Explain why human rights became an international concern.

The struggle for the respect of human rights was initially a domestic or national issue, but the
atrocities committed on mass of people during World War II convinced international jurists that
the protection of human rights should be an international concern.

First-generation human rights, sometimes called "blue" rights, deal essentially with liberty and
participation in political life. They are fundamentally civil and political in nature: They serve
negatively to protect the individual from excesses of the state. First-generation rights include,
among other things, the right to life, equality before the law, freedom of speech, the right to a fair
trial, freedom of religion, and voting rights. They were pioneered by the United States Bill of
Rights and in France by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in the 18th
century, although some of these rights and the right to due process date back to the Magna Carta
of 1215 and the Rights of Englishmen, which were expressed in the English Bill of Rights in
1689.

They were enshrined at the global level and given status in international law first by Articles 3 to
21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later in the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In Europe, they were enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights in 1953.

ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

- They belong to the very essence of government and without them no government can exist. A
constitution can only define and delimit them and allocate their exercise among various
government agencies. A constitution does not grant them.
Police power: inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of the society
1. Lawful subject
2. Lawful mean
Power of eminent domain: the use of government of its coercive authority, upon just
compensation, to forcibly acquire the needed property in order to devote the same to public use
Power of taxation: method by which contributions are exacted from persons and property for
the support of government and for all public needs

PROTECTED RIGHTS
Right to life
The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the right to be alive or
to the security of one’s limb against physical harm. The right to life is the right to a good life.
Right to property
Protected property includes all kinds of property found in the Civil Code.

SECTION 1 – DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Substantive due process: prohibition of arbitrary rules
Procedural due process: guarantee of procedural fairness and a law which hears before it
condemns
Equal protection
** The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the Equality of the
Person. The equality it guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all
persons before the law. Under it, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law,
which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he
possesses.

SECTION 2 – WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

** The purpose of the provision is to protect the privacy and sanctity of the person and of his
house and other possessions against arbitrary intrusions by State officers
Probable cause: such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that are in
themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest: such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested
Probable cause for a search: such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched
** Probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty.
Personal examination
** What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest. This means that what is required is personal determination and not personal examination.
Particularity of description
** A search warrant may be said to be particularly describe the thing to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow and by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure.
** Its purpose is to prevent abuse by the officer enforcing the warrant by leaving to him no
discretion as to who or what to search or seize.

SECTION 3 – PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

** The privacy right is but an aspect of the right to be secured in one’s person.
** The privacy right is but an aspect of the right to be secured in one’s person.

SECTION 4 – FREEDOM OF SPEECH

1. No prior restraint
2. No subsequent punishment
Prior restraint: official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination
Subsequent punishment: have the effect of unduly curtailing expression
Chilling effect: the citizen would hesitate to speak for fear he might be provoking the vengeance
of the officials he criticized
Unprotected speech: libel and obscenity
** It has been observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interests in order and morality

SECTION 5 – FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Non-establishment clause
** Neither the State nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. The
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation
between Church and State.”
Free exercise clause
The absoluteness of the freedom to believe carries with it the corollary right that the government,
while it may look into the good faith of a person, cannot inquire into a person’s religious
pretensions. The moment, however, belief flows over into action, it becomes subject to
government regulation.
Prohibition of religious test
The purpose of this provision, which is but a corollary of the freedom and non-establishment
clause, is to render the government powerless to restore the historically and constitutionally
discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons
who have, or perhaps more properly, profess to have a belief in some particular kind of religious
concept.

SECTION 6 – LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

** The liberty of abode may be limited only upon lawful order of a court whereas the right to
travel may be limited by administrative authorities as may be provided by law in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health.

SECTION 7 – RIGHT TO INFORMATION

1. Right to choose a person’s abode
2. Right to travel both at home and going out of the country
** They are subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
** The Ethical Standards Act prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging
confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not
made available to the public.

SECTION 8 – FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

** The right to form associations shall not be impaired except through a valid exercise of police
power.
** It is therefore an aspect of general right of liberty. More specifically, it is an aspect of
freedom of contract; and in so far as associations may have for their object the advancement of
beliefs and ideas, freedom of association is an aspect of freedom of expression and belief.
** Government employees do not have a constitutional right to strike.

SECTION 9 – POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Power of eminent domain:power of the state to take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation.
1. there is taking of private property
2. the taking must be for needed public use
3. there must be just compensation
** The power of eminent domain is possessed by the State and is exercised by the national
government.
Just compensation: the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation

SECTION 10 – CONTRACTS
** Not all impairment of the substance of a contract violates the Constitution. A valid exercise of
police power is superior to the obligation of contracts.
** The government cannot prejudice private rights without due process.

SECTION 11 – FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

** This constitutional provision is the basis for the provision of Sec 17, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis.
** Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants and laborers. They need not
be persons so poor that they must be supported at public expense. It suffices that the plaintiff is
an indigent.

SECTION 12 – MIRANDA RIGHTS

1. Right to remain silent
2. Right to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice
3. Right to be informed of such rights
Right to be informed
** When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.
** It is not sufficient for a police officer to just repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which
the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms.
** The right of the person under investigation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on
the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that
results in understanding what is conveyed.
Right to competent and independent counsel
** The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and
not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined.
** This is a product of experience under the Marcos regime when the military authorities used to
make available to detainees only counsel of the military’s choice, and presumably working also
for the interest of the military.
Waiver of rights
** These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Torture, force, etc. prohibited
** Because they vitiate truth and because they are an assault on the dignity of the person.

SECTION 13 – RIGHT TO BAIL

** Bail is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction.
Bail: mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance
of the accused ay his trial and usually takes the form of a deposit of money or is equivalent as a
guarantee of such attendance and which deposit is forfeited upon failure to appear.
** No constitutional right when the following conditions concur: the accused is charged with an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua; and the evidence against him is strong.

SECTION 14 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

1. Due process in criminal cases
2. Presumption of innocence
3. Right to be heard
4. Right to counsel
5. Right to be informed
6. Right to speedy, impartial, and public trial
7. Right to meet witness face to face
8. Compulsory process
Presumption of innocence
** No person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has proved him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
Right to counsel
** This is a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is represented by an experienced and learned counsel.
Right to be informed
** The object of the written accusation is to furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same course, and to inform the court
of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.
** The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged.
Right to speedy trial
** The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative and determination of whether the right has
been violated must be based on the balancing of various factors. Length of delay is certainly a
factor to consider; but other factors must also be considered such as the reason for the delay, the
effort of the defendant to assert his right, and the prejudice caused to the defendant,
Right to a public trial
** The purpose of this guarantee is to serve as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion us an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power.
Right to meet witness face to face
** The right has a two-fold purpose: to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
the witness by cross-examination and to allow the judge to observe the deportation if the witness.
Waiver of rights
** Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that
protection, the presumption is against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with
strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly
and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was
not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession.

SECTION 15 – PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Writ of habeas corpus:a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his
caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the
writ shall consider in that behalf
Privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:right to have an immediate determination of legality of
the deprivation of physical liberty
Validity of the suspension
1. the existence of actual invasion or rebellion
2. public safety requires the suspension

SECTION 16 – SPEEDY TRIAL

** Speedy trial in Sec 14 covers only the trial phase of criminal cases, whereas Sec 16 covers all
phases of nay judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings.

SECTION 17–RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

** It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity.
Public policy: if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest
temptation to commit perjury
Humanity: it would prevent the extorting of confession by duress
** Usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and that a question would
have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only one of said elements. The right thus,
includes a right to refuse to testify a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence
to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.

SECTION 18 – INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Involuntary servitude: every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to another no
matter under what formsuch servitude may be disguised

SECTION 19 – DEATH PENALTY

Guide
1. A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily.
3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.
4. It must not be excessive.
Heinous crimes: being grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.
** The circumstances under which a specific law may allow the death penalty may make it cruel
and unusual under such law.
** Death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. Punishment is so if it
involves torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there is something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

SECTION 20 – DEBT AND POLL TAX

Debt: Any liability to pay money growing out of a contract, express or implied.
** A person may be imprisoned for fraudulent debt only if the fraudulent debt constitutes a crime
and the debtor has been duly convicted.
Poll tax:cedula tax or residential tax
** The Constitution does not prohibit the cedula tax but it prohibits imprisonment for non-
payment of the cedula tax.

SECTION 21 – DOUBLE JEOPARDY

First jeopardy terminated
1. by acquittal
2. by final conviction
3. by dismissal without express consent of the accused
4. by dismissal on the merits

SECTION 22 – EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

** The ex post fcato clause prohibits only retrospective penal laws.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a historic document that was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly at its third session on 10 December 1948 as Resolution
217 at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France. Of the then 58 members of the United Nations, 48
voted in favor, none against, eight abstained, and two did not vote.[1]

The Declaration consists of 30 articles affirming an individual's rights which, although not
legally binding in themselves, have been elaborated in subsequent international treaties,
economic transfers, regional human rights instruments, national constitutions, and other laws.
The Declaration was the first step in the process of formulating the International Bill of Human
Rights, which was completed in 1966, and came into force in 1976, after a sufficient number of
countries had ratified them.

Some legal scholars have argued that because countries have constantly invoked the Declaration
for more than 50 years, it has become binding as a part of customary international law.[2][3]
However, in the United States, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), concluded
that the Declaration "does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international
law."[4] Courts of other countries have also concluded that the Declaration is not in and of itself
part of domestic law.

The underlying structure of the Universal Declaration was introduced in its second draft, which
was prepared by René Cassin. Cassin worked from a first draft, which was prepared by John
Peters Humphrey. The structure was influenced by the Code Napoléon, including a preamble and
introductory general principles.[5] Cassin compared the Declaration to the portico of a Greek
temple, with a foundation, steps, four columns, and a pediment.

The Declaration consists of a preamble and thirty articles:

 The preamble sets out the historical and social causes that led to the necessity of drafting
the Declaration.
 Articles 1–2 established the basic concepts of dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood.
 Articles 3–5 established other individual rights, such as the right to life and the
prohibition of slavery and torture.
 Articles 6–11 refer to the fundamental legality of human rights with specific remedies
cited for their defence when violated.
 Articles 12–17 established the rights of the individual towards the community (including
such things as freedom of movement).
 Articles 18–21 sanctioned the so-called "constitutional liberties", and with spiritual,
public, and political freedoms, such as freedom of thought, opinion, religion and
conscience, word, and peaceful association of the individual.
 Articles 22–27 sanctioned an individual's economic, social and cultural rights, including
healthcare. Article 25 states: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services." It also makes additional
accommodations for security in case of physical debilitation or disability, and makes
special mention of care given to those in motherhood or childhood.[6]
 Articles 28–30 established the general ways of using these rights, the areas in which these
rights of the individual can not be applied, and that they can not be overcome against the
individual.

These articles are concerned with the duty of the individual to society and the prohibition of use
of rights in contravention of the purposes of the United Nations Organisation.[7]

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral treaty
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly through GA. Resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16
December 1966, and in force from 23 March 1976 in accordance with Article 49 of the covenant.
Article 49 allowed that the covenant will enter into force three months after the date of the
deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession. The covenant commits its
parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life, freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to due process
and a fair trial.[2] As of August 2017, the Covenant has 172 parties and six more signatories
without ratification.[1]
The ICCPR is part of the International Bill of Human Rights, along with the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR).[3]

The ICCPR is monitored by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (a separate body to
the United Nations Human Rights Council), which reviews regular reports of States parties on
how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year after acceding to the
Covenant and then whenever the Committee requests (usually every four years). The Committee
normally meets in Geneva and normally holds three sessions per year.

Articles of the Covenant

 2.1 Rights to physical integrity

 2.2 Liberty and security of person
 2.3 Procedural fairness and rights of the accused
 2.4 Individual liberties
 2.5 Political rights

3.) Orquiola vs Tandang Sora Development Corporation 386 SCRA 301

Facts:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and
111266, in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of
Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the name of
Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October 29, 1964,
Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered
both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller
lots.

Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners,
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2, Lot 5, Block 1
of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is now #33 Doña Regina St., Regina
Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The other portions were registered in the name of the heirs
of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons. Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed
a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During
the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw
Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said
corporation. Trial continued for three decades.

On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and
severally liable for encroaching on plaintiff’s land.

Issues:
(1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether
petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.

Held:
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against
them. They argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de
Medina vs. Cruz8 in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as
such, they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-12918 even though they
were not impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in this
case because the circumstances therein are different from the circumstances in the present case.

Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina
acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was
commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot
before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918.

Second, the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in
Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El
Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
while the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a
fully recognized Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered
title in their own names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her
predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land. He can
rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata
Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the
petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.

Coming now to the second issue, A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for
value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other person in the property. The determination of whether one is a
buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to
determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take into
account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could
reasonably rely on Mariano Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still
free from any third party claim.

Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land
subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the
decision in Civil Case No. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued
against petitioners.
Stonehill vs Diokno DIGEST
December 21, 2016 ~ vbdiaz

Stonehill vs Diokno

20 SCRA 383

Facts:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the
subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the
applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held: No.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.
Stonehill v. Diokno Digest

Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ

Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due
to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code
and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted
in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated
the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with
the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized
effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The
court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure
in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation,
and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third
party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and
things seized from the offices and the premises).

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

Posted in CONLAW2 cases

Facts

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued
and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner
Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent.
In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in
extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following
conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence,
this instant petition.

Issue

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill
of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v.
Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in
criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their
treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of
the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan,
and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

U.S. Supreme Court

Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)

Time, Inc. v. Hill

No. 22

Argued April 27, 1966

Reargued October 18-19, 1966

Decided January 9, 1967

385 U.S. 374

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

Syllabus

Appellee, Hill, and his family, in 1952, were held hostage in their home by some escaped
convicts, and were ultimately released unharmed without any violence having occurred. They
later moved away, and appellee discouraged further publicity efforts about the incident, which
had caused extensive involuntary notoriety. A novel about a hostage incident, but depicting
considerable violence, later appeared, and was subsequently made into a play, these portrayals
having been shaped by several incidents. Appellant's magazine, Life, published an account of the
play, relating it to the Hill incident, describing the play as a reenactment, and using as
illustrations photographs of scenes staged in the former Hill home. Alleging that the Life article
gave the knowingly false impression that the play depicted the Hill incident, appellee sued for
damages under a New York statute providing a cause of action to a person whose name or
picture is used by another without consent for purposes of trade or advertising. Appellant
maintained that the article concerned a subject of general interest, and was published in good
faith. The trial court instructed the jury that liability under the statute depended upon a finding
that the Life article was published not to disseminate news, but as a fictionalized version of the
Hill incident and for the purpose of advertising the play or increasing the magazine's circulation.
The court also instructed the jury that punitive damages were justified if the jury found that the
appellant falsely connected Hill with the play knowingly or through failure to make a reasonable
investigation, and that personal malice need not be found if there was reckless or wanton
disregard of Hill's rights. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Though
liability was sustained on appeal, the Appellate Division ordered a new trial as to damages, at
which only compensatory damages were awarded, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The New
York courts have limited the reach of the statute as applied to reports of newsworthy persons or
events, and have made it clear since reargument here that truth is a complete defense. (Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 18

Page 385 U. S. 375

N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966)). However, the New York courts allow recovery under the
statute when such reports are "fictitious."

Held:

1. Constitutional protections for free expression preclude applying New York's statute to redress
false reports of newsworthy matters absent proof that the publisher knew of their falsity or acted
in reckless disregard of the truth. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254. Pp. 385 U.
S. 380-391.

(a) Erroneous statements about a matter of public interest, like the opening of a new play linked
to an actual incident, which was the subject of the Life article, are inevitable, and, if innocent or
merely negligent, must be protected if "freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space'
that they 'need to survive. . . .'" Id. at 376 U. S. 271-272. Pp. 385 U. S. 388-389.
(b) But constitutional guarantees of free expression can tolerate sanctions against calculated
falsehood without impairment of their essential function. P. 385 U. S. 389.

2. Since the evidence in this case would support a jury finding either (1) that appellant's
inaccurate portrayal of the Hill incident was innocent or merely negligent or (2) that it was
recklessly untrue or knowingly false, the trial court's failure properly to instruct the jury that a
verdict of liability could be predicated only on a finding of knowing or reckless falsity in the
publication of the Life article constituted reversible error. Pp. 385 U. S. 391-397.

3. A declaration would be unwarranted that the New York statute is unconstitutional on its face
even if construed by the New York courts to impose liability without proof of knowing or
reckless falsity, because the New York courts have been assiduous to construe the statute to
avoid invasion of freedom of speech and of the press. P. 385 U. S. 397.

15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, reversed and remanded.

U.S. Supreme Court

Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board

No. 74-773

Argued October 14, 1975

Decided March 3, 1976

424 U.S. 507

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

When striking members of respondent union picketed in front of their employer's leased store
located in petitioner's shopping center, the shopping center's general manager threatened them
with arrest for criminal trespass if they did not depart, and they left. The union then filed unfair
labor practice charges against petitioner, alleging that the threat constituted interference with
rights protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), concluding that the NLRA had been violated, issued a cease and desist
order against petitioner, and the Court of Appeals enforced the order. Petitioner and respondent
union contend that the respective rights and liabilities of the parties are to be decided under the
criteria of the NLRA alone, whereas the NLRB contends that such rights and liabilities must be
measured under a First Amendment standard.

Held:

1. Under the present state of the law, the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part
to play in a case such as this, and the pickets here did not have a First Amendment right to enter
the shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against their employer. Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551. Pp. 424 U. S. 512-521.

2. The rights and liabilities of the parties are dependent exclusively upon the NLRA, under
which it is the NLRB's task, subject to judicial review, to resolve conflicts between § 7 rights and
private property rights and to seek accommodation of such rights "with as little destruction of
one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other," NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.
S. 105, 351 U. S. 112. Hence, the case is remanded so that the NLRB may reconsider the case
under the NLRA's statutory criteria alone. Pp. 424 U. S. 521-523.

501 F.2d 161, vacated and remanded.