December 1, 2014

To: Zohra Yusuf, Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)

From: Adam Moscoe, Senior Analyst, Religious Minorities (fictional)

The Persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan:

Background and options for the Chairperson of the HRCP

Submitted to Professor Aryeh Neier, for the course:

Promoting Human Rights: History, Law, Methods and Current Controversies

Paris School of International Affairs, SciencesPo























Purpose

This note is intended to brief Ms. Yusuf on the current human rights situation of Ahmadis in
Pakistan, with a particular focus on the enforcement of the blasphemy law and the failure of
police and other authorities to protect the rights of Ahmadis in the face of extremist groups.
HRCP’s past engagement on this issue will be summarized followed by an assessment of
options for HRCP’s engagement in human rights promotion and protection concerning the
Ahmadis.

The Ahmadi population in Pakistan

The Ahmadi, or Ahmadiyya, are a religious minority who identify as Muslim and follow the
teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and the Quran. The group takes the name of its founder,
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (born in 1835 in Punjab), who Ahmadis consider to be a prophet and
messianic figure who intended to “revive the true spirit and message of Islam.”1 This notion is
seen as apostasy by Sunni Muslims. Of Pakistan’s 193 million people, 95% are defined as
Muslim (75% Sunni, 25% Shia). Estimates regarding the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan
range from 600,0002 to 2 million.3

The human rights situation faced by Ahmadis in Pakistan

The Ahmadi population of Pakistan has been the victim of a “sustained and vicious”
campaign of mass repression and impunity, in standing violation of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Pakistan ratified in 2010.4 Anti-Ahmadi riots
have taken place since as early as 1953, though the anti-Ahmadi constitutional amendments of
1973, described below, marked a turning point as persecution became less sporadic and more
systematic.5

While violence is generally carried out by non-state extremist groups, police are often accused
of turning a blind eye to attacks against vulnerable religious minorities. Furthermore,
legislators and members of the judiciary are accused of complicity in creating and maintaining
a system of discriminatory treatment towards Ahmadis accused of blasphemy or charged with
violating penal code provisions that effectively present the Ahmadis from exercising their
internationally enshrined right to religious practice.

The Ahmadis are far from the only religious minority to be currently facing repression. The
situation endured by Shia Muslims and Christians, for example, is similarly dire yet the
comprehensive nature of discrimination against Ahmadis — from birth until death and even
thereafter — is arguably unique. These minority communities suffered nearly one thousand
deaths between 2012 and 2013 due to sectarian attacks. Moreover, their members suffered

1Human Rights Watch (2007), “Pakistan: Pandering to Extremists Fuels Persecution of Ahmadis.” http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/05/05/pakistan-pandering-extremists-fuels-persecution-ahmadis
2 Freedom House (2010), “The Impact of Blasphemy Laws on Human Rights.” 120.
3 US State Department (2013), “Pakistan 2013 International Religious Freedom Report.” 2.
4 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), “State of Human Rights in 2013.” 88.; Freedom House 73.
5 Freedom House, 71

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serious human rights abuses including “extrajudicial and targeted killings, sectarian violence,
disappearances, and torture.”6

Before outlining the discriminatory provisions in the Penal Code, it is fitting to recall
Pakistan’s own constitution, which states: “subject to law, public order, and morality, every
citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion.” Also pertinent are
the words of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. In 1947, he stated: “You may
belong to any religion, caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. In
due course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims –
not in a religious sense for that is the personal faith of an individual – but in a political sense
as citizens of one state.” Jinnah’s words appear to have fallen on deaf ears over at least the
past four decades.7

Under Pakistani law Ahmadis have been defined as “non-Muslim” since 1974 pursuant to a
constitutional amendment. In 1984, the new government of Islamist military ruler Zia-ul-Haq
additionally prohibited Ahmadis from identifying or “posing as Muslims.”8 The penal code
imposes three-year prison sentences for Ahmadis who "who directly or indirectly, poses
himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his
faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims.”9
For example, in November 2013 a 72-year-old Ahmadi homeopath was arrested under the
Penal Code (Section 298-C) for “posing as a Muslim for quoting from the Quran.” Yet the
man was framed by complainant, who asked the man to explain the Ahmadi faith. The
complainant taped the man’s answer and submitted the recording to the police, thereby setting
him up to violate the Penal Code by explaining the Ahmadi faith to be routed in the Quran.10
The penal code (section 298-B) also imposes three year sentences for Ahmadis who refer to
their places of worship as "mosques" or to their calls to prayer as “azaan.”

One could argue that these sets of regulations do not categorically outlaw the practice of
religion by Ahmadi individuals, yet there can be no question that they make the practice of the
religion to which Ahmadis formally and fully adhere – Islam – inaccessible at best and life-
threatening at worst. Most crucially, these laws have – according to Mujib-ur-Rehman, an
Ahmadi who serves as an advocate at the Supreme Court – “institutionalised the persecution
of Ahmadis…under the cover of the law.” He goes on to say that “this does not happen to any
other community [in Pakistan],” thereby creating a distinction between the persecution faced
by the Ahmadis compared to that which plagues other religious groups, including Christians
and Shia Muslims.11 Most crucially, this legal framework, combined with a culture of

6 US State Department (2013), “Pakistan 2013 Human Rights Report.” 25.

7 State Department Religious Freedom 10.
8 Asad Hashim (2014), “Pakistan's Ahmadiyya: An 'absence of justice’.” Al-Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2014/08/pakistan-ahmadiyya-an-absence-justice-20148616414279536.html
9Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/
actXLVof1860.html.
10 HRCP 90.
11 Al-Jazeera (2014).

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intolerance for religious diversity, creates a “permissive environment” for extremist attacks.12
This effect is dangerously exacerbated by the increasing influence of “religious extremists in
the political system,” thereby compromising “the ability of lower-level judges, police, and
government officials to uphold pluralistic values.”13

The above laws are subject to highly broad interpretation, with past cases being brought forth
for – according to police files – minarets atop Ahmadi mosques (which is not explicitly
prohibited by law), merely reading the Quran or praising the Prophet Muhammad, wearing a
t-shirt containing an Islamic slogan, as well as including Quranic verses on wedding
invitations.14 As one editorial put it, the Ahmadis “have no rights, no safeguards, and can be
jailed for some of the pettiest ‘offences’ inventive and mischievous minds can think of.”15

Saleem Uddin, an Ahmadi spokesman, claims that discrimination against Ahmadis spans the
entire lifecycle and begins as early as birth, noting that one can be tried merely for whispering
the ‘azaan’ call to worship in the ears of newborns. Discrimination continues within work
settings and in both public and private educational institutions, where anti-Ahmadi
propaganda has been found in curricula.16 On the other end of the lifecycle spectrum, the
graves of deceased Ahmadis have been defaced by local extremists for containing verses from
the Quran.17 Moreover, police have succumbed to pressure from local clerics to disinter the
bodies of Ahmadis from common “Muslim” village graveyards.18 The pressure in this
situation emerges from external groups of extremists, disrupting traditionally peaceful
relations between Ahmadis and other citizens in small towns. What is unclear is why the
police appear powerless in the face of extremist groups and their demands.

Blasphemy Law

In 1986, Pakistan added Section 295 to the Penal Code. Known as the “Blasphemy Law,” the
section instituted the death penalty for the crime of blasphemy. Ahmadis were deemed
collectively guilty of this crime since their belief in Ahmad’s status as a prophet “defiled the
name of Prophet Muhammad.”19 The Blasphemy Law is embedded within the aforementioned
Penal Code restrictions on religious minorities.20 Blasphemy includes defiling the Quran as
well as carrying out gatherings or uttering words with the intention of disrespecting Islam.
Also included is the misuse of titles (such as “mosque”) that are reserved for specific religious

12 State Department Religious Freedom 17.

13 Freedom House 72.
14 Al-Jazeera (2014) and Human Rights Watch (2007).
15
HRCP 88; Human Rights Watch (2012), “Pakistan: Prosecute Ahmadi Massacre Suspects,” http://
www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/27/pakistan-prosecute-ahmadi-massacre-suspects.
16 State Department Religious Freedom 12.
17 Al-Jazeera (2014).
18 HRCP 90.
19 Freedom House 73.
20
List of prisoners charged with blasphemy as of April 2014: http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF
%202014%20Annual%20Report%20PDF.pdf,

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adherents (Section 298-B). Section 298-C explicitly prohibits Ahmadis from calling
themselves Muslims or preaching or disseminating their faith.

Key observations:

• Since 1984, 245 Ahmadis have been killed and 205 have been assaulted in attacks by mobs
and extremists. Violence against Ahmadis has decreased significantly from the 1980s, when
the Blasphemy Law was introduced accompanied by state-sanctioned persecution.

• In 2013, seven Ahmadis were murdered in targeted attacks, primarily in Karachi and
Lahore.21 These individuals were among the 722 individuals — mostly Shia Muslims —
killed in sectarian violence in 2013.22 36 Ahmadis were charged with religious offences, and
27 of them were arrested.23 Fuelling the campaign of attacks was encouragement from local
clerics who, in October, addressed a gathering of 9,000 people in Rabwah, calling for a
“holy war” against Ahmadis.24

• Attacks are usually carried out with firearms. In one case in a Lahore, an Ahmadi doctor
was attacked by a youth who threw acid on his face.

• On May 28, 2010, 86 Ahmadis were killed in two extremist attacks by an affiliate of the
Pakistani Taliban on Ahmadi places of worship in Lahore. The chief of Pakistan’s main
intelligence agency later testified that police “protected” those involved in the attack and
“even directed them to the hospital where the wounded were being treated.”25

• In July 2014, a woman and two of her granddaughters (7 and 8 years old) died of smoke
inhalation due to being trapped in their home in Gujranwala, the result of a violent mob of
1000 people that erupted after a member of the victims’ Ahmadi community was accused of
posting to Facebook a photo of a partially nude women sitting atop the Kaaba shrine in
Mecca. Eight others were injured in the mob, including a pregnant woman who suffered a
miscarriage, and at least eight houses were set ablaze.26 Some of the participants in the
rampage threw stones at ambulances. Ahmadi leaders allege that the police turned a blind
eye to the mob and, moreover, they allege that the Facebook account of the accused Ahmadi
individual was hacked, leading to the offensive post. Police officials indicated the mob
swelled to uncontrollable proportions “before we could do anything about it.”27 Imran
Khalid Butt, the local political representative in Punjab, characterized the mob members as
“some troublemakers who try to take advantage” of a situation in which someone is accused

21 HRCP 5.
22 Al-Jazeera (2014).
23 HRCP 5.
24 Ibid 92.
25 Ibid.
26Saba Imtiaz and Declan Walshjuly (2014), “Extremists Make Inroads in Pakistan’s Diverse South,” New York
Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/asia/militants-in-pakistan-make-inroads-in-the-diverse-and-
tolerant-south.html.
27 Qasim Naiman (2014), “Mob Kills Three Ahmadis in Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/
articles/mob-kills-three-members-of-ahmadiyya-religious-community-in-pakistan-1406559233.

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 of blasphemy.28 Just days after the mob, a cleric addressed a gathering and “demanded that
those arrested in connection with the arson and killings be released immediately.”29

• Two of the main extremist groups involved in coordinating attacks on Ahmadis include
Khatm-e-Nabuwat (Finality of Prophethood), which regularly hosts rallies and conferences
where Ahmadis are labeled as “heretics” for, as per the name of the extremist group, “not
accepting the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad.”30 Pamphlets issued by the group
advertise the killing of Ahmadis as a religious duty allowing Muslims to “attain the status of
a martyr” consistent with Sharia law.31 In addition, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is among the
leading groups orchestrating sectarian violence in Pakistan, including the July 2014 mob
killing described above.

Enforcement of the Blasphemy Law

The Blasphemy Law has been actively enforced, with 20 Pakistanis currently serving life
sentences. While the death penalty has yet to be employed, there are currently 17 Pakistanis
on death row for blasphemy and an additional 51 are believed to have been murdered
extrajudicially after being charged with blasphemy.32 In 2013 alone, ten Ahmadis were
charged under the Blasphemy Law. Ahmadis arrested following blasphemy charges are often
denied bail and face worse prison conditions than other minorities.33 Most problematically,
the government has refused international calls to amend or repeal the blasphemy law and this
refusal “provides extremists with legal tools to impose bigotry and perpetrate abuse.”34

Specific problems with the Blasphemy Law

• Lack of clarity: Prohibitions against Ahmadis identifying themselves as Muslims are vague
and this leads Ahmadis to face charges for any act that can be linked with Muslim identity,
such as using the standard Muslim greeting. Moreover, the law does not allow for a clear
distinction between “malicious, deliberate acts of blasphemy and unintended ones.”35

28 Ibid.
29 Al-Jazeera (2014).
30 Ibid.
31 http://www.khatm-e-nubuwwat.com/pamphlets.htm
32 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF( (2014), “2014 Annual Report.” 7.
33 State Department Human Rights 11, 16.
34Human Rights Watch (2013), “Pakistan: Abuses, Impunity Erode Rights,” http://www.hrw.org/news/
2013/02/01/pakistan-abuses-impunity-erode-rights.
35 Freedom House 73.

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• Absence of safeguards to prevent abuse: The evidentiary threshold required to file
blasphemy charges is very low. Authorities also have no direct means for punishing those
who falsely accuse individuals of blasphemy.36

• Disproportionate penalties: The institution of the death penalty for blasphemy crimes has
been described as “disproportionate and even unacceptable” by the former Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir (former Chairperson of the
HRCP). The fact that the death penalty has yet to be imposed is juxtaposed against two
rulings by the Federal Shariat Court stating that the death penalty should be the only
sentence in blasphemy cases.37

Violations: right to be protected from threats to safety and security

Pakistani police not only fail to protect Ahmadis from violent assault, but they have also been
widely accused of turning a blind eye to the activities of extremist groups, including mob
violence.38 For example, police were “present” yet unresponsive during a mob attack in
March 2013 led by Sunni clerics against an Ahmadi man and his family.39 Instead, the
authorities use these incidents as opportunities to charge Ahmadis for blasphemy, leading to
further hostility directed by society against them and their families.40 Authorities were
similarly silent in 2011 when a pamphlet disseminated by extremists declared 50 prominent
Ahmadis in Punajab “liable to be killed.” One of them was murdered.41 Pakistani authorities
are powerless to prevent such violence, as was affirmed in a 1993 Supreme Court ruling that
upheld the anti-Ahmadi laws.42

Violations: right to freedom of religion

In some cases, police and other authorities have extended anti-Ahmadi laws beyond their
scope of application, resulting in deepened persecution. For example, the penal code does not
forbid the construction of minarets atop Ahmadi places of worship, yet police — saying they
were “simply following the law” — complied after a mob pressured them to destroy three
minarets.43 Moreover, the scale of destruction of religious buildings — which cannot be
labelled ‘mosques’ under the law but are otherwise legal — is highly alarming. In 2013,
authorities closed 30 Ahmadi mosques and prevented the construction of 46 others. 28

36 Freedom House 75 and State Department Religious Freedom 9. 




“On September 18, the Council of Islamic Ideology recommended a draft resolution for the death penalty for
anyone convicted of making false accusations of blasphemy; however, hard-liners struck down this proposal on
September 19.” (State Department Human Rights 20)
37 State Department Religious Freedom 3.
38 Ibid. 13.
39 Ibid. 18.
40 Human Rights Watch (2007); Freedom House 77.
41 Human Rights Watch (2012).
42 Freedom House 81.
43 State Department Religious Freedom 14.

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Ahmadi mosques were demolished or damaged, 13 were set ablaze, and 16 were forcibly
occupied.44 Some of those mosques that remained intact were prohibited from hosting Eid
services, while individuals were detained for carrying out the traditional Eid animal
slaughter.45

Violations: right to freedom of expression and assembly

Contrary to the constitution, which enshrines freedom of assembly — let alone Article 18 of
the ICCPR, which protects the right to manifest through worship or practise one’s freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion — Ahmadis have been forbidden from holding gatherings or
conferences.46 With regard to press freedoms, those involved in printing and disseminating
Ahmadi materials — such as the newspaper, Al-Fazal — faced charges under the blasphemy
law as well as section 11-W of the Anti Terrorism Act, which prohibits “printing, publishing,
or disseminating any material to incite hatred or giving projection to any…organization
placed under observation.”47 These violations occur in the context of a nation-wide media and
online censorship program.48

Violations: right to citizenship and participation in elections

The blasphemy laws are explicitly intended to restrict forms of speech and expression and to
justify inter-religious tension through, for example, the banning of Ahmadi books.49 The
definition of blasphemy is left highly vague, allowing essentially any expression uttered by
Ahmadis to be declared “insulting [to] another’s religious feelings.”50

Essentially all Ahmadis experience discrimination when applying for national identity cards,
which are necessary for voting. In order to be listed as Muslims, Ahmadis must “swear they
believe the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet, and must denounce the Ahmadiyya
movement’s founder as a false prophet and his followers as non-Muslim.”51 A similar

44 Ibid. 10.
45 HRCP 899.
46 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) (2014). “Pakistan Leads the World
in Blasphemy Prisoners.” http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/perspectives/pakistan-leads-the-world-in-
blasphemy-prisoners.
47 Federal Investigation Agency (1997), “Anti Terrorism Act,” http://www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm; HRCP 90.
48 State Department Human Rights 31.
49 Freedom House 78.
50 State Department Religious Freedom 3.
51 Ibid. 



This creates a “catch-22” with respect to the Muslim Hajj pilgrimage. Only Muslims carry out this pilgrimage
but in order to leave the country and be able to participate, Ahmadis required passports, which list religious
affiliation. In order to obtain a “Muslim” label on their passports, Ahmadis were forced to renounce the
Ahmadiyya prophet. In other words, it was formally and administratively impossible for Ahmadis to participate
in the Hajj without renouncing their faith.

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declaration is required when registering to vote, leading most Ahmadis to abstain from
voting.52

Violations: right to fair trial and due process

Lower courts have been found to lack independence and to be “corrupt, inefficient, and
subject to pressure from prominent wealthy, religious, and political figures.”53 These concerns
are particularly relevant and acute for blasphemy cases. Ahmadis are usually denied bail and
those judges who do grant bail have been at times forced to reverse the decision in light of
apparently uncontrollable fury from mobs gathered outside courthouses.54 The activity of such
extremists — encouraged by the aforementioned anti-Ahmadi legislative framework —
makes the exercise and protection of fair trial rights practically impossible.55

Past or current efforts to address the human rights situation

• The HRCP has responded to violations of the rights of Ahmadis — including the July 2014
mob killing in Punjab — and has consistently examined the issue in its annual 300-page
human rights reports. HRCP’s monitoring and documentation of infringements on religious
freedom in Pakistan has been relied upon by the United States State Department for its
Country Reports on Human Rights Practises. The information has also been cited by Human
Rights Watch in its calls for improvements in rights protection.

• The HRCP Expert Group on Communities Vulnerable because of their Belief, which was
established in 2010 and includes representatives of religious minority groups as well as the
Sunni majority, met twice in 2013. The agenda focused on “political rights and issues of
representation of religious minorities in Pakistan.”56 In addition, one of the agenda items
was entitled “challenges for the Ahmadis.” At a time when Ahmadis and other religious
minorities are responding to extremist violence, it is unclear whether the issue of political
rights should be the first priority for the Expert Group, although the issue is of high
importance. Of note, the HRCP has criticized the government for maintaining separate
voters’ lists for Ahmadis, calling for their inclusion on the common lists to facilitate equal
exercise of democratic rights.57 However, as noted, the Ahmadis remain separated and,
when combined with the aforementioned infringements on religious freedom in the voter
registration process, the community boycotted the 2013 elections.

• The government's human rights bodies — the Senate and National Assembly Standing
Committees on Law, Justice, Minorities, and Human Rights — have held hearings on a

52 Ibid. 10.
53 State Department Human Rights 41.
54 HRCP 91.
55 Freedom House 83.
56 HRCP 85.
57 Ibid. 160.

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 police abuses in connection with the blasphemy law, however its conclusions have generally
reinforced government policy.58

• It was not possible to find (through English-only research) examples of efforts to directly
engage police and judicial authorities to encourage respect for the rights of Ahmadis
targeted by violent extremists.

• The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (or “Jama’at) is the Ahmadis’ central advocacy body
and it has been actively engaged in calling attention to the persecution of their adherents in
Pakistan through the website “http://www.persecutionofahmadis.org.” Information
regarding the breadth and depth of the website’s reach is not publicly available. The
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at has chapters throughout the world and its representatives
regularly appear before parliamentary committees studying the situation of Ahmadis. A
slide deck presented to Canadian officials emphasizes Islam as a religion of peace and the
Ahmadis’ deep roots within the broader Islamic tradition and within Pakistani history, as
well as the community’s accomplishments, including Pakistan's first Nobel Prize (in
Physics). The presentation also calls on “Western Governments and the United Nations…to
apply pressure to the Pakistani Government to do away with its anti-minority laws.” While
human rights organizations and Pope Benedict XVI have called for a repeal of the
blasphemy law, states have generally refrained from pressuring Pakistan to make legislative
changes.59

• In addition to the United States State Department reports on human rights and freedom of
religion (cited herein), other governments have raised the issue. (It is not clear whether the
Jama’at’s presentations compelled these governments to speak out). Canada’s Ambassador
for Religious Freedom has sought to raise awareness regarding the plight of Ahmadis in
Pakistan, however it is difficult to determine whether these and other condemnations have
reached Islamabad.

• Pakistani activist Asma Jahangir — former chairperson of the HRCP and former United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief — has received significant
press attention after being presented with the 2014 “Right Livelihood Award.” She has used
the award as an opportunity to raise awareness regarding human rights in Pakistan, though it
does not seem that she has specifically cited the situation of the Ahmadis as she has in past
media interviews.60

• The current Special Rapporteur, Dr. Heiner Bielefeldt, has been vocal regarding the
situation of the Ahmadis. In June 2014, he condemned violent attacks by extremists, which

58 State Department Human Rights.

59Daily Mail (2011), “Pope calls on Pakistan to repeal blasphemy law as 50,000 march in Karachi to support it.”
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1345799/Pope-calls-Pakistan-repeal-blasphemy-law-50-000-march-
Karachi-support-it.html.
60
Shamil Shams (2014), “Asma Jahangir: Alternative Nobel prize an 'honor for Pakistani activists’.” http://
www.dw.de/asma-jahangir-alternative-nobel-prize-an-honor-for-pakistani-activists/a-17955286. 



Daily Star (2005), “State of the religious minorities: Interview with Asma Jehangir,” http://
archive.thedailystar.net/2005/01/18/d501181501111.htm.

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 he said were fuelled by the blasphemy law.61 He called on the government to “ensure the
personal security" of Ahmadis.

• The situation of the Ahmadis has figured in Pakistan’s two evaluations under the UN
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process in 2008 and 2012. In 2008 and
2012, Canada, France, and the Holy See were the only countries to explicitly mention the
Ahmadis, calling on Pakistan to remove restrictions on their religious expression and
practise and to decriminalize defamation.62 It is important to note that Pakistan accepted
Canada’s recommendation to “prevent the abuse of blasphemy legislation” but merely
“noted” recommendations to repeal the legislation, suggesting that Pakistan is willing to
address the abuse of the law to target religious minorities. In 2012, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights called for reforms “at the legislative, administrative and
social levels” to address anti-Ahmadi discrimination.63 As confirmed by NGOs, Pakistan
does not appear to have implemented the UN’s recommendations.64

Options for the HRCP’s course of action

1. Conduct outreach efforts to governmental religious freedom bodies — such as the US

Commission on International Religious Freedom — as well as NGOs such as Human Rights
Watch, requesting that they unify their voices and form a coalition calling for a repeal of the
blasphemy law (section 295). Pakistani coalition partners could also include the Jinnah
Institute, the Pakistan Minorities Democratic Foundation, the Center for Legal Aid and
Assistance and the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum. The US-based Ahmadiyya Muslim
Lawyers Association could also be invited to participate.

Advantages: Builds on existing work by government and NGO officials. By creating a

coalition, these groups will be able to combine resources to improve the monitoring of abuses
and bolster stakeholder engagement in making the case for repeal.65

Disadvantages: Concentrating the critical mass of advocacy within the US creates a situation
in which Pakistan can dismiss criticism as ‘American propaganda.’ Moreover, focusing only
on the blasphemy law would be a mistake given the other problematic provisions in the Penal
Code that impede Ahmadis’ religious freedom. Most crucially, the HRCP understands that
Pakistan is not willing to consider repeal and that this is unlikely to change since the law is
supported not just by the government but by nearly all elected officials.66

61UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014), “Stop faith-based killings” – UN rights
experts urge Pakistan to protect Ahmadiyya Muslim minorities.” http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14658&#sthash.oqolhlDv.dpuf.
62 A/HRC/WG.6/14/PAK/2 — Compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/2; A/HRC/22/12.
63 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/159/20/PDF/G1215920.pdf?OpenElement
64 A/HRC/WG.6/14/PAK/3 — para 12, clause 73.
65 State Department Religious Freedom 2. The US government meets regularly with Pakistani officials and
regularly urges them to address concerns regrading religious freedom.
66Ibid. 17. “During the election campaign, all major candidates expressed strong support for the anti-Ahmadiyya
provisions of the constitution and criminal law.”

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2. Mobilize the above coalition to call for a full governmental inquiry into the events of July
2014 in Punjab. The inquiry would focus primarily on the failure of the police to intervene as
the extremist-led mob grew and identified its civilian targets. An attempt would be made to
identify the perpetrators of the main crimes so that they may be brought to justice.

Advantages: Offers an opportunity to tangibly address the complicity of police authorities in

these and other violent incidents. Pakistan has implied its willingness to address abuses of the
blasphemy law in situations when police face pressure from mobs, and this inquiry would
allow for specific reforms to be formulated. This approach also draws upon the HRCP’s
extensive experience advocating for legal redress for victims of human rights abuses.67 There
is also an opportunity here for the HRCP to collaborate with the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, who has already called for the perpetrators of
fatal attacks against Ahmadis to be brought to justice.68

Disadvantages: The inquiry may be subjected to political interference both in terms of access
to relevant sources as well as publicizing the fundings, limiting the impact of such an inquiry.
Also, even if suspects can be identified and charged, courts would likely continue to be
subject to political and ‘mob’ interference. The government may also find it convenient to
declare extremist groups — such as Sunni Tehrik, Tehrik-e-Tahafaz-e-Naomoos-e-Risalat,
Khatm-e-Nabuwat, Difa-e-Pakistan Council, and others affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban’s
umbrella69 — impermeable to investigation and they may therefore simply give up.

3. Mobilize a critical mass of international and domestic advocacy calling not for legislative
amendments but rather for reform of how police enforce the anti-Ahmadi laws. The HRCP
would prepare a report specifically examining the failure of police to resist extremist pressure
to overextend anti-Ahmadi laws and their failure to conduct impartial investigations, as is
required, before charging Ahmadis with blasphemy under the Penal Code. The HRCP’s
partners, including Human Rights Watch, would be asked to assist in disseminating the
findings, while the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief would also be
asked to lend his title and profile to the inquiry. The report could pave the way for the HRCP
to create a training program for police unit leaders aimed at instituting the policies and
safeguards necessary to create a culture within the police of respecting and protecting the
rights of vulnerable groups.

Advantages: This initiative is focused and specific. Given that Pakistan’s government has
expressed the will to examine the enforcement of laws suppressing Ahmadis’ rights (as
indicated in its response to the Universal Periodic Review), a detailed examination of the role
of police — in cooperation with police oversight bodies as per the Police Act of 2002 — could
lead the government to compel provincial governments to institute reforms. They may opt to
give police greater tools and training to resist pressure and riots spurred by local clerics and
their supporters, while also ensuring officers conduct adequate investigations before laying
charges. There is also an opportunity here to collaborate with the US Commission on

67
Online News Network (2014), “HRCP slams Ahmadis’ killing in Gujranwala,” http://
www.onlinenews.com.pk/details.php?newsid=267378
68 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014).
69 Human Rights Watch (2012).

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International Religious Freedom, which has previously called for part of the US’ military
assistance to Pakistan to be “used to help police implement an effective plan for dedicated
protection for religious minority communities and their places of worship.”70

Disadvantages: This research would require access to police to determine whether or not
proper investigations are being carried out, and such access may be impossible. Relying on
Ahmadis to testify regarding their interactions with police would only offer limited insight
into the actions of police. On the other hand, there are concerns regarding the safety of those
gathering information on behalf of the HRCP, especially those belonging to minority
communities.71

4. HRCP to call on the government to restore the Ministry of Interfaith Harmony as a separate
entity, distinct from the Ministry for Religious Affairs. The former was led by the brother of
Shahbaz Bhatti — the assassinated Minister for Minorities Affairs — until the election of
Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister, who combined the two.72

Advantages: The HRCP would be echoing concerns stated by the US government that the
Ministry of Religious Affairs focuses primarily on the concerns of Sunni Muslims,
necessitating a separate ministry to address minorities and foster interfaith understanding.73
The HRCP shares these concerns. There is also an opportunity here to call at the same time
for the changes to school curricula aimed at promoting tolerance and interfaith understanding.

Disadvantages: The HRCP would be wading into politically difficult territory, bound up with
the controversial Bhatti family, without a strong likelihood that such efforts would result in
better outcomes for Ahmadis.

5. HRCP to undertake a public outreach campaign combating intolerance and hatred towards
Ahmadis in the media and in public discourse. A research firm would be employed to conduct
demographic research on the profile of Pakistanis most likely to espouse extreme anti-Ahmadi
views as well as on the media platforms and television programmes these individuals are most
likely to view. The campaign could engage a number of revered Muslim figures from Pakistan
and elsewhere and have them record messages referring to Ahmadis as their Muslim brethren.
Television and online media spots could also profile in a creative and engaging manner
exemplary Ahmadis, such as Novel Prize-winning physicist Dr. Abdus Salam.

Advantages: Incitement to violence against Ahmadis is a real and pressing phenomenon and
this campaign would bypass political labyrinths and instead communicate directly with
citizens. For instance, in 2008 a talk show described Ahmadis as “worthy of death.”74 Three

70 USCIRF.
71State Department Human Rights 4. On February 8, a senior Shia lawyer, Malik Jarar Hussain, was shot and
killed on Gulbahar road in Peshawar District. He was a council member and a former vice chairperson of the
HRCP’s KP chapter.
72 USCIRF 75.
73 USCIRF (2014).
74
The Persecution (2010), “Yellow Journalism Turns Bright Yellow,” http://www.thepersecution.org/archive/
media.html.

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people were murdered shortly after the broadcast. When combined with aforementioned
advocacy efforts regarding interfaith policy, the HRCP could substantially counter hateful
sentiments towards the Ahmadis.

Disadvantages: Even with targeted outreach backed by research, there is no guarantee that
these public outreach efforts would reach those likely to support or join mobs that perpetrate
attacks on Ahmadis and leave police and judicial authorities powerless to protect Ahmadis’
rights. Islamic clerics could simply ban the media programmes and platforms in question.

6. With the HRCP as lead coordinator, the coalition referred to in Option 1 would issue
statements and op-eds demanding that the government fulfill its existing promises to address
the persecution of religious minorities, including the Ahmadis. In September 2013 following
an attack that killed 83 Christians at a church in Peshawar, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar
announced that the government would “develop a strong security plan for churches and other
places of worship.”75 This commitment has not yet been implemented.

Advantages: Of the Pakistani government’s rather muted commitments to improve the state of
minority rights, none have received as high-level political support as this one (which was
issued after significant international condemnation). The HRCP would be seizing on this
opportunity to secure places of worship for all minorities, including presumably the Ahmadis,
whose mosques have come under sustained attack.

Disadvantages: Even if the HRCP successfully encouraged the adoption of a security plan,
there are numerous ways that law enforcement officials could refuse to apply the plan towards
Ahmadis, for instance by accusing them of violating section 298 through the activities that
take place within these places of worship.

7. HRCP to call for an inquiry into the repression of those advocating for legislative reform.
In 2011, Shahbaz Bhatti, then-Minister for Minorities Affairs, as well as Salman Taseer, the
former governor of Punjab, were assassinated after advocating for reviews of the blasphemy
law.76 Bhatti publicly claimed that “the blasphemy law is being used to terrorize minorities in
Pakistan” and he called for amendments that would require judges to initially investigate
allegations before laying charges (as they are already obligated to do) and would impose
penalties on false accusers.77

Advantages: Bhatti’s assassination was allegedly committed by a militant belonging to

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the same group which carried out the violent rampage in July
2014. States such as the US have long pressured Pakistan to investigate the assassination, and
in providing the Pakistani government with such an investigation there may be an opportunity
to demobilize the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and prevent it from engaging, with impunity, in
continued violence against Ahmadis.

Disadvantages: Once again, this option would require the HRCP to devote its limited
resources towards a highly divisive issue that extends far beyond the immediate concern with

75 State Department Religious Freedom 16.

76 Al-Jazeera (2012).
77 Freedom House 77.

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responding to violence against Ahmadis and promoting an improvement in the human rights
situation of the Ahmadis and other religious minorities.

Recommendation:

Options 2, 3, 5, and 7 are recommended for immediate approval, while options 1, 4, and 6 are
recommended for reconsideration in nine months.

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