MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR. vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. Nos. 209195 and 209215, 17 September 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.)
“In a motion to discharge an accused to become a state witness, it is still the trial court
that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’
qualifications satisfies the procedural norms. This is a symbiotic relationship as the trial court
largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.”
Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose
Barrameda naming petitioner Manuel J. Jimenez and several others as his co-
conspirators. His statements detailed where the alleged steel casing containing the
body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver near the place which
he pointed. The People of the Philippines (People) through the state prosecutors filed
an Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez, and several others of murder for
killing Barrameda. Montero, as well as the People thereafter filed a motion for
discharge as a state witness for the prosecution which Jimenez opposed. The motion
to discharge was granted by the newly appointed judge, Hon. Zaldy B. Docena.
According him, the prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting the said motion.
Jimenez however, opposed Judge Docena’s ruling. He averred that the Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge because: (1)
the requirements for granting a motion were not properly complied; (2) there is no
absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero; (3) Montero’s testimony do not
corroborate with the prosecution’s evidence; (4) and Montero is favored as a state
witness though he appears to be the most guilty.

ISSUE: Did Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to
discharge Montero as a state witness?

RULING: No. Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment x x x as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner x x x. To resolve a motion to discharge under Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure x x x [it] only require that that
the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in
its material points, not on all points. x x x, [A] trial judge cannot be expected or
required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of
everything that may develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty
participation of the accused. [I]t is still the trial court that determines whether the
prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a
state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic
one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice,
largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.

x x x “Most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of

participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the
severity of the penalty imposed. x xx What the rule avoids is the possibility that the
most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of
participation would be penalized. x x x Thus, as a rule, x x x what are controlling are
the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed. x x x We draw
attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be found to be the
least guilty; he or she should not only “appear to be the most guilty.”