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Executive summary
• The conflict in Yemen has been labelled the ‘worst humanitarian crisis in the world’ by the EU
and characterised by the UN as ‘entirely man-made’.
• It was reported in late October 2018 that the Saudi-led coalition was deploying an additional
10,000 troops as part of a planned new offensive against the port city of Hodeida, which is the
principal humanitarian lifeline allowing food and medical aid to reach almost two-thirds of the
Yemeni population located in Houthi-controlled territory.
• The UN has warned that Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the Arab world prior to
the conflict, is now on the brink of widespread famine, which could lead to further massive loss
of life. Yemen is also suffering from one of the largest cholera outbreaks in recorded history,
with over one million suspected cases.
• It has been estimated that since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition has conducted 18,000 airstrikes,
one third of which have hit non-military targets. On 11 November 2018, the area around
Hodeida’s main hospital came under sustained air attack.
• The UN High Commissioner of Human Rights has suggested that war crimes may have been
committed by both sides to the conflict, noting reports of sexual violence, torture and child
soldier recruitment.
• The Australian Government has urged the parties to the conflict to ‘respect international
humanitarian law [and] minimise civilian hardship’ and the Opposition has urged the
Government to ‘support United Nations’ efforts to find a political solution to the conflict’.
• Australia made a number of military shipments to Saudi Arabia in 2016–17 and plans to
increase arms sales to the UAE. The Australian Greens and NGOs have called on the
Government to suspend such arms sales, as the German Government has done.
• Australia’s seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council provides an avenue for drawing
attention to the conflict and promoting a multilateral approach to de-escalating the conflict and
averting an even more widespread humanitarian disaster in Yemen.
ISSN 2203-5249
Contents
Executive summary ........................................................................ 1
Figure 1: political map of Yemen....................................................... 2
Introduction to the crisis ................................................................ 3
The conflict .................................................................................... 4
Figure 2: northern and southern Yemen prior to unification ........... 5
Figure 3: map of the Yemen conflict (September 2018) ................. 10
Potential war crimes .................................................................... 11
The Western connection .............................................................. 12
Australia’s role ............................................................................. 13
The involvement of foreign nationals ........................................... 15
Conclusion ................................................................................... 17
1. ‘Yemen “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”: EU’, Al Jazeera News, 5 August 2018; United Nations Human Rights Office of
the High Commissioner (OHCHR), Yemen: an ‘entirely man-made catastrophe’—UN human rights report urges international
investigation, media release, United Nations, 5 September 2017.
2. P Salisbury, Is the Yemen peace process coming back to life?, International Crisis Group, 7 September 2018; P Beaumont,
‘Huge spike in Yemen violence as civilian deaths rise by 164% in four months’, The Guardian, 26 September 2018.
3. P Cockburn, ‘The Yemen war death toll is five times higher than we think - we can’t shrug off our responsibilities any longer’,
The Independent, 26 October 2018.
4. M Ghobari, A El Yaakoubi and S Nebehay, ‘Fighting resumes in Yemen’s Hodeidah as peace talks stall’, Reuters,
12 September 2018.
5. ‘Saudi-led coalition sends thousands of troops towards Hodeidah’, al-Jazeera, 31 October 2018.
6. Yemen: averting a destructive battle for Hodeida, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2018.
7. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses
since September 2014, Advance edit version, 17 August 2018, p. 8; A Gregory, ‘Yemen’s food supplies might run out in two
months, charity warns’, The Independent, 23 September 2018.
8. S Oakford, ‘Saudi Arabia kills civilians, the U.S. looks the other way’, The New York Times, 19 August 2016.
9. M Bearak, ‘The Saudi power struggle hits the Arab world’s poorest country’, The Washington Post, 6 November 2017; J
Borger, ‘Deadly Yemen famine could strike at any time, warns UN boss’, The Guardian, 24 September 2018.
10. Cited in L Roopanarine, P Wintour, S Kamali and A Algohbary, ‘Yemen at “point of no return” as conflict leaves almost 7
million close to famine’, The Guardian, 16 May 2017.
11. Gregory, ‘Yemen’s food supplies might run out in two months’, op. cit.
Yemen’s health care system is on the verge of collapse. More than 55 per cent of health facilities
are only partially functioning or have been destroyed and ‘The underground water in all Yemeni
cities is contaminated with sewage and treatment plants are not functioning because of lack of
fuel and maintenance’.15 Indicatively, Yemen is suffering from one of the largest cholera outbreaks
in recorded history with over one million suspected cases. 16 According to the International Crisis
Group, ‘in excess of eighteen million people are food-insecure, and eight million are on the verge
of starvation’. 17
The conflict
The conflict has been variously portrayed as a civil war, a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and
Iran, and a supposedly ancient schism between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims (the latter notionally
represented by Zaydi Houthis).18 The diversity and sheer number of actors involved in the conflict,
however, demonstrates that these characterisations are far too simplistic and that the conflict
defies neat categorisation. 19 Accordingly, a UN panel of experts reporting to the Security Council
earlier this year expressed the view:
Yemen, as a state, has all but ceased to exist … Instead of a single State there are warring statelets, and
no one side has either the political support or the military strength to reunite the country or achieve
20
victory on the battlefield.
Nonetheless, conflict between the north and the south of Yemen is nothing new. Yemen is also no
stranger to outside intervention, having been the site of conflict between revolutionary Arab
republican states, led by Egypt, and conservative monarchies led by Saudi Arabia during the
1960s.21 Prior to the 1962 revolution, northern Yemen had been ruled by a Houthi imamate for
12. A Eshaq, A Fothan, E Jensen, T Khan and A Al Amodi, ‘Malnutrition in Yemen: an invisible crisis’, The Lancet, 389,
7 January 2017, pp. 31–32.
13. I Craig, ‘Bombed into famine: how Saudi air campaign targets Yemen’s food supplies’, The Guardian, 12 December 2017.
14. M Mundy, The strategies of the coalition in the Yemen war: aerial bombardment and food war, World Peace Foundation,
Tufts University, p. 18.
15. H Al-Mekhlafi, ‘Yemen in a time of cholera: current situation and challenges’, American Journal of Tropical Medicine and
Hygiene, 98(6), 2018, p. 1558.
16. A Barker, ‘Yemen cholera cases hit 1 million in “hideous milestone” for worst outbreak on record’, ABC News online,
22 December 2017.
17. Salisbury, Is the Yemen peace process coming back to life?, op. cit.
18. K Fahim, ‘UN probe details fallout of proxy war in Yemen between Saudi coalition and Iran’, The Washington Post, 11 January
2018; TL Friedman, ‘Tell me how this ends well’, The New York Times, 1 April 2015; H Mohammed, ‘A look at Zaydi Shiites and
Houthi rebels in Yemen’, Washington Examiner, 4 October 2014.
19. ‘Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom?’, BBC News online, 30 January 2018.
20. Cited in K Fahim, ‘US approach to Yemen is challenged as country splinters and government vanishes’, The Washington Post,
21 September 2018.
21. J Ferris, ‘Egypt’s Vietnam’, Foreign Policy, 3 April 2015.
Source: ‘Mapping the Yemen conflict—historical division (1962)’, European Council on Foreign Relations.
The central government, moreover, has never held a monopoly on armed coercive power, which
forms a key theoretical basis of the Weberian state’s sovereign legitimacy. Yemen has long been
beset by separatist movements in both the north and the south of the country, as well as ongoing
violent tribal disputes. 23 Instead, as Thomas Juneau explains:
[Former President Ali Abdullah] Saleh [who led Yemen through the process of unification] managed the
country’s affairs for 34 years by maintaining a precarious balance among a range of competing forces,
including the military and the security apparatus, tribes, political parties and factions, clerics and
businesspeople. By buying loyalty through patronage and ruling through a combination of co-optation,
22. N al-Dawsari, ‘The Houthis’ endgame in Yemen’, al-Jazeera, 22 December 2017; G Gasim, ‘What is going on in southern
Yemen?’, al-Jazeera, 30 January 2018.
23. M Reardon, ‘Saudi Arabia, Iran and the “Great Game” in Yemen’, al-Jazeera, 26 March 2015.
The roots of the current conflict, however, stem from a Houthi insurrection in 2004, which has
periodically flared up since, comprising six rounds of conflict between 2004 and 2010.25 The
Houthi movement (now formally known as Ansar Allah or ‘Supporters/Partisans of God’), was
founded by Hosein Badreddin al-Houthi, an influential cleric in northern Yemen and a former
member of parliament in the 1990s; it is affiliated with the Zaydi stream of Shi’a Islam and remains
firmly centred on the Houthi family. 26 From 2004, the Houthis fought against the Yemeni
Government with the aim of ending economic underdevelopment, political marginalisation and
discrimination. Zaydis constitute about 35 per cent of the Yemeni population, mostly located in
the north west of the country. 27 According to Juneau, ‘At this point the Houthis wanted a greater
say in national affairs, greater recognition of Zaydi cultural and religious rights, and an end to
proselytizing by Saudi-backed Wahhabi institutes in Sa’ada province, their northern stronghold’.28
Fearing instability, unrest and a potential security threat along its long and porous southern
border, Saudi Arabia first intervened in Yemen in 2009 on behalf of the Saleh Government,
employing artillery and air power against the Houthis and imposing a blockade on Yemen’s north
west coast to impede the transfer of arms.
The present conflagration started after the 2011 Arab uprisings, which led to the deposal of long-
time president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, amid widespread popular protests against corruption,
economic stagnation and authoritarianism. Saleh was replaced by the current internationally-
recognised president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, in 2012. 29 The Houthis then participated in the
national dialogue that followed, aimed at drafting a new constitution for a democratic and
federalised Yemen, but remained suspicious of the Sana’a-based elites’ sincerity regarding the
implementation of genuine reforms. In the event, the transition process ‘did not fundamentally
reform governance but merely perpetuated the pre-2011 system: while redistributing positions, it
failed to dismantle longstanding patronage structures and to integrate previously marginalized
actors’. 30
Following the collapse of national power-sharing talks in 2014, Houthi forces, then allied to forces
still loyal to Saleh—their former foe being keen to reverse the effects of the 2011 protests that
removed him from power—seized control of most of Yemen, including the capital Sana’a (Saleh
was later killed by the Houthis in December 2017 after attempting to defect to the Saudi-led
coalition).31 Hadi resigned from office on 22 January 2015 before escaping from house arrest,
fleeing to Yemen’s second city Aden on 21 February, which he designated the temporary capital,
and rescinding his resignation.32 As Houthi forces converged on Aden, Hadi then fled to Saudi
Arabia and a Saudi-led coalition began bombarding Yemen in support of his government in 2015.
24. T Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment’, International Affairs, 92(3),
2016, p. 651.
25. K McFarland, ‘Yemen: understanding the conflict’, The Conversation, 18 June 2018; M Wells, ‘Yemen’s Houthi movement and
the revolution’, Foreign Policy, 27 February 2012.
26. ‘Yemen war: who are the Houthis and why is Saudi Arabia fighting them?’, The Independent, 10 November 2018.
27. C Glenn, ‘Iran, Yemen and the Houthis’, Iran Primer, 29 April 2015.
28. Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis’, op. cit., pp. 651–2.
29. See United Nations, ‘Security Council demands end to Yemen violence, adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian
Federation abstaining’, 14 April 2015.
30. Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis’, op. cit., pp. 653.
31. M Hatem, ‘Houthis say they killed former Yemeni president Ali Abduallah Saleh, as pact unravels’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 5 December 2017.
32. ‘Yemen crisis: President Hadi flees as Houthi rebels advance’, BBC News, 25 March 2015.
Since 2012, Saudi Arabia has invested at least $4 billion to prop up the Yemeni economy after the
2011 uprisings. Remittances from Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia have also contributed around
another $4 billion per year to the Yemeni economy. 49 In short, the Houthis threaten the political
structures in which Saudi Arabia has so much invested. Juneau concludes thus:
Yemen is Saudi Arabia’s soft under-belly, and instability on this south flank represents an important
threat to Saudi security. This is far from the case for Iran. In sum, what happens in Yemen concerns
Saudi Arabia’s vital interests, but not Iran’s; for Iran, Yemen represents opportunities, not threats. The
Houthis are as a result much less dependent on Iranian support than pro-Saudi factions, including Hadi
and his allies, are on Saudi support. Without Iranian assistance, the Houthis would remain a dominant
actor; without Saudi support, Hadi would be significantly weaker… [T]he Houthis are neither a proxy nor
50
a pawn of Tehran.
As such, Iran’s goals in Yemen are centred on undermining Saudi efforts, while it focuses on issues
that are far more important to its overall strategic position in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, as well as
managing its tense relationship with the US. Nonetheless, following the success of the Houthis in
seizing Sana’a in 2014 in particular, Iranian news outlets have ‘pushed the theme of Zaidi [sic]
Yemenis as a downtrodden and oppressed minority rising against Saudi funded oppression by the
central government and by Salafi Jihadis in Yemen’. 51 This follows a pattern of Iranian support for
dissatisfied groups (regardless of creed) located in unstable settings, such as Lebanon, Iraq, and
Palestine, that allows Iran to accrue soft power by positioning itself as ‘the champion of the
oppressed and marginalised’. 52
44. Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis’, op. cit., p. 652.
45. C Landry, ‘Iran arming Yemen’s Houthi rebels since 2009: UN report’, Middle East Eye, 1 May 2015.
46. Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis’, op. cit., pp. 656–7.
47. Khoury, ‘A US-Iran strategy begins’, op. cit.
48. Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis’, op. cit., p. 662.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 662–3.
51. Khoury, ‘A US-Iran strategy begins’, op. cit.
52. Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis’, op. cit., p. 648.
53. K Fahim, ‘U.S. approach to Yemen is challenged as a country splinters and government vanishes’, The Washington Post,
21 September 2018.
54. B Watson, ‘The war in Yemen and the making of a chaos state’, The Atlantic, 3 February 2018; E Schmitt and S Al-Batati, ‘The
U.S. has pummelled Al Qaeda in Yemen. But the threat is barely dented’, The New York Times, 30 December 2017.
55. B Rich, ‘Explainer: what is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?’, The Conversation, 12 January 2015; Australian Government,
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
56. Yemen’s al-Qaeda: expanding the base, International Crisis Group, 2 February 2017, p. i.
57. M Michael, T Wilson and L Keath, ‘US allies, al-Qaida battle rebels in Yemen’, Associated Press, 7 August 2018; B Trew,
‘Former al-Qaeda footsoldiers have been allowed into Yemen forces, admits UAE military’, The Independent, 16 August 2018.
58. Yemen’s al-Qaeda, op. cit., p. 26.
59. B McKernan, ‘Yemen conflict: Amnesty calls for war crimes investigation into UAE-run prisons’, The Independent, 12 July
2018.
60. Gasim, ‘What is going on in southern Yemen?’, op. cit.
61. M Horton, ‘Can the UAE and its security forces avoid a wrong turn in Yemen?’, Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, 11(2),
February 2018; ‘US report: UAE ‘colonising force’ in Yemen’, Middle East Monitor, 21 February 2018; ‘UAE extends military
reach in Yemen and Somalia’, Reuters, 13 May 2018; M Vall, ‘Yemen: UAE attempting to ‘colonise’ Socotra’, al-Jazeera,
13 May 2018.
62. A Harper, ‘The spectre of a divided Yemen’, The Interpreter, The Lowy Institute, 8 February 2018.
63. ‘Yemen’s UAE-backed southern separatists announce popular uprising’, Middle East Eye, 3 October 2018; A El Yaakoubi,
‘Yemen separatists call for uprising as U.N. pursues peace’, Reuters, 4 October 2018.
Indiscriminate airstrikes are perhaps unsurprising given that in 2015, Saudi state TV declared
the Sa’da governorate of Yemen, a Houthi stronghold bordering the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, a military target in its entirety and ordered civilians there to leave. 65 Human Rights
Watch has also documented Saudi use of banned cluster munitions (neither Saudi Arabia nor
the United States has signed the relevant international treaty). 66 Houthi-led forces are also
accused of indiscriminate shelling of urban areas, which may amount to violations of
international humanitarian law.
The UN report also notes:
Victims and witnesses described to the Group of Experts persistent and pervasive aggressive behaviour,
including sexual violence perpetrated by the [UAE-backed] Security Belt Forces and United Arab
Emirates personnel. Examples include rape, of men and women, and sexual violence against displaced
67
persons, migrants and other vulnerable groups.
Similarly, the report notes that the panel has received reports of ‘ill-treatment and torture of
detainees’ by Houthi-led authorities. 68
Both coalition and Houthi-led forces have been accused of child soldier recruitment, a war
crime in its own right:
The Group of Experts received substantial information indicating that the Government of Yemen, the
coalition-backed forces and the Houthi-Saleh forces have all conscripted or enlisted children into armed
forces or groups and used them to participate actively in hostilities. In most cases, the children were
between 11 and 17 years old, but there have been consistent reports of the recruitment or use of
69
children as young as 8 years old.
According to Kamel Jendoubi, the chairperson of the Group of International and Regional Eminent
Experts on Yemen, ‘The primary legal responsibility for addressing these violations and crimes lies
with the [Hadi] Government of Yemen, which bears the duty to protect persons under its
jurisdiction’.70
64. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Yemen: United Nations experts point to possible war crimes by parties
to the conflict’, Geneva, 28 August 2018.
65. ‘Civilians order to leave Yemen’s Saada province ahead of Saudi strikes’, al-Jazeera America, 8 May 2015.
66. Hiding behind the coalition: failure to credibly investigate and provide redress for unlawful attacks in Yemen, Human Rights
Watch, 24 August 2018, p. 3.
67. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Yemen: United Nations experts point to possible war crimes’, op. cit.
68. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in Yemen, op. cit. p. 11.
69. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Yemen: United Nations experts point to possible war crimes’, op. cit.
70. Ibid.
71. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Official committee Hansard, 24 October 2018.
72. P Whish-Wilson, ‘General business notice of motion no. 1043’, Senate, Debates, 11 September 2018, p. 44.
73. Editorial Board, ‘Why are U.S. bombs killing civilians in Yemen?’, The New York Times, 28 August 2018; A Mitchell, ‘Britain is
complicit in Saudi Arabia’s war on Yemen’, The Guardian, 13 June 2018; J Irish and S Louet, ‘Pressure mounts on Macron over
arms sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE’, Reuters, 23 March 2018.
74. M Dalton, H Shah and T Robbins, ‘U.S. support for Saudi military operations in Yemen’, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 23 March 2018; P Cockburn, ‘The Saudi targeting of food supplies in Yemen is a worse story than the disappearance
of Jamal Khashoggi’, The Independent, 12 October 2018; Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), ‘Yemen war: Trump
administration to end US refuelling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft’, ABC News online, 10 November 2018.
75. R Merrick, ‘Revealed: the UK is training Saudi pilots amid accusations of war crimes in Yemen’, The Independent,
22 October 2016; D Bloom, ‘Saudi pilots trained by the RAF as more than 100 learn how to fly in the UK’, Mirror,
5 November 2018.
76. N Toosi, ‘Congress corners Pompeo on Saudi military actions’, Politico, 4 September 2018; D Nissenbuam, ‘Top U.S. diplomat
backed continuing support for Saudi war in Yemen’, The Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2018.
77. H Cooper, ‘U.S. blocks arms sale to Saudi Arabia amid concerns over Yemen war’, The New York Times, 13 December 2016;
W Strobel and M Stone, ‘Trump to resume precision munitions deliveries to Saudis: officials’, Reuters, 14 June 2017.
78. P Begley, ‘Australia selling military equipment to Saudi Arabia during brutal Yemen conflict’, The Sydney Morning Herald,
24 March 2017; J Vale, ‘MoD aware of 350 alleged breaches of international humanitarian law in Yemen’, HuffPost UK,
23 March 2018.
79. J Halliday and A Asthana, ‘Met police look at allegations of Saudi war crimes in Yemen’, The Guardian, 3 April 2017.
80. ‘US defence chief demands Yemen ceasefire; peace talks in 30 days’, al-Jazeera, 2 November 2018.
81. Trew, ‘Britain urges UN Security council to back ceasefire in Yemen’, op. cit.
The motion also endorses the US Administration’s decision to no longer take part in inflight refuelling
operations for Saudi-led coalition aircraft involved in the fighting.
Labor urges the Australian Government to support United Nations’ efforts to find a political solution to
the conflict in Yemen, and assure itself that any Australian military cooperation in the region, including
defence equipment sales, does not inadvertently contribute to the suffering of the Yemeni civilian
82
population.
Rather than de-escalating the conflict, however, these calls have been followed by a surge in
violence as both sides try to expand and consolidate gains before any potential imposition of a
ceasefire.83 Amnesty International described how, on 11 November, the area around Hodeida’s
main hospital came under sustained attack, reportedly by the Saudi-led coalition:
Hundreds of medical workers and patients, including a malnourished woman carrying her daughter in a
surgical robe and a man still hooked up to a catheter, fled in terror as a series of large explosions rocked
a hospital in central Hodeidah yesterday, according to an eyewitness who spoke to Amnesty
International.
A medical worker who was inside al-Thawra hospital at the time told Amnesty International that
hundreds of patients and staff dodged a hail of shrapnel as they fled in panic. The sustained
84
bombardment near the hospital lasted more than half an hour.
Finally, Mundy observes that while commentary of the war in Yemen often speculates on the
complicity of the arms-suppliers, and the top three in particular (the US, the UK and France),
in potential war crimes stemming from the Saudi-led military campaign, and may sometimes
mention their role in providing diplomatic cover for the coalition, their support for economic
war and the blockade of Yemen—the major causes of starvation, deprivation and disease—is
barely recognised.85
Australia’s role
Australia made a number of military shipments to Saudi Arabia in 2016–17 and plans to increase
arms sales to the UAE.86 Dubai is also home to Australia’s central military operational hub in the
Middle East region, providing support for missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Gulf of Aden,
among others. 87 The Middle East region involves Australia’s highest level of troop deployments,
with some 300 personnel in Afghanistan (Operation Highroad), 600 in Iraq (Operation Okra), 500
in the UAE (Operation Accordion) largely providing logistical support, and another 240
82. P Wong (Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), Labor urges end to hostilities in Yemen, media release, 14 November 2018.
83. B Graham, ‘US change of heart only seems to have made “apocalyptic” catastrophe in Yemen even worse’, Herald Sun,
7 November 2018.
84. ‘Yemen: eyewitness describes terrifying scenes as explosions rock hospital in central Hodeidah’, Amnesty International,
12 November 2018.
85. Mundy, ‘The strategies of the Coalition in the Yemen war’, op. cit., p. 7.
86. S Hutchinson, ‘Defence exports and the Arms Trade Treaty—is Australia missing in action?’ The Interpreter, The Lowy
Institute, 20 February 2018; A Cornwell, ‘Australia and UAE to explore deeper defense ties, A$1 billion in sales’, Reuters,
20 February 2017.
87. ‘Al Minhad Air Base’, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.
(i) the Saudi Arabian Government is breaking humanitarian law in its attacks on Yemen by bombing
schools, hospitals and refugee camps, and is pushing Yemenis towards famine by blocking supply
routes,
(ii) the Australian Defence Department has approved four military exports to Saudi Arabia in the
past year and that the Australian Government is leading a push for more, and
(iii) the Minister for Defence Industry, the Honourable Christopher Pyne, MP, visited Riyadh in
December 2016 to promote Australian defence material to senior government figures, including
Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah al-Saud, the head of Saudi Arabia's National Guard;
(b) notes that the Dutch Parliament voted in 2016 to ban military exports to Saudi Arabia, the United
Kingdom (UK) started a review in February aimed at halting UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and former
US President Barack Obama halted the sale of precision-guided technology to Saudi Arabia, all on
91
humanitarian grounds.
The motion was carried 39 votes to 22. Following the failure of the Defence Minister to
produce the documents requested, a second attempt on 10 May 2017 by Senator Ludlam to
have the Senate order their production failed by 40 votes. 92
In August 2018, the Defence Minister Payne stated that military exports are assessed against five
criteria:
Australia’s international obligations, human rights, regional security, national security and foreign policy.
The assessment of export applications is done on a case-by-case basis, looking at the end use, the end
93
user and technology that is being exported.
88. C Miranda, ‘Anzac spirit lives on today, all around the world’, Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 11 November 2018; see also, ‘Operation
Highroad’, Department of Defence; ‘Operation OKRA’, Department of Defence; ‘Operation Accordion’, Department of
Defence; ‘Operation MANITOU’, Department of Defence.
89. M Brissenden, ‘Al Minhad Air Base: a closer look at Australia’s base for operation in the Middle East’, ABC News,
15 September 2014.
90. S Ludlam, ‘Saudi Arabia: human rights, order for the production of documents’, Senate, Debates, 29 March 2017, p. 2624.
91. Ibid.
92. S Ludlam, ‘Military exports to Saudi Arabia—order for production of documents—non-compliance’, Senate, Debates,
10 May 2017.
…
Yet Australia chooses to wilfully ignore all of the human rights violations committed by Saudi Arabia and
continue to expand military exports to the Kingdom—with 18 licenses approved to date.
There is reluctance on the Government’s part to exercise transparency in its arms exports trade and this
98
is incredibly worrying. It must cease all military exports to Saudi Arabia.
On 24 October 2018 in Senate Estimates, Senator Payne, in her new role as Minister for Foreign
Affairs, ‘condemned the killing of Mr Khashoggi in the strongest possible terms’ and confirmed
the Australian Government’s intention to conclude a memorandum of understanding regarding
the exports of military equipment to Saudi Arabia. 99 However, Foreign Minister Payne has refused
to rule out a ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia. 100
Australia currently holds a three-year position on the United Nations Human Rights Council, which
provides an avenue for drawing attention to the conflict and promoting a multilateral approach to
de-escalating the conflict and averting an even more widespread humanitarian disaster in
Yemen.101
93. M Payne, ‘Answer to Question without notice: Yemen’, [Questioner: P Whish-Wilson], Senate, Debates, 13 August 2018.
94. P Riordan, ‘Pyne stands ready for jihadi influx’, The Australian, 5 September 2018.
95. D Dudley, ‘Why more and more countries are blocking arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’, Forbes, 7 September 2018.
96. B Trew, ‘“Khashoggi’s death was the final straw”: Saudi’s crown prince faces mounting backlash over Istanbul consulate
killing’, The Independent, 23 October 2018.
97. R Noack, ‘Germany halts arms deals with Saudi Arabia, encourages allies to do the same’, The Washington Post,
22 October 2018.
98. D Sayed, ‘Australia must suspend all military exports to Saudi Arabia over brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi’, Amnesty
International Australia, 23 October 2018.
99. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, op. cit.
100. L Martin, ‘Khashoggi killing: Australia refuses to rule out arms export ban to Saudi Arabia’, The Guardian, 24 October 2017.
101. ‘UNHRC: Australia elected to UN Human Rights Council amid concerns of refugee rights abuses’, ABC News online,
17 October 2017.
102. R Tanter, ‘Yemen: Australian mercenaries and the shifting sands of Australia-East alliances’, Arena Magazine, August 2018;
M Calligeros and AAP, ‘Australian mercenary reportedly killed in Yemen’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 2015;
A Roston, ‘A Middle East monarchy hired American ex-soldiers to kill its political enemies. This could be the future of war’,
BuzzFeed News, 16 October 2018; E Hager and M Mazzetti, ‘Emirates secretly sends Colombian mercenaries to Yemen fight’,
Yemen—the ‘worst humanitarian crisis in the world’ continues 15
the UAE hired Erik Prince, the founder of the organisation formerly called Blackwater, to train
foreign personnel.104
The presence of foreign soldiers, perhaps especially those in positions of command, raises
questions about culpability and accountability for potential war crimes and/or other human rights
violations detailed above. 105 For example, Stephen Toumajan, a former officer in the US Army, is
now a major general for the Emirati military and questions have been asked about his potential
accountability for war crimes. 106
Such questions are also important from an Australian perspective because, as the Herald Sun
reported in 2009, ‘Dozens of ex-Australian soldiers work for the UAE military in leadership, training
and mentoring roles, developing links between the two armed forces’. 107 This notably includes
former Australian SAS commander, Major General Michael Hindmarsh (Retd), who is serving as
Commander of the UAE’s Presidential Guard, the country’s elite fighting force, and reportedly
commands some 1,500 soldiers in Yemen. 108 There is, however, no suggestion or evidence
implicating Major General Hindmarsh in any wrongdoing.
It is also important to note the explanation of Major General Hindmarsh’s involvement contained
within internal Department of Defence documents (dated February 2016) released on 5 November
2018 under a Freedom of Information request:
In June 2009, then Chief of Army (Lieutenant General Gillespie) supported Major General Hindmarsh’s
request to travel to the United Arab Emirates to explore employment opportunities.
Personnel who retire or resign from active service, either Australian Regular Army or Army Reserve, are
considered by Defence to be private citizens and are able to seek employment domestically or overseas.
Whether a person is accepted into a foreign military is a matter for the country in question and their
laws regarding military service. The ADF has targeted recruiting schemes to meet particular personnel
capability requirements through recruitment of personnel with previous service in other foreign
militaries.
The New York Times, 25 November 2015; D Isenberg, ‘The UAE in Yemen: with a lot of help from its mercs’, The New Arab,
20 June 2018; L Carlsen, ‘Mercenaries in Yemen—the U.S. connection’, Huffington Post, 3 December 2015.
103. R Donaghy, ‘Revealed: the mercenaries commanding UAE forces in Yemen’, Middle East Eye, 23 December 2015.
104. M Mazzetti and E Hager, ‘Secret desert force set-up by Blackwater’s founder’, The New York Times, 14 May 2011; The New
Arab, ‘The UAE is “employing” Blackwater to run its army’, 8 July 2017.
105. ‘Q & A on the conflict in Yemen and international law’, Human Rights Watch, 6 April 2015.
106. A Roston, ‘This American is a general for a foreign army accused of war crimes in Yemen’, BuzzFeed News, 7 May 2018;
R Hamilton and S Knuckey, ‘Time to dust off the war crimes act? – for an American ex-soldier now in command of UAE forces’,
Just Security, 9 May 2018.
107. I McPhedran, ‘United Arab Emirates poaches former major-general Mike Hindmarsh as security adviser’, Herald Sun,
3 December 2009.
108. S McNeill, ‘Retired Australian Major General Mike Hindmarsh faces questions about knowledge of civilian attacks’, 7.30,
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 8 February 2016; M Brull, ‘Why Australia should stop supporting the war in
Yemen’, New Matilda, 12 September 2016.
Nonetheless, while the UAE is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court, Australia is and
Australia’s war crimes legislation has universal jurisdiction. According to Professor Richard Tanter,
given the presence of Australians fighting in military conflicts abroad, ‘Lawyers have pointed to
Australia’s responsibility for holding its citizens accountable for alleged war crimes under that
statute to investigate and if necessary prosecute under domestic war-crimes legislation or through
the ICC’. 110
Conclusion
As the Yemen crisis rapidly approaches is fifth year, since October 2018 there have been increasing
calls for a ceasefire, notably by the US and UK, the Saudi-led coalition’s principal suppliers of
weapons. This follows an increasing international focus on civilian deaths and the destruction of
infrastructure caused by the Saudi military campaign, as well as the ongoing humanitarian crisis
stemming from widespread famine and disease. At present, the UN Secretary-General’s special
envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, who recently visited Sana’a, is tasked with negotiating a
framework prior to the commencement of talks to avoid misunderstandings which may cause the
situation to deteriorate further. 111
Both the Houthis and the Hadi Government have long claimed that they are open to negotiations
and blamed the other for intransigence, but the multiple parties and multiple overlapping conflicts
comprising the war in Yemen complicate such matters. It also debatable how much control the
Hadi Government actually exercises in the territories notionally under its control given its conflict
with UAE backed forces, some of whom are secessionist in nature. AQAP and the Islamic State
group also have their own interests in acting as spoilers to prolong the chaos that has allowed
them to flourish.
Saudi Arabia, moreover, essentially possesses a veto over any agreement reached by the Hadi
Government. According to Peter Salisbury, a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House:
The Saudis won’t approve a deal that leaves the Huthis with a degree of power—as an agreement is
likely to do—without key assurances regarding border security, the Huthis’ ballistic missile capabilities
and the rebels’ relationship with Iran. In turn, the Huthis need to be confident that they will have a
guaranteed place at the political table in the long term, won’t have to give up all their weapons and will
have access to international trade through a seaport. Most importantly, they need to be assured that
112
the Saudis will stick to their side of the deal before signing off.
109. Department of Defence, Defence members involved in the war in Yemen, FOI no. 083/18/19, Freedom of Information
disclosure log—documents released by Defence, 2018–19.
110. Tanter, ‘Yemen: Australian mercenaries and the shifting sands’, op. cit.
111. B Trew, ‘Yemen government agrees to UN peace talks after Houthi leader calls for halt to attacks’, The Independent,
20 November 2018; ‘UN envoy arrives in Sanaa to push for peace talks’, al-Jazeera, 21 November 2018; M Aldroubi, ‘UN
envoy Martin Griffiths arrives in Sanaa to lay groundwork for peace talks’, The National (UAE), 21 November 2018.
112. Salisbury, Is the Yemen peace process coming back to life?, op. cit.
Nonetheless, US Secretary of Defence, Jim Mattis, has announced that peace talks will take place
in December in Sweden, with UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths claiming that Yemen’s warring
parties have given ‘firm assurances’ that they are committed to attending; experts, however, have
warned that Saudi Arabia might not take the necessary measures to facilitate their success. 114 The
UK has circulated a draft UN Security Resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and guarantees
for the safe delivery of aid, which has been reportedly opposed by Saudi Arabia. 115
Despite a brief lull in fighting and a temporary halt to the Saudi-led offensive of Hodeida in mid-
November, at the time of writing, fighting described by residents as the worst yet has broken out
once more in the key port city. 116
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113. Juneau, ‘Iran’s policy towards the Houthis’, op. cit., p. 661.
114. I Ali, ‘Yemen peace talks likely in early December: Mattis’, Reuters, 22 November 2018; N Gaouette, ‘Yemen peace talks set
for December, Mattis says’, CNN, 21 November 2018.
115. P Falk, ‘Time “running out” for war-torn Yemen as Saudis delay peace proposal’, CBS News, 20 November 2018; M Kosinski,
‘Saudi crown prince’s “fit” delays UN resolution on war in Yemen’, CNN, 17 November 2018; J Borger and B Mckernan, ‘UK
tables UN security council resolution calling for Yemen truce’, The Guardian, 20 November 2018.
116. B Mckernan, ‘Yemen: Hodeidah sees ‘worst fighting yet’ despite UN ceasefire calls’, The Guardian, 21 November 2018.