MEAL BREAK (ARTICLE 85, LABOR CODE) its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair
members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice,
G.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998
SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) and
SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALU-
TUCP), respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and
discarding their paid lunch break constitutive of unfair labor practice?
Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive
tires, tubes and other rubber products. Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association
(ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an association of monthly salaried employees
of petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to the present controversy, all company
factory workers in Marikina including members of private respondent union worked
from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30-minute paid "on call" lunch break.
On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees
advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in
the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, a change in
work schedule effective 14 September 1992 thus —
TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES
RE: NEW WORK SCHEDULE
Effective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule of the factory office
will be as follows:
7:45 A.M. — 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday)
7:45 A.M. — 11:45 A.M. (Saturday).
Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:
9:30 A.M. — 10:30 A.M. and
2:30 P.M. — 3:30 P.M.
Lunch break will be between:
12:00 NN — 1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).
Excluded from the above schedule are the Warehouse and QA employees who are on
shifting. Their work and break time schedules will be maintained as it is now. 1
Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule
and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid "on call" lunch break, it filed on behalf of
discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court in Sime
Darby International Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC.2 However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the change in the work schedule and the elimination
of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory workers constituted a valid exercise
of management prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour
lunch break did not have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory
workers as the working time did not exceed eight (8) hours.
The Labor Arbiter further held that the factory workers would be unjustly enriched if
they continued to be paid during their lunch break even if they were no longer "on
call" or required to work during the break. He also ruled that the decision in the
earlier Sime Darby case3 was not applicable to the instant case because the former
involved discrimination of certain employees who were not paid for their 30-minute
lunch break while the rest of the factory workers were paid; hence, this Court
ordered that the discriminated employees be similarly paid the additional
compensation for their lunch break.
Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal. 4 However,
upon motion for reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, this time with
two (2) new commissioners replacing those who earlier retired, reversed its earlier
decision of 20 April 1994 as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 5 The NLRC
considered the decision of this Court in the Sime Darby case of 1990 as the law of
the case wherein petitioner was ordered to pay "the money value of these covered
employees deprived of lunch and/or working time breaks." The public respondent
declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of a
time-honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch
break resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges prohibited by Art. 100
of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, this petition alleging that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (a)
in ruling that petitioner committed unfair labor practice in the implementation of the
change in the work schedule of its employees from 7:45 a.m. — 3:45 p.m. to 7:45
a.m. — 4:45 p.m. with one-hour lunch break from 12:00 nn to 1:00 p.m.; (b) in
holding that there was diminution of benefits when the 30-minute paid lunch break
was eliminated; (c) in failing to consider that in the earlier Sime Darby case
affirming the decision of the NLRC, petitioner was authorized to discontinue the
practice of having a 30-minute paid lunch break should it decide to do so; and, (d) in
ignoring petitioner's inherent management prerogative of determining and fixing the
work schedule of its employees which is expressly recognized in the collective
bargaining agreement between petitioner and private respondent.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a manifestation and
motion recommending that the petitioner be granted, alleging that the 14 August
1992 memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory
of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of
petitioner.
We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work schedules of the
employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the
employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business
operations and its improved production.6 It rationalizes that while the old work
schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon
to do jobs during that period as they were "on call." Even if denominated as lunch
break, this period could very well be considered as working time because the factory
employees were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for
working. With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour
lunch break without any interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour
undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively use this hour not
only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more
efficiency and better performance in their work. Since the employees are no longer
required to work during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to
be compensated for this period. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the new work
schedule fully complies with the daily work period of eight (8) hours without
violating the Labor Code.7 Besides, the new schedule applies to all employees in the
factory similarly situated whether they are union members or not. 8
workers.11 Further, management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the
service so require, to change the working hours of its employees. So long as such
prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees
under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise. 12
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection
of the working class, it should not be supposed that every dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has rights which, as such,
are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Although
this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and has upheld his
cause in his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism has not blinded the Court to
the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of
the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.13
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 29 November 1994 is SET ASIDE and the decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated 26 November 1993 dismissing the complaint against
petitioner for unfair labor practice is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent to equate the
earlier Sime Darby case9 with the facts obtaining in this case. That ruling in the
former case is not applicable here. The issue in that case involved the matter of
granting lunch breaks to certain employees while depriving the other employees of
such breaks. This Court affirmed in that case the NLRC's finding that such act of
management was discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice.

The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of
employees but only the issue of whether the change of work schedule, which
management deems necessary to increase production, constitutes unfair labor
practice. As shown by the records, the change effected by management with regard
to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line
of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it
cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of
private respondent to self-organization.

Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may
devise means to attain that goal. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the
employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives.10 Thus, management is free to regulate, according to its
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work MEAL BREAK (ARTICLE 85, LABOR CODE)
supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of
G.R. No. L-16275 February 23, 1961 vs. CIR, L-16404, October 25, 1960). Since, in the instant case there is no question that the
employees claiming overtime compensation were still in the service of the company when the
case was filed, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations cannot be assailed. In fact,
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS SYSTEM (PHILIPPINES), petitioner, since it is not pretended that, thereafter, the complainants were discharged or otherwise
vs. terminated their relationship with the company for any reason, all of said complainants could
PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondent. still be with the company up to the present.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner. Petitioner herein claims that the one-hour meal period should not be considered as overtime
Jose Espinas for respondent. work (after deducting 15 minutes), because the evidence showed that complainants could rest
completely, and were not in any manner under the control of the company during that period.
The court below found, on the contrary, that during the so called meal period, the mechanics
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
were required to stand by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when
called, they were reprimanded by the leadman; that as in fact it happened on many occasions,
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry Employees Association up
No. 1055-V dated October 10, 1959, and its resolution en banc denying the motion eating to perform work during this period. Far from being unsupported by substantial
for reconsideration filed by the petitioner herein. evidence, the record clearly confirms the above factual findings of the Industrial Court.

The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads: . Similarly, this Court is satisfied with the finding that there was no agreement to withdraw
Case No. 1055-V in consideration of the wage increases obtained by the, union and set forth in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement Exhibit "A". As reasoned out by the court below, such
WHEREFORE, the Court orders the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to
alleged agreement would have been incorporated in the contract if it existed. The fact that the
compute the overtime compensation due the aforesaid fourteen (14) aircraft mechanic and the
union filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice, after the Collective Bargaining Contract had
two employees from the Communication Department based on the time sheet of said
been signed, did not necessarily mean that it had agreed to withdraw the case in consideration
employees from February 23 1952 up to and including July 15, 1958 and to submit his report
of the wage increases. The motion itself (Annex "B", Petition for Certiorari) was expressly
within 30 days for further disposition by the Court; and the company shall show to the Court
based on an understanding that the company would "formulate a schedule of work which shall
Examiner such time sheets an other documents that may be necessary in the aforesaid
be in consonance with C. A. 444". All in all, there is substantial evidence in the record to
computation; and two (2) representatives for the company and two (2) representatives for the
support the finding of the court below that no such agreement was made.
union shall be chosen to help the Court Examiner in said computation.
The company is also ordered to permanently adopt the straight 8-hour shift inclusive of meal
period which is mutually beneficial to the parties. It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative
SO ORDERED. to compute the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions
and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the
overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have to be
In this appeal, petitioner advances five proposition which, briefly, are as follows: (1) the
submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of the order itself. That
Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to order the payment of overtime compensation, it being a
there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
mere monetary claim cognizable by regular courts; (2) the finding that the one-hour meal
incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation
period should be considered overtime work (deducting 15 minutes as time allotted for eating)
of the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).
is not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the court below had no authority to delegate its
judicial functions by ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to
compute the overtime pay; (4) the finding that there was no agreement to withdraw Case No. The Industrial Court's order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the
1055-V in consideration of the wage increases in the Collective Bargaining Contract (Exh. meal period was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete
"A") is not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the court below had no authority to rest, but was actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call.
order the company to adopt a straight 8-hour shift inclusive of meal period. Of course, if the Company practices in this regard should be modified to afford the mechanics
a real rest during that hour (f. ex., by installing an entirely different emergency crew, or any
similar arrangement), then the modification of this part of the decision may be sought from the
On the issue of jurisdiction over claims for overtime pay, we have since definitely ruled in a
Court below. As things now stand, we see no warrant for altering the decision.
recent decisions that the Industrial Court may properly take cognizance of such cases if, at the
time of the petition, the complainants were still in the service of the employer, or, having been
separated from such service, should ask for reinstatement; otherwise, such claims should be The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
brought before the regular courts (NASSCO v. CIR, et al., L-13888, April 29, 1960; FRISCO
v. CIR, et al., L-13806, May 23, 1960; Board of Liquidators, et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-15485, WAITING TIME (ARTICLE 84, LABOR CODE)
May 23, 1960; Sta. Cecilia, Sawmills Co. vs. CIR, L-14254 & L-14255, May 27, 1960; Ajax
International Corp. v. Seguritan, L-16038, October 25, 1960; Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., et al.
[G.R. No. L-15422. November 30, 1962.] 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.; then from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift,
there was a one-hour mealtime period, to wit: from (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and from (2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between 2 p.m. and
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS 10 p.m.
UNION, Respondents. The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless
credited the workers with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same
Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Lorenzo R. number of hours. However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to
Mosqueda for Petitioner. continue working until the next shift, Petitioner, instead of crediting them with eight hours of
overtime work, has been paying them for six hours only, petitioner claiming that the two hours
Mariano B. Tuason for the respondent Court of Industrial Relations. corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in computing compensation. On
the other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose members are employed at
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent National Textile Workers Union. the NDC, maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order
the payment of additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.

After hearing, Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the CIR issued an order, dated March 19, 1959,
SYLLABUS
holding that mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work and
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION; REQUISITES. — In order that the accordingly ordered petitioner to pay P101,407.96 by way of overtime compensation.
Court of Industrial Relations will have jurisdiction over a case, the following requisites must be Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the CIR en banc
complied with: (a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship or the on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish the union a copy of its motion.
claimant must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the
President to the Court of Industrial Relations as one involving national interest, or must have a Thereafter, petitioner appealed to this Court, contending, first, that the CIR has no jurisdiction
bearing on an unfair labor practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or over claims for overtime compensation and, secondly, that the CIR did not make "a correct
under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these circumstances, the claim becomes a mere appraisal of the facts, in the light of the evidence" in holding that mealtime periods should be
money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. (Campos, Et. Al. v. Manila included in overtime work because workers could not leave their places of work and rest
Railroad Co., Et Al., G.R. No. L-17905, may 25, 1962.) completely during those hours.

2. ID.; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; SERVICE ON ADVERSE PARTY REQUIRED. In support of its contention that the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for overtime pay upon
— A motion for reconsideration, a copy of which has not been served on the adverse party as the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), petitioner cites a number of
required by the rules, stands on the same footing as one filed outside of the period required by the decisions of this Court. On May 23, 1960, however, We ruled in Price Stabilization Corp. v.
rules of the Court of Industrial Relations. Hence, after its dismissal for failure to make such service, Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., 108 Phil., 138, 139, that.
there is no decision of the Court en banc that petitioner can bring to the Supreme Court for review.
"Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it will be noted in all of them, though not
3. LABOR; COMPENSABLE WORK; WHEN IDLE TIME IS NOT COUNTED AS WORKING
stated in express terms, is that were the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is
TIME. — The idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which he may leave the
spot or place of work though not the premises of his employer, is not counted as working time only sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful severance, (as where the employee seeks
where the work is broken or is not continuous. reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of,
or in connection with the employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and
4. ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF WHAT IS COMPENSABLE WORK ONE OF FACT. — The question Eight- Hour Labor Law. After the termination of their relationship and no reinstatement is
of what constitutes compensable work is one of fact the determination of which depends upon the sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the
particular circumstances, to be determined by the courts in controverted cases. (31 Am. Jur., Sec. regular courts.
626, pp. 877-878.)
"We are aware that in 2 cases, some statements implying a different view have been made, but
we now hold and declare the principle set forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one
DECISION
governing all cases of this nature."cralaw virtua1aw library
REGALA, J.:
This has been the constant doctrine of this Court since May 23, 1960 1
This is a case for review from the Court of Industrial Relations. The pertinent facts are the
A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the CIR is found in Campos, Et. Al. v. Manila
following.
Railroad Co., Et Al., G. R. No. L-17905, May 25, 1962, in which We held that, for such
jurisdiction to come into play, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) there must
At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there were
exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship or the claimant must seek his
four shifts of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while the three other shifts were from
reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the
CIR as one involving national interest, or must have a bearing on an unfair labor practice
charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage
Law. In default of any of these circumstances, the claim becomes a mere money claim that
comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Here, petitioner does not deny the existence
of an employer-employee relationship between it and the members of the union. Neither is
there any question that the claim is based on the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act No. 444, as
amended). We therefore rule in favor of the Jurisdiction of the CIR over the present claim.
The other issue raised in the appeal is whether or not, on the basis of the evidence, the
mealtime breaks should be considered working time under the following provision of the
law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than eight
hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not
working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted." (Sec.
1, Com. Act No. 444, as amended. Emphasis ours.)
It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for resting and
during which he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises 2 of his
employer, is not counted as working time only where the work is broken or is not continuous.
The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of fact which We
shall not review as long as the same is supported by evidence. (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 103, as
amended; Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303).
That is why We brushed aside petitioner’s contention in one case that workers who worked
under a 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule had enough "free time" and therefore should not be credited
with four hours of overtime and held that the finding of the CIR "that claimants herein
rendered services to the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, . .
. implies either that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they
could not rest completely." (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., v. Luzon Marine Department Union,
Et Al., G.R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957).
Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down as to what constitutes
compensable work, but rather the question is one of fact depending upon the particular
circumstances, to be determined by the courts in controverted cases. (31 Am. Jur. Sec. 626 pp.
877-878.)
In this case, the CIR’s finding that work in the petitioner company was continuous and did not
permit employees and laborers to rest completely is not without basis in evidence and
following our earlier rulings, We shall not disturbed the same. Thus, the CIR
found:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While it may be corrected to say that it is well-nigh impossible for an employee to work
while he is eating, yet under Section 1 of Com. Act No. 444 such a time for eating can only be
segregated or deducted from his work, if the same is not continuous and the employee can
leave his working place and rest completely. The time cards show that the work was
continuous and without interruption. There is also the evidence adduced by the petitioner that
the pertinent employees cannot freely leave their working places nor rest completely. There is
furthermore the aspect that during the period covered by the computation the work was on a
24 hour basis and as previously stated divided into shifts."cralaw virtua1aw library
From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petition company was continuous
and therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime
compensation.
Petitioner gives an eight-hour credit to its employees who work a single shift, say from 6 a.m.
to 2 p.m. Why cannot it credit them sixteen hours should they work in two shifts?
There is another reason why this appeal should be dismissed and that is that there is no
decision by the CIR en banc from which petitioner can appeal to this Court. As already
indicated above, the records show that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order of
March 19, 1959 was dismissed by the CIR en banc because of petitioner’s failure to serve a
copy of the same on the union.
Section 15 of the rules of the CIR, in relation to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The movant shall file the motion (for reconsideration), in six copies within five (5) days from
the date on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for
reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the
allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the adverse
party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath." (Emphasis
ours.)
In one case (Bien, Et. Al. v. Castillo, etc., Et. Al. G.R. No. L- 7428, May 24, 1955), We
sustained the dismissal of a motion for reconsideration filed outside of the period provided in
the rules of the CIR. A motion for reconsideration, a copy of which has not been served on the
adverse party as required by the rules, stands on the same footing. For "in the very nature of
things, a motion for reconsideration against a ruling or decision by one Judge is, in effect an
appeal to the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc," the purpose being "to substitute the
decision or order of a collegiate court for the ruling or decision of any judge." The provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 103 authorizing the presentation of a motion for reconsideration of a
decision or order of the judge to the CIR, en banc, and not direct appeal therefrom to this
Court, is also in accord with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies before
resort can be made to this Court (Broce, Et. Al. v. The Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-12367, October 29, 1959).
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been dismissed for its failure to serve a copy of
the same on the union, there is no decision of the CIR en banc that petitioner can bring to this
Court for review.
WHEREFORE, the order of March 19, 1959 and the resolution of April 27, 1959 are hereby
affirmed and the appeal is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
WAITING TIME (ARTICLE 84, LABOR CODE)
[G.R. No. 78210. February
TEOFILO ARICA, DANILO BERNABE, MELQUIADES DOHINO,
ABONDIO OMERTA, GIL TANGIHAN, SAMUEL LABAJO, NESTOR
NORBE, RODOLFO CONCEPCION, RICARDO RICHA, RODOLFO NENO,
ALBERTO BALATRO, BENJAMIN JUMAMOY, FERMIN DAAROL,
JOVENAL ENRIQUEZ, OSCAR BASAL, RAMON ACENA, JAIME
BUGTAY, and 561 OTHERS, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY KORONADO B.
APUZEN, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, HONORABLE CONRADO B.
MAGLAYA, HONORABLE ROSARIO B. ENCARNACION, and STANDARD
(PHILIPPINES) FRUIT CORPORATION, Respondents.
28, 1989.] their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at
times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The
records show that the Labor Arbiters’ decision dated October 9, 1985 (Annex "E",
Petition) pointed out in detail the basis of his findings and conclusions, and no
cogent reason can be found to disturb these findings nor of those of the National
Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the same.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:

Koronado B. Apuzen and Jose C . Espinas, for Petitioners.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the National Labor
The Solicitor General for public Respondent. Relations Commission dated December 12, 1986 in NLRC Case No. 2327 MC-XI-
84 entitled Teofilo Arica Et. Al. v. Standard (Phil.) Fruits Corporation
Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for Private Respondent. (STANFILCO) which affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos,
NLRC, Special Task Force, Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Davao City
dismissing the claim of petitioners.
SYLLABUS
This case stemmed from a complaint filed on April 9, 1984 against private
respondent Stanfilco for assembly time, moral damages and attorney’s fees, with the
1. LABOR LAW; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; NON- aforementioned Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Davao City.
COMPENSABILITY OF CLAIM ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN AN EARLIER
DECISION REMAINS TO BE THE "LAW OF THE CASE" ; ISSUE RAISED After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers (Annex "C",
BARRED BY THE RES JUDICATA. — It is clear that herein petitioners are merely pp. 30-40; Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 41-50), Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a
reiterating the very same claim which they fled through the ALU and which records decision dated October 9, 1985 (Annex "E", Rollo, pp. 51-58) in favor of private
show had already long been considered terminated and closed by this Court in G.R. respondent STANFILCO, holding that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
No. L-48510. Therefore, the NLRC can not be faulted for ruling that petitioners’
claim is already barred by res judicata. Be that as it may, petitioners’ claim that there "Given these facts and circumstances, we cannot but agree with respondent that the
was a change in the factual scenario which are "substantial changes in the facts" pronouncement in that earlier case, i.e. the thirty-minute assembly time long
makes respondent firm now liable for the same claim they earlier filed against practiced cannot be considered waiting time or work time and, therefore, not
respondent which was dismissed. It is thus axiomatic that the non-compensability of compensable, has become the law of the case which can no longer be disturbed
the claim having been earlier established, constitute the controlling legal rule or without doing violence to the time-honored principle of res-judicata.
decision between the parties and remains to be the law of the case making this
petition without merit. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General that this petition is "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant complaint
"clearly violative of the familiar principle of res judicata. There will be no end to this should therefore be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED.
controversy if the light of the Minister of Labor’s decision dated May 12, 1979 that
had long acquired the character of finality — and which already resolved that SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 58)
petitioners’ thirty (30)-minute assembly time is not compensable, the same issue can
be re-litigated again."cralaw virtua1aw library On December 12, 1986, after considering the appeal memorandum of complainant
and the opposition of respondents, the First Division of public respondent NLRC
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF QUASI-JUDICIAL composed of Acting Presiding Commissioner Franklin Drilon, Commissioner
AGENCIES GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — As a rule, the Conrado Maglaya, Commissioner Rosario D. Encarnacion as Members, promulgated
findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because its Resolution, upholding the Labor Arbiters’ decision. The Resolution’s dispositive
portion reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph library

"Surely, the customary functions referred to in the above-quoted provision of the (a) First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their individual work
agreement includes the long-standing practice and institutionalized non-compensable assignments from the foreman.
assembly time. This, in effect, estopped complainants from pursuing this case.
(b) Thereafter, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborer’s Daily
"The Commission cannot ignore these hard facts, and we are constrained to uphold Accomplishment Report during which they are often made to explain about their
the dismissal and closure of the case. reported accomplishment the following day.

"WHEREFORE, let the appeal be, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit. (c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment.

"SO ORDERED." (Annex "H", Rollo, pp. 86-89). (d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and
materials.
On January 15, 1987, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
opposed by private respondent (Annex "I" Rollo, pp. 90-91; Annex "J," Rollo, pp. All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish (Rollo, Petition, p. 11).
92-96).
Contrary to this contention, respondent avers that the instant complaint is not new,
Public respondent NLRC, on January 30, 1987, issued resolution denying for lack of the very same claim having been brought against herein respondent by the same
merit petitioners’ motion for reconsideration (Annex "K", Rollo, p. 97). group of rank and file employees in the case of Associated Labor Union and
Standard Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76 which was filed way back
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed on May 7, 1987. April 27, 1976 when ALU was the bargaining agent of respondent’s rank and file
workers. The said case involved a claim for "waiting time", as the complainants
The Court in the resolution of May 4, 1988 gave due course to this purportedly were required to assemble at a designated area at least 30 minutes prior
petition.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library to the start of their scheduled working hours "to ascertain the work force available
for the day by means of a roll call, for the purpose of assignment or reassignment of
Petitioners assign the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library employees to such areas in the plantation where they are most needed." (Rollo, pp.
64-65).
1) Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled
working time is compensable under the Labor Code. Noteworthy is the decision of the Minister of Labor, on May 12, 1978 in the
aforecited case (Associated Labor Union v. Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation,
2) Whether or not res judicata applies when the facts obtaining in the prior case and NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76) where significant findings of facts and conclusions
in the case at bar are significantly different from each other in that there is merit in had already been made on the matter.
the case at bar.
The Minister of Labor held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
3) Whether or not there is finality in the decision of Secretary Ople in view of the
compromise agreement novating it and the withdrawal of the appeal. "The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual
consent of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining
4) Whether or not estoppel and laches lie in decisions for the enforcement of labor Agreement cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of Section 5,
standards (Rollo, p. 10). Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code . . .

Petitioners contend that the preliminary activities as workers of respondents "Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice
STANFILCO in the assembly area is compensable as working time (from 5:30 to of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with
6:00 o’clock in the morning) since these preliminary activities are necessarily and complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits.
primarily for private respondent’s benefit. They are not new employees as to require the company to deliver long briefings
regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are situated right on the
These preliminary activities of the workers are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw area where the farms are located, such that after the roll call, which does not
necessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to their houses to attend
to some chores. In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company
during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would
justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The CBA does not contain any
provision to this effect; the record is also bare of any proof on this point. This,
therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute assembly time
was not primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the
employees to indicate their availability or non-availability for work during every
working day." (Annex "E", Rollo, p. 57).
Accordingly, the issues are reduced to the sole question as to whether public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of
discretion in its resolution of December 17, 1986.chanrobles law library
The facts on which this decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
in this questioned resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission.
It is clear that herein petitioners are merely reiterating the very same claim which
they fled through the ALU and which records show had already long been
considered terminated and closed by this Court in G.R. No. L-48510. Therefore, the
NLRC can not be faulted for ruling that petitioners’ claim is already barred by res
judicata.
Be that as it may, petitioners’ claim that there was a change in the factual scenario
which are "substantial changes in the facts" makes respondent firm now liable for the
same claim they earlier filed against respondent which was dismissed. It is thus
axiomatic that the non-compensability of the claim having been earlier established,
constitute the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties and remains to be
the law of the case making this petition without merit.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General that this petition is "clearly violative of
the familiar principle of res judicata. There will be no end to this controversy if the
light of the Minister of Labor’s decision dated May 12, 1979 that had long acquired
the character of finality — and which already resolved that petitioners’ thirty (30)-
minute assembly time is not compensable, the same issue can be re-litigated again."
(Rollo, p. 183).
This Court has held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In this connection account should be taken of the cognate principle that res judicata
operates to bar not only the relitigation in a subsequent action of the issues squarely
raised, passed upon and adjudicated in the first suit, but also the ventilation in said
subsequent suit of any other issue which could have been raised in the first but was
not The law provides that ‘the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action . . . litigating for the same thing and
in the same capacity.’ So, even if new causes of action are asserted in the second
action (e.g. fraud, deceit, undue machinations in connection with their execution of
the convenio de transaccion), this would not preclude the operation of the doctrine of
res judicata. Those issues are also barred, even if not passed upon in the first. They
could have been, but were not, there raised." (Vda. de Buncio v. Estate of the late
Anita de Leon, 156 SCRA 352 [1987]).
Moreover, as a rule, the findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence (Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union v.
San Miguel Corporation, 122 SCRA 557 [1983]; Dangan v. NLRC, 127 SCRA 706
[1984]; Phil. Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 75 SCRA 162
[1977]; Mamerto v. Inciong, 118 SCRA 265 [1982]; National Federation of Labor
Union (NAFLU) v. Ople, 143 SCRA 124 [1986]; Edi-Staff Builders International,
Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., 152 SCRA 453 [1987]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.
Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]).
The records show that the Labor Arbiters’ decision dated October 9, 1985 (Annex
"E", Petition) pointed out in detail the basis of his findings and conclusions, and no
cogent reason can be found to disturb these findings nor of those of the National
Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the same.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law library
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
OVERTIME WORK (ARTICLE 87, LABOR CODE)
[G.R. No. L-64967. September 23, 1985.]
Moreover, it argues that the contracts were submitted to BES Director Jonathan
ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. MINISTER OF LABOR, M.R.A. de la Cruz, the same director who rendered the questioned decision. He
DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES and MIGUEL V. approved the same. Without his approval, the petitioner would not have stipulated
ASPERA, Respondents. the ten-hour work schedule and would have provided for a lower basic salary for an
eight-hour working day.
D E C I S I O N
In addition to his salary, Aspera was given free board and lodging while in Saudi
AQUINO, J.: Arabia and free transportation in going to and returning from that country.
This is a claim for overtime pay. Miguel Aspera, a mechanical engineer, worked for
Engineering Equipment, Inc. in Saudi Arabia for nearly a year from April 26, 1977 We hold that under the particular circumstances of this case the Acting Minister of
to April 16, 1978 at a monthly salary of P750 (P860) with a six-day work week Labor and Director De la Cruz committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
consisting of ten working hours. His written contract of employment lack of jurisdiction in awarding overtime pay and in disregarding a contract that De
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph la Cruz himself, who is supposed to know the Eight-Hour Labor Law, had previously
sealed with his imprimatur. Because of that approval, the petitioner acted in good
"1. Work Schedule/Assignment . . . Your work days shall be on a six-day work week faith in enforcing the contract.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
basis, with a working day consisting of ten (10) working hours. You may be required
to work overtime in excess of ten (10) hours each work day and to work on your Furthermore, Aspera had not denied that he was a managerial employee within the
restdays and on Saudi Arabian legal holidays. meaning of section 82. As such, he was not entitled to overtime pay.

"2. A monthly salary of P750.00 plus overtime pay for work rendered during WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Acting Minister of Labor dated November 16,
restdays/holidays and or in excess of ten (10) hours during regular working 1981 is reversed and set aside. Aspera’s complaint is dismissed. No costs.
days."cralaw virtua1aw library
SO ORDERED.
Aspera worked ten hours daily for 335 working days. He claims that his monthly
salary should correspond to eight hours of daily work and that for the additional two
hours daily, he was entitled to overtime pay at $1.2162 per hour or to $814.85 for
670 hours during 335 working days.chanrobles law library : red

The Director of Employment Services and the National Labor Relations Commission
sustained his claim and awarded him that amount as overtime pay. They declared
void the stipulation for a ten-hour working day because it was contrary to section 33
of the Labor Code, formerly Eight-Hour Labor Law, which expressly provides that
"the normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day"
and to section 87 of the same Code which provides that work performed "beyond
eight (8) hours a day" is treated as overtime work.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioner. It contends that Aspera was a managerial
employee exercising supervision and control over its rank-and-file employees with
power to recommend disciplinary action or their dismissal. Section 82 of the Labor
Code provides that managerial employees are not entitled to overtime pay.

It also asserts that Aspera was one of several employees who signed written contracts
with a "built-in" overtime pay in the ten-hour working day and that their basic
monthly pay was adjusted to reflect the higher amount covering the guaranteed two-
hour extra time whether worked or unworked.
OVERTIME WORK (ARTICLE 87, LABOR CODE)
[G.R. No. 105963. August 22, 1996.]
PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.
(PESALA), Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and ANGEL V. ESQUEJO, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; CONTRACTS OF LABOR; NOT ORDINARY
CONTRACTS. — Generally speaking, contracts are respected as the law between
the contracting parties, and they may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may see fit; and for as long as such agreements are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, they shall have the force of
law between them. However,." . ., while it is the inherent and inalienable right of
every man to have the utmost liberty of contracting, and agreements voluntarily and
fairly made will be held valid and enforced in the courts, the general right to contract
is subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be in violation of the
Constitution, the statute or some rule of law (12 Am. Jur. pp. 641-642)." And under
the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly but are impressed with public
interest. Inasmuch as in this particular instance the contract is question would have
been deemed in violation of pertinent labor laws, the provisions of said laws would
prevail over the terms of the contract, and private respondent would still be entitled
to overtime pay.
2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS; IN ORDER TO JUDGE THE
INTENTION OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, THEIR
CONTEMPORANEOUS AND SUBSEQUENT ACTS SHALL BE PRINCIPALLY
CONSIDERED; APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN CASE AT BAR. — We cannot
agree with petitioner’s assertion that by judging the intention of the parties from their
contemporaneous acts it would appear that the "failure of respondent Esquejo to
claim such alleged overtime pay since 1986 clearly demonstrate(s) that the
agreement on his gross salary as contained in his appointment paper is conclusive on
the matter of the inclusion of overtime pay." This is simply not the case here. "The
interpretation of the provision in question having been put in issue, the Court is
constrained to determine which interpretation is more in accord with the intent of the
parties. To ascertain the intent of the parties, the Court is bound to look at their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts. Private respondent’s silence and failure to
claim his overtime pay since 1986 cannot be considered as proving the
understanding on his part that the rate provided in his employment contract covers
overtime pay. Precisely, that is the very question raised by private respondent with
the arbiter, because contrary to the claim of petitioner, private respondent believed
that he was not paid his overtime pay and that such pay is not covered by the rate
agreed upon and stated in his Appointment Memorandum. The subsequent act of
private respondent in filing money claims negates the theory that there was clear
agreement as to the inclusion of his overtime pay in the contracted salary rate.
3. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF AN EMPLOYEE TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT
IMMEDIATELY UPON VIOLATION THEREOF; CANNOT IPSO FACTO BE
DEEMED A WAIVER OF THE OPPRESSION; REASONS. — When an employee
fails to assert his right immediately upon violation thereof, such failure cannot ipso
facto be deemed as a waiver of the oppression. We must recognize that the worker
and his employer are not equally situated. When a worker keeps silent inspite of
flagrant violations of his rights, it may be because he is seriously fearful of losing his
job. And the dire consequences thereof on his family and his dependents prevent him
from complaining. In short, his thoughts of sheer survival weigh heavily against
launching an attack upon his more powerful employer.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES; CANNOT BE
CHARGED AGAINST A PARTY WHO HAS NOT INCURRED UNDUE DELAY
IN THE ASSERTION OF HIS RIGHTS. — Petitioner’s allegation that private
respondent is guilty of laches is likewise devoid of merit. Laches is defined as failure
or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within an unreasonable time, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot
work to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. Laches cannot be charged
against any worker when he has not incurred undue delay in the assertion of his
rights. Private respondent filed his complaint within the three-year reglementary
period. He did not sleep on his rights for an unreasonable length of time.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is an employee entitled to overtime pay for work rendered in excess of eight hours a
day, given the fact that his employment contract specifies a twelve-hour workday at
a fixed monthly salary rate that is above the legal minimum wage? This is the
principal question answered by this Court in resolving this petition which challenges
the validity and legality of the Decision 1 of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission 2 promulgated on April 23, 1992 in NLRC NCR CA No.
002522-91 entitled "Angel V. Esquejo v. PAL Employees Savings and Loan
Association" which Decision modified (slightly as to amount) the earlier decision 3
dated November 11, 1991 of the labor arbiter granting private respondent’s claim for
overtime pay.
The Facts and the Case Below
On October 10, 1990, private respondent with public respondent a complaint
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 10-05457-90 for non-payment of overtime pay
and non-payment of the P25.00 statutory minimum wage increase mandated by
Republic Act No. 6727.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint for illegal
suspension with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages. However,
before the case was submitted for resolution, private respondent filed a "Motion to
Withdraw Supplemental Complaint" on the ground that a separate action for illegal
suspension, illegal dismissal, etc. had been filed and was pending before another
labor arbiter. Hence, the issue decided by public respondent and which is under
review by this Court in this petition involves only his claim for overtime pay. On
November 26, 1990, private respondent filed his position paper 4 with the labor
arbiter alleging the following facts constituting his cause of
action:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Complainant (herein private respondent) started working with respondent
(PESALA) sometime last March 1, 1986 as a company guard and was receiving a
monthly basic salary of P1,990.00 plus an emergency allowance in the amount of
P510.00. He was required to work a (sic) twelve (12) hours a day, a (sic) xerox
copies of his appointment are hereto attached and marked as Annexes ‘C’ and ‘D’ of
this position paper;
That on December 10, 1986, respondent Board of Directors in its board meeting held
on November 21, 1986 approved a salary adjustment for the complainant increasing
his monthly basic salary to P2,310.00 and an emergency allowance of P510.00, a
xerox copy of the salary adjustment is hereto attached and marked as Annex ‘E’
hereof;
That on August 25, 1987, because of his impressive performance on his assigned job,
another adjustment was approved by the President of the association increasing his
monthly basic salary to P2,880.00, a xerox copy of the salary adjustment is hereto
attached and marked as Annex ‘ F’ hereof;
That from January 4, 1988 up to June 1990, several salary adjustments were made by
the respondent on the monthly basic salary of the complainant including a letter of
appreciation for being as (sic) one of the outstanding performers during the first half
of 1988, the latest salary prior to the filing of the complaint was P3,720.00, a (sic)
xerox copies of all the documents relative to the salary adjustments are hereto
attached and marked as annexes ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ of this position paper;
That during his entire period of employment with respondent, the former was
required to perform overtime work without any additional compensation from the
latter. It was also at this point wherein the respondent refused to give the P25.00
increase on the minimum wage rates as provided for by law. On October 12, 1990,
complainant was suspended for the period of thirty seven (37) days for an offense
allegedly committed by the respondent sometime last August 1989.’
On December 13, 1990, petitioner PESALA filed its position paper 5 alleging among
other things:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On 01 March, 1986, complainant was appointed in a permanent status as the
company guard of Respondent. In the Appointment Memorandum dated February
24, 1986 which has the conformity of complainant, it is expressly stipulated therein
that complainant is to receive a monthly salary of P1,900.00 plus P510.00 emergency
allowance for a twelve (12) hours work per day with one (1) day off. A copy of said
appointment memorandum is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’ and made an integral part
hereof.
On 01 December, 1986, the monthly salary of complainant was increased to
P2,310.00 plus P510.00 emergency allowance. Later, or on 01 January, 1988, the
monthly salary of complainant was again increased to P3,420.00. And still later, or
on 01 February, 1989, complainant’s monthly salary was increased to P3,720.00.
Copies of the memoranda evidencing said increase are hereto attached as Annexes ‘
B’, ‘B-1’ and ‘B-2’ and are made integral parts hereof.
On 29 November, 1989, the manager of respondent in the person of Sulpicio Jornales
wrote to complainant informing the latter that the position of a guard will be
abolished effective November 30, 1989, and that complainant will be re-assigned to
the position of a ledger custodian effective December 1, 1989.
Pursuant to the above-mentioned letter-agreement of Mr. Jornales, complainant was
formally appointed by respondent as its ledger custodian on December 1, 1989. The
monthly salary of complainant as ledger custodian starting on December 1, 1989 was
P3,720.00 for forty (40) working hours a week or eight (8) working hours a day. A
copy of said Appointment memorandum is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and made
an integral part hereof.
On 29 August, 1990, complainant was administratively charged with serious
misconduct or disobedience of the lawful orders of respondent or its officers, and
gross and habitual neglect of his duties, committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘1. Sometime in August, 1989, you (referring to complainant Esquejo) forwarded the
checks corresponding to the withdrawals of Mr. Jose Jimenez and Mr. Anselmo dela
Banda of Davao and Iloilo Station, respectively, without the signature of the
Treasurer and the President of PESALA, in violation of your duty and function that
you should see to it that the said checks should be properly signed by the two
PESALA officials before you send out said checks of their addresses. As a result of
which, there was a substantial delay in the transmission of the checks to its owners
resulting to an embarrassment on the part of the PESALA officers and damage and 2. The claim for non-payment of P25.00 salary increase pursuant to Republic Act
injury to the receipients (sic) of the checks since they needed the money badly. No. 6727 is dismissed for lack of merit."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. Sometime in August, 1989, before you (complainant) went on your vacation, you Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, petitioner appealed to public respondent NLRC
failed to leave or surrender the keys of the office, especially the keys to the main and only to be rejected on April 23, 1992 via the herein assailed Decision, the dispositive
back doors which resulted to damage, injury and embarrassment to PESALA. This is portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
a gross violation of your assigned duties and you disobeyed the instruction of your
Superior.’ "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the award is reduced to an amount of
TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIXTY-SIX PESOS AND 45/100 (P28,066.45). In
x x x all other respects, the Decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal
DISMISSED for lack of merit."cralaw virtua1aw library

Herein complainant was informed of the aforequoted charges against him and was No motion for reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the petitioner. 6
given the opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his behalf as shown by the
Notice of Hearing (Annex ‘D’ hereof) sent to him. Complainant did in fact appeared What transpired afterwards is narrated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum,
(sic) at the hearing, assisted by his counsel, Atty. Mahinardo G. Mailig, and 7 which we presume to be correct since petitioner did not contradict the same in its
presented his evidence in the form of a Counter-Affidavit. A copy of said Counter- memorandum:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Affidavit is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an integral part hereof.
". . . Petitioner did not appeal the Decision of respondent NLRC. When it became
On 12 October, 1990, after due deliberation on the merits of the administrative final, the parties were called to a conference on June 29, 1992 to determine the
charges filed against herein complainant, the Investigating Officer in the person of possibility of the parties’ voluntary compliance with the Decision (Order of Labor
Capt. Rogelio Enverga resolved the same imposing a penalty of suspension of herein Arbiter Linsangan. dated July 23, 1992).
complainant, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . In their second conference, held on July 15, 1992, petitioner proposed to private
‘PENALTY: 1. For the first offense, you (referring to complainant Esquejo) are respondent a package compromise agreement in settlement of all pending claims.
suspended for a period of thirty (30) working days without pay effective October 15, Private respondent for his part demanded P150,000.00 as settlement of his complaint
1990. which was turned down by petitioner as too excessive. Unfortunately, no positive
results were achieved.
2. For the second offense, your (sic) are suspended for a period of seven (7) working
days without pay effective from the date the first suspension will expire’."cralaw As a result, a pleading was filed by petitioner captioned: Motion to Defer Execution
virtua1aw library and Motion to Re-Compute alleged overtime pay. Petitioner states that ‘quite
recently, the Employee Payroll Sheets pertaining to the salaries, overtime pay,
On March 7, 1991, private respondent filed a detailed and itemized computation of vacation and sick leave of Angel Esquejo were located’.
his money claims totaling P107,495.90, to which petitioner filed its comment on
April 28, 1991. The computation filed on March 7, 1991 was later reduced to . . . Petitioner’s Motion to Defer Execution and Motion to Re-Compute respondent’s
P65,302.80. To such revised computation, the petitioner submitted its comment on overtime pay was denied in an Order dated July 23, 1992.
April 28, 1991.
. . . Petitioner moved to reconsider the Denial Order on July 27, 1992. Private
Thereafter, labor arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan rendered a decision dated November respondent opposed."cralaw virtua1aw library
11, 1991 granting overtime pay as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In the meantime, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari before
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library this Court on July 10, 1992. Later, on July 17, 1992, citing as reason that." . . quite
recently, the Employee Payroll Sheets which contained the salaries and overtime pay
1. Granting the claim for overtime pay covering the period October 10, 1987 to received by respondent Esquejo were located in the bodega of the petitioner and
November 30, 1989 in the amount of P28,344.55. based on said Payroll Sheets, it appears that substantial overtime pay have been paid
to respondent Esquejo in the amount of P24,283.22 for the period starting January
1987 up to November 1989", petitioner asked this Court for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. On the same date of
July 17, 1992, a "Supplemental Petition Based On Newly Discovered Evidence" was
filed by petitioner to which was attached photocopies of payroll sheets of the
aforestated period.
On July 29, 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the Decision dated April 23, 1992 issued in NLRC NCR
CA No. 002522-91, the case below subject of the instant petition.
The Issues
For issues have been raised by the petitioner in its effort to obtain a reversal of the
assailed Decision, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I.THE RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO OVERTIME PAY WHEN THE SAME IS A GROSS
CONTRAVENTION OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ESQUEJO AND A PATENT VIOLATION
OF ARTICLES 1305, 1306 AND 1159 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
II.THE RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AWARDING OVERTIME PAY OF P28,066.45 TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WHEN THE SAME IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 22
OF THE CIVIL CODE ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
III.THE RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSED OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PAID THE OVERTIME PAY BASED ON THE COMPUTATION OF LABOR
ARBITER CORNELIO LINSANGAN WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY SAID
RESPONDENT NLRC WHEN THE SAME IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IT, THEREFORE, VIOLATED THE
CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS PRESCRIBED IN ‘ANG
TIBAY VS. CIR’ 69 PHIL. 635.
IV.WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION
BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MAY BE ADMITTED AS
PART OF ITS EVIDENCE IT BEING VERY VITAL TO THE JUDICIOUS
DETERMINATION OF THE CASE." (Rollo, p. 367)
In essence the above issues boil down to this query: Is an employee entitled to
overtime pay for work rendered in excess of the regular eight hour day given the fact
that he entered into a contract of labor specifying a work-day of twelve hours at a
fixed monthly rate above the legislative minimum wage?
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, we would like to rectify the statement made by the Solicitor General
that the "petitioner did not appeal from the Decision of (public) respondent NLRC."
The elevation of the said case by appeal is not possible. The only remedy available
from an order or decision of the NLRC is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court alleging lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
8 The general rule now is that the special civil action of certiorari should be
instituted within a period of three months. 9 Hence, when the petition was filed on
July 10, 1992, three months had not yet elapsed from petitioner’s receipt of the
assailed Decision (should really be from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration).
However, aside from failing to show clearly grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent NLRC, which we shall discuss shortly, the petitioner also failed to
comply with the mandatory requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration from
the Decision of the Public respondent before resorting to the remedy of certiorari.
We have previously held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . .The implementing rules of respondent NLRC are unequivocal in requiring that
a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution, or decision of respondent
commission should be seasonably filed as a precondition for pursuing any further or
subsequent remedy, otherwise the said order, resolution, or decision shall become
final and executory after ten calendar days from receipts thereof. Obviously, the
rationale therefor is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify
such errors or mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice
can be had. This merely adopts the rule that the function of a motion for
reconsideration is to point to the court the error that it may have committed and to
give it a chance to correct itself." 10
"Additionally, the allegations in the petition clearly show that petitioner failed to file
a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution before filing the instant
petition. As correctly argued by private respondent Rolando Tan, such failure
constitutes a fatal infirmity . . . . The unquestioned rule in his jurisdiction is
that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public Respondent.
In the instant case, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision, based on palpable or patent
errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
the questioned decision. And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly
provided by law, petitioner has permitted the subject Resolution to become final and
executory after the lapse of the ten day period within which to file such motion for
reconsideration." 11
In brief, the filing of the instant petition was premature and did not toll the running
of the 3 month period. Thus, the assailed Decision became final and executory. On
this ground alone, this petition must therefore be dismissed.
However, in view of the importance of the substantial query raised in the petition, we
have resolved to decide the case on the merits also. SULPICIO B. JORNALES CATALINO F. BANEZ
(Signed)
The First Issue: Was Overtime Pay Included?
ANGEL V. ESQUEJO" 12
The main disagreement between the parties centers on how the contract of
employment of the private respondent should be interpreted. The terms and Petitioner faults the public respondent when it said that there was "no meeting of
conditions thereof read as follows: minds between the parties," since the employment contract "explicitly states without
"Date: February 24, 1986 any equivocation" that the overtime pay for work rendered for four (4) hours in
excess of the eight (8) hour regular working period is already included in the
NAME :ESQUEJO, ANGEL P1,990.00 basic salary. "This is very clear from the fact that the appointment states
12 hours a day work." 13 By its computations, 14 petitioner tried to illustrate that
NATURE OF ACTION :APPOINTMENT private respondent was paid more than the legally required minimum salary then
prevailing.
FROM
To prove its contention, petitioner argues that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
POSITION TITLE :COMPANY GUARD
"The legal minimum wage prescribed by our statutes, the legally computed overtime
TO :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library pay and the monthly salaries being paid by petitioner to respondent Esquejo would
show that indeed, the overtime pay has always been absorbed and included in the
STATUS :PERMANENT said agreed monthly salaries.

EFFECTIVE DATE :MARCH 1, 1986 In 1986, the legal minimum salary of Esquejo is computed as follows (per
Appointment Memoranda dated February 4, 1986 and June 6, 1986 [Annex ‘C’ and
FROM :P1,990.00 per month ‘D’ of Annex ‘B’ of this Petition]):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

plus P510.00 emergency 54 x 314 days

allowance:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ————

SALARY :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 12 months = P1,413.00 monthly salary

TO :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The hourly overtime pay is computed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

REMARKS :To confirm permanent 54/8 hours = P6.75 x 4 hrs. = P27.00

appointment as company P27.00 x 1.25 = P33.75 x 20 (should be 26)days = P887.50

guard who will render 12 (should be P877.50)

hours a day with one (1) P1,413.00 — legal minimum wage

day off + 887.50(877.50) — legal overtime pay

RECOMMENDED BY: APPROVED BY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
————
(Signed) (Signed)
P2,290.50 — amount due to respondent was resolved by the public respondent, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Esquejo under the law "In resolving the issue of whether or not complainant’s overtime pay for the four (4)
hours of work rendered in excess of the normal eight hour work period is
P2,500.00 — gross salary of Esquejo per contract incorporated in the computation of his monthly salary, respondent invokes its
contract of employment with the complainant. Said contract appears to be in the
-2,290.50 nature of a document identifiable as an appointment memorandum which took effect
on March 1, 1986 (Records, p. 56) by virtue of which complainant expressed
———— conformity to his appointment as company guard with a work period of twelve (12)
hours a day with one (1) day off. Attached to this post is a basic salary of P1,990.00
P 209.50 — Difference" (Rollo, p. 371). plus P510.00 emergency allowance. It is (a) cardinal rule in the interpretation of a
contract that if the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
On the other hand, private respondent in his position paper claims that overtime pay the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. (Art.
is not so incorporated and should be considered apart from the P1,990.00 basic 1370, Civil Code of the Philippines). To this, respondent seeks refuge.
salary. 15 Circumstances, however, do not allow us to consider this rule in the light of
complainant’s claim for overtime pay which is an evident indication that as to this
We find for the private respondent and uphold the respondent NLRC’s ruling that he matter, it cannot be said that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties, it
is entitled to overtime pay. appearing that respondent considered the four (4) hours work in excess of the eight
hours as overtime work and compensated by way of complainant’s monthly salary
Based on petitioner’s own computations, it appears that the basic salary plus while on the latter’s part, said work rendered is likewise claimed as overtime work
emergency allowance given to private respondent did not actually include the but yet unpaid in view of complainant’s being given only his basic salary.
overtime pay claimed by private Respondent. Following the computations it would Complainant claims that the basic salary could not possibly include therein the
appear that by adding the legal minimum monthly salary which at the time was overtime pay for his work rendered in excess of eight hours. Hence, respondent’s
P1,413.00 and the legal overtime pay P877.50, the total amount due the private Appointment Memorandum cannot be taken and accorded credit as it is so worded in
respondent as basic salary should have been P2,290.50. By adding the emergency view of this ambiguity. We therefore proceed to determine the issue in the light of
cost of living allowance (ECOLA) of P510.00 as provided by the employment existing law related thereto. While it is true that the complainant received a salary
contract, the total basic salary plus emergency allowance should have amounted to rate which is higher that the minimum provided by law, it does not however follow
P2,800.50. However, petitioner admitted that it actually paid private respondent that any additional compensation due the complainant can be offset by his salary in
P1,990.00 as basic salary plus P510.00 emergency allowance or a total of only excess of the minimum, especially in the absence of an express agreement to that
P2,500.00. Undoubtedly, private respondent was shortchanged in the amount of effect. To consider otherwise would be in disregard of the rule of nondiminution of
P300.50. Petitioner’s own computations thus clearly establish that private benefits which are above the minimum being extended to the employees.
respondent’s claim for overtime pay is valid. Furthermore, such arrangement is likewise in disregard of the manner required by the
law on how overtime compensation must be determined. There is further the
Side Issue: Meeting of the Minds? possibility that in view of subsequent increases in the minimum wage, the existing
salary for twelve (12) hours could no longer account for the increased wage level
The petitioner contends that the employment contract between itself and the private together with the overtime rate for work rendered in excess of eight hours. This
respondent "perfectly satisfies" the requirements of Article 1305 of the Civil Code as fertile ground for a violation of a labor standards provision can be effectively
to the "meeting of the minds" such that there was a "legal and valid contract" entered thwarted if there is a clear and definite delineation between an employee’s regular
into by the parties. Thus, private respondent "cannot be allowed to question the said and overtime compensation. It is, further noted that a reading of respondent’s
salary arrangements for the extra 4 ours overtime pay after the lapse of 4 years and Appointment Memoranda issued to the complainant on different dates (Records, pp.
claim only now that the same is not included in the terms of the employment 56-60) shows that the salary being referred to by the respondent which allegedly
contract." 16 included complainant’s overtime pay, partakes of the nature of a basic salary and as
such, does not contemplate any other compensation above thereof including
We disagree. Public respondent correctly found no such agreement as to overtime complainant’s overtime pay. We therefore affirm complainant’s entitlement to the
pay. In fact, the contract was definite only as to the number of hours of work to be latter benefit." 17
rendered but vague as to what is covered by the salary stipulated. Such ambiguity
Petitioner also insists that private respondent’s delay in asserting his right/claim
demonstrates his agreement to the inclusion of overtime pay in his monthly salary
rate. This argument is specious. First of all, delay cannot be attributed to the
private Respondent. He was hired on March 1, 1986. His twelve-hour work periods
continued until November 30, 1989. On October 10, 1990 (just before he was
suspended) he filed his money claims with the labor arbiter. Thus, the public
respondent in upholding the decision of the arbiter computed the money claims for
the three year period from the date the claims were filed, with the computation
starting as of October 10, 1987 onwards.
In connection with the foregoing, we should add that even if there had been a
meeting of the minds in the instant case, the employment contract could not have
effectively shielded petitioner from the just and valid claims of private Respondent.
Generally speaking, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties, and they may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may see fit; and for as long as such agreements are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy or public order, they shall have the force of law between
them. 18 However,." . ., while it is the inherent and inalienable right of every man to
have the utmost liberty of contracting, and agreements voluntarily and fairly made
will be held valid and enforced in the courts, the general right to contract is subject to
the limitation that the agreement must not be in violation of the Constitution, the
statute or some rule of law (12 Am. Jur. pp. 641-642)." 19 And under the Civil Code,
contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they
are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. 20 Inasmuch as in
this particular instance the contract is question would have been deemed in violation
of pertinent labor laws, the provisions of said laws would prevail over the terms of
the contract, and private respondent would still be entitled to overtime pay.
Moreover, we cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that by judging the intention
of the parties from their contemporaneous acts it would appear that the "failure of
respondent Esquejo to claim such alleged overtime pay since 1986 clearly
demonstrate(s) that the agreement on his gross salary as contained in his appointment
paper is conclusive on the matter of the inclusion of overtime pay." (Rollo, pp. 13-
15; also, Rollo, pp. 378-380). This is simply not the case here. "The interpretation of
the provision in question having been put in issue, the Court is constrained to
determine which interpretation is more in accord with the intent of the parties. 21 To
ascertain the intent of the parties, the Court is bound to look at their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts. 22 Private respondent’s silence and failure to
claim his overtime pay since 1986 cannot be considered as proving the
understanding on his part that the rate provided in his employment contract covers
overtime pay. Precisely, that is the very question raised by private respondent with
the arbiter, because contrary to the claim of petitioner, private respondent believed
that he was not paid his overtime pay and that such pay is not covered by the rate
agreed upon and stated in his Appointment Memorandum. The subsequent act of
private respondent in filing money claims negates the theory that there was clear
agreement as to the inclusion of his overtime pay in the contracted salary rate. When
an employee fails to assert his right immediately upon violation thereof, such failure
cannot ipso facto be deemed as a waiver of the oppression. We must recognize that
the worker and his employer are not equally situated. When a worker keeps silent
inspite of flagrant violations of his rights, it may be because he is seriously fearful of
losing his job. And the dire consequences thereof on his family and his dependents
prevent him from complaining. In short, his thoughts of sheer survival weigh heavily
against launching an attack upon his more powerful employer.
The petitioner contends that the agreed salary rate in the employment contract should
be deemed to cover overtime pay, otherwise serious distortions in wages would
result "since a mere company guard will be receiving a salary much more that the
salaries of other employees who are much higher in rank and position than him in the
company." (Rollo, p. 16) We find this argument flimsy and undeserving of
consideration. How can paying an employee the overtime pay due him cause serious
distortions in salary rates or scales? And how can "other employees" be aggrieved
when they did not render any overtime service?
Petitioner’s allegation that private respondent is guilty of laches is likewise devoid of
merit. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within an
unreasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
either abandoned or declined to assert it. 23 The question of laches is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application
is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot work to defeat justice or to
perpetrate fraud and injustice. 24 Laches cannot be charged against any worker when
he has not incurred undue delay in the assertion of his rights. Private respondent filed
his complaint within the three-year reglementary period. He did not sleep on his
rights for an unreasonable length of time.25cralaw:red
Second issue: Unjust Enrichment?
Petitioner contends that the award of overtime pay is "plain and simple unjust and
illegal enrichment." Such award "in effect sanctioned and approved the grant of
payment to respondent Esquejo which will result in double payment for the overtime
work rendered by paid employee." 26 Also, per petitioner," (n)othing in the Labor
Code nor in the Rules and Regulations issued in the implementation thereof prohibits
the manner of paying the overtime pay (by) including the same in the salary." 27
This is begging the issue. To reiterate, the main question raised before the labor
tribunals is whether the provision on wages in the contract of employment already
included the overtime pay for four (4) working hours rendered six days a week in
excess of the regular eight-hour work. And we hold that the tribunals below were
correct in ruling that the stipulated pay did not include overtime. Hence, there can be
no undue enrichment in claiming what legally belongs to private Respondent.
Third Issue: Basis of NLRC’s Decision? period in excess of one working day. Consequently, complainant’s overtime pay
shall be computed as follows:
Petitioner assails respondent NLRC for adopting that portion of the decision of the
labor arbiter, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph OVERTIME PAY: (4 HRS/DAY)

". . . Our conclusion is quite clear considering the fact that at the time of his October 10, 1987 — December 13, 1987 = 2.10 mos.
employment in March 1986, during which the minimum wage was P37.00 a day for
8 hours work, complainant’s total take-home-pay working 12 hours a day including P54/8 hrs. = P6.75 x 4 hrs. = P27.00
ECOLA, was only P2,500.00 a month. And immediately prior to his appointment as
Ledger Custodian effective December 1, 1989, with the working hours reduced to 8 P27 x 1.25 = P33.75 x 26 x 2.10 mos. = P1,842.75
hours or 40 hours a week, complainant’s monthly salary was P3,420.00 (instead of
P5,161.01 minimum monthly with 4 hours overtime work everyday, or a difference
December 14, 1987 — June 30, 1989 = 18.53 mos.
of P1,741.01 a month).
P64/8 hrs. = P8 x 4 hrs. = P32.00
"Accordingly, the claim for overtime pay reckoned from October 10, 1987 up to
November 30, 1989 should be, as it is hereby, granted." 28 (Rollo, p. 201).
P32 x 1.25 = P40 x 26 x 18.53 = P19,271.20
Petitioner believes that by adopting the above-quoted portion of the arbiter’s
decision, respondent NLRC violated the cardinal rule that its decisions must be July 1, 1989 — November 30, 1989 = 5 mos.
supported by substantial evidence. In doing so, petitioner claims that the NLRC
violated its primary rights as enunciated in the case of Ang Tibay v. CIR. 29 In other P89/8 hrs. = P11.12 x 4 hrs. = P44.50
words, petitioner holds the view that the arbiter’s decision failed to explain how the
amount of P5,161.01 was arrived at. 30 P44.50 x 1.25 = P55.62 x 25 x 5 mos. = P6,952.50(P6,953.125)

Petitioner is in error. The public respondent did not adopt in toto the aforequoted TOTAL OVERTIME PAY
portion of the arbiter’s decision. It made its own computations and arrived at a
slightly different amount, with a difference of P278.10 from the award granted by the P28,066.45(P28,067.075)" (Rollo, pp. 210-212).
labor arbiter. The refute petitioner’s claim, public respondent attached (as Annexes
"1", "1-A" "1-B" and "1-C") to its Comment, the computations made by the labor Prescinding therefrom, it is evident that petitioner had no basis to argue that
arbiter in arriving at the sum of P5,161.00. On the other hand, public respondent respondent NLRC committed any grave abuse of discretion in quoting the questioned
made its own computation in its assailed Decision and arrived at a slightly different portion of the labor arbiter’s holding.
figure from that computed by the labor arbiter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Fourth Issue: Newly Discovered Evidence?
"Respondent claims that the award of P28,344.55 is bereft of any factual basis.
Records show that as per computation of the office of the Fiscal Examiner, (Records, In its Supplemental Petition filed on July 17, 1996, petitioner alleges in
p. 116) the said amount was arrived at. The computation was however based on the part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
assumption that the complainant regularly reported for work. Records however show
that the complainant absented himself from work for one day in August 1989. "2. That only recently, the petitioner was able to locate the Employees Payroll Sheets
(Records, p. 63) For this unworked day, no overtime pay must be due. As to the rest which contained the salaries, overtime pay, vacation and sick leaves of respondent
of his period of employment subject to the three year limitation rule which dates Esquejo which pertains to the period starting from January 1, 1987 up to November
from October 10, 1987 up to his appointment as Ledger Custodian on December 1, 1989. Therefore, said total amount of overtime pay paid to and received by
1989 after which is regular work period was already reduced to eight hours, there respondent Esquejo should be deducted from the computed amount of P28,066.45
being no showing that the complainant absented himself from work, and he being based on the questioned decision;" (Rollo, p. 220).
then required to work for a period of twelve hours daily, We therefore rule on
complainant’s entitlement to overtime compensation for the duration of the aforesaid Contrary to petitioner’s claim however, said documents consisting of payroll sheets,
cannot be considered as "newly-discovered evidence" since said papers were in its
custody and possession all along, petitioner being the employer of private respondent WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Petition is DISMISSED,
the temporary restraining order issued on July 30, 1992 LIFTED, and the assailed
Furthermore, petitioner offers no satisfactory explanation why these documents were decision of the public respondent AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
unavailable at the time the case was being heard by the labor arbiter. In its
Memorandum, petitioner excused itself for its failure to present such evidence before
the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC by saying that "petitioner(’s office) appeared
to be in disorder or in a state of confusion since the then officers (of petitioner) were
disqualified by the Monetary Board on grounds of misappropriation of funds of the
association and other serious irregularities. There was no formal turn-over of the
documents from the disqualified set of officers to the new officers of petitioner." 31
We find such excuse weak and unacceptable, the same not being substantiated by
any evidence on record. Moreover, payroll records are normally not in the direct
custody and possession of corporate officers but of their subordinates, i.e., payroll
clerks and the like. In the normal course of business, such payroll sheets are not the
subject of formal turnovers by outgoing officers to their successors in office. And if
indeed it is true that petitioner had been looking for such records or documents
during the pendency of the case with the labor arbiter and with public respondent,
petitioner never alleged such search before the said labor tribunals a quo. Hence,
such bare allegations of facts cannot now be fairly appreciated in this petition
for certiorari, which is concerned only with grave abuse of discretion or lack (or
excess) of jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General quotes with approval a portion of private respondent’s

Opposition to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is clear from the payroll, although the substantial pages thereof do not show that
the net amount indicated therein have been received or duly acknowledged to have
been received by the complainant, THAT OVERTIME PAYMENTS THAT WERE
MADE REFER TO WORK RENDERED DURING COMPLAINANT’S OFF
DAYS. What has been rightfully claimed by the complainant and awarded by this
Honorable Office is the overtime works (sic) rendered by the complainant daily for
six (6) days a week computed at four (4) hours per day. This computation is based on
the evidence thus submitted by the parties. All appointments issued by the
respondent carries (sic) with it (sic) that the basic salary of the complainant is
equivalent to 12 hours work everyday for six (6) days a week, hence, the four (4)
hours overtime daily was not considered and therefore not paid by the Respondent."
(Rollo, p. 327).

It has been consistently held that factual issues are not proper subjects of a petition
for certiorari, as the power of the Supreme Court to review labor cases is limited to
questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. 32 The introduction in this
petition of so-called newly discovered evidence is unwarranted. This Court is not a
trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the evidence the
evidence presented (or which ought to have been presented) in the tribunals below.
33
NIGHT SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL (ARTICLE 86, LABOR CODE) provision on salaries. In view of the controlling doctrine that a grave abuse of
discretion must be shown in order to warrant our disturbing the findings of the
[G.R. No. L-30452. September 30, 1982.] respondent court, the reversal of the court’s findings on this matter is unwarranted.
(Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, 27 SCRA 490)
MERCURY DRUG CO., INC., Petitioner, v. NARDO DAYAO, ET
AL., Respondents. 2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAWS; COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. NOT DEPRIVED OF JURISDICTION TO SETTLE
Caparas & Ilagan for Petitioner. CLAIMS FOR NIGHT DIFFERENTIALS BY PASSAGE OF R.A.. 875. —
Petitioner wants Us to re-examine Our rulings on the question of nighttime work. It
Gerardo P. Cabo Chan and Elias Banzali for Respondents. contends that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to award additional
compensation for nighttime work because of the declared policy on freedom of
SYNOPSIS collective bargaining expressed in Republic Act 875 and the express prohibition in
Section 7 of the said statute. A re-examination of the decisions on nighttime pay
Respondents, employees of petitioner Mercury Drug, Co., filed a petition with the differential was the focus of attention in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., Et. Al. v.
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) praying among others for payment of their Ferrer, Et. Al. (19 SCRA 130). The earliest cases cited by the petitioner company,
unpaid wages for work done on Sundays and legal holidays and of additional Naric v. Naric Workers Union, L-12075, May 29, 1959 and Philippine Engineers’
compensation for nighttime work. Respondents alleged that they were coerced by Syndicate v. Bautista, L-16440, February 29, 1964, were discussed lengthily. Thus . .
petitioner into entering into contracts of employment waiving the said benefits. . . "while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional compensation
Petitioner filed an answer after its motion to dismiss was denied. The Industrial for night work, the industrial court has the power to determine the wages that night
Court rendered judgment in favor of respondents ruling that an agreement in a workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. 103, and so it justified the
contract of employment which would exclude the 25% additional compensation for additional compensation in the Shell case for ‘hygienic, medical, moral, cultural and
work done during Sundays and holidays is null and void, and ordered petitioner to sociological reasons.’ . . . The broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103
payrespondents two additional sums equivalent to 25% of their respective basic on the CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the
salaries for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays, and additional four categories therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement
compensation for nighttime services. Hence, the present recourse of petitioner, of industrial disputes via the collective bargaining process; but We find no cogent
alleging among others, that it was contrary to public policy todeclare the contracts of reason for concluding that a suit of this nature — for extra compensation for night
employment null and void. work falls outside the domain of the industrial court. . . . After the passage of
Republic Act 875, this Court has not only upheld the industrial court’s assumption of
The Supreme Court held that the entire employment contracts were not declared null jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay [Chua Workers
and void but only the provision on salaries which excluded additional compensation Union (NLU) v. City Automotive Co., Et Al., G.R. No. L-11655, April 29, 1959;
for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays; that while the broad powers of Prisco v. CIR, ct al., G.R. No. L-13805, May 23, 1960] or for payment of additional
the CIR under Commonwealth Act 103 may have been curtailed by Republic Act compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work
875 limiting them to the four categories expressed therein, our jurisprudence has [Nassco v. Almin, Et Al., G.R. No. L-9055, November 28, 1958; Detective &
upheld the CIR’s assumption of jurisdiction over claims for night work; and that Protective Bureau, Inc. v. Felipe Guevara, Et Al., G.R. No. L-8738, May 31, 1957]
additional compensation for nighttime work is founded on public policy which but has also supported such court’s ruling that work performed at night should be
cannot be waived. paid more than work done at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the
worker’s regular hours of duty, he should also be paid additional compensation for
Petition dismissed and the decision and resolution appealed from are affirmed. overtime work. [Naric v. Naric Workers’ Union, Et Al., G.R. No. L-12075, May 29,
SYLLABUS 1959, citing Shell Co. v. National Labor Union, 81 Phil. 315]. Besides, to hold that
this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of the industrial court
to decide, would amount to a further curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; REVIEW ON CERTIORARI; an extent which may defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; SHOWING THEREOF IS THE ONLY labor.’ [Luis Recato Dy, Et. Al. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-17788, May 25, 1962]"
GROUND FOR REVERSAL OF FINDINGS OF COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — We do not find any grave abuse of discretion on 3. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; EMPLOYMENT
the part of the respondent court in its interpretation of the employment contract’s CONTRACT WAIVING ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR NIGHTTIME
WORK, VOID. — The "waiver rule" is not applicable in the case at bar. Additional
compensation for nighttime work is founded on public policy, hence the same cannot "II. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the claims of petitioners
be waived. (Article 6, Civil Code). On this matter, We believe that the respondent Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar.
court acted according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and should be sustained. "III. There is another action pending between the same parties, namely, Mercury
Drug Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que and Nardo Dayao.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE; QUALITY NOT
QUANTITY OF WITNESSES, PRIMORDIAL CONSIDERATION IN while on the other hand, the second alleges that this Court has no jurisdiction over
APPRAISAL OF EVIDENCE. — The third assignment of error is likewise without the acts complained of against the respondent union.
merit. The fact that only three of the private respondents testified in court does not
adversely affect the interests of the other respondents in the case. The ruling in "For reasons stated in the Order dated March 24, 1966, this Court resolved the
Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations (G.R. No. L-0213, May 27, 1957) has motions to dismiss, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
been abandoned in later rulings of this Court. In Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor
Union (PLASLU) v. Sy Indong Company Rice And Corn Mill (11 SCRA 277) We "1. Ground No. 1 of management’s motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit.
had occasion to re-examine the ruling in Dimayuga. We stated: ". . . This Court fully
agrees with the respondent that quality and not quantity of witnesses should be the "2. Its second ground was found meritorious and, accordingly Januario Referente and
primordial consideration in the appraisal of evidence. Oscar Echalar were dropped as party petitioners in this case.

DECISION "3. The third ground was denied, holding that there still exists the employer-
employee relationship between Nardo Dayao and the management.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
"4. With respect to the fourth ground, the Court held that on the basis of section 7-A
of C.A. No. 444, as amended by R.A. No. 1993, ‘it can be safely said that, counting
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Industrial backward the three (3) year prescriptive period from the date of the filing of the
Relations dated March 30, 1968 in Case No. 1926-V and the Resolution of the Court instant petition — March 20, 1964 — all of petitioners’ claims have not yet
en banc dated July 6, 1968 denying two separate motions for reconsideration filed by prescribed.’
petitioners and respondents.
"5. In so far as respondent union’s motion is concerned, the Court held that
The factual background of Case No. 1926-V is summarized by the respondent Court ‘petitioners’ cause of action against the respondent; Association should be dismissed
of Industrial Relations as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph without prejudice to the refiling of the same as an unfair labor practice case.’

"This is a verified petition dated March 17, 1964 which was subsequently amended "Only the respondent management moved to reconsider the Order of March 24, 1965
on July 31, 1964 filed by Nardo Dayao and 70 others against Mercury Drug Co., but the same was denied by the Court en banc in a resolution dated August 26, 1965.
Inc., and/or Mariano Que, President & General Manager, and Mercury Drug Co., Respondent submitted an answer to the amended petition which was subsequently
Inc., Employees Association praying, with respect to respondent corporation and its amended on January 6, 1966, containing some admissions and some denials of the
president and general manager: 1) payment of their unpaid back wages for work material averments of the amended petition. By way of affirmative and special
done on Sundays and legal holidays plus 26% additional compensation from date of defenses, respondents alleged that petitioners have no cause of action against
their employment up to June 30, 1962; 2) payment of extra compensation on work Mariano Que because their employer is respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc., an
done at night; 3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar to their existing corporation which has a separate and distinct personality from its
former positions with back salaries; and, as against the respondent union, for its incorporators, stockholders and/or officers, that the company being a service
disestablishment and the refund of all monies it had collected from petitioners. enterprise is excluded from the coverage of the Eight Hour Labor Law, as amended;
that no court has the power to set wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or other
"In separate motions, respondent management and respondent union move to conditions of employment to the extent of disregarding an agreement thereon
dismiss, the first on the ground that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph between the respondent company and the petitioners, and of fixing night differential
wages; that the petitioners were fully paid for services rendered under the terms and
"I. The petition states no cause of action. conditions of the individual contracts of employment; that the petition having been
verified by only three of the petitioners without showing that the others authorized Resolution dated July 6, 1968.
the inclusion of their names as petitioners does not confer jurisdiction to this Court;
that there is no employer-employee relationship between management and petitioner Petitioner Mercury Drug Company, Inc., assigned the following errors in this
Nardo Dayao and that his claim has been released and/or barred by another action; petition:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
and that petitioners’ claims accruing before March 20, 1961 have prescribed."
(Annex "P", pp. 110-112, rollo). I.RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN DECLARING THE CONTRACTS OF
EMPLOYMENT, EXHIBITS "A" AND "B", NULL AND VOID AS BEING
After hearing on the merits, the respondent court rendered its decision. The CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND IN SUSTAINING, ACCORDINGLY,
dispositive portion of the March 30, 1968 decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ CLAIMS FOR 25% SUNDAY AND LEGAL
HOLIDAY PREMIUMS BECAUSE SUCH DECLARATION AND AWARD ARE
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THUS INFRINGING UPON
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph THE CARDINAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER; AND ALSO BECAUSE THE
VALIDITY OF SAID CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT HAS NOT BEEN
"1. The claim of the petitioners for payment of backwages corresponding to the first RAISED.
four hours work rendered on every other Sunday and first four hours on legal II.RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN SUSTAINING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’
holidays should be denied for lack of merit. CLAIMS FOR NIGHTTIME WORK PREMIUMS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF
THE DECLARE POLICY ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FREEDOM
"2. Respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the sixty-nine EXPRESSED IN REPUBLIC ACT 875 AND THE EXPRESS PROHIBITION IN
(69) petitioners:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph SECTION 7 OF SAID STATUTE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WAIVER OF
SAID CLAIMS AND THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THEREON.
"(a) An additional sum equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries III.RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN MAKING AWARDS IN FAVOR OF THE
for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays during the period from March PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO NEITHER GAVE EVIDENCE NOR EVEN
20, 1961 up to June 30, 1962; and APPEARED TO SHOW THEIR INTEREST.

"(b) Another additional sum or premium equivalent to 25% of their respective basic Three issues are discussed by the petitioner in its first assignment of error. The first
or regular salaries for nighttime services rendered from March 20, 1961 up to June issue refers to its allegation that the respondent Court erred in declaring the contracts
30, 1962. of employment null and void and contrary to law. This allegation is premised upon
the following finding of the respondent court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. Petitioners’ petition to convert them to monthly employees should be, as it is
hereby, denied for lack of merit. "But the Court finds merit in the claim for the payment of additional compensation
for work done on Sundays and holidays. While an employer may compel his
"4. Respondent Mariano Que, being an officer and acted only as an agent in behalf of employees to perform service on such days, the law nevertheless imposes upon him
the respondent corporation, should be absolved from the money claims of herein the obligation to pay his employees at least 25% additional of their basic or regular
petitioners whose employer, according to the pleadings and evidence, is the Mercury salaries.
Drug Company, Inc.
"‘No person firm or corporation, business establishment or place of center of labor
"To expedite the computation of the money award, the Chief Court Examiner or his shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays
authorized representative is hereby directed to proceed to the office of the respondent unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular
corporation at Bambang Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the latter to make available to said remuneration. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That this prohibition shall not apply to
employee its records, like time records, payrolls and other pertinent papers, and public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity,
compute the money claims awarded in this decision and, upon the completion power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication.’ (Section 4 C.
thereof, to submit his report as soon as possible for further disposition of the A. No. 444) (Italics supplied)
Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Although a service enterprise, respondent company’s employees are within the
Not satisfied with the decision, the respondents filed a motion for its reconsideration. coverage of C. A. No. 444, as amended known as the Eight Hour Labor Law, for
The motion for reconsideration, was however, denied by the Court en banc in its they do not fall within the category or class employees or laborers excluded from its
provisions. (Section 2, ibid.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
8 Hours work on regular days and all special Holidays that may be declared but with
"The Court is not impressed by the argument that under the contracts of employment the 25 % additional compensation;
the petitioners are not entitled to such claim for the reason that the same are contrary
to law. Payment of extra or additional pay for services rendered during Sundays and 4 Hours work on every other Sundays of the month;.
legal holidays is mandated by law. Even assuming that the petitioners had agreed to
work on Sundays and legal holidays without any further consideration than their For any work performed in excess of the hours as above mentioned, yon shall be
monthly salaries, they are not barred nevertheless from claiming what is due them, paid 25 % additional compensation per hour.
because such agreement is contrary to public policy and is declared null and void by
law. This appointment may be terminated without notice for cause and without cause
upon thirty days written notice.
"‘Any agreement or contract between employer and the laborer or employee contrary
to the provisions of this Act shall be null and void ab initio.’ This supersedes your appointment of July 1, 1959.

"Under the cited statutory provision, the petitioners are justified to receive additional Very truly yours,
amount equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries for work done
on Sundays and legal holidays for the period from March 20, 1961 to June 30, 1962." MERCURY DRUG CO., INC.
(Decision, pp. 119-120, rollo)
(Sgd.) MARIANO QUE
From a perusal of the foregoing statements of the respondent court, it can be seen
readily that the petitioner-company based its arguments in its first assignment of General Manager
error on the wrong premise. The contracts of employment signed by the private
respondents are on a standard form, an example of which is that of private ACCEPTED WITH FULL CONFORMITY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
respondent Nardo Dayao quoted hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
(Sgd.) NARDO DAYAO’"
"Mercury Drug Co., Inc.
(EXH. "A" and "1")
1580 Bambang, Manila
(Decision, pp. 114-115, rollo)
October 30, 1959
These contracts were not declared by the respondent court null and void in their
Mr. Nardo Dayao entirety. The respondent court, on the basis of the conflicting evidence presented by
the parties, in effect: 1) rejected the theory of the petitioner company that the 25%
1015 Sta. Catalina additional compensation claimed by the private respondents for the four-hour work
they rendered during Sundays and legal holidays provided in their contracts of
Rizal Ave., Exten. employment were covered by the private respondents’ respective monthly salaries;
2) gave credence to private respondents’, (Nardo Dayao, Ernesto Talampas and
Dear Mr. Dayao:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Josias Federico) testimonies that the 25% additional compensation was not included
in the private respondents’ respective monthly salaries and 3) ruled that any
You are hereby appointed as Checker, in the Checking Department of MERCURY agreement in a contract of employment which would exclude the 25% additional
DRUG CO., INC., effective July 1, 1959 and you shall receive an annual compensation for work done during Sundays and holidays is null and void as
compensation the amount of Two Thousand four hundred pesos only P2,400.000, mandated by law.
that includes the additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays.
On the second issue, the petitioner-company reiterated its stand that under the
Your firm being a Service Enterprise, you will be required to perform work every respective contracts of employment the private respondents, the subject 25%
day in a year as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library additional compensation had already been included in the latter’s respective monthly
salaries. This contention is based on the testimony of its lone witness, Mr. Jacinto
Concepcion and pertinent exhibits. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Exhibit A shows that for the period of October 30, 1960, the annual compensation
of private respondent Nardo Dayao, including the additional compensation for the
work he renders during the first four (4) hours on every other Sunday and on the
eight (8) Legal Holidays at the time was P2,400.00 or P200.00 per month. These
amounts did not represent basic salary only, but they represented the basic daily
wage of Nardo Dayao considered to be in the amount of P7.36 x 305 ordinary
working days at the time or in the total amount of P2,144.80. So plus the amount of
P156.40 which is the equivalent of the Sunday and Legal Holiday rate at P9.20 basic
rate of P7.36 plus 25% thereof or P1.84) x 17, the latter figure representing 13
Sundays and 4 Legal Holidays of 8 hours each. . . .
x x x finding that the respondent court did not declare the contracts of employment null
"That the required minimum 25% Sunday and Legal Holiday additional
compensation was paid to and received by the employees for the work they rendered
on every other Sunday and on the eight Legal Holidays for the period October, 1959
to June 30, 1962 is further corroborated by Exhibits 5, 6, 8, 9 and 9-A and the
testimony of Mr. Jacinto Concepcion thereon." (Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 24, 27).
The aforesaid computations were not given credence by the respondent court. In fact
the same computations were not even mentioned in the court’s decision which shows
that the court found such computations incredible. The computations, supposedly
patterned after the WAS Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 of the Department Labor
demonstrated in Exhibits "6", "7", "8", "9", and "9-A", miserably failed to show the
exact and correct annual salary as stated in the respective contracts of employment of
the respondent employees. The figures arrived at in each case did not tally with the
annual salaries on the employees’ contracts of employment, the difference varying
from P1.20 to as much as P14.40 always against the interest of the employees. The
petitioner’s defense consists of mathematical computations made after the filing of
the case in order to explain a clear attempt to make its employees work without the
extra compensation provided by law on Sundays and legal holidays.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In not giving weight to the evidence of the petitioner-company, the respondent court
sustained the private respondents’ evidence to the effect that their 25% additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and Legal Holidays were not included in
their respective monthly salaries. The private respondents presented evidence
through the testimonies of Nardo Dayao, Ernesto Talampas, and Josias Federico who
are themselves among the employees who filed the case for unfair labor practice in
the respondent court and are private respondents herein. The petitioner-company’s
contention that the respondent court’s conclusion on the issue of the 25% additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and legal holidays during the first four
hours that the private respondents had to work under their respective contracts of
employment was not supported by substantial evidence is, therefore, unfounded.
Much less do We find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
court in its interpretation of the employment contract’s provision on salaries. In view
of the controlling doctrine that a grave abuse of discretion must be shown in order to
warrant our disturbing the findings of the respondent court, the reversal of the court’s
findings on this matter is unwarranted. (Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, 27
SCRA 490).
The last issue raised in the first assignment of error refers to a procedural matter. The
petitioner-company contends that the question as to whether or not the contracts of
employment were null and void was not put in issue, hence, the respondent court
pursuant to the Rules of Court should have refrained from the ruling that such
contracts of employment were null and void. In this connection We restate our
and void in their entirely. Only the objectionable features violative of law were
nullified. But even granting that the Court of Industrial Relations declared the
contracts of employment wholly void, it could do so notwithstanding the procedural
objection. In Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, this Court speaking
through then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stated:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x
"Moreover, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the statutory mandate that
respondent Court in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in the exercise of any of its duties or power is to act ‘according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence’
informing its mind ‘in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.’ Again, this
Court has invariably accorded the most hospitable scope to the breadth and
amplitude with which such provision is couched. So it has been from the earliest case
decided in 1939 to a 1967 decision."cralaw virtua1aw library
Two issues are raised in the second assignment of error by the petitioner-company.
The first hinges on the jurisdiction of the respondent court to award additional
compensation for nighttime work. Petitioner wants Us to re-examine Our rulings on
the question of nighttime work. It contends that the respondent court has no
jurisdiction to award additional compensation for nighttime work because of the
declared policy on freedom of collective bargaining expressed in Republic Act 875
and the express prohibition in Section 7 of the said statute. a re-examination of the
decisions on nighttime pay differential was the focus of attention in Rheem of the
Philippines, Inc. Et. Al. v. Ferrer, et al (19 SCRA 130). The earliest cases cited by
the petitioner-company, Naric v. Naric Workers Union, L-12075, May 29, 1959 and
Philippine Engineers’ Syndicate v. Bautista, L-16440, February 29, 1964, were
discussed lengthily. Thus —
x x x
"2. On the claim for night differentials, no extended discussion is necessary. To be
read as controlling here is Philippine Engineers’ Syndicate, Inc. v. Hon. Jose S.
Bautista, Et Al., L-16440, February 29, 1964, where this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, declared — disputes via the collective bargaining process; but We find no cogent reason for
"‘Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 875,
the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night
work. Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and
limited it to specific cases which this Court has defined as: ‘. . . (1) when the labor
dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so
certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec. 10, Republic Act 875); (2)
when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law
(Republic Act 602); (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour
Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444) and (4) when it involves an unfair labor
practice [Sec. 5 (a), Republic Act 875]’, [Paflu, Et. Al. v. Tan, Et Al., 52 Off. Gaz,
No. 13, 5836].
"Petitioner insists that respondents’ case falls in none of these categories because as
held in two previous cases, night work is not overtime but regular work; and that
respondent court’s authority to try the case cannot be implied from its ‘general
jurisdiction and broad powers’ under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act
875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations,
beyond which it is not permitted to act.
"We believe petitioner to be in error. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric
case [National Rice & Corn Corp. (NARIC) v. NARIC Workers’ Union, Et Al., G.R.
No. 12075, May 29, 1959] where we held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned
case, it does not intend to convey the idea that work done at night cannot also be an
overtime work. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the
Shell Company made upon its laborers is not merely overtime work but night work
and so there was need to differentiate night from daytime work. In fact, the company
contended that there was no law that required the payment of additional
compensation for night work unlike an overtime work which is covered by
Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Eight-Hour Labor Law). And this court in that case
said that while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional
compensation for night work, the industrial court has the power to determine the
wages that night workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. 103, and so
it justified the additional compensation in the Shell case for ‘hygienic, medical,
moral, cultural and sociological reasons.’"
x x x "There is no serious disagreement between the petitioners and respondent
True, in Paflu, Et. Al. v. Tan, Et Al., supra, and in a series of cases thereafter, We
held that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may
have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the four categories
therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial
concluding that a suit of this
nature — for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the
industrial court. Withal, the record does not show that the employer-employee
relation between the 64 respondents and the petitioner had ceased.
After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has not only upheld the industrial
court’s assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay
[Chua Workers Union (NLU) v. City Automotive Co., Et Al., G.R. No. L-11655,
April 29, 1959; Prisco v. CIR, Et Al., G.R. No. L-13806, May 23, 1960] or for
payment of additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and
for night work [Nassco v. Almin, Et Al., G.R. No. L-9055, November 28, 1958;
Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. v. Felipe Guevara, Et Al., G.R. No. L-8738,
May 31, 1957] but has also supported such court’s ruling that work performed at
night should be paid more than work done at daytime, and that if that work is done
beyond the worker’s regular hours of duty, he should also be paid additional
compensation for overtime work. [Naric v. Naric Workers’ Union, Et Al., G.R. No.
L-12075, May 29, 1959, citing shell Co. v. National Labor Union, 81 Phil. 315].
Besides, to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of
the industrial court to decides, would amount to a further curtailment of the
jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of the Magna
Carta to the prejudice of labor.’ [Luis Recato Dy, et al v. CIR, G.R. No. L-17788,
May 25, 1962]"
The petitioner-company’s arguments on the respondent court’s alleged lack of
jurisdiction over additional compensation for work done at night by the respondents
is without merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The other issue raised in the second assignment of error is premised on the
petitioner-company’s contention that the respondent court’s ruling on the additional
compensation for nighttime work is not supported by substantial evidence.
This contention is untenable. Pertinent portions of the respondent court’s decision
read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
management on the facts recited above. The variance in the evidence is only with
respect to the money claims. Witnesses for petitioners declared they worked on
regular days and on every other Sunday and also during all holidays; that for services
rendered on Sundays and holidays they were not paid for the first four (4) hours and
what they only received was the overtime compensation corresponding to the
number of hours after or in excess of the first fort hours; and that such payment is
being indicated in the overtime pay for work done in excess of eight hours on regular
working days. It is also claimed that their nighttime services could well be seen on
their respective daily time records. . . . (Emphasis supplied) (p. 116, rollo)
The respondent court’s ruling on additional compensation for work done at night is,
therefore, not without evidence. Moreover, the petitioner-company did not deny that
the private respondents rendered nighttime work. In fact, no additional evidence was
necessary to prove that the private respondents were entitled to additional
compensation for whether or not they were entitled to the same is a question of law
which the respondent court answered correctly. The "waiver rule" is not applicable in
the case at bar. Additional compensation for nighttime work is founded on public
policy, hence the same cannot be waived. (Article 6, Civil Code). On this matter, We
believe that the respondent court acted according to justice and equity and the
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
should be sustained.
The third assignment of error is likewise without merit. The fat that only three of the
private respondents testified in court foes not adversely affect the interests of the
other respondents in the case. The ruling in Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial
Relations (G.R. No. L-0213, May 27, 1957) has been abandoned in later rulings of
this Court. IN Philippine Land-Air-Sea labor Union (PLASLU) v. Sy Indong
Company Rice And Corn Mill (11 SCRA 277) We had occasion to re-examine the
ruling in Dimayuga. We stated:chanrobles law library : red
"The latter reversed the decision of the trial Judge as regards the reinstatement with
backwages of . . . upon the theory that this is not a class suit; that, ‘consequently, it is
necessary and imperative that they should personally testify and prove the charges in
the complaint’, and that, having failed to do so, the decision of the trial Judge in their
favor is untenable under the rule laid down in Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-0213 (May 27, 1957).
"We do not share the view taken in the resolution appealed from. As the trial Judge
correctly said, in his dissent from said resolution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x policy.cralawnad
In the case of Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, this Court
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To the reproach against the challenged order in the brief of petitioners in view of
only two of the seven claimants testifying, a statement by this Court in Ormoc Sugar
Co., Inc. v. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union would suffice by way of
refutation. Thus: ‘This Court fully agrees with the respondent that quality and not
quantity of witnesses should be the primordial consideration in the appraisal of
evidence.’ Barely eight days later, in another decision, the above statement was
given concrete expression. Thus: ‘The bases of the awards were not only the
respective affidavits of the claimants but the testimonies of 24 witnesses (because 6
were not given credence by the court below) who identified the said 239 claimants.
The contention of petitioners on this point is therefore unfounded’. Moreover in
Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) v. Sy Indong Company Rice &
Corn Mill, this Court, through the present Chief Justice, rejected as untenable the
theory of the Court of Industrial Relations concerning the imperative needs of all the
claimants to testify personally and prove their charges in the complaint. As tersely
put: ‘We do not share the view taken in the resolution appealed from."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The petitioner’s contention that its employees fully understood what they signed
when they entered into the contracts of employment and that they should be bound
by their voluntary commitment’s is anachronistic in this time and age.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
The Mercury Drug Co., Inc., maintains a chain of drugstores that are open every day
of the week and, for some stores, up to very late at night because of the nature of the
pharmaceutical retail business. The respondents knew that they had to work Sundays
and holidays and at night, not as exceptions to the rule but a part of the regular
course of employment. Presented with contracts setting their compensation on an
annual basis with an express waiver of extra compensation for work on Sundays and
holidays, the workers did not have much choice. The private respondents were at a
disadvantage insofar as the contractual relationship was concerned. Workers in our
country do not have the luxury or freedom of declining job openings or filing
resignations even when some terms and conditions of employment are not only
onerous and inequitous but illegal. It is precisely because of this situation that the
framers of the Constitution embodied the provisions on social justice (Section 6,
Article II) and protection to labor (Section 9, Article II) in the Declaration of
Principles And State Policies.
It is pursuant to these constitutional mandates that the courts are ever vigilant to
protect the rights of workers who are places in contractually disadvantageous
positions and who sign waivers or provisions contrary to law and public
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The decision and resolution
appealed from are affirmed with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

NIGHT SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL (ARTICLE 86, LABOR CODE)
G.R. No. L-1309 July 26, 1948
THE SHELL COMPANY OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LIMITED, recurrente,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, recurrida.
Sres. Ross, Selph, Carrascoso y Janda en representacion de la recurrente.
Sres. Paguia y Villanueva en representacion de la recurrida.
BRIONES, J.:
Actuando sobre una peticion de la entidad obrera llamada "National Labor Union," la
Corte de Relaciones Industriales ha dictado una decision en la que, entre otras cosas,
se obliga a la firma petrolera "The Shell Company of Philippine Islands, Limited" a
pagar a sus obreros que trabajan de noche (desde que se pone el sol hasta que se
levanta al dia siguiente) una compensacion adicional de 50% sobre sus salarios
regulares si trabajasen de dia. Parece que la comania tiene necesidad del servicio
nocturno de un determinado numero de obreros, pues los aviones procedentes del
extranjero suelen aterrizar y despegarse de noche, siendo por esto necesario el que se
hagan faenas de noche para el suministro de gasolina y lubricantes, y para otros
menesteres. La compania petrolera se ha excepcionado contra dicha decision de ahi
el presente recurso de certiorari para que la revoquemos.
La compania recurrente alega y arguye que no solo no existe ninguna disposicion
legal que faculte a la Corte de Relaciones Industriales para ordenar el pago de
compensacion adicional a obreros que trabajan de noche, sino que, por el contrario,
la ley del Commonwealth No. 444 exime al patrono de semejante obligacion toda
vez que en dicha ley se proveen los casos en que es compulsorio el pago de
"overtime" (compensacion adicional), y entre tales casos no figura el trabajo de
noche.
Por su parte, la union obrera recurrida sostiene que la facultad que se discute forma
parte de los poderes amplios y efectivos que la ley del Commonwealth No. 103 — la
carta organica del Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales — otorga a dicho tribunal; y
que la ley No. 444 del Commonwealth que se invoca no tiene ninguna aplication al
presente caso, pues la misma es de alcance forzosamente limitado, refiriendose
particular y exclusivamente a la jornada maxima de trabajo contidiano permitida en
los establecimientos industriales — la jornada de 8 horas.
Nuestra conclusion es que la union obrera recurrida tiene la razon de su parte. Para
una clara y cabal elucidacion de los puntos discutidos, estmamos conveniente, aun a
riesgo de alargar esta ponencia, transcribir lasdisposiciones legales pertinentes que
son los articulos 1, 4 y 13 de la ley del Commonwealth No. 103. Helas aqui:
SECTION 1. The Judge: his appointment, qualifications, compensation, tenure. —
There is hereby created a Court of Industrial Relations, which shall have jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter, controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the
relation between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of this Act.
The Court shall keep a record of all its proceedings and shall be presided over by a
Judge to be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. The Judge of the Court
shall hold office during good behavior until he reaches the age of seventy years, or
becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office. His qualifications shall
be the same as those provided in the Constitution for members of the Supreme Court
and he shall receive an annual compensation of ten thousand pesos and shall be
entitled to traveling expenses and per diems when performing official duties outside
of the City of Manila. The Department of Justice shall have executive supervision
over the Court.
SEC. 4. Strikes and lockouts. — The Court shall take cognizance for purpose of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising form differences as
regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural
dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor, or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and
proper to be dealt with by the Court for the sake of public interest. In all such cases,
the Secretary of Labor or the party or parties submitting the disputes, shall clearly
and specifically state in writing the questions to be decided. Upon the submission of
such a controversy or question by the Secretary of Labor, his intervention therein as
authorized by law, shall cease.
The Court shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. If any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute is arrived at
by the parties, a memorandum of its terms shall be made in writing, signed and
acknowledged by the parties thereto before the Judge of the Court or any official
acting in his behalf and authorized to administer oaths or acknowledgments, or,
before a notary public. The memorandum shall be filed in the office of the Clerk of
the Court, and, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, shall, as between the parties to
the agreement, have the same effect as, and be deemed to be, a decision or award.
SEC. 13. Character of the award. — In making an award, order or decision, under
the provisions of section four of this Act, the Court shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which my be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of setting
the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
Resulta evidente de las disposiciones transcritas lo siguiente: (a) que cuando surge
una disputa entre el principal y el empleado u obrero, vgr. sobre cuestion de salarios,
la Corte de Relaciones Industriales tiene jurisdiccion en todo el territorio de Filipinas
para considerar, investigar y resolver dicha disputa, fijando los salarios que estime
justos y razonables; (b) que para los efectos de prevencion, arbitraje, decision y
arreglo, el mismo Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales tien igualmente jurisdiccion
para conocer de cualquier disputa — industrial o agricola — resultante de
cualesquier diferencias respecto de los salarios, participaciones o compensaciones,
horas de trabajo, condiciones del empleo o de la aparceria entre los patronos y los
empleados u obreros y entre los propietarios y los terratenientes u obreros agricolas
previo el cumplimiento de ciertos requisitos y condiciones, cuando se viere que dicha
disputa ocasiona o puede ocasionar una huelga; (c) que en el ejercicio de sus
facultades arriba especificadas, el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales no queda
limitado, al decidir la disputa, a conceder el remedio o remedios solicitados por las
partes en la controversia, sino que puede incluir en la orden or decision cualquier
materia o determinacion para el proposito de arreglar la disputa o de prevenir
ulteriores controversias industriales o agricolas.
En el caso nos ocupa existe indudablemente una dispunta industrial. Mientras la
empresa, la compania Shell, no esta dispuesta a pagar a sus obreros de noche
mayores salarios que los obreros de ida, la "NationalLabor Union", a la cual estan
afiliados los trabajadoresde la Shell, reclama otro tipo de salarios para el servicio
nocturno — un 50% mas. En esto consiste la disputa, el litigio industrial. Ahora bien:
¿que ha hecho la Corte de Relaciones Industriales, despues de sometido el conflicto a
su jurisdiccion? Pues precisamente lo que manda la citada ley No. 103 del
Commonwealth, carta organica de su creacion y funcionamiento, a saber: considerar,
investigar y enjuiciar la disputa, resolviedola despues en el sentido en que la ha
resuelto, es decir, remunerando el trabajo de noche con un 50% mas de los salarios
de dia. Y esto es perfectamente legal tanto dentro del alcance del articulo 1 de la
referida ley No. 103 que faculta a la Corte de Relaciones Industriales para decidir
cualquier disputa sobre salarios y compensaciones en la forma que estime razonable
y conveniente, como dentro del marco del articulo 4 de la misma ley que autoriza a
dicho tribunal para enjuiciar y decidir cualquier pleito o controversia industrial o
agricola determine el estallido de una huelga o tienda a causarla. Mas todavia: lo
hecho por el Trbunal de Relaciones Industriales en el presente caso es asimismo
legal dentro del marco del articulo 13 de la misma ley No. 103, articulo que, como
queda visto, no solo faculta a dicho tribunal a conceder el remedio que recabanlas
partes, sino inclusive a ir mas alla, esto es, a otorgar remedios no expresamente
solicitados, siempre que los mismos se encamienen a resolver de una vez la disputa o
a prevenir el estallido de ulteriores disputas o huelgas.
Es evidente que con estos amplios poderes el Estadose ha propuesto equipar al
Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales hasta el maximum posible de utilidad y eficacia,
haciendo del mismo no una simple agencia academica, sino verdaderamente activa,
dinamica y eficiente — en una palabra, la maquinaria oficial por excelencia en la
formidable y espinosa tarea de resolver los conflictos industriales, yagricolas de
cierta clase, previniendo y evitando de esta manera esos paros y huelgas que tanto
afligen y danan no solo a las empresas y a los obreros, sino, en general, a toda la
comunidad. En su opinion concurrente dictada en el caso autoritativo de Ang Tibay
contra Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales1 (R.G. No. 46496), el Magistado Laurel
ha expresado muy acertadamente la idea fundamental que subraya la creacion de
dicho tribunal, con el siguiente pronunciamiento:
In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and by it, our government no longer performs the
role of mere mediator or intervenor but that of supreme arbiter. (Las cursivas son
nuestras.).
La recurrente arguye, sin embargo, que si bien es verdad que en caso de disputa el
Tribunal de relaciiones Industriales tiene, en virtud de su ley organica, el poder de
fijar los salarios, tal poder no es absoluto, sino que esta sujeto a ciertas restricciones
y cortapizas, provistas en la ley comunmente conocida por ley sobre la jornada de
ocho horas, la ley del Commonwealth No. 444, cuyos articulos pertinentes se
transacriben integramente a continuacion:
SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of
not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during
which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest
completely shall not be counted.
SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or
impending emergencies caused by serious accidents, fire, flood, typhoon,
earthquake, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss to life and
property or imminent danger to public safety; or in case urgent work to be performed
on the machines, equipment, or installations in order to avoid a serious loss which
the employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar nature;
but in all such cases the laborers and employees shall be entitled to receive
compensation for the overtime work performed at the same rate as their regular
wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional.
In case of national emergency the government is empowered to establish rules and
regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to
be paid the laborers.
SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of
labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal
holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his
regular remuneration: Provided however, That this prohibition shall not apply to
public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity,
power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication.
Como quiera — argumentanlos abogados de la recurrente — que en estos articulos
se especifican los casos en que se autoriza el pago de compensacion extra o adicional
y son solo, a saber: (a) en caso de "overtime" o trabajo en exceso de las horas
regulares por razones imperiosasde urgencia con motivo de algun desastre o
accidente, o para evitar perdidas o repararlas; (b) en caso de trabajo por los domingos
y fiestas; (c) en caso de emergencia, y nada hay que se refiera al trabajo de noche;
luego la orden de que se trata es ilegal, pues no esta autorizada por la ley. "In the
absence — recalcan los abogados de la recurrente — legislation authorizing the
payment of extra compensation for work done at night, the Court of Industrial
Relations ha no power or authority to order the petitioner company to pay extra
compensation for work done by its laborers at night. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where, as inthe case at bar, statute expressly specifies the cases where
payment of extra compensation may be demanded, extra compensation may be
allowed in those cases only, and in no others. The provisions of the Commonwealth
Act No. 444 cannot be enlarged by implication or otherwise. Expressum facit cessare
tacitum.
La argumentacion es erronea. La Ley No. 444 no es aplicable al presente caso,
siendo evidente que la misma tiene un objeto especifico, a saber: (a) fijar en 8 horas
la jornada maxima de trabajo; (b) senalar ciertos casos excepcionales en que se
puede autorizar el trabajo fuera de dicha jornada; (c) proveer un sobresueldo, que no
debe ser menor de 25% del salario regular, para el "overtime" o trabajo en exceso de
las 8 horas.
En el caso de Manila Electric, solicitante-apelante, contra The Public Utities
Employees' Association,2 apelada, L-1206 (45 Off. Gaz., 1760), esta Corte ha
declarado que la facultad conferida por el articulo 1 de la ley del Commonwealth No.
103 al Tribunal de relaciones Industriales para enjuciar y decidir pleitos y
controversias industriales entre el capital y el trabajo, que incluye la de fijar salarios
y compnsaciones de empleados y obreros, ha quedado restringida por el articulo 4 de
la ley Commonwealth No. 444, que al mismo tiempo que limita a un 25% del salario
o compensacion regular del obrero el minimum de la compensacion adicional que el
tribunal puede conceder por trabajos en los Domingos y fiestas oficiales, exime del
pago de dicha compensacion adicional a las entidades de utilidad publica que prestan
algun servicio publico, como las que suministran gas, electricidad, fuerza mortriz,
agua, o proveen medios de transporte o communicacion. Tal restriccion viene a ser
una excepcion de la facultad general del tribunal para fijar, en casos de disputa, los
salarios y compensaciones que deben pagar los patronos a los empleados y obreros; y
como quiera que dicho articulo 4 se refiere solamente a salario o compensacion por
trabajos durante los dias de Domingo y fiestas oficiales, es obvio que no puede
referirse a salario o compensacion adicional por trabajos fuera de lajornada de ocho
horas que generalmente se realizan desde primeras horas de la manana a ultimas
horas de la tarde, pues una cosa es trabajar en dias de Domingo y fiestas oficiales, y
otra cosa bien distinta es trabajar de noche of fuera de la jornada de ocho horas en
dias laborables. Aplicando la maxima legal "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," se
puede sostener, sin temor de equivocarse, que una ley que provee una excepcion
especifica a sus disposiciones generales, como la compensacion adicional por
trabajos en dias de Domingo y fiestas oficiales, excluye cualquiera otra, como la
compensacion adicional por trabajos de noche en dias laborables."Another case in
which this maxim may almost invariably by followed is that of statute which makes
certain specific exceptions to its general provisions. Here wemay safely assume that
all other exceptions were intended to be excluded." (Wabash R. Co.vs. United States,
178 Fed., 5, 101 C. C. A. 133; Cella Commision Co. vs. Bohlinger, 147 Fed., 419; 78
C. C. A. 467; Kunkalman vs. Gibson, 171 Ind., 503; 84 N.E. 985; Hering vs.
Clement, 133 App. Div., 293; 117 N.Y., Supp. 747.).
El trabajo denoche que la compania Shell exige de sus obreros no es talmente un
"overtime", en el sentido en que se emplea esta palabra en la Le No. 444, sino que es
una jornada completa de trabajo, tambien de 8 horas: solo que, en vez de realizarse
de dia, se hace de noche. Dicho en otras palabras, el trabajo de noche de que aqui se
trata no es solamente unexceso, prolongacion u "overtime" del trabajo regular de dia,
sino que es otro tipo de trabajo, absolutamente independiente de la jornada diurna.
Por eso hay dos turnos: el turno de obreros que trabajan de dia; y el turno de los que
trabajan de noche. Asi que no es extrano que el legislador no haya incluido este tipo
de trabajo entre los casos de "overtime" senalados en la referida ley No. 444.
La cuestion que, a nuestro juicio, se debe determinar es si entre las facultades
generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin dipusta, esta
la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo; la de
estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia; y consiguientemente, la de
proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos.
Nuestra contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes
generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. Si este tribunal tiene, en casos de
disputa, el poder de fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el trabajo de
dia, no hay razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios
de noche; es tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro. Y con respecto ala apreciacion de que
el trabajo de noche es mas pesado y oneroso que el de dia y, por tanto, merece mayor
remuneracion, tampoco hay motivospara revocarla o alterarla. No hay argumento
posible contra el hecho universal de que el trabajo regular, normal y ordinario es el
de dia, y que el trabajo de noche es muy exceptional y justificado solo por ciertos
motivos imperativamente inevitables. Por algo la humanidad ha trabajadosiempre de
dia.
Razones de higiene, de medicina, de moral, de cultura, de sociologia, establecen de
consuno que el trabajo de nocho tiene muchos inconvenientes, y cuando no hay mas
remedio que hacerlo es solo justo que se remunero mejor que de ordinario para
resarcir hasa cierto punto al obrero de tales inconvenientes. Es indudable que el
trabajo de noche no solo a la larga afecta a la salud del trabajador, sino que le priva a
este de ciertas cosas que hacen relativamente agradable la vida, como, vgr., un
reposo completo e ininterrumpido y ciertos ratos de solaz, ocio o expansion espiritual
y cultural que podria tener al terminar el trabajo por la tarde y durante las primeras
horas de la noche. Se dice que el obrero puede descansar de dia despues de haber
trabajado toda la noche; pero puede acaso el reposo de dia dar al cuerpo aquel tonico
y aquel efecto reparador completo que solo puede proporcionar el reposo natural de
noche? Se dice tambien que algunos prefieren trabajar de noche bajo nuestro clima
abrasador, evitando asi el calor del dia. Mucho tememos, sin embargo, que esto sea
mejor hablado que praticado. Creemos que desde tiempo inmemorial la regla
universal es que el hombre trabja de noche mas por necesidad irremediable que por
placentera conveniencia.
A la opinion vulgar, universal, hay que sumar la opinionpericial, el criterio
especialista. La opinion de los tratadistas y expertos milita decididamente en favor de
la tesis de que el trabajo de noche es mas duro y oneroso que el trabajo de dia,
considerandose por esto con marcada repugnancia y compeliendo consiguientemente
a las gerencias capitalisticas a establecer una escala mas alta de salarios como
incentivo a los obreros para aceptarlo. Se podrian citar virias autoridades, pero para
no extender demasiado esta ponencia optamos por transcriber solamente algunas, a
saber:
. . . Then, it must be remembered that it is distinctly unphysiological to turn the night
into day and deprive the body of the beneficial effects of sunshine. The human
organism revolts against this procedure. Added to artificial lighting are reversed and
unnatural times of eating, resting, and sleeping. Much of the inferiority of nightwork
can doubtless be traced to the failure of the workers to secure proper rest and sleep,
by day. Because of inability or the lack of opportunity to sleep, nightworkers often
spend their days in performing domestic duties, joining the family in the midday
meal, 'tinkering about the place', watching the baseball game, attending the theater or
taking a ride in the car. It is not strange that nightworkers tend to be less efficient
than dayworkers and lose more time. . . (The Management of Labor Relations, by
Watkins & Dodd, page 524.).
Nightwork. — Nightwork has gained a measure of prominence in the modern
industrial system in connection with continuous industries, that is, industries in
which the nature of the processes makes it necessary to keep machinery and
equipment in constant operation. Even in continuous industries the tendency is
definitely in the direction of FOUR shifts of 6 hours each, with provision for an
automatic change of shift for all workers at stated intervals. Some discussion has
taken place with regard to the lengths of the period any workers should be allowed to
remain on the night shift. A weekly change of shifts is common, specially where
three or four shifts are in operation; in other cases the change is made fortnightly or
monthly; in still other instances, no alternation is provided for, the workers
remaining on day — or nightwork permanently, except where temporary changes are
made for individual convenience.
There is sharp difference of opinion concerning the relative merits of these systems.
Advocates of the weekly change of shifts contend that the strain of nightwork and
the difficulty of getting adequate sleep during the day make it unwise for workers to
remain on the"graveyard" shift for more than a week at a time. Opponents urge that
repeated changes make it more difficult to settle down to either kind of shift and that
after the first week nightwork becomes less trying while the ability to sleep by day
increases. Workers themselves react in various ways to the different systems. This
much, however, is certain: Few persons react favorably to nightwork, whether the
shift be continuous or alternating. Outside of continuous industries, nightwork can
scarcely be justified, and, even in these, it presents serious disadvantages which must
be recognized in planing for industrial efficiency, stabilization of the working force,
the promotion of industrial good-will, and the conservation of the health and vitality
of the workers.
Nightwork cannot be regarded as desirable, either from the point of view of the
employer or of the wage earner. It is uneconomical unless overhead costs are
unusually heavy. Frequently the scale of wages is higher as an inducement to
employees to accept employment on the night shift, and the rate of production is
generally lower. (Management of Labor Relations, by Watkins & Dodd, pp. 522-
524; emphasis ours.)
. . . The lack of sunlight tends to produce anemia and tuberculosis and to predispose
to other ills. Nightwork brings increased liability to eyestrain and accident. Serious
moral dangers also are likely to result from the necessity of traveling the streets
alone at night, and from the interference with normal home life. From an economic
point of view, moreover, the investigations showed that nightwork was unprofitable,
being inferior to day work both in quality and in quantity. Wherever it had been
abolished, in the long run the efficiency both of the management and of the workers
was raised. Furthermore, it was found that nightwork laws are a valuable aid in
enforcing acts fixing the maximum period of employment. (Principles of Labor
Legislation, by Commons and Andrews, 4th Revised Edition, p. 142.)
Special regulation of nightwork for adult men is a comparatively recent
development. Some European countries have adopted laws placing special
limitations on hours of nightwork for men, and others prohibit such work except in
continuous processes. (Principles of Labor legislation, 4th Revised Edition by
Common & Andrews, p. 147.)
Nightwork has almost invariably been looked upon with disfavor by students of the
problem because of the excessive strain involved, especially for women and young
persons, the large amount of lost time consequent upon exhaustion of the workers,
the additional strain and responsibility upon the executive staff, the tendency of
excessively fatigued workers to "keep going" on artificial stimulants, the general
curtailment of time for rest, leisure, and cultural improvement, and the fact that night
workers, although precluded to an extent from the activities of day life, do attempt to
enter into these activities, with resultant impairment of physical well-being. It is not
contended, of course, that nightwork could be abolished in the continuous-process
industries, but it is possible to put such industries upon a three- or four-shifts basis,
and to prohibit nightwork for women and children. (Labor's Progress and Problems,
Vol. I, p. 464, by Professors Millis and Montgomery.)
Nightwork. — Civilized peoples are beginning to recognize the fact that except in
cases of necessity or in periods of great emergency, nightwork is socially
undesirable. Under our modern industrial system, however, nightwork has greatly
aided the production of commodities, and has offered a significant method of cutting
down the ever-increasing overhead costs of industry. This result has led employers to
believe that such work is necessary and profitable. Here again one meets a conflict of
economic and social interests. Under these circumstances it is necessary to discover
whether nightwork has deleterious effects upon the health of laborers and tends to
reduce the ultimate supply of efficient labor. If it can proved that nightwork affects
adversely both the quality and quantity of productive labor, its discontinuance will
undoubtedly be sanctioned by employers. From a social point of view, even a
relatively high degree of efficiency in night operations must be forfeited if it is
purchased with rapid exhaustion of the health and energy of the workers. From an
economic point of view, nightwork may be necessary if the employer is to meet the
demand for his product, or if he is to maintain his market in the face of increasing
competition or mounting variable production costs.
Industrial experience has shown that the possession of extra-ordinary physical
strength and self-control facilitates the reversal of the ordinary routine of day work
and night rest, with the little or no unfavorable effect on health and efficiency.
Unusual vitality and self-control, however, are not common possessions. It has been
found that the most serious obstacle to a reversal of the routine is the lack of self-
discipline. Many night workers enter into the numerous activities of day life that
preclude sleep, and continue to attempt to do their work at night. Evidence gathered
by the British Health of Munition Workers' Committee places permanent night
workers, whether judged on the basis of output or loss of time, in a very unfavorable
positions as compared with day workers.
worker's failure to secure proper amounts of sleep and rest during the day. The
system of continuous shifts, especially for women, is regarded by all investigators as
undesirable. Women on continuous nightwork are likely to perform domestic duties,
and this added strain undoubtedly accounts for the poorer results of their industrial
activities. The tendency to devote to amusement and other things the time that should
be spent in rest and sleep is certainly as common among men as among women
workers and accounts largely for the loss of efficiency and time on the part of both
sexes in nightwork.
The case against nightwork, then, may be said to rest upon several grounds. In the
first place, there are the remotely injurious effects of permanent nightwork
manifested in the later years of the worker's life. Of more immediate importance to
the average worker is the disarrangement of his social life, including the recreational
activities of his leisure hours and the ordinary associations of normal family
relations. From an economic point of view, nightwork is to be discouraged because
of its adverse effect upon efficiency and output. A moral argument against nightwork
in the case of women is that the night shift forces the workers to go to and from the
factory in darkness. Recent experiences of industrial nations have added much to the
evidence against the continuation of nightwork, except in extraordinary
circumstances and unavoidable emergencies. The immediate prohibition of
nightwork for all laborers is hardly practicable; its discontinuance in the case of
women employees is unquestionably desirable. 'The night was made for rest and
sleep and not for work' is a common saying among wage-earning people, and many
of them dream of an industrial order in which there will be no night shift. (Labor
Problems, 3rd Edition, pp. 325-328, by Watkins & Dodd.).

Systems of nightwork differ. There is the continuous system, in which employees

labor by night and do not attend the establishment at all by day, and the
discontinuous system, in which the workers change to the day turn at regular
intervals, usually every other week. There are, of course, minor variations in these
systems, depending upon the nature of the industry and the wishes of management.
Such bodies as the British Health Munition Workers' Committee have given us
valuable conclusions concerning the effect of nightwork. Continuous nightwork is
definitely less productive than the discontinuous system. The output of the
continuous day shift does not make up for this loss in production.

There is, moreover, a marked difference between the rates of output of night and day
shifts on the discontinuous plan. In each case investigated the inferiority of night
labor was definitely established. This inferiority is evidently the result of the night