Burlesque, Tragedy, and Hierarchal Alchemy in the Rhetoric of America's
Foremost Political Talkshow Host," Southern Communication Journal 68, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 27.
14

“All they [Democrats] can do is call the same old play: fear monger, lie, smear, and make

coy accusations of scandal without a shred of proof”77

“They’re [Democrats] desperate, and they’re striking out blindly for a lie that will

work.”78

Limbaugh described Democrats as liars who trick the American public and as nasty politicians

who do not tell the truth for their own political gain. These attacks on Democrats are indicative

of Limbaugh’s viewpoint and of his on-air persona. This personality likely influenced the type of

viewer that tuned into Limbaugh’s program.

The demographics of gender, race, education, family income, exposure to news, party

affiliation, ideology, and age in connection with Limbaugh’s audience is very different from that

of Buckley’s National Review audience. The data for Limbaugh’s radio program originates from

the Pew Research Center, the American National Election Studies, and a study completed by the

University of Pennsylvania in 1996. The American National Election Studies (ANES), funded by

the National Science Foundation, has surveyed American voters in presidential and midterm

election years since 1948. Data from the 1994 ANES survey found that the mean score on a

feeling thermometer toward Limbaugh on a 100-point scale was 45.63 (see Appendix A). Thus,

Limbaugh in this study lacked a decidedly positive image with most individuals in the United

States.

The University of Pennsylvania 1996 study determined that 61 percent of those who

listened to Rush Limbaugh were men while 39 percent were women.79 Eight years later that


77
“Democrat Memo: Lie About GOP,” The Rush Limbaugh Show, last modified May 22, 2002, accessed April 22,
2018, https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/05/22/democrat_memo_lie_about_gop/.
78
“The GOP Page,” The Rush Limbaugh Show, last modified April 23, 2002, accessed April 22, 2018,
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/04/23/the_gop_page/.
79
Joseph N. Cappella, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Joseph Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio: Background, Content,
Audiences, Portrayal in Mainstream Media,” Annenberg Public Policy center of the University of Pennsylvania,
August 7, 1996, accessed March 2, 2018.
15

percentage held steady: according to the 2004 ANES study, 66.6 percent of listeners to the Rush

Limbaugh show were male.80 Pew Research Center similarly determined in 2008 that 72 percent

of listeners to The Rush Limbaugh Show were male, while 28 percent were female.81 Thus, since

the start of Limbaugh’s radio show, men have generally been more prevalent in Limbaugh’s

audience than women. In 2002 and 2004, however, gender was not a statistically significant

predictor of audience.82 In other words, although men made up the majority of the audience in

these surveys, gender was not a strong predictor for listening to The Rush Limbaugh Show in

those two years. It was a predictor throughout the 1990s and again in 2006.83 In 1994, there was

also a statistically significant difference between the feelings of men and women toward

Limbaugh. Men, on average, rated Limbaugh 7.1 points more favorably on a 100-point scale

than women (see Appendix B). Women likely viewed Limbaugh less favorably compared to men

because of his common attacks on feminists and his aggressive persona.

Like men, white individuals also constituted the vast majority of his audience. In 1996,

89.2 percent of Limbaugh’s listeners were white while only 10.8 were nonwhite.84 In 2004, the

percentage of white listeners increased to 92.9 percent.85 Furthermore, an analysis of the

audience of Limbaugh’s radio program reveals that race was not significant predictors of


https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Political_Communication/Political_Talk_Radio/1996_03
_political_talk_radio_rpt.PDF, 14.
80
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 92.
81
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, last modified August
17, 2008, accessed February 12, 2018. http://www.people-press.org/2008/08/17/key-news-audiences-now-blend-
online-and-traditional-sources/, 41.
82
Stephen Earl Bennett, "Who Listens to Rush Limbaugh's Radio Program and the Relationship Between Listening
to Limbaugh and Knowledge of Public Affairs, 1994-2006," Journal of Radio & Audio Media 16, no. 1 (May 2009):
72.
83
Ibid.
84
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 14.
85
Jamieson, Echo Chamber, 92.
16

listening.86 Just because an individual was white, did not mean that person would be more likely

to listen to the radio show.

Limbaugh’s audience, unlike race, had a wide distribution of education. In 1996, 34.6

percent of Limbaugh’s audience had a college degree, while 30.8 percent completed some

college, 31.3 percent had a high school degree, and 3.3 percent had less than a high school

degree.87 In 2008, 33 percent of Limbaugh’s audience graduated college.88 Thus, throughout the

years of the program, the percentage of his audience who graduated from college was relatively

stable. Education, however, was not a significant predictor of whether a listener would tune into

The Rush Limbaugh Show as evidenced by one study,89 while another found education was a

weak predictor.90

There was also a wide distribution of incomes for listeners of the radio show. In 1996,

39.3 percent of Limbaugh’s audience had an income above $50,000, $80,800 with inflation,

while 24.5 percent had an income between $30,000, $48,400 with inflation, to $50,000. 91

Furthermore, 21.9 percent of listeners had an income between $20,000, $32,300 with inflation, to

$30,000 and 14.3 percent had an income less than $20,000. The number of listeners with an

income above $50,000, $73,9000 with inflation, increased to 55 percent in 2000 while in 2004,

67 percent had an income above this amount.92 Family income was not a significant factor in

whether an individual listened to Limbaugh’s radio program.93 By 2004, 10.7 percent of his

listeners had an income above $150,000, $202,100 with inflation, while 13.9 percent had an


86
Bennett, “Who Listens to Rush Limbaugh's Radio Program,” 74.
87
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 14.
88
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, 42-43.
89
Bennett, “Who Listens to Rush Limbaugh's Radio Program,” 74.
90
Thomas Bryan Christie, "The Role of Values in Predicting Talk Radio Listening: A Model of Value
Equivalence," Journal of Radio Studies 14, no. 1 (May 2007): 32.
91
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 14.
92
Ibid.
93
Bennett, "Who Listens to Rush Limbaugh's Radio Program," 74.
17

income between $100,000, $134,700 with inflation, to $150,000.94 Thus, Limbaugh’s audience is

widely distributed across the income spectrum. Furthermore, it is evident that the income of

Limbaugh’s listeners has increased with time as in 1996 only 40 percent had an income above

$50,000.95

Unlike the wide distribution of incomes for his audience, most of Limbaugh’s audience

was extremely invested in politics and the news cycle. In October 1996, 44 percent of Limbaugh

listeners stated they listened to news on the television five or more days a week while 46 percent

stated they read newspapers five or more days a week.96 Meanwhile, non-listeners of

Limbaugh’s program listened or read news 33 percent for each.97 This deep interest in politics

and news is likely why 36 percent of Limbaugh listeners had a high knowledge of politics based

on a three-question test.98 Interviewers asked listeners to name the party that controlled the

House of Representatives, name the current Secretary of State, and name the Prime Minister of

Great Britain. If listeners correctly answered all three, then the interviewer labeled that listener as

having high knowledge of politics. In 2008, 80 percent of Rush Limbaugh’s listeners stated that

they followed the national news most of the time. 99 Meanwhile, the national average was 55

percent. Though Limbaugh’s audience is actively engaged in the news cycle, 75 percent of

listeners stated that they trust a few sources more than others, while 24 percent of Limbaugh

listeners stated that all news media was similar.100 Thus, the majority of his audience believed


94
Jamieson, Echo Chamber, 92.
95
Ibid., 99.
96
Jamieson, Echo Chamber, 171-172.
97
Ibid.
98
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, 43.
99
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, 38.
100
Ibid., 37.
18

that some sources were more reliable and relevant than others. Overall, exposure to news was a

strong predictor as to why an individual listened to the Rush Limbaugh show.101

In addition to interest in politics and the news, political ideology is also a factor that most

listeners have in common in Limbaugh’s audience. In 1994, there was a strong correlation

between positive attitudes toward conservatives and positive attitudes toward Limbaugh (see

Appendix C). This means that individuals who held a positive view of conservatives were also

likely to hold a positive view of Limbaugh. In 1996, 61.4 percent of his audience identified as

Republican, 24.8 identified as independent, and 13.8 percent identified as Democrat.102

Meanwhile 70 percent identified as conservative, 21.4 percent identified as moderate, and 8.6

percent identified as liberal.103 Eight years later in 2004, 78 percent of listeners identified as

Republican while 85 percent identified as conservative.104 In both of these studies there were

more individuals who identified as conservative than as Republican. This demonstrates that even

those individuals who were registered as Democrats or independents lean conservative. This

strong ideological trend continued into 2008 with 80 percent of listeners identifying as

conservative, seven percent as moderate, and ten percent as liberal.105 Furthermore, political

ideology and political party leaning were both strong factors that determined if an individual

listened to The Rush Limbaugh Show.106 Those that identified as conservative or Republican

correlated with a higher probability of listening to the Limbaugh’s show.

Age range, unlike political ideology, is widely distributed among those who listen to The

Rush Limbaugh Show. In 1996, 16.9 percent of his audience was older than 65, 21.3 percent was


101
Christie, "The Role of Values in Predicting Talk Radio Listening," 32.
102
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 14.
103
Ibid.
104
Jamieson, Echo Chamber, 92.
105
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, 16.
106
Christie, "The Role of Values in Predicting Talk Radio Listening," 32.
19

between 64 and 50, 43 percent were from 49 to 30, and 18.8 percent were from ages 29 to 18.107

In 2008, this distribution remained similar in regards to age: 21 percent were older than 65, 28

percent were between the ages of 64 and 50, 28 percent were between the ages of 49 and 30, and

22 percent were between 29 and 18.108 Overall, the age in Limbaugh’s audience is fairly

distributed between the different age brackets demonstrating that his show has appeal to a variety

of generations. Age was a strong predictor if an individual listened to Limbaugh’s radio show.109

In 1994, Pew Research Center commissioned a survey in which they assessed the current

political landscape and classified responses into certain groups. According to this study,

Enterprisers were Rush Limbaugh’s main audience. Enterprisers were “driven by economic

issues, but Enterprisers are also generally sympathetic to the religious right’s social issue

agenda.”110 Moreover, 56% of enterprisers regularly or sometimes listen to The Rush Limbaugh

Show.111 Enterprisers were “predominantly white (97%), male (60%) and middle-aged […]

[m]arried (70%), college educated (63%), relatively affluent and financially secure.”112 This

definition of Enterprisers generally fits the mold of an average Rush Limbaugh listener, although

there are some differences, such as education and income.

Demographics are not the only significant factor in Limbaugh’s audience as Limbaugh’s

audience size increased dramatically with time from when his radio program first became

nationally broadcasted. A year after The Rush Limbaugh Show went national, Limbaugh pulled

in 900,000 listeners in a quarter hour.113 Decades later in 2008, Premiere Radio Networks,


107
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 14.
108
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, 17.
109
Christie, "The Role of Values in Predicting Talk Radio Listening," 32.
110
“The People, the Press & Politics: The New Political Landscape,” Pew Research Center, last modified September
21, 1994, accessed February 15, 2018.
http://www.people-press.org/1994/09/21/the-people-the-press-politics-2/, 12.
111
Ibid., 114.
112
Ibid., 12.
113
Hemmer, Messengers of the Right, 261.
20

Limbaugh’s national syndicator, estimated that 3.59 million people listened to his program

during a quarter hour of his show.114 In 2004, Talkers determined Limbaugh’s overall audience

size to be 14.75 million with Sean Hannity’s audience at 13 million for comparison.115 Overall,

reports from various outlets place the 2018 size of Limbaugh’s audience between 13.5 to 20

million listeners.116 Arbitron, which has been acquired by Nielsen (measures ratings of the radio

industry), however, has not released an independently verified study of the full size of

Limbaugh’s audience.117 Thus, these various reports that place Limbaugh’s audience in the tens

of millions have not been independently verified.

In his prime, Limbaugh attracted more listeners than any other radio host. In 1996, 18

percent of adults in the United States listened to at least one political talk radio show at least

twice a week.118 Of all adults in the United States, 4% listened to Limbaugh and at least one

other host, while 7 percent only listened to Limbaugh. Similarly, 7 percent of all adults listened

only to another political talk radio show. Thus, Limbaugh’s show was incredibly far reaching in

American politics at this time as 11 percent of adults in the United States in 1996 listened to

Limbaugh on the radio. In this period of time, he not only dominated the radio landscape, but

was also one of the most influential leaders of the conservative movement because of his

following.

Because of Limbaugh’s large amount of influence in the conservative movement and in

media in general, Limbaugh affected the political thoughts of his audience. Limbaugh’s audience

responded in several manners to the views and policies presented on his radio show. First,


114
Paul Farhi, “Limbaugh’s Audience Size? It’s Largely Up in the Air,” Washington Post, March 7, 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/06/AR2009030603435.html.
115
Jamieson, Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment, 46.
116
Jamieson, Echo Chamber, 46.
117
Farhi, “Limbaugh’s Audience Size? It’s Largely Up in the Air,” Washington Post.
118
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 3.
21

Limbaugh and his show influenced the political ideology of listeners as well as their political

participation. An individual who “listens to Limbaugh at least twice a week […] translates into a

mean increase in participation by 11 percent” according to ANES data from 1996.119 Political

participation in this context includes voting, contacting government officials, working on

campaigns, and persuading family and friends to think and act in the same manner. Similarly,

Limbaugh’s program has also altered the voting decisions of the audience. Individuals that tuned

into Limbaugh’s radio program at least once a week “were 3.82 times as likely to change their

vote from Democratic in 1994 to Republican in 1996 than those who did not listen at all.”120 In

other words, individuals who listened to Limbaugh on a weekly basis were over three times as

likely to change their votes from Democrat in the midterm election in 1994 to Republican in the

presidential election in 1996 compared to those who did not listen to The Rush Limbaugh Show

at all. Thus, listening to Limbaugh increased political efficacy for conservatives and made them

feel more emboldened to participate in politics. The one-sided nature of Limbaugh’s program

creates a condition in which listeners not only vote more conservative, but also attempt to

involve others in the political process so that this conservative message can be spread.

Limbaugh’s decision on what issues to focus on in his own programs also affected the

audience and their perception of issues. Limbaugh’s opposition to the federal government and

how the government spent money was one of the central messages of his radio show. Limbaugh

then connects the idea of a larger more power federal government with the stereotypical actors in

the Democratic Party who would likely support it. Limbaugh on August 1, 2002, for example,

commented on his radio show: “these environmentalist extremist wackos are part of the


119
David S. Barker, "The Talk Radio Community: Nontraditional Social Networks and Political
Participation," Social Science Quarterly (University Of Texas Press) 79, no. 2 (June 1998): 269.
120
David C. Barker, "Rushed Decisions: Political Talk Radio and Vote Choice, 1994-1996," Journal Of Politics 61,
no. 2 (May 1999): 535.
22

Democratic Party coalition […and…] they have as their one common thread the belief in bigger,

more powerful, intrusive government.”121 When analyzed, there is a strong relationship between

listening to Limbaugh and dislike towards federal government spending.122 Moreover, listening

to Limbaugh did not correlate with a change in attitude toward issues such as affirmative action

or “family values.” This is significant as Limbaugh did not focus on these issues on his radio

show, but his opinion on these issues has been clear. Limbaugh, however, does focus heavily on

his dislike towards a large and powerful federal government. Thus, Limbaugh’s audience was

influenced directly by the issues and opinions that Limbaugh discussed during his program.

Generally, those who are more exposed to Limbaugh’s ideas agreed with his messaging more

than those who were not.123 It cannot be said that there was a direct causation as those

individuals who listened to Limbaugh were already predisposed to support the message he

advocated. His radio program nevertheless shaped the views and voting patterns of his audience,

but is sometimes difficult to point to direct causation between Limbaugh’s program and audience

response.

Furthermore, Limbaugh has been successful in creating support and opposition to

policies, politicians, or ideas among his audience. Republican voters who listened to Rush

Limbaugh, for example, on average rated Newt Gingrich 17.4 points more favorable on a

thermometer scale (score range from 1 to 100) than did Republican nonlisteners.124 Statistically

significant differences between Republican listeners and nonlisteners were also reported for


121
“Militant Environmentalist Wackos Kill!” The Rush Limbaugh Show, last modified August 1, 2001, accessed
April 22, 2018, https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2001/08/01/militant_environmentalist_wackos_kill/.
122
David Barker and Kathleen Knight, "Political Talk Radio and Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly 64, no.
2 (Summer 2000): 161.
123
GangHeong Lee and Joseph N. Cappella, "The Effects of Political Talk Radio on Political Attitude Formation:
Exposure Versus Knowledge," Political Communication 18, no. 4 (October 2001): 386.
124
David A. Jones, "Political Talk Radio: The Limbaugh Effect on Primary Voters," Political Communication 15,
no. 3 (July 1998): 375.
23

Congress, the Republican Party, conservatives, and fundamentalist Christians.125 On the other

hand, after the 2000 New Hampshire Republican primary, Limbaugh listeners became less

favorable to McCain after Limbaugh’s criticisms of him in the primaries.126 Later in the

presidential campaign, Limbaugh was able to imprint negative associations of McCain with

liberalism and his reiteration of these comparisons stuck with audience members. For example,

Limbaugh listeners were 3.94 times more likely than nonlisteners to know that The New York

Times endorsed McCain and 3.75 times more likely than nonlisteners to know that McCain

opposed the Bush tax cuts.127 Even though Limbaugh was a conservative, his program reflected

his own views regarding conservatism and the Republican Party. Thus, through his program,

Limbaugh was able to influence the information and evidence that listeners possessed. This in

turn influenced their view on politics, policies, and politicians.

Through the analysis of both audience demographics of National Review and The Rush

Limbaugh Show, there are several notable differences in regards to their demographics. First,

readers of National Review were generally more upper class and more educated than the listeners

of The Rush Limbaugh Show. More readers of National Review had received at least their college

degree: 64.3 percent of National Review readers graduated college128 while only 34.6 percent of

Limbaugh’s audience gradated college.129 This is a very large gap in educational attainment

between the two publications and demonstrates that readers of National Review not only were

better educated, but likely had the resources to invest in higher education. The annual income of

these two groups displays these resources. In 1996, 39.3 percent of Limbaugh’s audience had an


125
Ibid.
126
Jamieson, Echo Chamber, 114.
127
Ibid., 122.
128
Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109, Folder 4, Rusher Papers,
32.
129
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 14.
24

income above $50,000.130 Meanwhile 68.3 of National Review readers had an income above

$15,000 in 1971131 ($56,000 in buying power in 1996).132 This higher annual income of National

Review subscribers likely allowed them to afford to continue into higher education and acquire

more degrees. These higher educated individuals were likely attracted to National Review as this

magazine engaged in a debate regarding the tenants and ideas of conservatism. National Review

was not simply a declaration or definition concerning conservatism, the magazine was instead a

constantly evolving debate. Conversely, because Limbaugh has been a one-person outlet,

audience members either accept or reject his viewpoint on conservatism and politics. There was

a spectrum of thought that National Review encouraged in their magazine that has not been

present on Limbaugh’s show. Thus, this style of National Review likely attracted higher educated

conservative individuals who wanted to analyze different arguments and engage with multiple

conservative viewpoints. On The Rush Limbaugh Show, there was not a debate similar to

National Review in which the audience had to dissect arguments for themselves and determine

where they fell on the conservative spectrum.

Because both outlets are conservative, both audiences also overwhelmingly identify their

personal political ideology as conservative. Similar percentages of readers identify as

conservatives in both outlets: 72.7 of readers of the National Review identified as

conservatives,133 while 70 percent of listeners of Limbaugh’s show identified as conservative.134

In addition, males were the majority of the audience for both Limbaugh and National Review,

although males constituted a larger proportion of readers for National Review. While some of the


130
Ibid., 14.
131
Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109, Folder 4, Rusher Papers,
37.
132
“CPI Inflation Calculator,” Bureau of Labor Statistics.
133
Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109, Folder 4, Rusher Papers,
9.
134
Capella, Jamieson, Turow, “Call-In Political Talk Radio,” 14.
25

demographics of these two audiences may be different, their outlook on media and specifically

conservative representation in media is very similar: 75 percent of Limbaugh listeners trust a few

sources more than others, while only 24 percent trust all news media the same.135 Similarly, 87.6

percent of National Review readers did not consider the media fair to their point of view while

only 8.3 percent did.136 Even though more upper class and educated, National Review readers

believed that other media was biased against the conservative viewpoint, as did the listeners of

Limbaugh. This view of the audience is also demonstrated in the content of both National

Review and The Rush Limbaugh Show. In just some of its issues, authors of National Review

described the Washington Post as “the liberal pro-union Post,”137 asserted that “[t]he bias of the

American press is evident even in its terminology” when describing conservative individuals as

opposed to liberal ones,138 and argued that “[s]ome of the fault, again, lies with the media”

regarding the lack of respectable news produced in the United States compared to other

countries.139 However, National Review is trusting of media sources that are generally more

conservative or right wing. One author cited the Wall Street Journal as a credible source about

Reagan’s economic policy: “as is evidenced by the editorial reprinted here from the Wall Street

Journal.”140

Rush Limbaugh, similarly, contrasts the trustworthiness and consistency of his own radio

program with “the liberal media in this country.”141 Limbaugh on his radio show argues that

major news outlets such as The New York Times demonstrate their bias towards readers either

135
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, 37.
136
Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109, Folder 4, Rusher Papers,
9.
137
Von Dreele, “The Week,” 250.
138
"The Week," National Review 28, no. 3 (February 6, 1976): 70.
139
Anthony, Lejeune, "America Through British Eyes," National Review 28, no. 3 (February 6, 1976): 107.
140
Jude Wanniski, "Don't Let Them Bamboozle You, Mr. Reagan," National Review 28, no. 9 (March 19, 1976):
268.
141
“Media Wants Rights for Itself, Not You,” The Rush Limbaugh Show, last modified September 4, 2001,
accessed April 22, 2018, https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2001/09/04/media_wants_rights_for_itself_not_you/.
26

through emitting pertinent stories or through intentionally misleading them. For example,

Limbaugh stated on February 20, 2002, that “[t]his story is being completely and totally ignored

by the mainstream media,”142 while on August 19, 2002 he argued the danger that The New York

Times invited when they “intentionally [misled] and confuse[d] its readers on the newspaper’s

top right, above-the-fold front-page story.”143 Additionally, Limbaugh singled out The New York

Times on December 10, 2001, in wanting to censor certain speech in the United States: “this

newspaper [The New York Times] runs an editorial demanding that Congress act immediately to

pass a law that would abridge our free speech rights.” Both Limbaugh and Buckley’s media

outlets heavily emphasized a negative view of the mainstream media and labeled many

mainstream media sources as liberal. Thus, this feeling of untrustworthiness of other news

sources was not just limited to one specific group; it was how conservatives felt about the

mainstream media.

In addition to these two conservative outlets, the audiences of both National Review and

The Rush Limbaugh Show read and subscribe to other sources of political information,

demonstrating their deep interest in politics and policy. The average reader of National Review

bought 29 books in a year,144 while 80 percent of Rush Limbaugh’s listeners stated that they

followed the national news most of the time. 145 Their interest in politics did not stop at these two

conservative outlets, but expanded into other sources as well. Even though these two audiences

diverged in some aspects regarding demographics, they both thought similarly.


142
“Liberal Loopholes,” The Rush Limbaugh Show, last modified February 20, 2002, accessed April 22, 2018,
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/02/20/liberal_loopholes/.
143
“New York Times Misrepresents Kissinger on Iraq,” The Rush Limbaugh Show, last modified August 19, 2002,
accessed April 22, 2018,
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/08/19/new_york_times_misrepresents_kissinger_on_iraq/.
144
Ibid., 12.
145
“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources,” Pew Research Center, 38.
27

In conclusion, the demographics of both of these conservative outlets demonstrate change

in the followers of the conservative movement throughout the twentieth century, while the

attitudes and feelings remained the same. Unlike the audience of National Review, the more

current audience of Rush Limbaugh’s show has demonstrated that the followers of the

conservative movement are now more equally spread between educational levels, genders (even

though it favors men), and socioeconomic status. There has been some economic diversification

in conservative followers in some regards from the beginning of the movement with Buckley’s

audience to the current audience of Limbaugh.

Furthermore, each of these outlets had a distinctive purpose in the conservative

movement. National Review educated intellectuals of an earlier era and crafted the base for the

modern conservative movement. It laid the framework for conservative ideas as well as

introduced a group of individuals to conservatism. Decades later, Limbaugh then built off of that

base and ultimately took those ideas and spread them to a much wider audience than Buckley.

Limbaugh took the ideas presented in National Review and repackaged them so that more

Americans from different backgrounds could relate to these ideas. Limbaugh in his radio show

has more influence in regards to how many individuals he reaches, but Buckley had more

influence with his audience in terms of laying the foundation for the modern conservative

movement. Both of these outlets were necessary in making conservatism into a widely followed

ideology. Ultimately, Buckley succeeded in his pursuits of establishing a magazine that would

establish conservatism as one of the dominant ideologies in the United States. Similarly,

Limbaugh succeeded in taking some of those ideas and bringing them to a mass audience in the

United States.
28

Appendix

Appendix A

Data from “1994 Times Series Study.” American National Election Studies. Accessed March 10, 2018.
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/1994post/1994post.htm

Appendix B

Mean Test for Gender Based Differences in Rush Limbaugh Feeling


Thermometer
Male Female Mean T-Statistic P-Value
Difference
Rush 49.09692 41.94860 7.14832 2.4963 .01291
Limbaugh
Feeling
Thermometer

Data from “1994 Times Series Study.” American National Election Studies. Accessed March 10, 2018.
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/1994post/1994post.htm
29

Appendix C


Notes: correlation=.5226832

Data from “1994 Times Series Study.” American National Election Studies. Accessed March 10, 2018.
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/1994post/1994post.htm















30

Bibliography

Primary Sources

“1994 Times Series Study.” American National Election Studies. Accessed March 10,
2018. http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/1994post/1994post.htm

"Angry Voice on the Right." Time 76, no. 18 (October 31, 1960): 56. Time Magazine
Archive, EBSCOhost (accessed March 24, 2018).

"At 60, National Review Declares Victory (Sort of)." Media Industry Newsletter (November 16,
2015): 10. Accessed April 26, 2018. Business Source Alumni Edition, EBSCOhost.

Buckley, William F. February 25, 1974. Letter. Library of Congress, Box 113,
Folder 5, Rusher Papers.

Cappella, Joseph N., Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Joseph Turow. “Call-In Political Talk
Radio: Background, Content, Audiences, Portrayal in Mainstream Media.” Annenberg
Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania. August 7, 1996. Accessed March
2, 2018.
https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Political_Communication/Polit
ical_Talk_Radio/1996_03_political_talk_radio_rpt.PDF.

“Daschle Sneaks S. Dakota Exemption from Wacko Rules into Spending Bill.” The Rush
Limbaugh Show. Last modified August 2, 2002. Accessed April 22, 2018.
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/08/02/daschle_sneaks_s_dakota_exemption_f
rom_wacko_rules_into_spending_bill/.

“Democrat Memo: Lie About GOP.” The Rush Limbaugh Show. Last modified May 22, 2002.
Accessed April 22, 2018.
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/05/22/democrat_memo_lie_about_gop/.

Goodman, Mark. "Rush Limbaugh." People 38, no. 16 (October, 1992): 109-
112. Accessed February 14, 2018. EBSCOhost.

Johnston Jr., Joseph F. "The Leader as Mass Man." National Review 28, no. 9 (March 19, 1976):
270-272. Accessed April 23, 2018. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

“Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources.” Pew Research
Center. Last modified August 17, 2008. Accessed February 12, 2018. http://www.people-
press.org/2008/08/17/key-news-audiences-now-blend-online-and-traditional-sources/.

Kirk, Russell. "Sending the Sheriff." National Review 28, no. 9 (March 19, 1976): 274. Accessed
April 23, 2018. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

Lejeune, Anthony. "America Through British Eyes." National Review 28, no. 3 (February 6,
31

1976): 91-109. Accessed April 23, 2018. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

“Liberal Loopholes.” The Rush Limbaugh Show. Last modified February 20, 2002. Accessed
April 22, 2018. https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/02/20/liberal_loopholes/.

“Media Wants Rights for Itself, Not You.” The Rush Limbaugh Show. Last modified September
4, 2001. Accessed April 22, 2018.
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2001/09/04/media_wants_rights_for_itself_not_yo
u/.

“Militant Environmentalist Wackos Kill!” The Rush Limbaugh Show. Last modified August 1,
2001. Accessed April 22, 2018.
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2001/08/01/militant_environmentalist_wackos_kill/
.

“New York Times Misrepresents Kissinger on Iraq.” The Rush Limbaugh Show. Last modified
August 19, 2002. Accessed April 22, 2018.
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/08/19/new_york_times_misrepresents_kissin
ger_on_iraq/.

"NR's New Angel." Time 103, no. 12 (March 25, 1974): 57. Accessed April 23, 2018. Time
Magazine Archive EBSCOhost.

“The GOP Page.” The Rush Limbaugh Show. Last modified April 23, 2002. Accessed April 22,
2018. https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2002/04/23/the_gop_page/.

“The People, the Press & Politics: The New Political Landscape.” Pew Research Center.
Last modified September 21, 1994. Accessed February 15, 2018.
http://www.people-press.org/1994/09/21/the-people-the-press-politics-2/.

Subscriber survey, October 19, 1971. Manuscript. From Library of Congress, Box 109,
Folder 4, Rusher Papers.

“The Week.” National Review 28, no. 3 (February 6, 1976): 69-72. Accessed April 23,
2018. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

Von Dreele, W. H. "The Week." National Review 28, no. 9 (March 19, 1976): 248-252.
Accessed April 23, 2018. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

Wanniski, Jude. "Don't Let Them Bamboozle You, Mr. Reagan." National Review 28, no. 9
(March 19, 1976): 268-269. Accessed April 23, 2018. Academic Search Premier,
EBSCOhost.

Secondary Sources
32

Appel, Edward C. "Rush to Judgment: Burlesque, Tragedy, and Hierarchal Alchemy in


the Rhetoric of America's Foremost Political Talkshow Host." Southern Communication
Journal 68, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 217-230. Accessed February 14, 2018. Communication
& Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Barker, David C. "Rushed Decisions: Political Talk Radio and Vote Choice, 1994-
1996." Journal Of Politics 61, no. 2 (May 1999): 527-539. Accessed February 12,
2018. America: History & Life, EBSCOhost.

Barker, David S. "The Talk Radio Community: Nontraditional Social Networks and
Political Participation." Social Science Quarterly (University Of Texas Press) 79, no. 2
(June 1998): 261-72. Accessed February 6, 2018. America: History & Life, EBSCOhost.

Barker, David, and Kathleen Knight. "Political Talk Radio and Public Opinion." Public
Opinion Quarterly 64, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 149-70. Accessed February 12,
2018. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Bennett, Stephen Earl. "Who Listens to Rush Limbaugh's Radio Program and the
Relationship Between Listening to Limbaugh and Knowledge of Public Affairs, 1994-
2006." Journal of Radio & Audio Media 16, no. 1 (May 2009): 66-82. Accessed February
12, 2018. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Bogus, Carl T. Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism.
New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011.

Bridges, Linda. Strictly Right: William F. Buckley Jr. and the American Conservative
Movement. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

Christie, Thomas Bryan. "The Role of Values in Predicting Talk Radio Listening: A
Model of Value Equivalence." Journal of Radio Studies 14, no. 1 (May 2007): 20-36.
Accessed February 14, 2018. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Colford, Paul D. The Rush Limbaugh Story: Talent on Loan from God. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1993.

“CPI Inflation Calculator,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed March 31,


https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.

Critchlow, Donald T. The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political
History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Farber, David. The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Farhi, Paul. “Limbaugh’s Audience Size? It’s Largely Up in the Air.” Washington Post,
33

March 7, 2009. Accessed February 12, 2018.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/06/AR2009030603435.h
tml.

Garry, Patrick M. "A Turning Point for Modern Conservatism." Modern Age 49, no. 1
(Winter 2007): 24-36. Accessed February 6, 2018. America: History & Life, EBSCOhost.

Hart, Jeffrey. The Making of the American Conservative Mind: National Review and Its
Times. Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2006.

Hemmer, Nicole. Messengers of the Right: Conservative Media and the Transformation
of American Politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media
Establishment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Jones, David A. "Political Talk Radio: The Limbaugh Effect on Primary


Voters." Political Communication 15, no. 3 (July 1998): 367-81. Accessed February 12,
2018. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Kristol, Irving. "American Conservatism 1945-1995." Public Interest no. 121 (Fall 1995):
80-91. Accessed February 6, 2018. America: History & Life, EBSCOhost.

Lattin, Bohn David. "Rush to Praise and Blame: An Analysis of the ‘Paranoid’ Ego-
Function Of Limbaugh's Rhetoric." Journal of the Northwest Communication
Association 29, (Spring 2000): 1-11. Accessed February 14. Communication & Mass
Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Lee, GangHeong, and Joseph N. Cappella. "The Effects of Political Talk Radio on
Political Attitude Formation: Exposure Versus Knowledge." Political Communication 18,
no. 4 (October 2001): 369-94. Accessed February 12, 2018. Communication & Mass
Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Lee, Michael J. "WFB: The Gladiatorial Style and the Politics of Provocation." Rhetoric
& Public Affairs 13, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 43-76. Accessed February 14,
2018. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost.

Meehan II, William F. Conversations with William F. Buckley Jr. Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 2009.

Nash, George H. Reappraising the Right: The Past & Future of American Conservatism.
Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2009.

Noble, David W. "Conservatism in the USA." Journal of Contemporary History 13, no.
4 (October 1978): 635-52. Accessed February 14, 2018. America: History & Life,
EBSCOhost.
34

Sivek, Susan Currie. "Editing Conservatism: How National Review Magazine Framed
and Mobilized a Political Movement." Mass Communication & Society 11, no. 3
(Summer 2008): 248-274. Accessed February 11, 2018. Communication & Mass Media
Complete, EBSCOhost.

You might also like