European Environment
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
IS LOCAL TRULY BETTER?
SOME REFLECTIONS ON
SHARING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY BETWEEN LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS AND THE EU
Brendan Flynn*
Department of Political Science and Sociology, National University of Ireland,
Galway, Ireland
This paper discusses the appropriate role
for local governments in relation to EU
environmental policy. The discussion is
framed through a critical examination of
the principle of subsidiarity. Firstly due
to the way the member states have
defined the principle there is a danger of
inconsistency in its application. Secondly,
across Europe there is mixed evidence to
suggest local governments cope well
with having to do more in
environmental policy. Indeed a sensible
balance between the local, regional,
national and EU level seems at risk of
being undermined if subsidiarity is taken
too far. This paper argues that more
appropriate roles for local governments
might be to contribute to policy
innovation and better implementation.
What seems more needed is an approach
that systematically improves
intergovernmental relationships in
environmental policy across Europe.
Specific reforms suggested include
expanding Commission led networking
while making it more accountable and
* Correspondence to: Brendan Flynn, Department of Political
Science and Sociology, National University of Ireland, Galway,
Ireland. Tel.: +353 91 512054; fax: + 353 91 525700; e-mail:
brendan.flynn@nuigalway.ie
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
democratic, as well as including
indicative responsibilities for local
governments in future framework
directives. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE
T
he subsidiarity principle is now some
seven years old since it was ratified in
the Maastricht Treaty’s article 3b. Ar-
guably however, the principle remains con-
fusing in its application and significance for
EU environmental policy (Axlerod, 1994; Butt-
Philip, 1994, p 127–129). At its simplest article
3b ensures that in the exercise of non-exclu-
sive competences the European institutions
ought to defer to national leadership, unless it
can be clearly shown that EU level action
would be better. Yet in practice this formula-
tion may be hard to make workable. One
issue in particular that remains comparatively
unexplored is the extent to which the princi-
ple might justify a greater environmental pol-
icy role at the local level.
This issue is discussed here in a number of
sections. Firstly it is argued one must note
that the nation states in the Council, together
with the Commission, have applied the prin-
ciple in a highly selective way. While some
states appear happy to allow local and re-
gional governments considerable autonomy in
environmental policy, others enforce minimal

competences at the local level. In any event
article 3b seems powerless to impel national
governments to provide a greater role for
local governments. The result is a problem of
uneven application of subsidiarity towards all
European citizens.
In a second section a quite different ap-
proach is taken. Here some of the empirical
literature on local governments and environ-
mental policy is explored to assess their per-
formance. In other words, the question is
asked: would it be a good thing if local gov-
ernments could do more in environmental
policy? In fact a quite mixed performance is
revealed. This is because European local gov-
ernments frequently lack resources (fiscal,
personnel and technical expertise) to success-
fully carry out increased environmental du-
ties. Other problems include a risk of
regulatory capture at the local level, and the
need for local bodies to liase with central
government agents to address environmental
spillovers. Thus any argument that local gov-
ernment ought to have a greater role in envi-
ronmental policy is one that requires
considerable caution. A simple case for sub-
sidiarity for the local level cannot be made
without qualification.
On the positive side however, it is stressed
that local governments can provide valuable
proving grounds for policy innovation, and
they often have expert local knowledge that
with care can be harnessed to improve imple-
mentation. In some cases local governments
may also be more responsive to distinctive
local environmental problems and needs. This
suggests that it is a co-ordinated contribution
of the local level to any environmental policy
that is valuable. Yet this poses the question
then of how to ensure such a co-ordination
between different levels of governance in
terms of their roles, duties and competences.
In a final section this complex question is
partly answered by suggesting two possible
reforms. The first is a system of co-operative
networking between the Commission, na-
tional and local governments, which might
offer one way to improve implementation and
ensure that local interests are respected in EU
environmental policy. The second suggestion
is the inclusion of indicative responsibilities
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
76
B. FLYNN
for local governments in framework direc-
tives. Both approaches would address some of
the limitations that the local level often suffers
from, and more importantly add substance to
the subsidiarity principle for local
governments.
To conclude, what seems needed in the
coming decade are approaches that situate the
subsidiarity principle as part of a much wider
constitutional and administrative debate on
improving and democratizing intergovern-
mental relationships.
SUBSIDIARITY’S HOLLOW
PROMISE?
While some commentators suggested the in-
troduction of subsidiarity might empower lo-
cal and regional governments (Balducci, 1996,
p 50; Eberlein, 1996; Lerche and Preußer,
1997), the actual application of the principle
has offered local governments little substan-
tive support in their environmental policy du-
ties. This is perhaps strange given the
considerable impetus created by the Local
Agenda 21 initiative, whereby local govern-
ment actors in many states have developed a
distinctively local response to environmental
issues (Patterson and Theobald, 1995; Little-
wood and While, 1997; Meadowcroft, 1999).
Yet a conservative attitude to subsidiarity
for the local level in the EU context can be
seen in the Commission’s official rejection of
the application of article 3b sub-nationally. In
1994, Bruce Milan, responding to a series of
European Parliament questions (OJ 94/C102/
08, 1994a, pp 3–4; OJ 94/C336/36, 1994b, p 17),
set out quite clearly the limitations of sub-
sidiarity to local governments:
The application of subsidiarity to the rela-
tions between member states and regional
or local authorities is a matter of institu-
tional organization within each member
state and falls within the competence of
each member state. Nevertheless, the
Commission is convinced that regional
and local authority involvement in the
project of European construction is essen-
tial (OJ 94/C336/36, 1994b, p 17).
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
IS LOCAL TRULY BETTER?
Arguably the significance of this approach
has been somewhat ignored, for it strongly
suggests that the main actors interpreting and
applying the principle, the Council and Com-
mission, have no conception of the article as
an operating legal doctrine which local mu-
nicipalities can rely upon to defend their
competences.
Indeed this basic ‘minimalist’ approach has
been re-confirmed with the Amsterdam
Treaty (Duff, 1997, pp 96–106), which does
not alter article 3b. Instead it merely adds as
an attached protocol, the details agreed at the
Edinburgh summit of 1992 on how subsidiar-
ity would be applied (see CEC, 1992, p 116;
1993, pp 119 – 120). Significantly though, Ger-
many, Belgium and Austria have seen fit to
add their own protocol related to subsidiarity.
This indicates that they will apply the princi-
ple sub-nationally:
It is taken for granted by the German,
Austrian and Belgian governments that
action by the European Community in
accordance with the principle of subsidiar-
ity not only concerns the Member States
but also their entities to the extent that
they have their own law-making powers
conferred on them under national consti-
tutional law (Duff, 1997, p 99).
Confusingly then, it now seems that we are
faced with a future that will see an uneven
application of subsidiarity across the Eu-
ropean Union. In federal or decentralized
states the principle may well be followed in
the implementation of EU environment mea-
sures. Yet in centralized unitary states it
would appear unclear whether local authori-
ties will be similarly respected. Moreover, for
local governments it appears there is little
tangible legal, political or policy result that
they can clearly point to as an example of
subsidiarity. It is tempting then to conclude
that subsidiarity in the European context of-
fers a relatively hollow promise to European
local governments, even though theoretically
the principle favours the local, as well as
regional and national levels.
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
DEBUNKING SUBSIDIARITY LOCAL
BIAS: IS THE LOCAL TRULY BETTER
IN ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE?
In this section, some of the literature on envi-
ronmental policy and local governments is
examined. This is in order to be clear whether
in fact local governments deserve a greater
role in environmental policy. In fact a number
of problems are evident, which suggests cau-
tion in answering this question positively.
These can be analysed in turn as problems of
implementation, regulatory resources, regula-
tory capture and the existence of pollution
spillovers.
The problem of implementation at the
local level
It is often at the local and regional level that
environmental laws become ineffective
through poor implementation. Indeed
Demmke (1997, p 43) has suggested that with
the European decentralization and regional-
ization trends of the 1970s and 1980s, this
problem may well have become worse. There
is no doubt that decentralization in states
such as Belgium, but also in Italy, Germany,
Austria and Spain (Demmke, 1997, p 45),
has exacerbated implementation problems.
France, Greece and Italy are also suggested to
suffer from excessive local government frag-
mentation, with many small units overbur-
dened in carrying out environmental duties
(Demmke, 1997, p 60). In the UK, in relation
to waste policy, one source suggests about
40% of local authorities are experiencing a
serious implementation gap with 70% claim-
ing to suffer some local implementation fail-
ure (Read, 1999).
The problem of resources at the local level
Related to this often poor record of imple-
mentation is the issue of the regulatory re-
sources (in the form of field staff, expertise
and finance) available to local governments.
For example in Spain a lack of expertise and
finance has been cited as a specific problem
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
77

for local authorities (Morata and Font, 1998, p
221). Demmke suggests in fact that this expe-
rience may be endemic (1997, p 55). In other
cases administrative structures can limit the
scope of local environmental activities. For
example Italy’s system of having environmen-
tal functions vested in municipal public health
agencies means that more pressing responsi-
bilities for public health and services domi-
nate over a wider view of environmental
problems (Lewanski, 1998, p 143).
The case of local governments in Sweden is
particularly instructive here. Since the early
1980s there has been a conscious effort to
decentralize environmental policy (Lundqvist,
1996, pp 277 – 280). Yet this dramatic decen-
tralization has not actually been matched by
new improved fiscal resources (Lundqvist,
1998, p 242). Therefore Swedish municipalities
often find themselves overburdened with ad-
ministrative work (Lundqvist, 1998, p 242).
In practice it is difficult not to see in the
Swedish experiences, and developments in
the USA (Weber, 1998, pp 54–55), the decen-
tralization of fiscal austerity by central author-
ities as much as anything else. In many cases
then, central governments frequently expect
local administrations to do more on the envi-
ronment, but provide no greater support for
them (Read, 1999; Jansen and Mydske, 1998,
pp 193 – 194). Anyone thus invoking sub-
sidiarity would need to be careful lest their
demands are not repackaged as fiscal cut-
backs in another guise.
The problem of regulatory capture at the
local level
Of course one other reason why implementa-
tion problems arise locally is because local
elites, no less than national ones, appear
adept in certain cases at re-steering centrally
set environmental policy goals towards out-
comes they prefer (Burby and Strong, 1997;
Deyle and Smith, 1998; Groenendijk, 1998).
Neither do local political preferences always
prioritize the environment when faced with
limited finances. In Sweden for example, since
1991 about half of all Swedish municipalities
have decreased funding for environmental
protection and downgraded their environ-
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
78
B. FLYNN
ment departments through administrative
merger (Lundqvist, 1998, p 243).
Another way of seeing this problem is with
regard to the issue of regulatory capture
(Martimort, 1999). For example, in Danish en-
vironmental policy, which has taken an ex-
plicit decentralist orientation since the 1970s
(Andersen et al., 1998, pp 52–54), control and
inspection duties previously delegated to mu-
nicipalities have in several cases been re-
turned to the county level for fear that
municipalities might be ‘captured’ by specific
industries (Christiansen, 1996, p 54). This has
to be a real fear.
Simply put, the closer agencies responsible
for inspection duties are to their target
groups, the greater the scope for ‘regulatory
capture’. Arguably this danger is actually
greater at the local level (Demmke, 1997, p
64). In fact several studies of regulatory cap-
ture have confirmed that frequency of contact
with regulated firms and limited expert infor-
mation, which local regulators typically have,
can both exacerbate this problem (Dion et al.,
1998; Martimort, 1999). At least with a na-
tional environmental inspectorate agency
there is some hope of ‘distance’ and expertise
(Demmke, 1997, p 56). In contrast local repre-
sentatives who oversee local executive agen-
cies may well come under intense pressure to
ensure a local plant is not economically disad-
vantaged through inspections. Moreover, with
the added tendency of modern firms to fre-
quently cluster together in small regions or
even locales (Licht and Nerlinger, 1998;
Sweeney and Feser, 1998), political pressure
may be more pronounced. There are also ob-
vious questions about relying on local govern-
ments to be the ‘eyes and ears’ of enforcement
and implementation when it can be these very
agents themselves who often pollute local wa-
ters and air through poor sewage infrastruc-
ture or waste practices.
The problem of spillovers and scale for
local governments
Across Europe there appears a growing trend
towards local governments co-operating with
each other, pooling together resources in novel
and ad hoc inter-municipal organizations,
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
IS LOCAL TRULY BETTER?
and even handing over power to regional or
intermediate levels of governance (Forbes,
1993; Morata and Font, 1998, p 221; Scott et al.,
1998).
One reason why this happens is the nature
of the complex environmental problems they
face. Many of these problems exhibit a
‘spillover’ pattern whereby environmental ex-
ternalities fall outside the jurisdiction in
which they are generated. This can lead to
problems whereby some local jurisdictions at-
tempt to export their pollution problems and
they may as a result raise environmental stan-
dards locally to push pollution beyond their
boundaries (Glazer, 1999). Of course central-
ization of policy can prevent this. More sim-
ply, centralization may be also attractive in
terms of economies of scale and scope, as
local municipalities can no longer cope with
certain environmental issues themselves.
One might cautiously note, however, that
the mere existence of some pollution spillover
does not in itself justify a centralization of
policy. It is rather if spillovers are of an ap-
preciable scale and if bilateral action between
local agents cannot first address the problem
(Smith, 1993, p 71). By itself then the trans-
boundary spillover argument does not actu-
ally suggest local governments are unable to
meet most environmental problems within
their resources. Indeed, while the most seri-
ous types of spillover might be better ad-
dressed at a central government level, more
generally it appears that what is needed is a
pattern of highly co-ordinated intergovern-
mental relations between local, regional, na-
tional and EU levels to address such
problems.
TOWARDS A REALISTIC ROLE FOR
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE?
In this section, the positive role local govern-
ments can play in EU environmental policy is
discussed. The question posed here is: what
specific roles can be argued for local govern-
ments in EU environmental policy in a way
that respects subsidiarity?
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
One interesting starting point for this dis-
cussion is to note that many authorities do not
actually prescribe greater autonomy for local
governments in environmental policy, or even
subsidiarity more generally. Instead they
endorse the need for more efficient and
democratic patterns of intergovernmental co-
operation between the different tiers of envi-
ronmental governance (Birnesser et al., 1993;
Stoker, 1995; Guy and Marvin, 1996; Cimitile
et al., 1997; McEvoy et al., 1998). Indeed some
authors are relatively cautious about the sub-
sidiarity principle in environmental policy per
se, or the scope for local environmental policy
generally unless a wider pattern of central–
local relations is first extensively reformed
(Wise and O’Leary, 1997; Groenendijk, 1998;
Rocher and Rouillard, 1998).
This section places the issue of subsidiarity
and local governments’ roles in EU environ-
mental policy into a broader discussion about
intergovernmental relations and ‘collaborative
government’. In recent years an extensive lit-
erature has developed that stresses the im-
portance of negotiation, competition and
collaboration between different levels of gov-
ernance (Kamieniecki and Ferrall, 1991;
Scholz, 1991; Freeman, 1997; Wise and
O’Leary, 1997; Davis, 1998; Graham and
Phillips, 1998; Blom-Hansen, 1999). Arguably
this approach marks an important shift away
from much of the subsidiarity debate hereto-
fore in that it emphasizes the way in which
different tiers of governance interact to im-
prove policy, rather than whether any one
should enjoy particular legislative pre-
dominance.
Such a co-operative approach seems
needed, for while one can think of many
European municipalities that have introduced
innovative local environmental policies, these
efforts would seem limited unless co-
ordinated. For example sustainable urban
transport can be addressed extensively at the
local level, but very quickly local govern-
ments will find themselves facing single mar-
ket issues of vehicle and fuel taxes, road
pricing or the even more basic issue of vehicle
emission harmonization. It is useful to briefly
discuss two examples of the valuable role
local governments can play in this regard.
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
79

Local governments as environmental policy
innovators
In the case above, it was noteworthy the
Brussels actors do actually need evidence
from the local ‘pacesetters’ if they are ever
to know whether sustainable transport tax
instruments work. Often the local level will
be an ideal test bed for policy design and
innovation. Concepts and instruments, if
proven, can later be lifted upwards for EU-
wide acceptance. Indeed there is evidence
that nationally based policy entrepreneurs
often scour the local level for proof of their
reform proposals and for novel policy ideas
(Mintrom, 1997). On the other hand if the
pattern of central–local relations is overly
dominated by certain interest groups and
limited by excessive fiscal centralism then
the scope for innovation at the local level
can be limited (Groenendijk, 1998). Of
course innovation has also emerged in envi-
ronmental policy at the local level, quite in-
dependent of central state fiscal reforms,
chief of which has been the Local Agenda
21 process (Patterson and Theobald, 1995),
in this case suggesting the local level has a
relatively robust residual capacity for inno-
vation.
Local governments as responsive
environmental regulators
One obvious advantage of local governments
is that they often add value to policy where
they have special local information that re-
duces implementation costs or the marginal
costs of pollution abatement generally. This
is because they can fine-tune policy to
match local preferences and problems (van
den Bergh, 1996, p 370) and in that regard
there is a case for also arguing they are of-
ten highly responsive to local citizens (Bre-
ton et al., 1998).
However, it is important not to overstate
this argument, for national actors often have
important incentives as well to respond to
local citizens’ needs, as the costs of electoral
defeat for them may be higher and their
ability to provide public goods may be
greater (Breton et al., 1998, p 48). The re-
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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B. FLYNN
sponsiveness of any local government may
then be conditional on their relationship
with central state actors. The literature on
the so-called ‘joint-decision trap’ (Scharpf,
1988; Blom-Hansen, 1999) has pointed to
how, in complex states, conflicting interests,
along with shared competences between dif-
ferent levels of government, can lead to
stalemate and a lack of clarity in policy.
Once again it appears that in order to avoid
this problem one needs to return to an ex-
amination of the pattern of intergovernmen-
tal relations overall, with the suggestion in
particular that the existence of alternative
decision ‘exit points’ may encourage co-op-
erative rather than conflictual behaviour
(Blom-Hansen, 1999). Intriguingly then a vi-
tal role for intergovernmental relationships
is re-confirmed here.
Reform suggestion 1: democratizing
Commission–local networking
In recent years EU environmental policy has
actually developed a more flexible and co-
operative approach to environmental policy
as described above. There is greater respect
for the fact that local governments no less
than national ones need to be listened to,
either because they have examples of inno-
vation to share or because they have distinc-
tive knowledge and problems. One other
reason is simply because local governments
have moved to Brussels to engage in direct
lobbying and negotiation with the Commis-
sion (Marks et al., 1996, p 40). In addition,
new institutional ventures such as the re-
cently strengthened European Green Forum
on the Environment or the proposed expert
European freshwater monitoring network
(EUROP, No. 2, 1997) are important im-
provements in preventing Brussels from be-
coming a remote technocracy in this regard.
More intriguingly, networking between
the Commission and local city municipalities
on environment policy and related issues
has been extensively documented (Ward and
Williams, 1997; Perkmann, 1999). Of course
such links pose risks if they are not properly
organized, as opaque networks may bypass
local voters and national governments
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
IS LOCAL TRULY BETTER?
through irregular channels of communication
and dialogue (Hay, 1995). In fact then a more
realistic and useful subsidiarity debate might
be focused on how such networking does not
end up merely empowering local elites or
controlling local authorities even further. Too
frequently Commission sponsored networks
do not go far enough in ensuring accountabil-
ity and transparency, or are too ad hoc and
involve interest and issue groups in pref-
erence to formally elected government au-
thorities (Jacobs, 1997; Heritier, 1999).
Alternatively such EU networking can merely
confirm the power of the central state rather
than effect a genuine decentralization of pol-
icy (Martin, 1998).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
indicate in detail how such EU networking
could be reformed, the networking approach
does suggest a workable and concrete way of
linking the local with the Brussels level for the
benefit of policy. Also many innovative re-
forms in European local governance in recent
years have taken the form of modifying sim-
ple hierarchical relations with novel participa-
tory linkages to various civic–social partners
(Bogason, 1998). More generally some demo-
cratic theorists have begun to recognize the
valuable role state–social networks can play
in improving the quality of state institutional-
ized democratic practices (Busch, 1999).
Such networking could for example be as-
signed the goal of making the Commission
respond to local needs, and to improve imple-
mentation of EU policy. Indeed this is a job
that is already being started by the expanding
IMPEL network, which examines issue of im-
plementation (Demmke, 1997, p 70). Above all
though, it should provide local governments
with a means to supervise EU level policy
developments at an early stage and signal
their concerns. Indeed Ward and Williams
suggest that various urban environment pol-
icy related networking was embarked upon
by some German city states, exactly so that
they might monitor the Commission (Ward
and Williams, 1997, p 457). This latter point
leads to a second suggested reform approach
below.
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
Reform suggestion 2: framework directives
that enumerate local responsibilities
Several member states spell out specific envi-
ronmental policy duties for each level of their
state, through enumerated powers based on a
blend of common sense, custom, obvious
scale effects and local preferences (Sorenson,
1992; Føllesdal, 1998, p 191). This makes pol-
icy clearer and reduces the scope for turf
wars. The Austrian constitution for example
attempts this with regard to environmental
policy where it distinguishes between various
duties for the national and regional level (FPS,
1995, article 10(9), article 11(1.7), pp 11, 15).
Such an approach seems in keeping with a
broad definition of the subsidiarity principle.
A practical manifestation of this approach
in the EU context might be to add to frame-
work directives drafted by the Commission, a
distinct section that sets out responsibilities
and tasks ideal for each of the national, re-
gional and local levels in such a way that they
mutually reinforce each other. In practice of
course a wide margin of discretion would
continue to exist in each state as to how this
would work, as such a section should be
indicative only. This approach might allow
for ideal duties and targets on implementa-
tion to be agreed in advance of the directive
coming into force. In other cases it could
detail the acceptable legal margin of discre-
tion for further measures each tier might want
to pursue – for example setting higher local
standards due to higher levels of pollution.
Local, regional and national governments
would therefore know what is expected of
them in a general sense under a particular
directive’s terms, by being effectively written
into the drafting process from the outset.
Of course there are those who will still
argue that the national governments and min-
istries ought to best be left to represent such
local interests. Yet local and national interests
in the detail of policy are not always the
same, and there may be some features of local
expertise, or conversely a particularistic prob-
lem, which requires a more direct source of
representation.
Above all this approach would be useful, as
local governments would not have to wait for
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
81

detailed national direction on implementation,
or confuse their duties with that of another
level. Administrative problems of local imple-
mentation may also be usefully discussed with
the Commission before a final text is agreed,
thus pre-empting what has been a problem in
the past. In short this approach would institu-
tionalize a type of negotiation between the
Commission and local government environ-
mental experts to go hand in hand with the
networking approach discussed above. Indeed
such an approach has been argued for in the
USA in the context of groundwater policy, in
order to give local states sufficient flexibility
(Redifer and Davis, 1996).
CONCLUSION
Before some final closing comments, it is use-
ful here to reiterate, in schematic form, the
reasons why one might be sceptical about the
scope for the application of the subsidiarity
principle to the local level. These are the
following.
1. The definition given to subsidiarity in the
EU context suggests a serious problem of
uneven application. Some states, notably
Germany, Belgium and Austria, have indi-
cated they will apply the principle to the
sub-state level. In other states it remains
unclear how local governments can rely on
the principle without nation state
permission.
2. Local governments in any event appear to
have a very mixed performance at envi-
ronment related duties, which suggests
caution in advocating further decentraliza-
tion. In fairness this is often a function of
their limited resources, yet in other cases
local governments may suffer from poor
expertise, regulatory capture and the prob-
lem of spillovers. This typically adds up to
a serious problem of implementation. One
has to conclude that it appears many at-
tempts at decentralizing environmental
policy in Europe have largely failed to
deliver improvements and in fact some-
times merely masked a decentralization of
fiscal austerity.
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
82
B. FLYNN
3. A better way to conceive of a role for local
environmental actors towards the EU is
arguably one that evaluates their contribu-
tions in the context of a broader intergov-
ernmental relations perspective. What
emerges here is that local governments
offer scope in particular for policy innova-
tion and for more responsive and finely
tuned types of regulation.
4. Two specific reform suggestions were of-
fered building on this perspective. The
first was that expert policy networking
could allow for a flexible style of dialogue
to emerge between the Commission and
local governments, through which exam-
ples of innovation and the need for local
flexibility could be discussed. This ap-
proach is beginning in any case, but needs
to be made more accountable and trans-
parent. To give effect to this, a second
suggestion was that local experts could be
more involved in the drafting process for
future framework directives. These could
include enumerated indicative duties and
responsibilities for local governments.
After some seven years since the inclusion
of subsidiarity into EC law, it seems apt to
consider how the principle might be applied
in a more concrete way to local governments.
To date, the principle appears to offer little for
local governments. There is also a danger
that, if taken too far, the idea of subsidiarity
could be contorted to justify localized policy
autarky, a problem appearing in the USA
(Press, 1995). In contrast current trends in its
definition by the EU institutions seem to sug-
gest the continued concentration of political
decision-making power at the national level.
Somewhere between these two extremes, this
paper has argued for a more realistic ap-
praisal of the role of local governments in EU
environmental policy.
That is not to say that faith in the subsidiar-
ity principle should be abandoned outright,
for its usefulness all depends on how it is
constitutionally operationalized over time to
make policy more rational and democratic. In
the shorter term, it might also be useful to
develop the type of co-operative policy and
networking that can help local governments
Eur. Env. 10, 75 – 84 (2000)
IS LOCAL TRULY BETTER?
better implement European laws and ensure
the Commission proposes only those laws
that municipalities have had an opportunity
to extensively comment on. Such approaches
could be of use in maintaining cohesion and
unity in environmental policy where needed,
and at the same time allow for local adjust-
ments based on reasonable custom, political
legitimacy and, where useful, economic evi-
dence as well. Is it not time then to give up
the somewhat ambiguous subsidiarity debate
of the past for a more pragmatic and work-
able approach in the future?
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