VALENTIN TIO V.

VRB

DOCTRINES:
a. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one industry over another 

b. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
“inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation”.


c. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 


RECIT-READY: Valentino Tio filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of PD No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

(1) Whether or not Section 10 of P.D. No. 1987, which imposes a tax of thirty percent (30%) on the gross receipts payable to the
local government is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject thereof;
(2) Whether or not the tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due
process of the Constitution; and
(3) Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority;

As to the first issue, the SC held that Tio’s contention that the tax provision of the Decree is a rider is bereft and devoid of merit because
the title of the Decree, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) aimed at regulating and controlling the video
industry, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. Moreover,
it is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree. As to the second
issue, the SC held that it is axiomatic that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed. The legislature acts upon its constituents in imposing a tax; thus, in general, a sufficient
security against erroneous and oppressive taxation is afforded the taxpayer. More importantly, the tax imposed by the Decree
is also a revenue measure. The tax of 30% is exacted for a public purpose, i.e. to answer the need for regulating the video
industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes. As to the third issue, the SC held that the grant in Section 11 of the Decree of authority to
the VRB to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to
legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.

FACTS:
▪ Valentin Tio, petitioner, is doing business under the name of Omi Enterprises. Petitioner filed this case on his own behalf and
purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. 

▪ It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board”
with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The rationale behind the enactment of the decree, is set
out in its preambular clauses (Check case) 

▪ A month after the promulgation of P.D. 1987 (The Decree), Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal
Revenue Code providing, inter alia: 

▪ SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes
shall be subject to sales tax 

▪ Petitioner submits that the 30% tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. Petitioners provided
6 grounds to attack the constitutionality of P.D. 1987 (For this subject, we focus on #2) 


WHETHER P.D. IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID (DIFFERENT GROUNDS)

a. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same
is not germane to the subject matter thereof; 

b. Whether the tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution (30% tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade?);


c. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No.
6; 

d. There is undue delegation of power and authority; 

e. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and 

f. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

NO IT IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID.

Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a rider and the same
is not germane to the subject matter thereof
▪ No. The title of the P.D. 1987 is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably
covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of
the decree.

Whether the tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process
clause of the constitution (30% tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade?
▪ NO. The tax remains a valid imposition. The rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.
▪ It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely
deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts
 scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority
which exercises it.
▪ In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and
oppressive taxation.
▪ The tax imposed by P.D. 1987 is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of
videogram establishments of around P600M per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of
an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public
viewing. The tax burden is actually shifted on the buying or the viewing public (like amusement tax). It is a tax that is imposed
uniformly on all videogram operators.
▪ The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the P.D. 1987 to protect the movie industry, the tax
remains a valid imposition.
o The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to
favor one industry over another.
o It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held
that “inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation”
o Taxation has been made the implement of the State’s police power.
o At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

There is no factual or legal basis for the exercise by the president of the vast powers conferred upon him by amendment no. 6
▪ NO. In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General’s Office aver that the 8th “whereas” clause sufficiently summarizes
the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery
program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch.

There is undue delegation of power and authority

▪ NO. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and
units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority
or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.

The decree is an ex-post facto law; and

▪ NOT violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among other categories, one which “alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense.”there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which
is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a
forty- five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.

There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.
▪ NO. We do not share petitioner’s fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased out of existence as if it
were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. The enactment of the Decree since
April 10, 1986 has not brought about the “demise” of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have
proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
PRC vs. De Guzman
Facts:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in
February 1993. Petitioner PRC then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most
difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually
and exceptionally high. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects,
and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board
observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon
in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.
The Board withheld the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure
Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics,
and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the
said examination.
Fr. Nebres reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees
from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering
of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause “strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the
examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc.”
For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the
conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”
However, the RTC and the CA held that the respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure
examination for physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No.
2382, they should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
Issue: Whether De Guzman, et al. shall be allowed to take their oath as physicians – NO
Ruling:
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving
discretion. Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the act,[20] and the performance of the duty has been
refused. Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and register respondents
as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the issuance of
certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners “shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied
with the requirements of the Board.” In statutory construction the term “shall” is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus,
when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath
and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres,
the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be
appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and “disapprove
applications for examination or registration,” pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1.
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in
abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to
compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have
“satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination.” Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered “to
physicians who qualified in the examinations.” The operative word here is “satisfactorily,” defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or
obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance.” Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, which charged De Guzman, et al. for
“immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit”, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents “satisfactorily passed” the
licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.
It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right[35] of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.[36] But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge
may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence
in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would
practice medicine.
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised
by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular
privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however,
require giving up one’s constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature cannot validly
bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation
that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements
for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be
granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and
the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said
privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid
requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V CITY OF MANILA
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: Read with Ermita

FACTS
• In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other
establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision
tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law.
• Challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila"
o SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and
welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
o SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
o SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are
hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
• Malate Tourist and Development Corporation prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila
it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up
rates for stays of only three hours.
• On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention[7] on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
• The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice
a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general welfare clause.
• RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. [15] A month later, on March 8,
1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
o The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution."
o Illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where the legitimate purpose
of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of
carabaos and carabeef.
• City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
o [To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
o "to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and s uch
others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for
the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment for a single offense.
• Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an
invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
• CA
o First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
o Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method.
The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate.
o Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
o Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.

ISSUE
• Whether the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power—NO

RULING
• To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring
patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they
could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed
harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
• All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments.
• REQUISITES OF A VALID ORDINANCE
1. Within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law
2. Conform to substantive requirements
a. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
b. Must not be unfair or oppressive
c. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
e. Must be general and consistent with public policy; and
f. Must not be unreasonable.
• The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State .
o Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
• If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the
proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether
the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
o Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld.
• Standards of judicial review were established:
1. Strict scrutiny
a. Laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process
b. Presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
c. Standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms.[
d. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as we ll as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection
e. Protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,[62] judicial access[63] and interstate travel.[
2. Intermediate scrutiny
a. Governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
3. Rational basis standard
a. Review for economic legislation.
b. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. ] Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest
• Comparison to City of Manila
o Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen,
but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation
are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty
o Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among
willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of
Manila case.
• We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate
or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is
momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated
stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few h ours with
purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative
• It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.
o It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.[
• Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held
in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected
• The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of s ection 3 of the
Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without
exception to the unjustified prohibition.
• The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work wo uld be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
o Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a
portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
• We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However
well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification.
• "you cannot legislate morality"
CITY OF MANILA V LAGUIO
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: Sauna, massage parlors, nightclubs

FACTS
• The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is foremost a guardian
of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily"
in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote
morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.
• Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels,
hostels and lodging houses.
o It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of
Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
• In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments,
motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainmen t" and
they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb
the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." 1
• MTDC advanced that the Ordinance was invalid as the Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory
closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected
• Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, 19 otherwise known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)
o Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply
disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone
ISSUE
• Whether the ordinance constitutes a proper exercise of police power— NO

RULING
• A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law
• SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
1. Must not contravene to the Constitution or any statute
a. Pass under the test of constitutionality and test of consistency with the prevailing laws
b. Uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy
6. Must not be unreasonable
• The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
o Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out
the declared objects of their creation
• The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject
to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
o Substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action.
▪ Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of
scrutiny used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process
is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny
is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can
prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.
• Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
o To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for th e
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
o It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded.
• The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for
the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for
the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
o However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through
means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The
closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable
relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
o The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila
o We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it
may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance.
▪ Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because
immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men
o The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape
morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or
 establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the
establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
• A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
• Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion
vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the es tablishments
come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than
the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
o Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and
conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of
unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
• Comparison with Ermita
o The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, it needs pointing out, is also different
from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business
in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due
process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a
regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
Planters vs. Fertiphil [Chico-Nazario]
Facts:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of
a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA). After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil
demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of
LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of
law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately-owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly
of the fertilizer industry.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil, ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the State’s inherent power of
taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose.
CA affirmed the RTC decision, ruling that even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued under the police power of the state, it is
still unconstitutional because it did not promote public welfare.
Issue: Whether LOI 1465, being a law implemented for the purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country, and
for benefiting a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers their stock ownership in PPI constitutes a valid legislation
pursuant to the exercise of taxation and police power for public purposes – NO
Ruling:
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity.
Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power
is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The “lawful subjects” and “lawful means” tests are used
to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent
and constitutional limitations.
The Court agreed with the RTC that the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power. While it is true that the
power of taxation can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation. If the purpose is
primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.
The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on the seller
or the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a bag of fertilizer by as much as five percent. A plain reading of the LOI also supports
the conclusion that the levy was for revenue generation. The LOI expressly provided that the levy was imposed “until adequate capital is
raised to make PPI viable.”
An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for
purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons.
The term “public purpose” is not defined. It is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. Jurisprudence states
that “public purpose” should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only pertain to those purposes which are traditionally viewed as
essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian
reform.
When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from the public when its true intent is to give undue benefit and advantage to a private
enterprise, that law will not satisfy the requirement of “public purpose.”
The purpose of a law is evident from its text or inferable from other secondary sources. Here, the Court agreed with the RTC and that
CA that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose for the following reasons:
1. The LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private company. The purpose is explicit from Clause 3
of the law, thus: “until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable”
2. It provides that the imposition of the P10 levy was conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming financially “viable.” Worse,
the liability of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers of fertilizer to pay the levy is made indefinite. They are required to continuously
pay the levy until adequate capital is raised for PPI.
3. The RTC and the CA held that the levies paid under the LOI were directly remitted and deposited by FPA to Far East Bank and
Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. This proves that PPI benefited from the LOI. This also proves that the main purpose
of the law was to give undue benefit and advantage to PPI.
4. The levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI.
Even if LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police power of the State, it would still be invalid for failing to comply with the test of “lawful
subjects” and “lawful means.” Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give
undue advantage to a private corporation.
PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of operative
fact, which provides that an unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. PPI wants to retain the levies paid
under LOI No. 1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional. However, PPI did not raise the applicability of the doctrine
of operative fact with the RTC and the CA.
At any rate, the Court found the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights,
imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed.
Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle
against unjust enrichment.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would
put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Here, the Court did not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly
benefited from the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank account. Quite the
reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a refund.
Southern Luzon vs. DSWD
Facts:
R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation-Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges
and For Other Purposes," was enacted. Under the said law, a senior citizen, who must be at least 60 years old and has an annual income
of not more than P60,000.00, may avail of the privileges provided in Section 4 thereof, one of which is 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines.
To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior citizens, covered establishments can claim an equal amount as tax credit
which can be applied against the income tax due from them.
Arroyo signed R.A. No. 9257, amending some provisions of R.A. No. 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines but removed the annual income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the law. Further, R.A. No.
9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted to senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income, computed
based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.
DSWD issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9257. Article 8 of Rule VI of the said IRR provides that the cost
of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted.
The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to senior citizens did not sit well with some drug store owners and corporations,
claiming it affected the profitability of their business. Thus, Carlos Drug, et al. assailed the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
9257 primarily on the ground that it amounts to taking of private property without payment of just compensation.
In a Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the assailed provision, holding that the same is a legitimate exercise of police
power.
R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons" was enacted, codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter,
R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A. No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2
thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and incentives of PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines.
Similar to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross income,
based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking to declare as unconstitutional the said law and IRR insofar as these provisions only allow
tax deduction on the gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered as compensation to private establishments
for the 20% discount that they are required to grant to senior citizens and PWDs, which the CA dismissed, holding that the Court has
already resolved the issue in Carlos Super Drug vs. DSWD.
Issue: Whether the Magna Carta for PWDs and its IRR are unconstitutional – NO
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the petitioner that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to the instant case, not because
of the petitioner's submission of financial statements which were wanting in the first case, but because it had the good sense of including
questions that had not been raised or deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20% discount granted to
PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and violation of the equal protection clause.
Nonetheless, the Court finds nothing in the instant case that merits a reversal of the earlier ruling of the Court in Carlos Superdrug.
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, there is a very slim difference between the issues in Carlos Superdrug and the instant case with respect
to the nature of the senior citizen discount.
Police Power
This question had been settled in Carlos Superdrug, where the Court ruled that the change in the tax treatment of the discount was a
valid exercise of police power. Providing aid for the disabled persons is an important State responsibility. Thus, the State is obliged to
give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of society. This
entails the creation of opportunities for them and according them privileges if only to balance the playing field which had been unduly
tilted against them because of their limitations.
The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the community and even private entities. As to
the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare
of its people especially those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country, and refers to the State
in its role as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves. In fulfilling this
duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
The petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax treatment of the discount is illegal as it constitutes taking without just
compensation. It even submitted financial statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to support its claim of declining profits when the
change in the policy was implemented.
The Court is not swayed. To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had already been
made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen discount was its police
power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely
because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.
The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are individuals whose well-being is a recognized public duty.
The private sector, being recipients of the privilege to engage business in our land, utilize our goods as well as the services of our people
for proprietary purposes, it is only fitting to expect their support in measures that contribute to common good. Moreover, their right to
own, establish and operate economic enterprises is always subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands.
The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to implement the declared policies of the subject
laws, that is, to impose discounts on the medical services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as
tax deduction rather than tax credit. The measure is fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to prove the claim that it
was confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory, there must be taking of property without just compensation.
What is imperative is for it to establish that there was taking in the constitutional sense or that, in the imposition of the mandatory discount,
the power exercised by the state was eminent domain.
The first requirement speaks of entry into a private property which clearly does not obtain in this case. There is no private property that
is; invaded or appropriated by the State. The subject of what the petitioner supposed as taking was not even earned profits but merely
an expectation of profits, which may not even occur.
The supposed taking also lacked the characteristics of permanence and consistency. The reason is that the impact on the establishments
varies depending on their response to the changes brought about by the subject provisions. To be clear, establishments, are not
prevented from adjusting their prices to accommodate the effects of the granting of the discount and retain their profitability while being
fully compliant to the laws.
There is also no ousting of the owner or deprivation of ownership. Establishments are neither divested of ownership of any of their
properties nor is anything forcibly taken from them. They remain the owner of their goods and their profit or loss still depends on the
performance of their sales.
Apart from the foregoing, covered establishments are also provided with a mechanism to recoup the amount of discounts they grant the
senior citizens and PWDs. It is provided in Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 that establishments may claim
the discounts as "tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered."
To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and not earned profits. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the
right to profit is not a vested right or an entitlement that has accrued on the person or entity such that its invasion or deprivation warrants
compensation. Vested rights are "fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable." Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action to ask
for just compensation, it being only an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one's own.
Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction, suffice it is to say that it is within the province of Congress to do
so in the exercise of its legislative power. Corollary, whether to treat the discount as a tax deduction or tax credit is a matter addressed
to the wisdom of the legislature.
It is within the bounds of the police power of the state to impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their profits, such as in
the imposition of price control measures. There is no compensable taking but only a recognition of the fact that they are subject to the
regulation of the State and that all personal or private interests must bow down to the more paramount interest of the State.
This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of the State does not authorize the destruction of the business. While a business may be
regulated, such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision
cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation.
Equal Protection
The petitioner argues that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are violative of the equal protection clause in that it failed to distinguish between
those who have the capacity to pay and those who do not, in granting the 20% discount. R.A. No. 9257, in particular, removed the income
qualification before a senior citizen may be entitled to the 20% discount.
To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification. The Constitution itself considered
the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a priority to address their needs. The classification is based on age and therefore
qualifies all who have attained the age of 60. Senior citizens are a class of their own, who are in need and should be entitled to government
support, and the fact that they may still be earning for their own sustenance should not disqualify them from the privilege.
The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of PWDs as a class in R.A. No. 9442 and in granting them discounts.1âwphi1 It
needs no further explanation that PWDs have special needs which, for most,' last their entire lifetime. They constitute a class of their
own, equally deserving of government support as our elderlies. While some of them maybe willing to work and earn income for
themselves, their disability deters them from living their full potential. Thus, the need for assistance from the government to augment the
reduced income or productivity brought about by their physical or intellectual limitations.
There is also no question that the grant of mandatory discount is germane to the purpose of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is, to adopt
an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development and make essential goods and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost, with special priority given to the elderlies and the disabled, among others. The privileges granted by the
laws ease their concerns and allow them to live more comfortably.
The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the government for the welfare of the senior citizens and PWDs. It is not some
random predicament but an actual, continuing and pressing concern that requires preferential attention. Also, the laws apply to all senior
citizens and PWDs, respectively, without further distinction or reservation. Without a doubt, all the elements for a valid classification were
met.
Vagueness
The definitions provided by law have a striking conformity with the definition of "PWDs" in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The seemingly broad definition of the terms was not without good reasons. It recognizes that
"disability is an evolving concept" and appreciates the "diversity of PWDs." The terms were given comprehensive definitions so as to
accommodate the various forms of disabilities, and not confine it to a particular case as this would effectively exclude other forms of
physical, intellectual or psychological impairments.
Also, the Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will
not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act.
As regards the petitioner's claim that the law lacked reasonable standards in determining the persons entitled to the discount, Section 32
thereof is on point as it identifies who may avail of the privilege and the manner of its availment. It states:
Sec. 32. x x x

The abovementioned privileges are available only to persons with disability who are Filipino citizens upon submission of any of the following
as proof of his/her entitlement thereto:

(I) An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain of the place where the persons with disability resides;

(II) The passport of the persons with disability concerned; or

(III) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID) issued by the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP).

It is required that the person claiming disability must submit the following requirements before he shall be issued a PWD Identification
Card:
1. Two "1 x l" recent ID pictures with the names, and signatures or thumb marks at the back of the picture.
2. One (1) Valid ID
3. Document to confirm the medical or disability condition
To confirm his disability, the person must obtain a medical certificate or assessment, as the case maybe, issued by a licensed private or
government physician, licensed teacher or head of a business establishment attesting to his impairment. The issuing entity depends on
whether the disability is apparent or non-apparent.
The PWD identification card also has a validity period of only three years which facilitate in the monitoring of those who may need
continued support and who have been relieved of their disability, and therefore may be taken out of the coverage of the law.
At any rate, the law has penal provisions which give concerned establishments the option to file a case against those abusing the privilege.
PASEI vs. Drilon
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers."
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of
prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable
injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
Issue: Whether Department Order No. 1 is valid – YES
Ruling:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of:
(1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property
(2) in order to foster the common good.
It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it
to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption
logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department
Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class
The Court is satisfied that the classification made — the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances,
our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament.
As the Court has indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive
branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is
implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers." This Court has no quarrel that in
the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This
is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As
a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all
Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the
singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an
unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other
things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor
Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits." is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the
State's power of regulation. The Constitution declares that:
Sec 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such
an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange
lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to ensure
that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government
has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it
has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire
has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
Assn. of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform
175 SCRA 343 | July 14, 1989
CRUZ, J.

However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

FACTS
• "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly
urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
• Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 and 1973 emphasized the importance of social justice.
• The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people.
These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program in Sec. 4
• The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July
17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D.
No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This
was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
• Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President
and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result,
after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988.
• The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges
to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above.

ISSUES AND HOLDING

1.) W/N the power of eminent domain was rightfully utilized in this case. Yes.

• Let us dispose first of the argument that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform
instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct
to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all
agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP
was made by the legislative and executive departments in
the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been
abused.
• A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as
the political question.
• The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private
landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the
Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if
we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
• The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.
• Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative
authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the
rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land- o ... the DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land.
• To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by
any other branch or official of the government.
• However, a reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered
the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and
other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more
importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner
or any other interested party, as the determination made by the DAR is only preliminary and may be reviewed by the courts.
• The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved. This refers to Section
18 of the CARP Law which allows different modes of payment as just compensation.
• The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners
of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment
allowed.
• In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the
effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise.
• It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other.
And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
 relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal
with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
• The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in
excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a
particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from
the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner.
• Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of
pesos will be needed.
• We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority
project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they
also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical
method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that
there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers.
• We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
by unorthodox means.
• With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the
afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
• We find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on
the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are
likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP
bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
• The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of
just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
• The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions.
• The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
• Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid
for must also be rejected.
YNOT V IAC
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: Read with US v Toribio

FACTS
• Challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. Order is as follows
o WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos
not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
o WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter -
provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
• The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.
• The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
•
ISSUE
• Whether the EO is valid and if it is a valid exercise of police power—YES

RULING
• As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question
the validity of the executive order.
o The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary
because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable
command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process
clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times a nd
circumstances may require.
• The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country
is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land,"
• This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted except ions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience
or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.
o There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of
a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the
safety and lives of the people.
• It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No.
626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in
one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers
who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the
increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not
taken steps to protect and preserve them.
• Comparison to US v Toribio
o The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and no t unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the nece ssary
permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
o But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
▪ We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
o In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, an d the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
o It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted,
however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to
be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
▪ In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
• To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
Quezon City vs. Ericta
Facts:
Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private
Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof"
provides:
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.
The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval
of the application."

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of
the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
"RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the requ ired 6% space
intended for paupers’ burial."

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken
for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this
case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not
taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power – NO
Ruling:
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13
of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the
permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in
effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be justified under sub-section 't', Section
12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the City Council to—
"'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper place […]

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation.'
The police power of Quezon City is as the power to “make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, [etc.].”

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.'
Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the
general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare
as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of
his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation."
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and
to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the
burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own
city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
Carlos Super Drug vs. DSWD
Facts:
R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March
21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered

The DOF clarified the difference between a tax credit and a tax deduction, viz:
Effectively, a tax credit is a peso-for-peso deduction from a taxpayer's tax liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such
establishment has granted to a senior citizen. The establishment recovers the full amount of discount given to a senior citiz en and hence,
the government shoulders 100% of the discounts granted.

It must be noted, however, that conceptually, a tax credit scheme under the Philippine tax system, necessitates that prior payments of taxes
have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due.

Under the tax deduction scheme, the establishment concerned is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing for its tax liability, the
amount of discounts granted to senior citizens. Effectively, the government loses in terms of foregone revenues an amount equivalent to the
marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the government.

Issue: Whether RA 9257 is valid – YES

Ruling:
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling
drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-
up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated
for the discount.
Examining petitioners' arguments, it is apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme
as a reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Being a tax deduction, the
discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. The permanent
reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the taker's gain but the owner's loss. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would
not meet the definition of just compensation.
However, the Court believes that in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, the State can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. It seeks to “recognize the important role
of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.”
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides
that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
When the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will
suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the
alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business,
because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to
show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners
to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a
business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by
petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being
oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of
property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously
serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good.
MMDA vs. Garin
Facts:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and
his driver’s license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila.
He filed a case, assailing the constitutionality of the law, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec.
5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring
motorists.
The RTC held that there was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA, hence the MMDA Memorandum Circular
authorizing confiscation of driver’s licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio. Also, it held that the summary confiscation of a
driver’s license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (driver’s license) without DUE
PROCESS.
Meanwhile, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the
procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which
can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers’ licenses as a matter of course in cases of
traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay
their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that
matter, that would entail confiscating drivers’ licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioner’s future programs, the
Court deemed it appropriate to rule on the matter.
Issue: Whether MMDA can summarily confiscate a driver’s license – NO
Ruling:
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state,
which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare,
subject to the procedural due process requirements.
The legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be
exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential
danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate
them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in
the interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon
noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
However, it is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor
vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant
the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, police power cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only
such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a “political subdivision
of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.” Local government units are the provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. However, unlike the legislative bodies of
the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power
to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise
of police power.