UNIT III

ENGINEERING AS SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION

Syllabus: Engineering as experimentation– Similarities to standard experiments, learning from the past and
knowledge gained. Engineers as Responsible Experimenters – Conscientiousness, moral autonomy and
accountability. The challenger case, codes of ethics and limitations. Industrial standards, problems with the law of
Engineering.

INTRODUCTION:

Engineering is everywhere:

• Almost everything you eat, wear, use and like to do involves engineering.
• From everyday things like your mobile, computer and clothes to medicine, space, national security
and renewable energy.
• To tackling climate change, providing clean drinking water or ensuring sustainable food supplies.
What is engineering?

Designing and implementing things that have not previously existed, and that directly or indirectly serve
society or some element of society. Engineering’s about…

 Finding out what people need, developing an idea and seeing how it can be made at a good price.
 Developing the ‘product’ on time and running tests to make sure it’s safe and reliable.
 Producing something that makes our lives better… whether that’s a new games console, high-tech
sports equipment or quicker, greener and safer travel.

Difference between Scientist and Engineer:

Scientist and engineer are two types of professions which contribute to the society in terms of knowledge.

S.NO SCIENTIST ENGINEER

1. Develop theories to understand Apply that knowledge to solve real world

the nature. problems.
2. Belong to academic category. Belong to the professional category.
Mathematics is the key tool and language but
3. Mathematics is the key tool and
use of more approximations and empirical
language.
methods than scientists.
4. Concern on research and results. Concern more on design and optimization.
5. Discover the world that exists. Create the world that never was!

ENGINEERING AS EXPERIMENTATION:
 Experimentation plays a significant role in design processes. From a basic concept to a rough design
preliminary tests or simulations are carried out at various stages, till finished product comes out.
 Usually design process is iterative type i.e. carried out on trial design with modification on the basis
of feedback received at various stages.
  Engineering should be viewed as an experimental process. This experiment is not conducted in a
laboratory under controlled conditions. It is an experiment conducted on a social scale involving
humans.
 An Engineering project is started with only partial knowledge of scientific laws about nature and
society. Hence, Engineering projects are experiments that involve technology development and
humans.
SIMILARITIES TO STANDARD EXPERIMENTS:

Engineering is considered as social experimentation because of various features. The various features
of engineering experiments are:

a) Partial ignorance
 Partial ignorance cases while any project is carried out are as follows
a) The abstract model is used so design calculations should be done carefully
b) Purchased material is not having Precise characteristics (accurate or error free)
c) Purchase of Low quality Material
d) Aging of components is not observed properly
e) Testing phase not done properly due to carelessness
f) Pressure to complete the work on time
 An engineer must not wait until all the relevant facts to, come before experimentation.
 Also theoretical exploration and lab-testing must be done at various stages once the project gets
started.
 Sometimes they have to be avoided for the sake of moving ahead on a project.
 The success of engineer lies in the ability to complete to tasks with partial knowledge of scientific
laws about society and nature.
b) Final outcomes of Project

 The final outcomes of engineering projects are generally uncertain. [E.g. Tried for something and
invented new thing, accidental inventions etc.]
 Sometimes it is not even known what the possible outcomes are.
 A few times unintended risks, side effects and unsafe operation occurs.
 Accidently, some inventions may be harmful to the society or the experimenter also.
For example,
 Harmful radiations or pollutants from nuclear reactor.
 A reservoir may not serve its intended purpose if the dam leaks or breaks
 Plastic, Potato Wafers, Corn Flakes, Microwave oven, Hair dryer, X-Ray, Atomic bomb etc.
Few More Examples in detail:
Atomic Bomb: (Harmful to society or the experimenter also)

• The atomic bomb was invented during World War II in the famous Manhattan Project led by
scientist Robert Oppenheimer. It was first tested on July 16, 1945 in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The
blast was so bright, a blind girl 120 miles away claimed to see it, and it caused a mushroom cloud
of radioactive vapor to hover at 30,000 feet. This ushered in the Atomic Age, and led to the
 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a month later, killing 66,000 and 39,000 respectively. The
nuclear fallout of the blasts led to radiation poisoning, illness, disease, and leukemia in many
survivors. The atomic bomb has only been used these two times, so far at least. Hopefully the
world will keep it that way.

Dynamite:

 Gunpowder and nitroglycerin have been around for ages. The issue however, especially in the case
of nitroglycerin, was its instability. It wasn’t until Alfred Nobel accidentally discovered a method of
containing the substance without hindering its power that people could really start having a blast.

Rustless Steel: (Many failures but finally one failure resulted success)

• Throughout the ages, metallurgists attempted to add other elements to steel to prevent rusting,
until 1912, when a metallurgist named Harry Brearly from the English city of Sheffield tried to come
up with a better gun.
• Brearly sought to develop a steel alloy that would resist erosion. He failed. Again and again. And his
heap of steel scraps grew bigger and bigger.
• After several months of trying and failing, Brearly noticed that one of his failures had retained its
luster, while the others had rusted.
• The sample contained about 12 percent chromium, which had reacted with the oxygen in the air to
form a thin, protective film. Even when it was scratched, the film would quickly restore itself.
Brearly called his invention "Rustless steel."
D.D.T. (Accidently discovered but having side-effects)

• Invented as a simple pesticide, DDT (also known by its chemical name

dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) was first synthesized in 1874.
• Its properties as a pesticide were not discovered until 1939, from which time it was used all over
the world to control and wipe out insect populations. It was discovered, however, that all of this
DDT had a detrimental environmental effect, harming wildlife and causing cancer in humans.
• The United States banned the use of DDT in 1972, and some say that’s why the bald eagle has
made a comeback from near-extinction. However, it is still used in India and North Korea.
c) Knowledge about product

 The effective engineering relies upon knowledge gained about products for improving current
products and creating better ones.
 The success depends on gaining new knowledge and monitoring.
 To monitor means to make periodic observations and tests in order to check for both successful
performance and undesired side effects.
 Monitoring is not restricted to in house development during testing phases. In an engineering
project analysis correct lessons are to be learned.
LEARNING FROM THE PAST:

 Usually, for success, Engineers should learn not only from their own result but also from other
engineer's results.
  But because of Lack of established communication channels, misplaced pride in not asking for
information, fear of litigation and simply negligence usually impede the flow of information and
leads to repetitive mistakes.
 Engineer's should not always rely on handbooks alone but should remain alert and informed at
every stage of project or experimentation.

KNOWLEDGE GAINED:
The engineering experimentation will not produce any new knowledge but it that we are right about the
factor while scientific experiments will gain new knowledge. If any unexpected result is obtained, it is sent
for scientific experiment.
ENGINEERS AS RESPONSIBLE EXPERIMENTERS:
 Engineers are the main technical enablers or facilitators. Their responsibility is shared with management,
the public, and others.
 But the expertise of engineers places them in a unique position to monitor projects, to identify risk and
to provide clients and the public with the information needed to make reasonable decisions.
 From the perspective of engineering as social experimentation, four features characterize what it means
to be a responsible person while acting as an engineer:
a) Conscientiousness (desire to do a task well): A primary obligation to protect the safety of human
subjects and respect their right of consent.
b) Comprehensive perspective (Relevant Information): Awareness of experimental nature of projects,
imaginative forecasting, monitoring
c) Moral autonomy: Personally engaged, thoughtful, involvement in project
d) Accountability: Accept responsibility for results of a project
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS (Carefulness)
 In conscientious moral situation an individual is sensitive about moral values and responsibilities to
a given situation. In today's working condition where most of engineers are salaried employees
because of conscientious moral, minimum negative duties giving true date, not violating patent, and
not breaking confidentiality can be viewed.

 Engineering as social experimentation restores the scope of engineers as guardians of public

interests. The engineer’s professional duty is to guard the welfare and safety of the people who are
affected by the engineering projects. They should not impose their own views at social good upon
society.

Comprehensive perspective (Relevant Information)

 Conscientiousness is blind without relevant information. Moral concern is commitment to obtain

relevant information to meet one's moral obligations. It means fully grasping the context of one's
work which makes it count as an activity.

MORAL AUTONOMY
 People are morally autonomous when their moral conduct and principles of action are their own.
Moral beliefs and attitudes must be decided on the basis of reflections. This confirms the
authenticity in one's commitment to moral values.
  Being engineer as social experimenter they exercise a specialized training that makes him to
identify as a professional. Also they should consider about economic and safety standards.

ACCOUNTABILITY
 A responsible individual accept the moral responsibility for their action. The true meaning of
accountable is the general disposition of being willing to submit one's actions to moral scrutiny and
be open and responsive to the assessments.
 It involves a willingness to present morally cogent reasons for one's conduct when asked to do so
on appropriate circumstances.
 Differences between causal influence and moral accountability are commonly seen in engineering
profession. Such a condition is caused by several features:
a) In a large engineering project there is fragmentation of work. Each person is contributing to
a large project.
b) As per the fragmentation of work the accountability is also assigned within hierarchies of
authority.
c) Meeting schedule is the most important aspect of accountability usually there is pressure to
move to next project before the current is tested or finished.
d) The malpractices are spreading equally in to the engineering profession.
Thus, Engineering:
– Is a risky activity which has the potential to present some danger!
– Can be regarded as an experiment not conducted under lab controls

– Is based on uncertainties and assumptions with unknown outcomes

Engineer’s must learn from past mistakes and monitor over long periods of time. If possible, safe
exits MUST be provided when human life is at risk. Public MUST be informed of any risk –> respect for life.
“Engineers who accept engineering as a social experiment will find that they cannot distance
themselves from the personal responsibility for their work.”

CODES OF ETHICS:
 Engineering codes of ethics approved by two different societies are mentioned there.
a) ABET

 Codes of ethics for engineers approved by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology
(ABET) in October 1977 are as follows

Code of Ethics of Engineers:

The fundamental principles
 Engineers uphold and advance the integrity honor and dignity of the engineering profession by
a. Using their knowledge and skill for the enhancement of human welfare.
b. Being honest and impartial, serving with fidelity to the public and their employers.
c. Striving to increase the competence and prestige of the engineering profession and
d. Supporting the professional and technical societies of their disciplines.
The fundamental canons (rule):
 Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of
their professional duties.
 Engineers shall perform services only in the areas of their competence.
 Engineers shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.
 Engineers shall act in professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agent or trustees
and shall avoid conflicts of interest.
 Engineers shall build their professional reputation on the merit of their services and shall not
compete unfairly with others.
 Engineers shall act in such a manner as to uphold and enhance the honor, integrity and dignity of
the profession.
 Engineers shall continue their professional development throughout their careers and shall provide
opportunities for the professional development of those engineers under their supervision.
b) IEEE

 Codes of ethics for engineers approved by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
in August 1990 are as follows

 We the members of IEEE , in recognition of the important of our technologies offering the
quality of life throughout the world, and in accepting a personal obligation to our profession, its
members and the communities, we serve, do hereby commit ourselves to the highest ethical and
professional conduct and agree :

 To accept responsibility in making engineering decision constitute with the safety, health and
welfare of the public, and to disclose promptly factors that might endanger the public or the
environment

 To avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest whenever possible, and to disclose them to affected
parties when they do exist;

 To be honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates based on available data; To reject bribery
on all its forms. To improve the understanding of technology; its appropriate application, and
potential consequences.

 To maintain and improve our technical competence and to undertake technological tasks for others
only if qualified by training or experience or after full disclosure of pertinent limitations. To seek,
accept and offer honest criticism of technical work, to acknowledge and correct errors, and to
credit properly the contributor of others;

 To treat fairly all persons regardless of such factors as race, religion, gender, disability, age or
national origin; To avoid injuring others, their property, reputation or employment by false or
malicious action;

 To assist colleagues and co-worker in their professional development and to support them in
following this code of ethics. We do not intend our frame work to replace such codes, but
introduce it in to the literate to facilitate discussion and recognition of ethical dilemmas in practice.

Roles of Codes:
  The code of ethics for any organization or society performs following important roles:

1. Inspiration and guidance

2. Support

3. Discipline and deterrent

4. Education and mutual understanding

5. Contributing profession's image

6. Protecting the status-quo

7. Promoting business interests.

Inspiration and Guidance

 Codes provide helpful guidance about the main obligations of engineers. Codes are also inspiration
to the ethical conduct of engineers.

 To be effective the codes must be brief, specific direction regarding applications may be given in
supplementary statements or guidelines.

 This is done for engineers by the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE). For
concentrating the moral issues of their own interests most of the engineering societies and
companies are listed below:

a. ABET (Accreditation Board of Engineering Technology)

b. NSPE (National Society of Professional Engineers)

c. IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering)

d. ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers)

e. ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers)

Support

 Codes provide positive support for any ethical act. Codes served legal support for engineers
towards this professional obligation. It gives engineers some backing in decisions on moral issues.

Discipline and Deterrent

 Codes serve as the formal basis for investigating unethical conduct. Deterrent is the motive for not
acting immorally. Investigation usually requires paralegal proceedings designed to get the truth
about a given charge without violating the personal rights of person being investigated.

Education and Mutual Understanding

 Codes can be used for discussion and reflection on moral issues and to encourage a shares
understanding among professionals and other regarding moral responsibilities. The codes can be
used for this purpose because they are widely circulated and approved by different professional
societies.
Contributing to Profession Image
  Codes can present a positive image to the public. This helps engineers more effectively serve the
public. It also gives power of self regulation for the profession.

Protecting Status Quo

 A code establishes ethical conventions which can help to promote an ethical conduct. Sometimes
the code can suppress the differences of opinion within the profession. Also a code has positively
discouraged moral conduct and serious harm to those seeking to serve the public.

Promoting Business Interests

 Codes provide restraints of commerce on business transaction to benefit professionals. But an

undue influence can be observed by self serving items of codes. Due to this there may be
disagreement about the function. Some engineers believe that the codes were justified in forbidding
competitive bidding and some engineers believe that such a restriction is inappropriate.

Limitations of Codes

 The codes have few major limitations. Sometimes codes instead of solving the moral problems, it
becomes an essential exercise of personal moral responsibility. Few important limitations are
listed below
 Codes are restricted to general and vague wording. Hence sometimes the codes are not directly
applicable to all situations. Engineering is a complex profession, so all the moral problems cannot
be judged.
 Due to technological development and changing social structures new and unpredictable conditions
are developed.
 Even in a predetermined condition it is not possible to word a code which is suitable for that
instance. Sometimes codes are used to serve the personal gain of specific individuals. Sometimes
code created moral dilemmas, as code provides no guidance as to which entry should have priority
among different entries
For example consider two entries from NSPE code.

Section 1:

"The engineer will be guided in all his professional relation by the highest standards of integrity and will act
in professional matters for each client or employer as a faithful agent."

Section 2:

"The engineer will have proper regard for the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of
his professional duties." The second entry is more applicable when an engineer is told to ignore a situation
that believes threatening to the public safety on the basis of a business decision. Newly revised code
states the Engineer shall hold paramount the safety health and welfare of the public in the performance of
their professional duties, the meaning of paramount is most important. The code cannot serve as the final
moral authority for professional conduct. The code cannot be used as last moral word. Usually, it is
referred as ethical conventionalism. Ethical conventionalism is a view that a particular set of conventions,
customs is self-certifying and not to be questioned as long as it is the set in force at a given time or place.
Such a view does not support moral frame work.

For examples consider an old entry from NSPE code.

 The engineer shall not submit engineering proposal on the basis if competitive bidding. It is to
protect the public safety by discouraging cheap engineering proposals that may costs safety in order to get
the contract. The critic contended what it is for the self-interest of established engineering firms and
prevents the power pricing due to the greater competition.Separate codes for different engineering
societies gives the feeding that ethical code is more relative right and none of the code is really right.

A Balanced Outlook on Law

The role of engineering as social experimentation and its interaction rules with engineering process the role
of formal rules and their ethical implications are to be studied.

Regulated Society

To work live with harmony in society, there must be balance of individual needs and collective needs.
Ethical conduct provides this balance. Engineers should play an active role in engineering and enforcing
them. It is an argument that the engineers concern with ethics on the job is limited to similar activities and
following rules of conduct.
a) Babylon's Building Code.

b) United States Steamboat Code.

INDUSTRAL STANDARDS:

 Industries are more specific towards standards. Standards facilitates the interchange and substitute for
specifications, also it reduces product costs. Standards or specifications follow to get the desired
quality. Following table gives criteria, purpose and examples of standards.

Standard are established either by companies or by professional/ trade association. The standards
established by companies are for in-house use and that by professional associations are for wide industry
use. The standards can be declared as laws or official regulations.

Advantages of standards
 Standards are very useful for manufacturers for production of goods.
 Standards also benefit user and public.
 Because of standards there is competitiveness in the industry giving equal opportunity to all the
manufacturers.
 Standards ensure quality and hence facilitate more realistic trade-decisions.
Disadvantages of standards
 Sometimes if standards are not specific it creates confusion. Descriptive standards are not very
 specific.
 Also when special interests of manufacturers, trade union, exporters or importers imposes
unnecessary provisions on standards, this leads to reduce market opportunities in order to secure
their own narrow self interest.
 Sometimes standards are imposed forcefully when actually there is no standard at all.
PROBLEM WITH LAW IN ENGINEERING:

 Various specific legal regulations are applicable to engineering and other professions. This creates
problem and whenever crisis occurs, special interest is threatened. More emphasis on law can cause
problems in regard to ethical conduct which differs from the practical issues.
 On the other hand readymade situations updated by laws and regulations may be
counterproductive. The law will lag behind the technology and there will be over burdening the
rules and regulator. Many laws are not enforceable. Such laws are for window dressing i.e. false
caring.
Proper Role of Law in Engineering:
Good laws if properly enforced definitely produces benefits. These laws authoritatively establish
reasonable minimal standards of professional conduct. They also provide a self interest motive to comply.
They serve as powerful support for those who are willing to act ethically.

CHALLENGER CASE STUDY:

Roger Boisjoly’s: Attempts to Avoid Challenger Disaster

What do safety problems look like to the engineer who encounters them? What are good ways of
responding to such problems at each stage of their development? Much can be learned from the attempts
of Roger Boisjoly, an engineer at Morton Thiokol, to avert the challenger disaster in January 1986. His care
in coping with the uncertainties about the nature and extent of the threat to the shuttle and his
courageous persistence in raising issues exceptionally responsible engineering behavior. Roger Boisjoly
is an exceptionally sincere and forthright person who is not only truthful with others but also honest with
himself about his feelings and motives, a person not likely to fall into self-deception. His integrity and
openness make his personal account of events especially illuminating.

Moral Lessons to Safety Problems

To take Roger Boisjoly’s action as exemplary does not mean that they are above criticism or that they
could not in any way improved on. Exemplary actions like excellent designs may be improved on, but they
give us the shoulders of giants to stand on. Some have suggested that if Boisjoly had made a more
effective graphical presentation of the data on hot gas blow he could have made his case more convincing.
If this is a valid criticism, it provides a lesson for engineering educators, since effective graphical
presentation is a skill that receives little or no emphasis in most engineering programs. The point of
examining Boisjoly's experience is to learn from this example what engineers do when they respond well to
moral problems such as safety problems. Evaluation of the strengths and weakness of the shuttle program
has already been done in the report of the Presidential commission (commonly called the “Rogers
commission" for William P. Rogers who chaired it) and in several books, including Malcolm McConnell's
Challenger A major malfunction.

For his effort to avert the challenger explosion, Boisjoly received the AAAS award for Scientific Freedom
and Responsibility. The implication of the AAAS award is that Boisjoly's actions were well-conceived and of
the right sort to bring attention to the risks he recognized to the challenger flight. But acting well does not
guarantee a good outcome, if one does not have complete control of the situations. Even the best
practitioner rarely has control of all the factors that determine the outcome.

Flight Inspection in January 1985

For Roger Boisjoly the story began in January 1985, a year before the flight of the challenger. At this time,
Boisjoly involved the post flight hardware inspection of another shuttle flight, 51C. During this inspection
he observed large amounts of blackened grease between the two O-rings seals, showing that the grease
had been burned by escaping combustion gases. Gases from their rockets had, under immense pressure,
created a blowhole through more than ten feet of zinc-chromate putty. Some hot gas had blown by the
primary O-ring seal as well. Were the gas to leak the secondary seal, it would risk igniting the fuel tanks,
causing them to explode.
Boisjoly reported these findings to his superiors, who asked him to go to the Marshall Space Flight
Center in Huntsville, Alabama to give a presentation of his observations and explain the seal erosion and
escape of hot gases that caused it. Boisjoly said he believed that the resilience of the O-rings, and hence
their capacity to seal, had been compromised by lower than usual launch temperatures.

Being Asked to Tone down the Hypothesis about Cold Temperature

NASA asked Morton Thiokol to give a more detailed presentation on the seal functions as part of the flight
readiness review for flight 51 E, scheduled for April 1985. Boisjoly presented his view are three successively
higher-level review boards, but NASA management insisted that he soften his interpretation for the final
review board. The primary seal in Flight 51 C, the January 1985 flight, had leaked gas in what was the
most extreme temperature change in Florida history. That such conditions would soon occur was unlikely,
certainly not for Flight 51E which was scheduled for launch in Florida in April. Before pressing his
hypothesis that low temperature had been a factor in the failure of the seals, took the opportunity to test
his hypothesis. He sought out his friend and colleague Arnie Thompson to discuss the blow by and the
effect of cold temperature on an O-ring’s resilience. Thompson proposed conducting tests of the effects of
temperatures on resiliency, which he and Boisjoly then carried out. The resiliency testing showed that low
temperature was a problem. Boisjoly and Thompson discussed the data with Morton Thiokol engineering
managers, but the managers felt the finding too sensitive to release.
 Fig: NASA drawing of the solid rocket booster showing main section

Delay in Mounting Evidence about Seal Erosion

Another post flight inspection occurred in June 1985 at Morton Thiokol in Utah. This time a nozzle joint
from Flight 51 B, which flew on April 29, 1985, was found to have a primary seal eroded in three places
over a 1.3-inch length. Inspectors postulated that the primary seal had never sealed during the full two
minutes of flight. The secondary seal in the same joint also showed signs of erosion. Boisjoly was greatly
concerned about this finding. A flight readiness review presentation was prepared for Flight 51 F,
scheduled for launch on July 29, 1985. The status of the booster seals was the topic of a presentation to
NASA at Marshall Space Flights Center on July 1, 1985 and of another the next day. The preliminary results
of the O-ring resilience testing in March were presented for the first time during this meeting. Everyone in
the program was by then aware of the influence of low temperature on the joint seals.

At this point, management at Morton Thiokol and NASA had evidence that the seals did not
perform as required and that cold temperature was a factor in their failure to perform. An attempt on
July 19, 1985 to form a team to work on the seal erosion problems failed, however. In his journal, Boisjoly
recorded his frustration with management's failure to take appropriate steps in response to the persistent
failure of the O-rings.

Boisjoly's Action: Keeping a Journal

By this time Roger Boisjoly's heightening concern led him to begin keeping a journal of events
pertaining seal erosion. The journal would later become an important aid to him in giving testimony to the
Presidential Commission investigating the challenger explosion (the “Rogers Commission"). The journal
had the immediate purpose of enabling Boisjoly to monitor events so that he could discover and remove
roadblocks that stood in the way of fixing the problem.

Roger Boisjoly reports being influenced by the memory of an engineer who has been involved in another
famous disaster: the 1974 DC-10 crash. For many years this crash was the worst airline accident in terms
of loss of life. The engineer whose design has significantly contributed to this accident became almost
totally disfunctional for a long period after the crash and went through his workday under heavy sedation.
This memory made Roger Boisjoly realize that major safety problems might not be remedied through
normal reviews. Therefore, he closely monitored all action taken on the problem of the O-ring seals.

The problem had evolved from a matter of seal erosion during several flights to one experimentally
shown to be aggravated by cold temperature. Although no launches in cold temperature would occur in
mid-summer, the steps necessary to assure adequate sealing in all weather were not being taken. Roger
Boisjoly, therefore, took direct action to force the attention of management to the issue. He wrote a memo
to the vice president of Engineering, Robert Lurid, stating his concern that failure to address the problems
would mean an explosion of the shuttle. This memo was immediately stamped "company private", meaning
that it must not be outside Morton Thiokol. This memo was specifically cited in the AAAS award to Boisjoly
for his efforts to avert the Challenger explosion. The persistent inability of management to take effective
action on a major threat to safety justifies and even requires speaking up, even if it requires going outside
normal channels.

Boisjoly's Action: Expressing a Concern

Although the situation that Roger Boisjoly faced at this point was not an emergency, since no low-
temperature lunch was imminent, Boisjoly had good reason to think that management was not taking
steps to properly address the hazard evidence in seal erosion. He chose to communicate his concerns to
Vice President Bob Lund in writing although on other occasions Boisjoly had expressed his concern by
talking with Lund. Written communication ensures that a decision maker has a precise statement of the
problem and that anyone else who is shown or who receives a copy of the communication sees the same
statement, which they can each later review.

Some corporations, such as automobile manufacturers who have experienced law suits charging
unsafe design in which employees memos have been subpoenaed, are reluctant to create records that
might be used against them in some future liability suits. They may discourage hard copy (paper and ink)
communication about safety problems. To retain the precision of written communication, some of these
companies encourage the use of electronic mail. However, e-mail' is rapidly acquiring the same potential as
evidence in court.

Boisjoly 's Action : Informing Others When Going to the Top

Inexperienced professionals who find that they are in a situation in which they need to go "over
someone's head" or "to the top" with their concerns may neglect the question of whom they should inform
or consult in doing so. Going to the top is less likely to offend those who are "leapt over" if they are at
least informed, so that they are not caught unprepared for the actions that follow. Following his usual
practice, Boisjoly showed his memo to his direct supervisor, who then countersigned it. Boisjoly's memo
got the attention of top management, which then authorized the formation of a seal team.

A Company's Concern about its Image

On August 19, 1985 Moroton Thiokol personnel went to a meeting at the Marshall Space Flight
Center on the problem with the seals on the booster rockets. In September 1985, NASA officials
instructed Morton Thiokol to send a representative to the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
conference on October to discuss the seals and solicit help from others at the conference. Boisjoly was
selected to make the presentation, but NASA gave strict instructions that he was not to express the critical
urgency of the joint problem, but rather to emphasize the progress on solving it that the company had
made thus far.
Every organization has difficulties that it overcomes in the normal course of its operation. A
company is usually reluctant to publicize its mistakes and failures. At this time, NASA was receiving public
criticism for promising commercial uses of shuttle flights that never materialized, for having cost overruns,
and for being behind schedule and Morton Thiokol was worried about losing its position as sole contractor
for certain parts of the space shuttle effort.

In other cases, a company, a research lab, or an academic researcher might be reluctant or release
information about mistakes that competitors might use to advantages. A major hazard in concealing
difficulties is that the difficulties remain inadequately addressed. NASA's unwillingness to reveal, a major
malfunction in the solid rocket booster hampered Boisjoly's attempt to get expert advice about the seal
problem. However, NASA's instruction was not so outlandish that Boisjoly's felt morally obliged to
defy it. After his presentation, Boisjoly asked the audience for suggestions to improve the design, but he
received none. Boisjoly and another Morton Thiokol engineer, Bob Eberling, spent the remainder of the
convention meeting with seal vendors whom they had previously contacted for help.

Working With Poor Management Support

Although the seal task team, had been formed in response to his July memo, Boisjoly reports that
management did not give the effort much support and that it lacked necessary resources and
information. Many unanswered question remained as the seal task team approached the end of 1985.
Almost twenty flights had flown successfully and some of the cases of hot gas blow by had occurred during
warms as well as cold temperatures.

In attempting to bring attention to the problem, Boisjoly used normal channels to the fullest and
had already presented his concerns directly to the vice president of Engineering. He continued to keep his
journal of progress, or lack of progress on the seal problem and used activity reports to document the
frustration of his efforts, including attempts to get more data on seal erosion. He received no response,
however, and never knew if his comments went to upper management. The Presidential Commission
investigating the shuttle disaster later cited frequent failures to pass along vital conformation as a principal
pattern of errors that led to the shuttle disaster. Contacting an ombudsman or a safety hotline at Morton
Thiokol or at NASA might have been appropriate at this point, but Morton Thiokol and NASA had neither.
 Fig. 2.2 "Joint rotation", showing inside of clevis bending away from tang

The Day before the Flight

The challenger, with a crew that included "the teacher in space" was scheduled to fly on January
28, 1986. The preceding day, Boisjoly and his colleagues were shocked to learn that the overnight
temperature at the launch site was predicted to be only 18 degree Fahrenheit, lower than the record cold
experienced the previous year. Boisjoly and several of his colleagues were firmly convinced that this
extreme weather condition presented a major threat to the capacity of the O-ring seals to function and
thus to the survival of the flight crew.

With time running out, Boisjoly and his colleagues went directly to Bob Lund, the vice president of
Engineering, to make their case for postponing the flight. They convinced him of the danger and secured
his decision to recommend against flying. To make their point to NASA at the teleconference
scheduled for that evening, they hurriedly prepared viewgraphs outlining their concerns about
launching at such a low temperature.

The teleconference linked Morton Thiokol with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida and the
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama. A manager colleague who had long shared
Boisjoly's concerns, Al McDonald, was present at KSC for the teleconference ("telecon"). Discussion started
with a history of O-ring erosion in field joints. Boisjoly reports that - Data was presented showing a major
concern with seal resiliency and the change to the sealing timing function and the criticality of this on the
ability to seal. I was asked several times during my portion of the presentation to quantify my concern
but I said I could not since the only data I had was what I had presented and that I had been trying to
get more data since last October.

When Boisjoly made this last comment, the general manager of Morton Thiokol glared at him. This
presentation ended with the recommendation not to launch below 53 degrees. NASA then asked Joe
Kilminster, vice president of Space Booster Programs at Morton Thiokol, for this launch decision. Kilminster
said that because of the engineering judgment just presented he would recommend against launching.
Then Larry Mulloy of NASA at KSC asked George Hardy of NASA at MSFC for this launch decision. George
responded that he was appealed at Thiokol's recommendation against flying, but said he would not
launch if Morton Thiokol objected. Mulloy then spent some time giving his interpretation of the data,
arguing that the data were inconclusive.

The vehement reaction of NASA’s George Hardy to the recommendation against launch surprised
Boisjoly. Not only was Hardy usually moderate in speech, but in Boisjoly's experience, NASA had shown a
great concern for safety consciousness. Nevertheless, the Rogers communication was to find that, although
failure of the seals on the field joints caused the explosion, many other flaws in the shuttle design and poor
patterns of communication might also have resulted in a fatal crash. NASA's prior reputation for safety
seems to have rested on their practice of placing the burden of proof on those who advocated launch. If
there was any question of a risk, a flight was normally postponed. This time, however, NASA did not follow
its established practice.

Joe Kilminster responded by asking for a five-minute off-line cause to reevaluate the data. The
mute button was pushed, so the two NASA groups could no longer hear Morton Thiokol's discussion.
Immediately Thiokol's general manager, Jerry Mason, said in a soft voice: "we have to make a
management decision". It would be a mistake to interpret Mason's remark to mean that he thought that
from management’s point of view the explosion of the challenger would be an acceptable outcome. Mason
intended to consider factors other than safety factors that would weigh in favor of launching. To consider
other factors meant down playing the danger that Boisjoly knew to exist. Boisjoly reports that he became
furious when he heard Mason's remark. He describes the subsequent discussion and follows

Some discussion had started between the managers when Arine Thompson moved from his position
down the table to a position in front of the managers and once again tried to explain our position by
sketching the joint and discussing the problem with seals at low temperature. Arnie stopped when he saw
the unfriendly look in Mason's eyes and also realized that no one was listening to him. I then grabbed the
photograph evidence showing the hot gas blow by and placed it on the table and somewhat angered
admonished them to look and not ignore what the photos were telling us. I, too, received the same cold
stares sd Arnie with looks as if to say ." Go away and don't bother us with the facts."

At that moment I felt totally helpless and that further argument was fruitless, so I, too, stopped pressing
my case....

During the closed managers' discussion jerry Mason asked in a low voice if he was the only one
who wanted to fly. The discussion continued, the Mason turned to Bob Lund, the Vice-president of
Engineering, and told him to take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat. The decision to
launch resulted from the yes vote of only the four senior executives since the rest of us were excluded
from both the final decision and the vote poll. The telecom resumed and foe Kilminster read the launch
support rationale from a handwritten list and recommended that the launch proceed. NASA promptly
accepted the recommendation to launch without any probing discussion and asked Joe to send a signed
copy of the chart. The change in decision so upset me that I do not remember Stanley Reinhartz of NASA
asking if anyone had anything else to say over the telecom.

The telecom was then disconnected so I immediately left the room feeling badly defeated. In this
situation, NASA responded in a way that was unprecedented in Boisjoly's experience. In the wake of the
success of the Apollo project that had placed astronauts on the Moon, NAS$ had conceived the shuttle
projects to retain public support. They had over promised as achievement. Having failed in many of its
promises, NASA felt pressure to have the flight with "the teacher in space” as a visible success that could
be mentioned in the State of the Union Address, which the President was to give the next day. As Boisjoly
was later to find out, Morton Thiokol was at this point negotiating a new contract with NASA and trying to
remain the sole Rocket Booster Program. This negotiation undoubtedly influenced top management's
decision not to delay the challenger flight, and so they reversed their engineering decision. Faced with a
horrible outcome, it is tempting to wish for a miraculous "rescue." Thus it is often suggested that Boisjoly,
Thompson, or McDonald ought to have done something more to see that the flight was stopped.

Fig. 2.3 O-Ring under three difference conditions.

Fig. 2.4 Gross-section view of the solid rocket motor joint showing position of tang,
Clevis, two O-rings, leak check port, and putty
The presidential commission found multiple instances in which safety concerns were not passed
along. The communications about safety problems were found to be grave that astronaut Sally Ride, who
served on the Commission, refused to fly any more after the commission's hearing. As Commission
member Richard Feynman put it, The guys at the top.. didn't want to hear the about the difficulties of the
engineers. It's better if they don't hear so they can be more 'honest' when trying to get congress to OK
their projects" NASA's deputy administrator, Hans Mark wrote in an article In the IEEE spectrum that he
had known and written a memo about the O-ring problem two years before, so that it seemed incredible to
him that Jesse Moore, the NASA decision maker in-charge of the challenger flight, did not know of the 0-
ring problem. Thus even if had been able to find someone on authority at NASA to tell that evening, he
would have been giving them information that they are already showing resistance to receiving.

Later, Boisjoly did take information to outside authorities, thereby becoming "a whistle - blower."
He gave document to the Presidential Commission investigating the challenger explosion without first
giving them to Morton Thiokol to review and censor. His disclosure of the information to the presidential
Commission led to sanctions against him at Morton Thiokol and to his being ostracized in the little Utah
town where he had previously been mayor. Given his willingness to give documents to the Presidential
commission despite the risk to his career and his continuing to reside in a town for which Morton Thiokol
was the principal employers, it is reasonable to assume that had he known of an effective way of raising
his concern about the effect of temperature on the seals he would have done so. To require that
professionals behave responsible cannot imply that they should be blamed for bad outcomes or that others
are not responsible for supporting their efforts to safeguard the public's safety health, education, or
wellbeing.

In this instance those in authority behaved not only unreasonably, but also unpredictably. An
engineer could not have known in advance that going outside the company was necessary. If they are
prepared to raise safety issues as clearly, forthrightly, a persistently as Boisjoly and some of his colleagues
then engineers will be meeting their responsibility for safely'-although that may not be able to prevent
every disaster. If corporations and government agencies support engineers v-ho raise safety concerns, a
single had decision will not create a disaster like the explosion of the challenger. Accidents and safety
problems are clearly not in the interest of management. When the general manager of Morton Thiokol
recommended launching over the objections of his engineers, he made a very bad management decision.

Preventing Accident

Usually management does not flagrantly disregard safety, but management fails to give due regard
to safety hazards because of the pressure of deadlines or financial exigencies. Using data comparable to
that Boisjoly was able to gather, participants in an exercise now wide used in management training often
behave as Morton Thiokal decision as individuals and then as members of a group.
As individuals, the majority decide not to tell the life-threatening risk in the face of the evidence. In
group, however, two thirds of the group’s predominantly male training programs decide to take the risk.
(Most of the group in an all - female management program did not).
A review of cases of accidents fails entirely to pick up the many situations in which managers and
corporations responded appropriately to the safety concerns of their engineers. Many corporations
recognize that it is in their interest to provide their employees with adequate opportunities to raise concern
about safety, and they are taking steps to provide their employees with avenues to raise concern about
safety and other ethical matters.
Attention to how organizations support the timely expression of employee’s ethical concerns is at
least as important to preparing for professional responsibility as reviewing disaster.
Conclusion: Roger Boisjoly's attempt to avert the challenger disaster deserves careful study for what it
reveals about fulfilling an engineer's professional responsibility for safety. Boisjoly's problem situation and
the responses he made to it at various stages of development illustrate many points about how safety
problems are recognized and the needed to resolve those problems.

--x-- The End --x--