The West Philippines Sea dispute and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Delfin Miguel D. Fernandez

Term Paper | AB Political Science
San Beda University

In this term paper will tackle one of the most contested regions in ASIA, the West

Philippine Sea, as by far the highly debated and unresolved disputed territories as to their true

claimant if such areas do belong to China or the Philippines. The Philippine archipelago is at the

center of the momentum of this issue on the West Philippine Sea.1 China’s historical claim to a

vast majority of the islands and reefs on the sea is defined by a ‘nine-dash-line’ which stretches

hundreds of miles across the south and eastern parts of the Hainan province; and it is on this basis

that China lays strong claims to the territories it controls, carrying out unlawful and destructive

acts to keep other countries from encroaching on their space.2 3 Moreover, the Chinese government

is aggressive on its stand as to their claim to the areas, and using a large sum of military resources

to defend over the region, it is quite an alarming projection of military posture on their part, without

realizing that what they are doing is in fact unlawful and unwarranted to International Maritime

Borders. After which, China articulated its strategic objective to become a “true maritime power”

during the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 and the

12th National People’s Congress in March 2013.4 The islands, banks, shoals and surrounding

waters – maritime features China claims accounts for hundreds of islands, islets, sandbanks, rocks,

1
Olu-Ibukon, Y. South-China Sea Dispute: Sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal.(Swansea University Paper) at pag
1
2
Austin, G. Why Beijing’s South China Sea Moves Make Sense Now (The National Interest, 2015) at page 1 (Cited at
Olu-Ibukon, Y. South-China Sea Dispute: Sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal. Swansea University)
3
See Lunn, A and Lang, A, note 6, above, at page 3 (Cited at Olu-Ibukon, Swansea University)
4
S. Yoon, “Implications of Xi Xinping’s ‘True Maritime Power’,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 3, 2015, 41 in Do
Thanh Hai, Vietnam and the South China Sea: Politics, Security and Legality (New York: Routledge, 2017), 198. (Cited
at Pablo, M. David Dancing With Goliath: A Critique And Revaluation Of The Armed Forces Of The Philippines’
Conventional Deterrence Posture In The West Philippine Sea 2016/2017)
and shoals (Paracel, Spratly, Scarborough Shoal and Macclesfield Bank, and the Pratas Islands)

throughout the South China Sea region.5 The West Philippine Sea is of economic importance in

East Asia, ‘rich in fisheries and abundant natural resources’ and has understandably been a source

of maritime and territorial dispute between several ASEAN countries.6 Following this trends,

arguably China’s claim can be seen in the frames of economic and trade agenda setting and it is

and maybe their over-arching motivation for their aggressive claim on the territories, as this is part

of their policy of strengthening their economic agendas and ultimately dictate the wholeness of

trade in the region, and one of the most prevalent features of this agenda setting is China’s Belt

and Road Initiative. But, the Philippines isn’t going to lay down their claim on the region as they

made necessary steps to strengthen their claim to the West Philippine Sea. The filing of the instant

arbitral case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) stemmed from two events: (1)

China’s transmittal of its nine-dash line claim to the United Nations in 2009, and (2) China’s

forcible expulsion of Philippine fishermen from the maritime areas around the Scarborough Shoal
7
in 2009. The Tribunal recognizes that the China and the Philippines are both bound to the

provisions of UNCLOS.8 On January 21 2013, a Q&A on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings

against China to Achieve a peaceful and Durable Solution to the Dispute in the West Philippine

Sea, DFA said that, “The Philipines felt like it was high time to Institute a legal action because

past diplomatic efforts have proven to be futile”. When the Philippines began the arbitration case

5
ISDP Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes (Institute for Security and Development
Policy, 2016) at page 1 (Cited at Olu-Ibukon, Y. South-China Sea Dispute: Sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal.
Swansea University)
6
Olu-Ibukon, Y. South-China Sea Dispute: Sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal.(Swansea University Paper) at pag
3
7
DFA, Statement Before the Permanent Court of Artbitration. January 5. (Urubuio, U.* Hopeless or Hopeful: A
Commentary on the Aftermath of the West Philippine Sea Case. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEOPLS REPUBLIC
OF CHINA. PCA Case No. 2013-19 12. July 2016. Junior Law Student* San Beda University – College of Law.)
8
Urubuio, U.* Hopeless or Hopeful: A Commentary on the Aftermath of the West Philippine Sea Case. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES V. PEOPLS REPUBLIC OF CHINA. PCA Case No. 2013-19 12. July 2016. Junior Law Student* San Beda
University – College of Law.
proceedings before the PCA on the 22nd of January 2013, the Philippine government stated their

claim on the basis of the Articles of 286 and 287 of the UNLCLOS.9 China over their released

position paper,10 made a refusal to participate in the proceeding and will give no compliance due

to the Tribunal lacking such jurisdiction over (1) the matter that the case cover territorial

sovereignty and is beyond the capacity of UNCLOS, (2) The Philippines and China had come to

an understanding of settling through diplomatic means, (3) even if the matter is covered by the

jurisdiction of the UNCLOS, China claimed it falls under the exceptions clause stipulated by China

in 2006 under Article 298.11

9
Article 286
Application of procedures under this section
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no
settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.
Article 287
Choice of procedure
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by
means of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of
disputes specified therein.
2. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be affected by the obligation of a State Party to accept
the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the extent and
in the manner provided for in Part XI, section 5.
3. A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted
arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.
10
Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction of the South
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, December 7, 2014 (Cited in Urubuio, U.* Hopeless
or Hopeful: A Commentary on the Aftermath of the West Philippine Sea Case. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
PEOPLS REPUBLIC OF CHINA. PCA Case No. 2013-19 12. July 2016. Junior Law Student* San Beda University – College
of Law.
11
Article 298
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may, without prejudice
to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures
provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
(a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary
delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles, provided that a State having made such a declaration
shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no
agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties, at the request
Going back to the earlier discussion that the move of China towards these margins are motivated

by Trade and Economic Agenda, especially China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China is currently

on a bid for global economic expansion and dominance. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the

overarching foreign policy of the Chinese government is called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):

a $1-trillion plan to build massive infrastructure links spanning Asia-Pacific, Africa, the Middle

East, and Europe. China often trumpets BRI as a way to help cash-strapped developing countries

in dire need of finances for their own infrastructure projects.12 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

BRI takes on the task of reviving the ancient Silk Road by building its first component, an overland

route from China to Western Europe, sweeping through South Asia and Southeast Asia, Russia,

the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean. Dubbed as the Silk Road

Economic Belt (SREB), the plan consists of the following:13 six economic corridors, namely: the

New Eurasia Land Bridge, PRC-Mongolia-Russia, PRC-Central Asia-West Asia, PRC-“Indochina

of any party to the dispute, accept submission of the matter to conciliation under Annex V, section 2; and
provided further that any dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled
dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory shall be excluded
from such submission;
(ii) after the conciliation commission has presented its report, which shall state the reasons on which it is
based, the parties shall negotiate an agreement on the basis of that report; if these negotiations do not
result in an agreement, the parties shall, by mutual consent, submit the question to one of the procedures
provided for in section 2, unless the parties otherwise agree;
(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any sea boundary dispute finally settled by an arrangement
between the parties, or to any such dispute which is to be settled in accordance with a bilateral or
multilateral agreement binding upon those parties;
(b) disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft
engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the
exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article
297, paragraph 2 or 3; 137 xxx

12
Punongbayan, J. [ANALYSIS] Is Duterte selling out the Philippines to China? (News Article – retrieved, March 1,
2019. www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/217353-is-duterte-selling-out-philippines-to-china)
13
Estrada, D. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Philippines. (FSI Insights Vol. V, No. 3. March
2018). Retrieved on March 1, 2019 - http://www.fsi.gov.ph/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-implications-for-the-
philippines/
Peninsula”, PRC-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-PRC-India-Myanmar corridors14; a number of

railroad connections; and a few gas and oil pipelines.15 But the economic initiative by the Chinese

government may seem to be a win-win for participating states but with loan conditions that are

reasonable unarguable to be paid set by the conditions, one must thing that the Belt and Road

Initiative may seem a bit for China, rather than for the participating state. First, BRI has a proven

capacity to wreak mayhem in the finances of participating countries: more and more have found

themselves buried in debt – and therefore beholden – to China.16 Second, in the event they are

unable to repay China, these countries are often left with no choice but to give up a slice of their

natural resources or strategic assets – even their sovereignty – to China. Effectively, they are

collateralizing their resources and rights to gain access to the Chinese loans.17 Third, many

countries have bemoaned that many BRI projects require that only Chinese workers and specialists

be employed, thus excluding local talent. Fourth, many groups have pointed out that BRI projects

– owing to their sheer scale and ambition – often pose threats to the environment and biodiversity.18

The second component is a maritime route which runs southbound down the east coast of China,

through the South China Sea and into the South Pacific before heading westbound through the

Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea to Europe referred to as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

(MSR). The concept of a “Maritime Silk Road” is nothing new as it dates back to as early as the

14
James Villafuerte et. Al, “The One Belt, One Road: Impact on Trade and Growth.” Paper presented at 19th
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Washington DC, June 15-17, 2016. (Cited in Estrada, D. China’s
Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Philippines. (FSI Insights Vol. V, No. 3. March 2018) Retrieved on
March 1, 2019 - http://www.fsi.gov.ph/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-implications-for-the-philippines/)
15
Mercator Institute for China Studies, Infographic/China Mapping Silk Road Initiative, accessed at
http://www.merics.org/en/merics-analysis/infographicchina-mapping/china-mapping/. (Cited in Estrada, D.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Philippines. (FSI Insights Vol. V, No. 3. March 2018) Retrieved
on March 1, 2019 - http://www.fsi.gov.ph/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-implications-for-the-philippines/)

16
Punongbayan, J. [ANALYSIS] Is Duterte selling out the Philippines to China? (News Article – retrieved, March 1,
2019. www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/217353-is-duterte-selling-out-philippines-to-china).
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
nineteenth century, when ancient merchants journeyed the route of China’s eastern coast, the

southernmost region of India, East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea to enhance economic

and cultural relations.19

Conclusions

The Risks of sovereignty out weigh the needs of the country’s sovereignty should not be compromised

in the guide of economic setting and significance, the facts still remains that China has clear

motivations as to their over-arching agenda on their claim on the West Philippine Sea s their part of

the maritime silk road which respectively and greatly benefits their country and is and may be the

reason for China to compromise their military resources and policy to defend the areas all in the name

of trade and economic, but for the Philippines it is not to close to comfort and may still participate and

still wreak the merits and gain benefits on the Belt and Road Initiative by the Chinese government.

With the potential of the initiative to become a catalytic project that would change the geopolitical

arena, the Philippines would be amiss not to take part in it. However, it is always good to be equipped

with a comprehensive understanding of the initiative and each specific project under it to be able to

balance the risks and benefits. It is important for the Philippines, with its direction toward a “golden

age of infrastructure,” to not just see the agenda but also be cautious of the risks.20

19
China accelerates planning to re-connect Maritime Silk Road, Xinhuanet. Accessed at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/16/c_133267903.htm. (Cited in Estrada, D. China’s Belt and
Road Initiative: Implications for the Philippines. (FSI Insights Vol. V, No. 3. March 2018))
20
Estrada, D. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Philippines. (FSI Insights Vol. V, No. 3. March
2018) – Retrieved on March 1, 2019 - http://www.fsi.gov.ph/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-implications-for-the-
philippines/