Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10614 October 22, 1962

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE TUAZON, et al., defendants,
JOSE TUAZON, ERMITO KIGAO alias JEREMIAS LEPPAGO, AMADEO DE LA FUENTE,
HILARIO TABERDO, MARIANO TABANIAG, ANTONIO TAMO, MANUEL TAMO and
NEMESIO TAURO, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Ernesto P. Parel for defendants-appellants Jose Tuazon, Ermito Kigao, Antonio Tamo and
Manuel Tamo.
Paredes and Paredes for defendants-appellants Amadeo de la Fuente, Mariano Tabaniag and
Hilario Taberdo.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Hon. Jose M. Mendoza,
presiding, finding Jose Tuazon, Amadeo de la Fuente, Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago,
Ayong Taberdo alias Hilario Taberdo, Nemesio Tauro, Manuel Tamo, Antonio Tamo and Mariano
Tabaniag, guilty of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, for the killing of Ballao Hermoso,
and Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago, Nemesio Tauro, Manuel Tamo and Antonio Tamo,
also guilty of murder qualified by treachery, for the killing of Masibag Hermoso. Corresponding
indemnities for the deaths above mentioned at the rate of P6,000.00 for each victim, are
adjudged to be borne jointly and severally by the said convicts, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, and with costs.

The above decision was rendered upon an information charging the accused-appellants with the
crime of double murder for ambushing and killing the victims Ballao Hermoso and Masibag
Hermoso on June 17, 1954 at Lagangilang, Abra at an uninhabited place, with the qualifying
circumstances of alevosia and the generic circumstance of evident premeditation, and the
aggravating circumstances of (a) taking advantage of superior strength; (b) with the aid of armed
men and by a band to facilitate the commission of the offense; (c) in consideration of a price, or
promise of reward, and (d) in an uninhabited place, and as regards accused Jose Tuazon and
Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago, with having taken advantage of their public office as
municipal mayor and municipal policeman, respectively.

It appears from the evidence submitted at the trial that on June 17, 1954, at sunrise, Ballao
Hermoso and his nephew Masibag Hermoso started from Kimpal for Bangued, Abra, to attend
the hearing of a civil case involving lands, between the deceased Ballao Hermoso and the
accused appellant Mariano Tabaniag, Ballao and Masibag rode horses. They were accompanied
by Felipe Tadeo, who had no horse and had to walk on foot. A companion who had walked
ahead was Restituto Barreta, who carried provisions. When they reached the Baay river, barrio
Siwasiw, municipality of Bucay, and at a place where there is a path with a fence on both sides,
they were suddenly attacked and fired upon by men armed with firearms. Ballao Hermoso was
ahead followed by Felipe Tadeo, who in turn was followed by Masibag Hermoso, and when the
first shot was heard, he turned his horse back. However, he could not get away because he
received a shot at the back, and fell down from his horse into the water. Masibag Hermoso, who
was behind, also turned back, but he too was hit by shots and so he also fell down.
The persons who made the ambush were seen by Felipe Tadeo, who upon hearing the first shot,
went into the bushes to hide and from there was able to see the persons who fired upon him and
his companions. He recognized six of the ambushers but knew the names of only four of them,
namely, Naro Talledo. Antonio Tamo, Manuel Tamo and Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago.
The other two whose names he did not knew were identified by him at the trial as Marcelino
Artero and Nemesio Tauro.

The ambush as above set forth was testified too by Felipe Tadeo, the pedestrian companion of
the victims Ballao Hermoso and Masibag Hermoso. After his two companions had fallen down
from their respective horses Felipe Tadeo went back to Kimpal to ask for help.

That same morning of June 17, 1954, the incident was reported to the police. Investigators of the
Constabulary went to the scene and found the corpse of Ballao Hermoso on the bank of the
Baay river. That of Masibag Hermoso was found approximately 200 meters away from the scene
of the ambush. On the opposite side of the river, that is opposite the dead body of Ballao
Hermoso, they found many shells of carbine, four of which were presented to the Court at the
time of the trial. They also found one carbine slug, and the dead body of a horse a short distance
from the corpse of Masibag Hermoso. A sketch of the scene of the crime indicating the places
where the dead bodies and the dead horse were found, and the scene of the crime, which is a
trail, was presented as Exhibit "M" for the prosecution and Exhibit "8" for the defense.

Before the trial began the provincial fiscal submitted a motion to discharge the accused
Marcelino Artero so that he could be utilized as a witness for the prosecution, as there was no
direct evidence available for the identification of many of the accused. The motion was granted
and Marcelino Artero testified as follows: On the 15th of June, 1954, Mariano Tabaniag went to
his house and asked him to go to Bogbog, sitio of Bucay. At the premises near the house of
Celso Bragas he saw many persons gathered together, among whom were Mariano Tabaniag,
Nemesio Tauro, Hilario Taberdo, Antonio Tamo, Jeremias Leppago, Manuel Tamo and Mayor
Jose Tuazon. Mariano Tabaniag asked Mayor Tuazon if anybody wanted to kill Capitan Ballao
for a reward. Tuazon thereupon asked who would be willing to give rewards to the persons who
would kill Captain Ballao. Tabaniag answered "We". Amadeo de la Fuente also promised to give
a reward. After Taberdo, Mayor Tuazon and others had promised to give the reward for the
killing, the men who were there agreed to carry out the ambush, whereupon Tabaniag said to
them "go and kill Captain Ballao and you will be given reward."

According to the same Marcelino Artero, Taberdo again came to his house for the second time
on June 16, Wednesday, to call for him. Artero went to the place of the meeting and there found
Hilario Taberdo, Antonio Tamo, Manuel Tamo, Jeremias Leppago and Nemesis Tauro. When
evening came Mayor Jose Tuazon invited them to his house, where they stayed until dawn. Early
in the morning Tuazon woke them up, telling them "Wake up now and go to your posts at
Dinglay". Following his words the accused went to the indicated place, where they were
supposed to ambush their victim Ballao Hermoso. Those who posted themselves beside the way
were Manuel Tamo, Antonio Tamo, Marcelino Artero (the witness), and Nemesio Tauro. Amadeo
de la Fuente was posted at a place to look out for the coming of Ballao Hermoso and give notice
thereof to the others. When Amadeo gave notice of the coming of their victims, Hilario Taberdo
fired, so did Nemesio Tauro. Both Ballao Hermoso and Masibag Hermoso were fired at. Ballao
fell into the water and Masibag who turned his horse away was also felled down further away
from where Ballao had fallen.

Another witness who testified for the prosecution was Patricio Talaga who declared that one day
prior to the ambush he went to Bogbog, the place of Celso Bragas, to practice his fighting cock.
There he saw Genaro Talledo. Genaro Talledo asked him (the witness) if he was willing to go for
an "ambush". The witness understood that the ambush was for wild pigs. That afternoon Genaro
Talledo again went to his house in company with Manuel Tamo, Nemesio Tauro and some of the
accused, who were outside of the house. Talaga talked with Arong Talledo who invited him to go
with them to Kimpal for the ambush of Captain Ballao, but Talaga answered that he was afraid
and that his family was alone so he could not join them. One day he saw Genaro Talledo again.
Talledo then asked him to go to Hilario Taberdo and Mariano Tabaniag to get his money. This
was the fourth day after the ambush. The money that he was asked to get was the pay of Arong
Talledo for the shooting of Ballao Hermoso. Witness went to Tabaniag who, in answer, said to
the witness "... tell him (Arong Talledo) to wait because I have not yet sold my carabao." When
the witness reported what Tabaniag said to him, Ayong Taberdo said that "he (Arong Talledo)
had taken some (money) already."

The autopsy report on the body of Ballao Hermoso disclosed he had a penetrating-perforating
wound the entry of which is at the level of the first thoracic vertebrae (in the back), perforating the
apex of the left lung severing the left carotid artery, with exit at the anterior portion of the neck.
That of Masibag Hermoso disclosed the presence of a penetrating-perforating wound involving
the middle portion of each of the thighs.

The evidence conclusively shows that the reason for the murder is the enmity between Mariano
Tabaniag and Ballao Hermoso caused by conflicts over the ownership of some lands. There
were certain parcels of land which for a long time were the subject of litigation between them.
The documents show that in the year 1935 Ballao Hermoso filed an action against the
predecessors in interest or parents of the defendant Mariano Tabaniag for the recovery of a
certain parcel of land in the barrio of Tabiog, Bucay, Abra. (Exh. "I") The case was brought to the
Court of First Instance of Abra for trial and judgment was rendered on May 29, 1934 declaring
Ballao Hermoso owner of the property subject of the litigation. (Exh. "J") The case was appealed
to the Court of Appeals and this Court rendered a decision on August 17, 1937 confirming the
decision of the court of first instance in favor of Ballao Hermoso. A writ of possession was issued
in December, 1937 of said parcel of land in favor of Ballao Hermoso against the predecessors in
interest of Narciso Tabaniag. (Exh. "L")

In December, 1938, Ballao Hermoso charged Nicolas Tabaniag and his wife with contempt for
entering the land which was the subject of litigation between Ballao Hermoso and Narciso
Tabaniag. In December, 1938, Teodoro alias Nicolas Tabaniag was sentenced to one year
imprisonment. (Exh. "J-10") On February 5, 1941 Mariano Tabaniag and others were charged
with the crime of theft for entering the fenced estate of Ballao Hermoso and stealing palay worth
P125.00, and on June 17, 1941 Mariano Tabaniag, Felix Tabaniag and Elino Tabaniag were
convicted and each sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, the other accused
were acquitted. (Exhs. "J-11" and "J-12", respectively).

The land subject of the above civil and criminal cases was also the subject of an application for
free patent by the predecessors in interest of Narciso Tabaniag. Decision was rendered in their
favor by the Lands Office on January 5, 1938 but upon learning that a decision was rendered in
the Court of Appeals in favor of Mariano Tabaniag the said office reversed and cancelled its
decision. On July 12, 1951 the free patent issued in the name of Patricia Torqueza was also
cancelled it having been found that the said land had been adjudged the private property of
Ballao Hermoso.

On May 3, 1954 a notice of hearing of case G.L.R.O. No. 2744, Ballao Hermoso vs. Mariano
Tabaniag et al., was sent, notifying the parties of a hearing of the above case on June 17, 1954,
at 8:00 a.m. in Bangued, Abra. The case, which is originally case No. 7 of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, is an application of Ballao Hermoso for the registration of a parcel of land.
Mariano Tabaniag, Esperanza Bribon and Silvestre Tabaniag opposed the application. (Exh. "K-
1") The record of the case in said court shows that the case was called at 9:00 a.m. but the
attorney for the petitioner, Atty. Brillantes, asked that the case be called later because his clients
were not yet there. The case was again called at 11:17 but his clients did not appear. (Exh. "H-
2") In that same registration case an order was entered which reads as follows:

On petition of Atty. Agripino Brillantes, counsel for the applicant, on the ground that the
herein applicant BALLAO HERMOSO had been ambushed on his way to this town for the
 hearing of this case according to information he has just received, the hearing is hereby
ordered postponed until further assignment.

SO ORDERED.

Bangued, Abra, June 17, 1954.

As to the accused Jeremias Leppago, evidence was submitted that although he was supposed to
be on guard in the municipal building in the morning of June 17, 1954, he did not report for duty
and only appeared in the afternoon of that day. This is the substance of copies of the police
blotter submitted at the trial and the testimony of the chief of police of Lagangilang, Abra.

Through the testimony of Felipe Tadeo, the following accused defendants were identified (by
him) as present at the time of the ambush, namely: Genaro Talledo, Antonio Tamo, Manuel
Tamo and Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago as well as Marcelino Artero and Nemesio Tauro.
Witness Marcelino Artero testified that the persons were actually present in the ambush were
Arong Talledo, Antonio Tamo and Nemesio Tauro. This same witness declared that the following
persons were present in the evening of June 16, 1954 at the house of Mayor Jose Tuazon:
Nemesio Tauro, Arong Talledo, Antonio Tamo, Manuel Tamo, Jeremias Leppago, and Jose
Tuazon, the mayor. At the meeting held in the afternoon of June 16 at the premises of Celso
Bragas were Mayor Jose Tuazon, Mariano Tabaniag, Arong Talledo, Manuel Tamo, Anton
Tamo, Nemesio Tauro and Amadeo de la Fuente.

From all the above it was sufficiently proved that defendants-appellants participated in the
ambush of the victims in the following manner: Mariano Tabaniag, by offering a reward of money
amounting to P400.00 to those who would ambush and kill Captain Ballao Hermoso; Mayor Jose
Tuazon, by cooperating with Mariano Tabaniag in making the offer, and further making the
ambushers sleep in his house on the eve of the ambush, and waking them up at dawn on June
17 and urging them then to proceed with the ambush.

Jeremias Leppago alias Ermito Kigao was also present at the house of Mayor Tuazon and was
among those who actually ambushed the victims and fired at them.

Amadeo de la Fuente was present at the meeting when the decision was made to ambush the
victims Ballao Hermoso and acted as a lookout for the coming of the victim.

Ayong Taberdo, Nemesio Tauro, Manuel Tamo and Antonio Tamo were present in the meeting
on June 16, this meeting the decision was made to carry out the ambush of the victim upon the
promise of reward from Mariano Tabaniag. Those who promised to give reward were Mariano
Tabaniag, Hilario Taberdo and Mayor Jose Tuazon.

Those present at the ambush, according to Felipe Tadeo, were Genaro Talledo, Antonio Tamo,
Manuel Tamo, Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago, Marcelino Artero (witness for the
prosecution) and Nemesio Tauro. According to Marcelino Artero, the accused present at the
ambush, were Genaro Talledo, Antonio Tamo, Jeremias Leppago, Nemesio Tauro, Manuel
Tamo and Amadeo de la Fuente.

The court below found Jose Tuazon, Amadeo de la Fuente, Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias
Leppago, Ayong Taberdo alias Hilario Taberdo, Nemesio Tauro, Manuel Tamo, Antonio Tamo
and Mariano Tabaniag guilty of the killing of Ballao Hermoso on the other hand, it found the
accused-appellants Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago, Nemesio Tauro, Manuel Tamo and
Antonio Tamo guilty of the killing of Masibag Hermoso. We find this conclusion of the court to be
correct; since Mariano Tabaniag, Jose Tuazon and Hilario Taberdo included their co-conspirators
to make an ambush of Ballao Hermoso without mentioning the latter's companion, such as
Masibag Hermoso; since there is no evidence that they ordered the killing of the companion of
Ballao Hermoso, they stand guilty for the death of Ballao Hermoso alone. On the other hand,
those who actually participated in the ambush and in the killing of both Ballao Hermoso and
Masibag Hermoso, are guilty of homicide for the killing of these two victims. They are Jeremias
Leppago, Nemesio Tauro, Manuel Tamo and Antonio Tamo. One of the participants in the
assault namely Genaro Talledo, could not be indicted and he is still at large. The other is
Marcelino Artero who served as a prosecution witness.

The circumstance attending the commission of the crime as to all of the accused are the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength and/or
alevosia. The inductors of the crime, namely, Mariano Tabaniag, Jose Tuazon and Ayong
Taberdo, are guilty as principals by induction, having induced their co-accused to commit the
crime by offering to give reward therefor; while the others, who had actually participated in the
ambush and in the assault are guilty as principals by direct participation.

The defendants-appellants Jose Tuazon and Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago, who are
represented in the appeal by Atty. Ernesto P. Parel, deny having participated in the conspiracy or
in the ambush, and testified personally to their defenses. Jose Tuazon submitted the municipal
treasurer of Lagangilang, Abra, as a witness on behalf, who testified that he saw Mayor Tuazon
in his office in the municipal building on June 15 at day time and in the afternoon at four o'clock;
that he again saw him on the following day in the municipal building. Another witness testified
that he worked in the house Mayor Tuazon for six days beginning June 14, 1954 and that he saw
no other person in the said house except Mayor Tuazon, the members of his family and the
witness and his companions.

Jeremias Leppago denied the testimonies of Felipe Tadeo and Marcelino Artero, principal
witnesses for the prosecution, as false and fabricated; denied having participant in the meetings
and gatherings in which the ambush of Ballao Hermoso was agreed upon; and claimed that it
was only on June 17 at 8:30 in the morning that he learn of the ambush when a lieutenant of the
Constabulary went to the house of Mayor Tuazon. Leppago submitted a witness in the person of
Laureano Testado who declared that he saw Leppago on June 15 and 16, and that on the 16th
the witness lunched at the house of Leppago and stayed there until 1:00 p.m. Another witness
corroborated this statement and further testified that Leppago was in a certain harvest, and on
the night of June 16 Leppago slept in his house and that when he awoke up on the following
morning of July 17 Jeremias Leppago was still sleeping, and thereafter went to guard.

Two eyewitnesses declared as to the participation of defendant-appellant Leppago in the

ambush, namely, Marcelino Artero and Felipe Tadeo. The record of the police of the municipality
of Lagangilang shows that Leppago absented himself in the morning of June 17, when he should
have reported for duty early in the morning. So in the presence of this evidence and the fact that
two witness for the prosecution could not be assailed in their credibility, we find the defense
offered by Leppago unavailing. As to Mayor Tuazon, we find that the testimony of the municipal
treasurer of his having seen Tuazon in the municipal building in the afternoon at four o'clock,
does not prove that Mayor Tuazon was not with the group that made the agreement to ambush
Ballao Hermoso because the gathering in the fields took place later in the afternoon or in the
evening. As to Tuazon's denial of the fact that the ambushers slept in his house, said denial
cannot overcome the strength of the declaration of witness Marcelino Artero that the ambushers
slept in the house of Tuazon and went together early in the morning to carry out the ambush. It
would have been difficult for the ambushers to have been together early in the morning of June
17 unless they were together in the evening and slept at the same place, taking into account the
fact that they did not live together in the same house or place. The only reasonable conclusion is
that they must have been together, if not the night before, at least very early at dawn.

The defendants-appellants Manuel Tamo and Antonio Tamo are represented in this appeal by
Atty. Ernesto P. Parel. Attempt was made to destroy the value of the confessions that said
defendants-appellants had executed, namely, Exhibits "D" and "E". But we are fully satisfied that
these were voluntarily executed as certified to by the justice of the peace before whom they were
made. There is no credible proof of the alleged maltreatment that they suffered in the hands of
the police as a result of which they executed the confessions.
But even without the confessions, the testimonies of the two witnesses Marcelino Artero and
Felipe Tadeo conclusively show that they actually participated not only in the conspiracy to make
the ambush in the meetings had for that purpose, but also actually participated in the assault and
in the ambush made against the deceased Ballao Hermoso and Masibag Hermoso. As to them,
their defense of alibi is certainly unavailing.

The other defendants-appellants, who are represented by Paredes & Paredes, assail the
credibility of the witness Marcelino Artero, pointing out to the alleged discrepancies made in his
testimony. We have carefully read and studied the testimony of this witness and we do not agree
with counsel that his credibility has been successfully impeached. The only flaw in his testimony
is a certain confusion, induced by a very tiresome cross-examination, as to whether or not it was
Monday or Tuesday when the meeting was held at which the ambush of the victim was agreed
upon. In some part of Artero's testimony he said it was Monday, in another he said it was
Tuesday. But the fact is, prior to the meeting on the evening of June 16, a meeting was held to
decide upon the ambush. Whether that meeting was held in the evening of Monday or in the
evening of Tuesday, the fact remains that there was a meeting held. Witness asserted clearly
this fact without doubt. It is true that evidence was submitted to the effect that prior to becoming a
witness for the Government, Marcelino Artero had denied participation. This is natural as it is for
a man to evade his criminal responsibility. But later on he made a clean-breast confession,
admitting his participation in his own confession, Exhibit "F" and thereafter agreed to become a
witness for the Government. He was subjected to a barrage of cross-examination questions but
he did not budge an inch from his assertion that he was present at the meeting when the
agreement to carry out the ambush was made, indicating the persons who actually participated in
the ambush. We are satisfied that he told the truth when he identified the persons who were
present at the meeting, and declared the offers of reward made by Mariano Tabaniag and some
of his colleagues, and the conformity of the others to carry out the plan to ambush.

With the above considerations we believe that the evidence submitted by the prosecution proves
beyond reasonable doubt that all the defendants-appellants had participated in the commission
of the crime, the conspiracy to make the ambush and the actual ambush itself, in the form and
manner already described above.

The penalty imposed upon the accused-appellants except Mariano Tabaniag, of reclusion
perpetua, is proper taking into account that the only aggravating circumstance against them was
that of having accepted to commit a crime in consideration of a monetary reward, and it
appearing that these appellants live in barrios, without any apparent education. The penalty
meted by the lower court would seem to be commensurate with the nature of the crime and their
personal circumstances.

As to the accused-appellant Jose Tuazon, it does not clearly appear that he took advantage of
his position as mayor of a municipality to induce the commission of the crime, or that his position
was the main consideration why they committed the crime. He acted merely like his co-accused
Mariano Tabaniag and Hilario or Ayong Taberdo, in inducing the co-conspirators to commit the
crime.

As to the defendant-appellant Ermito Kigao alias Jeremias Leppago, who was a policeman at the
time of the commission of the crime, it also appears that there has been no abuse of his position,
he voluntarily absented himself from his hours of duty on the morning of June 17, 1954, to take
part in the ambush. With respect to the defendant-appellant Mariano Tabaniag, we find that he
should be meted a more severe penalty, because it was he who promised the principal reward
and he was not satisfied with securing the services of only one or two individuals but had to get
those of a group of more than six, all of them fully armed with firearms in order to better insure
the execution of his illegal purpose to eliminate his antagonist in his land troubles, as a result of
which not only was his antagonist killed but also the latters nephew, an innocent party.
Considering the manner in which he effected his diabolical purpose to eliminate his enemy, the
number of the persons who were employed by him to carry out his purpose, and the number of
arms with which they were provided, the Court believes that he should be meted out a penalty
more severe than that imposed upon those who actually carried out the murder desired by him.
The Court believes that he deserves the supreme penalty of death, the highest, justified by the
great number of persons and firearms he had engaged to carry out his criminal intent and design.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that the defendant-
appellant Mariano Tabaniag should receive the supreme penalty of death instead of that of
reclusion perpetua given by the lower court. In all other respects, the sentence imposed upon the
defendants-appellants is affirmed.

So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE V. BAGTAS, defendant,
FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate left by the late Jose V.
Bagtas, petitioner-appellant.

D. T. Reyes, Liaison and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because only questions of law are raised.

On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the
Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari,
of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May
1949 for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the book
value of the bulls. Upon the expiration on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower asked for a
renewal for another period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources approved a renewal thereof of only one bull for another year from 8 May 1949 to 7
May 1950 and requested the return of the other two. On 25 March 1950 Jose V. Bagtas wrote to
the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls. On 17 October
1950 he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of yearly depreciation to be
approved by the Auditor General. On 19 October 1950 the Director of Animal Industry advised
him that the book value of the three bulls could not be reduced and that they either be returned
or their book value paid not later than 31 October 1950. Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book
value of the three bulls or to return them. So, on 20 December 1950 in the Court of First Instance
of Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced an action against him praying that he be
ordered to return the three bulls loaned to him or to pay their book value in the total sum of
P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee in the sum of P199.62, both with interests, and costs; and
that other just and equitable relief be granted in (civil No. 12818).
On 5 July 1951 Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and Manalo, answered that
because of the bad peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of
Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the President of the Philippines from the refusal by the Director of Animal
Industry to deduct from the book value of the bulls corresponding yearly depreciation of 8% from
the date of acquisition, to which depreciation the Auditor General did not object, he could not
return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

After hearing, on 30 July 1956 the trial court render judgment —

. . . sentencing the latter (defendant) to pay the sum of P3,625.09 the total value of the
three bulls plus the breeding fees in the amount of P626.17 with interest on both sums of
(at) the legal rate from the filing of this complaint and costs.

On 9 October 1958 the plaintiff moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the court granted on
18 October and issued on 11 November 1958. On 2 December 1958 granted an ex-parte motion
filed by the plaintiff on November 1958 for the appointment of a special sheriff to serve the writ
outside Manila. Of this order appointing a special sheriff, on 6 December 1958, Felicidad M.
Bagtas, the surviving spouse of the defendant Jose Bagtas who died on 23 October 1951 and as
administratrix of his estate, was notified. On 7 January 1959 she file a motion alleging that on 26
June 1952 the two bull Sindhi and Bhagnari were returned to the Bureau Animal of Industry and
that sometime in November 1958 the third bull, the Sahiniwal, died from gunshot wound inflicted
during a Huk raid on Hacienda Felicidad Intal, and praying that the writ of execution be quashed
and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. On 31 January 1959 the plaintiff objected to
her motion. On 6 February 1959 she filed a reply thereto. On the same day, 6 February, the
Court denied her motion. Hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court as
stated at the beginning of this opinion.

It is true that on 26 June 1952 Jose M. Bagtas, Jr., son of the appellant by the late defendant,
returned the Sindhi and Bhagnari bulls to Roman Remorin, Superintendent of the NVB Station,
Bureau of Animal Industry, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as evidenced by a memorandum receipt
signed by the latter (Exhibit 2). That is why in its objection of 31 January 1959 to the appellant's
motion to quash the writ of execution the appellee prays "that another writ of execution in the
sum of P859.53 be issued against the estate of defendant deceased Jose V. Bagtas." She
cannot be held liable for the two bulls which already had been returned to and received by the
appellee.

The appellant contends that the Sahiniwal bull was accidentally killed during a raid by the Huk in
November 1953 upon the surrounding barrios of Hacienda Felicidad Intal, Baggao, Cagayan,
where the animal was kept, and that as such death was due to force majeure she is relieved from
the duty of returning the bull or paying its value to the appellee. The contention is without merit.
The loan by the appellee to the late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three bulls for breeding
purposes for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949, later on renewed for another
year as regards one bull, was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10% of
the book value of the bulls. The appellant contends that the contract was commodatum and that,
for that reason, as the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due
to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous.1 If the breeding fee be
considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of
the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith,
because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the
contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code
provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum —

. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:

(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .

 (3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a
stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;

The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of one bull was
renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used
the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore,
when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls had each an
appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the
Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event
the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability.

The appellant's contention that the demand or prayer by the appellee for the return of the bull or
the payment of its value being a money claim should be presented or filed in the intestate
proceedings of the defendant who died on 23 October 1951, is not altogether without merit.
However, the claim that his civil personality having ceased to exist the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the case against him, is untenable, because section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that —

After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. . . .

and after the defendant's death on 23 October 1951 his counsel failed to comply with section 16
of Rule 3 which provides that —

Whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform
the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of the executory
administrator, guardian, or other legal representative of the deceased . . . .

The notice by the probate court and its publication in the Voz de Manila that Felicidad M. Bagtas
had been issue letters of administration of the estate of the late Jose Bagtas and that "all
persons having claims for monopoly against the deceased Jose V. Bagtas, arising from contract
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, for funeral expenses and
expenses of the last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for monopoly against him, to
file said claims with the Clerk of this Court at the City Hall Bldg., Highway 54, Quezon City, within
six (6) months from the date of the first publication of this order, serving a copy thereof upon the
aforementioned Felicidad M. Bagtas, the appointed administratrix of the estate of the said
deceased," is not a notice to the court and the appellee who were to be notified of the
defendant's death in accordance with the above-quoted rule, and there was no reason for such
failure to notify, because the attorney who appeared for the defendant was the same who
represented the administratrix in the special proceedings instituted for the administration and
settlement of his estate. The appellee or its attorney or representative could not be expected to
know of the death of the defendant or of the administration proceedings of his estate instituted in
another court that if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or its
attorney of such death as required by the rule.

As the appellant already had returned the two bulls to the appellee, the estate of the late
defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned
to the appellee, because it was killed while in the custody of the administratrix of his estate. This
is the amount prayed for by the appellee in its objection on 31 January 1959 to the motion filed
on 7 January 1959 by the appellant for the quashing of the writ of execution.

Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V.
Bagtas having been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Q-200), the money judgment
rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution but must be
presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant, the administratrix appointed by the
court.

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48922 October 30, 1962

INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DECEASED PEDRO ROYO: AMPARO N. VDA. DE

ROYO, Administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Royo and PEDRO ROYO JR., movants-
appellants,
vs.
N. T. DEEN and TOMAS DELGADO, oppositors-appellees.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a reconstituted case, originating in the Court of First Instance of Cebu as Special
Proceeding No. 850 of said court, entitled Intestate of Pedro Royo, Amparo Vda. de Royo,
Administratrix and Pedro Royo, Jr., Movant versus N.T. Deen and Tomas Delgado, Oppositors,
wherein oppositors' bond in favor of the administrator of the estate of Pedro Royo, Pantaleon del
Rosario, is sought to respond for the sum of P17,610.00 which said administrator allegedly failed
to account for in his capacity as administrator of the estate. Motion was filed on November 6,
1940. In a decision dated May 17, 1941 Justice Felix Martinez, then presiding judge of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, denied the motion holding:

Se pide la ejecucion de una fianzaa or valor de P25,000.00 otorgada por Tomas Delgado
y N.T. Deen, para que puedo hacerse efectiva contra la misma la cantidad de
P17,610.00, por la cual, segun las alegaciones, es reponsable el finando Pantaleon E.
del Rosario como aministrador de los bienes relictos del finado Pedro Royo. Delgado y
Deen son fiadores para reponder de cualesquier obligaciones resultantes de las
gestiones de Pantaleon E. del Rosario como administrator del intestado de Pedro Royo.

No so discute que Pantaleon E. del Rosario fue nombrado administrador de los bienes
del finado Pedro Royo el dia 11 de Octobre de 1924, en sustitucion de Jose Vano; asi
como de que, como tal, paso a sus manos la suma de P43,500.00 procedente del
importe de venta de dos casa de materiales fuertes y dente del importe de venta de dos
casas de materiales furertes y planchas de zincede la propiedad del intestado de que as
administrator. De dicha suma, del Rosario desembloso, mediante comprabantes, la
cantidad de P24,890.00 en pago de las reclamciones controlla admistracion, quesdado,
por tanto, un saldo de P17,610.00. No hay informacion en el record que uso se hizo de
este saldo por el administrator. Este se limito a hacerultimanente una manifestacion, de
fecha 8 de Septiembre de 1928, . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 2 Que a consecuencia de cirtos arreglos que los herederos del finado Pedro
Royo habian hecho con ciertos assreedores suyos, los primeros han disputo de
bastante fondos edad, y se han reservado solamente en poder del Administrador
aquellas candidades que se han creido necessarias para el pago de las deudas
del difunto, pero en la computacion de estos pagos no se han tenido en cuenta
varios gastos y obligaciones dela administracion, que no se han podido
considerar cuando dischos herederos hicieron uso de los fondos que so crian
que iban a corresponderles, habiendo resultado, al verificarse la venta ordenada
por el Juzgado el 7 de Enero de 1928 de las fincas del finado, que habia un
deficit de unos P600.00 para la administracion que no se podrian cubrir, en razon
de que todas lad deudas ya habian asido pagadas, y los herederos tomaron para
si todo el remante de la administracion.

Con todo, se veclamente que Del Rosario, desde-el año 1928, hizo costar que la
administracion a su cargo ya no poseia bienes. Por orto parte, los herederos de Pedro
Royo; que eran ya de edad legal desde al año 1924, nunca han impugnado la
manifestacion citada, como tampoco haan dado paso alguna para averiguar is exestian o
no todavia bienes en la administration. Esto constituye, naturalmente, una tacita
admission de lo manifestado por del Rosario en su escrito ya aludido.

Esto a un lado, y por otro, Del Rosario mario el 25 de Noviembro de 1930, y se instituyo
despues an expendiente de administracion de los bienes dejado por el mismo. No hay
informacion es el record del expiendiente de administracion de los bienes de Pedro
Royo, ni se ha aportado prueba alguna en el juico de la mocion bajo consideracion, que
los herederos de dicho Pedro Royo han presentado reclamacion alguna en la
administracion de los bienes de Pantaleon E. del Rosario por cualesquier obligaciones
en que este hay racarrido o por la cantidad de P17,610.00. De modo que, el escrito de
constancia y mocion de fecha 6 de Noviembro de 1940 se presento muytarde . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . el articulo 6 de la Regla No. 87 del Nuevo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, como

sigue:

"Cuando la obligacion del difunto fuero solidaria y de mancomuncon orto deudor

la reclamacion debera presentarse contra el difunto como si fuera el unico
deudor, sin perjuricio del derecho de la testamentaria o del intestado a reconbrar
del orto deudor la parte que a este le correspondiere en dicha obligacion."

No se ha presentado reclamacion por la obligacion de que son responsables

mancomunada y solidariamente Pantaleon E. del Rosario, Tomas Delgado y N. T. Deen,
en el expediente del intestado del primero (Pantaleon E. del Rosario). Ello, dado el
tiempo trancurrido, constituye impendimento para ecigir cualesquier responsabilidad en
que haya podido incurrir Del Rosario en vida, en relacion con sus gestiones en la
administracion de los bienes del finado Pedro Royo, por precripcion o, tan siquiera, por
(estoppel by laches. El articulo 1148 del Codigo Civil dice lo siguente:

"El de deudor solidario podra utilizar contra las reclamaciones del creedor, todas
las excepciones que se deriven de la naturaleza de la obligacion y las que le
sean personales."

y, por tanto, la prescription a "estoppel by laches' puede ser invocado por Delgado y
Deen.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals by movants, this Court endorsed the case to Us for the reason
that all the issues raised in movant's brief involve questions of law. The assignment of errors in
appellants' brief are as follows:

FIRST ERROR

THE COURT A QUO IN DENYING THE MOVANTS APPELLANTS' MOTION DATED

NOVEMBER 6, 1940, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN NOT ORDERING THE EXECUTION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR'S BOND FOR THE SUM OF P17,610.00 WHEREBY THE
BONDSMEN N.T. DEEN AND TOMAS DELGADO (OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES) ARE
JOINTLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE

SECOND ERROR

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE OF

PRESCRIPTION AND ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ARE APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT
CASE.

THIRD ERROR

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
PLEADING ENTITLED "MANIFESTATION FILED BY THE FORMER ADMINISTRATOR
PANTALEON E. DEL ROSARIO DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 1928. (APPEARING IN THE
RECORD - PAGE 1164 - PIEZA SEXTA )

FOURTH ERROR

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE CLOSURE OF THE PRESENT

CASE.

The last assignment of error attacks as error on the part of the trial judge that of having
considered the "Manifestaciones" of the administrator dated September 8, 1928 as true and valid
notwithstanding the fact that said manifestations were not sworn to as intended by the signer (the
administrator).

The material statements contained in the "Manifestaciones" of the administrator are as follows:

2. — Que a consocuencia de ciertas arreglos que los herederos del finado Pedro Royo
habian hecho con ciertas acreedores suyos los primeros han dispuesto de bastantes
fondos que pertenecian a la administracion, por ser ya mayores de edad, y se han
reservado solamente en poder del Administrador a quellas cantidades que se han creido
necesarias para el pago de las deudas del difunto pero en la computacior de estos
pagos no se han tenido en cuenta varior gastos y obligaciones de la administracion, que
no se han podido consideraration cuando dichos herederos hicieron uso de los fondos
que se creian que iban a corresponderles, habiendo resultado, al verificarse la venta
ordenada por el Juzgado el 7 de Enero de 1928 de las fincas del finado que habia un
deficit de unos P600.00 para la administration que no se podrian cubrir, en razon de que
todas las deudas ya habian sido pagodas, y los herederos, tomarom para si todo el
remanente de la administracion.

Appellants argue that the "Manifestaciones" is not sworn to and is irregular and the parties or
heirs were not furnished copies thereof. It should be borne in mind that an administrator, before
assuming his duties as such, must furnish a bond wherein he undertakes to faithfully perform his
duties. (Sec. 1, Rule 82) Having been previously sworn to faithfully perform his duties, no further
swear in is necessary as to the reports that he submits in the course of administration.
It does not appear that any opposition to the above-quoted report of the administrator was ever
filed by the heirs. Section 9 of Rule 86 provides that if examined on his accounts, the
examination shall be under oath. No opposition having been filed examination under oath was
not necessary. (Ibid) In the report it is stated: (1) that the administrator was ordered to retain only
P2,900 to respond for the claim of the Lyric Films; (2) that the heirs of the estate, being already
of age, have disposed of a great portion of the funds of the estate, the administrator retaining
only sums necessary to pay debts; (3) that the court had ordered the sale of properties of the
estate on January 1928 because the debts had all been paid. From these statements, which do
not appear controverted in the record of the proceedings, it can clearly be deduced that the
P17,600, subject of the present suit had already been used up either to pay debts or taken by the
heirs themselves who have already reached the age of majority.

The above statements do not appear to have ever been contradicted by the heirs of the estate,
nor have objections thereto ever been filed by the heirs, according to the record of the
proceedings, otherwise the judge below would have noted said objections, and the plaintiff would
have indicated where and when the objections were made. Not that the report (Manifestaciones)
is dated September 8, 1928, whereas the present action was filed on November 6, 1940, or
twelve years and two months thereafter.

The complaint alleges that the deceased administrator never presented an account of his
administration, especially after the sale of properties was authorized. We declare in reply that the
"Manifestaciones" is virtually the report on the estate of his accounts. The absence of any
opposition thereto on the part of the heirs in the administration proceedings shows that they
acquiesced therein and in all that is alleged therein. Any action to contest the correctness of said
report on its contents should have been presented promptly by the heirs. Their continued silence
— no action until now has been brought by the heirs of the estate — can only mean their
conformity therein or acquiescence thereto. Such silence or acquiescence is a patent denial of
the existence of any malfeasance on the part of the administrator Del Rosario in his
administration and is competent proof that he did not retain the sum claimed but had actually
used it in the payment of debts, or had delivered it to the heirs.

In its decision the court below found that notwithstanding the fact that the report of Del Rosario is
dated September 8, 1928 and he died on November 25, 1930, and administration proceedings
for the settlement of his estate were instituted, it does not appear that the heirs of Pedro Royo
had ever presented a claim for any liability that he may have contracted as administrator,
especialIy with respect to the amount of P17,610, subject of the present suit. No such claim was
ever presented either against Del Rosario singly or jointly with his bondsmen Deen and Delgado.
Under these circumstances, the court below held, the heirs of Pedro Royo or their administratrix
are prevented by estoppel or laches from instituting the present action. We find these
conclusions of fact and law to be well-founded.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed
with costs against the movants-appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20010 October 30, 1962

FRANCISCO BOIX and JOSE SILVESTRE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MELQUIADES G. ILAO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance for the Province of
Camarines Norte and MARICHU BATALLA, respondents.

Leonardo Abola for petitioners.

Jaime R. Alegre for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

On March 29, 1962, Marichu Batalla, a lumber concessionaire in the barrio of Lalawigan,
Municipality of Mercedes, in Camarines Norte, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
that province (Civil Case No. 1395) against Francisco Boix and his overseer Jose Silvestre,
demanding the removal of a roadblock consisting of high fence of poles, constructed by said
defendants on a road said to be existing since pre-war days, which prevented the passage of her
trucks from the logging area to the loading point in San Miguel Bay. As it was claimed that the
obstruction by defendants of said road was causing plaintiff a daily loss of P2,000.00, the court
granted her prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on March 29, 1962, upon her
filing a bond in the sum of P5,000.00, directing the defendants Boix and Silvestre to remove the
roadblocks and to refrain from interfering with and stopping plaintiff's delivery or transportation of
her logs.

In due time, defendants filed their answer alleging that the fence in question was constructed by
defendant Silvestre upon order and instruction of defendant Boix on the latter's land; that the log
pond claimed by plaintiff to be hers is a portion of the tract of land owned by Boix that plaintiff's
forest concession, on the other hand, also abuts the shores of San Miguel Bay besides having
other adequate outlets and means by which she could transport logs from her logging area to the
beach of San Miguel Bay; that plaintiff has no right to demand the use of the road and the log
pond referred to in the complaint, the same not being owned by her, nor are they properties of
public dominion; and that plaintiff has no cause of action against defendants. Attached to the
answer were proofs of defendant Boix 'ownership of the land on which road in question
traverses. As counterclaim, defendants demanded actual, compensatory and moral damages
and attorney's fees. Defendants also filed a separate motion for the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiff's complaint does not allege sufficient facts
entitling her to the relief therein demanded or to the said writ of preliminary injunction,
considering that the complaint failed to state that plaintiff has a right to the use of the road either
as owner thereof, or as assessor of a dominant estate with easement on the property belonging
to defendant Boix; that neither has plaintiff the right to demand a right of way over the aforesaid
parcel of land because her timber concession abuts the shores of San Miguel Bay and there are
other outlets through which plaintiff could transport her logs from the logging area to the public
highway or the shores of San Miguel Bay. It was claimed, therefore, that the continuation of the
acts complained of by plaintiff will not and cannot work injustice to her.

Acting on this motion to dissolve the preliminary mandatory injunction, the respondent Judge
under date of June 18, 1962, issued the following:

ORDER

It appearing that the road in question is a private road belonging to defendants and that
the plaintiff has not acquired any right to use the same for her logging purposes, the writ
of preliminary injunction issued ex-parteagainst the defendants on March 29, 1962, is
hereby ordered dissolved upon defendants' filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00 to
answer for damages the plaintiff may suffer by reason of this dissolution.

SO ORDERED.
The bond was filed and the writ of injunction issued therein was actually dissolved on July 6,
1962.

On July 7, 1962, plaintiff Batalla filed an urgent no for reconsideration of the order dissolving the
writ of injunction on the ground that she was scheduled to load 1,000,000 board feet of logs
bound for Japan on or a July 15, 1962, and should the road be closed, plain would be unable to
fulfill her aforesaid commitment which would result in irreparable damage to her.

This motion was heard on July 13, 1962, and upon termination of the urgency of plaintiff's need
to load or before July 18, 1962, the logs already felled and cut from her concession, the court
ordered on the same the revival or reinstatement of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(of March 29, 1962) enjoining defendants and their representatives from interfering plaintiff's
transportation of her logs, and ordering them (defendants) to remove the roadblock serving as
obstruction on the road in question.

It is against this second order of the lower court to the defendants, now petitioners here, have
filed the instant petition for certiorari seeking to nullify said order of July 13, 1962. And, as prayed
for by petitioners, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent to refrain
from removing the fence and having free access to the road in dispute. Copy of our writ was
actually received for respondent Marichu Batalla on July 20.

Under the circumstances above narrated, it is evident that the only purpose of this proceeding is
to secure the nullification and dissolution of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which
was dissolved and later revived by the lower court, to enable respondent Batalla to make use of
the road in order that she may fulfill her business commitments. We are not here, therefore, to
rule upon the right of respondent Batalla to use the road, nor on the propriety and sufficiency of
the means employed by petitioners for the alleged protection of the property right, but only to
determine whether the respondent court abused its discretion in issuing the order of July 13,
1962, reviving the dissolved writ of preliminary injunction issued on March 29, 1962.

It may be observed that the original order of March 29, 1962, granting the writ of preliminary
injunction that restrained petitioners from obstructing the passage of Batalla's trucks, was based
on the allegation in the complaint of the existence of plaintiff's right to the use of the road. In its
order of June 18, 1962, dissolving the writ of injunction the lower court found otherwise and
declared the said road as "belonging to defendants and that plaintiff has not acquired any right to
use the same for her logging purposes." Later however, or on July 13, 1962, the lower court,
without setting aside this order of June 18, 1962 expressly declaring the road as belonging to
defendants and that plaintiff has not acquired any right to use the same, the respondent judge
revived the injunction on the mere representation of plaintiff that she had to load and ship her
lumber on July 18, 1962. This, we believe, constitutes no sufficient justification for her use of
petitioner Boix' road, against the latter's will. Upon the facts before the court at the time, it was
irregular and improper and was a grave abuse of discretion to issue or revive the mandatory
injunction compelling respondent Boix to permit the use of his private road by the plaintiff who up
to that time the court has declared not to have acquired any right to use the same.

Counsel for petitioners, in his motion of August 15, 1962, called the attention of this Court to the
fact that from August 7 to 14, 1962, and notwithstanding the injunction issue by this Court, of
which respondent Batalla had prior notice, trucks loaded with logs belonging to her forced their
way through the road in question. Respondent Batalla, on the other hand, while admitting
ownership of the trucks and logs transported across petitioner's land, claims that during the
period when the alleged contemptuous acts were committed, she was in Manila and had no
opportunity to know the same much less give instruction to do said acts. Under the
circumstances, respondent is hereby only given warning that a repetition of similar or other acts
in violation of lawful orders or processes of this Court shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court of July 13, 1962 is hereby set aside, and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made respondent. With costs
against respondent Batalla.

So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18953 October 30, 1962

EMILIO ARZAGA, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO BOBIS, SR., respondent.

Jose P. Rodriguez and Jose P. Lagrosa for petitioner.

Abordo, Paredes and Socrates Law Office for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In the general election of November 10, 1959, the board of municipal canvassers of El Nido,
Palawan, proclaimed incumbent Emilio Arzaga mayor with a majority of 2 votes (509 by 507). His
election was contested in due time, and the Court of First Instance of Palawan likewise declared
him winner by 3 votes (509 by 506). His opponent, Francisco Bobis, Sr., brought the case to the
Court of Appeals. The latter reversed the decision of the lower court and declared Bobis, Sr., the
winner by 5 votes (502 by 507). The present case is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner Arzaga assigned twelve errors involving 15 ballots, whereas respondent Bobis, Sr.,
made five counter-assignments of error relative to 6 ballots. Thus, we are to review a total of 21
ballots only.

PETITIONER'S TWELVE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The Court of Appeals erred in considering Ballot Exhibit "A-6" (Precinct 3-A) as valid
vote for respondent.

In the blank Space for mayor in this ballot the following was written: "F. Vuvis". Under the idem
sonans rule, this should be counted in favor of respondent Bobis, Sr. The first assignment of
error is, therefore, overruled.

A name or surname incorrectly written which when read has a sound equal or similar to
that of the real name or surname of a candidate shall be counted in his favor. (Sec. 149,
paragraph 2, Revised Election Code.)

II. The Court of Appeals erred in considering ballot Exhibit 'A-1' (Precinct 3) as a valid
vote for respondent, in spite of the fact that what is written thereon is not the name of
respondent nor idem sonans thereof.
In the space for mayor "F. Pabes (or Pabis), Sr." was written by the voter. The second
assignment of error is likewise overruled. It is counted in favor of respondent under the idem
sonans rule.

III. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring Exhibit "B-6" (Precinct 3-A) as invalid vote
against petitioner.

With respect to this ballot the Court of Appeals said:

En la balota B-6 aparece votado E. Arzaga para el puesto de alcalde. El elector escribe
con bastante claridad, voto a 6 candidatos para senadores, para el puesto de
governador y vice-governador, y a 6 consejales. En el espacio para miembros de la junta
provincial, escribio "E. Arzaga" y en el segundo espacio "Castro Adolfo" pero tacho estos
dos nombres y despues de la palabra "Arzaga" puso "Potang ena mo'y despues del
apellido "Adolfo" puso "Berat". Indudablemente, estas palabras insultantes e indecentes
han sido escritas por el mismo elector a juzgar por la caligrafia con que estan trazadas
las mismas.

We have examined this ballot, and we agree with the Court of Appeals that the voter used
indecent words to mark his ballot. The third assignment of error is similarly overruled.

IV. The Court of Appeals erred in considering ballot Exhibit "B-14" (Precinct 3-A) as
marked and invalidating it against herein petitioner.

Petitioner Emilio Arzaga was voted for in this ballot. The Court of Appeals nullified the same as
marked, inasmuch as "Perez Bungcad" was written on the third space for councilors.

In the absence of any evidence aliunde, we are not convinced that this is a marked ballot. In fact,
there was a candidate for councilor by the surname of "Bungcad", although his first name was
not Perez, but Patricio, corroborated by the election return, Exhibit "YY"; the ballot Exhibit B-X-4;
and by the tally sheet, Exhibit "A-X-6". The fourth assignment of error is sustained. Ballot Exhibit
"B-14" of Precinct 3-A is counted in favor of petitioner Arzaga.

V. The Court of Appeals erred in considering ballot Exhibit "B-5" (Precinct 3-A) as
marked and invalidating it against herein petitioner.

Petitioner Arzaga was voted for herein. But on the 8th space for senators the voter wrote "R.
Perez Cabus Cabus". No evidence aliunde was presented as to the meaning of "Cabus Cabus".
Hence, it does not appear certain, nor clear, that the ballot is marked (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-14092, 10 April 1959). While Perez is not a candidate for senator, the writing of his
name should be considered a stray vote only, in accordance with paragraph 13, Section 149, of
the Revised Election Code, to wit:

13. Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of
a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself, shall be void and counted
as stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole ballot.

The fifth assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. Exhibit "B-5" is counted in favor of petitioner
Arzaga.

VI. The Court of Appeals erred in considering ballot Exhibit "B-10" (Precinct 3-A) as
marked and invalidating it against petitioner.

VII. The Court of Appeals erred in considering ballot Exhibit "B-11" (Precinct 3-A) as
marked and invalidating it against herein petitioner..
 VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in considering ballot Exhibit "B-12" (Precinct 3-A) as
marked and invalidating it against herein petitioner.

The 6th, 7th, and 8th assignments of error are taken up together because they have a common
feature. In all of them petitioner Arzaga was voted as mayor. In ballot Exhibit "B-10" the voter
wrote on the fifth line for councilors the words "Perez lagare talob sa kabila", In Ballot Exhibit "B-
11" was written "Perez lagari", on the sixth space for councilors. In ballot Exhibit "B-12 also
appears "Perez lagare" on the fourth space for councilors. With respect to these ballots, the
Court of Appeals said:

El protestante contiende que estas balotas son marcadasporque aparecen votados

"Perez" con varias palabras impertinentes. El protestante declaro en la vista de esta
causa que elnombre completo de Jose Perez es Jose Sanchez Perez y que Jose Perez
no es conocido en el barrio con una apodo. Jose Perez no era candidato para ningun
cargo.

El protestante declara que la palabra "lagare" en visayosignifica "sierra". En tagalog, que

es nuestra lengua nacional, la palabrra "lagare" tiene el mismo significado y aun sin
pruebas podemos declarar que la palabra "lagari" en tagalog significa "sierra". Tenemos,
por consifuiente, que segun el protestante no contradicho por ningun otro testigo, Jose
Perez no es conocidoen el barrio por ningun otra apodo o apelativo.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that these ballots were marked intentionally to identify them.
"Lagare" is an impertinent and derogatory word meaning a person who would want to profit or
get from both sides; and the appearance of three ballots from the same precinct, having the
same derogatory expression, strongly implies its use as a mark. The 6th, 7th, and 8th
assignments of error are overruled.

IX. The Court of Appeals erred in considering ballot Exhibit "B-8" (Precinct 3-A) as
marked and invalidating it against herein petitioner.

Petitioner Arzaga was voted as mayor in Exhibit "B-8". However, on the 6th line for councilors the
words "Bienes — OPA" were written. While no evidence aliunde was presented by respondent
as to the meaning of these words, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that the ballot
was marked intentionally, considering that the letters OPA were written in capitals at the bottom
of the ballot and away from the rest of the names of the persons voted for, which are all in
current script. Nor is there showing that the letters are the initials of a candidate. The 9th
assignment of error, is therefore, overruled (Coraede vs. Del Castillo, 50 O.G. 571; Moya vs. Del
Fierro, 69 Phil. 199).

X. The Court of Appeals erred in not invalidating Ballots Exhibits "A-1", "A-3", "A-7", and
"A-8" (Precinct 3-A) against respondents.

Petitioner Arzaga claims that indecent words or expressions, were written on these four ballots.
Since he did not, or could not, specify the alleged indecent words or phrases therein, the 10th
assignment of error is forthwith overruled. These ballots are counted in favor of respondent
Bobis, Sr.

XI. The Court of Appeals erred in counting Ballot Exhibit "A-2" (Precinct 3) in favor of
respondent.

On the space for mayor was written "F. Babes" or "F. Babeis". Obviously, the voter intended to
vote for respondent Bobis, Sr. (idem sonans rule). The 11th assignment of error is overruled.

XII. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering ballot Exhibit "A-3" (Precinct 3) marked
and in counting it a valid vote for respondent.
In Exhibit "A-13" appears written in the space for mayor "Kiko Padrieno-Bobis, Sr. "Kiko" is just a
nickname for Francisco, and "Padrieno" is not more but an expression of respect. The intention
of the voter to mark his ballot is not clear. The 12th assignment of error is over ruled.

RESPONDENT'S COUNTER-ASSIGNMENTS OF
ERROR

Respondent Francisco Bobis, Sr., made five counter-assignments of error involving 6 ballots,
which will be taken up one by one.

First Error. The Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the votes for respondent in ballots
Exhibits B(s)-1 (Precinct 3) and B(s)-2 (Precinct 3).

In Exhibit "B (s) 1", we read the name written on the space for mayor as "F. Bobis", which is idem
sonans with the name of respondent. But in Exhibit ""B (s) 2", "F. Boslro" appears to have been
written. There being no similarity in the sound as written in the latter ballot with that of respondent
Bobis, Sr., the same may not be counted in his favor. The first counter-assignment of error is
sustained as to Exhibit "B (s) 1", and overruled as to Exhibit "B (s) 2".

Second Error. The Court of Appeals erred in holding ballot Exhibit B-1, (Precinct 3) as
valid for petitioner.

"E. arsaaa" was voted for as mayor in this ballot. Plainly, the voter intended to vote for
respondent E. Arzaga, and the vote is valid under the idem sonans rule. The second counter-
assignment of error is overruled.

Third error. The Court of Appeals erred in holding ballot Exhibit B-1 (Precinct 3-A) as
valid for petitioner.

Petitioner E. Arzaga was voted for in Exhibit "B-1" of Precinct 3-A. Respondent Bobis, Sr.,
contends that this ballot is marked because the words "Casoy Guzman" was written on the first
space for councilors. According to the Court of Appeals, no evidence aliunde was presented to
show the intended meaning of the word "Casoy". We believe this ballot is a valid vote for
petitioner Arzaga (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, supra). The third counter-assignment of error is,
therefore, overruled.

Fourth Error. The Court of Appeals erred in holding ballot Exhibit B-7 (Precinct 3-A) as
not marked by the words "Dreo Boro Sosoc".

Petitioner Arzaga was voted for herein. However, respondent Bobis, Sr., contends that this ballot
was intentionally marked in as much as the words "Dreo Boro Sosoc" were written on the third
space for councilors and on the fourth space appeared "Bienes I Love y Darling'. In the absence
of evidence aliunde, we can not determine whether the words "Dreo Boro Sosoc" were not meant
to stand for the name of a non-candidate. As to the "I love y darling", it merely expresses
preference for candidate Bienes, and does not invalidate the ballot (Delgado vs. Tiu, G.R. No. L-
14143, May 27, 1959). Exhibit "B-7" of Precinct 3-A is, therefore, valid. The fourth counter-
assignment of error is overruled.

Fifth Error. The Court of Appeals erred in holding ballot Exhibit B-2 (Precinct 3-A) as valid
vote for petitioner.

Petitioner E. Arzaga was voted as mayor in this particular ballot. Respondent Bobis, Sr., Claims
that it was intentionally marked, because "S. Sumurraga" was written three times herein. We
have examined the ballot carefully and have found that "S. Sumurraga" was really written on
three different spaces: (a) on the 8th space for senators; (b) on the space for provincial vice-
governor; and (c) on the space for vice-mayor. According to the election return, Exhibit "YY", and
the tally sheet, Exhibit A-X-6", Santiago Sumurraga was a candidate for vice-mayor only. From
the ballot it is evident the voter could hardly write. It is apparent that it took him great pains and
trouble to write the three sets of "S. Sumurraga" — "S. Sumurraga" — "S. Sumurraga". Attention
is also invited to the fact that the first six spaces for senators were left blank. On the seventh
space for senators he wrote "Villareal". He did not vote for any member of the provincial board.
He voted for only one councilor, "Guzman", but he wrote it on the sixth line, and also left the first
five spaces for councilors blank. All these facts and circumstances found on the ballot seems to
indicate the apparent intention of said voter to mark his ballot to identify it. In upholding the
validity of this ballot the Court of Appeals relied on paragraph 3, Section 149, of the Revised
Election Code, which provides:

3. When the name of a candidate appears in two spaces of the ballot, it shall be counted
in favor of the candidate for the office with respect to which he is a candidate. The vote
for the office for which he is not a candidate shall be counted as stray.

The Court of Appeals also cited the case of Amurao vs. Calangi, G.R. No.
L-12631, promulgated August 22, 1958, which is not applicable to this case. We believe that the
case of Gutierrez vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-14252, promulgated on February 28, 1959, is the one
applicable to this case, a portion of which is quoted hereunder to wit:

Ballot Exhibit P32-GI. This ballot was rejected by the trial court as marked because the
name "Recto", a candidate for Senator, was written in all the eight spaces for senators.
To this conclusion we agree because the writing of the name "Recto" several times
evidently was intended to identify the voter who cast this ballot. Rule 3, Section 149, of
the Revised Election Code is inapplicable. This rule contemplates the writing of a name
of a candidate in TWO SPACES of the ballots whereby the vote for the office for which
he is not candidate shall be counted as stray vote. This ballot was properly rejected.

The rule of the Election Code above-quoted is justified in the case of a bane written in two
spaces because the duplication could be an oversight. But the rule can not be stretched
indefinitely without opening the door to fraud. Ballot Exhibit "B-2" of Precinct 3-A should be
nullified and the fifth counter-assignment of error sustained.

In conclusion, only two (2) votes should be added to petitioner Emilio Arzaga's total numbre of
votes and one (1) deducted from him. The votes of respondent Francisco Bobis, Sr., should be
increased by e. The result is as follows:

ARZAGA BOBIS

As of the appealed decision 502 507

Plus: Exh. "B-14" Plus: Exh. "B(s)-1"

(Prec. 3-A) (Prec. 3)

(1st counter-assignment of
(4th assignment of error) 1 error) 1

(Exh. "B-5")
(Prec. 3-A)
(5th assignment of error) 1

504

Less:
 Exh. "B-2"
(Prec. 3-A)
(5th counter-assignment of
error) 1

FINAL TOTAL 503 508

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the modification above-indicated.
Respondent Francisco Bobis, Sr., is hereby declared elected to the office of municipal mayor of
El Nido, Province of Palawan, with a majority of five (5) votes. Costs against petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
Dizon and Regala, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18622 October 30, 1962

LIM SON, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATIONS, respondent
appellee.

Salvador M. Sales for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by petitioner Lim Son from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

On February 29, 1960, said petitioner commenced this special civil action in said Court, to secure
a writ of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondent Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, mainly to enjoin the latter from proceeding with his
deportation from the Philippines. After a hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction
the same was denied. Subsequently, respondent filed its answer, and, after several
postponements of the hearing on the merits, petitioner, without introducing any evidence
submitted the case for decision, upon the filing of the memoranda of the parties. Thereupon, the
lower court rendered its aforementioned decision. A reconsideration thereof having been denied,
petitioner interposed the present appeal.

It appears that on October 12, 1949, a warrant for petitioner's arrest was issued for the purpose
of deporting him, under Section 37 (a) (9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, upon the
charge that he had given false testimony under oath in an administrative investigation conducted
by the Bureau of Immigration. The Board of Commissioners of Immigration found petitioner — in
a decision dated July 14, 1955, in Immigration Case No. 14708F — guilty as charged, and,
accordingly, ordered his deportation. Said decision having become final, the corresponding
warrant for petitioner's deportation was, on August 6, 1955, issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration. A motion of petitioner to re-open the deportation proceedings was denied by said
respondent Board on September 3, 1955. Petitioner took no further action on the matter until the
institution, on February 29, 1960, of this case in which he assails said decision as null and void,
upon the theory that said Board had "acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, with grave
abuse of discretion", but the Court of First Instance of Manila found this pretense devoid of merit,
aside from holding petitioner guilty of laches. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

He maintains that the lower court has erred in finding that his cause of action is barred by laches.
Mere delay he says, does not amount to laches, when there has been an irregularity in the
procedure, and, there has been, he maintains, such irregularity in the present case, because his
motion to re-open the deportation proceedings was denied by the Board of Commissioners, not
by the Commissioner of Immigration, who, petitioner asserts, has, under Rule 3, Subdivision A,
Section 21 of Administrative Order No. 1, the exclusive authority to act on said motion. There is,
however, no merit in this pretense, for the Commissioner of Immigration is the Chairman of said
Board, so that the action of the latter is, also, actually an action of the former. Moreover,
considering that the decision of the Board finding petitioner guilty of false testimony was
rendered on July 14, 1955, and that he neither assailed the action of the Board until February 29,
1960, nor tried to explain this long inaction, we find that the lower court was justified in declaring
petitioner herein guilty of laches. Regardless of the foregoing, there is no reason to review the
decision of the Board of Commissioners, there being absolutely no evidence that the same had
committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner guilty of false testimony.

One other point. Nobody appeared before this court at the hearing of this case, on July 20, 1962.
Five (5) days later, counsel for petitioner filed an unverified motion alleging that his failure to
attend said hearing was due to his presence in Samar in connection with several cases, neither
the number nor the title of which he gave, that he did not return to Manila until July 24, 1962, and
it was only on July 25, 1962 that he received the notice of said hearing and praying, accordingly,
that this be re-scheduled for hearing. The motion is denied, it appearing that the notice of hearing
was mailed on July 1962; that it was received in the office of the postmaster of Caloocan City,
where counsel for petitioner resides, July 14, 1962, and that it could not be delivered to said
counsel prior to July 24, 1962, owing to his absence for Caloocan up to such date. Besides, the
appeal and the case in itself are so manifestly devoid of merit that cannot hearing would merely
delay further the execution of valid decision that has been final since 1955.

The decision appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18239 October 30, 1962

CESAR ROBLES, ELISA G. DE ROBLES and SULPICIO ROCO, petitioners,

vs.
DONATO TIMARIO, ET AL., respondents.

Ramon Imperial and Donato C. Valenzuela for petitioners.

Reyes and Dy-Liacco for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

From the records of this case for certiorari, we gather that in Civil Case No. 3015 of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, certain properties of the defendants Cesar Robles and Elisa G.
de Robles, consisting of a house and lot, were preliminarily attached. In the decision,
promulgated thereafter, said defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs, Donato Timario and
Consuelo J. Timario, the sum of P9,218.00, with costs. This decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, and became final and executory; but execution thereof was set aside by the
Supreme Court, on certiorari (G.R. No. L-13911, April 28, 1960), for the reason that the writ of
execution ordered collection of legal interest, which was not authorized in the judgment.

Now the matter of execution of the decision has again come up to this Court, this time petitioners
claiming that the whole amount of P9,218.00 should not be enforced against them in view of
supervening circumstances that transpired pending their appeal of the principal case.

In the present case, petitioners alleged that, pending the former appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the Robles spouses sold the attached properties to one Sulpicio Roco, their co-petitioner, under
stipulation that the latter should assume payment to the Timarios of whatever amount may finally
be adjudged in their favor; that the Timarios learning of the transaction, verbally requested Roco
to cede to them a strip of land with an area of approximately 84 square meters, and, upon assent
by Roco, took possession of the premises. The petition further alleges that through a letter dated
June 16, 1959 sent by petitioner Roco's counsel to the Timarios, Roco offered payment to them
of the amount of P9,218.00, adjudged against the spouses Robles:

. . . after deducting the value of the small parcel of land in Dimas Alang street which Mr.
Roco ceded to you as part of the redemption; and with respect to the 'legal interest', he
will abide by the result of the certiorari case.

i.e., G.R. No. L-13911; that Donato Timario answered the letter (Annex C) manifesting:

. . . I wish to state that inasmuch as the period for redemption had already expired and
inasmuch as you have raised this point in your motion to the Supreme Court, it seems to
me that it would be better to wait for the resolution of the Supreme Court of your said
motion.;

and that when the earlier certiorari case was decided, the Timarios moved again for execution for
the full amount of P9,218.00, without deducting the value of the strip of land ceded to them.

Except for the motion for the writ of execution for the full amount, the respondents denied all the
preceding allegations, not only in their answer to the present petition but also in previous
pleadings filed with the trial court.

Over the opposition to the motion for execution filed by herein petitioners, the lower court, in its
order dated December 20, 1960, granted the issuance of an alias writ of execution because of
the denial by the plaintiffs Timarios (herein respondents) of the alleged agreement with Sulpicio
Roco, and because, even if true, said contract is foreign to the case and may be the subject of an
independent action. Further steps to proceed with this alias writ of execution were blocked when
this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

The theory of petitioners is that there has been a change in the situation of the parties which
makes the execution inequitable at present. We agree. If it be true and Timario's letter, Annex
"C", above-quoted does not deny it that Roco did cede to the Timarios the parcel of land in
Dimas Alang street as part payment of their judgment credit, it is but just that the value of this
property should be determined and deducted from the judgment. Such termination can not be
properly made in an independent case, because the judgment debtor is entitled to the benefit of
it, and to have the exact balance fixed. In addition, the reduced judgment may affect the amount
of property to be sold; it may sway prospective bidders for the property levied upon, as well as
influence the judgment debtors or their successors in interest, in deciding whether or not they
should redeem the property sold. Much complication can be avoided if the trial court should
resolve now what is the true balance of the judgment in favor of respondents Timario, instead of
leaving the question open for a separate suit that does not appear to be a fully adequate remedy.
As to Roco's personality to intervene, it must be remembered that the property attached was
transferred to him, and he has stepped into the shoes of his assignors, the original party
defendants; and if the Timarios did accept a part payment from him (Roco), they would be
estopped to question his intervention in these proceedings.

The order appealed from is hereby set aside and the records ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision, in order to determine the exact
balance of the judgment in favor of spouses Timario before execution is issued. The preliminary
injunction is hereby made permanent. Costs shall be paid by respondents Donato and Consuelo
Timario.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
Regala JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18235 October 30, 1962

PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU), SEVERINO BUNGOLTO and 14

OTHERS, petitioners,
vs.
KIN SAN RICE AND CORN MILL COMPANY and/or TIBURCIO MA and TUBOD LABOR
UNION and/or DIEGO PALOMARES, ROSARIO SAMBRANO and OTHERS UNKNOWN and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,respondents.

Emilio Lumuntad for petitioners.

Victor A. Arches for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

Appeal by certiorari taken by Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union and fourteen of its members
to reverse the resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations in case No. 43-ULP-Cebu
setting aside its decision (thru Jose S. Bautista) dated June 30, 1960, and dismissed their
complaint.

Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, with main office in Cebu City, while its co-petitioners
are among its members employed with respondent Kim San Rice & Corn Mill Company, duly
organized domestic partnership doing business at Tubod, Lanao del Norte, with respondent
Tiburcio Ma as its manager.

On August 15, 1955, petitioners filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a complaint for unfair
labor practices Republic Act 875 (Case No. 43-ULP-Cebu) against respondents and the Tubod
Labor Union, a legitimate labor organization, its officers and some of its members, alleging that
on April 9, 1955, Rosario Sambrano, vice-president of the Tubod Labor Union, together with
other members thereof, threatened and coerced members of the PLASLU, who were employees
of respondent company, into joining their union, resulting in petitioner Feliciano Angcajas being
boxed and slipped by Sambrano; that on April 20, 1955 Tiburcio Ma, discriminating against
PLASLU members, refused them work.

In separate answers respondents denied the material allegations of the complaint.

On June 30, 1960, after due trial, the Court, through Judge Jose S. Bautista, found the
respondents guilty of the unfair labor practices charged and ordered them to desist from further
committing the acts complained of, and ordered them (except the Tubod Labor Union)
furthermore to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions under the same terms and
conditions of employment, with back wages from April 20, 1955 until their actual reinstatement.

Deciding respondents' timely filed motion for reconsideration, the respondent Court en
banc issued the appealed resolution, whose dispositive part reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision dated June 30, 1960, is set aside and
the complaint should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED, for failure of the complainants to
substantiate the same.

However, since counsel for respondents in the oral argument has made the Court
understand that there could be a possibility of taking them (petitioners) back (for work)
should they present themselves (Hearing of November 10, 1960), the Court enjoins
respondents to comply with the commitment for the sake of industrial peace, whenever
possible.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Industrial Relations committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling (a) that their evidence, consisting mainly of the testimonies of petitioners Francisco
Angcajas Felix Gonzaga and Emilio Lucot, is not sufficient to prove the alleged unfair labor
practices alleged in their complaint, and (b) that each of the fourteen individual petitioners should
have testified to prove their respective claims.

In the last analysis, the issue involved in this appeal therefore is whether or not the respondent
court erred in finding that its co-respondents did not commit the acts complained of, namely: that
they coerced some members of petitioner union to join the Tubod Labor Union, the coercion
consisting mainly in petitioner Feliciano Angcajas being maltreated by the Vice President of the
Tubod Labor Union, and that respondent partnership, through its Manager, discriminated against
members of petitioner union to whom it refused work and employment on April 20, 1955.

In the decision of June 30, 1960, Judge Bautista found, on the basis of the evidence presented,
that said acts were committed by respondents, but, in deciding the motion for reconsideration
timely filed by respondents, the court en banc found otherwise; that is, that the alleged acts of
coercion, maltreatment, and discrimination were not committed. This is the finding that petitioners
now seek to have us reverse.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that the decisions of the Court of Industrial Relations are
open for review, on appeal by certiorari, only as to questions of law and not as to questions of
fact nor as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support its findings of fact. On the other hand, it is
likewise clear that, upon considering a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Industrial
Relations, sitting en banc, is not bound to accept the findings of fact and law made by one of its
judges who tried the case, but has the authority, nay, the duty, to ascertain whether said findings
are or are not supported by the record, and if they are not, to reverse them and render the
corresponding decision. In view of these considerations, we are not now in a position to hold that,
contrary to the finding made by a majority of the judges of the respondent court, the acts
complained of were really committed and that, consequently, respondents are guilty of unfair
labor practice.

WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from is affirmed with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18216 October 30, 1962

STOCKHOLDERS OF F. GUANZON AND SONS, INC., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA, respondent-appellee.

Ramon C. Fernando for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On September 19, 1960, the five stockholders of the F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. executed a
certificate of liquidation of the assets of the corporation reciting, among other things, that by
virtue of a resolution of the stockholders adopted on September 17, 1960, dissolving the
corporation, they have distributed among themselves in proportion to their shareholdings, as
liquidating dividends, the assets of said corporation, including real properties located in Manila.

The certificate of liquidation, when presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila, was denied
registration on seven grounds, of which the following were disputed by the stockholders:

3. The number of parcels not certified to in the acknowledgment;

5. P430.50 Reg. fees need be paid;

6. P940.45 documentary stamps need be attached to the document;

7. The judgment of the Court approving the dissolution and directing the disposition of the
assets of the corporation need be presented (Rules of Court, Rule 104, Sec. 3).

Deciding the consulta elevated by the stockholders, the Commissioner of Land Registration
overruled ground No. 7 and sustained requirements Nos. 3, 5 and 6.

The stockholders interposed the present appeal.

As correctly stated by the Commissioner of Land Registration, the propriety or impropriety of the
three grounds on which the denial of the registration of the certificate of liquidation was
predicated hinges on whether or not that certificate merely involves a distribution of the
corporation's assets or should be considered a transfer or conveyance.

Appellants contend that the certificate of liquidation is not a conveyance or transfer but merely a
distribution of the assets of the corporation which has ceased to exist for having been dissolved.
This is apparent in the minutes for dissolution attached to the document. Not being a conveyance
the certificate need not contain a statement of the number of parcel of land involved in the
distribution in the acknowledgment appearing therein. Hence the amount of documentary stamps
to be affixed thereon should only be P0.30 and not P940.45, as required by the register of deeds.
Neither is it correct to require appellants to pay the amount of P430.50 as registration fee.

The Commissioner of Land Registration, however, entertained a different opinion. He concurred

in the view expressed by the register of deed to the effect that the certificate of liquidation in
question, though it involves a distribution of the corporation's assets, in the last analysis
represents a transfer of said assets from the corporation to the stockholders. Hence, in
substance it is a transfer or conveyance.

We agree with the opinion of these two officials. A corporation is a juridical person distinct from
the members composing it. Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it
as an entity separate and distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute personal
property they do not represent property of the corporation. The corporation has property of its
own which consists chiefly of real estate (Nelson v. Owen, 113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75; Morrow v.
Gould, 145 Iowa 1, 123 N.W. 743). A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the
corporation's property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed
according to law and equity (Hall & Faley v. Alabama Terminal, 173 Ala 398, 56 So., 235), but its
holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation (Bradley v. Bauder 36 Ohio
St., 28). Nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets
(Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U.S., 521; Jones v. Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The stockholder is not a co-
owner or tenant in common of the corporate property (Halton v. Hohnston, 166 Ala 317, 51 So
992).

On the basis of the foregoing authorities, it is clear that the act of liquidation made by the
stockholders of the F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. of the latter's assets is not and cannot be
considered a partition of community property, but rather a transfer or conveyance of the title of its
assets to the individual stockholders. Indeed, since the purpose of the liquidation, as well as the
distribution of the assets of the corporation, is to transfer their title from the corporation to the
stockholders in proportion to their shareholdings, — and this is in effect the purpose which they
seek to obtain from the Register of Deeds of Manila, — that transfer cannot be effected without
the corresponding deed of conveyance from the corporation to the stockholders. It is, therefore,
fair and logical to consider the certificate of liquidation as one in the nature of a transfer or
conveyance.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the resolution appealed from, with costs against appellants.

Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18112 October 30, 1962

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA NG ALAK (NAFLU), petitioner,

vs.
HAMILTON DISTILLERY COMPANY, CO BON BENG, MARIANO ANG ENG and HAMILTON
WORKERS' UNION, respondents.

Oliveros and Mallare for petitioner.

Agapito S. Mendoza for respondent Hamilton Workers Union.
Lopez-De Joja, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for respondent Hamilton Distillery Company, et
al.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dismissing the complaint
herein for unfair labor practice.
Respondent Hamilton Distillery Company or Hamilton Wine Manufacturing Co., hereinafter
referred to as the Company, is a commercial establishment engaged in the manufacture of wine
in the Philippines, whereas respondents Co Bon Beng and Mariano Ang Eng are the
superintendent or cashier and the manager respectively thereof.

On September 24, 1957, two (2) labors unions, composed of employees and laborers of the
Company, were registered with the Department of Labor, namely, petitioner Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa ng Alak (NAFLU), hereinafter referred to as the NAFLU, and respondent Hamilton
Workers' Union, hereinafter referred to as the Workers' Union. Thereupon, the latter and the
Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement, incorporated into a private instrument
purporting to have been executed on September 24, 1957. Moreover, the Company issued a
notice bearing the same date, addressed to all of its employees, giving non-members of the
Workers' Union thirty (30) days within which to join the same, or else, be dismissed.

There is evidence to the effect that, upon learning that the NAFLU was being organized, or on
September 23, 1957, Co Bon Beng sent for Francisco Dumlao, and inquired whether it was true
that he had organized said labor and was its president; that upon receipt of an affirmative
answer, Co Bon Beng urged Dumlao to dissolve the NAFLU, for otherwise he would be
dismissed; that when Dumlao answered that he could not follow this advice, Co Bon Beng bade
him to look for another job; that on September 24, 1957, Co Bon Beng refused to admit him to
work upon the ground that he was unwilling to dissolve the NAFLU; that, subsequently, some
members thereof resigned therefrom and joined the Workers' Union, because otherwise they
would be dismissed by the Company; that beginning from September 30, 1957, those who
remained affiliated to the NAFLU were allowed to work only two (2) days a week; and that on
October 28, 1957 the following members of the NAFLU, who had not joined the Workers' Union
were dismissed by the Company, namely:

1. Ambos, Avelina 27. Gawiran, Gorgonio

2. Belarmino, Gleceria 28. Jusay, Ruben

3. Bada, Adora 29. Ignacio, Antonio

4. Cerezo, Rosa 30. Labusta, Engracio

5. Cerdeno, Josefa 31. Libatique, Ceril

6. Cobarrubias, Luz 32. Martin, Ramon

7. Cobarrubias, Corazon 33. Hermogeno, Esther

8. Castranero, Filimena 34. Javier, Mercedes

9. Cenon, Marina 35. Lacsamana, Nenita

10. Dumlao, Cristina 36. Manreza, Avelina

11. Cruz, Elena de la 37. Masiglat, Norma

12. Esquivel, Plavia 38. Montealegre,

Angelina

13. Evangelista, 39. Yumul, Laura

Rosanna

14. Francisco, Rosita 40. Reyes, Elnora

15. Flores, Dorotea 41. Sarmiento, Purita

 16. Germeno, Caridad 42. Santos, Crisanta

17. Pique, Remedios 43. Perez, Cresencia

18. Vigo, Leda 44. Martin, Jorge

19. Avinante, Simplicio 45. Martin, Severino

20. Brion, Felix 46. Mariano, Anicito

21. Bayano, Ramon 47. Mendoza, Roman

22. Cruz, Jose de la 48. Montevirgin, Manuel

23. Diaz, Angel 49. Opinaldo, Fernando

24. Dumalo, Francisco 50. Santos, Vicente

25. Gindoy, Luis, Jr. 51. Reyes, Felicisimo

26. Gonzaga, Atanacio 52. Sanchez, Esteban

These dismissed employees reported the matter to the Court of Industrial Relations, with which a
formal complaint for unfair labor practice was, on November 28, 1957, filed, by an acting
prosecutor of said court, against the Company, its aforementioned superintendent or cashier and
manager, and the Workers' Union. In their answer to this complaint, respondents denied the
charge and invoked, in justification for said dismissal of members of the NAFLU, a "closed shop"
clause in the collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the Workers Union.

Meanwhile, or on October 11, 1957, the NAFLU had filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a
petition for certification election (Case No. 500 MC), in view of which said court issued an order
dated October 19, 1957, directing that copies thereof be posted for the information of the
employees and laborers concerned and that copies of the petition be served upon the
corresponding officers of the Company and of the Workers' Union. Still later, or on November 25,
1957, the NAFLU filed, in the unfair labor practice proceedings, an urgent petition for an
injunctive relief, praying, among other things, that the effectivity of the collective bargaining
agreement between the Company and the Workers' Union be suspended and that the Company
be ordered to reinstate the dismissed employees or laborers with backpay. This petition was
denied on January 3, 1958. In due course thereafter, or on December 29, 1960, said Court
rendered a decision dismissing the unfair labor practice case. A reconsideration of such decision
having been denied by the Court sitting en banc, the case is now before us on appeal by
certiorari taken by the NAFLU.

The main issues in this appeal are: (1) whether or not the collective bargaining agreement
between the Company and the Workers' Union had been made fraudulently; and (2) whether or
not the dismissal of members of the NAFLU who had failed and refused to join the Workers'
union constitutes an unfair labor practice.

With respect to the first issue, one cannot minimize the importance of the fact that, although the
Workers' Union was registered on September 24, 1957, its collective bargaining agreement with
the Company and the notice issued by the Company — giving its employees who were not
members of the Workers' Union thirty (30) days to join the same, or else be dismissed — bear
the same date. Likewise, noteworthy is the circumstance that, aside from being a Chinese,
Valentin Kaw, the president of the Workers' Union, was the time-keeper of the Company, who, as
such, had supervisory authority over its employees and laborers, and could, therefore, exercise
substantial pressure upon them to induce, if not compel, them to join the Workers' Union, and
that the treasurer thereof was his brother Benito Kaw, another Chinese. Considering further that
said agreement was contained in a private document, and that the NAFLU was, also, registered
as a duly organized labor union, on the date aforementioned, we find it difficult to avoid the
feeling that the Workers' Union was, if not company dominated, at least organized under the
patronage of the Company, and that the same was in such a hurry to bargain with the Workers'
Union, in order to beat the NAFLU and prevent it from taking appropriate action prior, thereto,
that the agreement was made in a private instrument, thus suggesting that it must have been
made late at night. Otherwise the agreement would have been executed before a notary public
for the corresponding acknowledgment.

Indeed, the record shows that, despite several defections from the NAFLU, prior to the expiration
of the period given by the Company to non-members of the Workers' Union, the Company had to
dismiss 52 members of the NAFLU, apart from its president, for failure to join the Workers' Union
within said period. Considering that the Company had altogether around 100 employees only, it
is clear that a petition for certification election, if filed by the NAFLU prior to the execution of the
collective bargaining agreement between the Workers' Union and the Company, would have, in
all probability, barred effectively said agreement.

Independently of the foregoing, the provisions thereof do not legalize the dismissal of members
of the NAFLU. The lower court held otherwise, relying upon the "closed shop" clause of said
agreement reading:

That the COMPANY shall establish the policy of "Union Shop," effective October 24,
1957. All workers shall by that date become members of the UNION, except those
monthly salaried employees, and other supervisor-employee (technical men) listed by the
Management. The COMPANY shall be free to hire new laborers without giving
consideration to their membership or non-membership to the Union. However, all
laborers hired must join the UNION within sixty (60) days of employment, or face
discharge, except, those selected by the Management above. The UNION assumes
responsibility of individually signing up new laborers.

In this connection, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that, in the absence of a manifest intent to
the contrary, "closed shop" provisions in a collective bargaining agreement "apply only to
persons to be hired or to employees who are not yet members of any labor organization" and
that said provisions of the agreement are "not applicable to those already in the service at the
time of its execution" (Confederated Sons of Labor vs. Anakan Lumber Co., L-12503 [April 29,
1960]; Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers[FFW] vs. Judge Tabigne, L-16093 [November 29,
1960]; Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co. vs. CIR, L-16561 [January 28, 1961]; San Carlos Milling
Co. vs. CIR, L-15463 and L-15723 [March 17, 1961]; Talim Quarry Co., Inc. vs. Bartolo, L-15768
[April 29, 1961]).

The language of the above quoted "closed shop" clause is not such as to bar necessarily the
limitation of its application to new employees or laborers, or, at least, to those who were not as
yet affiliated to any labor organization. The first sentence of said clause may be construed to
refer to laborers or employees admitted after September 24, but before October 24, 1957. At any
rate, if the Company and the Workers' Union intended by said clause, to authorize the dismissal
of persons already in the service of said Company on or before September 24, 1957, but
belonging to another labor organization, and who failed to quit from the latter and join the
Workers' Union on or before October 24, 1957, then such stipulation would be null and void
(Findlay Millar Timber Co. vs. PLASLU L-18217 and L-18222 [September 29, 1962]. As held
in Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co., Inc vs. CIR (supra):

The closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4, subsec. a(4) of the Industrial Peace
Act above quoted should however, apply only to persons to be hired or to employees
who are not yet members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to those already in
the service who are members of another union. To hold otherwise, i.e., that the
employees in a company who are members of a minority union may be compelled to
 disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or contracting union, would render
nugatory the right of all employees to self organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing, a right guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act (sec.
3, Rep. Act No. 875) as well as by the Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1[6]).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
ordering the Company to cease and desist from further unfair labor practices, to pay the
members of the NAFLU who had been discriminated against the difference between the
compensation actually paid to them and that which they would have received had there been no
discrimination, and to reinstate the employees named above, with back wages from the time of
their dismissal until their actual reinstatement, with all of the rights and privileges appertaining
thereto, as well as to pay the costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18068 October 30, 1962

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION TO BECOME CITIZEN OF THE

PHILIPPINES, ANTONIO GO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Hernando Pineda for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal by the Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, granting the petition for naturalization of Antonio Go, despite the opposition thereto of
the Solicitor General. The grounds relied upon by appellant in urging the reversal of said decision
may be summed up as follows: (1) non-compliance with Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended; (2) appellee's character witnesses are neither competent nor credible; and (3)
petitioner's lack of the requisite qualifications.

In view of our opinion concerning the last two (2) issues, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the
first one.

Referring now to the second issue, we find that Governor De Lara, one of the character
witnesses in this case, does not have sufficient personal knowledge of the facts pertinent thereto
to vouch for the qualifications of petitioner herein and his alleged lack of disqualifications.
Governor De Lara testified that some of the data contained in his affidavit attached to the
petition, such as the date of birth of petitioner, was supplied by the latter. Hence, the knowledge
of said witness thereon is purely hearsay. Governor De Lara likewise stated that petitioner had
studied in public schools, although the school records and other evidence for the latter show the
contrary. Again, said witness testified that petitioner is a business partner of the Mindanao
Lumber and Hardware, whereas petitioner contradicted him by asserting that he was a salaried
employee of said establishment. Indeed, petitioner resides in Cagayan de Oro City, which is over
150 kilometers away from the municipality of Gingoog, Misamis Oriental, where the Governor
resides, thus explaining his scant knowledge of the aforementioned facts.
With respect to the other character witness, namely, Henry Canoy, suffice it to note that the
Revised Naturalization Law requires that character witnesses be "credible persons" and that, as
held in Ong vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-10642 (May 30, 1958):

. . . Within the purview of the Naturalization Law, a "credible" person is, to our mind, not
only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police
character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose "affidavit"
or testimony is not incredible. What must be "credible" is not the declaration made, but
the person making it. This implies that such person must have good standing in the
community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good
warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner. Thus in Cu vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-3018
(decided on July 18, 1951), we declared that said affiants "are in a way insurers of the
character of the candidate concerned." Indeed, by their affidavits, they do not merely
make the statements herein contained. They also vouch for the applicant, attest to the
merits of his petition and sort of underwrite the same.

The record before us does not affirmatively show that Henry Canoy lives up to the foregoing
standard.

Again, the evidence for petitioner does not satisfactorily establish that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed by Law. To begin with, he would have us believe that he used to get
from a business establishment his family a monthly salary of P120.00, which was lately
increased to P200.00, aside from free board and lodging from his mother. We have already held
that, in view of the reduced purchasing power of the Philippine currency, said income does not
suffice to make his trade or occupation a "lucrative" one, as required in Section 2, paragraph 4,
of the Revised Naturalization Law (Koa Gui vs. Republic, L-13717 [July 31, 1962]; Tan vs.
Republic, L-14860 [May 30, 1961]; Ong vs. Republic, L-15764 [May 19, 1961]; Tan vs. Republic,
L-14861 [March 17, 1961]). The absence of this qualification becomes more patent when we
consider petitioner's testimony to the effect that, upon graduation from college, he would stop
working to study medicine in Manila.

So, too, petitioner's veracity, and, hence, moral character, are, to say the least, of dubious
nature. The testimony given by him about his alleged employment and compensation is
contradicted by the fact that his residence certificates and school records show that his
occupation is merely that of a student. In this declaration of intention, Exhibit L, he claimed to be
"actually engaged in (the) business operation" of the Mindanao Hardware, which is contrary to
his testimony in court to the effect that he is an employee. Then, also, he has not paid income tax
or residence tax class B, which he should if his testimony as to his alleged income were true.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition herein dismissed,
with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18066 October 30, 1962

JUANITA NAIRA, petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MANILA, and
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, respondents.

Francisco P. Claravall and Bienvenido M. Fallarme for petitioner.

Villavieja and Belgado for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The facts of his case, as found by the Workmen's Compensation Commission, are stated in
appealed decision to be as follows:

. . . . The late Juan Naira had been employed by the respondent in its river barge for 26
years, first as an oarsman, and later as barge pilot until his death on November 13, 1958.
His monthly salary, at the time of his death, was P72.20 with rice allowance. Aside from
his duties as helmsman, he helps in the loading and unloading of cargoes on the barge.
On November 12, 1958, Juan Naira worked up to 1:30 p.m. helping in loading the barge
with cargoes consisting of 12 sacks of cotton seeds and fertilizers, 3 big loaded barrels
and 2 small ones, the three big barrels were heavy so that 3 persons, including the late
Juan Naira, carried the barrels, one at a time, to the barge. After the loading, Juan Naira,
went home to take his lunch. Not long after he had returned to the tabacalera compound
at 2:00 p.m., he began to complain of stomachache. He was brought to Dr. Melendres'
Clinic at Centro, Ilagan. Because of the intense pain, he was brought the next day to the
Isabela Provincial Hospital, where he died. Dr. M. Lim, Junior Resident Physician of said
Hospital, who attended him diagnosed his illness as acute mesenteric thrombosis, which
was later confirmed, as the cause of death, when autopsy was performed on the
deceased Juan Naira. . . .

The claimant-widow averred, and tried to prove, that her husband died of pulmonary
tuberculosis; she also submitted a death certificate, showing the cause of the death of her
husband to be acute beriberi. But from the evidence, particularly the autopsy report, the
Commission arrived at the conclusion that the cause of the death of the late Juan Naira was
none other than acute mesentric thrombosis, and denied compensation because:

. . . . Being merely sick of mesenteric thrombosis which caused his death, the same,
nevertheless, would not suffice to place the claim within the orbit of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. There must be a showing that such ailment or disease was directly
caused by his employment or aggravated by, or the result of the nature of such
employment. We have perused the entire record of the case and found no evidence
showing that the sickness of acute mesentric thrombosis was traceable to the
employment. In other words, no evidence was shown which would link said illness with
the nature of his work. (Emphasis added)

Hence, upon denial of her motion for reconsideration claimant resorted to this Court for review.

We agree with appellant that the decision should be reversed. In demanding that the claimant
should establish that the cause of death was directly brought about by the employment, or
aggravated by the nature of the employment the Workmen's Compensation Commission has
chosen to ignore the presumption expressly established in Section 43 (1) of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (No. 3428), as amended by Republic Act 772.

SEC. 43. Presumption. — In any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for
compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary —

"1. That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act."
In other words, in the absence of proof that the injury or death supervening in the course of
employment has arisen because of the nature of the same, the death or injury is, by law,
compensable, unless the employer clearly establishes that it was not caused or aggravated by
such employment or work. Mere absence of evidence that the mishap was traceable to the
employment does not suffice to reject the claim; there must be credible showing that it was not
so traceable (Batangas Trans. Co. vs. Vda. de Rivera, G.R. No. L-7658, May 8, 1956; Bohol
Land Trans. Co. vs. Vda. de Madanguit, 70 Phil. 685). In fact, in the Batangas Transportation
case, we held that where the cause of death supervening in the course of employment is
unknown, the death is compensable. In the case now before us, the fact that the illness followed
closely the exertions of the deceased in unloading the employer's barge strongly supports the
inference that the thrombosis leading to his death was at least precipitated by strain.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision brought on appeal for review is hereby reversed,
and this case is remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for the determination of
the amount of compensation due the petitioner and the other heirs of the deceased worker, with
costs against the respondent corporation.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor.

BARRERA, J.:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No. 433)
a petition which reads:

1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three
years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;

2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable
Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R.
Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of
legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;

3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her
maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from
Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now;

4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that
 she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are
had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.

The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates
the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the
Rules of Court.

In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of
the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon
petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name,
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married
name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil
Code which reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation
has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to
use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name from
Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her
maiden name, giving as reason or cause therefor her being legally separated from the husband
Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact that they have ceased to live together for many years.

There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from
the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the
change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact,
ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which
refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the
New Civil Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone — which is the only
basis for the petition at bar — is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provisions of Article 372.

It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner
owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding
is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition
was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner
and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod).
Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is hereby
set aside and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.