CRIMINAL LAW II

DAILY CASE DIGEST

Second Semester School Year 2017 -2018

Jennica Gyrl Delfin


TITLE ONE – CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL
SECURITY AND LAW OF NATIONS
November 24, 2017 - Article 114 - TREASON
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
US v. ABAD
G.R. No. L-976. October 22, 1902
LADD, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge of “treason and
sedition” was proper.
FACTS:
The offense with which the defendant was
charged and of which he has been convicted is
that defined in section 14 of Act No. 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission, which is
as follows: "Any person who shall have taken any
oath before any military officer under the Civil
Government of the Philippine Islands, whether
such official so administering the oath was
specially authorized by law so to do or not, in
which oath the affiant is substance engaged to
recognize or accept the supreme authority of the
United States of America in these Islands or to
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by its duly constituted authorities
and who shall, after the passage of this act,
violate the terms and provisions of such oath or
any of such terms or provisions, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ten
years, or both."
In the present case the act by which the
defendant is found by the court below to have
violated the oath was that of denying to an officer
of the United States Army the existence of certain
rifles, which had been concealed by his orders at
the time of his surrender in April, 1901, and of
the existence and whereabouts of which he was
cognizant at the time of the denial. If this act was
a violation of the oath, which upon the evidence
in the case may be doubtful, it was probably also
an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to
the enemies of the United States, giving them aid
and comfort, and if the element of breach of
promise is to be regarded as merely an incidental
circumstance forming no part of the essence of
the crime of violation of oaths of allegiance, the
offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be
held to be covered by the amnesty as being, in
substance, treason though prosecuted under
another name.
HELD:
YES. Treason, in its more general sense, is the
"violation by a subject of his allegiance to his
sovereign or liege lord, or to the supreme
authority of the state." Sedition, in its more
general sense, is "the raising of commotion or
disturbances in the state." Technical terms of the
law when used in a statute are ordinarily to be
given their technical signification. But in
construing an executive act of the character of
this proclamation, as in construing a remedial
statute, a court is justified in applying a more
liberal rule of construction in order to effectuate,
if possible, the beneficient purpose intended.
Certainly a limitation of the words in question to
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their literal and technical signification would
utterly defeat the unmistakable general object of
the amnesty. Upon such a construction treason,
the highest of all political crimes, a crime which
may be punished by death under section 1 of Act
No. 292, would be included in the amnesty, while
insurrection, which is a crime of precisely the
same nature and differs from it solely in being
inferior in degree and punishable by fine and
imprisonment only, would be excluded. A
construction leading to such manifest
inconsistencies could be accepted only when the
language admitted of no other. We think the
construction suggested as the true one though
somewhat less restricted that the precise legal
signification of the terms "treason" and "sedition"
might warrant, may be adopted without doing
violence to the language of the proclamation, and
there is no room for doubt in our minds that by
adopting that construction we carry out the real
intention of the President.
The Court ruled that the offense of violation of
oaths of allegiance, being one of the political
offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included in the
general words "treason and sedition," as used in
the proclamation. The defendant is entitled to
the benefits of the proclamation.
LAUREL v. MISA
G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be prosecuted
for the crime of Treason penalized under Art. 114
of the RPC.
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas
corpus which was based on a theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving
the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended.
HELD:
YES. The idea of suspended sovereignty or
suspended allegiance is incompatible with our
Constitution. There is similarity in
characteristics between allegiance to the
sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband.
Because some external and insurmountable
force precludes the husband from exercising his
marital powers, functions, and duties and the
wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his
protection, may the wife invoke the theory of
suspended loyalty and may she freely share her
bed with the assailant of their home? After giving
aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing
him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay
in the invaded home, may the wife allege as
defense for her adultery the principle of
suspended conjugal fidelity?
Considering that the crime of treason against the
government of the Philippines defined and
penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code,
though originally intended to be a crime against
said government as then organized by authority
of the sovereign people of the United States,

exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of
the United States, was made, upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the
Government of the Philippines established by
authority of the people of the Philippines, in
whom the sovereignty resides according to
section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section
2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All
laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this
Constitution.
PEOPLE v. PEREZ
G.R. No. L-856. April 18, 1949
TUASON, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge of Treason was proper.
FACTS:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was
convicted of treason and sentenced to death by
electrocution. Seven counts were alleged in the
information but the prosecution offered evidence
only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which,
according to the court, were substantiated.
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together
with the other Filipinos forced numerous girls
and women against their will for the purpose of
satisfying the immoral purpose and sexual desire
of Colonel Mini.
Count No. 2 of the information substantially
alleges: That accused in company with some
Japanese and Filipinos forcefully took some
women to attend a banquet and a dance
organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet
Governor and thereafter be used as sex slaves by
the Colonel.
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July
16, 1942, that two girls were taken from their
homes by the accused and his companion named
Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese
Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal
appetite, but these two, the accused Susano
Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, raped
the girls before delivering them to the Japanese
Officer.
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4,
1942, the said accused deceived two women on
the pretext that they were to be taken as
witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the
investigation of a case against a certain Chinese,
but upon arriving at the Colonel’s office, through
force and intimidation, the two women were
raped by the accused and some Japanese
Officials.
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together
with his Filipino companion two nurses of the
provincial hospital, for not having attended a
dance and reception organized by the Puppet
Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other
Japanese high ranking officers; that upon being
brought the Puppet Governor, they were severely
reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942,
against said nurses were forced to attend
another banquet and dance in order that the Jap
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officers Mini and Takibayas might make a
selection which girls would suit best their fancy;
that the real purpose behind those forcible
invitations was to lure them to the residence of
said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
HELD:
NO, the charge was not proper. The SC ruled that
the deeds committed by the accused do not
constitute treason. If furnishing women for
immoral purposes to the enemies was treason
because women's company kept up their morale,
so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at
parties, selling them food and drinks, and
kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of
hospitality without doubt produces the same
general result, yet by common agreement those
and similar manifestation of sympathy and
attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are
punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not
prescribe all kinds of social, business and
political intercourse between the belligerent
occupants of the invaded country and its
inhabitants. In the nature of things, the
occupation of a country by the enemy is bound
to create relations of all sorts between the
invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort
constitute treason must depend upon their
nature degree and purpose. To draw a line
between treasonable and untreasonable
assistance is not always easy.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of
the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be
to render assistance to them as enemies and not
merely as individuals and in addition, be directly
in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To
make a simple distinction: To lend or give money
to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the
beneficiary so that he may buy personal
necessities is to assist him as individual and is
not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to
lend or give him money to enable him to buy
arms or ammunition to use in waging war
against the giver's country enhance his strength
and by same count injures the interest of the
government of the giver. That is treason.
Applying these principles to the case at bar,
appellant's first assignment of error is correct.
His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the
lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not
treason even though the women and the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant
for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not
guilty any more than the women themselves
would have been if they voluntarily and willingly
had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainment. Sexual and social relations with
the Japanese did not directly and materially tend
to improve their war efforts or to weaken the
power of the United State. The acts herein
charged were not, by fair implication, calculated
to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army
or to cripple the defense and resistance of the
other side. Whatever favorable effect the
defendant's collaboration with the Japanese
might have in their prosecution of the war was
trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent
of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of
treason, which, in the absence of admission, may

be gathered from the nature and circumstances
of each particular case.
November 25, 2017 – Article 115 –
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT
TREASON
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
US VS. BAUTISTA, ET AL.
6 PHIL. 581 NOVEMBER 3, 1906
CARSON, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conspiracy and
proposal to commit treason.
FACTS:
During the latter part of 1903, a junta was
organized and a conspiracy entered into by a
number of Filipinos, resident in Hongkong, for
the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
the United States in the Philippine Islands by
force of arms and establishing in its stead a
government to be known as the Republica
Universal Democratica Filipina. Prim Ruiz was
recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy
and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the military
forces to the organized in the Philippines in the
furtherance of the plans of the conspirators. The
appellant Francisco Bautistam was an intimate
friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and
notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and
that, to aid him in his journey, Bautista
forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after
the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was present,
taking part in the meetings whereat the plans of
the conspirators were discussed and perfected,
and that at one of these meetings Bautista, in
answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that
the necessary preparations had been made and
that he "held the people in readiness." The
appellant Tomas Puzon united with the
conspirators through the agency of one Jose R.
Muñoz, who was proven to have been a prime
leader of the movement, in the intimate
confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to
distribute bonds and nominate and appoint
certain officials, including a brigadier-general of
the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary
forces; that at the time when the conspiracy was
being brought to a head in the city of Manila,
Puzon held several conferences with the said
Muñoz whereat plans were made for the coming
insurrection; that at one of these conferences
Muñoz offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-
general of the signal corps and undertook to do
his part in organizing the troops; and that at a
later conference he assured the said Muñoz that
he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that
he had duly organized in accordance with the
terms of his commission.
HELD:
Yes. It is contended that the acceptance or
possession of an appointment as an officer of the
military forces of the conspiracy should not be
considered as evidence against him. But the case
at bar is to be distinguished from these and like
cases by the fact that the record clearly disclose
that the accused actually and voluntarily
accepted the appointment in question and in
doing so assumed all the obligations implied by
such acceptance, and that the charge in this
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case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the
accused accepted the appointment is taken into
consideration merely as evidence of his criminal
relations with the conspirators.
It is quite conceivable that a group of
conspirators might appoint a person in no wise
connected with them to some high office in the
conspiracy, in the hope that such person would
afterwards accept the commission and thus
unite himself with them, and it is even possible
that such an appointment might be forwarded in
the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the
possession of the person thus nominated, and
that such appointment might be found in his
possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the
person in whose possession the appointment
was found might be entirely innocent of all
intention to join the conspiracy, never having
authorized the conspirators to use his name in
this manner nor to send such a commission to
him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the
annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has
been proven that such appointments have been
concealed in the baggage or among the papers of
the accused persons, so that when later
discovered by the officers of the law they might
be used as evidence against the accused. But
where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have
existed as in this case, and it is proven that the
accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as
an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this
fact may properly be taken into consideration as
evidence of his relations with the conspirators.
JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 148965 FEBRUARY 26, 2002
PUNO, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge against petitioner for
alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators,
is proper.
FACTS:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the
impeachment proceedings against Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic
of the Philippines, five criminal complaints
against the former President and members of his
family, his associates, friends and conspirators
were filed with the respondent Office of the
Ombudsman. The respondent Ombudsman
issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of
several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein.
One of the Informations was for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among
the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
HELD:
Yes, but only to those acts which were allegedly
done in conspiracy with the former President
Joseph Estrada.
The Amended Information, in its first two
paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-
accused with the crime of plunder. The first
paragraph names all the accused, while the

second paragraph describes in general how
plunder was committed and lays down most of
the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that
constitute the crime and name in particular the
co-conspirators of former President Estrada in
each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in
the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the
items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate
act of receiving, on several instances, money
from illegal gambling, in consideration of
toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and
expressly names petitioner as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act
corresponds with the offense described in item 2
of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate
act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a
portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the
offense described in item 1 in the enumeration in
Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does
not mention petitioner but instead names other
conspirators of the former President. Sub-
paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of
ordering the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving
commissions from such purchase from the Belle
Corporation which became part of the deposit in
the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI
Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items
2 and 3 in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and
was allegedly committed by the former President
in connivance with John Does and Jane Does.
Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate
act that the former President unjustly enriched
himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and
deposited the same under his account name Jose
Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act
corresponds to the offense under item 6 in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended
Information, it is clear that all the accused
named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their
individual acts, conspired with former President
Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the
Amended Information is worded, however, it is
not certain whether the accused in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other
to enable the former President to amass the
subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of
clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused
with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in
relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold
that petitioner can be held accountable only for
the predicate acts he allegedly committed as
related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which were allegedly done in
conspiracy with the former President whose
design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting
to more than P4 billion.
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
In the crime of plunder, different parties may be
united by a common purpose. In the case at bar,
the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality to help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information alleged the different
participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge,
therefore, is not that each accused agreed to
receive protection money from illegal gambling,
that each misappropriated a portion of the
tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered
the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself
from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it
is that each of them, by their individual acts,
agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth of and/or for former President
Estrada.
November 26, 2017 – Article 116 – MISPRISION
OF TREASON
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
US VS CABALLEROS ET AL
4 Phil 350 (1905)
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was Misprision of Treason.
FACTS:
Two accused were sentenced to the penalty of
seven years of presidio mayor as accessories to
the crime of assassination or murder of four
American school- teachers. Without having
taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices but they took part in the burial of
the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court did not justify the
evidence.
As regards to accused Baculi, although he
confessed to have assisted in the burial of the
corpses, it appears that he only did it because he
was compelled by the murderers who called him,
striking him with the butts of their guns and
forced him to bury the corpses. It was
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime
who was present when it was committed. The
witness also stated that Baculi was not a
member of the group who murdered the
Americans.
As regards to the other accused Apolonio
Caballeros, there was no proof that he took any
part in the execution of the crime and did not
take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses as to the testimonies of the witness and
the other accused.
The fact that the two accused did not report to
the authorities about the perpetration of the
crime, which seemed to be one of the motives for
the conviction and which the lower court took
into consideration in the judgment, is not
punishable by the Penal Code and therefore

cannot render the two accused criminally liable
under the law.
November 27, 2017– Article 117 – ESPIONAGE
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017– Article 118 – INCITING TO
WAR OR GIVING MOTIVES FOR REPRISALS
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 119 – VIOLATION
OF NEUTRALITY
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 120 –
CORRESPONDENCE WITH HOSTILE
COUNTRY
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 121 – FLIGHT TO
ENEMY’S COUNTRY
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 122 – PIRACY
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO & SARAW
G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922
ISSUE:
WON Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the
crime of piracy alleged in this case.
FACTS:
Two boats left Matuta, the boat 1 is of a dutch
possession and had one dutch subject, while
boat 2 had 11 men, women and children,
likewise from Holland.
Boat 2 arrived in Buang and Bukid in the Dutch
East Indies, then suddenly they were
surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 moros
who first asked for food. They eventually entered
the boat and took all the cargo, attacked some of
the men, and brutally violated two women.
They also took the 2 women and left the ship to
sink-- on board those who were left as they
placed holes in it. Two moro marauders in Tawi
Tawi were identified as Lol-lo and Saraw, and
arrested for piracy.
The accused-appellants questioned the
jurisdiction of the Philippine courts to the case,
but the court ruled that piracy is a crime against
all mankind, so every court also has jurisdiction
to try these cases.
HELD:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of piracy were
present. Piracy is robbery in forcible depredation
on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi (intention to steal), and in
the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
Philippine courts has jurisdiction to this case
because pirates are in law hostes humani generis
(enemy of mankind), a crime against all
mankind. Therefore, it can be punished in any
competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found.
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The Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy is
still in force in the Philippines.
PEOPLE VS. CATANTAN
G.R. No. 11807, September 5, 1997
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant committed grave
coercion or piracy under PD. No. 532.
FACTS:
The Pilapil brothers, Eugene and Juan Jr., were
fishing in the sea, 3 kilometers away from the
shores of Tabogon, Cebu. In the course of their
fishing, accused Catantan and Ursal boarded the
pumpboat of the Pilapil's at gun point.
The pumpboat of the Pilapil brothers broke
down, as a result, they boarded another
pumpboat operated by Juanito. Catantan
ordered the latter to take them to Mungaz, Cebu.
However, Juanito's pumpboat ran out of gas and
the accused were apprehended by the police
soon after the Pilapils reported the incident to the
local authorities.
HELD:
Yes. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime
of piracy under PD 532, which was affirmed by
the Supreme Court. Hence, were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
However, accused-appellant argues that in order
that piracy may be committed it is essential that
there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He
claims that he and his companion did not attack
or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by
using force or intimidation but merely boarded
the boat, and it was only when they were already
on board that they used force to compel the
Pilapils to take them to some other place.
Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no
intention of permanently taking possession or
depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter
of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they
ordered the brothers right away to approach that
boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in
their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
The Court does not agree on the contention of the
appellant that the acts committed only
constitute grave coercion defined in Article 286
of the RPC, and not piracy under PD No. 532.
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as
well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of
the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true
that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination,
such compulsion was obviously part of the act of
seizing their boat.
PP v. TULIN
G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001
ISSUE:
WON the Philippine courts is without jurisdiction
to try the crime of piracy committed outside
Philippine waters and territory.
FACTS:

A cargo vessel owned by PNOC named MT
Tabangao was sailing near the coast of Mindoro
loaded with barrels of Kerosene, gasoline and
diesel oil. Suddenly, the cargo vessel was
boarded by seven (7) fully armed pirates named
Tulin et. al., and took control over the vessel and
painted the logo and ship with black, and then
painted with the name Galilee.
In Singapore, where the ship crew was forced to
sail from Mindoro, a vessel called Navi Pride,
anchored beside MT Tabangao. One of the
accused Hiong, supervised the Navi's crew and
received the cargo on board MT Tabangao.
The said vessel went back to the Philippines and
the pirates released the original crew members in
batch after the transfer of goods were completed.
The pirates then ordered the batch not to tell
authorities what happened.
A series of arrests were effected against the
accused-appellants, charging them with
qualified piracy or violation of PD. No. 532 (Piracy
in Philippine Waters), after the Chief Engineer of
the crew reported the incident to the coast guard.
However, one of the accused-appellant Hiong,
argues that the trial court erred in convicting
him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly
committed by him were executed outside the
Philippine waters and territory, therefore
stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
hold him for trial.
HELD:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try
this case.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act
No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision
was widened to include offenses committed "in
Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the
law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor
amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no
need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage
of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect
the citizenry as well as neighboring states from
crimes against the law of nations. As expressed
in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential
Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy
under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
6 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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As regards the contention that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to
state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T
Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the
captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No.
532 requires that the attack and seizure of the
vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine
waters, the disposition by the pirates of the
vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act
of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed
in Philippine waters.
November 28, 2017 – Art. 123 – QUALIFIED
PIRACY; AND PD 532
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
PEOPLE V. SIYOH, KIRAM, INDANAN AND
JAMAHALI
G.R. NO. L-57292, February 18, 1986
ISSUE:
Whether the guilty of Siyoh et al were proven
beyond reasonable doubt granting that the body
of Anastacio de Guzman was never found.
FACTS:
Antonio de Guzman together with his friends,
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio
de Guzman, who were also travelling merchants
like him, were on their way to Pilas Island,
Province of Basilan. The group were onboard a
pumpboat operated by Kiram with Siyoh as his
help.
While on their way, 2 men armed with armantes
onboard a pumpboat fired at them thereupon
Kiram turned off the engine and threw a rope
towards the other pumboat. While the group’s
boat was towed towards Mataja Island, the
armed men took their money and goods as well
as their clothes. After which, Kiram uttered “It
was good to kill all of you” then Siyoh hacked de
Castro and Hiolen with his “barong.” Antonio de
Guzman was able to jump out of the boat but
Kiram’s group fired at him hitting him at the
back. Antonio de Guzman was able to survive the
attack and reported it to the Philippine Army.
Antonio de Guzman was able to identify the men
who boarded their boat as the men that his group
saw talking with Kiram and Siyoh in Baluk-
Baluk Island the previous night.
The trial court found the defendants to be guilty
qualified piracy with triple murder and
frustrated murder. It then imposed to Siyoh et al
the death penalty.
HELD:
The Court upheld the decision of the trial court.
Art.123. of the RPC states that: Qualified piracy.
— The penalty of reclusion temporal to death
shall be imposed upon those who commit any of
the crimes referred to in the preceding article,
under any of the following circumstances:

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by
boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their
victims without means of saving themselves; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by
murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.
In the case at bar, it was proven that Siyoh et al
killed their victims, with the exception of
Antonio, after they stole the personal belongings
of their victims. The number of persons killed on
the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No.
532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder
or homicide is committed as a result or on the
occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime
punishable by death regardless of the number of
victims. Thus, the recovery or non-recovery of
the body of Anastacio is immaterial in the
present case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME
RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE
LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-60100, L-60768 and L-61069
March 20, 1985
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not
appreciating their plea of guilty as a mitigating
circumstance.
FACTS:
Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de
Lara y Medrano; Rico Lopez; Davao Reyes alias
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; and Peter Ponce
y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were crew
members of M/V Noria 767.
While within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province
of Tawi-Tawi, armed with bladed weapons and
high caliber firearms, the group robbed the said
vessel. In the course of the robbing, several
persons were killed and injured. Leopoldo Lao,
Municipal Health Officer of the said municipality
went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it arrived
at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi and saw at the wharf
ten dead bodies.
Upon their arraignment the accused pleaded
guilty of the crime of piracy.
The trial court imposed the penalty of death
upon the accused.
HELD:
The trial court was correct.
Sec. 3 of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-
Piracy Law provides that Sec. 3 Penalties.—Any
person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall,
upon conviction by competent court be punished
by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. If rape, murder or no homocide is
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committed as a result or on the occasion of
piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the
victims without means of saving themselves, or
when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon
or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of
death shall be imposed.
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons
found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape,
murder or homicide is committed is mandatory
death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed
no error in not considering the plea of the three
(3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance.
In relation to the above, Art. 63 of the RPC was
cited, to wit: ART. 63. Rules for the application of
indivisible penalties.—In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
PEOPLE V. ANG CHO KIO
G.R. NOS. L-6687 AND L-6688
JULY 29, 1954
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in not finding the
accused guilty of the complex crime of grave
coercion with murder with the imposable penalty
of death.
FACTS:
Ang Cho Kio was onboard PAL flight heading to
Aparri from Laoag. Somewhere over the airspace
of Mt. Province, he shot and killed the purser of
the flight, Eduardo Diago.
He then ordered the pilot, Pedro Perlas, to
change route towards Amoy. The pilot refused,
prompting Kio to shoot the pilot which caused
his instantaneous death.
For the first charge, he was sentenced to prision
mayor in the minimum and reclusion temporal
as maximum. For the second charge, the court
found him guilty of murder and grave coercion
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
The trial court was correct.
The accused committed two separate crimes,
murder and grave coercion. The defendant could
have deprived Pedro Perlas of his life without
having to force him to change the direction of the
airplane; Coercion to commit murder was not
indispensable. Nor was it indispensable to
assassinate to commit coercion, quite the
contrary; for having murdered the pilot, the
defendant did not get his wish to reach Amoy: he
committed two acts that consisted of the crimes
of coercion and murder.
Complex crime is defined as a single act
constituting two or more crimes or when one of
them is necessary to commit the other. The
penalty corresponding to the most serious crime
shall be imposed, applying it to its maximum
extent.
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

TITLE TWO – CRIMES AGAINST THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
November 29, 2017 – Article 124 – ARBITRARY
DETENTION
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
RAMON MILO VS CFI JUDGE ANGELITO
SALANGA
G.R. NO. L-37007, July 20, 1987
JUSTICE GANCAYCO
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio
captain, can be charged of arbitrary detention.
FACTS:
On April 21, 1973 at around 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, Philippines, the accused with the
aid of some other private persons, conspiring,
maltreated Armando Valdez by hitting with butts
of their guns and fists. Immediately thereafter,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and
lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal
jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash
the information on the ground that the facts
charged against him do not constitute an offense
of arbitrary detention and that the proofs
adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Respondent
judge quashed the motion on the ground that
Tuvera Sr. was not a public officer who can be
charged with arbitrary detention. Petitioner
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed
an opposition thereto.
HELD:
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public
officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the
following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed
into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later
named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in
authority. In various cases, this Court deemed
them as persons in authority, and convicted
them of Arbitrary Detention.
Thus, it was erroneously reasoned that captain
did not detained Valdez, being merely a captain,
no authority, and that barrio captain was not a
public official, not considered persons in
authority, only upon PD 299. From the foregoing,
there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like
private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable
for Arbitrary Detention.
FELICIANO GALVANTE VS HON. ORLANDO
C. CASIMIRO
9 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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G.R. NO. 162808, April 22, 2008
JUSTICE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents can be
charged of arbitrary detention.
FACTS:
On May 14, 2001, private respondents, PO1
Romil Avenido, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PO1
Eddie Degran, PO1 Federico Balolot and
Regional Mobile Group, PNP members of
Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur,
confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super
.38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short
magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions.
Consequently, information filed against the
petitioner for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on
Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258.
Petitioner filed against private respondents an
administrative case and criminal case for
Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner states that private
respondents aimed their long firearms at him,
arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in
detention. Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a
"Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss," which
was granted by Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II
Victoriano Pag-ong, on the ground that "the
action of the policemen who conducted the
warrantless search in spite of the absence of any
circumstances justifying the same intruded into
the privacy of the accused and the security of his
property."
HELD:
The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention
was properly dismissed by public respondents.
To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary
detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender
is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender
detained the complainant, and (c) the detention
is without legal grounds. The second element
was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-
Complaint. As pointed out by private respondent
Conde in his Comment and Memorandum,
petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-
Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba
who caused his detention. Nowhere in said
affidavit did petitioner allege that private
respondents effected his detention, or were in
any other way involved in it. There was,
therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the
criminal charge for arbitrary detention against
private respondents.
November 30, 2017 – Art. 125 – DELAY IN THE
DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE
PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES.
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl
LINO V. FUGOSA, ET. AL
G.R. NO. L-1159
JANUARY 30, 1947
ISSUE:
Whether or not Montaniel and Deoduco were
detained illegally.
FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed against
Valeriano Fugoso, Lamberto Javaler and John
Doe in their capacity as Mayor, police and officer
in charge of the municipal jail of the City of
Manila, respectively for unlawfully detaining
twelve (12) persons. Ten of the petitioners were
released. However, the other two remained and
were confined for three days and four days
respectively without warrants and charges
formally filed in court. The papers of their cases
were not transmitted to the City Fiscal’s office
until late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946.
Montaniel and Deoduco remained in custody
because they were charged with unjust vexation
and disobedience to an agent of a person in
authority. The informations were filed the same
day. However, no warrants of arrests or orders of
commitment were issued by the municipal court.
HELD:
Yes. The detention of Deoduco and Montaniel
was illegal upon the exploration of six hours
without them having been delivered to the
corresponding judicial authorities. Their cases
were referred to the City Fiscal four and three
days, respectively, after they were arrested. The
illegally of their detention was not cured by the
filing of information against them, since no
warrants of arrest or orders of commitment were
issued by the municipal court. The two
petitioners are charged with light offenses. The
general rule is that when the offense charged is
light the accused should not be arrested, except
in particular instances when the court expressly
orders. In the instant case, the municipal court
has not yet acted on the informations. While an
arrest may be made without warrant there are
reasonable grounds the prisoner cannot be
retained beyond the period provided by law,
unless a warrant is procured from a competent
court. The City Fiscal had no authority to issue
warrants of arrest and was powerless to validate
such illegal detention by merely filing
informations or by any order of his own, either
express or implied. It is not necessary to
determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial
authority within the purview of article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code since the petitioners’ case
was referred to him long after the expiration of
the six hours provided by law. These prisoners
should have been out of prison long before the
informations were filed with the municipal court,
and they should not be retained therein merely
because of the filing of such informations since
that the offenses charged are light. Under such
circumstances, only an order of commitment
could legalize the prisoner’s continued
confinement, and no such order has ever been
issued.
SORIA V DESIERTO
G.R. NOS. 153524-25, JANUARY 31, 2005
ISSUE:
Whether or not the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in
dismissing the complaint for violation of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were
arrested on May 13, 2001, a Sunday and the day
before May 14 elections, without a warrant by
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respondents for alleged illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. One police identified
Bista to have a standing warrant of arrest for
violation of BP Blg. 6. From the time of Soria’s
detention up to the time of his release, 22 hours
had already elapsed and Bista was detained for
26 days. The crimes for which Soria was arrested
without warrant are punishable by correctional
penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with
the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of
his arrest. The crimes for which Bista was
arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only
be detained for 36 hours without criminal
complaints or information having been filed with
the proper judicial authorities.
Petitioners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-
affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code against herein private respondents.
The office dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Petitioners then filed their motion for
reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit in the second assailed Resolution.
HELD:
No. Respondents did not abuse their discretion
in dismissing the case. Their disposition of
petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have
been conjured out of thin air as it was properly
backed up by law and jurisprudence. Grave
abuse of discretion is such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the
public officer concerned which is equivalent to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on
applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election
day or a special holiday, should not be included
in the computation of the period prescribed by
law for the filing of complaint/information in
courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a
'no-office day. Hence, there could be no arbitrary
detention or violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against
the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will
not prosper because the running of the thirty-six
(36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing
of the complaint against him from the time of his
arrest was tolled by one day (election day).
Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for
Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he could only be
released if he has no other pending criminal case
requiring his continuous detention.
December 1, 2017- Article 127- EXPULSION
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. V. LUKBAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-14639, MARCH 25, 1919
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mayor Lukban was authorized to
send those women in transferring their residence
from Manila to Davao

FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill
repute, which had been permitted for a number
of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women
were kept confined to their houses in the district
by the police. Presumably, during this period, the
city authorities quietly perfected arrangements
with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women
to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting
pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila,
Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that
awaited their arrival. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they
were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had
not been asked if they wished to depart from that
region and had neither directly nor indirectly
given their consent to the deportation.
HELD:
NO. Only the court by a final judgment can order
a person to change his residence. This is
illustrated in ejectment proceedings,
expropriation proceedings and in the penalty of
destierro. Hence, the Mayor and the Chief of
Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes
residing in that City to go and live in Davao
against their will, there being no law that
authorizes them to do so. These women, despite
their being in a sense, lepers of society, are
nevertheless not chattels, but Philippine citizens,
protected by the same constitutional guarantees
as are other citizens.
December 2, 2017 - Art. 128 - VIOLATION OF
DOMICILE
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE
and GENEROSO MARFIL alias "TAPOL" vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
ISSUE:
WON the accused are guilty of violating art. 128?
The crime of violation against domicile
FACTS:
On May 14, 1989 in the Evening. Acccused
Gerochie, then Barangay Captain and 2 CAFGU
members, hence persons in authority who
feloniously and without judicial order entered
the house of victim Mallo by breaking the door
against the will of the occupants and injuring
one of them
During Trial, the Accused were named as
barangay captain and Civilian Volunteer, which
the accused later admitted and confirmed
RTC: Found the accused guilty of slight Physical
Injuries under Art. 265
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They also stated that accused should not be
guilty of violating Art. 128 for lack of proving the
essential requisite that the accused were Public
Officials and that such admission is not enough
to prove that they were public officers. It is
required that clear and convincing evidence
other than the the testimony of the witnesses
that accused were in fact public officers. and
when in doubt on whether the accused were
public officers, then it should be ruled in favor of
the accused
Petitioners appealed to the CA to contest the
decision on Slight Physical Injuries
CA: Upon appeal the RTC decision, the CA set
aside the ruling of the RTC on Slight Physical
Injuries but ruled that accused were guilty of
Violating of Domicile considering that the
accused admitted to be the Barangay Captain
and part of the Citizen Armed Forces
HELD:
YES, The Court adopts the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony
before the open court as well as in the pleadings
they filed, neither Geroche denied that he was a
barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted
that they were CAFGU members. In holding such
positions, they are considered as public
officers/employees.
December 3, 2017 - Art. 129 - SEARCH
WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED, AND
ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF THOSE LEGALLY
OBTAINED
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
AURELIO S. ALVERO vs. ARSENIO P. DIZON,
ET AL
G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946
ISSUE:
Is a search and seizure without warrant but an
incident of a lawful arrest legal?
FACTS:
While the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers
of the United States Army, accompanied by men
of Filipino Guerrilla Forces arrested Aurelio
Alvero for treason and seized and took certain
papers from his house. He filed a petition, in
which he protested against the procedure of the
government in the seizure of said documents,
and asked for the documents to be returned to
him but was denied.
Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order
but was gain denied. Herein petitioner now
claims that the respondent judges, in denying
the petition for the return of said documents,
acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave
abuse in the exercise of their discretion, alleging
that even the seizure of documents by means of
a search warrant legally issued which
constitutes a violation of his rights under the
Constitution.
HELD:
The court ruled YES and cited the ruling in
Agnello vs United States: "The most important
exception to the necessity for a search warrant is
the right of search and seizure as an incident to

a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made
either while a crime is being committed or after
its commission. The right to search includes in
both instances that of searching the person of
him who is arrested, in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or
as the means by which it was committed."
The purpose of the constitutional provisions
against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person
and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting
under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give
remedy against such usurpations when
attempted. But it does not prohibit the Federal
Government from taking advantage of unlawful
searches made by a private person or under
authority of state law.
FELICIANO GALVANTE vs. HON. ORLANDO
C. CASIMIRO
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008
ISSUE:
Can the respondents be criminally liable under
article 129 of the revised penal code?
FACTS:
Respondents pointed their firearms to petitioner;
went near the owner type jeep owned by
petitioner and conducted a search. Respondents
saw a .38 pistol under the floormat of the jeep
and asked petitioner of the MR of the firearm.
Due to fear that respondents' long arms were still
pointed to them, petitioner searched his wallet
and gave the asked document. Immediately, the
policemen (respondents) left them without saying
anything bringing with them the firearm.
The RTC found that "the action of the policemen
who conducted the warrantless search in spite of
the absence of any circumstances justifying the
same intruded into the privacy of the accused
and the security of his property.
Unaware of the RTC decision, Ombudsman
dismissed the criminal complaint for illegal
search. It found that the allegations of the
complainant failed to establish the factual basis
of the complaint, it appearing that the incident
stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest.
HELD:
NO. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a
criminal act for it is not penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special
law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms
of searches: Art. 129. Search warrants
maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of
those legally obtained, and Art. 130. Searching
domicile without witnesses.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of
the foregoing felonies; rather, he accused private
respondents of conducting a search on his
vehicle without being armed with a valid
warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not
covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless
search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under
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Article 32, in relation to Article 2219 (6) and (10)
of the Civil Code.
Ombudsman properly dismissed the complaint
for illegal search, although the reason for
dismissing (valid warrantless arrest) the same is
rather off the mark. The same should have been
dismissed by the reason that it is not cognizable
by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a
criminal offense.
December 4, 2017 - Article 130 - SEARCHING
DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESS
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
PAPA VS MAGO
G.R. NO. L-27360, FEBRUARY 28, 1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the goods were
valid.
FACTS:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence
unit of the Manila Police Department, acting
upon a reliable information that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released
the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and
upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of
Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of
the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance
at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the
trucks left gate No. 1 the counter-intelligence
unit went after the trucks and intercepted them
at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load
of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of
goods, and the two trucks, were seized on
instructions of the Chief of Police.
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods
seized. She hired the trucks owned by Valentin
Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to
her residence. She claims that the goods were
seized without search warrant issued by a
competent court. Further, the Chief of Police
Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for
Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and
the goods contained therein be not examined and
that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto
Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to
examine the goods because the goods were no
longer under the control and supervision of the
Commissioner of Customs.
HELD:
Yes. It is the settled rule that the Bureau of
Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement
of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control, even if
no warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. The Chief of the Manila Police
Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been
deputized in writing by the Commissioner of
Customs, could, for the purposes of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any
cargo, articles or other movable property when

the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for
any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws.
He could lawfully open and examine any box,
trunk, envelope or other container wherever
found when he had reasonable cause to suspect
the presence therein of dutiable articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;
and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It
cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner
Ricardo could lawfully effect the search and
seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and
Customs Code authorizes him to demand
assistance of any police officer to effect said
search and seizure, and the latter has the legal
duty to render said assistance.
Petitioner his companion policemen had
authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff
and Customs Code does not require said warrant
in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, or envelope or any person on board, or
to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant
in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling
house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace.
. . ." Hence, the seizure of the goods were valid.
EDUARDO QUINTERO VS. NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
G.R. NO. L-35149 JUNE 23, 1988
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence being seized were
admissible.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Quintero disclosed that
certain persons had distributed money to some
delegates of the Con-Con to influence the
delegates in the discharge of their functions. As
an offshoot of this disclosure, Delegate Quintero
delivered to the Con-Con the aggregate amount
of the "payola" he himself had received the
amount of P11, 150.00 in cash. Quintero,
however, did not reveal the names of the persons
who gave him the money; and he begged at that
time not to be made to name names. However,
pressure mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal
the identities of the people behind the "payola"
scheme. Hence, Quintero released from his
hospital bed in San Juan de Dios Hospital a
sworn statement addressed to the Committee on
Privileges of the Con-Con, mentioning the names
of the persons who gave him the "payola." Also,
In his privilege speech, he said that "in that same
evening of January 6,1972, after the dinner was
over, when we were still inside the Malacañang
grounds on our way to our cars, one of the
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delegates made this announcement: "The
envelopes are ready. They will be distributed in a
couple of days." Hours after Delegate Quintero's
statement was made public, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos went on the air as well as
on TV to denounce Mr. Quintero, and he averred
that he "shall not rest until I have unmasked this
pretender, his master-minds and accomplices."
In the evening of the same day that Mr. Marcos
issued the afore-quoted statement, the agents of
the respondent National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI, for short) raided the house of Delegate
Quintero, on the basis of Search Warrant No. 7
issued also on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge
Elias Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. NBI agents seized bundles of money
amounting to P379, 000.00. On 1 June 1972, the
NBI filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal
complaint for direct bribery against Delegate
Quintero.
HELD:
No. Disregarding for a moment the absence of
"probable cause," the search itself that was
conducted by the NBI agents who raided the
house of petitioner, pursuant to the questioned
search warrant, was highly irregular. The two (2)
occupants of the house who witnessed the
search conducted, Generoso Quintero and Pfc.
Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where a
search was being made by a member of the
raiding party, while the other NBI agents were
left to themselves in the other parts of the house,
where no members of the household were in a
position to watch them, and thus they conducted
a search on their own. Such a procedure,
wherein members of a raiding party can roam
around the raided premises unaccompanied by
any witness, as the only witnesses available as
prescribed by law are made to witness a search
conducted by the other members of the raiding
party in another part of the house, is held to be
violative of both the spirit and the letter of the
law, which provides that "no search of a house,
room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of at least one competent
witness, resident of the neighborhood." Another
irregularity committed by the agents of
respondent NBI was their failure to comply with
the requirement of Sec. 10, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court which provides that "The officer seizing
property under the warrant must give a detailed
receipt for the same to the person on whom or in
whose possession it was found, or in the absence
of any person, must, in the presence of at least
one-witness, leave a receipt in the place in which
he found the seized property." The receipt issued
by the seizing party in the case at bar, showed
that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio
Veracruz. This person was a policeman from the
Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP), who
accompanied the agents of respondent NBI
during the conduct of the search, The
requirement under the aforequoted Rule that a
witness should attest to the making of the
receipt, was not complied with. This requirement
of the Rules was rendered nugatory, when the
one who attested to the receipt from the raiding
party was himself a member of the raiding party.
The circumstances prevailing before the
issuance of the questioned search warrant, and
the actual manner in which the search was
conducted in the house of the petitioner, all but

imperfectly, and yet, strongly suggest that the
entire procedure, from beginning to end, was an
orchestrated movement designed for just one
purpose — to destroy petitioner Quintero's
public image with "incriminating evidence," and,
as a corollary to this, that the evidence allegedly
seized from his residence was "planted" by the
very raiding party that was commanded to "seize"
such incriminating evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. YOLANDA
G.R. NO. 89373. MARCH 9, 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence was properly
obtained by the police.
FACTS:
A police raiding team armed with a search
warrant went to the brgy. captain for them to be
accompanied in serving the said warrant at the
residence of the accused, Yolanda Gesmundo.
The police was allowed to enter the house upon
the strength of the warrant shown to the
accused. The accused begged the police not to
search and to leave the house. However, the
police still searched the house and was led to the
kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a
table as the hiding place of died marijuana
flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked
ISETANN. The police also recovered from a native
“uway” cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops
wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper. According
to the accused, when the police arrived at her
house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano.
She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while
Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near
the house. While inside the house Yte showed the
accused something he claimed as a search
warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen
uttered “eto na” They proceeded to the kitchen
and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four
other companions. They confronted the accused
and insisted that the bags belonged to her.
Accused denied the accusation and told them
that she doesn’t know anything about it. She was
made to sign a prepared document. She was
brought to the police station and was detained.
HELD:
No. The claim that the marijuana was planted
was strengthened as the police violated sec 7,
rule 126 rules of the court provides no search of
a house, room or any other premise shall be
made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. This requirement is
mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution
of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in
fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was
inadmissible to the court as the accused was not
informed of her right not to sign the document
neither was she informed that she has the right
to the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it
may be used as evidence against her. It was not
proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not
only does the law require the presence of
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it
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also imposes upon the person making the search
the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the
property seized. He is likewise required to deliver
the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true and accurate
inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Again,
these duties are mandatory and are required to
preclude substitution of the items seized by
interested parties. Hence, the guilt of the
accused was has not been established she is
acquitted from the crimes charged.
December 5, 2017 - Article 131 -
PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND
DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
FERNANDO IGNACIO and SIMEON DE LA
CRUZ, VS THE HONORABLE NORBERTO ELA
[G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956.]
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent mayor violated Article
131 by not granting the petition to hold the
public meeting in the part of the public plaza as
was requested.
FACTS:
A permit to hold a public meeting at the public
plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the
kiosk, was sought on behalf of the Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society (commonly known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses). The respondent mayor
gave them permission to use the northwestern
part of the plaza, instead of the section of the
plaza near the kiosk. It appears that the public
plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short
distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The
proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused
some concern on the part of the authorities
regarding peace and order. This is especially so
considering that the tenets of petitioners’
congregation are derogatory to those of the
Roman Catholic Church.
HELD:
The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully
assemble, though guaranteed by our
Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be
regulated in order that it may not be “injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the right of the
community or society,” and this power may be
exercised under the “police power” of the state,
which is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Thus, the action taken by
the respondent who refused to allow the use of
the kiosk, part of the public plaza, by the
members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society, whose tenets and principles are
derogatory to those professed by the Catholics, is
not unconstitutional as an abridgement of the
freedom of speech, assembly, and worship,
considering that in view of the proximity of the
kiosk to the Catholic church, such meeting, if
allowed, might result in the happening of
untoward incidents and disturbance of peace
and order.

NELSON NAVARRO VS. MAYOR ANTONIO
VILLEGAS
G.R. NO. L-31687 FEBRUARY 26, 1970
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents act on denying
the request of the petitioner violates the
petitioners’ Right to peaceable assembly and
right to the equal protection of the law in
violation of Article 131 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in
behalf of the Movement of a Democratic
Philippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the
Mayor of the city of Manila, applying to hold a
rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from
4-11pm.On the same day, the respondent wrote
a reply, denying his request on the grounds
that,the have temporarily adopted the policy of
not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza
Miranda for rallies or demonstration during
weekdays due to the events that happened from
the past week. On the same letter, the
respondent gave the petitioner an option to use
the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its rally,
and for it to be held earlier for it to end before
dark. The petitioner filed suit contesting the
Mayor’s action on the ground that it violates the
petitioner’s right to peaceable assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances
(ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioner’s right to
the equal protection of the law (art. 3, sec. 1).
HELD:
The right of peaceable assemble is subject to
regulation under the police power of the state.
The right to freedom of speech and peaceful
assembly, though granted by the Constitution, is
not absolute for it may be regulated in order that
it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right of community and
society, This power may be exercised under the
police power of the state, which is the power of
the state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, and good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. While the privilege of the
citizen to use streets and parks for
communication may be regulated in the interest
of all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be
exercised insubordination to the general comfort
and convenience and in consonance with peace
and good order, but it must not guise of
regulation be abridged or denied.
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO
L-18000. JAN 27, 1948
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor Violated Article 131 of
the RPC in refusing to issue permit hence
violating freedom of assembly.
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by
petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent
Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel
the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a
public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16,
1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to
hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the
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respondent refused to issue such permit because
he found “that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and
upon the fact that passions, specially on the part
of the losing groups, remains bitter and high,
that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people
in their government, and in the duly peace and a
disruption of public order.” Respondent based
his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace,
and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."
Included herein is Sec. 1119, Freeuse of Public
Place.
HELD:
Yes. Supreme Court states that the freedom of
speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitution.
However, these rights are not absolute. They can
be regulated under the state’s police power – that
they should not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to
the rights of the community or society. The Court
holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec.
1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to
grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly
or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets
and other public places of the City of Manila ;and
2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or
public places to be used with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of the streets and public places by others,
and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored
the second construction since the first
construction is tantamount to authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under
our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency. It is to be noted that
the permit to be issued is for the use of public
places and not for the assembly itself. The Court
holds that the assembly is lawful and thus
cannot be struck down. Any public officer or
employee is in violation if Article 131 if the RPC
if he or she shall prohibit or hinder any person
from addressing, either alone or together with
others, any petition to the authorities for the
correction of abuses or redress of grievances.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is
the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech
is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify

its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state. PETITION IS
GRANTED.
BAYAN, ET AL., VS. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET
AL.,
G.R. NO. 169838, APRIL 25, 2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not policemen violated Article 131 in
relation to BP 880 by dispersing BAYAN,
KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS in their rally.
FACTS:
The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they
are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and
that their right as organizations and individuals
were violated when the rally they participated in
on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No.
880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No.
880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution,
Article 131 of the RPC:
Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of
peaceful meetings, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is
a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880
requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence
of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the
message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does
not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,”
“protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition
of some cause not espoused by the government.
Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows
that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As
a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other
petitions were ordered to be consolidated on
February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a
speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the
portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether
B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the
rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005.
HELD:
Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine
Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. The right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless
and unprotected.
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However, it must be remembered that the right,
while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,
nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of
such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign “police power,” which is the power
to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that
it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to “lawful
cause” does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and
entitled to protection. Neither the words
“opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of
grievances come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of
the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on
the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
December 6, 2017 - Article 132 -
INTERRUPTION OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
US VS. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA
G.R. NO. 8722, September 10, 1913
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable for
"interruption of religious worship".
FACTS:
The accused entered a private house, uninvited,
where services of the Methodist Episcopal
Church were being conducted between ten and
twenty persons, and threatened the group with a
club, interrupting or the disturbing the divine
service. The Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija sentenced the defendant/appellant, to
three years six months and twenty-one days of
prision correccional, and a fine of 625 pesetas,
together with other accessory penalties provided
by law.
HELD:
YES. The Spanish Constitution provided for a
state religion but also guaranteed the privilege of
freely practicing, both in private and public.
However, only those followers of the state religion
are allowed to practice in public. It is under this
constitution the Penal Code of Philippines of
1884 was promulgated, it provided
consequences against the violation or crime
against the state religion specifically disturbing,
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

by means of violence, threats, etc., their
ceremonies when conducted in cemeteries or
other places were such ceremonies may be
lawfully authorized. (Art. 225.)
The change of sovereignty and the enactment of
the fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill caused the complete separation of
church and state, and the abolition of all special
privileges and all restrictions theretofore
conferred or imposed upon any particular
religious sect, looking equally to all religious
sects. The articles of the Penal Code referring
equally to all religious sects are of two, article
223 and 571.
This article recognizes the freedom of religion
and worship of all mankind however violations
against this incur subsequent penalties. But like
any other constitutions no penalty was attached
in this article. It says that "the penalty . . . shall
be imposed upon any person who . . . shall force
some other person to perform an act of worship .
. ."
fence in front of the chapel. The chairman of the
committee in charge of the pabasa tried to
persuade them to refrain from carrying out their
plans, because it was already late at night and it
was during the holy week. An altercation ensued
thus, a complaint was filed against the
defendants.
HELD:
NO. it is noted that Article 133 of the revised
penal code punishes acts “notoriously offensive
to the feelings of the faithful”. The construction
of the fence, even though irritating and vexatious
is not an act designated as “notoriously offensive
to the feelings of the faithful.” It is urged that the
act of building a fence was innocent and was
simply to protect the property rights of the
owners. Therefore, appellants are acquitted of a
violation of Article 133 but was found guilty of
art 287 of the same code.

The offense falls within the provisions of article

223 and 571 of the Penal Code. However records
failed to establish the intent of the accused in
committing the act, it was not proven that
religious hatred prompted the accused to act as
he did. He simply threatened to assault them
with a club if they will not stop the religious
service. The offense appears to be simply that of
disturbing the religious service, punishable
under article 571.

It is further alleged that the people thus

dispersed by the defendant were not holding
religious services, as they were simply reading
some verses out of the Bible. We have been
unable to find any provision of law which
requires religious services to be conducted in
approved orthodox style in order to merit its
protection against interference and
disturbances. As stated in Hull vs. State (120
Ind., 153): It makes no difference that the
method of worship of those assembled was
singular or uncommon. The protection of the
statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed,
opinion, or mode of worship.

Persons who meet for the purpose of religious

worship, by any method which is not indecent
and unlawful, have a right to do so without being
molested or disturbed.

December 7, 2017 – Article 133 – OFFENDING

THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.

PEOPLE VS. PROCORPIO REYES, ET AL.

GR No. L-40577, Aug 23 1934

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants violated Article
133 of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS:
In the Barrio of Macalang, Tarlac there is a
chapel where it is customary to hold a Pabasa.
While the pabasa was going between 11 and 12
o clock midnight, the defendants Procorpio Reyes
and company started to construct a barbed wired
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TITLE THREE – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC
ORDER
December 8, 2017 – Article134 – REBELLION
OR INSURRECTION
ALILIAN, Enna B.
POMEROY V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. Nos. L-14284-14285, February 24, 1960
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI erred in ordering the
release of the petitioners.
FACTS:
William Pomeroy and Celia Mariano were
convicted with the complex crime of rebellion
with murder, arson and robbery committed in
pursuance of the rebellion. They entered prison
and began serving their sentence. Thereafter,
said convicts filed a petition invoking subsequent
cases wherein the Court declared that the acts of
violence committed in pursuance of rebellion give
rise only to simple rebellion. CFI Court ordered
the release of the petitioners.
HELD:
Yes. The rule adopted by the Court is that
judicial doctrines have only prospective
operation and do not apply to cases previously
decided. The sentence meted out was the one
provided by law for rebellion which herein
applicants were indicted, at the time of their
conviction. It was only 4 years after petioners’
conviction that the Court declared that the acts
of violence committed in pursuance of rebellion
did not give rise to a complex crime in People v
Hernandez, May 30 1964.
CFI erred in ordering the release of the
petitioners.
December 8, 2017 – Article134-A – COUP
D’ETAT
ALILIAN, Enna B.
TRILLANES IV V PIMENTEL, SR.
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in denying
petitioner’s motion to be allowed to leave from
imprisonment.
FACTS:
Petitioner was arrested and charged with coup
d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code based on his acts of storming into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments and publicly
demanding the resignation of the President and
key national officials. Subsequently, petitioner
won a seat in the Senate causing him to file an
"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be allowed
to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"
invoking that since he was not convicted yet, he
must still be presumed to be innocent. Further,
he pleaded for the same liberal treatment
accorded other detention prisoners who have
also been charged with non-bailable offenses.
HELD:
No. The court held that the presumption of
innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights.
18 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Also, since coup d’etat cases are punishable by
reclusion perpetua, the rule that no person
charged by crimes and offenses punishable by
such shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong was applicable in this case. It is
uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for
bail and for release was denied. The
determination that petitioner’s guilt was strong
justified his detention as a valid curtailment of
his right to provisional liberty.
Moreover, leaves from imprisonment are allowed
to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders. Petitioner failed
to establish that the discretion was gravely
abused.
December 9, 2017 – Article 135 – PENALTY
FOR REBELLION, INSURRECTION OR COUP
D’ETAT
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26 July 18, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
CONCEPCION, J.
LEGAL ISSUE:
W/N Rebellion should be complexed with other
crimes committed on such occasion.
FACTS:
That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some
time before the said date and continuously
thereafter until the present time, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and the place which they
had chosen as the nerve center of all their
rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, HERNANDEZ, conspiring,
confederating, and cooperating with each other,
as well as with the thirty-one (31) Defendants
charged in criminal cases and also with others
whose whereabouts and identities are still
unknown.
The HERNANDEZ and their co-conspirators,
being then officers and/or members of, or
otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor
Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the
Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), an
active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with
central offices in Manila and chapters and
affiliated or associated labor unions and other
‘mass organizations’ in different places in the
Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and
instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and
synchronizes its activities with the rebellious
activities of the ‘Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan,
(H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate,
and effect the complete and permanent success
of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the
Philippines.
‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or
‘Hukbalahaps’ made armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary
and army detachments as well as innocent
civilians, and as a necessary means to commit
the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith
and in furtherance thereof, have then and there

committed acts of murder, pillage, looting,
plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property to create and spread
chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate
the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is
charged with, and has been convicted of,
rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and
robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is
claimed, may be imposed, although the lower
court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment.
However, the defense contends, among other
things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery.
HELD:
NO. It is true that treason and rebellion are
distinct and different from each other. This does
not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same
and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more
reason to apply said rule in the crime of rebellion
than in that of treason, for the law punishing
rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code)
specifically mentions the act of engaging in war
and committing serious violence among its
essential elements — thus clearly indicating that
everything done in the prosecution of said war,
as a means necessary therefor, is embraced
therein — unlike the provision on treason (Article
114, Revised Penal Code) which is less explicit
thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a
person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority may be committed with physical
injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162), homicide
(People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S.
vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; U. S. vs. Baluyot,
40 Phil., 385), and rape may be perpetrated with
physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690),
then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does
not follow, for engaging in war, serious violence,
physical injuries and destruction of life and
property are inherent in rebellion, but not in
assault upon persons in authority or agents of
persons in authority or in rape. The word
“rebellion” evokes, not merely a challenge to the
constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a
bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go
with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault upon
persons in authority connotes necessarily, or
even generally, either physical injuries, or
murder.
Political crimes are those directly aimed against
the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive. If a crime usually regarded as common
like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance “to the Government
the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part
thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of
its “common” complexion, inasmuch as, being
part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the
latter.
19 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
FEDERICO GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR,
ET AL.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 23, 1956
REYES, J. B. L., J.
LEGAL ISSUE:
W/N accused Geronimo should only be guilty of
simple rebellion only.
FACTS:
On or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa
Rita, Del Gallego, Camarines Sur a group of
HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander
Oscar ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol
headed by Cpl. Bayrante, resulting in seriously
wounding of Pfc. Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio
Gruta a civilian.
Also, on or about February 1954 at barrio
Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur, a group
of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar
with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay a
barrio lieutenant.
On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of
P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various
persons killed, as listed in the information, in the
sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the
proportionate costs of the proceedings.
From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo
appealed, raising the sole question of whether
the crime committed by him is the complex crime
of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
HELD:
YES. As in treason, where both intent and overt
act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is
integrated by the coexistence of both the armed
uprising for the purposes expressed in article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts
of violence described in the first paragraph of
article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are
essential components of one crime, and that
without either of them the crime of rebellion
legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of
any penalty attached to article 134. It follows,
therefore that any or all of the acts described in
article 135, when committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends described in
article 134, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized as
distinct crimes in themselves. In law they are
part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and cannot
be considered as giving rise to a separate crime
that, under article 48 of the Code, would
constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
The majority of the Court found no cogent reason
for limiting “commission of serious violence” in
article 135 to hostilities against the
Government’s armed forces exclusively; for in
that case, the former expression would be

redundant and mere duplication of “engaging in
combat” with loyal troops, also described in the
same article. If the infliction of “serious violence”
was separately expressed in the law, it is because
the violence referred to is that inflicted upon
civilians. Again, to restrict “serious violence” to
acts short of homicide, is to unwarrantedly
assume that the broad term “violencia grave” is
used in the limited sense of “lesiones graves”,
which in our Penal Code has a specialized
signification. In truth, if physical injuries
constitute grave violence, so would killing
necessarily be, if not more. Additionally, it may
be observed that rebellion is by nature a crime of
masses or multitudes, involving crowd action
that cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds.
And we have already pointed out in the
Hernandez resolution that to admit the
complexing of the crime of rebellion with the
felonies committed in furtherance thereof, would
lead to these undesirable results: (1) to make the
punishment for rebellion heavier than that of
treason, since it has been repeatedly held that
the latter admits no complexing with the overt
acts committed in furtherance of the treasonous
intent, and, in addition, requires two witnesses
to every overt act which is not true in the case of
rebellion; (2) to nullify the policy expressed in
article 135 (R.P.C.) of imposing lesser penalty
upon the rebel followers as compared to their
leaders, because under the complexing theory
every rebel, leader or follower, must suffer the
heavier penalty in its maximum degree; (3) to
violate the fundamental rule of criminal law that
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused: “in dubiis reus est absolvendus”,
“nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege.”
Of course, not every act of violence is to be
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely
because it happens to be committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the
rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done
for private purposes or profit, without any
political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be
absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the
individual misdeed could not be taken with the
rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the
constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated
to each other; the individual crime would not be
a means necessary for committing the rebellion
as it would not be done in preparation or in
furtherance of the latter. This appears with
utmost clarity in the case where an individual
rebel should commit rape; certainly the latter
felony could not be said to have been done in
furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its
commission in any way. The ravisher would then
be liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and
rape, and the two could not be merged into a
juridical whole.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. HON. OMAR U.
AMIN
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
ISSUE:
W/N the crime of Rebellion can be complexed
with the special penal law
20 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of December 1989, at
Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, having reasonable
ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a
crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously,
willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede,
frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex.
Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring
or concealing him in his house.
On March 21, 1990, ENRILE filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an
offense; and
(b) The pending charge of rebellion complexed
with murder and frustrated murder against
Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on
December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of
the Senator for harboring or concealing the
Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that
the petitioner entertained and accommodated
Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen.
Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because
of such failure the petitioner prevented Col.
Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of
PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case
filed against the petitioner on the theory that the
former involves a special law while the latter is
based on the Revised Penal Code or a general
law.
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of absorption is applicable in
the case at bar. If a person cannot be charged
with the complex crime of rebellion for the
greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be
charged separately for two (2) different offenses
where one is a constitutive or component
element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion
in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo
Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or
concealing was for no other purpose but in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. it was motivated
by the single intent or resolution to commit the
crime of rebellion.
As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed
against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve
a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is
described as a vast movement of men and a

complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the
rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in the one single crime of
rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90
[1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958];
People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People
v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act
of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is
clearly a mere component or ingredient of
rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis
of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto
2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and
comfort can only be accomplished by some kind
of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or
physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as
an element of treason it becomes identified with
the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty as article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one
cannot be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and
a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force
and trespass are inherent in smoking and in
robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be
made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense whereas in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of
treason.
December 11, 2017 – Article 136 –
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT
COUP D'ETAT, REBELLION OR
INSURRECTION
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE UNITED STATES v. SIMEON FIGUERAS
ET AL
G.R. No. 1282. September 10, 1903.
MAPA, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are guilty of the
crime of conspiracy
FACTS:
The judgment of the Court of First Instance from
which the defendants appealed finds them guilty
of the crime of conspiracy under section 1 of Act
No. 292.
There were three witnesses: Paulino Legaspi,
Laureano Martinez, and Petronilo Portugal.
Petronilo Portugal’s testimony was disregarded.
He testifies that he was invited by Paulino
Legaspi to rebel against the Government, and
that he was given to understand by Legaspi that
there were many persons who intended to
conspire, but the witness did not know whether
the accused were implicated in this conspiracy.
21 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Paulino Legaspi testifies that various persons,
some forty more or less in number, were
conspiring to overthrow the constituted
Government, and states that he knows that the
defendants were engaged in this conspiracy
because he heard them say so in their
conversations. Called upon to repeat the words
which he heard them say, he stated the following:
"What a life this is, so full of misery, constantly
increasing. When will our wretchedness end?
When will the authorities remedy it? What shall
we do?" He does not state that he heard anything
beyond this, and it appears that he relies solely
upon these words, used by the defendants, as a
basis for his assertion that they were conspiring.
As to other matters this witness testifies solely
from hearsay.
The second witness, Laurenao Martinez, the
owner of the said house where the meeting was
held, averred that it is improbable that the
defendants should select his house, for the
purpose of meeting together to conspire, to read
and comment upon correspondence relating to
the conspiracy, and to consider the matter of
contributions and arms collected for the
purposes thereof, as this witness testifies, doing
all this in his presence, without the slightest
caution or care, when it appears from the
testimony of the witness himself that not only
was he not a party to the conspiracy but that he
had not even been requested to join it. From this
it follows necessarily that the conspirators could
not know whether they could count upon his
consent and adhesion or not, and it is incredible
that the defendants should discuss so grave and
delicate a matter with such an absolute
disregard of the most rudimentary precautions
— precautions which the most ordinary
prudence would counsel in such cases — as
would appear to be the case from the testimony
of the witness Martinez. Martinez further said
that it is also improbable that Martinez, who had
no interest in the conspiracy, he being, according
to his own testimony, an entire outsider, would
have permitted such criminal meetings to be held
in his house, thus exposing himself to
disagreeable consequences.
A letter which Martinez states that he abstracted
from the pocket of the defendant Bermudes, was
attached to the record as evidence for the
prosecution.
HELD:
No. The insufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution it is unnecessary to consider the
weight to be attributed to the testimony of the
witnesses for the defense, which, however, tends
to demonstrate the innocence of the defendants.
The letter submitted might perhaps have some
value as evidence if it were shown:
(1)That the words and phrases used in the letter
have a conventional meaning; and if so, then the
ordinary meaning of the words and phrases
employed;
(2)The authenticity of this letter.
Nothing in this connection has been proven, nor
was any attempt made to introduce such
evidence at the trial and in the absence of such

important data the value of this letter as evidence
must depend exclusively upon the testimony of
Laureano Martinez, whose credibility, as we have
already stated, appears exceedingly doubtful.
The terms of the letter itself are such that, given
their natural and ordinary meaning, they do not
even remotely show the existence of any
conspiracy.
The court finds that it is at least strange that
Martinez, although he succeeded in getting
possession of the letter on the night of Monday,
March 9, did not deliver it to the governor of the
province until the night of Wednesday, the 11th,
if, as he testifies, his sole purpose in stealing it
was to discover and denounce the conspiracy.
There is nothing in the case, supposing that such
was his purpose, to satisfactorily explain such a
delay, and it is even more strange that it should
not have occurred to the witness to read the
letter. He had it in his possession for a
considerable length of time, and it would have
been natural for him to be interested in reading
it, either for the purpose of assuring himself that
it was the same letter he proposed to purloin and
not some other, or else for the purpose of
determining, by acquainting himself with its
contents, of which he had no knowledge, whether
or not it was sufficient to support the very grave
charge which he proposed to lodge with the
Government authorities of the province.
Above all, the fact that the other witness for the
prosecution, Paulino Legaspi, who, according to
the testimony of Martinez, is the one who
delivered this letter to the defendant Bermudes,
not only fails to say a single word about it but
testifies in such a way that it may reasonably be
inferred from his testimony as a whole that he
was wholly ignorant of the existence of the letter,
his statements thus being an implicit denial of
the assertions of Martinez in this regard.
The court finds that the guilt of the defendants
not having been established by the evidence,
they are entitled to an acquittal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
-----------------------------
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL
G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964
ISSUE:
Does his or anyone's membership in the
Communist Party per se render Hernandez or
any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of
the Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
On or about March 15, 1945, and for some time
before the said date and continuously thereafter,
the said accused, conspiring, confederating and
cooperating with each other, as well as with the
thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal
Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and
14344, the said accused and their other co-
conspirators, being then high ranking officers
and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with
22 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),
which is now actively engaged in an armed
rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines thru act theretofore committed and
planned to be further committed in Manila and
other places in the Philippines, and of which
party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as
the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help, support, promote, maintain,
cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the
"Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take
arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such armed public
uprising, for the purpose of removing the
territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to
the government and laws thereof as in fact that
to attain the said purpose by then and there
making armed raids, sorties and ambushes,
attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as
a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof, have then and there
committed acts of murder, pillage, looting,
plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property to create and spread
chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate
the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
The said accused conspiring among themselves
and with several others as aforesaid, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously organized,
established, led and/or maintained the Congress
of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as
the Committee on Labor Organizations (CLO),
with central offices in Manila and chapters and
affiliated or associated labor unions and other
"mass organizations" in different places in the
Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and
instrumentality of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ,
and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and
synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus
organized, established, led and/or maintained
by the herein accused and their co-conspirators,
has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized
its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other
organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to
thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete
and permanent success of the above-mentioned
armed rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.
HELD:
No. The advocacy of Communism or
Communistic theory and principle is not to be
considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless
transformed or converted into an advocacy of
action.
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection
shall be punished, respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine
which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and by
prision correccional in its medium period and a
fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a
theory or principle is insufficient unless the
communist advocates action, immediate and
positive, the actual agreement to start an
uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to
use force and violence in an uprising of the
working class to overthrow constituted authority
and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless
action is actually advocated or intended or
contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist,
merely holding belief in the supremacy of the
proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate
the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a
theorist the Communist is not yet actually
considered as engaging in the criminal field
subject to punishment. Only when the
Communist advocates action and actual
uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty
of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Mere membership in the Communist Party or in
the CLO renders the member liable, either of
rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion,
because mere membership and nothing more
merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or
principle without any action being induced
thereby; and that such advocacy becomes
criminal only if it is coupled with action or
advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or
conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts
conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the
other hand, membership in the HMB
(Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual
uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks
pretend, the liberation of the peasants and
laboring class from thraldom. By membership in
the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the
use of force, and by such membership he agrees
or conspires that force be used to secure the
ends of the party. Such membership, therefore,
even if there is nothing more, renders the
member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
punishable by law.
The leader of the CLO therefore, namely
Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in
actual rebellion or of the actual uprising subject
of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the
CLO therefore, by his presidency and leadership
of the CLO cannot be considered as having
actually risen up in arms in rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines, or taken part in
the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as
charged against him in the present case; he was
merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of
Communism, he was not a Communist
conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by the
mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
December 12, 2017 – Article 137 –
DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS OR
EMPLOYEES
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 12, 2017 – Article 138 – INCITING
TO REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 12, 2017 – Article 139 – SEDITION
DUQUE, Francis Lester
PEOPLE vs. GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 17748 - March 4, 1922
23 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
ISSUE:
WON it is necessary that the offender should be
a private citizen in the crime of sedition.
FACTS:
Policemen of city Manila arrested a woman who
was a member of the household of a
Constabulary soldier stationed at Santa Lucia
Barracks. The next day, Artemio Mojica, police
officer posted in the street of Calle Real had an
encounter with various Constabulary soldiers
which resulted in the shooting of private
Macasinag, constabulary who was mortally
wounded and eventually died. The next day in, a
rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia
Barracks that policeman Mojica was allowed to
continue on duty
These incidents was considered by some of the
Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed
by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to
friction between members of Manila police
department and member of the Philippine
Constabulary. Constabulary soldier endangered
a deep feeling of resentment which was soon
converted into a desire for revenge against the
police force of the city of Manila. At about 7
o'clock in the evening of the same day, corporal
Ingles approached private Nicolas Torio who was
then the man in charge of quarters, and asked
him to let the soldiers out through the window.
Private Torio was easily was persuaded. Some 70
armed soldier went out. They divided into two
groups. One platoon of Constabulary Soldier
fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles
Real where an American policeman Driskill was
stationed with his friend Jacumin. A street car
happened to stop. Without considering that the
passengers in the car were innocent passersby,
the Constabulary squad fired a volley into the
car, killing one passenger wounding three
civilian. Some minutes later, Captain William E.
Wichman, assistant chief of police, riding in a
motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived
and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers
were fired resulted in the instantaneous death of
Wichman and Saplala. About the same time, a
police patrol came, the Constabulary soldiers
fired at them which resulted in the death of
patrolmen Trogue and Sison. Another platoon
arranged themselves in a firing line on the east
side of Calle General Luna and fired upon the
motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and
driven by policeman Policarpio who were just
passing. As a result the two policemen was
mortally wounded. The same platoon fired
several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta
police station, and the office of the secret service.
The next day Colonel Lucien R. Sweet of the
Constabulary officers, and the fiscals of the city
of Manila, commenced an investigation. Sergeant
Graciano L. Cabrera admitted to have
participated in the shooting. The defendants
were charged with the crime of sedition and
found guilty by the court. Hence this petition.
Counsel contend that it is necessary that the
offender should be a private citizen and the
offended party a public functionary, and that
what really happened in this instance was a fight
between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government.

HELD:
No. Act No 292 - Sedition Law makes no
distinction between the persons to which it
applies when the wording of said law states that
"it makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by
force or outside of legal methods any one of vie
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate
or revenge upon the person or property of any
official or agent of the Insular Government or of
Provincial or Municipal Government."
PEOPLE vs. NARCISO UMALI, ET AL
G.R. No. L-5803 - November 29, 1954
ISSUE:
WON the trial court is correct in finding Narciso
Umali guilty of complex crime of rebellion.
FACTS:
Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old
time friends belonged to the same political
faction and even campaigning for each other.
Umali was then a congressman while Punzalan
was a Mayor. Narciso Umali regarded himself as
the political head and leader in Tiaong, became
jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing
popularity among the people of Tiaong who
looked to him instead of Umali for political
guidance, leadership, and favors.
On 1951 election, Punzalan ran for reelection. To
oppose him, and to clip his political wings and
definitely blast his ambition for continued power
and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio
Pasumbal, his trusted leader. Amado Mendoza,
star witness for the prosecution, testified that on
the eve of the election, at the house of
Pasumbal's father, then being used as his
electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct
Pasumbal to contact the Huks through
Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be
killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his
Chief (Umali) went to the mountains and held a
conference with Commander Abeng. It would
seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that
Punzalan was going to win in the elections the
next day, and that his death was the surest way
to eliminate him from the electoral fight. In the
evening of the same day, Mendoza heard
Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference
with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter
was agreeable to the proposition and had even
outlined the manner of attack.
Day following the election, Punzalan win over
Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with
him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep
toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once
there he (Mendoza) was left at the school
premises with instructions by Umali to wait for
Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to
them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for
sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering
about fifty, armed with garands and carbines,
arrived and after explaining his identity and his
mission to Abeng, Mendoza had led them
Punzalan's house and then walked toward his
home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat
in a canal. Before reaching his house, he already
heard shots, so, he evacuated his family. His wife
Catalina incidentally saw Congressman Umali
holding a revolver, in the company of Huk
24 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Commander Torio and about 20 armed men.
Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions
leave.
HELD:
No. The crime committed was not rebellion but
rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid
and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and
taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government as defined in Article 134 of the RPC
but rather, the object was to attain by means of
force, intimidation, etc. to inflict an act of hate or
revenge upon the person or property of a public
official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of
Tiaong punishable uder Article 139 of the RPC.
December 13, 2017 – Article 140 – PENALTY
FOR SEDITION
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 13, 2017 – Article 140 –
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SEDITION
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna
THE UNITED STATES vs. MAXIMINO PLANAS
G.R. No. 6867 December 23, 1911
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the
crime of conspiracy to commit sedition.
FACTS:
On the 1st day of September, 1910, an uprising
in the Philippine Islands, and having for its
object the overthrow of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and provincial and municipal
governments of the Province of Nueva Vizcaya
and other provinces in the Philippine Islands,
took place in and about the township of Solano
in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
Defendant, Maximino Planas, was the president
of the town of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On the
3rd day of September, 1910, the said Maximino
Planas called together the policemen of the said
town of Bambang and said them, "The
insurrectos have entered Solano and seized
money from the treasury, burned the papers,
and made prisoners of the padres. Now you must
bring your arms to my house so that I can deliver
them to the issurrectos when they reach here
and you must all be ready to join the insurrectos
when they bring because I am captain of
insurrectos, and when they come we will kill the
Americans Bennett and Scott and the Romanista
padre, and burn the convent. Do not tell
anything of this to the Americans or the
insurrectos will kill you when they come," or
words to that effect.
On the 4th day of September, 1910, between 9
and 10 o'clock, the councilmen of Bambang
assembled at the presedencia of said town in
obedience to the call or bandillo which had been
published the previous evening in said town by
the defendant. At this meeting there were present
the councilmen: Proceso Sierra, Martin Apno,
Marcelino Alvarez, Angel Malonoy, Santiago
Corales, and Francisco Pugayan, and President
Planas, the accused. And that the accused then
told the assembled councilmen that the
insurrectos had entered Solano, seized the

municipal funds, burned the papers, and made
prisoners of the Romanista padres. "Prepare your
people with arms, bolos, spears, and arrows, and
when the insurrectos arrive in this town be ready
to join them, then we will kill the Americans
Bennett and Scott and the Romanista padre," or
words to that effect.
Also, in the house of the councilman Martin
Apno, of the town of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya,
the accused had a conversation with the
aforementioned Councilman Martin Apno in
which the accused said "Do you know what has
happened in Solano? The insurrectos have
entered there and taken the money and burned
the papers," and that said councilman Apno
must prepare bolos, lances, and other arms and
when the insurrectos entered be prepared to join
them and that after they would kill Mr. Bennett
and Mr. Scott and the Roman padre of the town
of Bambang, Nueva Viscaya.
HELD:
Yes.
Many witnesses were presented both by the
government and the defendant. The facts in the
present case bear a very close relation to the
facts in the cases of U. S. vs. Mandac (No. 6763),
and U.S. vs. Isidro Olaño (No. 6882).
The Court found that the facts were conclusively
and overwhelmingly proven by the testimony of
the prosecution which consisted of the evidence
of four policemen of the town of Bambang,
Pantaleon Pugayan, Pedro Sierra, Santiago
Angela, and Emeterio Marquez; three
councilmen of said town whose names were
Proceso Sierra, Martin Apno, and Angel Malanoy,
and the municipal treasurer of Bambang,
Ventura Bernal, and his clerk Martiniano
Mirralles. The policemen testified that they
assembled, four in number, at about 4 o'clock in
the afternoon in the presidencia of Bambang by
order of the defendant on the 3d of September,
1910, and that the defendant then told them to
deliver their arms to his house as he, the
defendant, was a captain of the insurrectos and
that he (the defendant) would deliver said arms
to the insurrectos when they entered the town of
Bambang. The defendant also told the four
policemen that the insurrectos had already
entered Solano, seized the municipal funds and
burned the papers, and that when they (the
insurrectos) reached Bambang to be ready to join
them and that they would then kill the two
Americans, Bennett and Scott, and the
Romanpadre and burn the convent. On the next
day, the 4th of September, when six councilmen
assembled in thepresidencia of Bambang in
obedience to his order the defendant repeated
substantially the same conversation as he had
with the policemen. He told the councilmen to
prepare their people with arms of all kinds, bolos,
lances, and arrows, and be ready to join the
insurrectos when they reached Bambang, after
which they (the insurrectos) would kill the
Americans Scott and Bennett, and the
Romanista padre, and burn the convent. He also
told the councilmen that the insurrectos had
already entered Solano, seized the municipal
funds and burned the papers, and that when
they (the insurrectos) entered Bambang, they,
the councilmen and their people, would hear the
25 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
salvos of the police at the presidencia and this
would be the signal to join forces with the
insurrectos.
From the foregoing, the Court held that the
findings of fact made by the lower court are in
accordance with such evidence, and show that
the defendant was guilty of the crime charged
beyond peradventure of doubt, and that the
sentence imposed by the lower court is in
accordance with the law.
December 14, 2017 - Article 142 – INCITING TO
SEDITION
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
PEOPLE vs. ISAAC PEREZ
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
MALCOLM, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has uttered seditious words
which tend to incite others.
FACTS:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar,
Sorsogon, and one Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen
of that municipality, happened to meet in
the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in
a discussion regarding the administration of
Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like
myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for the
Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
HELD:
Yes. In the words of law, Perez has uttered
seditious words. He has made a statement and
done an act which tended to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He
has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He
has made a statement and done an act which
tended to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities. He has made a statement and done
an act which tended to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety or order of the
Government. Since, the Governor-General is an
executive official appointed by the President of
the United States and holds in his office at the
pleasure of the President, a seditious attack on
the Governor-General is an attack on the rights
of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty.
PEOPLE VS. NABONG
G. R. No. 36426, November 03, 1932
STREET, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nabong’s speech tended to
instigate others to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purposes.
FACTS:
Antonio D. Ora, the head of the communists in
the Philippine Islands, died and a necrological
service in his memory was held. Nabong, an
attorney, delivered a speech in such
service criticizing the members of the

Constabulary, using words substantially to the
following effect:
"They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag.
The members of the Constabulary are bad
because they shoot even innocent women, as it
happened in Tayug. In view of this, we ought to
be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the
present government and establish our own
government, the government of the poor. Use
your whip so that there may be marks on their
sides."
HELD:
Yes. The language used by Nabong clearly
imported an overthrow of the Government by
violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain
and obvious sense in which it was evidently
intended to be understood. The word "overthrow"
could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinary change by the exercise of the elective
franchise. It was the purpose of Nabong, beyond
a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of
organized government by unlawful means. The
words used by Nabong manifestly tended to
induce the people to resist and use violence
against the agents of the Constabulary and to
instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purposes. They also suggested and
incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending
to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community. It is not necessary, in order to be
seditious, that the words used should in fact
result in a rising of the people against the
constituted authorities. The law is not aimed
merely at actual disturbance, and its purpose is
also to punish utterances which may endanger
public order.
ESPUELAS VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-2990, DECEMBER 17, 1951
BENGZON, J:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espuelas was liable of scurrilous
libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines.
FACTS:
In the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas
had his picture taken, making it to appear as if
he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of
rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when
in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on
a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph,
Espuelas sent copies of the same to Free Press,
the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of
general circulation and other local periodicals in
the Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication
with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to
appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide,
stating his dismay in the administration of
President Roxas, pointing out the situation in
Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his dear
wife to write to President Truman and Churchill
of US and tell them that in the Philippines the
government is infested with many Hitlers and
Mussolinis and for this reason he is ashamed
that he cannot hold high brows to the world with
such dirty government.
26 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
HELD:
Yes. A published writing which calls our
government one of crooks and dishonest persons
("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e.
dictators, and which reveals a tendency to
produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible
with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government, is a scurrilous libel against the
Government. The violent and provocative
statements made by Espuelas against the state
was neither constructive nor with reason. It,
instead, went beyond the ambit of criticism
legally permitted since it had the dangerous
tendency of appealing to the common mind and
suggesting or inciting rebellious conspiracies
and riots against the duly constituted
government.
December 15, 2017 – Article 143 – ACTS
TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF
THE ASSEMBLY AND SIMILAR BODIES
ALAMEDA, Manuel
PEOPLE VS ALIPIT
55 Phil 170- August 22, 1922
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chief of police and municipal
president are liable under Article 143 for
preventing the meeting of the municipal council.
FACTS:
The municipal council held an extraordinary
meeting which was presided over by vice-
president Basa because the hour fixed had come
without the president being present. While the
meeting was being held, the accused Victorio
Alemus, then the chief of police of that
municipality, entered the room, saying that he
had an order from the president to arrest vice-
president Basa. Basa answered that he had not
committed any crime. Dominador Delfino, one of
the councilors present, succeeded in persuading
the chief of police to wait until the meeting was
over. A few minutes thereafter president Alipit
arrived at the municipal building and after
taking one of the revolvers in the police office,
fired a shot in the air, entered immediately the
room where the meeting was being held and said
in a loud voice to the chief of police who was
there: "Arrest him, arrest him," pointing out the
vice-president. The chief of police obeyed the
order, holding the vice-president by the arm and
taking him to the jail, president Alipit following
them with the revolver in his hand. Shortly
afterwards, councilor Delfino asked president
Alipit if they could continue the meeting to the
end, to which Alipit answered: "Whoever dare
continue holding the meeting will be arrested."
the councilors then dispersed, leaving the
premises.
HELD:
Any stranger, even if he be the municipal
president himself or the chief of the municipal
police, must respect the meeting of the municipal
council which for the time being, at least, raises
the presumption that no defect exists to render
it illegal. That meeting of the municipal council
was entitled too this respect on the part of the

defendants and the aforesaid presumption was
effective as to them.
December 16, 2017 – Article 144 – food, drinks and cigarettes at two public
DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS
RIVERA, Marynit P.
LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES
G.R. No L-3436, November 5, 1930
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Candido Lopez could
be made the basis for contempt proceedings and
for criminal prosecution
FACTS:
On October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked
and assaulted, without any justification, the
Honorable Jose D. Dimayuga, who was then and
is now a member of the House of Representatives
of the Philippine Islands while said
Representative was going to the hall of the House
of Representative to attend to the sessions. As a
result of the attack and assault, Representative
Dimayuga was unable to attend the sessions on
that day and those of the two days next following
by reason of the threats which Mr. Candido
Lopez made against the said Representative.
HELD:
Yes. The implied power to punish for contempt of
the National Assembly is coercive in nature. The
power to punish crime is punitive in character.
Thus, the same act could be made the basis for
contempt proceedings and for criminal
prosecution.
December 17, 2017 – Article 145 – VIOLATION
OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN vs. THE
HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
and THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-34022, March 24, 1972
ISSUE:
Whether Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
applies in this case
FACTS:
Petitioner Martinez y Festin alleged that on June
10, 1971, an information against him for
falsification a public document was filed. Its
basis was his stating under oath in his certificate
of candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional
Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945,
when in truth and in fact he knew that he was
born on June 20, 1946.
He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the
afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the time of
the filing of the petition he was confined at the
City Jail in the custody of respondent City
Warden of Manila. He was on his way to attend
the plenary session of the Constitutional
Convention. Such arrest was against his will and
over his protest.
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it
was alleged that he is a duly elected and
proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. Two criminal complaints was filed
27 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
by a defeated delegate-aspirant for alleged
violation of Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code
in that they gave and distributed free of charge
meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in
Tuba, both towns being in Province of Benguet.
Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases
could be issued, petitioner in a motion of August
14, 1971 invoked the privilege of immunity from
arrest and search, pursuant to Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in relation
to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution and
Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
NO. Their reliance on the constitutional
provision which for them should be
supplemented by what was provided for in the
Revised Penal Code is futile. There is no
justification then for granting their respective
pleas.
As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the
immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the
peace.
Certainly then from the explicit language of the
Constitution, even without its controlling
interpretation as shown by the debates of the
Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter
discussed, petitioners cannot justify their claim
to immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised
Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a
provision that took effect in 1932 could not
survive after the Constitution became operative
on November 15, 1935.
The repugnancy between such an expansion of
the congressional immunity and the plain
command of the Constitution is too great to be
overcome, even on the assumption that the
penalty to which a public officer will be subjected
in the event that he did arrest one entitled
thereto for an offense punishable by less than
reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope.
There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except
the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the
utmost latitude in free speech should be
accorded them. When it comes to freedom from
arrest, however, it would amount to the creation
of a privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered
immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same.
DECEMBER 18, 2017 – Article 146 – ILLEGAL
ASSEMBLIES
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
G.R. NO. L-62270 MAY 21, 1984
ISSUE:

Whether Article 146 of the Revised Penal Code
applies in this case
FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold
a meeting to protest the merger of two units of
the university. On the scheduled date, the
students continued their meeting beyond the
scheduled time and held it in a different place
from that indicated in the permit. They expressed
in a vehement language their opposition to the
merger and as a result, classes and office work
was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under
preventive suspension. On appeal, they were
found guilty of holding an illegal assembly and
oral defamation.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners only invoke their rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech which they
are entitled to do so. Their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy or
disorder. If assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities who are devoid to deny such request.
In granting such permit, there may be conditions
as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-
academic personnel. However, in violation of
terms, penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
December 19, 2017 – Article 147 – ILLEGAL
ASSOCIATION
NASH, Regina Mercado
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF SERAFIN G. CRUZ.
SERAFIN G. CRUZ vs. GEN. ROMEO GATAN
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga
G.R. No. L-44910 November 29, 1976
ISSUE:
Whether or not the detention of Serafin Cruz was
legal under Art. 147 RPC.
FACTS:
Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on
August 30, 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along
Kennon Road, Baguio City, and brought to Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, under the
command of respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan, for
custodial interrogation. On October 22, 1976, a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus was filed in his behalf wherein it was
claimed that the said Serafin Cruz is held
incommunicado; that he is restrained of his
liberty without due process of law and is in the
custody of the respondent not by virtue of a
judgment or court order; that he is not a member
of any subversive organization covered by
Proclamation No. 1081 and falls within the class
of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has not been suspended.
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus
returnable to the Court on Friday, November 12,
1976 at 3:00 p.m. and required the respondent
to make a return of the writ not later than
Wednesday, November 10, 1976.
Admitting that the petitioner has been arrested
and detained, the respondent justifies such
arrest and detention as having been legally
ordered by the President of the Philippines in the
exercise of his powers under martial law claiming
that Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by virtue of
Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order No. 4122,
dated August 28, 1976, issued by the Secretary
of National Defense, for violation of Art. 147 of
the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations),
Serafin G. Cruz being the "Over-all Commander
and Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders
Command," an unregistered veterans outfit, at
the time of his arrest. It is further claimed that
his continued detention is the free will and
volition of the petitioner who expressed fears that
he might be harmed or injured by some members
of the "Bataan Defenders Command" if he were
free from custody while the mastermind and legal
counsel of the association, one Atty. Cecilio
Baylon Buenafe, has not yet been arrested.
On November 17, 1976, counsel, who filed the
petition in behalf of Serafin G. Cruz, filed a
comment on the return saying, among others,
that after November 12, 1976, he talked with
Serafin G. Cruz and the latter avowed his
preference to stay within the confines of Camp
Olivas, notwithstanding the subsequent arrest of
the said Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, thus
rendering the issues raised in the petition
unnecessary and/or irrelevant. Then, at the
hearing of the case, Serafin G. Cruz manifested
to the Court that he prefers to stay under
protective custody. Under the circumstances,
there is no other recourse but to dismiss the
case.
But, be that as it may, under General Order No.
2-A, as amended, the President of the
Philippines, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972, ordered the Secretary
of National Defense "to arrest or cause the arrest
and take into custody and to hold them until
otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly
designated representative: 1. Such persons as
may have committed crimes and offenses in
furtherance or on the occasion of or incident to
or in connection with the crimes of insurrection
or rebellion as defined in Articles 134 to 138 of
the Revised Penal Code, and other crimes against
public order as defined in Articles 146, 147, 148,
149, 151, 153, 154, 155, and 156 of the same
Code; ...
HELD:
Yes it was legal when they arrested and detained
Cruz by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure
Order issued by the Secretary of National
Defense for violation of Article 147 of the Revised
Penal Code pursuant General Order No. 2-A, as
amended. The declaration of martial law and the
consequent suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons
reasonably believed or charged to be engaged in
the disorder.

December 20, 2017 – Article 148 – DIRECT
ASSAULT
DAHIROC, Janice L.
RIVERA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 138553, JUN 30, 2005
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Rivera is guilty of the crime of
direct assault?
FACTS:
Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo and SPO1
Joseph Basquial were conducting patrols on
board in Shilan, Benguet. They came upon a
truck which was unloading sacks of chicken
dung at the stall of Enrique Totoy Rivera along
the highway since Municipal Ordinance No. I-91
prohibits the unloading of chicken dung along
the highway, Inspector Leygo asked the driver to
stop unloading the manure and return the truck
from where it came. The driver complied. After a
while, Enrique Rivera asked the driver to drive
back to Shilan, Benguet and unload the sacks of
chicken dung and not follow the police’s orders.
The driver followed Rivera’s order and drove back
to Shilan Benguet while Rivera was following
closely behind in his own car. Inspector Leygo
gave chase to the truck. Leygo was able to
intercept the truck and force it to stop. Leygo
inquired why they insisted on defying the ban on
the loading and unloading of manure. Rivera
then alighted from his vehicle and uttered
insulting words such as: “babalian kita ng buto”,
“Ilalampaso kita”, and “Pulis lang kayo”. Leygo
then approached Rivera and said that he was
going to arrest him for violating the Municipal
Ordinance. Rivera then assumed fighting stance
and punched Leygo in his lower lip. They
grappled for a while and with the help of fellow
police officers, Rivera was finally arrested.
HELD:
YES. Direct assault may be committed by two
ways: first, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition; second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.
It is evident that this case falls under the second
mode. It is evident that the assault happened
when Leygo was engaged in the actual
performance of his official duties. He was
wearing the designated police uniform and was
on board a police car conducting a routinary
patrol when he first came upon the truck
unloading chicken manure. Since the loading
and unloading of chicken manure is prohibited
by an ordinance, Leygo has every right to order
the accused to stop. When accused defied such
a lawful order, it is only natural that Leygo would
stop them from doing so. Under the
circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue
that Leygo was not in the performance of his
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lawful duties as a police officer when the assault
upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner.
Aggravating circumstances
1. The assault is committed with a weapon
2. When the offender is a public officer or
employee
3. When the offender lays hand upon a person
in authority
GELIG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 173150/ JUL 28, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Lydia C. Gelig is liable for the
crime of Direct Assault.
FACTS:
Lydia C. Gelig and Gemma B. Micarsos were
public school teachers at the Nailo Elementary
School. Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of
Gemma. Lydia confronted Gemma during class
after learning that Gemma called Roseller "sissy".
Gemma tried to calm Lydia down but failed to do
so. As Gemma tried to go the Principal office,
Lydia pushed Gemma causing her to fall and hit
a wall divider. Gemma experienced abdominal
pain and after 42 days she suffered incomplete
abortion. Lydia was convicted in the RTC for the
crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion. Lydia was then acquitted before the CA
for the crime of direct assault but was held liable
for slight physical injuries. Unsatisfied with the
ruling, Lydia brought he case before the SC.
HELD:
Yes. This case falls under the second mode of
Direct Assault which has the following elements:
1. that the offender (a) makes an attack, (b)
employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation,
or (d) makes a serious resistance. 2. That the
person assaulted is a person in authority or his
agent. 3. That at the time of the assault the
person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged i
the actual performance of official duties, or (b)
that he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties. 4. That the
offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise
of his duties. 5. That there is no public uprising.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to
the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the RPC. Since the
assault happened while Gemma was overseeing
the class, she is in the actual performance of her
official duties. That being the case, all of the
requisites of the crime of Direct Assault are
present. As such, Lydia is guilty of Direct
Assault. However, Lydia is not guilty of indirect
abortion since the prosecution failed to prove
that the act of pushing is the proximate cause of
the abortion. The interval of time 42 days, is too
lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus
from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome
of the assault.
December 21, 2017 – Article 149 – INDIRECT
ASSAULT
[NO CASE FOUND]

December 21, 2017 – Article150 –
DISOBEDIENCE TO THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
UY KHEYTIN ET. AL., VS ANTONIO
VILLAREAL
GR NO. 16009, SEP 21, 1920
ISSUE:
Whether the Books, Papers, and other properties
seized may be returned.
FACTS:
Ramon Gayanilo, a constabulary, applied for a
search warrant, stating in his application; “That
in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, under the
writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain
amount of opium.” Upon that application, a
search warrant was issued.
On April 30th, respondent and accompanied by
some of his subordinates, searched the house of
petitioner Uy and found 60 small cans of opium.
They wanted to search the bodega but Uy denied
that it was his. Wanting to be sure, Torralba
placed a guard in the premises to ensure nothing
was removed from the premises. Later, they
found out thru one Segovia that Uy was renting
the bodega. There, Torralba resumed the search
and found and seized other articles such as
opium pipes, containers, books and papers.
Uy then filed a criminal complaint for violation of
the Opium law and filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance, for the return of the private
papers, books and other property which the
Constabulary seized illegally and in violation of
the constitutional rights of the defendants.
HELD:
Yes. Although in the issuance of the search
warrant, the Judge did not comply with the
requirements of Sec. 98 of General Orders No.
58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return
of the opium and its paraphernalia which was
found under said warrant.
However, the seizure of the petitioner’s books,
letters, telegrams, and other articles which have
no inherent relation with opium and the
possession of which is not forbidden by law, was
illegal and in violation of the petitioner’s
constitutional rights.
Hence, Art. 150 may not apply when the papers
or documents may be used in evidence against
the owner, because it would be equivalent to
compelling him to be a witness against himself.
JEAN ARNAULT VS. LEON NAZARENO
G.R. NO. L-3820, JULY 18, 1950
ISSUE:
Whether the senate can impose penalty against
those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
FACTS:
The Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates
known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the
30 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively.
Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest
H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his
attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the
Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L.
Arnault.
A Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created,
composed of five members to be appointed by the
President of the Senate to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall
be the duty of the said Committee to determine
whether the said purchase was honest, valid,
and proper and whether the price involved in the
deal was fair and just, the parties responsible
therefor, and any other facts the Committee may
deem proper in the premises. Said Committee
shall have the power to conduct public hearings;
issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the
production of documents before it; and may
require any official or employee of any bureau,
office, branch, subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the Government to assist or
otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee
in the performance of its functions and duties.
Said Committee shall submit its report of
findings and recommendations within two weeks
from the adoption of this Resolution.
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial
of the purchase price to a representative of the
vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault
refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The Senate adopted a resolution committing
Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms
and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as
well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a
writ of Habeas Corpus
HELD:
When Arnault refused to divulge the identity of
the person to whom he gave an amount of
P440.000, whose identity the Senate
investigating committee believed him to know,
the Senate pronounced him guilty of contempt
and ordered his imprisonment until he would be
willing to identify such person.
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose
penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct
inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein
established that a witness who refuses to answer
a query by the Committee may be detained
during the term of the members imposing said
penalty, but the detention should not be too long
as to violate the witness’ right to due process of
law.
December 22, 2017 – Article 151 -
DISOBEDIENCE TO THE PERSON IN
AUTHORITY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE VS CHAN FOOK
G.R. NO. 16968, OCTOBER 6, 1921
ISSUE:

Whether accused is guilty for the crime of
resistance and disobedience to the public
authority.
FACTS:
Accused is a Chinese subject and a passenger of
a US military transport South Bend which
arrived in Manila on April 6, 1920. The
immigration authorities has allowed the
appellant to land, he left the boat on the same
day. Appellant then went back to the pier No. 1
to get his baggage the following day, Customs
agent Cruz searched the baggage of the accused
and found postcards of indecent characters. He
later then tried to search the body of the accused,
which the accused objected. A disputed took
place, after showing the accused his police
badge, the accused still resisted and struck the
agent on the stomach. The agent then struck the
accused on the neck and Agent Jacinto
intervened and explained that the inspector was
a custom agent searching for contraband, and
appellant resisted no further and allowed him to
be searched.
Chan Fook was then prosecuted for the crime of
resistance and disobedience to the public
authority, and sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to two months and one day of
arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 1,301 pesetas
and the costs of the action, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
HELD:
No, that the right to be secured against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated. It is urged that the object of searching
the person of the accused was to find whether he
had with him any contraband. It was too late to
look for any contraband. He had already been
searched when he left the boat. The accused had
reached his destination, spending the night in
the house where he had taken lodging. It is not,
therefore, reasonable to believe that when he
returned to pier No. 1 the next day, he had about
his body any contraband. Thus the search made
by the agent Cruz appears to be unreasonable.
A person in authority, his agent or a public
officer who exceeds his power cannot be said to
be in the exercise of the functions of his office.
The law that defines and establishes his powers
does not protect him for anything that has not
been provided for.
"The scope of the respective powers of public
officers and their agents is fixed. If they go
beyond it and they violate any recognized rights
of the citizens, then the latter may resist the
invasion, specially when it is clear and manifest.
The resistance must be coextensive with the
excess, and should not be greater than what is
necessary to repel the aggression.
EDMUNDO SIONZON V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 202692, NOVEMBER 12, 2014
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner violated Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code when he resisted the officer
placing him under arrest.
FACTS:
31 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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A checkpoint was established along Roxas
Boulevard in Malate on June 11, 2006. P/Insp.
Aguilar et. al., where manning the checkpoint
when they saw a red Ford Ranger with plate
number XAE 988 driven by petitioner Sydeco.
They then proceeded to flagged the swerving pick
up and asked the petitioner to alight from the
vehicle. Petitioner, who the police claimed was
smelling liquor, denied of being drunk, shouted
and talked rudely to the Policemen. Petitioner
blurted out “Putang Ina Mo, bakit mo ako
hinuhuli.” Respondents, proceed to subdue the
petitioner and was arrested and brought to
Manila Hospital to be examined for liquor.
Petitioner on the other hand, claimed to be a
victim of physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary
detention against P/Insp. Aguilar.
The MTC and the RTC, rendered judgment
finding petitioner guilty of violation of RA 4136
and violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal
Code of resisting arrest.
HELD:
No. Swerving is not necessarily indicative of
imprudent behavior as defined in Sec. 48 of RA
4136 – No person shall operate a motor vehicle
on any highway recklessly or without reasonable
caution or so as to endanger the property or the
safety or rights of any person or so as to cause
excessive or unreasonable damage to the
highway.
Nothing in the records indicate that the area was
a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the
swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at
around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually
clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and
the danger to life, limb and property to third
persons is minimal. The men manning the
checkpoint in the subject area and during the
period material appeared not to have performed
their duties as required by law, or at least fell
short of the norm expected of peace officers. They
spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving
vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he
obeyed. But they did not demand the
presentation of the driver’s license or issue any
ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation
as required under the particular premises by
Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. –
Law enforcement and peace officers of other
agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act
or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of
local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate
the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau
therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding
seventy-two hours from the time and date of
issue of said receipt.
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and
his apprehending team are persons in authority
or agents of a person in authority manning a
legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of
exercising one’s right against unreasonable
searches to be conducted in the middle of the
night cannot, in context, be equated to
disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in

contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has
often been said, albeit expressed differently and
under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of
democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees,
but in the courage of the people to assert and use
them whenever they are ignored or worse
infringed. Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing
in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-
manning policemen to order petitioner and his
companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle
and body search. And it bears to emphasize that
there was no reasonable suspicion of the
occurrence of a crime that would allow what
jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk"
action.
December 23, 2017 – Article 152 – PERSONS
IN AUTHORITY AND AGENTS OF PERSONS IN
AUTHORITY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE VS FELIX BENITEZ
G.R. NO. 48396, SEPTEMBER 11, 1942
ISSUE:
Whether or not a division superintendent of
schools is a person in authority.
FACTS:
Felix Benitez, a special agent in the office of the
Provincial Governor punched D’Artagnan
Williams, a Division Superintendent of School in
Negros Occidental for his supposed acts or
remarks that caused an outrage or offense to the
Provincial Governor in connection with the
appointment of teachers.
On an indictment for assault upon a person in
authority, defendant was found guilty and
sentenced to from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years,
2 months and 1 day of prision correccional and
to pay a fine of P500 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
HELD:
Under the law (section 917 of the Revised
Administrative Code), a division superintendent
of schools is given the power of general
superintendence over schools and school
interests in his division, with the right to appoint
municipal school teachers and to fix their
salaries, and further, since education is a state
function and public policy demands an adequate
protection of those engaged in the performance
of this commission, we believe and so hold that
a division superintendent of schools should be
regarded as a person in authority.
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 185128, JANUARY 30, 2012
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued to conduct
search and the seizure of illegal drugs found by
the barangay tanod in the nipa hut are
admissible as evidence.
FACTS:
Operatives of the Cebu City Police conducted a
surveillance at the house of the petitioner. After
which, they secured a search warrant from the
RTC and on September 13, 1997, the same police
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went to Mabolo Cebu City to serve the search
warrant.
The residence were the petitioner resided was a
two-storey
house. The police officers went upstairs where
they met the wife of the accused and told her that
they will implement the search. But as soon as
they can search the area, the accused fled the
scene to a Nipa House.
SP03 Masnayon then requested the aid of the
Barangay Tanods to conduct a search. This time,
they conducted the search at the residence of the
petitioner and the nipa hut, where they found
several articles of four (4) packs of crystalline
substance which was later tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
And information was filed against the petitioner
and the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable charge of violating section 16, Article
3 of R.A. 6425 which the CA affirmed, hence the
petition.
HELD:
No. The requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known
to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.
In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-
1197-24] specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be
searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by
a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away
from the residence of the petitioner. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place
other than the one described in the search
warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as
an evidence is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure.
Having been established that the assistance of
the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant,
the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority
and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or governmental corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority. The police officers, as well as the
barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the
search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence.
Wherefore, Petitioner is Acquitted.

December 24, 2017 – Article 153 – TUMULTS
AND OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC
ORDER
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE VS BACOLOD
G.R. No. L-2578, July 31, 1951
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in granting the
motion to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy.
FACTS:
Ladislao Bacolod, then a member of the PC Patrol
in the municipality of Santa Fe, Cebu, fired his
sub-machine gun thereby hitting Consorcia
Pasinio at the back of the right side of her body.
That the same caused a serious disturbance in a
public place by firing his sub-machine gun which
wounded Pasinio, thereby causing panic among
the people present in the town fiesta.
Accused Bacolod was charged with two
informations; one charging him of the crime of
serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence and the other is serious disturbance
in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun.
His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second
information, invoking double jeopardy by reason
of the first information which the lower court
granted prompting the People to appeal.
HELD:
Yes. It will be observed that both informations
have one common element: defendant’s having
fired a sub-machine gun, however the two
informations do not describe the same offense.
One is a crime against persons; but the other is
an offense against public peace and order.
The first is punished under article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code and the latter under article
153 referring to individuals disturbing public
gatherings or peaceful meetings.
The proof establishing the first would not
establish the second, it being necessary to show,
besides the willful discharge of firearm, that
there was a dance in the tennis court in
connection with the town fiesta, and that the
people in attendance became panicky and
terrified.
Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed
and the record is remanded for further
proceedings.
December 25, 2017 – Article 154 – UNLAWFUL
USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION AND
UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 25, 2017 – Article 155 – ALARMS
AND SCANDALS
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
PEOPLE V. DORIQUEZ
GR No. L-24444-45, July 29, 1968
ISSUE:
33 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Whether or not accused Doriquez was placed in
double jeopardy by charging the offense of
discharge of firearm.
FACTS:
Accused Doriquez was charged with the offense
of grave oral defamation before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. Six days later, Doriquez was
indicted before the same court for discharge of
firearm. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty
to the two indictments.
Subsequently, he moved to dismiss both
information. One of his contentions is that the
institution of criminal action for discharge of
firearm places him in double jeopardy for he had
already been in jeopardy once in the municipal
court of Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without
his consent, the information charging him with
the offense of alarm and scandal based on the
same facts. The court denied the motion to
dismiss. The motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Hence, this appeal.
HELD:
No. For double jeopardy to attach in his favor,
the accused must prove, among other things,
that there is "identity of offenses." It is altogether
evident, however, that the offense of discharge of
firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal,
nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter
felony. Neither may it be asserted that every
crime of discharge of firearm produces the
offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the
reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony
of discharge of firearm does not include or
subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which
is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal
filed under Article 155 of the Revised Penal Code
and the information for discharge of firearm
instituted under article 258 of the same Code are
closely related in fact (as the two apparently
arose from the same factual setting, the firing of
a revolver by the accused being a common
element), they are definitely diverse in law.
Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the
same felony - alarm and scandal is an offense
against public order while discharge of firearm is
a crime against persons. Secondly, the
indispensable element of the former crime is the
discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm
or danger to the public, while the grava men of
the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or
at a certain person, without intent to kill.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be
accorded merit, as the two indictments are
perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever
closely they may appear to be connected in fact.
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offense.
The instant appeal is premature, and the present
appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered
remanded to the court of origin for immediate
trial on the merits.
December 26, 2017 – Article 156 – DELIVERY
OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.

ALBERTO AND INTIA VS HON. DELA CRUZ
AND ORBITA
G.R. No. L-31839, June 30, 1980
ISSUE:
Whether or not Governor Cledera and Esmeralda
can be held liable under Article 156 of the
Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Respondent Judge Dela Cruz directed petitioners
Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Camarines Sur to amend the information filed
in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the CFI of
Camarines Sur entitled, People of the Philippines
versus Eligio Orbita, so as to include as
defendants Governor Armando Cledera and
Assistant Provincial Warden Jose Esmeralda of
Camarines Sur. In said case, Orbita, a provincial
guard, was prosecuted for infidelity in the
custody of a prisoner for the escape of detention
prisoner, Pablo Denaque. In the course of the
trial, the defense alleged that Esmeralda received
a written note from Governor Cledera asking him
to send in five prisoners which party included
Denaque, who was then under the custody of
Orbita, to his house in Taculod, Canaman,
Camarines Sur to work in the construction
which made Denaque's escape possible, and
thus, Esmeralda and Gov. Cledera should be
equally guilty of the offense with Orbita.
HELD:
No. The offense of delivering prisoners from jails
as defined in Article 156 is usually committed by
an outsider who: (1) removes from jail any person
therein confined or (2) helps him escape. To
remove means to take away a person from the
place of his confinement, with or without the
active compensation of the person released. To
help in the escape of a person confined in any jail
or penal institution means to furnish that person
with the material means such as a file, ladder,
rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. If
the offender is a public officer who has custody
or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity
in the custody of prisoners defined and penalized
under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of
the province and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for
the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of
the Revised Penal Code.
December 27, 2017 – Article 157 – EVASION OF
SERVICE OF SENTENCE
ALAMEDA, Manuel F.
TANEGA V MASAKAYAN
GR No. L-27191, February 28, 1967
ISSUE:
WON Prescription of sentence has commenced
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City
Court of Quezon City. She was found guilty once
again by the Court of First Instance where she
was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to
indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in
the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, on
34 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
ST
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the
sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On
petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to
February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed
day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This
prompted the respondent judge, on February 15,
1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on
March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
Petitioner was never arrested. Petitioner moved
to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15,
1965 and March 23, 1965. (Ground: Penalty has
prescribed. On December 19, 1966, the
respondent judge ruled that "the penalty
imposed upon the accused has to be served",
rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and,
instead, directed the issuance of another alias
warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition.
HELD:
NO. Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00
constitute a light penalty. By Article 92 of the
Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by
final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period
of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding
Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence". Elements of evasion of
service of sentence are: the offender is a convict
by final judgment; he "is serving his sentence
which consists in deprivation of liberty"; he
evades service of sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence.
Article 157: provides for a higher penalty if such
"evasion or escape shall have taken by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other
convicts or employees of the penal institution, ...
"
evasion of sentence is but another expression of
the term "jail breaking"
Petitioner was never placed in confinement and
the prescription of penalty does not run in her
favor.
DEL CASTILLO VS. TORRECAMPO
GR NO 13903, December 18, 2002
ISSUE:
Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo
had prescribed
FACTS:
Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section
178(nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum
to 3 years as maximum. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. During the execution of
judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was
not present. The presiding Judge issued an order
of arrest and the confiscation of his bond.
Petitioner was never apprehended. 10 years
later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty
imposed upon him had already prescribed. The
motion was denied by the trial court.
HELD:

No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides
when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall
commence to run from the date the felon evades
the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article
157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
"escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful
departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom. In the instant case, petitioner
was never brought to prison. In fact, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction,
he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for
the compassion of the Court because he has
ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after
he failed to appear in court for the execution of
his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords
compassion only to those who are deserving.
Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable
doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded
therefor.
PEOPLE VS ABILONG
G.R. NO. L-1960, NOVEMBER 26, 1948
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing a
penalty on the accused under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, which does not cover
evasion of service of "destierro."
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of September,
1947,in the City of Manila, Philippines,
Florentino Abilong, the accused, being then a
convict sentenced and ordered to serve destierro
during which he should not enter any place
within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City
of Manila for attempted robbery, evaded the
service of said sentence by going beyond the
limits made against him and commit vagrancy.
HELD:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in
the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de
libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally
clear that although the Solicitor General
impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty,
though partial, in the sense that as in the
present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the
City of Manila. Under the case of People vs.
Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor
General that "it is clear that a person under
sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of
his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of
the penalty when he enters the prohibited area."
US VS. LOO HOE
G.R. NO. 12473, SEPTEMBER 18, 1917
ISSUE:
35 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
WON the penalties for jail breaking under Article
127 is applicable to sentence executed by
deportation.
FACTS:
Loo Hoe was found guilty of a violation of the
Opium Law and was sentenced to be deported.
The sentence was executed. However, he
returned to the Philippine Islands, in violation of
the terms of said sentence.
A complaint was filed by the deputy prosecuting
attorney and Loo hoe was brought to trial, and
upon arraignment plead guilty and was
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of four
months, and at the termination of said sentence
of imprisonment, to be again deported and to pay
the costs.
HELD:
No.
If the defendant who has been sentenced to
imprisonment breaks jail, the executive
departments of the Government may do two
things:
a. It may, in proper cases, proceed against him
under article 127 and other provisions of the
Penal Code; and
b. it may simply arrest him and return him to
jail.
Whether the executive department of the
Government will pursue one or the other of these
statutory remedies lies within the discretion of
that department of the Government.
The violation of the judgment of deportation by
the appellant is not punishable as contempt
under section 232. The judgment of deportation
was final. The sentence had been duly executed.
The court had lost all jurisdiction over the
defendant in that case. The judgment was
executed by the executive department of the
Government; and if the defendant has escaped
the penalty imposed by the court, the executive
department of the Government has its remedy by
enforcing the terms of the sentence again.
The SC is also of the opinion that none of the
provisions of article 127 of the Penal Code is
applicable to the present case. The penalties for
jail breaking under said article (127) cannot be
applied to the acts of the defendant.
BASILONIA v. VILLARUZ
GR Nos. 191370-71, Aug 10, 2015
ISSUE:
WON the penalty of imprisonment already
prescribed and the civil liability arising from the
crime already extinguished.
FACTS:
On June 19, 1987, a decision was promulgated
against Basilonia et al in a criminal case for
murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete.
Almost two decades passed from the entry of
judgment, on May 11, 2009, Roblete, claiming to
be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete,
filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment
alleging, among others, that despite his request

to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for
execution, the judgment has not been enforced
because said prosecutor has not acted upon his
request.
The trial court granted the motion for execution
and ordered the bondsmen to surrender
Basilonia et al. Due to petitioners' failure to
appear in court after the expiration of the period
granted to their bondsmen, the bail for their
provisional liberty was ordered forfeited and the
sheriff issued the writ of execution.
Basilonia et al contended that trial court has no
more jurisdiction to order the execution of
judgment since the penalty has already
prescribed.
HELD:
Evasion of service of sentence is an essential
element of prescription of penalties. The culprit
should escape during the term of imprisonment
in order for prescription of penalty imposed by
final sentence to commence to run. The period of
prescription of penalties as provided in Article 93
states - "shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence."
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code explains
the concept of evasion of service of sentence:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
convict who shall evade service of his sentence
by escaping during the term of his imprisonment
by reason of final judgment. However, if such
evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by
using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance
with other convicts or employees of the penal
institution, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:
1. the offender is a convict by final judgment;
2. he "is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty; and
3. he evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence.
By the express terms of the statute, a convict
evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason
of final judgment." That escape should take place
while serving sentence, is emphasized by the
provisions of the second sentence of Article 157
which provides for a higher penalty if such
"evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by
using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance
with other convicts or employees of the penal
institution.." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking."
36 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Thus, one who has not been committed to prison
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
"Escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful
departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. It applies only to those who are
convicted by final judgment and are serving
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty,
and that the period for prescription of penalties
begins only when the convict evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
This is not applicable in the case at bar. For the
longest time, they were never brought to prison
or placed in confinement despite being sentenced
to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription
of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their
favor. Thus, the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over
the motion for execution and in eventually
granting the same.
PARULAN VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. NO. L-28519, FEBRUARY 17, 1968
ISSUE:
WON the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try
and decide the case and to impose the sentence
upon Parulan for evasion of service of sentence.
FACTS:
Parulan was serving life imprisonment
(commuted to 20 years by the President) in
Muntinlupa. In Oct 1964, he was transferred to
Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the same month,
but was recaptured in Manila.
He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, penalized under Art. 157 of
the RPC. The CFI in Manila found him guilty and
sentenced him accordingly.
He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
directed to the Director of Bureau of Prisons,
praying that the latter be ordered “to release
immediately and without delay the body of the
petitioner from unlawful and illegal
confinement.” Parulan contended that his
confinement illegal because the sentence of
conviction imposed upon him for the crime of
evasion of service of sentence was rendered by a
court without jurisdiction over his person and of
the offense with which he was charged.
HELD:
Yes. Transitory or continuing offenses are crimes
where some acts material and essential to the
crime occur in one province and some in
another. The court of either province where any
of the essential ingredients of the crime took
place has jurisdiction to try the case. There are,
however, crimes which although all the elements
thereof for its consummation may have occurred
in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature
of the offense committed, the violation of the law
is deemed to be continuing.
When the prisoner in his attempt to evade the
service of the sentence imposed upon him by the
courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law,
moves from one place to another; for, in this
case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a

continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a
single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long it may be. It
may not be validly said that after the convict
shall have escaped from the place of his
confinement the crime is fully consummated, for,
as long as he continues to evade the service of
his sentence, he is deemed to continue
committing the crime, and may be arrested
without warrant, at any place where he may be
found. The right of arrest without a warrant is
founded on the principle that at the time of the
arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime — evading the service of his
sentence.
December 28, 2017 – Article 158 – EVASION OF
SERVICE OF SENTENCE ON THE OCCASION
OF DISORDER, CONFLAGRATIONS,
EARTHQUAKES, OR OTHER CALAMITIES.
ALILIAN, Enna B.
LOSADA v ACENAS
GR No. L-810, March 31, 1947
ISSUE:
WON the said inmates were entitled to the
deduction of their sentence provided in Art 98 in
accordance with Art 158 RPC
FACTS:
The Justice of Peace ordered the release of the
four (4) inmates who remained in the penal
colony and did not try to escape during the war.
HELD:
No. The special allowance for loyalty authorized
by articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code
refers to those convicts who, having evaded the
service of their sentences by leaving the penal
institution, give themselves up within two days.
As these petitioners were not in that class,
because they had not escaped, they had no claim
to that allowance.
December 30, 2017 – Article 159 – OTHER
CASES OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF
SENTENCE
Arances, Javy Ann G.
PEOPLE VS SANARES
G.R. NO. L-43499, January 11, 1936
Justice Recto
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted
or that the penalty be reduced.
FACTS:
Isidoro Sanares y Caerne was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The accused
was granted by His Excellency, the Governor-
General, a conditional pardon remitting the
unexecuted portion of the sentence of
imprisonment of six years and one imposed upon
him for the crime of theft. Upon accepting the
condition of such pardon, to wit: that he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippine Islands, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously violated the condition
of such pardon by then and there committing the
crime of estafa for which he was finally sentenced
to suffer three months and eleven days of
imprisonment.
37 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty
and the court forthwith ordered his
recommitment for the unexpired portion of his
former sentence. The accused appealed from this
judgment and prays that he be acquitted or that
the penalty be reduced.
The record shows that the conditional pardon
whose conditions were violated by the accused
referred to a penalty of six years and one day of
prision, of which two years, five months and
twenty-two days had been served by the accused.
The penalty remitted by the pardon was,
therefore, three years, seven months and eight
days.
HELD:
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon the
convict who, having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any
of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the
Penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon
be higher than six years, the convict shall then
suffer the unexpired portion of his original
sentence."
The second part of the article just quoted is
inapplicable to the case at bar because the
unexpired portion of the penalty remitted by
reason of the condition pardon granted the
accused does not exceed six years. The first part
thereof, which imposes the penalty or prision
correccional in its minimum period upon the
convict who, having been granted conditional
pardon, shall violated any of its conditions, is,
therefore, applicable. The duration of this
penalty is from six months and one day to two
years and four months. Inasmuch as the
mitigating circumstance of having pleaded guilty
should be considered in favor of the accused, and
there being no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its minimum
period which ranges from six months and one
day to one year, one month and ten days of
prision correccional. The benefits afforded by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law are not applicable
to the accused, by express provision thereof.
TORRES VS GONZALES
G.R. NO. 76872, July 23, 1987
Justice Feliciano
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
FACTS:
In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa and in
1979, he was pardoned by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws
again and that should this condition be violated,
he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was
charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,
Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled

the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the
Supreme Court averring that the Executive
Department erred in convicting him for violating
the conditions of his pardon because the estafa
charges against him were not yet final and
executory as they were still on appeal.
HELD:
In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (1)
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court,
in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under article 159 of the Revised Penal Code,
parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
December 31, 2017 – Article 160 –
COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING
SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs. ANTONIO
YABUT
G.R. No. 39085 September 27, 1933
BUTTE, J.
LEGAL ISSUE:
Whether or not Quasi-Recidivism of Article 160
is not
applicable for YABUT.
FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the
City of Manila, the accused Antonio Yabut, then
a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison,
in said city, did then and there, with intent to
kill, wilfully and treacherously, assault and use
personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another
prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then
and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly
and unexpectedly from behind with a wooden
club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing
the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon
him various other physical injuries on different
parts of the body which caused the death of the
latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.
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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
At the time of the commission of this offense, the
said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having
previously been convicted twice of the crime of
homicide and once of serious physical injuries,
by virtue of final sentences rendered by
competent tribunals. Upon arraignment, YABUT
pleaded not guilty. We reject the testimony of
Yabut that it was Prisoner Villafuerte, the squad
leader of their brigade, not YABUT, who gave the
fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies
of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the
Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the
Medico Legal Department of the University of the
Philippines, clearly establish that the death of
Aseo was caused by subdural and cerebral
hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull
resulting from the blow on the head of Aseo. They
further confirm the testimony of the four
eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from
behind. YABUT places much stress upon the
word "another" appearing in the English
translation of the headnote of article 160 and
would have us accept his deduction from the
headnote that article 160 is applicable only when
the new crime which is committed by a person
already serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch
as the appellant was serving sentence for the
crime of homicide, the appellant contends the
court below erred in applying article 160 in the
present case which was a prosecution for murder
(involving homicide).
HELD:
Yes, Article 160 still applies. The language is
plain and unambiguous. There is not the
slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that
said article applies only in cases where the new
offense is different in character from the former
offense for which the defendant is serving the
penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a
statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous,
there is neither necessity nor propriety in
resorting to the preamble or headings or
epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the
text, especially where such epigraphs or
headings of sections are mere catchwords or
reference aids indicating the general nature of
the text that follows.
A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the
Revised Penal code will reveal that they were not
intended by the Legislature to be used as
anything more than catchwords conveniently
suggesting in a general way the subject matter of
each article. Being nothing more than a
convenient index to the contents of the articles of
the Code, they cannot, in any event have the
effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous
words of the text. Secondary aids may be
consulted to remove, not to create doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BETH
TEMPORADA.
G.R. No. 173473 December 17, 2008
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
LEGAL ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 160 should not be
considered as an “attending circumstances” in

relation to the application of Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
FACTS:
From September 2001 to January 2002,
Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette Miranda,
Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and Beth
Temporada, all employees of the Alternative
Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC), recruited
and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to
complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician
in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay,
Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory
workers in Hongkong. The accused and
appellant were then holding office at Dela Rosa
Street, Makati City but eventually transferred
business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila.
After complainants had submitted all the
requirements consisting of their respective
application forms, passports, NBI clearances and
medical certificates, the accused and appellant,
on different dates, collected and received from
them placement fees in various amounts, viz: a)
from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. – 57,600.00; b) from
Dennis Dimaano – P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn
Estacio – P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle –
P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay –
P69,520.00. As none of them was able to leave
nor recover the amounts they had paid,
complainant lodged separate criminal
complaints against accused and appellant before
the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29,
2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto
Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations
against the accused and appellant, one for Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38 (a)
of the Labor Code as amended, and the rest for
five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. There
is an argument that the incremental penalty rule
should not be considered as analogous to a
modifying circumstance stems from the
erroneous interpretation that the "attending
circumstances" mentioned in Section 1 of the ISL
are limited to those modifying circumstances
falling within the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of
the RPC.
HELD:
YES. While we affirm the conviction for the five
(5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that the
CA erroneously computed the indeterminate
penalties therefor. The CA deviated from the
doctrine laid down in People v. Gabres; hence its
decision should be reversed with respect to the
indeterminate penalties it imposed. The reversal
of the appellate court’s Decision on this point
does not, however, wholly reinstate the
indeterminate penalties imposed by the trial
court because the maximum terms, as
determined by the latter, were erroneously
computed and must necessarily be rectified.
Section 1 of the ISL is again quoted below –
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of said Code, and the minimum which
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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; x x x
The plain terms of the ISL show that the
legislature did not intend to limit "attending
circumstances" as referring to Articles 13 and 14
of the RPC. If the legislature intended that the
"attending circumstances" under the ISL be
limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it could have
simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly
permits other modifying circumstances outside
of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as
"attending circumstances" for purposes of the
application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism
under Article 16051 of the RPC. Under this
provision, "any person who shall commit a felony
after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence, or while
serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law
for the new felony." This circumstance has been
interpreted by the Court as a special aggravating
circumstance where the penalty actually
imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty in
its maximum period without regard to any
generic mitigating circumstances. Since quasi-
recidivism is considered as merely a special
aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower
in degree is computed based on the prescribed
penalty without first considering said special
aggravating circumstance as exemplified in
People v. Manalo and People v. Balictar. The
question whether the incremental penalty rule is
covered within the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances" under the ISL was answered in
the affirmative by the Court in Gabres when it
ruled therein that the incremental penalty rule is
analogous to a modifying circumstance.
Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides –
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person
who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its
maximum period to prisión mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as
the case may be. x x x Under Gabres, prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor
minimum is the prescribed penalty55 for estafa
when the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00. An amount defrauded in excess of
P22,000.00 is effectively considered as a special
aggravating circumstance in the sense that the
penalty actually imposed shall be taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period
without regard to any generic mitigating
circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next
lower in degree is still based on the prescribed
penalty without in the meantime considering the
effect of the amount defrauded in excess of
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

P22,000.00. What is unique, however, with the

afore-quoted provision is that when the amount
defrauded is P32,000.00 or more, the prescribed
penalty is not only imposed in its maximum
period but there is imposed an incremental
penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided
that the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed 20 years. This incremental
penalty rule is a special rule applicable to estafa
and theft. In the case of estafa, the incremental
penalty is added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty (or to anywhere from 6 years,
8 months and 21 days to 8 years) at the
discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the
penalty actually imposed (i.e., the maximum
term, within the context of the ISL). This unique
characteristic of the incremental penalty rule
does not pose any obstacle to interpreting it as
analogous to a modifying circumstance, and,
hence, falling within the letter and spirit of
"attending circumstances" for purposes of the
application of the ISL. Under the wording of the
ISL, "attending circumstances" may be
reasonably interpreted as referring to such
circumstances that are applied in conjunction
with certain rules in the Code in order to
determine the penalty to be actually imposed
based on the prescribed penalty of the Code for
the offense. The incremental penalty rule
substantially meets this standard. The
circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess
of P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule
is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed. At
its core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a
mathematical formula for computing the penalty
to be actually imposed using the prescribed
penalty as starting point. Thus, it serves the
same function of determining the penalty
actually imposed as the modifying
circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of
the RPC, although the manner by which the
former accomplishes this function differs with
the latter. For this reason, the incremental
penalty rule may be considered as merely
analogous to modifying circumstances.
Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the
incremental penalty rule falls within the scope of
"attending circumstances" under the ISL, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of inclusion
because this interpretation is more favorable to
the accused following the time-honored principle
that penal statutes are construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused.56
Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinion’s
interpretation is gratuitously conceded as
plausible, as between Gabres and the dissent’s
interpretation, Gabres should be sustained since
it is the interpretation more favorable to the
accused.

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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

TITLE FOUR – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC
INTEREST
January 1, 2018 – Article 161 –
COUNTERFEITING THE GREAT SEAL OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
FORGING THE SIGNATURE OR STAMP OF
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
GAMIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge of violation of Art. 161
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was proper.
FACTS:
On March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant
Juan C. Tuvera issued Memorandum Circular
No. 1281. Following the issuance of this
memorandum, the Presidential Security
Command and the Office of the President,
through the Malacañang Complaints and
Investigation Office (CIO), investigated petitioner.
On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of
Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer,
petitioner appeared and presented the 11
documents, claiming that President Ferdinand
E. Marcos had signed them in his (petitioner's)
presence. The lone witness for the prosecution,
Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff
Director of the Malacañang Records Office
(MRO), testified that there were no copies of the
documents on file in his office and that the
signatures thereon did not appear to be those of
the former President. For his part, petitioner said
that he was the Executive Director of the
Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring
Services, or PRAMS, having been appointed by
then President Marcos and that his appointment
and the related documents, subject of the
prosecution, had been signed by the former
President in petitioner's presence.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila found
him guilty and charged him with 11 counts of
violation of Art. 161 of the RPC by forging the
signature of the President of the Philippines on
11 different documents and making it appear
that the documents were genuine official
documents of the Republic of the Philippines. He
was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, in each of these eleven (11) criminal
cases, or a total of eighty (80) years up to one
hundred fifty-four (154) years. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition.
HELD:
YES, the petition has no merit.
Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the
Malacañang Records Office, testified that his
office did not have a record of the documents. For
his part Executive Secretary Juan C. Tuvera
declared the Presidential Regional Assistant
Monitoring Services as nonexistent and its
alleged Executive Director, herein petitioner, as
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
not in any capacity connected with the Office of
the President. From these premises it is rational
to conclude that the documents in question,
which purport to have been signed by then
President Marcos, are bogus documents. The
trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found
petitioner to be the author of the forgery. The
presumption is that the possessor and user of a
falsified document is the forger thereof.
Petitioner also argues that he should have been
charged under only one information because
there was only one intent "to discharge the
imagined functions of a non-existent office." The
argument has no merit. The documents in this
case were forged on different dates. One act was
not done to commit another. There is therefore
no basis for considering the various acts as
constituting only one crime of forgery.
January 2, 2018 – Article 162 – USING
FORGED SIGNATURE OR COUNTERFEIT
SEAL OR STAMP
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 2, 2018 – Article 163 – MAKING AND
IMPORTING AND UTTERING FALSE COINS
DAHIROC, Janice L.
THE UNITED STATES VS. AGUSTIN BASCO
G.R. NO. L-2747 APRIL 11, 1906
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case constitutes the crime of
counterfeiting money.
FACTS:
It was proved at the trial of this case that the
defendant attempted to pay for a package of
cigarettes which he bought at a certain store with
what appeared to be silver coin, but which, as a
matter of fact, was a Philippine copper cent. He
insisted that the owner of the store should accept
the same as a peseta, that is to say, a twenty cent
piece. The latter refused to accept it upon
noticing what the real value and denomination of
the coin was. The defendant again insisted that
the money be accepted and the owner of the store
refused to do so. As a result of such refusal a
quarrel ensued between them. A policeman then
interfered, and upon being informed of what had
happened, placed the defendant under arrest
and took him to the police station, where several
Mexican and Japanese coins were found in his
possession together with a roll of Philippine
copper cents, the latter being silver plated, and
identical with the coin which he had attempted
to pass at the store as a twenty-cent piece. Upon
an examination of these plated coins it was found
that they were genuine Philippine copper cents,
which apparently and been whitened with
quicksilver to give them the color and brightness
of silver. The defendant having been asked as to
where he had obtained the said coins, first
answered that he had received them as change,
but later admitted that he had silvered them
himself.
HELD:
No. The Attorney-General, in his brief filed in this
court, contends that these facts do not constitute
the crime of counterfeiting money, but that of
estafa, and for this reason asks that the

defendant be acquitted of the crime charged in
the complaint without prejudice to the filing of
another complaint against him for estafa.
There can be no counterfeiting of money when,
as in this case, no spurious or clipped coin was
used. The coins in question were genuine copper
cents and bore their original designs and
inscriptions. The defendant did not make or
attempt to make any alteration in the designs
and inscriptions of the said coins. All that he did
was to give them the appearance of silver pieces
for the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent
coins. He did not, however, attempt to imitate the
peculiar design of such coins. The acts
committed by the defendant for the purpose of
defrauding third persons by deceiving them us to
the real value of the coins in question constitute
the crime of estafa and not of counterfeiting
money. There were not legal grounds upon which
a charge for this latter offense could be based.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and the defendant acquitted of the charge of
counterfeiting money contained in the
complaint, and the Attorney-General is directed
to present another complaint against him for the
crime of estafa. It is ordered that the Mexican
and Japanese coins found in the possession of
the defendant be returned to him. The costs of
both instances are declared de oficio. After the
expiration of ten days from the date of final
judgment, let the case be remanded to the Court
of First Instance from whence it came for proper
procedure.
January 3, 2018 – Article 164 – MUTILATION
OF COINS - IMPORTATION AND UTTERANCE
OF MUTILATED COINS
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J.
PEOPLE V TIN CHING TING
GR L-4620 JANUARY 30,1952
ISSUE:
Whether or not the coins in this case are
mutilated.
HELD:
Mutilation is to diminish by ingenuous means
the metal in the coin. One who mutilates a coin
does not do so for the sake of mutilating, but to
take advantage of the metal abstracted; he
appropriates a part of the metal of the coin.
Hence, the coin diminishes in intrinsic value.
One who utters said mutilated coin receives its
legal value, much more than its intrinsic value.
It is indispensable that the mutilated coin be of
legal tender.
(Note: The copy of the full text of the case cannot
be found; only the ruling)
January 4, 2018 – Article 165 – SELLING OF
FALSE OR MUTILATED COIN, WITHOUT
CONNIVANCE
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
PEOPLE V GO PO
GR. NO. 42697, VL.J. 393, AUGUST 1985
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Chinaman may be convicted
of illegal possession of false coin?
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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
A Chinese merchant was paid by purchaser of
goods in the former’s store a false 50-centavo
coin. He placed it in his drawer. During a search
by some constabulary officers, the false coin was
found in the drawer.
HELD:
No. Article 165 requires three things as regards
possession of false coins, namely: (1) possession
; (2) intent to utter; and (2) knowledge that the
coin is false. The fact that the Chairman received
it in payment of his goods and placed it in his
drawer shows that he did not know that such
coin was false.
January 5, 2018 – Article 166 – FORGING
TREASURY OR BANK NOTES OR OTHER
DOCUMENTS PAYABLE TO BEARER;
IMPORTING, AND UTTERING SUCH FALSE OR
FORGED NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
US VS GARDNER
G.R. No. 1468, March 14, 1904
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant can be held liable
for falsification of notes or documents equivalent
to current money payable to bearer
FACTS:
Gardner ordered Jameson to buy a bottle of
mucilage and blue pencil. That night, while
passing by a tailor shop, Gardner handed
Jameson a bill asking him to change it for silver
and promised to give him half its value. Jameson
cashed the bill and received 25 pesos. Gardner
also had another bill on which he had pasted a
number "10". Gardner tried to pass Confederate
$10 in a Filipino drug store. The Chinaman Ah
Fun had given 25 pesos in exchange for an
American bill upon which the number 10 had
been pasted. He did not observe the defect in the
bill at first, but observed it afterwards and
immediately went to the people station to file a
complaint. Some other night, Gardner through
the witness Klip also attempted to pass a one-
dollar bill raised to a ten in a house of
prostitution. It was shortly after returned to him
saying that it was bad.
HELD:
Yes. The falsification of bank notes and of
documents of credit payable to bearer and issued
by the State, to which class the two certificates
in question belong, is an act severely punished
by the law as tending to bring such documents
into discredit and because such offenses produce
a lack of confidence on the part of the holders of
said documents to the prejudice of the interest of
society and of the State, and for this reason the
law punishes this crime more severely than it
does the counterfeiting of money, in
consideration of the fact that it is easier to
counterfeit such certificates, notes, and
documents of credit payable to bearer than to
make counterfeit coin, and that the profit which
is derived therefrom by the forger of such
documents is greater and the incentive for the
commission of such a crime more powerful.

DEL ROSARIO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-16806, December 22, 1961
ISSUE:
Whether or not said act constitutes a violation of
Article 166 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and
Benedicto del Pilar were accused of
counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes. They
have shown to Apolinario del Rosario Philippine
one-peso and two-peso bills and induced him to
believe that the same were counterfeit paper
money manufactured by them, although in fact
they were genuine treasury notes of the
Philippine Government one of the digits of each
of which had been altered and changed. They
obtained P1,700.00 from said complainant for
the purpose of financing the manufacture of
more counterfeit treasury notes of the
Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. It is not disputed that a portion of the last
digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619, had been
erased and changed so as to read 0 and that
similar erasures and changes had been made in
the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691,
in the last digit in Serial No. D-716326, and in
the last digit 9 of Serial No. D-716329. The
possession of genuine treasury notes of the
Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or
signs contained" in which had been erased and
or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they
were used by petitioner herein and his co-
defendants in the manner adverted to above, is
punishable under Article 168, in relation to
Article 166 (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
TECSON VS CA
G.R. No. 113218, November 22, 2001
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tecson can be held liable for the
illegal possession and use of counterfeit US
dollar notes
FACTS:
On April 26, 1990 a test-buy operation was
ordered by Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the
Investigation Staff of the Central Bank, which
resulted in the purchase from Tecson of one US
dollar note for Two Hundred Pesos that was
found to be counterfeit. Consequently, a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation was formed.
During such occasion, Tecson was introduced to
Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta as persons
interested in buying US dollar notes. Apparently
convinced, the man drew ten pieces of US $100
dollar notes from his wallet. Upon such, the two
introduced themselves as Central Bank
operatives and apprehended Tecson. The trial
court found Tecson guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168 and
penalized in Art. 166 paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. Hence this petition.
HELD:
Yes. The prosecution established, through the
testimonies of Pedro Labita and Johnny
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ST
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Marqueta, that a buy-bust operation was
conducted by the combined agents of the Central
Bank of the Philippines and the US Secret
Service, and that the petitioner was therein
caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of
and in the act of offering to sell counterfeit US
dollar notes. The testimony of Pedro Labita which
was corroborated by Johnny Marqueta and the
presentation during the trial of the ten
counterfeit US $100 dollar notes, which were
confiscated from the petitioner when he was
arrested, proved beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the petitioner for the crime of illegal
possession and use of fake US dollar notes under
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
January 7, 2018 – Article 167 –
COUNTERFEITING, IMPORTING, AND
UTTERING INSTRUMENT NOT PAYABLE TO
BEARER
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 7, 2018 – Article 168 – ILLEGAL
POSSESION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY
OR BANK NOTES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS
OF CREDIT
DUQUE, Francis Lester M
THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN DE LEON, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 1934, April 29, 1905
ISSUE:
WON it is necessary to convict the accused that
the latter know the bill was a counterfeit at the
time it was uttered.
FACTS:
Juan de Leon and Albino de Leon, the accused
in this case, were found guilty in the CFI of the
crime of uttering a counterfeit bank note under
Art 292 of the Penal Code.
It appears that the accused were brothers, and
that Juan de Leon having paid a debt with a
counterfeit 50-peso note of the Spanish-Filipino
Bank, and the creditor having expressed some
doubt as to the genuineness of the note, the said
Albino de Leon assured him that the said note
was good, and promised that if it should prove to
be counterfeit he himself would make good the
loss. It was further shown that the note was in
fact counterfeit and that the said Albino de Leon
refused to make good the amount as he had
promised.
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 292 of the Penal Code, to
sustain a conviction of the crime of uttering a
counterfeit bank note it must affirmatively
appear that the accused knew that the note was
counterfeit at the time it was uttered.
Here, It was not proven that Albino was aware
that the note in question was counterfeit when
he aided his brother in uttering it, and guilty
knowledge of this fact being an essential element
of the crime, Albino should not have been
convicted either as principal or accomplice.
PEOPLE VS. NICASIO BARRAQUIA
C.A. NO. 50, APRIL 13, 1946
ISSUE:

WON the evidence is sufficient to find accused
convicted for the crime charged.
FACTS:
The witness for the prosecution Maximo Pascasio
testified that: Nicasio went to his office to change
a bank note of ten-peso denomination; he did not
change it because he saw that it was not
genuine; he ordered that a policeman be called;
when he told accused that the bank note was a
counterfeit, the accused kept silent; accused had
occasion to go away before the arrival of the
policeman, but he preferred to remain and
waited for the policeman; accused admitted to
the policeman that he is the owner of the bank
note, and the policeman brought him for
investigation to the municipal building without
offering any resistance.
Other witness Vicente C. Reventar, cashier of the
provincial treasury of Laguna, testified that: he
can distinguish a counterfeit from a genuine one;
in his opinion, ten peso bill is a counterfeit
because the printing is somewhat blurred and
the paper is very oily.
At the investigation, accused explained that the
bank note was passed to him in a game of cara y
cruz. Upon his own testimony accused appears
to be an illiterate laborer, who does not know
how to read or write. He testified that he
happened to know that the bill a counterfeit only
when the postmaster of Calamba informed him
so, but for himself he cannot distinguish a
counterfeit note from a genuine one.
HELD:
No. The only evidence presented by the
prosecution to the effect that the bank note in
question was a counterfeit is the testimony of
Reventar who stated that the printing of the bill
is somewhat blurred and the paper is very oily.
The SC do not believe that these two
circumstances may be considered as enough
basis for declaring the bill in question as
falsified. The fact that the printing is somewhat
blurred may be attributed to the overuse of an
old printed matter, or that the bank bill is oily is
not an evidence of a counterfeit bill, because any
bank note may become oily by impregnation with
an oily liquid. According to the decision of the
lower court, the subject bill bears No.
D462691D. No evidence has been presented that
this number does not check with the genuine one
issued with the same number. Furthermore,
even if the subject ten peso bill was counterfeited
bank note, it was not prove that appellant had
knowledge of the fact before the postmaster of
Calamba called a policeman.
PEOPLE VS. CAMOLO DIGORO ALIAS
PANONDIONGAN.
G.R. NO. L-22032, MARCH 4, 1966
ISSUE:
WON the RTC is correct in finding accused guilty
under Article 168 of the RPC.
FACTS:
On 1961, Camolo Digoro was charged with
Article 168 of the RPC. The information was read
as follows: That said accused, did then and there
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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to possess, have in his possession, custody and
control, 100-peso bill, 20-peso bill, 10-peso bill,
5-peso bill, 2-peso bill and 1-Peso bill
denominations in resemblance or similitude to a
genuine treasury or bank notes issued by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
A decision was rendered finding accused guilty
by the trial court. The accused appealed his
case., on the ground that the information does
not charge an offense.
HELD:
No. Possession of false treasury or bank notes
alone without anything more, is not a criminal
offense. For it to constitute an offense under
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code the
possession must be with intent to use said false
treasury or bank notes. The subject law is clear:
Under ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of
false treasury or bank notes and other
instruments of credit.— …any person who shall
knowingly use or have in his possession, with
intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall
suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed in said articles.
It follows that an information, as in this case,
alleging possession of false treasury and bank
notes without alleging intent to use the same but
only "intent to possess" them, charges no
offense. Wherefore, the case is remanded for new
prosecution under an appropriate and valid
information.
January 8, 2018 – Article 169 – HOW
FORGERY IS COMMITTED
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
THE UNITED STATES VS ALONSO P.
GARDNER
G.R. NO. 1468, MARCH 14, 1904
ISSUE:
Whether or not forgery was committed.
FACTS:
Accused was charged with falsification of silver
certificates by pasting little pieces of paper, on
each one of which the figure “10” appears, over
the figure “1’, which showed the true value of the
certificate and by obliterating with a pencil the
number “1” whenever it appeared on the corners
or sides of the certificates for the purpose appear
that each one of them was worth $10 instead of
$1, and by this means the sum of 25 Mexican
pesos was fraudulently obtained in exchange for
one of the said bills or certificates.
HELD:
Yes. Article 289 of the Penal Code provides that
those who falsify bank notes or other
instruments or documents payable to bearer, or
coupons thereof, the issue of which has been
authorized by law, or those who introduce such
in the Philippine Islands, shall be punished.
The silver certificates in the record are
documents payable to bearer or documents of
credit duly issued by virtue of the Federal laws
in force in the United States, and are included as
instruments payable to bearer.

THE UNITED STATES vs MARIANO SOLITO
GR. NO. L-12546 August 25, 1917
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of forging,
uttering and passing an altered obligation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
FACTS:
Accused was the correspondence clerk and
acting chief clerk in the office of the division
superintendent of schools in the municipality of
Dumaguete. With that he was intrusted and
authorized to open letters of an official character
addressed to the office. It was the custom of the
director of Education to forward to division
superintendents of schools checks for the
reimbursement for travel expenses and for the
payment of the salary of employees. On April 19,
1915 a Treasury Warrant was issued to Alvah D.
Riley for the sum of P657.53 from the Auditor of
the Philippine Islands for payment. Accused then
presented the said warrant to the municipal
treasurer for payment, bearing the indorsement
of Alvah D. Riley and received the amount stated
therein. Alvah D. Riley contended that he never
had in his possession the said warrant, nor had
ever seen the same, that he did not indorse the
same by writing his name at the back, that his
signature which appears at the back of the said
warrant was not his.
HELD:
Yes. The said warrant was a check issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands and, an
obligation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands. It was originally made payable to Alvah
D. Riley, or to his order. When it was indorsed as
above indicated, it became a check or warrant
payable to “bearer”. The indorsement made a
material alteration in said warrant. The
indorsement changed said check from one
payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to one to whom he
ordered it paid, to one payable to bearer. The
indorsement of the accused had the effect of
erasing the phrase “or order” upon the face of the
warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RAFAEL
BALMORES
85 Phil. 493 FEBRUARY 16, 1950
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused committed forgery under
Article 169 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Accused was charged for attempted estafa
through falsification of security by tearing off at
the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of
a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true
and real unidentified number of same and
substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on
the left side of said ticket the figure or number
074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said
number 074000, which is a prize-winning
number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
draw last June 29, 1947, and presenting the said
ticket so falsified on said date, September 22,
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1947, in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office for the purpose of exchanging the same for
the corresponding cash that said number had
won, fraudulently pretending in said Office that
the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is
entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55
so won by said ticket in the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes draw on said date, June 29, 1947,
but the said accused failed to perform all the acts
of execution which would have produced the
crime of estafa thru falsification of a security as
a consequence by reason of some causes other
than his spontaneous desistance.
HELD:
Yes. The alteration, or even destruction, of a
losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm
to anyone and would not constitute a crime were
it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered
as a prize-winning number. The penalty imposed
by article 166 for the forging or falsification of
"treasury or bank notes or certificates or other
obligations arid securities" is reclusion temporal
in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed
P10,000, if the document which has been
falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an obligation
or security of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands. In this case the ticket in
question was owned by the government of the
Philippine Islands.
January 9, 2018 – Article 170 –
FALSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE
DOCUMENTS
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 9, 2018 – Article 171 –
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BY
A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE OR NOTARY OR
ECCLESIASTIC MINISTER
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE V. PO GIOK TO
G.R. NO L-7236, April 30, 1955
ISSUE:
Whether Defendant violated Article 171 by
forging a public document.
FACTS:
Defendant forge a public document namely the
residence certificate No. A-1618529 and
misrepresenting to the said representative of the
City Treasurer that his name is Antonio Perez
along with his birth place and citizenship when
in fact he is a Chinese national.
The CFI of Cebu charged defendant with the
crime of falsification of a public document.
Accused then filed a motion to quash on the
grounds that the information did not allege that
the document allegedly falsified and that he had
the wrongful intent to injure a third person. The
lower court then dismissed the case on the
grounds that the information filed did not alleged
the intent and disclosure of the facts in the
documents allegedly falsified.
Defendant also contended that he cannot be
charged with violation of Article 171 since the

falsified document was committed by a public
employee who wrote the untrue facts.
HELD:
Yes, although it is true that it was the employee
who wrote the untrue facts, it was the defendant
who induced him to do so by supplying the facts
making him the principal of the crime by
inducement.
The court also held that the obligation on the
part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the
facts that should appear in a residence certificate
to be issued to him, is inherent in the very nature
and purpose of said document. Hence,
defendants falsification of the information need
not be alleged in the information for him to be
convicted of the crime. Since under
Commonwealth Act No. 465, for the purpose of
establishing his true and correct identity, he
thereby committed falsification as principal by
induction in making false statement in the
narration of fact.
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the
case back to the lower court for further
proceedings.
SPS. REVELO AND CORAZON VILLAMAR V.
PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 178652, 12/8/10
ISSUE:
Whether accused falsified a public document.
FACTS:
On April 20, 1967, Elena Mananton sold a parcel
of land to her 9 children. On June 6, 1983, some
of her children sold Land to Simplicio. However,
Modesta and Felipe did not participate in the
sale. Simplicio then sold the parcel of land to his
daughter Corazon who is married to Petitioner
Revelo.
They registered the deed of sale in the Office of
the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen which was
signed and notarized which was dated Nov. 23,
1989. In the deed it was made to appear that all
of Elena’s children signed it. The signatures of
Modesta and Felipe were forged.
On Sept. 7, 2000, an information was filed
charging petitioner with falsification of public
documents. Petitioner maintained that they
could not be guilty since it was not them who
prepared the document. It was left in the
assessors office which they were told to come
back and once they came back it was already
signed. They contended that they did not act with
intent to falsify and that they acted in good faith.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners were the authors and
mastermind since falsification is presumed from
the fact that they actually benefited from it. In
Maliwat v. CA, the Supreme Court held that in
the absence of satisfactory explanation, the one
found in possession of and who used a forged
document and made use of it, taking advantage
and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification.
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January 10, 2018 – Article 172 –
FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
AND USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T. II
THE UNITED STATES, v. DAMIAN OVERA
(alias KIM CUAN),
11 Phil 596
ISSUE:
WON a counterfeiting a ticket is considered a
falsification of a private document.
FACTS:
Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
of the crime of having falsified a Chinese theater
ticket which entitled the bearer thereof to
admission to a performance held in the theater
by counterfeiting and simulating the signature
and rubric of Eng Ning on the said ticket,
The accused was sentenced to be imprisoned at
the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period of six
months and one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas,
Philippine currency, and the costs of the suit,
from which judgment the accused appealed.
HELD:
YES
That the court below did not err in qualifying
such ticket as a document in order to prosecute
and punish the crime of falsification, the subject-
matter of the complaint, because if, according to
the authority cited by the appellant, a document
is "a deed, instrument or other duly authorized
paper by which something is proved, evidenced
or set forth," and a private document is,
according to another authority cited by the same
appellant, "every deed or instrument executed by
a private person, without the intervention of a
public notary or of other person legally
authorized, by which document some disposition
or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," it
follows that the ticket in question, being an
authorized document evidencing an agreement
for the rent of a place in a theater to enable the
possessor to witness a theatrical performance, is
a private document.
PEOPLE VS MANANSALA
105 Phil 1253
ISSUE:
WON the person being in possession of the tvr
is presumed to be the author of the falsification
FACTS:
Felix Manansala, Accused was apprehended by
del Rosario of Manila Police Department (MPD)
for driving outside of his authorized route. Upon
presenting the Traffic Violations Report (TVR) del
Rosario noticed that the TVR was altered.It was
later found that the alterations consisted of
erasing the number “III” and the word “three”
after the word Pending cases and replacing the
figures with “I” and “one”this changed the
original meaning of the TVR which previously
stated 3 pending cases to only 1 pending case.

At the investigation, the accused admitted
having made the alterations in question, in order
to hide his previous pending traffic violation
cases and thereby avoid immediate arrest should
he be caught committing a fourth traffic violation
HELD:
YES.
The falsified Traffic Violations Report(TVR) in
question was issued to the accused and the
records show that it was in his possession and
had been used as a temporary drivers permit
from its issuance to the time he was caught by
del Rosario upon commission of his 4th violation.
It is an established rule that when a person has
in his possession a falsified document and
makes use of the same, the presumption is that
such person is the forger. The accused also had
sufficient motive to commit the falsification as
MPD policy is to arrest a person upon the 4th
traffic violation. Hence, he had the strongest
temptation to make in his TVR appear that he
had only committed 1 infraction.
PEOPLE VS DOMINGO
49 PHIL 28
ISSUE:
WON the acts of the accused constitute a
falsification of public documents
FACTS:
Benita Domingo and company were accused of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents after they had defrauded a Moises
Bunzon for an amount of P5,000.
The property (fishpond) in question is under the
administration of Josefa de Leon. Accused
Benita Domingo approached the administrator
(representing herself as a Realty broker) after
learning that de Leon was looking for a buyer of
the property. Domingo later stated that she had
found a buyer and asked if she could have
temporary possession of the Title deed and other
related documents to the property.The
documents were later handed to Domingo on the
promise that it would be returned later in the
afternoon. However, that promise was broken.
Shortly, Sanchez learned his property was being
mortgaged by accused Modesto and company
(comrades of Domingo) but upon confrontation
he was merely told that he did not have
possession of the documents Modesto and
Company later approached a certain Moises
Bunzon and pretended to be Josefa de Leon and
representing the owner of the property.
They sold the subject property for P5000 to
Bunzon with the option of buying back the
property.
This transaction criminally defrauded and
injured Moises Buzon
HELD:
YES
The crime charged in the information and
conclusively established by the evidence. The
crime could hot have been committed if its
perpetrators had not been in possession of the
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certificate of title is obvious and it has been
proven beyond a shadow of doubt that the
appellant was the person who obtained the
certificate from Sanchez. It is true that there is
no direct evidence that she delivered it to the two
women who signed the deed, but in view of the
fact that she offered no explanation as to what
she did with the certificate and even denied that
she received it, there is no escape from the
inference that she placed the certificate in the
hands of her confederates. If she had not been a
co-conspirator, she would have revealed the
name of the party to whom the certificate was
delivered. Her position is analogous to that of a
person who immediately after a larceny has been
committed is found in possession of the stolen
goods and offers no explanation
SIQUIAN VS PEOPLE
171 SCRA 223
ISSUE:
WON Siquian was guilty of falsification of public
documents
FACTS:
Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel
Siquian, the municipal mayor of Isabela, to apply
for a job in the office of the mayor. Siquian later
appointed her as a clerk in the office of the
municipal secretary and even said that her
salary would be included in the budget.
Accompanying her appointment is the
certification, among others, of the availability of
funds through a form issued by Siquian and
addressed to the CSC, pursuant to the
requirements of the latter.
It should be noted that the Municipal council of
Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-76. As
such, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal
Year 1974-75, was deemed re-enacted.
No such position (that assigned to Carreon)
existed then. Carreon worked for five months
and was supposed to receive her salary of P120.
She approached the municipal treasurer to ask
for the money but the latter said that there was
no money yet. She then sued Siquian for
falsification of a public document.
HELD:
YES.
He was found guilty under par 4 of art
171,“making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts”; the elements of which are:
(a) That the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false.
In this case, all the elements for falsification were
met especially when Siquian stated that funds
were available for the position to which Jesusa
Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in
reality, the position itself did not even exist and
no funds had been appropriated. It is further

bolstered by the fact that when the budget was
deemed re-enacted, there is no such position as
Clerk to the Municipal Secretary, the position to
which Carreon was appointed. And there is also
no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for
the Fiscal Year 1974-75 for such position, thus
rendering Siquian's statement in his certification
utterly false. Siquian also had the legal obligation
to disclose the truth of such facts.
He also took advantage of his official position in
falsifying the document. Abuse of public office is
considered present when the offender falsifies a
document in connection with the duties of his
office which consist of either making or preparing
or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a
document. In this case, Siquian was charged
with the duty of issuing the certification
necessary for the appointment of Carreon.
Lastly, the existence of a wrongful intent to
injure a third person is not necessary when the
falsified document is a public document.
January 11, 2018 – Article 173 –
FALSIFICATION OF WIRELESS, CABLE,
TELEGRAPH, AND TELEPHONE MESSAGES,
AND USE OF SAID FALSIFIED MESSAGES
MERCADO-NASH, Regina
US V. ROMERO
17 Phil. 76
ISSUE:
Whether or not Romero was guilty of falsifying
telegraph message.
FACTS:
On April 24, 1908, the accused Joaquin Romero
who was a postmaster and telegraph operator
send two telegrams for transmission. He reduced
the words of the telegraph messages by twelve
and eight words, respectively. He was not
authorized to do so by the senders. Romero
pocketed the differences in the prices charged in
the sums of P0.72 and P.48, respectively.
On August 24, 1908, the provincial fiscal filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance in
Tarlac, charging Romero with the crime of
falsification of telegrams. This crime is
punishable under Article 300 of the Penal Code
(now Art. 173 of the Revised Penal Code). He was
a government employee and engaged in the
service of sending or receiving wireless, cable,
telegraph or telephone messages.
The defendant Joaquin Romero admitted that he
changed the wording of the telegrams which he
received by omitting several words in each of
them; and the record of the cause shows no proof
of his allegation that he made an error in
recounting the amount received for each
telegram, owing to the number of words they
contained, and that he was obliged to diminish
the number of words of each of them.
HELD:
Yes, Romero had violated the crime of
falsification of telegrams. The crime is provided
for and punished by Article 303 in connection
with Article 300 of the Penal Code, which article
303 reads: “A public official in charge of the
telegraph services who shall originate or falsify a
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telegraphic message shall incur the penalty of
prision correctional in its medium and maximum
degrees.”
January 13, 2018 – Article 174 – FALSE
MEDICAL CERTIFICATES, FALSE
CERTIFICATES OF MERITS OR SERVICE,
ETC.
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
UNITED STATES VS. JUAN ANGEL
MICHELENA
(4 Phil 492)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of falsification of
certification of merit was committed.
FACTS:
In an application to the Civil Service Board for
examination, a document printed in accordance
with the form prescribed by said Board, and in
that part thereof which contains
recommendations of the applicant. The
certificate No. 3 appears to be subscribed by
Frank N. West, the latter having neither
subscribed it nor written the contents thereof,
the same not being correct in some respects, as
regards the age of the party certifying and the
length of time which he knew the candidate
recommended. The candidate, now the
defendant, failed to present himself for
examination, notwithstanding having in his
possession the ticket of admission.
HELD:
YES. The crime was fully proven. The act done by
the defendant is simply the falsification of a
certificate of merit. The court sentenced Juan
Angel Michelena to two months and one day of
arresto mayor, crediting him with one-half of the
time of his detention already suffered, and the
costs in both instances.
THE UNITED STATES vs. RUFINO DELOSO
(11 Phil 180)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of falsification of
certification of merit was committed.
FACTS:
Rufino Deloso, in order to take part in the
municipal elections that were to be held about
the first (1st) of December, 1904. in the town of
Jimenez, called at that municipal building and
stated under oath to the municipal secretary,
that he was a resident of the said town, and that
at the date of the next municipal election, he
would have resided therein for a period of six
months; and that he was in every way entitled to
vote. Subsequently, At the municipal elections
held at the town of Oroquieta, in the same
province, on the fifth (5th) of December 1905, the
said Deloso was elected by a majority vote to the
office of municipal president. The election was
protested by several residents of the town on the
ground that the successful candidate had no
legal residence therein. In his defense, Deloso
stated under oath on the 4th of January, 1906,
before Vicente Fortich, notary public of
Oroquieta, that he had been, and was at the time
a resident of the said town, and that he had

resided therein from the month of April, 1902,
until the above-mentioned date; that he was a
candidate for the municipal presidency of
Oroquieta at the elections of December, 1903,
that, although he paid frequent visits to the
pueblo of Jimenez, he always returned to
Oroquieta, the place where he resided; that he
never vote for municipal officers in the pueblo of
Jimenez. A complaint was filed by the provincial
fiscal charging Rufino Deloso with the crime of
falsification of official documents.
HELD:
YES. The document offered in evidence issued by
the municipal secretary of Jimenez is not, strictly
speaking, a public document, but it belongs to
the class of documents that the falsification of
which is covered under the falsification of a
certificate of merit. The said document or
certificate was used with the knowledge that its
contents were false, in that Deloso was not a
resident of Jimenez. The falsity of the statement
made by him to the municipal secretary of said
pueblo, was proven by another notarial
document executed by the said Deloso who also
stated under oath, that he was a resident of
Oroquieta both before and after the year 1904; it
is therefore unquestionable that the accused was
liable.
DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D.
SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA
G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of falsification of
certification of merit was committed.
FACTS:
A Complaint Affidavit filed by Cariaga before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) accusing
respondents Emmanuel D. Sapigao (Sapigao)
and Ginalyn C. Acosta of the crimes of
Falsification of Public Documents, False
Certification, and Slander by Deed, defined and
penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). In the said complaint,
Cariaga alleged that respondents, in their
respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and
Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan,
Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries in the
barangay blotter: (1) stating that an unnamed
resident reported that someone was firing a gun
inside Cariaga's compound, and that when
Sapigao went thereat, he was able to confirm that
the gunfire came from inside the compound and
was directed towards the adjacent ricefields and
(2) stating that a concerned but unnamed
resident reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his
companions attended the funeral march of
former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr. (Calivo, Sr.)
with firearms visibly tucked in their waists.
Accordingly, the police authorities used the
blotter entries to obtain a warrant for the search
and seizure operation made inside Cariaga's
residence and cattle farm which resulted in the
confiscation of a firearm and several
ammunitions, the criminal case for illegal
possession of firearms consequently filed against
him but was dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court claiming that the statements in the blotter
entries were completely false and were made to
dishonor and discredit him. Sagipao and Acosta
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raised their defenses, Sapigao denied the
accusations against him, maintaining that the
blotter entries were true, as he personally
witnessed their details whereas Acosta averred
that she was merely performing her duties as
Barangay Secretary when she certified as true
copies the photocopies of the aforesaid blotter
entries requested by the police authorities. The
OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable
cause. It found that the questioned blotter
entries were all made in good faith and merely for
recording purposes; done in the performance of
respondents' official duties; and based on
personal knowledge of what actually transpired.
Cariaga filed a petition for review before the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP)
but affirmed the OPP's ruling. The ORSP pointed
out that Acosta's mere authentication of the
photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be
equated to issuing a false certification so as to
indict her of such crime.
HELD:
NO. The court affirmed the ORSP ruling that the
mere act of authenticating photocopies of the
blotter entries cannot be equated to committing
the crime of False Certification under the law.
Hence, the ORSP correctly found no probable
cause to indict respondents of the said crimes.
January 14, 2018 – Article 175 – USING FALSE
CERTIFICATES
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
NEGROS MERCHANTS ENTERPRISES INC.
VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
GR NO. 150918 (AUGUST 17, 2007)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed because of using a false and
unauthorized certificate
FACTS:
Petitioner NMEI, through its President and
General Manager, Jacinto Tan Jr., applied for an
P8 million Credit Accommodation with
respondent CBC. The loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage over its properties.
Subsequently, NMEI, through Tan, applied for
an additional Case-to-Case Loan. Both loans
were respectively paid in 1996.
Petitioner NMEI re-availed the P8M credit line
and failed to settle the obligation. The latter,
through its counsel Atty. Diaz, sent two letters to
respondent requesting a detailed statement of
account and to hold in abeyance any legal action.
The latter replied that said statement could not
be released without proper board resolution or
authorization. The petitioner’s properties were
extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public
auction, with respondent as the highest bidder.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Foreclosure Sale with Damages and Preliminary
Injunction. Respondent CBC moved to dismiss
the same on the ground that petitioner failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that it is
entitled to the relief sought in the complaint. The
RTC of Bacolod denied respondents Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner later filed an Amended
Complaint impleading Tan and his spouse,
Corazon Tan, as well as respondents Bacolod

Branch Manager Ainalea Cortez. Respondent
again sought to dismiss the amended complaint
for failure to state cause of action and for failure
to comply with the rules on non-forum shopping.
In the CA, it held that the Amended Complaint
should have been dismissed because the
accompanying certification against forum
shopping which was signed by petitioner's
corporate secretary, Amelito Lizares, was
defective, for lack of authorization from the board
of directors.
HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, Lizares was not
authorized to file the complaint for and in behalf
of petitioner corporation. Thus, the complaint is
not deemed filed by the proper party in interest
and should be dismissed. There was no
allegation that petitioner NMEI, through a board
resolution, authorized Lizares to execute the
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. Moreover, no such board resolution
was appended to the complaint or amended
complaint.
In Tamondong v. CA, it was held that if a
complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff
who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is
not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint
does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the
court should dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.
January 15, 2018 – Article 176 –
MANUFACTURING AND POSSESSION OF
INSTRUMENTS OR IMPLEMENTS FOR
FALSIFICATION
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
US VS. ANGELES
6 PHIL. 435 (SEPTEMBER 11, 1906)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Angeles is liable under Article
176 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
The evidence is sufficient to show that the
defendant Modesto Angeles, manufactured a seal
in imitation of the seal of the municipality of
Lipa, in the Province of Batangas, for the purpose
of using it in the making of false certificates of
the transfer by him of live stock.
HELD:
YES. A person who manufactured a seal in
imitation of the seal of Lipa, Batangas, for
making false certificates for the transfer of
livestock, is guilty of making instrument for
falsification of certificates. The falsification of one
of these documents is punished, as we have just
held in the case of the United States v. Florentino
Sayson 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 572).
PEOPLE VS. MAGPALE
G.R. NO. L-46656 (JUNE 26, 1940)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in applying article
176 of RPC
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FACTS:
A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe
Magpale in the justice of the peace court of San
Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, charging him with
a violation of Article 176. That, on or about the
25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of
San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-
named accused did then and there willfully,
feloniously, knowingly and without lawful
purpose, have in his possession, custody and
control one brand of the municipal government
of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to wit: ,with the intent
of using it for falsifying the official brand of the
said municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in
public documents, to wit: Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle. All contrary to law.
HELD:
NO. Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code
provides as follows:
ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of
instruments or implements for falsification. —
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed
10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who shall make or introduce into the Philippine
Islands any stamps, dies, marks, or other
instruments or implemented intended to be used
in the commission of the offenses of
counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the
preceding sections of this chapter.
Appellant himself admits that the ordered the
questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he
is criminally liable for the making thereof. (Article
176, Revised Penal Code.) It also appears that
the said brand is an exact imitation of that
owned and used by the municipality of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, to brand its own large cattle and to
counterbrand large cattle belonging to its
inhabitants.
January 16, 2018 – Article 177 – USURPATION
OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
PEOPLE VS. HILVANO
G.R. No. L-8583. July 31, 1956
BENGZON, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hilvano, a public officer, be held
liable for the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions under Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
Francisco Hilvano, the councilor of the
municipality of Villareal, Samar, acted in place of
the Mayor of said municipality as he was
designated by the latter when the latter departed
for Manila on official business. Vice-Mayor Juan
Latorre then served written notices to the
Municipal Councilors, including Hilvano, that he
was assuming the duties of the absent Mayor.
When Hilvano refused invoking that he was
designated by the Mayor, Vice-Mayor sent a
telegram to the Executive Secretary informing
such controversy. The latter replied by letter,
that under sec. 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who

should discharge the duties of the Mayor during
the latter’s temporary absence. Vice-Mayor also
sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal who
also had the same view with the Executive
Secretary. Shown these official pronouncements,
Hilvano still refused to surrender the position
and held it for about a month; appointed some
policemen, solemnized marriages, and received
the salary for mayor.
Hilvano was charged with usurpation of
authority and official functions under Article 177
of the R.P.C. On his appeal, Hilvano contended
that he committed no usurpation of authority
because he was a public officer and that such
crime may only be committed by private
individuals.
HELD:
Yes, Hilvano, a public officer, was liable for the
crime of usurpation of authority and official
functions.
There was actually no reason to restrict the
operation of Article 177 to private individuals.
For one thing it applies to “any person”; and
where the law does not distinguish, the court
should not distinguish. Furthermore, contrary
to Hilvano’s assumption that Articles 238-241 of
the Revised Penal Code penalize all kinds of
usurpation of official functions by public officers,
said articles merely punish interference by
officers of one of the three departments of
government (legislative, executive and judicial)
with the functions of officials of another
department. Said articles do not cover
usurpation of one officer or employee of a given
department of the powers of another officer in the
same department.
There was no excuse for Hilvano. In the
beginning he might have pleaded good faith,
invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after
he had been shown the letter of the Executive
Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal,
he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to
the position.
PEOPLE VS. LIDRES
G.R. No. L-12495, July 26, 1960
BARRERA, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lidres was guilty of Usurpation
of Official Functions under Republic Act No. 10.
FACTS:
Joseta Diotay and Dionisio Lidres filed an
application as a substitute teacher of the second
grade class of Biasong Elementary School when
Echavez, the original teacher of said class, filed
and granted a maternity leave.
Diotay was appointed as a substitute teacher
and began teaching. However, before the said
appointment, Diotay was requested by the
supervising teacher to sign an agreement to take
over Echavez' position on a "50-50" basis, that is,
the period from January to March, 1954 would
be equally divided between her and Lidres.
51 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
On the strength of the agreement, Lidres, armed
with a prepared letter of resignation for the
signature of Diotay, appeared at the school and
asked Diotay to sign it but the former refused.
Despite the refusal of Diotay, Lidres took over her
class.
Accordingly, Lidres was charged with the crime
of usurpation of official function with deliberate
intent and without pretense of official position
under Republic Act No. 10
HELD:
No. Republic Act 10 was intended as an
emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal
situation created by the subversive activities of
seditious organizations at the time of its passage
in September, 1946. Hence, the elimination of
the element of pretense of official position
required under Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code, and the elevation of the penalty
from prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods to not less 2 years nor more
than 10 years. And since it was neither alleged
in the information nor proved during the trial
that Lidres was a member of said seditious
organizations engaged in subversive activities,
he could not be held liable or found guilty under
Republic Act. No. 10.
Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10
was an amendment to Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and not merely an implementation
thereof or an emergency measure as stated, the
subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 379
effective June 14, 1949, would constitute an
amendment thereof by restoring the element
of pretense of official position in the offense of
usurpation of official functions, originally
required by Article 177 prior to its amendment
by the latter Act. Under Republic Act No. 379
then, the law in force at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense by
Lidres, pretense of official position was an
essential element of the crime of usurpation of
official functions. But the information
specifically charges that Lidres committed the
offense "without pretense of official position".
Under circumstances, the facts alleged in the
information failed to constitute an offense.
Neither can defendant be convicted of
usurpation of authority, as distinguished from
usurpation of official functions, under the first
paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said
Republic Act No. 379, namely, that of
representing to be an officer, agent, or
representative of any department or agency of
the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, inasmuch as the information does
not charged the same.
RUZOL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:
ISSUE:
Whether Ruzol was guilty of Usurpation of
Official Functions.
FACTS:
Leovegildo R. Ruzol, the Municipal Mayor of
General Nakar, Quezon, was accused of

usurpation of official functions for issuing 221
Permits to Transport salvaged forest products
under the alleged “pretense of official position
and without being lawfully entitled to do so”,
since such authority, as ruled by the
Sandiganbayan, belonged solely to the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
HELD:
No. The DENR is not the sole government agency
vested with the authority to issue permits
relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest
products, considering that, pursuant to the
general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise
such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the
records, the permits to transport were meant to
complement and not to replace the Wood
Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect,
Ruzol required the issuance of the subject
permits under his authority as municipal mayor
and independently of the official functions
granted to the DENR. The records were likewise
bereft of any showing that Ruzol made
representations or false pretenses that said
permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least
as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR.
January 17, 2018 – Article 178 – USING
FICTITIOUS NAME AND CONCEALING TRUE
NAME
RIVERA, Marynit P.
US v. TO LEE PIU
G.R. No. 11522, September 26, 1916
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be convicted
of the crime of using a false name
FACTS:
The appellant To Lee Piu was charged with using
a false name. He came to the Philippine Islands
in 1911 and presented a section six certificate
wherein his name appears to be To Lee Piu.
Thereafter, he attached to an application for a
passport the name Toribio Jalijali. Said
application was accompanied by the affidavits of
two witnesses and by a baptismal certificate
showing that a person by that name was born in
the Philippine Islands in 1878. On the trial there
was no denial of the fact that appellant signed
the name Toribio Jalijali to the application for a
passport. According to the defendant, he was
born in the Philippine Islands as Toribio Jalijali.
He went to China at an early age. Feeling
doubtful as to his ability to prove his right to
reenter, he applied to the American consul at
Canton for a section six certificate. On such
application, he stated that his name was Toribio
Jalijali. Upon being told by the clerk of the
consulate that it was not necessary to put his
surname in such application, he wrote therein
the Christian name Toribio alone. The charge is
prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu is the
appellant's correct name and that the name
Toribio Jalijali is false.
HELD:
Yes. It is established beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant used the name of another
person for the purpose of deceiving Government
52 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
and, by that deception, to obtain a passport. He
came to the Philippine Islands as a Chinese
person traveling for curiosity and pleasure. He so
represented himself to the American consul at
Canton and, by that representation, obtained a
section six certificate. In his application for that
certificate he stated that he was a Chinese
person, and that his name was To Lee Piu .He
came to the Philippine Islands upon those
representations; and, by virtue of the certificate
obtained thereby, was permitted to enter the
country. Desiring to return to China, or travel in
other parts of the world and, at the same time,
be permitted to return to the Philippine Islands
at will, he sought to obtain a passport as a citizen
of the Philippine Islands under the sovereignty of
the United States. In order to accomplish his
purpose it was necessary for him to show to the
authorities of the Philippine Islands issuing
passport that he was in fact a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to a
passport. He thereupon took unto himself a
Filipino name, one not his own, and made his
application for a passport attaching to his
application the name Toribio Jalijali.
ONG HOCK LIAN alias JULIAN ONG v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-21197, May 19, 1966
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong Hock Lian is guilty of
violating the Anti-Alias Law
FACTS:
Ong Hock Lian alias Julian Ong, a citizen of the
Republic of China filed a petition for
naturalization pursuant to the Naturalization
Law. The Solicitor General appealed from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of which it
granted the petition for naturalization. Moreover,
appellant contends that the lower court erred in
in not holding that appellee uses an alias without
court authority and in violation of the Anti-Alias
Law.
HELD:
Yes. Under the law, except as a pseudonym for
literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was
christened or by which he has been known since
childhood, or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court (Section 1,
Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name
"Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias
"Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee
has been baptized with the latter name or that
he has been known by it since childhood, or that
the court has authorized the use thereof.
Appellee has therefore committed a violation of
the Anti-Alias Law.
January 18, 2017 – Article 179 – ILLEGAL
USE OF UNIFORMS OR INSIGNIA
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 18, 2018 – Article 180 – FALSE
TESTIMONY AGAINST A DEFENDANT
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO
MANEJA
G.R. NO. L-47684, JUNE 10, 1941
ISSUE:
From what date should the period of prescription
be computed for the crime of false testimony
under article 180 of the Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
This case was an appeal by Dionisio Maneja who
was accused of giving a false testimony in a
criminal case no. 1872 on December 16, 1933 as
the lower court held, or from the time the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid
case became final in December 1938.
HELD:
The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which final judgment is served
in the principal case. Considering that the
penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the
Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to
depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant in the principal case, the act of
testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an
actionable offense until the principal case is
finally decided. And before an act becomes a
punishable offense, it cannot possibly be
discovered as such by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents.
January 19, 2018 – Article 181 – FALSE
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE V. REYES
(C.A., 48 O.G. 1837)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the false testimony in favor of
defendant need not directly influence the
decision of acquittal.
FACTS:
The accused was the star witness in a
prosecution for robbery against Jemenia. Before
the trial, the accused executed an affidavit in
which he manifested that he was not interested
in the prosecution of the case and that he wanted
to give the accused “a chance to earn his living
wisely and in the honest way.” The fiscal refused
to ask for the dismissal of the case. When the
case was called for trial, the accused who was
asked to identify Jemenia, testified that he could
not remember anymore the face of Jemenia. After
further questions failed to elicit other data, the
case against Jemenia was dismissed by the
court, resulting in his acquittal.
HELD:
The contention of the defense that the acquittal
of Jemenia was due to the failure if the fiscal to
call other witnesses who could have properly
identified Jemenia, is irrelevant. It is not
necessary that the testimony given by the
witness should directly influence the decision of
acquittal, it being sufficient that it was given with
the intent to favor the accused.
U.S. V. SOLIMAN
36 PHIL. 5
53 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
ISSUE:
Whether or not Soliman is guilty of violating
Article 181 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Soliman, testifying in his own behalf in the
course of another criminal case in which he, with
several others, was charged with estafa, swore
falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He
testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in
evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which
was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his
guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and
that its execution had not been procured by the
police by the use of force, intimidation and
prolonged torture.
HELD:
It must not be forgotten that the right of an
accused person to testify in his own behalf is
secured to him, not that he may be enabled to
introduce false testimony into the record, but to
enable him to spread upon the record the truth
as to any matter within his knowledge which will
tend to establish his innocence.
January 21, 2018 – Article 182 – GIVING
FALSE TESTIMONY IN CIVIL CASES
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ISIDORO ARAGON
G.R. No. L-2709 December 28, 1905
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty of giving false
testimony in a civil case
FACTS:
This was an action for the crime of giving false
testimony. Isidoro Aragon is accused of the crime
of false testimony in a civil case.
On February 23 1904, E.H Warner filed a
complaint for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer against the tenants of his estate. The
accused was summoned as witness to appear
before the justice of the peace court of manila,
and after having been duly sworn, testified that
he does not remember or have no recollection of
forcible entry or detainer suits on the Pasay or
Pineda Estate prior to the four last years.
It was alleged that all his statements are
absolutely false, and are essential to the case at
issue as they were made. He well knew that at
that time there were brought in the justice of the
peace court at Pineda when he was filing that
office many actions for forcible entry and
detainer, instituted by Agustin J. Montilla
against tenants of the estate.He received an
order from the CFI asking for a list of forcible
entry and detainer actions and the accused
himself signed three lists which was forwarded to
the CFI, among other orders of the CFI to the
accused.
HELD:
During the examination of the defendant as a
witness in the cause in which it is alleged he gave
false testimony he was asked certain questions
with reference to the existence of certain facts.
His answers invariably were that he did not
remember, or that he had no recollection
concerning those facts. His answers invariably

were that he did not remember, or that he had
no recollection concerning those facts. The
prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the
facts with reference to which the defendant was
questioned, but failed to prove that the
statements of the defendant with reference to
those facts were false. The mere fact that the
defendant had had to do in the year 1896 with
certain facts and relations was not sufficient to
prove that he stated a falsehood when he stated
in December, 1904, that he had "no recollection
with reference to such facts or relations." The
evidence adduced during the trial fails, in our
judgment, to show that the defendant testified
falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in
the complaint.
In order that a defendant may be convicted
under article 321 of the Penal Code for giving
false testimony, the following facts must be
shown:
First. The testimony must be given in a civil
cause.
Second. The testimony must relate to the issues
presented in said cause.
Third. The testimony must be false.
Fourth. The false testimony must be given by the
defendant knowing the same to be false.
Fifth. Such testimony must be malicious and
given with an intent to affect the issues
presented in said cause.
The evidence adduced during the trial of this
case is not sufficient to show that the defendant
committed the crime charged in the complaint.
The judgment of the inferior court is therefore
reversed and the said cause is hereby ordered to
be dismissed.
ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC. vs. The
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 150, HON. ZEUS
ABROGAR, VIOLETA BAGUIO and LORELEI
IRA
[G.R. No. 137010. August 29, 2003]
ISSUE:
Whether Article 182 is violated
FACTS:
Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity)
filed with the City Prosecutor of Makati a
criminal complaint for False Testimony in a Civil
Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code
against herein private respondents Violeta
Baguio and Lorelei Ira.
It was alleged that on or about the 19th day of
February, 1996, the accused gave false
testimony upon a material fact in Civil Case No.
95-1542, relative to a complaint for Collection of
sum of money, torts and damages filed by Ark
Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Inc. for short) against
New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA, Inc.
for short). During the trial of said civil case, the
accused testified under oath that the claims of
ARK, Inc. supported by a statements of accounts
(Exhibit E to GG) sent to and received by
defendant-corporation NFMA, Inc. is baseless
and/or been paid, which testimony as accused
very well knew and ought to know, by reason of
accused's position as cashier, was false
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
inasmuch as the claim based on the statement
of accounts of ARK, Inc. are, in truth and in fact,
valid, legal and unpaid accounts of NFMA, Inc.
with ARK Travel Inc., herein represented by
private complainant MA. PAZ ALBERTO, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
HELD:
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a
Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal
Code, the following requisites must concur:
1. The testimony must be given in a civil case;
2. The testimony must relate to the issues
presented in the case;
3. The testimony is false;
4. The false testimony must be given by the
defendant knowing the same to be false; and
5. Such testimony must be malicious and given
with and intent to affect the issues presented in
the case.
There is no doubt that the first two requisites are
extant in this case. The records show that Ark
Travel filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money, torts and damages against New Filipino
Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMAI) and Angelina T.
Rivera with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(Branch 137). In said civil case, private
respondents were presented by NFMAI as
witnesses. They executed their respective sworn
statements and testified before the trial court
that NFMAI has no outstanding obligation with
Ark Travel as the same had been paid in full.
The existence of the last three requisites is quite
dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies of
private respondents is yet to be established. It is
noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal
complaints, the civil case filed by Ark Travel is
still pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove
the validity of its monetary claims and damages
against NFMAI. It is only after trial that the RTC
can assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony
and correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the
civil case is so intimately connected with the
subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the respondents in the criminal
cases. In other words, whether or not the
testimonies of private respondents in the civil
cases are false is a prejudicial question.
January 22, 2018 – Article 183 – FALSE
TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY
IN SOLEMN AFFIRMATION
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
US V. JURADO
(31 Phil 491)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jurado committed the crime of
perjury.
FACTS:
On July 9, 1913, the acting provincial fiscal of
Cebu, Dionisio Jacosalem, proceeded to
investigate the matter of the robbery of some tins
of opium, committed in the house of Francisco
Jurado by Alejandro Albao, a municipal
policeman, through threats and intimidation and
by availing himself of his office. This opium
belonged to Vicente Lizarraga who had taken it

to the said house to sell it to some residents of
the town. Lizarraga, the owner of the drug, stated
that Francisco Jurado was present, among
others, at the time of the robbery; but when
Jurado was called to testify as an eyewitness to
the crime he denied that he was at home on the
night of the robbery, as he was then in a
cinematograph with his family. He further
testified that he did not know either Vicente
Lizarraga or Alejandro Albao. Such was his
testimony given under oath before the provincial
fiscal Jacosalem, but in the proceedings brought
against Ciriaco Singson for robbery, commenced
on September 24,1913, Jurado, testifying as a
witness for the defense, stated under oath that
he had known Vicente Lizarraga since the month
of June, 1913, and that he was already
acquainted with Alejandro Albao on the date of
the crime.
In order that a witness, in testifying under oath
before a public official authorized to administer
same commit the crime of perjury and incur the
penalty prescribed by section 3 of Act No. 1697,
it is necessary and indispensable that he testify
to and.declare under oath with regard to some
material matter which he does not believe to be
true, or that such false testimony tend to
establish something which conflicts with the
truth of an essential or important fact which has
been proven by the evidence; because, if the false
testimony of the witness is not important,
essential, or material to the principal matter
under investigation, it can not properly be held
that the crime of perjury has been committed.
RULING:
No. The principal object of the investigation was
to find out whether Alejandro Albao had actually
been in Jurado's house where Lizarraga was that
night with several tins of opium for sale, and
whether on that occasion Albao, availing himself
of his office of municipal policeman, by
intimidation with a revolver, succeeded in
compelling Lizarraga to deliver to him the tins of
opium which Lizarraga was carrying and which
Albao seized, took away with him and
appropriated to himself, and which have not yet
been recovered.
Jurado, the owner of the house where the
robbery was committed, testified that he learned
from Isabelo Alburo that Lizarraga had in fact
been in the house with tins of opium for sale, but
that witness did not see them because he was
that night in the cinematograph with his family.
This testimony is not contradicted by any
evidence in the record. For lack of sufficient proof
of the falsity of that statement by the owner of
the house, the defendant Jurado, for it was not
proven that it was false and, as he certainly was
in his own house on the said night of the robbery,
it cannot be held that, in testifying as he did, he
perjured himself.
January 23, 2018 – Article 184 – OFFERING
FALSE TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
SORIANO VS. CABAIS
( GR NO. 157175, June 21, 2007)
ISSUE:
55 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Whether or not perjury was committed under
article 184?
FACTS:
Hilario P. Soriano, petitioner, is the President of
the Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM). On
the other hand, Zenaida A. Cabais, respondent,
is the comptroller designated by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to oversee the bank’s
operations.
Eventually, the RBSM was closed and placed
under receivership by the BSP. Thereupon,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review. In the course of the
proceedings, respondent executed two affidavits
stating that:
13. About a week before RBSM declared a "bank
holiday" on January 4, 2000, RBSM on
December 27, 1999 and December 29, 1999,
paid Forcecollect Professional Solution, Inc. and
Surecollect Professional Solution, Inc., entities
owned/controlled by Mr. Soriano and other
RBSM officers (Annexes "14" and "15") P5.300
million and P5.750 million (Annexes "16" and
"17"), respectively, without any supporting
documents, as payment of 25% collection fee;2 x
x x (Affidavit dated February 17, 2000)
8. RBSM paid Manager Check Nos. 0000040071
and 0000040079 in cash on December 27 and
29, 1999, respectively, as evidenced by the
attached Debit Advances of even dates (Annexes
"1-B" and "2-B" respectively).3 x x x (Affidavit
dated March 22, 2000)
On April 6, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila a complaint for
perjury defined and penalized by Articles 183
and 184 of the Revised Penal Code against
respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent
committed perjury by narrating false statements
in her affidavits.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
The fact of issuance and payment by RBSM of
said checks to Forcecollect and Surecollect is
furthermore bolstered by the Certifications
issued by RBSM Accountant, Narciso Adriano (p.
39), RBSM Branch Accountant for Plaridel,
Carmina Capule (p. 40), and PDIC’s Assisting
Deputy Receiver, Mauricia Manzanares (p. 41).
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that the
averments of respondent in her subject Affidavits
are true. Nevertheless, granting for the sake of
argument that the statements of respondent in
her Affidavits are false, still, there exists no
reasonable ground to indict her under Articles
183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code. It bears
stressing that one element of perjury is a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood. Such
element is absent in the instant case.
Respondent’s contention that said Manager’s
Checks were issued and paid by RBSM to
Forcecollect and Surecollect, are duly supported
by RBSM records which she has perused and
examined in her capacity as duly designated BSP
Comptroller for RBSM. Thus, respondent
believes in good faith that what she mentioned in
her Affidavits are true. It must be noted that good

faith is a defense in perjury (People of the
Philippines v. Abaya, 74 Phil. 59). For the same
reasons, respondent cannot likewise be
prosecuted under Article 184 of the Revised
Penal Code.
January 24, 2018 – Article 185 – solicit any gift or promise as a consideration for
MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
VICENTE DIAZ VS. RUPERTO KAPUNAN
DECEMBER 8, 1923
ISSUE:
Whether or not attorney Kapunan Violate Article
542 of the Penal Code(Now Article 185 of the
Revised Penal Code).
FACTS:
Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona
formed a partnership and entered into extensive
business transactions in the Province of Leyte.
The capital of the partnership was P380,000.
Unfortunately, however, the business failed to
prosper, with the result that on liquidation, it
was found to have suffered a loss of P67,000.
When Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up
their affairs, they eventually formulated a
document of sale and mortgage in which
Mendezona recognized a debt in favor of Diaz in
the sum of P80,000 and an additional sum of
P10,000 owing to Diaz, laid upon the hacienda
"Mapuyo," and to be paid within the term of one
year. When the year had expired Mendezona was
not to be found and his family was unable to
meet the payment. There followed the usual
proceedings for foreclosure and sale, which, after
considerable delay, resulted in the hacienda's
being offered for sale at public auction.
At the time fixed for the sale, December 23, 1922,
there appeared Vicente Diaz, accompanied by his
lawyer Emilio Benitez, and Attorney Ruperto
Kapunan. Luis Velarde, the deputy sheriff of
Leyte, is authority for the statement that
Kapunan told him that he, Kapunan, was ready
to bid on the property up to P16,000 in order to
assist the Mendezona family which was in
financial straits. At any rate, the bidding was
opened by Kapunan offering P12,000 for the
property and with Diaz and Kapunan raising the
bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500. There the
bids stopped on account of Diaz and Kapunan
entering into the agreement, of decisive
importance, which we next quote in full:
We, Vicente Diaz and Ruperto Kapunan, both
being the bidders at the auction held for the sale
of the properties of Secundino Mendezona, do
hereby agreed that Don Ruperto Kapunan
should withdraw his bid and refrain from bidding
at the said auction as he does hereby withdraw
his bid, and in consideration thereof, the said Mr.
Diaz offers him a premium of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) which, out of consideration to
said Don Vicente Diaz, Mr. Kapunan accepts and
has, for this reason, refrained from bidding in
competition with said Mr. Diaz.
Following the termination of the sheriff's sale,
Diaz on December 26, 1922, gave Kapunan P500
of the P1,000 mentioned in the above quoted
document. Diaz further followed the usual
procedure to take over the property of
Mendezona pursuant to his bid of P12,500,
56 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
which covered the amount of the mortgage with
its accumulated interest and with the judicial
expenses.
RULING:
YES. Article 542 punishes "any person who shall
agreeing to refrain from taking part in any public
auction." The crime is consummated by the mere
act of soliciting a gift or promise for the purpose
of abstaining from taking part in the auction. Not
permitting our minds to be confused by the
varied explanations of Diaz and Kapunan, the
document formulated by them and hereinbefore
quoted, demonstrates that Kapunan, on the
promise of Diaz to pay P1,000, refrained from
further participation in the sale of the property
of Mendezona, which is exactly the situation
covered by article 542 of the Penal Code.
Public policy discountenances combinations or
agreements on the part of bidders at execution
sales, the objects and effects of which are to stifle
competition. The courts will consider an
agreement between a judgment creditor and one
claiming an interest in the thing about to be sold
under an execution, that neither shall bid
against the other, as void, unless all parties
concerned know of the arrangement and consent
thereto. Execution sales should be open to free
and full competition, in order to secure the
maximum benefit for the debtor. Article 542 of
the Penal Code is, therefore, a wise provision
even though rarely invoked, and should be used
to discourage the stifling of bids at judicial sales.
PATERNO OUANO
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANCISCO
ECHAVEZ
GR No. L-40203 August 21, 1990
ISSUE:
Whether Ouano committed machinations in
public auction punishable under the Article 185
of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel
of land registered under RFC (DBP). Said
property was offered for bidding for the second
time because the first bidding was nullified due
to Ouano’s protest. It appears that prior to the
second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally
agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and
that if it was accepted, they would divide the
property in proportion to their adjoining
properties. To ensure success of their enterprise,
they also agreed to induce the only other party
known to be interested in the property-a group
headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from
presenting a bid. They broached the matter to
Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to
withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the
sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as
reimbursement for its expenses.
RULING:
YES. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial
Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had
promised to share in the property in question as
a consideration for Ouano's refraining from
taking part in the public auction, and they had

attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in
causing another bidder to stay away from the
auction. in order to cause reduction of the price
of the property auctioned In so doing, they
committed the felony of machinations in public
auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of
the Revised Penal Code
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is
a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only
one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land
in consequence of which Echavez eventually
acquired it. The agreement therefore being
criminal in character, the parties not only have
no action against each other but are both liable
to prosecution and the things and price of their
agreement subject to disposal according to the
provisions of the criminal code. This, in
accordance with the so-called pari delicto
principle set out in the Civil Code.
January 25, 2018 – Article 186 – MONOPOLIES
AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF
TRADE
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE UNITED STATES v. CANDIDO
FULGUERAS
G.R. No. 2176
April 18, 1905
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fulgueras committed the acts as
mentioned under article 186 of the revised penal
code on monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade
FACTS:
In the months of March to July, 1904, Fulgueras
attributed to himself a supernatural power
pretending to hold a commission from a powerful
chief in Manila. He went about distributing
papers and proclamations to the people of
Oroquieta, Province of Cagayan de Misamis,
spreading subversive and fanatical ideas, and
with orders from his alleged chief to lower the
prices of needful commodities and to reform the
customs otherwise they would be under the
penalty of being visited with flood and calamities.
By these machinations and deceits the defendant
succeeded in deceiving ignorant people and
causing them to provide themselves with
instruments of measure larger than they
formerly had and different from the regular size
and also succeeded in making them lower the
prices of commodities of everyday life, all with
violation of law.
HELD:
Yes. The court held in this case that this
spreading of false rumors or making use of any
other artifice to restrain free competition in the
market constitutes the acts as mentioned under
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.
The court found all these charges well proven
and sentenced the defendant to the penalty of six
months’ arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 5,000
pesetas, in accordance with the provisions of
article 544 of the Penal Code (now Article 186 of
the RPC).
57 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
ST
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
January 26, 2018 – Article 187–
IMPORTATION AND DISPOSITION OF
FALSELY MARKED ARTICLES OR
MECHANDISE MADE OF GOLD, SILVER,
OTHER PRECIOUS METALS OR THEIR
ALLOYS
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 26, 2018 – Article 188 –
INFRINGEMENT - RA 8293 (SUBSTITUTED
FOR ART. 188 OF THE RPC)
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
GSELL v. YAP-JUE
G.R. No. 4720, Jan. 19, 1909
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yap-Jue infringed on the patent
of Gsell.
FACTS:
Gsell obtained a patent for manufacturing canes
and umbrellas with a curved handle by means of
a lamp or blowpipe fed with mineral oil or
petroleum. Yap-Jue made similar products using
the same process but instead of using “a lamp or
blowpipe fed with mineral oil or petroleum,” he
used a lamp fed with alcohol.
HELD:
Yes, he did. The Court held that alcohol is an
equivalent or substitute for mineral oil or
petroleum, in connection with blast lamps or
blowpipes. It is a well-known fact at the time
when the patent was issued to Gsell. The use of
a blast lamp or blowpipe fed with petroleum or
mineral oil, rather than one fed with alcohol, is
an unessential part of the patented process the
use of which was prohibited by the court in a
prior proceeding.
The Doctrine of “Mechanical Equivalents”
provides that the inventor of an ordinary
machine is protected against all mere formal
alterations and against the substitution of mere
mechanical equivalents. It protects the patentee
from colorable invasions of his patent under the
guise of substitution of some part of his
invention by some well-known mechanical
equivalent.
Human ingenuity would be taxed beyond its
powers in preparing a grant of a patent so
comprehensive in its terms, "as to include within
the express terms of its detailed description every
possible alternative of form, size, shape,
material, location, color, weight, etc., of every
wheel, rod, bolt, nut, screw, plate, and other
component parts of an invention."
ASIA BREWERY, INC. V. CA AND SAN
MIGUEL CORP
GR NO. 104533 JULY 5, 1993
FIRST ISSUE:
Does ABI's BEER PALE PILSEN label or "design"
infringe upon SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN
WITH RECTANGULAR MALT AND HOPS
DESIGN?
HELD:

NO. On the other hand, the dominant feature of
ABI's trademark is the name: BEER PALE
PILSEN, with the word "Beer" written in large
amber letters, larger than any of the letters found
in the SMC label.
The trial court perceptively observed that the
word "BEER" does not appear in SMC's
trademark, just as the words "SAN MIGUEL" do
not appear in ABI's trademark. Hence, there is
absolutely no similarity in the dominant features
of both trademarks.
Neither in sound, spelling or appearance can
BEER PALE PILSEN be said to be confusingly
similar to SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No one
who purchases BEER PALE PILSEN can possibly
be deceived that it is SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN.
No evidence whatsoever was presented by SMC
proving otherwise
Besides the dissimilarity in their names, the
following other dissimilarities in the trade dress
or appearance of the competing products
abound:
(1) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle has a
slender tapered neck. The BEER PALE PILSEN
bottle has a fat, bulging neck.
(2) The words "pale pilsen" on SMC's label are
printed in bold and laced letters along a diagonal
band, whereas the words "pale pilsen" on ABI's
bottle are half the size and printed in slender
block letters on a straight horizontal band. (See
Exhibit "8-a".).
(3) The names of the manufacturers are
prominently printed on their respective bottles.
SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN is "Bottled by the
San Miguel Brewery, Philippines," whereas
BEER PALE PILSEN is "Especially brewed and
bottled by Asia Brewery Incorporated,
Philippines."
(4) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle cap is
stamped with a coat of arms and the words "San
Miguel Brewery Philippines" encircling the same.
The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle cap is stamped
with the name "BEER" in the center, surrounded
by the words "Asia Brewery Incorporated
Philippines."
(5) On the back of ABI's bottle is printed in big,
bold letters, under a row of flower buds and
leaves, its copyrighted slogan:
"BEER NA BEER!"
Whereas SMC's bottle carries no slogan.
(6) The back of the SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN
bottle carries the SMC logo, whereas the BEER
PALE PILSEN bottle has no logo.
(7) Finally, there is a substantial price difference
between BEER PALE PILSEN (currently at P4.25
per bottle) and SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN
(currently at P7.00 per bottle). One who pays
only P4.25 for a bottle of beer cannot expect to
receive San Miguel Pale Pilsen from the
storekeeper or bartender.
Second Issue: whether ABI is passing off its
BEER PALE PILSEN as SMC's SAN MIGUEL
PALE PILSEN.
58 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
HELD:
NO. The amber color is a functional feature of the
beer bottle. As pointed out by ABI, all bottled
beer produced in the Philippines is contained
and sold in amber-colored bottles because amber
is the most effective color in preventing
transmission of light and provides the maximum
protection to beer.
As was ruled in California Crushed Fruit
Corporation vs. Taylor B. and Candy Co., 38 F2d
885, a merchant cannot be enjoined from using
a type or color of bottle where the same has the
useful purpose of protecting the contents from
the deleterious effects of light rays. That the ABI
bottle has a 320 ml. capacity is not due to a
desire to imitate SMC's bottle because that bottle
capacity is the standard prescribed under
Metrication Circular No. 778, dated 4 December
1979, of the Department of Trade, Metric System
Board. With regard to the white label of both beer
bottles, ABI explained that it used the color white
for its label because white presents the strongest
contrast to the amber color of ABI's bottle; it is
also the most economical to use on labels, and
the easiest to "bake" in the furnace.
No one can have a monopoly of the color amber
for bottles, nor of white for labels, nor of the
rectangular shape which is the usual
configuration of labels. Needless to say, the
shape of the bottle and of the label is
unimportant. What is all important is the name
of the product written on the label of the bottle
for that is how one beer may be distinguished
form the others.
BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPEADIE GMBH AND
CO. KG V. PHILIPPINE SHOE EXPO
MARKETING CORP.
GR. NO. 194307 NOV. 20, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject marks should be
allowed registration in the name of Birkenstock.
FACTS:
Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp. (PSEMC)
was the registered owner of the trademark
“Birkenstock and Device” since October 21, 1993
in the Philippines.
Birkenstock Orthopeadie GMBH and Co.
KG(Birkenstock), a German company, and has
been using “Birkenstock” since 1774 by its
inventor, Johan Birkenstock. In 1994,
Birkenstock applied for trademark registration of
“Birkenstock” before the Intellectual Property
Office (IPO) in the Philippines. This was opposed
by PSEMC. During the pendency of the
registration proceedings, PSEMC failed to file the
required 10th Year Declaration of Actual Use
(10th Year DAU) for “Birkenstock and Device” on
or before October 21, 2004. Failure to file the
10th Year DAU constitutes abandonment of the
trademark and will result in the automatic
cancellation of the certificate of registration.
The Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) found that the
mark, “Birkenstock”, of Birkenstock was not
popular in the Philippines and that PSEMC did
not lose their right over the mark for non-filing of

the 10th Year DAU due to their continued use of
the product. The decision of the BLA was
reversed by the Director General of the IPO (DG-
IPO) citing that PSEMC’s failure to file the DAU.
The CA reversed the decision of the DG-IPO and
adopted the BLA’s ruling.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It
affirmed the decision of DG-IPO that non-filing of
the DAU is an automatic cancellation of the
registration and constitutes abandonment of the
mark.
The SC also appreciated the evidence provided by
Birkenstock, though photocopies , that
“Birkenstock” is a popular mark in the world and
thus entitled to protection under Philippine
Laws. It emphasized that registration of a
trademark, by itself, is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.1âwphi1 If the applicant is not the
owner of the trademark, he has no right to apply
for its registration. Registration merely creates a
prima facie presumption of the validity of the
registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the
trademark, and of the exclusive right to the use
thereof. Such presumptionis rebuttable and
must give way to evidence to the contrary. It is
not the application or registration of a trademark
that vests ownership, but it is the ownership of a
trademark that confers the right to register the
same. A trademark is an industrial property over
which its owner is entitled to property rights
which cannot be appropriated by unscrupulous
entities that, in one way or another, happen to
register such trademark ahead of its true and
lawful owner. The presumption of ownership
accorded to a registrant must then necessarily
yield to superior evidence of actual and real
ownership of a trademark.
The Court also finds that the registration of
PSEMC of the mark was in bad faith since it is
very remote that two persons did coin the same
or identical marks. To come up with a highly
distinct and uncommon mark previously
appropriated by another, for use in the same line
of business, and without any plausible
explanation, is incredible. The field from which a
person may select a trademark is practically
unlimited. As in all other cases of colorable
imitations, the unanswered riddle is why, of the
millions of terms and combinations of letters and
designs available, [respondent] had to come up
with a mark identical or so closely similar to the
[petitioner’s] if there was no intent to take
advantage of the goodwill generated by the
Birkenstock mark. Being on the same line of
business, it is highly probable that the PSEMC
knew of the existence of “BIRKENSTOCK” and its
use by the Birkenstock, before PSEMC
appropriated the same mark and had it
registered in its name.
January 27, 2018 – Article 189 –
INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN,
FALSE DESCRIPTION, FRAUDULENT
REGISTRATION.
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
COFFEE PARTNERS, INC. V. SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE ROASTERY, INC.
59 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
G.R. NO. 169504 MARCH 3, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners use of the trademark SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE constitutes infringement
of respondent’s trade name SAN FRANCISCO
COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC.
FACTS:
Respondent San Francisco Coffee Roastery, Inc.
is a local corporation engaged in wholesale and
retail sale of coffee. It registered its business
name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY,
INC. with the Department of Trade and Industry
in June 1995. On the other hand, petitioner
Coffee Partners, Inc. is a local corporation
engaged in the business of establishing and
maintaining coffee shops in the country. It
registered its name on January 2001 under a
franchise agreement with Coffee Partners Ltd., a
business entity established under British Virgin
Islands to use CPL’s designed trademarks like
SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE. In 1998, respondent
formed a joint venture agreement with Boyd
Coffee USA and later on embarked in setting up
coffee shops in malls and commercial
establishments around Metro Manila. In June
2001, respondent discovered that petitioner was
about to open a coffee shop under the name SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE in Libis, Quezon City.
According to respondent, petitioners shop
caused confusion in the minds of the public as it
bore a similar name and it also engaged in the
business of selling coffee. Respondent sent a
letter to petitioner demanding that the latter stop
using the name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE.
Respondent also filed a complaint with the
Bureau of Legal Affairs-Intellectual Property
Office (BLA-IPO) for infringement and/or unfair
competition with claims for damages.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE
trademark is clear infringement of respondent’s
SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC.
trade name. The descriptive words San Francisco
Coffee are precisely the dominant features of
respondent’s trade name. Petitioner and
respondent are engaged in the same business of
selling coffee. Whether wholesale or retail. The
likelihood of confusion is higher in cases where
the business of one corporation is the same or
substantially the same as that of another
corporation. In this case, the consuming public
will likely be confused as to the source of the
coffee being sold at petitioner’s coffee shops.
Respondent has acquired an exclusive right to
use of the trade name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE
& ROASTERY, INC. since the registration of the
business name with the DTI in 1995. Thus,
respondent’s use of its trade name from then on
must be free from any infringement by similarity.
Of course, this does not mean that respondent
has exclusive use of the geographic word SAN
FRANCISCO or generic word COFFEE.
Geographic or generic words are not, per se,
subject to exclusive appropriation. It is only the
combination of the words SAN FRANCISCO
COFFEE, which is respondent’s trade name in its
coffee business, that is protected against
infringement on matters related to the coffee
business to avoid confusing or deceiving the
public.

DIAZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
LEVI STRAUSS INC.
G.R. NO. 180677 FEBRUARY 18, 2013
ISSUE:
WON there was infringement of trademarks
committed by Diaz in this case.
FACTS:
Levi Strauss and Company (Levi’s), a foreign
corporation had been engaged in the apparel
business. It is the owner of trademarks and
designs of Levi’s jeans like LEVI’S 501, the
arcuate design, the two-horse brand, the two-
horse patch, the two-horse patch with pattern
arcuate, and the composite tab arcuate. After
receiving information that Diaz was selling
counterfeit LEVI’S 501 jeans in his tailoring
shops in Almanza and Talon, Las Piñas City,
Levi’s Philippines hired a private investigation
group to verify the information. Surveillance and
the purchase of jeans from the tailoring shops of
Diaz established that the jeans bought from the
tailoring shops of Diaz were counterfeit or
imitations of LEVI’S 501. Levi’s Philippines then
sought the assistance of the NBI for purposes of
applying for a search warrant against Diaz to be
served at his tailoring shops. NBI agents
searched the tailoring shops of Diaz and seized
several fake LEVI’S 501 jeans from them. Levi’s
Philippines claimed that it did not authorize the
making and selling of the seized jeans; that each
of the jeans were mere imitations of genuine
LEVI’S 501 jeans by each of them bearing the
registered trademarks, like the arcuate design,
the tab, and the leather patch; and that the
seized jeans could be mistaken for original
LEVI’S 501 jeans due to the placement of the
arcuate, tab, and two-horse leather patch.
In his defense, the accused interposed that he
did not manufacture Levi’s jeans, and that he
used the label "LS Jeans Tailoring" in the jeans
that he made and sold; that the label "LS Jeans
Tailoring" was registered with the Intellectual
Property Office; that his shops received clothes
for sewing or repair; that his shops offered made-
to-order jeans, whose styles or designs were done
in accordance with instructions of the
customers; that since the time his shops began
operating in 1992, he had received no notice or
warning regarding his operations; that the jeans
he produced were easily recognizable because
the label "LS Jeans Tailoring," and the names of
the customers were placed inside the pockets,
and each of the jeans had an "LSJT" red tab; that
"LS" stood for "Latest Style;" and that the leather
patch on his jeans had two buffaloes, not two
horses. The RTC found him guilty of the said
crime.
HELD:
No. Diaz used the trademark "LS JEANS
TAILORING" for the jeans he produced and sold
in his tailoring shops. His trademark was
visually and aurally different from the trademark
"LEVI STRAUSS & CO" appearing on the patch of
original jeans under the trademark LEVI’S 501.
The word "LS" could not be confused as a
derivative from "LEVI STRAUSS" by virtue of the
"LS" being connected to the word "TAILORING",
thereby openly suggesting that the jeans bearing
the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" came or
60 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay
CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
were bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz, not
from the malls or boutiques selling original
LEVI’S 501 jeans to the consuming public.
The prosecution also alleged that the accused
copied the "two horse design" of the petitioner-
private complainant but the evidence will show
that there was no such design in the seized
jeans. Instead, what is shown is "buffalo design."
Again, a horse and a buffalo are two different
animals which an ordinary customer can easily
distinguish.
The prosecution further alleged that the red tab
was copied by the accused. However, evidence
will show that the red tab used by the private
complainant indicates the word "LEVI’S" while
that of the accused indicates the letters "LSJT"
which means LS JEANS TAILORING. Again, even
an ordinary customer can distinguish the word
LEVI’S from the letters LSJT.
DY V. PHILIPS ELECTRONICS
G.R. NO. 186088 MARCH 22, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether the registration of the trademark of
PHILITES will defraud and cause unfair
competition and infringement of trademark to
PHILIPS.
FACTS:
On 12 April 2000, petitioner PHILITES filed a
trademark application covering its fluorescent
bulb, incandescent light, starter and ballast.
After publication, respondent Philips Electronics
filed a Verified Notice of Opposition alleging that
the registration of such will cause to mislead the
public as to the origin, nature, quality, and
characteristic of the goods on which it is affixed
and it is tantamount to fraud as it seeks to
register and obtain legal protection for an
identical or confusingly similar mark that clearly
infringes upon the established rights of PHILIPS
over its registered and internationally well-
known mark.
HELD:
Yes. Applying the dominancy test in the instant
case, it shows the uncanny resemblance or
confusing similarity between the trademark
applied for by respondent with that of petitioner's
registered trademark. An examination of the
trademarks shows that their dominant or
prevalent feature is the five-letter "PHILI",
"PHILIPS" for petitioner, and "PHILITES" for
respondent. The marks are confusingly similar
with each other such that an ordinary purchaser
can conclude an association or relation between
the marks. The consuming public does not have
the luxury of time to ruminate the phonetic
sounds of the trademarks, to find out which one
has a short or long vowel sound. At bottom, the
letters "PHILI'' visually catch the attention of the
consuming public and the use of respondent's
trademark will likely deceive or cause confusion.
Most importantly, both trademarks are used in
the sale of the same goods, which are light bulbs.
Applying the holistic test, entails a consideration
of the entirety of the marks as applied to the
products, including the labels and packaging, in
determining confusing similarity. A comparison
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

between petitioner's registered trademark

"PHILIPS'' as used in the wrapper or packaging
of its light bulbs and that of respondent's applied
for trademark "PHILITES" as depicted in the
container or actual wrapper/packaging of the
latter's light bulbs will readily show that there is
a strong similitude and likeness between the two
trademarks that will likely cause deception or
confusion to the purchasing public. The fact that
the parties' wrapper or packaging reflects
negligible differences considering the use of a
slightly different font and hue of the yellow is of
no moment because taken in their entirety,
respondent's trademark "PHILITES" will likely
cause confusion or deception to the ordinary
purchaser with a modicum of intelligence.

61 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW

Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

TITLE FIVE – CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM
AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
January 28, 2018 – RA 6425 – CRIMES
RELATED TO OPIUM AND OTHER
PROHIBITED DRUGS
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
US VS AH SING
36 PHIL 978
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Ah Sing is liable to illegal
importation of Opium.
FACTS:
Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun
Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in the port
of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium
in Saigon, brought them on board and had them
in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans
of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler
of the steamer's engine by authorities who made
a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu.
The defendant confessed that he was the owner
of the opium and that he had purchased it in
Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his
purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that
it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug.
RULING:
Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly
hold that any person who unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under
this person's control on a vessel which has come
direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of
the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense
proves otherwise.
note:
Possession of Opium on board a vessel is
punishable when Philippine port is its
destination.
When a foreign steamer anchored in any of our
ports after arriving direct from a foreign country,
mere possession of Opium therein is punishable.
PEOPLE VS. MARTIN SIMON
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of accused Simon
for the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
was proper.
FACTS:
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The
confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8
grams, when subjected to laboratory
examination, were found positive for marijuana.
Simon denied the accusation against him,
claiming that on the day of question, he was
picked up by the police at their house while
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watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher
so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he
was handcuffed instead. When they finally
reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some
papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in
the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro.
He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him.
He denied knowledge of the marked money or the
4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted
that the marked money came from the pocket of
Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited
blood was because of the blows he suffered at the
hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of
Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that
she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed
that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s
peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or
serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on
his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand
pesos and to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
RULING:
No. To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited
drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. To sell means to give,
whether for money or any other material
consideration. It must, therefore, be established
beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and
delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves
to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in
exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After careful review, the Court held that there
were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and
there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana
confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of
selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.
However, there is an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua
by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is
less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum
of the penalty where the marijuana involved is
750 grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited
and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20.
To harmonize such conflicting provisions in
order to give effect to the whole law, the court
hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where
the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion
temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is
also concordant with the fundamental rule in
criminal law that all doubts should be construed
in a manner favorable to the accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as
now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and
effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the
maximum of said sentence, the court have
applied the provisions of the amended Section 20
of said law to arrive at prision correccional and

Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided
for in a special law, is now in effect punished by
and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively,
to determine the minimum, the court applied
first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs
that “in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense.”
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be
begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence
within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty
next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range have fixed through the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised
Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court
may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of
arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of
prision correccional.
JULIUS CACAO Y PRIETO VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. NO. 180870, 610 SCRA 636, JANUARY
22, 2010]
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a proper chain of
custody in the instant case.
FACTS:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the
evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of
the Intelligence and Operation Section of the
Laoag City Police Station received a telephone
call from an informant about a drug session
being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel
located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.
Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together
with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to
the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of
the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady
clerk manning the information counter of
Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged
drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.
The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was
about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they
could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy
to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked
at the door and a woman, later identified as
Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable
the police officers to look inside.
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner
seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while
Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting
petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner
and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug
paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters
and plastic sachets. PO2 Mangapit frisked
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petitioner and recovered from him one plastic
sachet containing shabu.
After informing petitioner and Joseph of their
constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police
Station and turned them over to the police officer
on duty while the confiscated items were turned
over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.
The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory
conducted an examination on the specimen
recovered from appellant and his companion
which tested positive for shabu.
On October 15, 2004, two separate informations
were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit and
Cacao indicting them for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City.
Both RTC and CA convicted petitioner.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court and the CA are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any
indication that the trial court overlooked certain
facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case,
the Supreme Court will not hesitate to review the
same. In this case, the Court finds it imperative
to review the factual findings of the trial court
because of certain inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on
material points.
A. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal
witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered
the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.
In this case, PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and
PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified
that it was the latter who brought the item
confiscated from petitioner to the evidence
custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta).
However, the foregoing assertions are totally at
odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence
custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit
who delivered the item allegedly recovered from
Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically
declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong)
from whom he received the plastic sachet of
shabu.
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court,
The Court is of the considered view that this
contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor
but a discrepancy touching on substantial and
significant matter which could well affect the
credibility of the witnesses.
B. The prosecution failed to satisfactorily
establish that the item presented in court was
the same item confiscated from Cacao.
The patent inconsistency between the
testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one
hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other
hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the
plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the
same item that was allegedly seized and
confiscated from petitioner. If the version of
Mangapit is to be believed, then the most
lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to

identify the seized item with certainty. For sure
Mangapit, who is the most competent person to
make the proper identification being the officer
who confiscated the item from Cacao, never
actually identified the same.
The only other person who could have identified
the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, the Court
cannot lend credence to his supposed
identification, the same not being also positive,
certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no
showing that this witness actually saw the shabu
at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner.
In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the
identification since from all indications, he has
never been in possession of it.
Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta,
it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It
must be noted that Balolong was never presented
to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence
to prove that what was turned over to the
evidence custodian by Balolong and later
presented in court was the same substance
recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish
the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s
case.
Note:
Essential in a drug-related case is that the
identity of the dangerous drug be established
beyond reasonable doubt Since the dangerous
drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment
of conviction, it behooves upon the prosecution
to establish and prove with certainty that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same item recovered
from his possession.
The failure to establish the chain of custody is
fatal to the prosecution’s case. There can be no
crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug
when nagging doubts persist on whether the
item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited
drug.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself override the
constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent unless overcome by strong,
clear and compelling evidence.
PEOPLE VS PAGADUAN
(GR NO 179029, 12 AUGUST 2010)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the integrity of the evidence was
preserved.
FACTS:
Buy-bust operation was conducted by PO3
Almarez, SPO1 Balido and Captain de Vera.
Ruper Pagaduan was arrested and plastic sachet
of what appears to be shabu was marked,
request for laboratory examination was done the
same day. The plastic sachet was turned over to
PNP Crime Laboratory two days after. He was
found guilty by the court and the same was
affirmed by CA
Pagaduan contents among others that the
prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of
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custody in the handling of the seized drug. He
claims that there was no evidence to show when
the marking were done.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court acquitted Pagaduan. The
prosecution failed to show that the illegal drug
presented in the court is the same illegal drug
actually recovered from the Pagaduan. Strict
compliance with the prescribed procedure is
required because of the illegal drug’s unique
characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily open to tampering
alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise.
Resolution:
We recognize that the strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may
not always be possible under field conditions; the
police operates under varied conditions, and
cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the
procedures in the handling of confiscated
evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of the
implementing rules provides that non-
compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily
fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures
in the handling of confiscated evidence may still
have some lapses, as in the present case. These
lapses, however, must be recognized and
explained in terms of their justifiable grounds,
and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved
In the present case, the prosecution did not
bother to offer any explanation to justify the
failure of the police to conduct the required
physical inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs. The apprehending team failed to show
why an inventory and photograph of the seized
evidence had not been made either in the place
of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police
station (as required by the Implementing Rules
in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize
that for the saving clause to apply, it is important
that the prosecution explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
value of the seized evidence had been preserved.
In other words, the justifiable ground for
noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The
court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.
The second link in the chain of custody is its
turnover from the apprehending team to the
police station. PO3 Almarez testified that the
appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station
after his arrest. However, he failed to identify the
person who had control and possession of the
seized drug at the time of its transportation to
the police station. In the absence of clear
evidence, we cannot presume that PO3 Almarez,
as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet
to the exclusion of others – during its transfer
from the place of arrest and confiscation to the
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

police station. The prosecution likewise failed to

present evidence pertaining to the identity of the
duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet
containing shabu from the buy-bust team. This
is particularly significant since the seized
specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory only after two days. It was not,
therefore, clear who had temporary custody of
the seized items during this significant
intervening period of time. Although the records
show that the request for laboratory examination
of the seized plastic sachet was prepared by
Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that
he was the official who received the marked
plastic sachet from the buy-bust team.

As for the subsequent links in the chain of

custody, the records show that the seized
specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the
PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003,
where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later
examined by PSI Quintero. However, the person
from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized
illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory
was not identified. As earlier discussed, the
identity of the duty desk officer who received the
shabu, as well as the person who had temporary
custody of the seized items for two days, had not
been established.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the
glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a
reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated
from the appellant were the same drugs that
were brought to the crime laboratory for
chemical analysis, and eventually offered in
court as evidence. In the absence of concrete
evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold,
the body of the crime the corpus delicti has not
been adequately proven. In effect, the
prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of
the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt on
the appellants criminal liability.

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TITLE SIX – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC
MORALS
January 30, 2018 – Article 195 – ACTS
PUNISHABLE IN GAMBLING AND BETTING
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M
U.S. v. JAIME FILART AND HILARIO
SINGSON
G.R. No. L-10263 March 13, 1915
Moreland, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants conducted lottery
FACTS:
Filart and Singson took part in a lottery or raffle
of an automobile, which was the property of
Filart. The winner was determined in the
following manner: The numbers composing the
450, each written on a separate piece of paper,
were placed together in a box and thoroughly
mixed. A boy was selected who placed his hand
in the box and drew out a number. This he
delivered to a person who unfolded the paper and
read the number in a loud voice while Filart, with
a list of the 450 numbers referred to, struck from
the list the number corresponding to that drawn
from the box. This was repeated until all of the
numbers were drawn from the box and stricken
from the list. It was agreed that the last number
drawn from the box should be the winning
number and that the owner of that number
should win the automobile.
Both defendants were charged for violating the
following provisions of the law:
Section 7 of Act No. 1757 provides, as follows:
The playing at and the conducting of any game
of monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy
. . . is hereby prohibited, and any person taking
any part therein . . . shall be punished as
provided in section 3 hereof. . . . .
This section also provides that:
It shall be no defense to any criminal action
under this section that the defendant acted as
the agent of another or that he had no interest in
the result.
HELD:
Yes. The facts of record place this case within the
definition generally given of a lottery. A lottery is
said to be “a species of gaming, which may be
defined as a scheme for the distribution of prizes
by chance among persons who have paid, or
agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the
chance to obtain a prize.” It was held in the case
of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, 117 Ga., 599,
that three elements enter into a lottery scheme:
(1) A consideration; (2) chance: (3) a prize, or
some advantage or inequality in amount or value
which is in the nature of prize.
Doctrine:
A lottery is defined as a scheme for the
distribution of prizes by chance among persons
who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable
consideration for the chance to obtain a prize. Its
elements are: (1) a consideration; (2) chance: (3)
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a prize, or some advantage or inequality in
amount or value which is in the nature of prize.
MARTIN VILLAMOR and VICTOR BONAOBRA
VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200396 MARCH 22, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ conviction for
violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under
Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator,
controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) for
Bonaobra, should be upheld.
FACTS:
Villamor was charged as a collectior with
violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting
and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game
locally known as "lotteng” and possessing a list
of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone,
and cash.Another Information was filed in the
same court charging Bonaobra as an operator or
manager with violation of the same law on the
same day and place. The prosecution testified
that PD Penaflor received a call from an
informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers
game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes,
specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. They
proceeded to the latter's residence and upon
arrival, they saw petitioners in the act of
counting bets, described by the Bicol term
“revisar,” which means collating and examining
numbers placed in “papelitos,” which are slips of
paper containing bet numbers, and counting
money bets.When they entered the gate of fee
compound, they introduced themselves as police
officers and confiscated the items found on the
table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00
in different denominations, the “papelitos,” a
calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen.
Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco
Camacho where they were investigated for illegal
gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against
the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. The version of the defense asserted
that the evidence were inadmissible because the
police officers had no search warrant when they
barged into Barnoabra's compound and
therefore the conviction should not be
upheld.The RTC gave credence to the testimonies
of the arresting officers and held that petitioners
were caught in flagrante delicto committing an
illegal numbers game locally known as “lotteng”
a variant of Last Two. CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. Hence, this petition.
RULING:
No. The Court finds that the right of the
petitioners against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated by the arresting officers
when they barged into Bonaobra’s compound
without a valid warrant of arrest or a search
warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule
requiring a warrant for a valid search and
seizure, none applies in the case at bar.
Consequently, the evidence obtained by the
police officers is inadmissible against the
petitioners, the same having been obtained in
violation of the said right.After a judicious review
of the records of the case, the Court finds that
there was no valid warrantless arrest on
petitioners. It was not properly established that
petitioners had just committed, or were actually

committing, or attempting to commit a crime and
that said act or acts were done in the presence of
the arresting officers. In this case, the
prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts
that constitute the offense of illegal gambling as
a collector or an agent.The prosecution merely
relied on the alleged illegal gambling
paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the
house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt
acts that constitute the offense.All told, the
evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra
compound is inadmissible in evidence since it
was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, Since the alleged
illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits
petitioners.
"EL DEBATE," INC., VS
JOSE TOPACIO, Director of Posts
G.R. No. L-19982 December 29, 1922
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guessing contest of El Debate
a "lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme
depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance"
within the meaning of the law.
FACTS:
El Debate, a newspaper of the City of Manila,
published a full page announcement regarding
two contests.The first contest is for the award of
prizes for the nearest approximate guesses as to
the total number of votes that will be cast for any
of the winning candidates for Carnival Queen
either in the provinces or in Manila. The second
contest is for the award for the nearest
approximate guesses as to the total number of
votes that the Queen elect will receive for the
Carnival queenship. Any subscriber to El Debate
may participate in these two contests by paying
in advance at least the amount of the
subscription of a quarter.But payment is to be
strictly in advance and the estimate or guess
must be explained.The Director of Posts,
following the advice of the Attorney-General,
refused to admit the issues of El Debate,
containing the advertisement, to the mails, for
the reason that it fell within the provisions of the
Administrative Code concerning non-mailable
matter. Not satisfied with the ruling of the
Director of Posts, the publishers of El Debate
have had recourse to these original proceedings
in mandamus to settle the controversy between
the newspaper and the Government. El Debate
argued that it was a guessing game and not
lottery thus Director of Posts must grant the
issues containing such advertisements.
RULING:
Yes. It is similar. "Neither of these contests is a
"legitimate business enterprise." In each
thousands invest small sums in the hope and
expectation that luck will enable them to win
large returns. A comparatively small percentage
of the participants will realize their expectations,
and thousands will get nothing. They are, in
effect, lotteries, under the guise of 'guessing
contests'. The Meeting, therefore, the issues in
the case, we rule that the Director of Posts acted
advisedly in refusing the use of the mails for the
issue of El Debate which contained the
announcement of its guessing contest, and that
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said contests is a lottery, or gift enterprise
depending in part upon lot or chance, within the
meaning of the Postal Law.The general rule is
that guessing competitions or contests are
lotteries within the statutes prohibiting lotteries.
Indeed, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for
the most ingenious and subtle mind to devise
any scheme or plan short of a gratuitous
distribution of property, which will not be held to
be in violation of the Gambling Law, and
repugnant to the Postal law. It is for the courts
to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance,
in order to unmask the real element and the
pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking
to prevent.The purpose of El Debate in devising
its advertising scheme was to augment its
circulation and thus to increase the number of
newspaper readers in the Philippines — which is
commendable. But the advertisement carries
along with it a lottery scheme — which is not
commendable.Open the door of chance but a
little, for one scheme, however ingeniously and
meritoriously conceived, to pass through, and
soon the whole country will be flooded with
lotteries.
January 31, 2018 – Article 196 –
IMPORTATION, SALE AND POSSESSION OF
LOTTERY TICKETS OR ADVERTISEMENTS
ALAMEDA, Manuel F.
THE UNITED STATES vs. EMILIO SANTOS
REYES, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-7260 August 21, 1912
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant violated Sec.3, Act
No. 1523.
FACTS:
These defendants were charged with a violation
of an Section 3, Act No. 1523, to prohibit the
importation, sale, giving away, use and
possession of lottery tickets and lottery
advertising matter. The defendant, Emilio S.
Reyes, was by occupation a printer; that during
the months of March, April, May and June, 1911,
he printed a large number of lottery tickets,
alleged to be lottery tickets of the Royal Lottery
of Colombo; that a number of said lottery tickets
were found in his private residence and others in
his place of business; that the tickets which the
defendant Reyes had delivered to the defendant
Dominga Trinidad were later found in the
possession of the said Dominga Trinidad and the
other codefendant, Teodoro Fidel. The attorney
for the appellant maintains in his brief that said
Act No. 1523 did not provide a punishment for
the possession of lottery tickets of the Philippine
Islands or of lottery tickets made in the
Philippine Islands. He further argues that the
tickets were printed by the defendant Reyes for
one Miguel Soler and that he had nothing to do
with said lottery tickets, except to print them
under his contract with Soler. Soler was not
called as a witness during the trial of the cause.
The defendant Reyes admitted that he had
printed the tickets; that he was in possession of
the same; that a part of them were found hidden
in his house and that he had given to his
codefendant, Dominga Trinidad, a number of
said tickets for a certain sum of money.
HELD:

In view of the fact that the defendant, Emilio
Santos Reyes, gave to his co-defendant, Dominga
Trinidad, certain of said lottery tickets, and in
view of the fact that he had hidden away in his
private residence certain of said lottery tickets,
we are of the opinion that his possession of the
same has not been satisfactorily explained, and
that his possession of said lottery tickets is in
violation of said section 3.
U.S. VS MARCELO JOSE
GR NO. 11566 AUG 10, 1916
ISSUE:
Did the defendants violate Section 3 of Act No.
1523?
FACTS:
The mercantile firm of Marcelo Jose & Co.,
composed of Marcelo Jose and Tan Bo, was
located at No. 200 Calle Harris, Olongapo. Both
members of this firm were arrested on the night
of May 16, 1915, and placed in confinement.
About 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the
following day, May the 17th, the store was
searched by the authorities and a one-tenth part
of a Macao lottery ticket was found therein. At
the time this search was made neither of the
owners of the store was present. Tan Bo, the
managing partner, testified that this lottery
ticket was sent to him by a friend in Amoy and
that when he received it he put it in an envelope
and placed it in the drawer and that his partner,
Marcelo Jose, had never seen it. The appellant,
Marcelo Jose, testified that, although he is a
member of the mercantile firm of Marcelo Jose &
Co., he knew nothing of the existence of the
lottery ticket until he saw it in the court of the
justice of the peace, and that he lived in Manila
and went to Olongapo only when the business
required his presence. Section 3 of Act No. 1523
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person
to sell, give away, use or have possession of, with
intent to sell, give away or use, any lottery ticket.
HELD:
If the defendant can establish that he did not
know of the existence of the lottery ticket within
his premises, the presumption is destroyed and
the defendant must be acquitted.It is a general
rule that, when ay of the prohibited drugs,
enumerated in section 31 of the Opium Law, are
found upon the premises occupied by a person
accused of using the same, there can be no
conviction under said section unless it
affirmatively appears that he knowingly had the
prohibited article on the premises, or that the
animus possidendi in fact existed together with
his alleged apparent possession or control of
such article. But direct proof of facts of this
nature, in a criminal proceeding, is rarely
forthcoming, except in cases of confession, and
their existence may and usually must be inferred
from the varying circumstances in each
particular case. When a full, satisfactory, and
sufficient explanation of the presence of a
prohibited drug on the premises at the time of
the seizure is given, which is entirely consistent
with the allegation of the defendant to the effect
that he did not have the same in his possession,
there can be no conviction and the accused must
be acquitted.
The testimony of both this appellant and Tan Bo
68 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
stands uncontradicted and the Government did
not attempt to impeach the credibility of these
witnesses.
February 1, 2018 – Article 197 – BETTING IN
SPORTS CONTESTS
ALILIAN, Enna B.
[NO CASES FOUND]
February 1, 2018 – Article 198 – ILLEGAL
BETTING ON HORSE RACES
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
[NO CASES FOUND]
February 2, 2018 – Article 199 – ILLEGAL
COCKFIGHTING
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
MARIANO AYOSO, TEODORICO
VALENZUELA, ALFONSO DESOYO and
FELIPE DE LA CRUZ.
G.R. No. L-18762 April 27, 1967
Ponente: MAKALINTAL, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance regarding
cockfighting is valid.
FACTS:
On July 21, 1960, accused-appellants MARIANO
AYOSO, ET AL., were charged with the crime of
ILLEGAL COCKFIGHTING before the Municipal
Court of Bogo. That on or about 2:45 o'clock in
the afternoon, more or less of July 21, 1960 at
the cockpit of Tan Sim, Poblacion Bogo, Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there, willfully, feloniously, unlawfully
and knowingly with unlawful purpose, indulge
themselves in illegal cockfighting commonly
known as "Tari-Tari", wherein money P25 is used
as bet on a day, Thursday, which is not
permitted by law though the place is a licensed
cockpit. This act is a gross violation of Article 199
of the Revised Penal Code, Section 1.
The accused filed a motion to quash, claiming
that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
constitute an offense because cockfighting is
authorized in Bogo on Thursdays under the
provisions of Ordinance No. 18, Series of 1960,
enacted and approved by the Municipal Council
of Bogo.
HELD:
NO. The municipal ordinance is invalid.
Thus, the issue boils down to whether Republic
Act No. 938, as amended, gives local government,
blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any
time and for as long as said governments may
wish it. Upon mature deliberation, we hold that
the answer must be in the negative.
To begin with, repeals and even amendments be
implication are not favored, whereas an
affirmative answer would entail a vital
amendment, amounting for all practical
purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286
of the Revised Administrative Code.

Secondly, grants of power to local governments
are to be constructed strictly, and doubts in the
interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor
of the national government and against the
political subdivisions concerned.
Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledge that
cockfighting is one of the most wide-spread vices
of our population, and that the government has
always shown a grave concern over the need of
effectively curbing its evil effects. The theory of
petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic
of the Philippines has completely reversed its
position and chosen instead, to place the matter
entirely at the discretion of local governments.
We should not, and cannot adopt, such promise
except upon a clear and unequivocal expression
of the will of Congress, which insofar as said
premise is concerned is not manifest from the
language used in Republic Act No. 938, as
amended.
Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are
regulated separately be our laws. Thus, Section
2243 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
empowers municipal councils "to regulate
cockpits". Yet, the authority of said councils over
cockfighting, is found in sections 2285 and 2286
of said Code, not in said section 2243 (i).
Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes, not illegal "cockpits" but "illegal
cockfighting." What is more, participation in
cockfights "on a day other than those permitted
by law" is dealt with in said article separately
from participation in cockfights "at a place other
than a licensed cockpit".
So too, the authority of local governments, under
Republic Act No. 938, as amended, "to regulate
... the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of ... cockpits" does not necessarily
connote the power to regulate "cockfighting",
except insofar as the same must take place in a
duly licensed "cockpit". Again, the first and
second proviso in Section 1 of said Act,
regulating the distance of cockpits and places of
amusements therein mentioned from 'any public
building, schools, hospitals and churches' and
the third proviso of the same section, prohibiting
the admission of minors to some of those places
of amusement, suggest that the authority
conferred in said provision may include the
power to determine the location of cockpits,
conditions to be observed for the protection of
persons therein, the number of cockpits that
may be established in each municipality and or
by each operator, the minimum age of the
individual who may be admitted therein, and
other matters of similar nature — as
distinguished from the days on which
cockfighting shall be held and the frequency
thereof.
In short, we are of the opinion that the city
ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein
authorizing cockfighting on Thursdays, are
invalid.
February 3, 2018 – Article 200 – GRAVE
SCANDAL
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
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US vs. SAMANIEGO
G.R. No. 5115. November 29, 1909.
MORELAND, J. :
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed Grave
Scandal.
FACTS:
That on and for many weeks prior to the 27th day
of November, 1907, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Juana Benedicto de
Perez was a married woman, and that said
Manuel Samaniego knew that she was married
and united in the bonds of matrimony with and
was the legitimate consort of Jose Perez
Siguenza; that during the period of time above
expressed the said Manuel Samaniego and
Juana Benedicto de Perez, willfully, illegally, and
criminally and scandalously, without having any
matrimonial tie between them, habitually
appeared together in public places and
frequented together places of recreation,
suspicious places, vacant houses, and houses of
bad repute, in the daytime as well as in the
nighttime; and lewdly and indecently went to bed
together in the house of the husband of the said
Juana Benedicto de Perez during the late hours
of the night, dressed only in their night clothes,
and indecorously, indecently, and immodestly
embraced each other and caressed each other in
the presence of the family, children, and servants
of the said husband of Juana Benedicto de Perez;
all with public scandal and with scandal to the
community, and with shame and humiliation to
the husband and family of the said Juana
Benedicto de Perez.
RULING:
NO. The acts complained of lack many of the
elements essential to bring them within the
purview of the article of the Penal Code invoked
by the prosecution. Every act that was in
anywise public fails entirely of those qualities
which offend modesty and good morals by
"grievous scandal or enormity." The occurrence
at the residence on the night of the 6th of
November did not have that publicity which is
required by the article of the Penal Code referred
to. (U.S. v. Catajay, 6 Phil. Rep., 398; supreme
court of Spain, April 13, 1885, December 14,
1903, and January 27, 1908; Viada, vol. 3, p.
130.)
The evidence introduced on the reopening adds
nothing to the case already made by the
prosecution. The case was reopened for a
particular purpose and the evidence to be
introduced, if any, was restricted to a particular
condition, viz, the "publicity or nonpublicity of
the acts charged in the complaint." On the
reopening, evidence was presented by the
prosecution in relation to the alleged occurrence
between the defendants in Plaza Palacio.
Concerning this incident testimony had already
been given on the trial by the witness Rafael
Perez. Testimony was also given on the reopening
by the same witness as to an occurrence between
the defendants one morning in the Botanical
Garden. In relation to this same event he had
already given his testimony on the trial. His
evidence as to these two events given on the
reopening of the case is wholly inconsistent with,

if not absolutely contradictory of, his testimony
in relation to the same events given on the trial.
Such testimony can have no weight.
The other testimony given on the reopening by
this witness and the testimony of the witness
Amadeo Pacheco can have no bearing or weight
in the decision of this case because such
testimony relates to acts and relations between
the defendants which are not "charged in the
complaint" and concerning which no evidence
whatever had been offered on the trial.
In the judgment of this court the evidence fails to
show the defendants guilty of the crime charged.
US vs. CATAJAY
G.R. No. 2785. August 23, 1906.
CARSON, J. :
ISSUE:
WON the accused committed Grave Scandal.
FACTS:
The trial court found be accused guilty of the
crime of public scandal in violation of the
provisions of article 441 of Penal Code. PUBLIC
SANDAL. — Article 441 of the Penal Code
construed. Held, That it is an essential element
of the crime defined and penalized therein that
the acts complained of resulted in a grave public
scandal. It appears, however, that the acts
complained of were committed at night, in a
private house, and at a time when no one was
present except the accused, the mistress of the
house, and one servant, and we are of opinion
that these circumstances do not constitute that
degree of publicity which is an essential element
of the crime defined and penalized in article 441
of the Penal Code. The correct construction of
this article well stated by Viada in his
commentary on article 457 of the Penal Code of
Spain, which exactly corresponds with the article
in question:
"Constitute the crime provided all those acts
contrary to decency and good manners that, for
their publicity, have been subject to public
scandal for people who have accidentally
witnessed. Although the article does not say it, it
is evident that it is a precise condition for this
crime to exist that offense to modesty and good
habits is public: if the offense did not have this
character, it is clear that it would not produce
the serious scandal nor the transcendence
required by the article, and therefore, no longer
subject to the sanction of the same, but the most
benign of No. 2 of Article 586, which punishes as
inmates a simple offense against public order,
with the arrest penalty of one to ten days and a
fine of 5 to 50 pesetas, to those who with any
kind of acts offended the moral and good custom
without committing a crime. When the act, then,
offensive to modesty is publicly committed,
should be assessed as a crime, since this same
publicity is what produces the serious scandal
that is punished: in another case, the provision
cited Article 586 is the one that should apply."
(Viada comments to the Penal Code of 1870,
fourth edition, volume 3, page 130.) *translated
via translate.google.com
RULING:
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YES. There can be no doubt that the accused
committed the offense defined and penalized in
No. 2 of the article 571 of the Penal Code, which
corresponds with the above-mentioned number
2 of article 586 of the Penal Code of Spain, and
provides that a penalty of from one of ten days’
arrest and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas shall
be imposed upon those who, by exhibiting prints
or engravings, or by means of other acts, shall
offend against good morals and custom without
committing a crime.
Since this is a lesser offense that the one charged
in the complaint, and is included therein, we find
him guilt of a violation of the provisions of the
said article and, reversing the sentence of the
trial court, we impose upon the accused, Jose
Catajay, the penalty of the ten days’
imprisonment (arresto), and the payment of a
fine of 125 pesetas, and the costs of the trial in
both instances. After the expiration of ten days
from the date of final judgment let the cause be
remanded to the lower court for proper
procedure. So ordered.
February 4, 2018 – Article 201 – IMMORAL
DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND
EXHIBITIONS, AND INDECENT SHOWS
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
FERNANDO V. CA
G.R. NO. 159751 DEC. 6, 2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernando was guilty of selling
and distributing obscene materials.
FACTS:
Gaudencio E. Fernando owned Gaudencio E.
Fernando Music Fair and Rudy Estorninos was
its attendant. Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group in the
National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR), acting
on reports that the store sold and distributed
pornographic materials, raided the store by
virtue of a search warrant. The raid yielded
twenty five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different
magazines.
Fernando contends that his Mayor’s permit was
expired and thus not the lawful owner of the
store.
HELD:
Yes, he is guilty of Art. 201.
In order to be liable under Art. 201, it must be
proven that (a) the materials, publication, picture
or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender
sold, exhibited, published or gave away such
materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated
materials are obscene must be proved.
The following guidelines as to what is obscene
was adopted by the Court:
(1) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest;
(2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and

(3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
The Supreme Court noted the reasoning of the
trial court as to the obscene nature of one of the
VHS tapes confiscated: “The tape exhibited
indecent and immoral scenes and acts. Her
dancing movements excited the sexual instinct of
her male audience. The motive may be innocent,
but the performance was revolting and shocking
to good minds.”
Furthermore, Art. 201 does not require that a
person be caught in the act of selling, giving away
or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for
as long as the said materials are offered for sale,
displayed or exhibited to the public.
PEOPLE V. KOTTINGER
G.R. NO. L-20569 OCTOBER 29, 1923
ISSUE:
Whether or not the photos of naked native
women in the post cards were obscene.
FACTS:
Kottinger was manager of Camera Supply Co
where several post cards were confiscated due to
their alleged obscenity. The post cards showed
photos of naked native women from non-
Christian areas in the Philippines.
HELD:
No, they do not. The tests used by the Court as
to whether a material is considered obscene were
the following: 1) whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall; and 2) Whether it shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men.
The Court ruled that the pictures merely depict
persons as they actually live, without attempted
presentation of persons in unusual postures or
dress. That pictures portraying the inhabitants
of the country in native dress and as they appear
and can be seen in the regions in which they live,
are not obscene or indecent. Dr. Beyer, a
professor from University of the Philippines also
testified that that none of the pictures
represented poses which he had not observed on
various occasions, and that the costumes worn
by the people in the pictures are the true
costumes regularly worn by them.
February 5, 2018 – Article 202 – VAGRANCY
AND PROSTITUTES
DAHIROC, Janice L.
PEOPLE VS. SITON, ET AL.,
GR 169364, 18 SEPT. 2009
ISSUE:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the
equal protection clause?
FACTS:
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate
Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant
to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate
Informations. Accused were found wandering
71 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi
Streets of Davao City, without any visible means
to support herself nor lawful and justifiable
purpose. Respondents filed separate Motions to
Quash on the ground that Art. 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overboard.
The municipal trial court denied the motions,
directed respondents to file their respective
counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on
vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s
police power (or the power of promoting public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property) and justified by the Latin
maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” (which
calls for the subordination of individual benefit
to the interest of the greater number).
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the RTC challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and
claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal
protection clause. The RTC granted the petition
of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202
(2) unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the
equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor
or unemployed, but for conducting themselves
under such circumstances as to endanger the
public peace or cause alarm and apprehension
in the community. Being poor or unemployed is
not a license or a justification to act indecently
or to engage in immoral conduct.
U.S. VS HART, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 8848 NOVEMBER 21, 1913
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad have
committed the act of Vagrancy.
FACTS:
Hart, Miller and Natividad were accused of
Gambling and Vagrancy where they all appealed.
Hart had ran gambling games in his saloon ever
night one in Angeles and one in the Bario of
Tacondo. He also operated a hotel Angeles in
which he did a business. He was also a proprietor
He raised hogs which he sold to the Army
garrison at Camp Stotsenberg. He was also
authorized to sell several hundered hectarcs of
land owned by one Carrillo in Tacondo. With the
power of an attorney, he furnished the same
property and paid for the 1st public school in
Tacondo.
Miller had the reputation of being a gambler and
that he was fined for gambling and was seen in
houses of prostitution. Miller was discharged
from the Army last year. He had the position of
Sergeant and received a rating as "excellent" on
being discharged. He had a partnership with one
Buckered and invested P1000. The business
netted him P300 per month.
Natividad was also a gambler. During his visits
to saloons, he sometimes acted as a banker. His
occupancy is that of a tailor which was sufficient
enough to support his family.
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

HELD:
Defendants are AQUITTED
Act No. 519 states that:
"(1) Every person having no apparent means of
subsistence, who had the physical ability to
work, and who neglects to apply himself or
herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling housed, or tramping or straying
through the country without visible means of
support; (3) every person known to be a
pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his
own confession or by his having been convicted
of either said offenses, and having no visible or
lawful means of support when found loitering
about any gambling house, cockpit, or in any
outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or
dissolute person of associate of known thieves or
ladrones who wanders about the country at
unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle person
who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel,
or place other than such as is kept for lodging
purposed, without the permission of the owner
or a person entitled to the possession thereof; (6)
every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and
about houses of ill fame; every common
prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant."

It is insisted by the Attorney General (AG) that

visible means of support, which are evident in
the occupations of the accused, would not be a
bar to the conviction under any one of the last
four (4) clauses of the said act. The AG contends
that "visible means of support" only applies to
those "staying through the country".
The courts decided that the mere missing of the
punctuation cannot hold bar the argument of the
AG, since the intention of the legislators was to
prevent "loitering". It was stated that loitering
was idling or wasting one's time. The time spent
in saloons drum shops, and gambling houses is
anything but that.

The three defendants were earning a living by

legitimate means in a degree of comfort higher
than the average. Their sole offense was
gambling, which the legislature has yet to make
a subject of penal law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
For these reasons, the defendants are
ACQUITTED, with the costs de oficio.

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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

TITLE SEVEN – CRIMES COMMITTED BY A
PUBLIC OFFICERS
February 6, 2018 – Article 203 – WHO ARE
PUBLIC OFFICERS
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-2971 April 20, 1951
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maniego is considered a public
officer.
FACTS:
Feliciano Maniego was employed as a laborer to
work as the person in charge of delivering
summons and subpoenas in the Municipal Court
of Manila. Nevertheless, Maniego was permitted
to write motions for dismissal of prescribed
traffic cases against offenders without counsel,
and to submit them to the court for action,
without passing through the regular clerk.
Sometime in 1947, a certain Felix Rabia was
subpoenaed in connection with a traffic
violation. The said crime has prescribed without
Rabia being prosecuted but then Maniego
informed Rabia that he is penalized with a P15
fine; that Maniego can fix this if Rabia can pay
him P10. Maniego pocketed the P10.00 and for
this he was later charged for violating Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code which provides in part:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an
act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received by such officer, personally or
through the mediation of another, shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and fine of not
less than the value to the penalty corresponding
to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have
been committed.
Maniego assails the charge. He avers, among
others, that he is not a public officer as he was
merely hired as an ordinary government
employee.
HELD:
Yes. Maniego is considered a public officer under
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code which
includes all persons “who, by direct provision of
law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Philippine
Government, or shall perform in said
government or any of its branches, public duties
as an employee, agent or subordinate official or
any rank or class.” That definition is quite
comprehensive, embracing as it does, every
public servant from the highest to the lowest. For
the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the
standard distinction in the law of public officers
between “officer” and “employee”. Further, even
assuming that Article 203 can’t be applied,
although Maniego was originally engaged as a
laborer, he was temporarily performing public
functions when he was permitted to draft
motions. And as in the performance thereof he
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
accepted, even solicited, monetary reward, he
certainly guilty as charged. The receipt of bribe
money is just as pernicious when committed by
temporary employees as when committed by
permanent officials.
AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA,
Petitioner,
vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
[FOURTH DIVISION] and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185224 July 29, 2015
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners, as public officers,
were correctly charged with the crime of
malversation.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an anonymous
complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann
Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
(Ombudsman) for participating in the scheme of
questionable grants and donations to fictitious
entities using provincial funds. As a result of this
complaint, the Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province.
Among the irregularities discovered by the
Special Audit Team was a ₱20,000.00 financial
assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a
cooperative whose members were mostly
government personnel or relatives of the officials
of Sarangani Province.
The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report
to the Ombudsman which, in turn, conducted a
preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, charged the petitioner, Vice-
Governor Felipe Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad,
Maria Camanay, and Teodorico Diaz with
malversation of public funds by falsification of
public documents defined and penalized under
Article 217 in relation to Article 171(2) and
Article48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
before the Sandiganbayan in an Information
which reads:
That on January 24, 2002 or prior or subsequent
thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-ranking public
officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province
of Sarangani, Maria D. Camanay, Provincial
Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board
Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, Executive
Assistant III, all accountable public officials of
the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by
reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and
confederating with Violita Bahilidad, private
individual, the public officers, while committing
the offense in relation to office, taking advantage
of their respective positions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert
and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine
Currency, in public funds under their custody,
and for which they are accountable, by falsifying
or causing to be falsified the corresponding
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822
and its supporting documents, making it appear

that financial assistance had been sought by
Women In Progress, Malungon, Sarangani,
represented by its President, Amelia Carmela C.
Zoleta, when in truth and in fact, the accused
knew fully well that no financial assistance had
been requested by the said group and her
association, nor did Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta
and her association receive the aforementioned
amount, thereby facilitating the release of the
above-mentioned public funds in the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00)through encashment by the accused
at Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No.
36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the
name of the Violeta Bahilidad, which amount
they subsequently misappropriated to their
personal use and benefit and despite demand,
the said accused failed to return the said amount
to the damage and prejudice of the government
and the public interest of the aforesaid sum.
HELD:
Malversation may be committed by appropriating
public funds or property; by taking or
misappropriating the same; by consenting, or
through abandonment or negligence, by
permitting any other person to take such public
funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property.
The elements common to all acts of malversation
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are the following: (a) that the offender
be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office; (c) that those funds or
property were public funds or property for which
he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take
them. All these elements have been established
by the prosecution.
First, it is undisputed that all the accused,
except Bahilidad, are all public officers. A public
officer is defined in the Revised Penal Code as
"any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or class. Constantino was the
Vice-Governor of Sarangani Province, while the
petitioner, Camanay, and Diaz were occupying
the positions of Executive Assistant (at the Office
of the Vice-Governor), Provincial Accountant,
and Provincial Board Member, respectively.
Second, the funds misappropriated are public in
character, as they were funds belonging to the
Province of Sarangani.
Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay
were accountable public officers. Under the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an
accountable public officer is a public officer who,
by reason of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property. The Local Government Code
expanded this definition with regard to local
government officials.
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Finally, Vice-Governor Constantino and
Camanay appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take the
public funds when they signed Disbursement
Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822. The term
voucher, when used in connection with
disbursement of money, implies some
instrument that shows on what account or by
what authority a particular payment has been
made, or that services have been performed
which entitle the party to whom it is issued to
payment. Corollarily, when an authorized person
approves a disbursement voucher, he certifies to
the correctness of the entries therein, among
others: that the expenses incurred were
necessary and lawful, the supporting documents
are complete, and the availability of cash
therefor. He also attests that the person who
performed the services or delivered the supplies,
materials, or equipment is entitled to payment.
February 7, 2018 – Article 204 – KNOWINGLY
RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
QUINTIN STA. MARIA vs. HON. ALBERTO
UBAY
A.M. No. 595-CFI December 11, 1978
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge may be held
liable under Art 204 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Quintin R. Sta Maria, attorney-in-fact of
Valeriana Sta Maria, filed with the Supreme
Court a letter-complaint against Judge Q. Ubay
for violating the provisions of Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code when he knowingly rendered
an unjust judgment by promulgating a decision
contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court
in previous related proceedings, violating section
11 of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, falsifying
his decision in order to make it appear that he
rendered the same within the statutory three-
month period and putting ever obstacle to the
approval of their Record on appeal in spite of lack
of opposition duly filed on time. The letter-
complaints were indorsed by the Assistant to the
Judicial Consultant to the respondent Judge for
comment. In another letter complaint, Atty. Paz
Palanca, branch clerk of Clerk of respondent
judge in his sala, was also charged with infidelity
in the custody of judicial records and, with
putting all obstacles to the approval of their
Record on Appeal. Sta. Maria states that the
respondent Judge in awarding to the plaintiffs (in
Civil Case C-2052) in toto what they prayed for
in their complaint and amended complaint did so
in bad faith and with full knowledge that said
plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
HELD:
No. the Court reiterates the ruled that in order
that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust in the
sense that it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence and the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do
an injustice. The rule requires that the judgment

should be unjust for being contrary to law and
for not being supported by the evidence. In the
case at bar, to determine whether or not the
decision of the respondent Judge in Civil Case C-
2052 constitutes an unjust judgment would
involve more than a mere cursory reading of the
decision itself or its comparison with this Court's
decisions invoked by the complainant. To delve
into the different factors bearing on the issues
raised in Civil Case C-2052 considered by the
respondent Judge in arriving at his conclusions
set forth in the decision in question for purposes
of ascertaining the factual, legal and
jurisprudential bases of the said decision, would
be tantamount to pre-empting the Court of
Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the case,
considering that the same is pending before it.
Indeed, this Court stated in Gahol vs. Hon.
Riodique that "only after the appellate court
holds in a final judgment that a trial judge's
alleged errors were committed deliberately and in
bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering
an unjust decision be levelled against a trial
judge." For, through an appeal, an aggrieved
party can always point out, for rectification by
the appellate court, the errors in the alleged
unjust judgment affecting him. The rule also
requires that the judgment should be rendered
by the judge with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice. In the case at bar, the
complainant failed to show any unmistakable
indication that bad faith motivated the alleged
unjust actuations of the respondent judge in
Civil Case C-2052. Absent, thus, any positive
evidence on record that the respondent Judge
rendered the judgment in question with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice, the compliant must fall.
BAN HUA U. FLORES V OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND ATTY. ENRIQUE L.
FLORES, JR.
GR NO. 136769, SEPT. 17, 2002
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint against private
respondent for violation of Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
FACTS:
A complaint against the Ban Hua Flores for
accounting and turnover of corporate funds of
UBS Marketing was instituted by Johnny K. H.
Uy with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Petitioner moved for the dismissal
of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
which was denied. Likewise denied was the
appeal filed with the SEC en banc. A judgment
was rendered in favor of the complainant.
Petitioner Flores and company then appealed to
the SEC en banc which reversed the decision
except the order of accounting. A criminal
complaint was then filed by the petitioner
alleging that Hearing Officer Enrique Flores
rendered an unjust judgment under Art. 204 of
the RPC and violating Sec. 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which was
dismissed by the Office of Ombudsman for
insufficiency of evidence ratiocinating that there
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was no showing that the decision was rendered
maliciously and deliberately to do an injustice to
the complainant and that the error was
committed in good faith pursuant to the principle
of regularity in the performance of official
functions. It was well settled that a judicial
officer, when required to exercise his judgment
or discretion is not criminally liable for any error
which he commits provided he acts in good faith.
Even though the complainant had been
inconvenienced because of the decision of the
respondent, such inconvenience did not amount
to causing undue injury under Sec. 3 of RA 3019,
not only because there is no showing of evident
bad faith or inexcusable negligence but because
the decision appealed to the SEC en banc was
immediately corrected, hence said decision did
not become final and executory. Petitioner moved
for the reconsideration which was likewise
denied. Hence this petition where petitioner
contends that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint, alleging that the decision was not
made in good faith since the case did not involve
a complex question of law but was a plain
violation of simple rules of procedure and that
petitioner and her family suffered undue injury
as result of the decision, making respondent
liable under Sec. 3 of RA 3019.
HELD:
No. There is grave abuse of discretion where the
respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of
his judgment,13 as when the assailed order is
bereft of any factual and legal justifications. In
this case, the Court found that the assailed
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissing the complaint against private
respondent was legally justified. This is so
because before one can be held liable under
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section
3 (e) of RA 3019, the person subject of the
complaint must be shown to have committed the
act in bad faith. It was held in Guerrero vs.
Villamor, 296 SCRA 88, 98 (1998), that a judge
will be held liable for rendering an unjust
judgment where he acts in bad faith, malice,
revenge or some other similar motive. In Ingco vs.
Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563, 574 (1997), the
Court clearly indicated, as one of the elements of
the offense under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, that
the public officer complained of should have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. In this case, the
Office of the Ombudsman did not find private
respondent in bad faith, hence, the important
element for the above offenses is wanting. Notice
should also be made of the fact that under Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must
be a judge. In this case, the alleged offender is a
hearing officer of the SEC. Neither does the
assailed resolution lack factual justification
because petitioner failed to overcome the burden
of proof to show private respondent’s bad faith.
February 8, 2018 – Article 205 – JUDGMENT
RENDERED THROUGH NEGLIGENCE
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
EVANGELISTA VS BAES
61 SCRA 475 DECEMBER 26, 1974

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge may be held liable for
abuse of discretion
FACTS:
Judge Baes is charged with knowingly, or by
reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance,
rendering unjust orders.
In CAR Case No. 959 Judge De Guzman
authorized landholder Jose Tan Kapoe to eject
his tenant Silvestre Masa. On May 8, 1963
Masa's counsel moved to reconsider; Judge
Macalino, then the presiding judge, ordered the
clerk of court to furnish a copy of the motion to
Tan Kapoe's counsel. As no opposition to the
motion was interposed, Judge Macalino
reconsidered Judge De Guzman's decision, and
rendered on February 20, 1964 a decision
denying the petition for ejectment of Masa and
adjudging a leasehold system of tenancy between
Tan Kapoe and Masa. Three and a half years
later, Judge Macalino, on petition of Masa,
rendered a supplemental decision fixing the
rental on the holding. On April 2, 1968 Tan
Kapoe moved for reconsideration of not only the
supplemental decision but also the decision of
February 20, 1964. Judge Baes granted Tan
Kapoe's motion for reconsideration, with the
justification that Judge De Guzman's prior
decision had become final and executory
allegedly because the motion for its
reconsideration that was granted by Judge
Macalino was fatally defective for lack of proof of
service.
Judge Baes' justification for his orders of June
11, 1968 and October 8, 1969 was rejected in
Masa vs. Baes, et al., L-29784, May 21, 1969, 28
SCRA 263, where this Court held, inter alia, that
the alleged non-service upon Tan Kapoe of a copy
of Masa's motion to reconsider Judge De
Guzman's decision "is belied by the record" and
that Tan Kapoe was in estoppel to deny his
receipt of a copy of the motion for
reconsideration.
HELD:
While Judge Baes acted in abuse of discretion in
issuing the orders complained of, it does not
necessarily follow that he acted in bad faith or
that his abuse of discretion signifies ignorance of
the law in his part. Abuse of discretion signifies
ignorance of the law on his part. Abuse of
discretion by a trial court does not necessarily
mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct or willful
disregard of a litigant's rights.
YARANON VS JUDGE RUBIO
66 SCRA 67 August 7, 1975
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Rubio can be held liable
for an error in judgment
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Antonio Rubio of the
Municipality of Inopacan Leyte for alleged (1)
incompetence and/or ignorance of the law and
(2) delaying justice. Complainant, Atty. Yaranon
filed a charge of estafa with respondent's court
against the spouses Puzon, his tenants or
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overseers who had earlier filed a case against him
and his wife for reinstatement, which said
complainant eventually lost. Complainant
accused said tenants with having failed to
account for agricultural items given to them in
trust. After due trial wherein the only witness of
complainant was himself, respondent acquitted
the accused. Complainant charges that said
decision of acquittal constitutes knowingly
rendering an unjust and/or unfair decision.
HELD:
The Court was satisfied that absent any evidence
of ill-motive or improper consideration, the same
cannot by itself prove the charge laid against
respondent. The decision discusses creditably
the evidence of the parties and the Court see no
indication therein of any untoward factor that
could have induced respondent to be unfair to
complainant. The latter may have a different view
of his case, but mere error of judgment,
assuming its existence, and the Court hold that
here there was none, cannot serve as basis for a
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, there being no proof or even allegation
of bad faith.
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC.
vs COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO
NATIVIDAD
G.R. No. 152568 February 16, 2004
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it modified the decision of the
NLRC and ordered the petitioner to pay
backwages to the private respondent.
FACTS:
Private respondent Pedro Natividad was working
with petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College
(TCMC) as "Liason Officer" of the school. On June
10, 1996, the private respondent was arrested by
the Morong police authorities, without any
warrant therefore, for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. A criminal complaint was later filed
against him. A preliminary investigation was
conducted which found probable cause to hold
him for trial. The court, on the said date, issued
a warrant for the private respondent’s arrest. The
records were elevated to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. In the interim, the
petitioner sent a Memorandum to the private
respondent informing him that his employment
was already terminated.
On July 5, 1996, the private respondent posted
a bail bond. He did not, however, file any
complaint against the petitioner with the NLRC
on account of his dismissal.
On October 2, 1996, the State Prosecutor issued
a Resolution dismissing the criminal complaint
filed against the private respondent for lack of
merit.
On November 21, 1996, the private respondent
was arrested anew by police authorities. The
Morong Chief of Police filed a criminal complaint
for violation of Section 27, Article III of Rep. Act
No. 6425. On February 17, 1997, an Information
therefore was filed with the RTC. On said date,
the private respondent posted a bail bond and

was released from detention.
On June 11, 1997, the private respondent filed a
complaint with the NLRC against the petitioner
for illegal dismissal.
On November 10, 1998, Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter Ramos, rendered a decision dismissing
the complaint for lack of legal basis.
The private respondent appealed the decision to
the NLRC which affirmed the same. However, on
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the appellate
court affirmed, with modification, the decision of
the NLRC, holding that although there was a
valid cause for the private respondent’s
dismissal, the petitioner did not follow the
procedure for the termination of his employment.
The CA ordered the petitioner to pay backwages
to the private respondent from June 13, 1996 up
to the finality of the said decision.
The petitioner assails the decision of the CA in
this Court. Among his contentions was that:
The Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion and authority when it knowingly
rendered a decision which is bias, unfair &
unjust, a violation of Art. 205 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Sec (2) (e) of RA 3019
(anti-graft law), hence the decision is void.
HELD:
No.
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction
if he does not have the legal power to determine
the case. There is excess of jurisdiction when the
public respondent, being clothed with the power
to determine the case, oversteps his authority as
determined by law. There is a grave abuse of
discretion where the public respondent acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In Santos v. NLRC, the Court explained that:
The normal consequences of a finding that an
employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly,
that the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement to his former position without loss
of seniority rights and secondly, the payment of
backwages corresponding to the period from his
illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The
statutory intent on this matter is clearly
discernible. Reinstatement restores the employee
who was unjustly dismissed to the position from
which he was removed, that is, to his status quo
ante dismissal, while the grant of backwages
allows the same employee to recover from the
employer that which he had lost by way of wages
as a result of his dismissal. The two forms of
relief are distinct and separate, one from the
other.
The payment of backwages is generally granted
on the ground of equity. It is a form of relief that
restores the income that was lost by reason of
the unlawful dismissal; the grant thereof is
intended to restore the earnings that would have
accrued to the dismissed employee during the
period of dismissal until it is determined that the
termination of employment is for a just cause.
The award of backwages is not conditioned on
the employee’s ability or inability to, in the
interim, earn any income. While it may be true
that on June 11, 1996, the private respondent
was detained , the State Prosecutor found no
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probable cause for the detention of the private
respondent and resolved to dismiss the case. The
private respondent has not yet been convicted by
final judgment. Indeed, he is presumed innocent
until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
In fine, the Court found and held that the
Decision of the CA is in accord with law.
February 9, 2018 – Article 207 – MALICIOUS
DELAY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE
Duque, Francis Lester M
RENATO ALVARO RUPERTO vs. JUDGE
TIRSO F. BANQUERIGO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1154. August 26, 1998
ISSUE:
WON Judge Banquerigo can be held liable under
Art 207.
FACTS:
Complainant alleges that this administrative
case stems from respondent Judge ruling in a
case he filed against the spouses Anselmo and
Pacita Mojillo, for ejectment with damages, The
Mojillo spouses failed to file their answer to the
complaint within the reglementary period. Since
the case falls under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, herein complainant filed a
motion with the trial court to summarily decide
the case in accordance with the aforesaid Rule.
Respondent judge, however, failed to act on the
motion and, worse, he further granted therein
defendant spouses an additional ten days within
which to file their answer. The case was set for
hearing on December 14, 1995, and, thereafter,
it was again reset to March 14, 1996.
Respondent Judge in his comment stressed that
he was only an acting judge of the MCTC which
had jurisdiction over the cases in question and
that he was reporting to that court which had
226 pending cases, only twice a week. The
subject ejectment case was filed in August, 1995.
Considering that there were several cases filed
with said MCTC, the case was set for hearing on
March 14, 1996 allegedly as agreed upon by the
parties and their counsel. He claims that his
failure to act on the motion of complainant to
decide the case in accordance with Section 6 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was
because, in the interest of justice and equity, he
believed that said motion should be set for
hearing.
HELD:
No. The Court held that although Judge
Banquerigo failed to comply with what is
specifically required as a judicial duty. The
ejectment case filed by complainant against the
defendant spouses therein clearly falls under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. SEC. 6.
(Effect of failure to answer) hereof provides--
Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period, the court, motu
proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein...

The court however, believe that respondent judge
should be merely reprimanded, in view of the fact
that he was not only detailed to the court where
the cases herein involved were pending, but also
to other courts. Such multiple assignments, in
one way or another, affected his efficient
handling of cases. In addition, there was no
showing of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations on the part of respondent judge
which would justify the imposition of a more
severe penalty, or that he has heretofore been
found guilty of any administrative offense.
RAFAEL SALCEDO vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
DAVID ALFECHE, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. 267-MJ June 30, 1975
ISSUE:
WON Respondent Judge can be held liable as
charged.
FACTS:
An administrative complaint of malicious delay
in the administration of justice filed by Rafael
Salcedo against Judge Alfeche, Jr. due to his
absence from his official position on March 5,
1971, as a consequence of which a cash bond
posted by complainant, then accused in a
pending criminal case, could not be accepted,
with the result that he was detained overnight.
Respondent in his answer claim that his absence
on March 5, 1971 was due to his having taken a
vacation leave and he did not have to report until
March 6, 1971.
HELD:
No. The matter was referred to the then
Executive Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, who in his
report and recommendation stated the following:
"Respondent judge had noted in his daily time
record his absence from his station. In the
absence of the municipal judge, it is a provision
in the rules of Court that the accused may put
up his bond before the municipal mayor who is
authorized to order his release in case of such
bond, reporting to the municipal judge on his
return to the office the release made. It is clear
though that immediately after he took
cognizance of the fact that the accused was
apprehended and ready to put up his bail, he
immediately ordered his release on March 6
when he reported to the office the next day. In
other words, after he had knowledge of the
apprehension of the accused or his being
detained, on the first opportunity he immediately
released him. There was no motive why
respondent Judge could be accused of having
wantonly prejudiced the right of the
complainant, he recommended the dismissal of
the charges.
JOHAN L.H. WINGARTS and OFELIA A.
WINGARTS vs. JUDGE SERVILLANO M.
MEJIA
A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012 March 20, 1995
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge can be held liable for
Article 207 of the RPC "Malicious Delay in the
Administration of Justice
FACTS:
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Complainant Johan L.H. Wingarts was the
accused in MTC for malicious mischief.
Respondent judge is charged with malicious
delay in the administration of justice because the
case Malicious Mischief allegedly dragged for one
year and four months.
HELD:
No. A perusal of the records reveal that while
there was a delay in hearing the case, such a
delay does not appear to be malicious nor
deliberate. Firstly, while the case appears to have
been filed only on February 1, 1993, it was
remanded back to respondent's sala sometime in
June 1993 and was set for hearing on July 9,
1993. Secondly, the postponements were all on
account of the absence or unavailability of the
fiscal and/or the defense counsel and not of the
Judge's own making. While Judges should not
allow the parties to control the proceedings in
their Court, in the case of respondent, he had no
alternative but to grant the postponements if
only to better serve the ends of justice. On
January 10, 1994, he had to reset the hearing as
the assigned fiscal was still in the USA. On April
21, 1994, respondent Judge issued an Order
giving the prosecution fifteen days within which
to file its position paper and thereafter, the case
is deemed submitted for decision. Counting
fifteen (15) days from April 21, 1994, the case
was deemed submitted for decision last May 6,
1994. It was decided on June 8, 1994 or barely a
month after it was deemed submitted for
decision. Obviously, therefore there was no delay
in deciding the case. If at all, the delay was in the
hearing of the case and for apparently excusable
grounds.
February 10, 2018 – Article 207 –
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; NEGLIGENCE
AND TOLERANCE
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS NICOLAS
L. MINA
G.R. NO. L-45312 JUNE 13, 1938
ISSUE:
Whether accused violated Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Accused was the chief of police in Asingan,
municipality of Pangasinan. He was charged in
breached of his official duty by maliciously
defaulted in the prosecution and punishment of
the violators of law prohibiting and penalizing
the game of chance called “jueting” in that he
failed to file the corresponding criminal actions
against Juan Lazo as Jueting collector.
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code,
any public officers or officer of the law, who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall
maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution
for the punishment of the violators of law, or
shall tolerate the commission of offenses shall be
punished.
In this case, the accused being the chief of police
was proven to have failed to prosecute the jueting
collector who was caught possessing jueting
lists, was held liable.

BEATRIZ RAMOS VDA DE BAGATUA, ET AL.
VS PEDRO A. REVILLA AND LEONIAS S.
LOMBOS
G. R. NO. L- 12247 AUGUST 26, 1958
ISSUE:
Whether the City Attorney and Assistant City
Attorney are liable under Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Upon the death of her husband, Ramos donated
a parcel of land to her children. When her
children decided to subdivide the lot among
themselves they engaged the services of a real
estate broker. However, Rodrigo Bagatua
accused Pangilinan real estate broker of estafa
before the City Attorney of Quezon city for
allegedly inducing them to sign papers
supposedly necessary for the subdivision of the
lot that turned out to be a deed of sale.
Upon receipt of said complaint, the Assistant
City Attorney, acting for the City Attorney,
conducted a preliminary investigation, during
that time both parties were duly represented by
counsel. After the presentation of testimonies
and documentary evidence the Assistant City
Attorney recommended for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. Accordingly the
complaint was dismissed. Complainants filed a
petition for mandamus seeking to compel the
City Attorney and the Assistant City Attorney to
file an information against Pangilinan for estafa
contending that in dismissing the complaint,
respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD:
No. The court held that the fiscal as a
prosecuting officer, is under no compulsion to
file information based upon complaint, where he
is not convinced that the evidence gathered or
presented would warrant the filing of an action
in court. Respondents are not liable.
HILARIO SORIANO VS OMBUDSMAN SIMEON
V. MARCELINO ET. AL
G.R. NO. 163178 JANUARY 30, 2009
ISSUE:
Whether Garcia violated Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila an affidavit of complaint
against Mely Palad a bank examiner of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas for falsification of public
document and use of falsified document.
Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that
Palad be charged in court for falsification of
Public document. First Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the approval of the resolution.
However, upon the motion of Palad to reconsider,
First Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the
reopening of the case. Respondent approved the
recommendation to re open the case. However, in
an Indorsement, Garcia forwarded the complete
records of the case to the Chief State Prosecutor
of the Department of Justice. In September
2002, petitioner filed an Affidavit- Compalint
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against Garcia for violation of Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
No, The court held in citing the case of US vs
Mendoza, 23 PHIL 194 that “ The crime
committed by the law violator must be proved
first. If the guilt of the law violator is not proved,
the person charged with dereliction of duty
under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code is
not liable”.
In taking into the account of the aforementioned
jurisprudence and elements of the offense
charged, it is clear that the filing of the instant
suit is still premature considering the questioned
controversy against Palad is still pending. Even
the element of malice and deliberate intent to
favor the violator of law cannot be entrenched
without Palad’s guilt for the alleged defiance
having been pronounced first.
February 12, 2018 – Article 209 – BETRAYAL OF
TRUST BY AN ATTORNEY OR SOLICITOR-
REVELATION OF SECRETS
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
MA. LUISA HADJULA V. ATTY. ROCELES F.
MADIANDA
A.C. NO. 6711 (JULY 3,2007)
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of Article 209 (2)
Revealing any of the secrets of his client learned
by his in this professional capacity.
FACTS:
Hadjula and Atty. Madianda were used to be
friends as they were colleagues at Bureau of Fire
Protection where Atty. Madianda was the Chief
Legal Officer and Hadjula was the Chief Nurse.
Sometime in 1998, Hadjula approached
respondent for some legal advice. She alleged
that in their discourse, it was supposed to be
kept confidential as she disclosed personal
secrets and produced copies of a marriage
contract, birth certificate and a baptismal
certificate, only to be informed later that
respondent will refer the case to her another
lawyer friend. Hadjula alleged that was malicious
because after respondent heard her case and her
secrets to she refused to take the case.
Eventually, Hadjula filed for administrative and
criminal complaint against Atty. Madianda for
violation of Article 209 of the RPC because those
secrets and information were later on used
against her in a administrative case at the Office
of the Ombudsman.
HELD:
Yes. However, the Supreme Court did not upheld
the case as punishable under the Revised Penal
Code even though Atty. Madianda was found
indeed to have breached his duties of preserving
the confidence of a client. The SC reiterated in
this manner: The seriousness of the respondent’s
offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that
there is room for compassion, absent compelling
evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will.
Without meaning to condone the error of
respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the
Court is two former friends becoming bitter
enemies and filing charges and counter-charges

against each other using whatever convenient
tools and data were readily available.
Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with
complainant became handy in her quest to even
the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear
to us that respondent was actuated by the urge
to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the
process of giving vent to a negative sentiment,
she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
Thus, Atty. Madianda was only REPRIMANDED
by the SC in this case.
February 12, 2018 – Article 210 – DIRECT
BRIBERY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE V. JOSELITO C. BARROZO
A.C. NO. 10207 (JULY 21, 2015)
ISSUE:
Whether the act of the accused constitute direct
bribery.
FACTS:
Disbarment Case against former Assistant Public
Pros., Joselito C. Barrozo. Jen Valeriano, was a
respondent in several cases of estafa and was
assigned to respondent. According to Valeriano,
Respondent would resolve her cases in her favor
in exchange for P20,000.00. Hence, Valeriano
went to the Office of the State Prosecutor to
report the matter. NBI then conducted an
entrapment operation where respondent was
caught red handed receiving the P20,000.00.
Sandiganbayan sentenced respondent to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day of prision correccional to 9 years, 4
months and 1 day prision mayor and a fine of
P60,000.00 In October 2013 the Office of the Bar
Confidant received a letter from Wat & Co. of
Hongkong that their office received a letter from
respondent asking for long service payment. Wat
& Co. found out about respondent’s conviction
on the internet and asked the OBC if respondent
is qualified to practice law. Prompted by this
letter, OBC recommended the disbarment of
respondent.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or
disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. And with the
finality of respondent's conviction for direct
bribery, the next question that needs to be
answered is whether direct bribery is a crime
that involves moral turpitude.
The elements of Direct Bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or
receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or
present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime but the act must be
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unjust, or to refrain from doing something which
it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform
or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
To consider a crime as one involving moral
turpitude, the act constituting the same must
have been "done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. [It must involve] an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. Respondent's
conduct in office fell short of the integrity and
good moral character required of all lawyers,
specially one occupying a public office.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
UNITED STATES V. RUFINO SANCHEZ
G.R. NO. 9102 (NOVEMBER 5, 1913)
ISSUE:
Whether the crime committed in this case is
direct bribery.
FACTS:
A municipal policeman pretended to arrest a
person who had in his possession a substance
which he had purchased as opium but proved to
be only molasses. The policeman knew the
character of this substance and, with this
knowledge, threatened to have the said person
prosecuted for a violation of the Opium Law
unless he paid him P500. P150 was finally
agreed upon as the price which the policeman
would accept to turn him loose. Sometimes
afterward Lua discovered that what he had
purchased and had been deprived of by the two
policemen was not opium at all, and the present
case is a consequence of his complaint to the
authorities.
The appellant, Rufino Sanchez contends that the
crime established by the above facts is not
robbery, but bribery.
In United States v. Gimenea (24 Phil. Rep., 464),
this court said: "Viada, vol. 2, p. 642, in
discussing article 381, says that to constitute the
crime of bribery as provided in this article, four
things are necessary:
(1) That the defendant be a public officer
according to the meaning of this term in article
401;
(2) that he has received either personally or
through another gifts or presents or accepted
offers or promises;
(3) that such reception of gifts or presents or
acceptance of offers or promises has been for the
purpose of executing a crime; and
(4) that the act constituting the crime relates to
the exercise of the office which the public officer
discharges.

HELD:
No. The money was not delivered to the two
policemen for the purpose of executing a crime.
Had Lua been allowed to retain possession of the
molasses no law would have been violated, nor
would the two policemen have been guilty or a
noncompliance with their official duties. Several
reasons are advanced as to why the acts of the
policemen did not constitute robbery all based
upon the misconception of the injured person as
to the nature of the substance which he had
purchased as opium. It is quite true that had the
latter been aware of the true state of affairs he
would not have permitted the appellant and his
companion to force him to pay them the P150.
But the guilt of the appellant is not contingent
upon the conception or misconception of Lua as
to the true state of affairs.
In the case of United States v. Flores (19 Phil.
Rep., 178), the court laid down the following
doctrine: "A policeman who, knowing that a
person has committed no crime for which he
could be lawfully arrested and tried, nevertheless
arrests such person, falsely accusing him of a
crime, and then by means of threats of
presentation and imprisonment, thus playing
upon his ignorance and fear, obtains money from
the said person, secures such money by force
and intimidation and commits the crime of
robbery as defined by the Penal Code.
FEBUARY 13, 2018 – ARTICLE 211 – INDIRECT
BRIBERY
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
LEONOR FORMILLEZA,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of indirect bribery
under article 211
FACTS:
Petitioner Formilleza has been with government
service for around 20 years as the personnel
supervisor of the regional office of the National
Irrigation Administration. (NIA)
On the other hand, Mrs. Mutia was an employee
of NIA for 7 years. Sometime in December 1983,
her appointment was terminated. Taking steps to
either obtain permanency or at least a renewed
appointment she was told to approach the
petitioner who determined if an employee is to be
appointed or promoted. However, petitioner
refused to attend to her papers unless she was
given some money.
Mrs. Mutia reported the problem with the
Philippine Constabulary, Who later took steps for
an entrapment.
The entrapment was a success after Mrs. Mutia
handed the marked money under the table to
which petitioner accepted the money.
Petitioner was found positive of ultra-violet
powder. Powder used in the marked money.
HELD:
No, The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as
defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code
is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift or material consideration. There
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must be a clear intention on the part of the
public officer to take the gift so offered and
consider the same as his own property from then
on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping
or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance
or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient
to lead the court to conclude that the crime of
indirect bribery has been committed. To hold
otherwise will encourage unscrupulous
individuals to frame up public officers by simply
putting within their physical custody some gift,
money or other property.
Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed
to support a judgment of conviction, Moral
certainty is a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of those who
are to act upon a given matter. 14 Without this
standard of certainty, it may not be said that the
guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
ISSUE:
WON the money given was a bribe to corrupt the
city probation officer
FACTS:
Petitioner Pozar, is an American Citizen and
Permanent resident of the Philippines, Charged
with the crime of corruption of a public official.
After he feloniously gave to the city probation
officer 100pesos upon his application for
probation.
RULING:
The court deduce that the procedure for
processing petitioner's application for probation
in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not
precise, explicit and clear cut And since the
accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite
unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures,
there is reason to conclude that petitioner was
befuddled, if not confused so that his act of
providing and advancing the expenses for
whatever documentation was needed further to
complete and thus hasten his probation
application, was understandably innocent and
not criminal.
The facts and circumstances on record amply
justify and support the claim of the defense as
against the conjectures, speculation and
supposition recited in the decision of the trial
court and quoted with approval in the appealed
decision under review. The Government's own
evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence
Investigation Report that the giving of the one
hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in good faith,
is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent.
There being no criminal intent to corrupt the
Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is
entitled to acquittal of the crime charged. We
hold and rule that the prosecution has not
proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
ATTY. ENRICO M. CABRERA
vs.
JUDGE JAMES B. PAJARES

ISSUE:
WON respondent judge accepted the money on
account of his office.
FACTS:
On Jan, 1985,Petitioner Enrico Cabrera
denounced Respondent Judge Pajares for having
allegedly asked money from him in connection
with his case.
Petitioner was advised by his counsel to
accommodate any request for money from the
respondent so that he would not be unduly hard
on the complainant. And during the course of the
case, The Respondent Judge, told petitioner
needed money. To which, petitioner gave P1000
the next day. However, after two months the
Respondent Judge told him once again that he
needed money. It was then when the petitioner
decided to report to the authorities.
Acting on the report, NBI staged an entrapment
and used marked money. The entrapment
succeeded when the judge took the marked
money from the complainant.
RULING:
There is reason to believe that the respondent
judge accepted the money and that he knew it
was being given to him by reason of his office.
The evidence shows that after receiving the
envelope with the money, the respondent judge
did not really try to return it to Cabrera, as he
claims he did, but that instead he placed it
between the pages of his diary
Second, the plan to entrap the respondent
appears to have been cleared with the Executive
Judge, Hon. Juan B. Llaguno, before whom the
complainant swore to his statement and It is not
likely that Judge Llaguno would approve the
'frame-up' of a colleague
Investigating Justice Mendoza's above statement
and analysis of the evidence and a review of the
records fully support the finding that
"respondent Judge accepted the money and that
he knew it was being given to him by reason of
his office." The Court has time and again
stressed that members of the judiciary should
display not only the highest integrity but must at
all times conduct themselves in such manner as
to be beyond reproach and suspicion.
But the Court is constrained to disapprove his
recommendation as to the first charge of indirect
bribery which is fully supported by the evidence
that respondent Judge "be suspended from office
for 2 years and 4 months, taking into
consideration the penalty prescribed in art. 211
of the Revised Penal Code." The penalty of 2 years
and 4 months imprisonment provided for the
criminal offense of indirect bribery may not be
equated with the penalty of separation from the
judicial service which is the proper applicable
administrative penalty by virtue of respondent
Judge's serious misconduct prejudicial to the
judiciary and the public interest.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice
to reinstatement in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities.
FEBUARY 14, 2018 – ARTICLE 212 – a public officer can make of record his assets and
CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
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NASH, Regina M.
MORFE V MUTUC, 22 SCRA 424
January 31, 1968
Fernando, J.
Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)
Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc
(Executive Secretary) et al.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for
public officers is:
1. An oppressive exercise of police power;
2. Violative of due process and an unlawful
invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban
against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination;
3. An insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity of public officials.
FACTS:
• The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
• Every public officer within 30 days after its
approval or after his assumption of office “and
within the month of January of every year
thereafter”, as well as upon termination of his
position, shall prepare and file with the head of
the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed
and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year”.
• Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that
the periodical submission “within the month of
January of every other year thereafter” of their
sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is
violative of due process as an oppressive exercise
of police power and as an unlawful invasion of
the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the
ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination.
• Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
• Acceptance of public position = voluntary
assumption of obligation
• Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of
insuring the interest of general welfare in honest
and clean public service and is therefore a
legitimate exercise of police power.
• CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement
exceeds the permissible limit of the police power
and is thus offensive to the due process clause
RULING:
Decision reversed.
RATIO:
1. Presumption of validity
• Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL
was a reasonable requirement for employment so
liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did

not present evidence to rebut the presumption of
validity.
• “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-
Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense
provided by the Due Process Clause
• “inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice
Malcolm)
• The power of sovereignty, the power to govern
men and things within the limits of its domain
(Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of
rights)
• Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the
extension of police power to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life can
invoke the protection of due process.
• It has been held that due process may be relied
upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
property. Therefore he could also use due
process to strike down what he considers as an
infringement of his liberty.
• Under the Constitution, the challenged
provision is allowable as long as due process is
observed.
• The standard for due process is
REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression.
• “It would be to dwell in the realm of
abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its
ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed
and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon
public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years
after having done so upon assuming
office…There was therefore no unconstitutional
exercise of police power.”
1. Right to privacy
• Right to be let alone
• “It cannot be said that the challenged statutory
provision calls for disclosure of information
which infringes on the right of a person to
privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational
relationship such a requirement possesses with
the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such
character. This is not to say that a public officer,
by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize
that in subjecting him to such a further
compulsory revelation of his assets and
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liabilities, including the statement of the
amounts of personal and family expenses, and
the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.”
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
• The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure does not give
freedom from testimonial compulsion.
1. Right against self-incrimination
• We are not aware of any constitutional
provision designed to protect a man’s conduct
from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from
justice.
1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
• Only congressional power or competence, not
the wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid.
OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. Rainier Espina
GR No. 213500, Mar 15, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espina should be held
administratively liable for the charges imputed
against him? Was he guilty of graft and
corruption due to gross negligence in signing
procurement documents without proper
inspection.
FACTS:
On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the Fact-
Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed
before the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint
and a supplemental complaint, respectively,
charging Espina and several other PNP officers
and private individuals for: (a) violation of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7080 Anti - Graft and
Corruption Practices Act, RA 3019, RA 9184 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR),
and Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents under Article
217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC); and (b) Grave Misconduct and
Serious Dishonesty; arising from alleged
anomalies that attended the Philippine National
Police's (PNP) procurement of 40 tires, and
repair, refurbishment, repowering, and
maintenance services of a total of 28 units of V-
150 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and the
related transportation and delivery expenses of
18 units of LAYs between August and December
2007.It averred that the PNP did not comply with
the bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184
and its IRR, in that: (a) copies of the bid
documents were not furnished to possible
bidders; (b) no pre-procurement and pre-bid
conferences were held; (c) the invitation to bid
was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation; (d) the procuring agency did not
require the submission of eligibility requirements
as well as the technical and financial documents
from the bidders; and (e) no post qualification
was conducted. Further, it claimed that there

were "ghost deliveries," i.e., the tires were never
delivered to the PNP and no repair and
refurbishment works were actually performed on
the LAVs.
In a Joint Resolution dated December 19, 2012,
the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
Espina and several other PNP officers for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Section 65
(b) (4) of RA 9184, and for Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification under Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 of the RPC. The
Ombudsman also found them guilty of Grave
Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty and,
accordingly, recommended their dismissal from
government services.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper
or unlawful conduct motivated by a receipt of said amount is respondent's private
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
It is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior
and to constitute an administrative offense, the
misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. It is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.
RULED:
Rainier A. Espina is GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT
OF DUTY. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from
government service with all the accessory
penalties.
FEBUARY 15, 2018 – ARTICLE 213 – FRAUDS
AGAINST THE PUBLIC TREASURY AND
SIMILAR OFFENSES
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
SOLEDAD V. GANADEN VS. GREGORIO N.
BOLASCO
Adm. Matter No. P-124, May 16, 1975
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bolasco is liable under Article
213 of the RPC.
FACTS:
Gregorio N. Bolasco, who was Deputy Provincial
Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Zambales
is charged by complainant, Soledad V. Ganaden,
a stenographer of the same court, with
dishonesty by demanding P13.00 as sheriff's fee
in civil case, entitled "Carmen Flores vs.
Leonardo Frondarina," but issuing therefor a
receipt for a lesser amount and by issuing a
private receipt for P50.00 to plaintiff Paulino
Padua in a civil case for the service of a writ of
execution but failed to make a return of said writ.
Bolasco was also charged with misconduct by
delaying the service of summons upon Paulita
Esteban and entrusting its service to her
nephew, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing, Jr..
HELD:
YES. Bolasco committed illegal exaction
penalized by paragraph 2(b) of Article 213 of the
RPC for failure to issue receipts for money
collected by him officially.
In this case, on two occasions, Bolasco received
certain amounts in connection with the
performance of his duties as deputy sheriff
without issuing the corresponding official
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receipts. First, was on February 3, 1971, counsel
for plaintiff in a civil case gave respondent
P12.60 for sheriff’s fee for service of the
complaint and summons thereof upon the
defendants. Bolasco received said amount before
the summons to be served were delivered to him
for service, in spite of the standing instruction
from the clerk of court and the provincial sheriff
not to accept any payment if no official receipts
are available. Bolasco did not issue the official
receipt even after he had received the booklet of
official receipts February 5 or 6, 1971. Lastly,
respondent also received, again without issuing
the corresponding official receipt, P50.00 from
plaintiff for service of a writ of execution issued
in connection in another civil case. Proof of
receipt. Hence, a collecting officer should issue
official receipts and not mere private receipts.
ARIEL C. VALLEJO vs HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 156413 April 14, 2004
ISSUE:
Whether or not Vallejo is liable
FACTS:
Ariel Vallejo is a lawyer in the Register of Deeds
of the province of Isabela. Franklin M. Javier, a
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent,
filed a sworn application for search warrant
before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan which
briefly requests that a Search Warrant be issued
on the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Provincial
Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the purpose of seizing
the following documents:
01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND
TITLES, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office,
Judicial Form No. 39 known as Our Primary
Entry Book under no. 496 and other pertinent
documents related therewith;
02. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the
drawers of every table of employees of the
Registry of Deeds;
03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer
transactions without the corresponding payment
of Documentary Stamps and Capital Gains Tax.
That all of the said documents are being used or
intended to be used in the commission of a felony
that is FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under
Article 171 RPC, Article 213 RPC and R.A. 3019
(Anti-Graft) and are hidden or being kept in the
said office.
HELD:
NO. The charged imputed upon Vallejo should be
dismissed and the seized items be returned.
The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-
shot warrant for having been issued for more
than one offense - Falsification of Land Titles
under Article 171 and Article 213 of the RPC, and
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A
warrant must be issued upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. In fact, a
careful perusal of the application for the warrant
shows that the applicant did not allege any
specific act performed by the petitioner

constituting a violation of any of the
aforementioned offenses. Thus, the questioned
warrant must be struck down for having been
issued in contravention of the 1987 Constitution,
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and existing
jurisprudence consequently the charged against
Vallejo must be dismissed.
FEBUARY 16, 2018 – ARTICLE 214 – OTHER
FRAUDS
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
FRANCISCO AND LENLIE LECAROZ V.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 130872 (MARCH 25, 1999)
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Francisco and Lenlie
Lecaroz are guilty of Estafa through falsification
of public documents, and thereby convicting
them also under Article 214 of the Revised Penal
Code
FACTS:
Francisco Lecaroz is the Municipal Mayor of
Santa Cruz, Marinduque. Lenlie Lecaroz, the
former’s son, was the outgoing chairman of
Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Santa Cruz and
member of Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
representing the federation of KBs. Jowil Red
won as Chairman of Barangay Santa Cruz in the
1985 KB elections. Lenlie did not run as
candidate as he was no longer qualified, having
passed the age limit.
Jowil Red was appointed by President Marcos as
member of SB of Santa Cruz, representing the
federation of KBs. He received his appointment
powers when President Aquino was already in
power. However, he was not allowed by Mayor
Lecaroz to sit as sectoral representative in the
SB. Subsequently, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and
approved on different dates the payment to
Lenlie Lecaroz of payrolls covering period of
January 1987 to January 1987.
Red assumed position of KB presidency upon
expiration of term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It was
alleged that Lenlie continued to receive salary
even after his term has expired. The
Sandiganbayan convicted the accused, on 13
Information for Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents, and perpetual special
disqualification from public office in accordance
with Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD
No. The offenses of which petitioners were
convicted under Article 171, paragraph 4, of The
Revised Penal Code, are intentional felonies for
which liability attaches only when it is shown
that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or
malice. If what is proven is mere judgmental
error on the part of the person committing the
act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully
imputed to him. There was no criminal intent
demonstrated to justify petitioner’s conviction.
Moreover, the decision of the Sandiganbayan of
the accused’s perpetual special disqualification
from public office in accordance with Article 214
of the Revised Penal Code, does not stand.
Petitioners have been convicted for falsification
of public documents through an untruthful
narration of facts under Article 171, paragraph
4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to
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be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated
by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was
made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person. The first and third elements of the
offense have not been established in this case.
UNITED STATES V. FLORENCIO TORRIDA
G.R. NO. 7450, 7451 AND 7452 (SEPTEMBER
18, 1912)
ISSUE
Whether or not the penalty under Article 214 is
applicable to accused Torrida.
FACTS
Torrida, as part of his councilman duties in the
town of Aparri, Cagayan Province, gave
directions to his subordinates that the death of
all large animals must be reported by the owners
to him as councilman. These orders were
conveyed to the people as directed. Several
individuals lost their carabaos. Upon the receipt
of this information, appellant Torrida informed
these owners that they must pay a fine of P5 for
each animal, these fees to be turned into the
municipality by him. The owners, believing that
the municipality had provided for the payment of
such fines, turned over to the appellant five
pesos for each animal that died. There was no
provision whatever made by the municipality or
any other entity for the imposition of such fines.
These facts clearly constitute the crime of Estafa
as defined and penalized in paragraph 1, article
535, in relation with paragraphs 1, article 534,
Penal Code. Torrida was charged with three
separates crimes of Estafa in three separate
actions, tried and found guilty in each case.
HELD
Yes. When the councilor, Torrida in this case,
takes advantage of his official position in
committing Estafa, the disqualification
mentioned in Article 399 (now Article 214 of the
Revised Penal Code) is a part of the penalty to be
imposed.
The fact that the appellant was councilman at
the time placed him in a position to commit these
crimes. If he had not been councilman, he could
not have induced the injured parties to pay these
alleged fines. It was on account of his being
councilman that the parties believed that he had
the right to collect fines and it was for this reason
that they made the payments. It is true that he
had no right to either impose or collect any fines
whatsoever. It is also true that a municipal
councilman is not an official designated by law
to collect public fines. But these facts do not
destroy or disprove the important fact that the
accused did by taking advantage of his public
position, deceive and defraud the injured parties
out of the money which they paid him.
UNITED STATES V. JUSTO DACUYCUY
G.R. NO. L-3873 (OCTOBER 18, 1907)
ISSUE
Whether or not accused Dacuycuy is liable under
Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS
On December 1906, the provincial fiscal of Ilocos
Norte filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of said province accusing Justo
Dacuycuy of the crime of Estafa, stating that the
said accused, being a public official and taking
advantage of his office of councilor for the
municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, received
the sum of P39 from the residents of his district,
for the purpose of investing the money in
cedulas, and failed to invest said sum in cedulas
or return the same to the owners thereof, and
misapplied it and converted it to his own use to
the prejudice of the several residents.
The court sentenced Dacuycuy to the penalty of
two months and one day of arresto mayor, to
suffer the accessory penalties, to indemnify the
individuals residing in the barrio of Oangagan,
town of Bacarra of said province. From this
sentence the accused has appealed.
In his testimony, the accused Dacuycuy
confessed to having received from several
residents of the barrio, the said sum of P39 to
purchase an equal number of cedulas, but
denied that he had gone over to the said barrio
in order to collect taxes, and further stated that
he was there enjoying a vacation when the
residents handed him the money for the
purchase of their respective cedulas, but that he
was unable to get the cedulas because at the
municipal treasury one person was not
permitted to take out a cedula for another.
HELD
No. Since the councilor committed the crime of
Estafa as a private individual, it is not proper to
impose on him the penalty provided by Article
399 (now Article 214) of the Revised Penal Code
for public officers, because he received the
money not on the exercise of his functions as a
councilor.
When a public officer commits a common crime
independent of his official functions and does
acts that are not connected with the duties of his
office, he should be punished with the penalty
which the law imposes on the private individual
who violates its provisions, without taking into
account the official character with which the
guilty party is invested.
February 17, 2018 – Article 215 – PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS
[NO CASE FOUND]
February 17, 2018 – Article 216 – POSSESSION
OF PROHIBITED INTEREST BY A PUBLIC
OFFICER
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
THE UNITED STATES v. CLEMENTE UDARBE
G.R. No. 9945. November 12, 1914
ARAULLO, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Municipal President Urdabe
became interested in any business in which it
was his official duty to intervene.
FACTS:
Urdabe was appointed as the Municipal
President of the Municipality of Magsingal and
while on duty as said president, the Municipal
Council on and under his presidency, approved
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and passed Regulation No. 7 for the leasing of
fishponds in the said municipality.
When the auction for the different sections of
said fishponds was held in the town hall of the
municipality, it was recorded that Urdabe, who
presided over the auction, took part in the
bidding for one particular section of the
fishponds and that section was adjudicated to
him as the highest bidder for the sum of two
pesos a year.
HELD:
Yes. Municipal President Urdabe became
interested and took direct part in the leasing of
property of the Municipality of Magsingal,
wherein he had to intervene by reason of his
office as president of said Municipality, and he
has therefore openly violated the provisions of
Section 28 of the Municipal Code which states
that:
"No municipal officer shall be directly or
indirectly interested in any contract work, or
cockpits, or any other permitted games and
amusements, or business of the municipality, or
in the purchase of any real estate or any other
property belonging to the corporation.”
MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION
Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982
MAKASIAR, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion intervened in his
official capacity in the transactions of Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
FACTS:
Judge Asuncion rendered a decision pertaining
to a partition of the estate of Francisco Diaz. One
of the lots of the said estate was sold to the
spouses Galapon. A year after, spouses Galapon
sold such lot to Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc. wherein, at the time of the
sale, Judge Asuncion was the stockholder’s
president of the corporation.
Consequently, Bernardita Macariola, one of the
heirs of Diaz and who was against of the partition
of the estate, contended that Judge Asuncion
intervened in his official capacity in the business
or transactions of Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. when he rendered the
decision concerning the partition of the estate.
HELD:
No. There was no showing that Judge Asuncion
participated or intervened in his official capacity
in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
The business of the corporation in which Judge
Asuncion participated has obviously no relation
or connection with his judicial office. The
business of said corporation is not that kind
where Judge Asuncion intervenes or takes part
in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance. As was held in one case involving the
application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal
Code which is a prohibition on public officers
against directly or indirectly becoming interested
in any contract or business in which it is his
official duty to intervene," (I)t is not enough to be
a public official to be subject to this crime: it is

necessary that by reason of his office, he has to
intervene in said contracts or transactions; and,
hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office
cannot commit this crime."
February 18, 2018 – Article 217 –
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR
PROPERTY - PRESUMPTION OF
MALVERSATION
RIVERA, Marynit P.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LICERION
P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON AND
ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT
G.R. NO. L-33254 JANUARY 20, 1978
ISSUE:
Whether or not Samson is guilty of malversation
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
In 1969, Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of
Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Samson, an
employee of a lumber and hardware store in
Dagupan City, used 6 forged provincial vouchers
to evidence fictitious sales of construction
materials in order to embezzle from the road and
bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23. Samson
hand-carried the vouchers and followed-up their
processing in the offices of the provincial
government and received the cash payments.
HELD:
Yes. Samson is a co-principal in the six crimes of
malversation because he conspired with the
provincial treasurer in committing those
offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a
private person conspiring with an accountable
public officer in committing malversation is also
guilty of malversation.
CECILIA U. LEGRAMA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Cecilia Legrama is
guilty of the crime of malversation under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
The Office of the Provincial Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) for the Province of
Zambales issued PAO Office No. 96-09 directing
an Audit to conduct an examination of the cash
and account of petitioner Cecilia Legrama, the
Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San
Antonio, Zambales. After the audit, the COA
prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on
the Cash and Accounts of Ms. Cecilia U.
Legrama. The report contained the findings that
petitioners cash accountability was short of
P289,022.75 and that there was an unaccounted
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the amount
of P863,878.00, thereby showing a total shortage
in the amount of P1,152,900.75. Included in the
shortage is the amount of P709,462.80,
representing the total amount of various sales
invoices, chits, vales, and disbursement
vouchers, which were disallowed in the audit for
lack of supporting documents. From the total
amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to
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restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan failed
to consider the testimonial and documentary
exhibits presented to support her claim that she
did not appropriate or misappropriate for her use
and benefit the subject fund nor did she allow
her co-accused to use the said fund without the
proper acknowledgment such as receipts, vales
or sign chits. Petitioner maintains that she has
satisfactorily explained the shortage on the basis
of the documentary evidence submitted.
HELD:
Malversation may be committed by appropriating
public funds or property; by taking or
misappropriating the same; by consenting, or
through abandonment or negligence, by
permitting any other person to take such public
funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property. The essential elements
common to all acts of malversation under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) That the offender be a public officer;
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) That those funds or property were public
funds or property for which he was accountable;
and
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated
or consented, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take
them.
In the case at bar, after the government auditors
discovered the shortage and informed petitioner
of the same, petitioner failed to properly explain
or justify the shortage that was subject to her
accountability. Petitioner denied that she put the
amount involved to personal use and presented
various sales invoice, chits, vale forms, and
disbursement voucher to prove her claim.
Petitioner even went further by testifying that the
total amount of P681,000.00 appearing in a
disbursement voucher were cash advances given
to the mayor during the height of the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption. However, the date when the
eruption occurred was way before the period
subject of the audit. Undoubtedly, all the
elements of the crime are present in the case at
bar. Hence, the petitioner is guilty of the crime of
malversation under Article 217 of the RPC.
February 21, 2018 – Article 218 – FAILURE OF
ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER TO RENDER
ACCOUNTS
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
FLORENCIO B. CAMPOMANES vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DECEMBER 19,2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not Campomanes is guilty of failure
to render accounts as defined in Article 218 of
the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
During the period material to the Information of
this case, accused Cecilio G. Hechanova was the
Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission

(PSC) and Florencio B. Campomanes was the
President of the Federation International Des
Echecs (FIDE), a private international
organization with offices at Lausanne,
Switzerland. On 6 March 1991,the Philippine
Sports Commission submitted to FIDE a bid offer
to host the 30th Chess Olympiad of 1992 in
Manila.The PSC’s bid offer was accepted by
FIDE, and accordingly the Philippine government
thru the PSC was granted the right to organize
and host the 30th World Chess Olympiad in
Manila from June 6-25, 1992. From October
1990 to June 1992 the PSC, also complying with
its obligations under the bid offer, remitted to
FIDE – received in FIDE’s behalf by its President,
Florencio Campomanes – the total amount of
P12,876,008.00 in connection with the 30th
World Chess Olympiad in Manila. The amount of
P12,876,008.00 was acknowledged as having
been received by FIDE as shown by a letter dated
December 22, 1995 of Willy Iclicki, FIDE
Treasurer. The Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted an audit of the PSC’s transactions
from March 1990 up to June 1992. The COA
team noticed irregularities in the claims payable
to the FIDE. The irregularities consisted of the
lack of acknowledgment receipts and of
accounting liquidation attached to the
disbursement vouchers. The COA defined an
acknowledgment receipt as an official receipt
evidencing that the FIDE received the funds from
the PSC. The COA invited the PSC officials to an
exit conference on 27 October 1993. During the
conference, the COA submitted its team’s
findings to the PSC and requested for the PSC’s
comment on the matter. In the absence of the
PSC’s comment, the COA prepared SAO Report
No. 93-27. The report stated that the FIDE,
through Campomanes, received P12,876,008
without acknowledgment and without
liquidation. Hechanova and Campomanes were
charged as of fail to render account on the
disbursement thereof, within the period provided
for by law and the rules and regulations of the
Commission on Audit. The Sandiganbayan
acquitted Hechanova on the basis of proof
beyond reasonable doubt while convicted
Campomanes of the crime of failure to render
accounts as defined in Article 218 in relation to
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
NO. There are four elements of the crime under
Article 218. First, the offender is a public officer.
Second, he must be an accountable officer for
public funds or property. Third, the offender is
required by law or regulation to render accounts
to the COA, or to a provincial auditor. Fourth, he
fails to render an account for a period of two
months after such accounts should be rendered.
Campomanes is clearly not a public officer. He is
the president of the FIDE, a private foreign
corporation with whom the PSC, through
Hechanova, negotiated to conduct the 1992
Chess Olympiad and Congress in Manila. The
Sandiganbayan acknowledged that
Campomanes is not a public officer. So the
Sandiganbayan applied Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 218. The
Sandiganbayan’s decision, however, failed to
specify any law or regulation requiring
Campomanes to render accounts to the COA.
Therefore Campomanes was acquitted because
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of the failure of the prosecution to prove all the
elements of Article 218, in relation to Article 222,
of the Revised Penal Code. Because of this
failure, The Supreme Court deem it unnecessary
to rule on the other issues raised by both parties.
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA
191
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the acquittal under RA
3019(Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) is a
bar to his conviction under Art. 218 of Revised
Penal Code.
(2) Whether prior demand is a requisite for
conviction under Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code.
FACTS:
In 1994, Mayor Lumauig of Alfonso Lista
obtained a cash advance of P101,736.00
intended for the payment of freight and
insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to
be donated to the municipality by the City of
Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was
able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. It
never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the
amount advanced since the vehicles were already
turned over to the municipality. He claimed that
he was neither informed or did he receive any
demand from COA to liquidate his cash
advances. It was in 2001 while he was claiming
for separation pay when he came to know he still
has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not
to prolong the issue, he paid the amount of
P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer, for
which reason, the incumbent Mayor
Prudenciano executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Lumauig for the
violation of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) but convicted him for the felony of
Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under
Art. 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
(1) NO, acquittal from violation of RA 3019 is not
a bar against conviction for Article 218 of the
RPC. It is undisputed that the two charges
stemmed from the same incident. However, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the
same act may give rise to two or more separate
and distinct charges. The elements of the felony
punishable under Article 218 of the RPC are:
(1) that the offender is a public officer whether in
the service or separated therefrom.
(2) that he must be an accountable officer for
public funds or property.
(3) that he is required by law or regulation to
render accounts to the COA or to a provincial
auditor; and
(4) that he fails to do so for a period of two
months after such account should be rendered.
(2) NO, demand is not element of the offense and
that it is sufficient that there is a law or
regulation requiring the public officer to render
an account.

Since Lumauig received the subject cash
advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus,
required to liquidate the same on or before
January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability
under Article 218, he should have liquidated the
cash advance two months from the time it was
due, or on before March 20, 1995. In the case at
bar, Lumauig liquidated the subject cash
advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, he was
liable for violation of Article 218 because it took
him over six years before settling his accounts.
Considering the two mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and return or full restitution
of the funds, Lumauig is sentenced to a straight
penalty of four months and one day of arresto
mayor.
HERMES E. FRIAS, SR.
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 171437 OCTOBER 4, 2007
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frias is guilty with violation of
Art.218 of the Revised Penal Code despite the
fact that he did not benefited from the disallowed
cash advances.
FACTS:
Frias, on behalf of the Municipality of Capas,
made cash advances amounting to P50,000 and
P950,000 (or a total of P1,000,000). These cash
advances were allocated for the maintenance of
economic enterprises and the augmentation of
the general fund.
The Commission on Audit found these purposes
too vague. Thus, they disallowed the cash
advances due to petitioner's failure to indicate a
specific legal purpose. COA notified Frias,
municipal treasurer Panganiban and municipal
accountant Domingo of the disallowance of the
municipality's cash advances and directed them
to settle the P1,000,000. Neither Panganiban nor
Domingo returned the amount. Hence, Abesamis
requested petitioner to settle the disallowed cash
advances. Petitioner, however, refused for the
reason that he gave the proceeds of the cash
advances to Panganiban. COA, mindful of
petitioner's predicament, pointed out that the
cash advances were made under his authority.
Moreover, the checks were payable to him (as
payee) and he admitted receipt thereof. For this
reason, even if he gave the proceeds to
Panganiban, he was still required to return the
P1,000,000.
Notwithstanding COA's demand, petitioner did
not account for the cash advance. Thus, COA
recommended the filing of this criminal
complaint against petitioner.In his defense,
petitioner argued that he was not liable for the
cash advances because he did not derive any
benefit from them. Panganiban alone benefited
from the cash advances as she used the
P1,000,000 to settle her existing deficiencies
with the Commission on Audit (COA). Petitioner
pointed out that the COA, upon Abesamis'
recommendation, also filed a criminal complaint
against Panganiban.
RULING:
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YES. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty
as charged due to the concurrence of the
following elements:
1. petitioner was a public officer;
2. he was an officer accountable for public funds
or property;
3. he was required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or provincial auditor and
4. he failed to render an account for the period of
two months after such accounts should have
been rendered.
According to the Sandiganbayan, in spite of the
fact that Panganiban alone benefited from the
disallowed cash advances, petitioner, as
municipal mayor, was responsible and
accountable for it.Moreover, petitioner was liable
to return the proceeds to the Government in view
of his failure to account for the cash advances.
Therefore Hermes E. Frias Sr. is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code.
February 22, 2018 – Article 219 – FAILURE OF
A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC OFFICER TO
RENDER ACCOUNTS BEFORE LEAVING THE
COUNTRY
[NO CASE FOUND]
February 22, 2018 – Article 220 – ILLEGAL USE
OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE VS MONTEMAYOR
5 SCRA 929, AUGUST 30, 1962
ISSUE:
WON there is a diversion of the funds from the
purpose for which they had been originally
appropriated by law or ordinance.
FACTS:
Zosimo Montemayor then, and until now,
President of the Mindanao Agricultural College,
a government institution established and
existing under the provisions of law, order the
accused Ciriaco Ducusin to use the students'
property deposits for the purchase of supplies
and materials needed by the college, and the
latter, then the property custodian of said college
and who had been keeping said fund under his
administration, by virtue of said instruction and
order, spend and apply the amount of P1,911.64
out of said fund for the purchase of 9991.8
gallons of gasoline, 965.1 gallons of crude oil and
131.5 gallons of SAE 30 for the use of said
college, thereby applying said amount to a public
use other than that for which it was appropriated
by Resolution No. 18 of the Board of Trustees of
said college namely, for the payment of the losses
and breakages of college instrument and
equipment incurred by students.
HELD:
No crime committed if amounts received are
applied to a public use.
To constitute the crime of illegal use of public
funds, there must be a diversion of the funds
from the purpose for which they had been

originally appropriated by law or ordinance
(Revised Penal Code, Article 220).
In the case at bar the students' payments had
not been so appropriated, because the resolution
of the college authorities that the amounts paid
by the students should be later refunded
nowhere implied that the repayment was to be
made precisely out of the moneys received, and
as the refund could be made out of any available
funds of the College, there was no appropriation
for a particular purpose that was violated by the
accused.
PARUNGAO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
197 SCRA 173, May 15, 1991
Considering that the evidence presented in the
malversation case is the same evidence that will
be presented in the event that a technical
malversation charge is later filed, the Court deems
it best to pass upon the issue of whether or not
petitioner is indeed guilty of illegal use of public
funds.
ISSUE:
Is Parungao guilty of Illegal use of public funds?
FACTS:
OSCAR PARUNGAO, Municipal Treasurer of
Porac, was charged with malversation for
appropriating and converting to his own personal
use and benefit the amount of P185,250.00.
Parungao entered a plea of not guilty. During the
pretrial conference, he admitted that he received
from the Ministry of Public Works and Highways
the amount of P185,250 known as the fund for
construction, rehabilitation, betterment and
improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of
Barangay Jalung Road located in Porac,
Pampanga. In his defense, he accounted for the
P185,250 fund, and after hearing, the
respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a decision
acquitting the petitioner of the crime of
malversation of public funds but convicting him
of the crime of illegal use of public funds.
But while the accused could be deemed to have
fully accounted for the amount in question, the
fact sticks out from the evidence that he allowed
the use of part of the funds for a purpose other
than what it was intended. The said amount of
P185,250.00 was specifically allotted for the
concreting of the barangay Jalung road in Porac,
Pampanga. Instead of applying it fully to that
particular project, he gave P59,154.41 of it to the
municipal mayor of Porac to pay the labor
payrolls of the different barangays of the
municipality, resulting in the non-completion of
the project. He thereby violated the following
provision of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code.
HELD:
A comparison of the two articles reveals that
their elements are entirely distinct and different
from the other. In malversation of public funds,
the offender misappropriates public funds for his
own personal use or allows any other person to
take such public funds for the latter’s personal
use. In technical malversation, the public officer
applies public funds under his administration
not for his or another’s personal use, but to a
public use other than that for which the fund
was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical
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malversation is, therefore, not included in nor
does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation of public funds charged in the
information. Since the acts constituting the
crime of technical malversation were not alleged
in the information, and since technical
malversation does not include, or is not included
in the crime of malversation of public funds, he
cannot resultantly be convicted of technical
malversation.
The Court has unequivocably ruled that in the
absence of law or ordinance appropriating the
CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay
Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared
guilty of the crime of illegal use of public funds.—
the use thereof for another public purpose (there,
for the payment of wages of laborers working on
projects other than the Barangay Jalung Road)
will not make Parungao guilty of violation of
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
ABDULLA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 150129, April 6, 2005
ISSUE:
Is there a presumption of criminal intent in
illegal use of funds or property cases?
FACTS:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of
illegal use of public funds, Abdulla is before the
Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Appellant’s co-accused, Aguil and Darkis, were
both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty
and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. Upon
motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan
amended Abdulla’s sentence by deleting the
temporary special disqualification imposed upon
her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this
Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime
charged.
RULING:
No. The presumption of criminal intent will not
automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public
funds for public use is per se not an unlawful
act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the
obligation of the Sulu State College to its
employees in the form of terminal leave benefits
such employees were entitled to under existing
civil service laws. In the absence of any
presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of
proving by competent evidence that appellant’s
act of paying the terminal leave benefits of
employees of the Sulu State College was done
with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the
forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by
the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment
of the terminal leave benefits of other school
teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be
held guilty of technical malversation in the
absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688
specifically appropriating said amount for
payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the
third and fourth elements of the crime defined in
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking
in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

YSIDORO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 192330, November 14, 2012
ISSUE:
Whether or not he approved the diversion of the
subject goods to a public purpose different from
their originally intended purpose
FACTS:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged
with illegal diversion of food intended for those
suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries
of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of
victims of calamities.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of
rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And
since she had already distributed food to the
mother volunteers, what remained could be
given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold
James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to
seek his approval. After explaining the situation
to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed
the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two
boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.
She also pointed out that the Supplemental
Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local
Government Units governed the distribution of
SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical
malversation when he approved the distribution
of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000
the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted
Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual
general fund for 2001. This appropriation was
based on the executive budget which allocated
P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social
Services which covers the CSAP housing
projects.
The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied
public property to a pubic purpose other than
that for which it has been appropriated by law or
ordinance.
RULING :
The crime of technical malversation as penalized
under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has
three elements: a) that the offender is an
accountable public officer; b) that he applies
public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and c) that
the public use for which such funds or property
were applied is different from the purpose for
which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance.
The creation of the two items shows the
Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate
funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual
budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods
using SFP funds, then those goods should be
used for SFP’s needs, observing the rules
prescribed for identifying the qualified
beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target
clientele of the SFP according to its manual are:
1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-
school children aged 36 months to 72 months;
and 2) the families of six members whose total
monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.
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Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he
approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their
own homes. This is technical malversation. If
Ysidoro could not legally distribute the
construction materials appropriated for the
CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP
malnourished clients neither could he distribute
the food intended for the latter to CSAP
beneficiaries.
February 24, 2018 – Article 221 – FAILURE TO
MAKE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR
PROPERTY
[NO CASE FOUND]
February 24, 2018 – Article 222 – OFFICERS
INCLUDED IN THE PRECEDING PROVISIONS
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
ALFREDO L. AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA
G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
ISSUE:
Whether or not Azarcon is considered a public
officer by reason of his designation by the BIR as
a depositary of distrained property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated
an earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and
ore." His services were contracted by the Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP). Occasionally, he engaged the services of
sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks
were left at the former's premises. From this set
of circumstances arose the present controversy.
It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of
Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the
Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose
Batausa) or his authorized representative of
Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding
the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime
Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and,
a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo
Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his
possession owned by taxpayer Ancla.
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla,
Petitioner Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in
relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
No. The Solicitor General contends that the BIR,
in effecting constructive distraint over the truck
allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring
the petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in
possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for
it, effectively designated petitioner a depositary
and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, a public
officer. This is based on the theory that
(t)he power to designate a private person who has
actual possession of a distrained property as a
depository of distrained property is necessarily

implied in the BIRs power to place the property
of a delinquent tax payer (sic) in distraint as
provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208
(formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) x x x.
We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not
applicable to the case before us simply because
the facts therein are not identical, similar or
analogous to those obtaining here. While the
cited case involved a judicial deposit of the
proceeds of the sale of attached property in the
hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with
the BIRs administrative act of effecting
constructive distraint over alleged property of
taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes,
property which was received by petitioner
Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within
the scope of that courts jurisdiction and judicial
power to constitute the judicial deposit and give
the depositary a character equivalent to that of a
public official. However, in the instant case,
while the BIR had authority to require petitioner
Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck,
the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint
Azarcon a public officer.
FLORENCIO B. CAMPOMANES v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161950 December 19, 2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not Campomanes is guilty of failure
to render accounts as defined in Article 218 in
relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Florencio B. Campomanes was the President of
the Federation International Des Echecs (FIDE),
a private international organization with offices
at Lausanne, Switzerland. The Philippine Sports
Commission submitted to FIDE a bid offer to
host the 30th Chess Olympiad of 1992 in Manila.
The PSC’s bid offer was accepted by FIDE. The
PSC, also complying with its obligations under
the bid offer, remitted to FIDE – received in
FIDE’s behalf by its President, Florencio
Campomanes – the total amount of
P12,876,008.00 in connection with the 30th
World Chess Olympiad in Manila.
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an
audit of the PSC’s transactions from March 1990
up to June 1992. During the audit, the COA
team requested for the journal and checks and
disbursements issued by the PSC pertaining to
the P12 million appropriated to defray the
organization, administration, and hosting of the
Chess Olympiad and Congress. The COA team
noticed irregularities in the claims payable to the
FIDE. The irregularities consisted of the lack of
acknowledgment receipts and of accounting
liquidation attached to the disbursement
vouchers.
HELD:
No. Campomanes is clearly not a public officer.
He is the president of the FIDE, a private foreign
corporation with whom the PSC, through
Hechanova, negotiated to conduct the 1992
Chess Olympiad and Congress in Manila. The
Sandiganbayan acknowledged that
Campomanes is not a public officer and applied
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Article 218. The Sandiganbayan enumerated
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the elements of the crime as applied to
Campomanes thus:
1. That the offender is [a] private individual.
2. That he has charge of any insular (now
national), provincial, or municipal funds,
revenues, or property or [is an] administrator or
depository of funds, property attached, seized, or
deposited by public authority, even if such
property belongs to a private individual.
3. That he is required by law or regulation to
render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or
to a provincial auditor.
4. That he fails to do so for a period of two
months after such accounts should be rendered.
Campomanes admitted that he received funds
from the PSC, through Hechanova. The exhibits
show Campomanes’ signatures in the respective
disbursement vouchers issued by the PSC and
FIDE’s letters to PSC acknowledging receipt of
the funds. Moreover, Campomanes has not
rendered an accounting of the funds even after
he received a letter dated 19 January 1994 from
COA Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria demanding
that Campomanes refund or submit a detailed
accounting to the COA covering the liquidation of
the funds that the FIDE received.
The Sandiganbayan’s decision, however, failed to
specify any law or regulation requiring
Campomanes to render accounts to the COA.
The COA has the authority to demand an
accounting from the FIDE if there is a law which
requires the PSC to ask the FIDE to render an
accounting, or if the PSC expressly required the
FIDE to render an accounting as a condition for
funding the Chess Olympiad and Congress.
Absent such law or contractual obligation, the
COA does not have the authority to audit the
accounts of non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity from the government, like the
FIDE. In the same manner, non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity from the
government, like the FIDE, are not obliged to
render an accounting to the COA if no law or
contract requires them to do so.
In the present case, the absence of the conditions
contained in Section 2(1)(d) of Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution prevents the creation of an
obligation on the FIDE’s part to render an
accounting to the PSC or the COA.
Consequently, Campomanes, as representative
of the FIDE which has no legal obligation to
render an accounting, cannot be liable under
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
February 26, 2018 – Article 223 – CONNIVING
WITH OR CONSENTING TO EVASION
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
US vs. LEON BANDINO
G.R. No. L-9964 February 11, 1915
ISSUE:
Whether or not Accused Leon Bandino was guilty
of 'connivance or consenting to evasion'?
FACTS:
On December 4, 1912, the municipal president
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, filed a written

complaint in the justice of the peace court of the
said pueblo, charging Leon Bandino with the
crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners
committed with reckless negligence. Said Leon
Bandino, accused, a municipal policeman having
under his care and guard one Juan Lescano, who
was serving a sentence in the municipal jail of
the said pueblo, did, with great carelessness and
unjustified negligence, grant him permission to
go and buy some cigarettes near the place where
he was held in custody. The prisoner, taking
advantage of the confusion in the crowd there,
fled from the custody of the accused.
HELD:
Article 358 of the Penal Code prescribes that "any
public officer guilty of connivance in the escape
of a prisoner in his custody shall be punished,"
etc. In the existence and commission of the crime
of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners, it is
essential that there should have been, on the
part of the custodian, connivance in the escape
of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with
guarding the fugitive did not connive with him,
then he did not violate the law and is not guilty
of the crime of faithlessness in the discharge of
his duty to guard the prisoner.
It may perhaps be true that the accused had no
knowledge that the prisoner Lescano would
escape, and that he did not permit him to do so,
but it is unquestionable that he did permit him
to go out of the municipal jail, thus affording him
an opportunity to get away with ease. Therefore
the prisoner's escape was effected through the
tolerance of his custodian, and is deemed also to
have been by connivance with the latter.
According to the rules established by the courts,
there is real and actual evasion of service of a
sentence when the custodian, failing
intentionally or maliciously to perform the duties
of his office, and conniving with the prisoners,
permits him to obtain a relaxation of his
imprisonment and to escape the punishment of
being deprived of his liberty, thus making the
penalty ineffectual, although the convict may not
have fled, and where the prisoner's leaving the
jail and his evasion of service of the sentence
were effected with the consent and tolerance of
the custodian, or rather in agreement and
connivance with him.
Even though the accused committed the crime of
faithlessness with carelessness, in violation of
regulations or with culpable negligence, the case
should not be dismissed nor should the crime go
unpunished.
March 8, 2018 – Article 226 – REMOVAL,
CONCEALMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS
ALILIAN, Enna B.
ZAPANTA V PEOPLE
G.R. NOS. 192698-99 APRIL 22, 2015
ISSUE:
WoN accused was guilty of violating Art 226 RPC
FACTS:
Accused, as employees of Registry of deeds,
caused the disappearance and re-issuance of
TCT NO. T-285369, and deleting the
encumbrance annotated in TCT No. T-256662,
thereby affording unwarranted benefits to one
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First Oriental Ventures, Inc., the owner of TCT
No. T-285369, to the damage and prejudice of
Manuel Ang, Sr., the mortgagee in TCT No.
256662.
RULING:
Yes. An accused may be held criminally liable of
Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under
Article 226 of the RPC, provided that the
following elements are present:
1. The offender must be a public officer
2. There must be a document abstracted,
destroyed or concealed
3. Such documents are entrusted to the public
officer by reason of his office
4. There was a damage to public interest or a
third person
Said elements are present in the case at bar.
The act of the said public officers of the Registry
of deeds caused damage to Dr. Ang and eroded
public trust and confidence in the Register of
Deeds.
Further, citing the case of Kataniag v. People,25
the Sandiganbayan wrote that damage under
Art. 226 of the RPC may also consist in mere
alarm to the public or in the alienation of its
confidence in any government agency. The
Sandiganbayan added that Atty. Gadia's act of
concealing TCT No. T-256662 constituted a
breach of trust in the official care of the said
certificate of title.
ATTY MANZANARIS V PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-64750 JANUARY 30, 1984
ISSUE:
WoN Sandiganbayan was right in finding
accused guilty even though the latter did not act
in bad faith
FACTS:
Atty Manzanaris as the Clerk of Court was found
by the Sandiganbayan to be guilty of Violation of
Art 226 of RPC for giving the certificate of title to
one accused in the Court where he was working.
Atty Manzanaris argued that he did it with a
lawful and commendable motive.
RULING:
No. To warrant a finding of guilt of the crime of
infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of
removal as a mode of committing the offense,
should be coupled with criminal intent or illicit
purpose. This calls to mind the oft-repeated
maxim "Actus non facit, nisi mens sit rea”.
February 28, 2018 – Article 231 – OPEN
DISOBEDIENCE
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND
ASEOCHE, REPRESENTED BY ITS
FOUNDING PARTNER, FRANCISCO I.
CHAVEZ, vs. ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA
G.R. No. 183014 August 7, 2013
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Fria is guilty of acts
violating article 231 Open Disobedience of the
RPC.
FACTS:
Atty. Josejina C. Fria (Atty. Fria), Branch Clerk
of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch
203, was charged for the crime of Open
Disobedience under Article 231 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110 instituted
before Branch 203. On July 29, 2005, judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff (July 29,
2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the
same case to appeal. However, Branch 203
disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered
that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the
foregoing judgment. Due to the denial of the
defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the July
29, 2005 judgment became final and executory.
In its Complaint-Affidavit dated February 12,
2006, The Law Firm alleged that as early as April
4, 2006, it had been following up on the issuance
of a writ of execution to implement the July 29,
2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria vehemently
refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing
said writ.
In her Counter-Affidavit dated June 13, 2006,
Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution
(draft writ) was not addressed to her but to
Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen (Felicen), who was
then on leave. Neither did she know who the
presiding judge would appoint as special sheriff
on Felicen’s behalf. Nevertheless, she maintained
that she need not sign the draft writ since on
April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued an
Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue
the same.
On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor issued a
Memorandum recommending, inter alia, that
Atty. Fria be indicted for the crime of Open
Disobedience. The corresponding Information
was thereafter filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 80 (MTC.
The MTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 46400 for lack of probable cause. It found
that aside from the fact that Atty. Fria is a
judicial officer, The Law Firm failed to prove the
existence of the other elements of the crime of
Open Disobedience. In particular, the second
element of the crime, i.e., that there is a
judgment, decision, or order of a superior
authority made within the scope of its
jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities,
unlikely existed since the Court already declared
as null and void the entire proceedings in Civil
Case No. 03-110 due to lack of jurisdiction. In
this regard, the MTC opined that such
nullification worked retroactively to warrant the
dismissal of the case and/or acquittal of the
accused at any stage of the proceedings.
HELD:
No. The criminal case is dismissed for lack of
probable cause.
Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may
immediately dismiss a criminal case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause, viz:
Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a)
By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10)
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days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 6 of
this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the complaint of information.
It must, however, be observed that the judge’s
power to immediately dismiss a criminal case
would only be warranted when the lack of
probable cause is clear.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public
prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that
the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only
in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record
plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is
when the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on
record shows that, more likely than not, the
crime charged has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty of the same, the
judge should not dismiss the case and thereon,
order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful
cases, however, the appropriate course of action
would be to order the presentation of additional
evidence.
Applying these principles to the case at bar
would lead to the conclusion that the MTC did
not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable
cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since
the records clearly disclose the unmistakable
absence of the integral elements of the crime of
Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e.,
that the offender is a judicial or executive officer,
concurs in view of Atty. Fria’s position as Branch
Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of
the crime evidently remain wanting.
March 2, 2018 – Article 234 – REFUSAL TO
DISCHARGE ELECTIVE OFFICE
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 4, 2018 – Article 238 – ABANDONMENT
OF OFFICE OR POSITION
ALAMEDA, Manuel
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES v CA
GR No. 118883 January 16, 1998
ISSUE
1. Whether Antonio’s resignation was complete.
2. W/N respondent abandoned his membership
in the SB.
FACTS:
Antonio, priate respondent, was elected
barangay captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes

on March 1989. He was later elected president of
the Association of Barangay Council(ABC) for the
Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983,
he was appointed by the President as Member of
the Sanguniang Bayan of the sid municipality.
Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election for
the president of the Federation of the Association
of Barangay Council(FABC) void for lack of
quorum. As a result, the provincial council was
reorganized. DILG Sec then designated private
respondent as a temporary member of the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes
effective on 15 June 1990. Because of his
designation, private respondent tendered his
resignation as a member of the Sanguniang
Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San
Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his letters were
also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG
and the municipal treasurer. Subsequently,
Aquino then the Vice President of ABC was
appointed by the provincial governor as member
of the Sanguniang Bayan in place of private
respondent. Aquino assumed office on 18 July
1980 after taking his oath. Subsequently, the
ruling of the DILG annulling the election of the
FABC president was reversed by the Supreme
Court and declared the appointment of private
respondent void for lacking the essential
qualification of being the president of FABC. On
31 March 1992, private respondent wrote to the
Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San Andres regarding
his re-assumption of his original position. SB
refused.
HELD
The resignation was not complete for lack of
acceptance thereof of the proper authority
however, an office may still be deemed
relinquished through voluntary abandonment
which needs no acceptance. In Ortiz vs Comelec,
resignation is defined as the “act of giving up of
an ifficer by which he declines his office
andrenounces the further right to use it”. It can
be express or implied. To constitute a complete
and operative resignation the folloving must be
present. (1) an intention to relinquish a part of
the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an
acceptance by the proper authority. In the case
at bar, there was no evidence that the private
respondent’s resignation was accepted by the
proper authority. Although the Local
Government Code of 1983 was silent as to who
specifically should accept the resignation it
provides that the position shall be deemed
vacated only upon acceptance of resignation and
should be acted upon by the Sangunian
concerned. The resignation letter was tendered
to the mayor and copies were sent to the
governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer but
none of them expressly acted on it. Furthermore,
under established jurisprudence, resignations,
in the absence of statutory provisions as to
whom it should be submitted, should be
submitted to the appointing power. Therefore,
the resignation should have been submitted to
the president or to the DILG as the president’s
alter ego. Tackling the second issue,
abandonment has been defined as the voluntary
relinquishment of an office by the holder, with
the intention of terminating his possession and
contro thereof. It is a species of resignation.
While resignation is the formal relinquishment,
95 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment by
non-user. There are 2 essential elements of
abandonment : (1) an intention to abandon and
(2) an overt act by which intention is carried on.
In the case at bar, the first element was
manifested on the following instances: (1) private
respondent’s failure to perform his function as
SB; (2) his failure to collect the corresponding
renumeration for the position, (3)his failure to
object to the appointment of Aquino as his
replacement to SB and (4) his prolonged failure
to initiate any act to reassume his post in the SB
after SC had nullified his designation as member
of Sanguniang Panlalawigan. The second
element was demonstrated by the following: (1)
his letter of resignation, (2) his assumption of
office as member of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his
duties and functions of SP and (4) his recept of
renumeration for such post.
JOSON III VS SANTOS
G.R. NO. 91548 JULY 13, 1990
ISSUE:
Whether or not the office of Vice-Governor of
Nueva Ecija was rendered vacant by the
voluntary resignation.
FACTS:
The controversy originated from the indefinite
sick leave that the incumbent Governor of Nueva
Ecija, Eduardo L. Joson, had to take on
December 7, 1989, thus creating a temporary
vacancy in his Office. As Vice Governor, Nario
took over as Acting Governor pursuant to the
Local Government Code l. 1 But as fate would
have it, Nario himself fell ill shortly afterwards,
and so executed a "waiver" of his "right" to the
office of Governor. Joson forthwith took his oath
as Acting Governor, on December 19, 1989. Four
(4) days later, apparently feeling that his illness
had worsened, Nario sent a letter to the Secretary
of local Governments tendering his resignation
as Vice- Governor of Nueva Ecija
RULING:
The decided weight of authority is that "apart
from legal provision, . . . mere presentation of
resignation does not work a vacancy, and a
resignation is not complete until accepted by
proper authority;" Clearly, a public officer cannot
abandon his office or position before his
resignation is accepted, but the incumbent
official would not be in a position to determine
the acceptance of his resignation unless he has
been duly notified therefor. This is not to say that
a public officer may not resign. Mechem says
that he "'may certainly resign, but without
acceptance his resignation is nothing, and he
remains in office.' He is, therefore, so far as the
rights of third persons are concerned, not only
still clothed with authority, but is subject to the
burdens of the office, and he may be compelled
to perform the duties, and is liable for their non-
performance, as before. In our jurisprudence,"
this Court has held, "acceptance is necessary for
resignation of a public officer to be operative and
effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the
penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised
Penal Code
REPUBLIC vs. WINSTON T. SINGUN

G.R. No. 149356 March 14, 2008
ISSUE:
WON Singuin is considered as resigned in his
post.
FACTS:
Singuin was the former Chief Trade and Industry
Development Specialist of DTI-RO2, Cagayan
Province. In a letter dated 20 October 1999, he
wrote Regional Director Hipolito signifying his
intention to apply for an 8 month leave of
absence starting 16 November 1999 until 31
July 2000 and to retire from the service on 1
August 2000. On 4 November 1999, respondent
filed his application for leave of absence and
early retirement. Director Hipolito denied the
request.
Director Hipolito endorsed the application to
Assistant Secretary Maglaya for comment. But
without waiting for Assistant Secretary
Maglaya’s comment, he again filed an application
for leave of absence but for a shorter period (16
November 1999 to 14 January 2000) and
signified his intention to resign effective at the
close of office hours on 14 January 2000.
According to Director Hipolito, he immediately
approved respondents application for leave of
absence and resignation and he reiterated said
approval in a memorandum dated the same day.
Director Hipolito also notified Regional Director
Soria of the CSC of his acceptance of
respondents resignation.
Undersecretary Ordoez detailed respondent to
the Office of the Undersecretary for Regional
Operations effective 17 January 2000.
On January 14, 2000, respondent informed
Director Hipolito that he was reconsidering his
earlier letter of resignation and that he decided
to wait until he could qualify for early retirement.
But according to Atty. Soria, respondent was
considered resigned effective 14 January 2000
because (1) of respondents voluntary written
notice informing Director Hipolito that he was
relinquishing his position and the effectivity date
of said resignation and (2) Director Hipolitos
acceptance of respondents resignation in writing
which indicated the date of effectivityof the
resignation. His letter withdrawing his
resignation did not automatically restore him to
his position because Director Hipolito should
first approve the withdrawal before it becomes
effective.
Singuin informed Undersecretary Ordoez that
his application for resignation was made under
duress because it was imposed by Director
Hipolito as a condition for the approval of his
application for leave of absence. His original
intention was to resign on 1 August 2000 after
completing 15 years of service in the government
it was also ineffective because he was not notified
of its acceptance for he did not receive a copy of
his approved resignation letter and Director
Hipolitos memorandum accepting his
application for resignation.
Singuin demanded from Director Hipolito the
payment of his salaries and other benefits from
1 December 1999 to 31 March 2000.
Director Hipolito answered that he was
considered resigned as of 14 January 2000
because the detail order made no mention that
its issuance meant that the acceptance of the
resignation was revoked.
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HELD:
To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, there must be: (a)
an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b)
an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance
by the proper authority.[29]
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for
resignation of a public officer to be operative and
effective. Without acceptance, resignation is
nothing and the officer remains in office.[30]
Resignation to be effective must be accepted by
competent authority, either in terms or by
something tantamount to an acceptance, such
as the appointment of the successor.[31] A
public officer cannot abandon his office before
his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer
is subject to the penal provisions of Article
238[32] of the Revised Penal Code.[33] The final
or conclusive act of a resignations acceptance is
the notice of acceptance.[34] The incumbent
official would not be in a position to determine
the acceptance of his resignation unless he had
been duly notified therefor.
In this case, the Court of Appeals and the CSC
declared that there was nothing in the records to
show that respondent was duly informed of the
acceptance of his resignation. There was no
indication that respondent received a copy of his
12 November 1999 application for leave of
absence and resignation as accepted by Director
Hipolito. Neither was there any indication that
respondent received Director Hipolitos 12
November 1999 Memorandum informing him of
the acceptance of his resignation. Therefore, we
affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
respondents resignation was incomplete and
inoperative because respondent was not notified
of the acceptance of his resignation.
Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or
offer to resign is revocable.[36] And the
resignation is not effective where it was
withdrawn before it was accepted.[37]
In this case, since respondents resignation was
not finally and conclusively accepted as he was
not duly notified of its acceptance, respondent
could validly withdraw his resignation. There
was no need for Director Hipolito to accept the
withdrawal of resignation since there was no
valid acceptance of the application of resignation
in the first place. Undersecretary Ordoez also
validly issued the detail order as respondent had
not effectively resigned from DTI-RO2.
March 4, 2018 – Article 240 – USURPATION OF
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
PEOPLE VS HILVANO
GR NO. L-8583, JUL 31, 1956
PONENTE: JUSTICE BENGZON
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Francisco Hilvano, can
be charged of usurpation of executive functions.
FACTS:
On September 22, 1952, When Mayor Fidencio
Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila
on official business, designated the herein
defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to
discharge the duties of his office. Later, Vice-
Mayor Juan Latorre found Hilvano acting in the

place of the Mayor; he served written notices to
the corresponding municipal officers, including
Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor
was assuming the duties of the absent mayor.
However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that
the Mayor had designated him. Whereupon the
Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive
Secretary informing the latter of the controversy.
Also, sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal,
who by letter (Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-
Mayor had the right to the office. Wherefore
Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted and after trial
was convicted of usurpation of public authority
under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due
time.
HELD:
Article 240 of the Revised Penal Code to read as
follows:
“Usurpation of executive functions. — Any judge
who shall assume any power pertaining to the
executive authorities, or shall obstruct the latter
in the lawful exercise of their powers, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period.”
Thus, a councilor who assumes a power
pertaining to the mayor or obstructs him in the
lawful exercise of his power is not liable under
Article 240, because only a judge can commit
usurpation of executive functions. The councilor
is liable under Article 177 of the Code, if he
assumes the power of the mayor.
March 5 2018 – Article 241 – USURPATION OF
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. FRANCISCO HILVANO
G.R. No. L-8583 JULY 31, 1956
ISSUE:
Whether or not Francisco Hilvano is guilty of
usurpation.
FACTS:
On September 22, 1952, When Mayor Fidencio
Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila
on official business, designated the herein
defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to
discharge the duties of his office. Later, Vice-
Mayor Juan Latorre found Hilvano acting in the
place of the Mayor; he served written notices to
the corresponding municipal officers, including
Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor
was assuming the duties of the absent mayor.
However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that
the Mayor had designated him. Whereupon the
Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive
Secretary informing the latter of the controversy.
Also, sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal,
who by letter (Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-
Mayor had the right to the office. Wherefore
Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted and after trial
was convicted of usurpation of public authority
under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due
time.
Hilvano contented that Articles 238-241 of the
Revised Penal Code penalize all kinds of
usurpation of official functions by public officers.
HELD:
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Yes. But in violation of Article 177 not Article 238
to 241.
Hilvano’s contention is untenable.
Said articles (Article 238-241) merely punish
interference by officers of one of the three
departments of government (legislative, executive
and judicial) with the functions of officials of
another department Said articles (Articles 238-
241) do not cover usurpation of one officer or
employee of a given department of the powers of
another officer in the same department. For
instance, the exercise by a bureau employee of
the powers of his director.
There is no excuse for Defendant-Appellant. In
the beginning he might have pleaded good faith,
invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after
he had been shown the letter of the Executive
Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal,
he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to
the position. He was rightfully convicted.
JOSE REYES y VACIO, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. Nos. 177105-06 August 12, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reyes is guilty of usurping the
judicial functions as provided by Art. 241.
FACTS:
On February 20, 1986, the IAC promulgated its
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, granting
Belen’s appeal: declaring as null and void and
without any effect whatsoever the deed of sale
executed by and between appellant Belen Lopez
vda. De Guia and defendant Carlos de Guia.
On November 8, 1988, Belen, through her
daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G.
Valenzuela (Melba), filed in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a
complaint for ejectment and collection of rents
against the tenants, entitled Belen Lopez Vda. De
Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact, Melba G.
Valenzuela vs. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia,
Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and
Santiago Sacdalan and docketed as DARAB Case
No. 034-BUL’88.
On March 16, 1993, the JOSE REYES, as
Provincial Adjudicator, rendered a decision in
DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88 entitled Belen
Lopez vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact,
Melba G. Valenzuela v. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo
Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan
and Santiago Sacdalan,11 dismissing Belen’s
complaint for ejectment and collection of rents
and affirming the respective TCTs of the tenants.
On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed two informations in the Sandiganbayan, one
charging the petitioner with a violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019, and the other with usurpation
of judicial functions under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Criminal Case No. 24656
That on or about 16 March 1993, or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan,
Philippines, above-named accused Jose V.
Reyes, a public officer being then employed as
Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in

Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance of his
official function as such and taking advantage
thereof, with full knowledge of a Decision in AC-
GR CV-02883 of the Court of Appeals, which
declared Belen de Guia as the true owner of the
lands litigated in said case, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously disregard,
obstruct and ignore the said final and executory
decision of the Court of Appeals, by rendering a
decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 thereby
favoring and emboldening the tenants-
respondents in said DARAB case to unlawfully
continue occupying the lands of Belen de Guia,
the complainant, to her damage and prejudice,
as well as to the public interest.
Arraigned on August 8, 2000, the petitioner,
assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty
to each information.
After trial, on January 15, 2007, the
Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision,22
finding the petitioner guilty of both charges; and
sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case No.
24655 (for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019),
an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from
six years and one month, as minimum, to 10
years as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from holding public office; and
(b) in Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of
judicial functions under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code), imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration on March 15, 2007.
On appeal, the petitioner insists that his
rendition of the decision did not amount to the
felony of usurpation of judicial functions.
HELD:
NO. Reyes did not commit any usurpation.
Hence, not guilty.
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:
xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correcional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any officer of the
executive branch of the government who shall
assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the
execution of any order or decision rendered by
any judge within his jurisdiction.
In usurpation of judicial function, the accused,
who is not a judge, attempts to perform an act
the authority for which the law has vested only
in a judge.44 However, the petitioner’s task as
Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered
judgment in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 was to
adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As
such, he performed a quasi-judicial function,
closely akin to the function of a judge of a court
of law. He could not be held liable under Article
241 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore,
considering that the acts constitutive of
usurpation of judicial function were lacking
herein.
March 6, 2018 – Article 243 – ORDERS OR
REQUEST BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS TO ANY
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
BORRROMEO V. MARIANO
G.R. NO. 16808 JANUARY 3, 1921
ISSUE:
WON the transfer of Judge Borromeo by the
Governor-General was valid.
98 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Andres Borromeo was appointed as judge of the
24th Judicial District (JD) on July 1, 1914. Said
appointment was accepted by Borromeo on the
same date. On February 25, 1920, he was
transferred to the 21st JD without his consent.
Under the Administrative Code, Judges of First
Instance are appointed by the Governor-General
with the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve
until they reach the age of 65 years.
HELD:
No, it was not.
Under the Administrative Code, ”a Judge of First
Instance can be removed from office by the
Governor-General only if in the judgment of the
Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist
involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in
office..”
Relatedly, Art. 243 of the Revised Penal Code
states that “Orders or request by executive
officers to any judicial authority. – Any executive
officer who shall address any order or suggestion
to any judicial authority with respect to any case
or business coming within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of justice shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos.”
It was noted that although the appointment of a
judge lies with the Executive Department (by the
Governor-General with the consent of the
Senate), the power to remove, transfer or
discipline the judges lies with the Judiciary. The
power of the Executive ceases upon the consent
of the judge to the position, to allow such action
by the Executive could be used to discipline the
judge or as an indirect means of removal thus
would violate the separation of powers between a
coordinate and equal branch of the government.
March 7, 2018 – Article 245 – ABUSES
AGAINST CHASTITY
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
G.R. NO. L-9768 FEBRUARY 20, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE,
VS.
EULALIO MORELOS, DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT
ISSUE:
Whether or not proof of solicitation is necessary
when the illicit relations were consummated.
FACTS:
The appellant, as acting warden, was in charge
of the prisoners in the Tondo police station.
Among them was a woman named Tomasa
Clemente. On the night of 18th of September
1913, he entered the cell of the woman and had
illicit relations with her.
The appellant argues that the proof fails to show
that he solicited a woman in his custody. It was
proven, however, that his illicit relations were
consummated.
HELD:
No. It would be a strange interpretation to place
upon said law, that a failure in the proof to show
a "solicitation" was sufficient to relieve the
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

defendant from responsibility, when the act

solicited was consummated.

G.R. No. L-28144 August 26, 1927

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE MARIANO, defendants-appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of abuse against
chastity is included in those cases in which
criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage
of the accused with the offended party.

FACTS:
The accused was charged with the crime of abuse
against chastity, and after trial the Court of First
Instance of Manila convicted him of said crime,
sentencing him to three years, six months and
twenty-one days prision correccional with the
accessories of the law and the costs of the action.
The accused appealed to this court from said
judgment. On August 3, 1927, he filed a motion
praying for the dismissal of the case as he had
married the offended party, according to the
marriage certificate attached to said motion.

HELD:
Yes. The intention of our Legistature in enacting
said Act No. 1773 was that the married of the
accused or convict with the offended party
should extinguish the criminal liability in the
cases of seduction, abduction and rape and
those involving offenses included in said crimes,
such as frustrated or attempted seduction,
abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the
liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver
cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger
reason, in the lesser crimes.
Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity
is not denominated rape, it is only for lack of the
intention to lie, both crimes being identical in
every other respect, though of different degrees
of gravity. For this reason, in regard to the kind
of crimes for which the Legislature wished to
provide extinction liability by reason of marriage,
abuse against chastity cannot but be held
included to the crime of rape without
misinterpreting the intention of the law, or
thwarting its lofty and wholesome purposes.
We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse
against chastity is included in the crime of rape
mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773 and,
consequently, to marriage of the accused with
the offended party in the present case has
extinguished his criminal liability.

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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

TITLE EIGHT – CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
March 8, 2018 – Article 246 – PARRICIDE
DELFIN, JENNICA GYRL G.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PILUS
SUBANO
GR. NO L-48143, SEPTEMBER 30, 1942
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pilus Subano is guilty of
parricide.
FACTS:
Pilus Subano had a quarrel with his wife,
Bankalot, when the latter refused to work in their
kaingin. Their quarrel resumed the following day
when Bankalot refused to accompany Pilus to
Macasin River to catch fish. Bankalot’s father,
Ebol and father of Pilus’ other wife, Biwang,
noticed that he went home alone that day and
that there were bloodstains on his bolo and on
its scabbard. Pilus explained that the
bloodstains were from the fish he had just cut.
Ebol asked Pilus where his daughter was but the
latter disclaimed any knowledge of her. Four
days later, Bankalot’s body was found in the
middle of Macasin River. The incident was
reported to Lieutenant Olivares to whom the case
was reported. During trial, Pilus denied killing
his wife.
HELD:
No. The facts duly established that Pilus is the
author of the crime but what he committed was
homicide and not parricide. From the testimony
of Ebol, father of the deceased, it appears that
the defendant has three wives and that the
deceased was the last in point of time. Although
the practice of polygamy is approved by custom
among these non-Christians, polygamy,
however, is not sactioned by the Marriage Law
which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals.
The deceased, under our law, is not thus the
lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes
conviction for the crime of parricide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANUEL
MACAL Y BOLASCO
G.R. NO. 211062, JANUARY 13, 2016
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
finding the accused guilty of the crime of
parricide.
2. Whether or not the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
FACTS:
Manuel and Auria Macal are married and begot
2 children. Auria’s mother, Angeles, claimed that
they were all living together in Tacloban. Angeles
testified that she was walking home with her
children, including Auria after playing bingo at a
local peryahan. Along the way, with some of their
friends, their group met Manuel who joined them
in walking back in their house. When they
arrived, the group proceeded to the living room
except for Auria and Manuel who went straight
to their bedroom. Shortly thereafter, Angeles
heard her daughter screaming for help. They
immediately tried opening the locked door. When
it was opened, they saw a bloodied Auria on one
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
side of the room. Next to her was Manuel, who
was trying to stab himself with the use of an
improvised weapon. Auria was immediately
taken to the hospital but was pronounced dead
on arrival. On the other hand, Manuel, managed
to escape before the police could reach the crime
scene. In his defense, Manuel claimed that he did
stabbed his wife but it was not intentional. He
only did that out of anger because he saw his wife
conversing with a man inside their bedroom. The
Regional Trial Court convicted Manuel of the
crime of Parricide and held that they were not
convinced that the stabbing incident was purely
accidental. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision.
HELD:
1. No. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person
is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendants or other descendants, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. Among the
three requisites, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is the most crucial. This
relationship is what actually distinguishes the
crime of parricide from homicide. In parricide
involving spouses, the best proof of the
relationship between the offender and victim is
their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also
be considered in proving the relationship
between the two as long as such proof is not
contested. In this case, the spousal relationship
between Auria and the accused-appellant is
beyond dispute. As previously stated, the
defense already admitted that Auria was the
legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during
the pre-trial conference. Such admission was
even reiterated by the accused-appellant in the
course of trial of the case. Nevertheless, the
prosecution produced a copy of the couple's
marriage certificate which the defense admitted
to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the
original.
2. Yes. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the imposable penalty for parricide
is reclusion perpetua to death. With the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346),
the imposition of the penalty of death is
prohibited. Likewise significant is the provision
found in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
stating that in the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
Applying these to the case at bar and considering
that there are no mitigating and aggravating
circumstances present, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was correctly imposed by the RTC and
CA.
March 9, 2018 – Article 247 – DEATH OR
PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
PEOPLE VS BITUANAN
G.R. No. 34510 August 31, 1931
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to the
privilege under Art 423 of of the Penal Code
(source of Art . 247 of the RPC)

FACTS:
Moro Bituanan and Mora Sabay were married by
Datu Alon according to Moro customs and
usages. According to the same customs and
usages, the Datu divorced the couple. Twenty
days afterwards, Bituanan caught Sabay and Ali
Sabpa sleeping on the same bed. Thereupon,
Bituanan attacked Ali Sabpa and Sabay, killing
the former and wounding the latter.
In the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Judge
Natividad found Bituanan guilty of the crime of
murder. It is the sole contention of counsel for
the accused, on appeal, that the decision of the
lower court should be modified by applying
article 423 of the Penal Code to the admitted
facts. Said article provides that "Any husband
who, having surprised his wife in the act of
adultery, shall kill her or her paramour in the
act, or shall inflict any serious physical injuries
upon either, shall suffer the penalty of destierro."
HELD:
The marriage of Bituanan and Sabay, performed
according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion, was valid. Granting, without necessarily
having to decide, that Bituanan and Sabay were,
accordingly, not legally divorced, it only need be
said that there is no evidence in the record
showing that Bituanan surprised Sabay and Ali
Sabpa in the act of adultery when he killed the
latter. The privilege given in article 423 of the
Penal Code extends solely to the case of a
husband who surprises his wife in the act of
actual adultery, that is, actual carnal knowledge
with her paramour. The article does not apply to
a husband who catches his wife sleeping with
another man on the same bed.
PEOPLE VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 46310 October 31, 1939
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code is applicable in this case
FACTS:
Marciano Gonzales , on returning to his house
from the woods, surprised his wife, Sixta
Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told
her that the man was the very one who used to
ask rice and food from them, and counseled her
not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife,
promised him not to do the act again. The
accused left the house and went to see his
carabaos. Upon returning to his house in the
afternoon, and not finding his wife there, he
looked for her and found her with Isabelo near
the toilet of his house in a place covered with
underbush, who was standing and buttoning his
drawers, immediately took to his heels. The
accused went after him, but unable to overtake
him, he returned to where his wife was and,
completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife
without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took
pity on her and took her dead body to his house.
The accused contends that he was entitled to the
privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code.
HELD:
The accused cannot avail himself of the aforesaid
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article, because the privilege there granted is
conditioned on the requirement that the spouse
surprise the husband or the wife in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another
person; the accused did not surprise his wife in
the very act or carnal intercourse, but after the
act, if any such there was, because from the fact
that she was rising up and the man was
buttoning his drawers, it does not necessarily
follow that a man and a woman had committed
the carnal act.
PEOPLE VS ABARCA
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abarca is entitled to the
provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code
FACTS:
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a
peephole, caught his wife having sexual
intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside
the Abarca residence. The two also caught
Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed his
pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One hour later,
Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the
gambling place where Koh usually stays and
then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died
instantaneously. However, two more persons
were shot in the adjacent room. These two other
persons survived due to timely medical
intervention.
Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of
the complex crime of murder with frustrated
double murder.
HELD:
Yes. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Any legally married person who, having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill
any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them
any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1)
that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that he
kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter. These elements are
present in this case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from
the time Abarca caught his wife with Koh and the
time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct
by-product of Abarca’s rage. Therefore, Abarca is
not liable for the death of Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he
caused to the two other persons he shot in the
adjacent room but his liability shall not be for
frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca has
no intent to kill the other two persons injured.
He was not also committing a crime when he was
firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art. 247.
Abarca was however negligent because he did
not exercise all precaution to make sure no one
else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for
less serious physical injuries through simple

negligence for the injuries suffered by the two
other persons who were in the adjacent room
when the incident happened.
PEOPLE VS OYANIB
G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March 12, 2001
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to the
privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code
FACTS:
Manolito and Tita were married and had two
children. Due to marital differences, they
separated with Manolito keeping custody of their
children. Tita lived nearby, renting a room at the
second floor of Edgardo Lladas' house. Manolito
exerted efforts towards reconciliation for the sake
of their children, but to no avail. Tita was very
reluctant to reconcile instead, she was open
about her relationship with other men and would
flaunt it in front of Manolito. One instance,
Manolito chanced upon Tita and Jesus in a very
intimate situation by a hanging bridge. He
confronted them and reminded Tita that she was
still his wife. They ignored him and threatened to
kill him. On September 4, 1995, Manolito went
to the house where Tita was staying to inform the
latter of the meeting at the school about the
failing grades of their child. Upon reaching the
house, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing)
coming from the inside. He opened the door lock
using a hunting knife and caught Tita and Jesus
having sexual intercourse, Jesus on top of Tita,
with his pants on his knees. Jesus kicked
Manolito in the cheek but the latter immediately
stabbed the former. Lladas, upon hearing a
commotion on the second floor of his house, went
to check and found Manolito stabbing Jesus
while sitting on the latter's stomach. Tita was
sprawled on the floor with her duster smeared
with blood.She died on the way to the hospital.
Jesus and Tita died of multiple stab wounds.
Accused surrendered and admitted killing his
wife and her paramour but invoked the
exceptional circumstance under Article 247 of
RPC. The trial court convicted him of homicide
and parricide with 2 mitigating circumstances:
passion/obfuscation and voluntary surrender.
HELD:
Yes. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause.
"An absolutory cause is present 'where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public
policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed.”
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes
the following essential elements for such a
defense: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
The Court found the accused to have acted
within the circumstances contemplated in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly,
accused-appellant surprised his wife and her
lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
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To the mind of the court, what actually happened
was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the
place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in
the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by
jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus
who fought off and kicked the accused. He
vented his anger on his wife when she reacted,
not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus.
Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
surrendered to the police when a call for him to
surrender was made.
March 9, 2018 – Article 248 – MURDER
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
G.R. No. L-4116 February 25, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EPIFANIO
O. VALERIO, JR., and DOMINGO ELEPAÑO
FACTS:
The case revolves around a plot of murder of an
eight-year old boy for insurance. The persistence
in the criminal design was evident from the fact
that when the insured eight-year-old waif
disappeared, another hapless substitute, whose
name is unknown to this day, was taken... to
replace the first intended victim.
Sometime in August 1972, Amador Castro
brought home a boy whom he met in a Pantranco
bus during a flood. "I will live with you to take
care of the cows" said the boy.
On November 8, 1972, accused VALERIO, one
Celestino de la Cruz and Amador Castro, while
at the latter's yard at Bo. Tamayo, San Carlos
City, conferred about obtaining life insurance on
the boy living with Castro, who would be
subsequently killed so that the policy proceeds
could be "divided 50-50"
In accordance with the aforementioned plan, and
upon instructions of VALERIO, Castro had the
boy baptized as "Amador Castro, Jr." at the San
Carlos City Roman Catholic Church with
Celestino de la Cruz as "ninong". VALERIO
waited outside the church during the ceremony.
On January 16, 1973, the insured boy left the
Castro household after losing money, through
gambling, given to him by Castro's wife to buy
something. Castro then informed De la Cruz and
VALERIO about the departure of the boy but the
latter told him "easy ka lang, steady... ka lang,
we will substitute a boy for him". VALERIO then
gave Amador Castro a boy, who began staying
with the Castros beginning March 6, 1973.
Thereafter, VALERIO, Castro and De la Cruz
planned the killing of the new boy at Lido Beach,
Cavite. VALERIO and de la Cruz told Castro that
if the plan were to be executed in Pangasinan,
they would be "mabubuko".
On March 13, 1973, Castro, his wife, their three
children, the new boy, VALERIO, De la Cruz and
accused Domingo ELEPAÑO, as driver of the
jeep, went to Lido Beach in Cavite. According to
Castro's testimony on the witness stand, he,
VALERIO, and De la Cruz together with the...
new boy went swimming. When they reached a
depth of four feet, Celestino de la Cruz who was
at the back of the boy hit the latter's head with a
piece of iron. Castro was at the left side of the
boy while VALERIO was at the boy's right side.
De la Cruz then held the boy by the... neck and

submerged him in water. VALERIO and Castro
left De la Cruz and the boy in the water. Upon
instructions of De la Cruz, Castro reported the
new boy's "loss" to the life saver in Lido Beach.
Later, the life saver found the new boy, who was
brought to the Bautista Hospital... at Cavite City.
The boy was pronounced lifeless and was not
examined anymore. The cadaver was thereafter
brought to Funeraria Popular, Manila, where it
was examined by NBI agents. Thereafter, Castro
filed a death claim on the insurance of "Amador
Castro, Jr.", which was denied because the
fingerprints of the boy insured were different
from the boy who was killed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Valerio and Elepano
are liable for murder.
RULING:
Yes, both are liable.
From inception to execution, Valerio’s active
participation was evident. He authored the idea
of securing insurance on the boy's life, killing
him and thereafter collecting the insurance
proceeds.
VALERIO was with Castro and the boy when the
latter was taken swimming to deeper waters.
Those were the categorical testimonies of Castro
and ELEPAÑO. According to ELEPAÑO,
VALERIO also assisted in funeral arrangements.
VALERIO was at the vigil of the boy until the
latter was... buried. VALERIO contributed
P100.00 for burial expenses.
But in so far as ELEPAÑO is concerned, we find
the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
only evidence linking him to the crime is found
in Castro's Statement given to the NBI on April
25, 1973, Exhibit "1". Castro,... however,
repudiated under oath and in open Court his
said Statement in so far as ELEPAÑO is
concerned and stressed that ELEPAÑO had
nothing to do with the killing.
Treachery, as alleged in the Information, must be
considered qualifying and must be appreciated
against the accused. The killing of a child is
murder even if the manner of attack was not
shown.[63] The qualifying circumstances of
treachery or "alevosia" exists in the commission
of the crime of murder when an adult person
illegally attacks a child of tender years and
causes his death.
Evident premeditation is satisfactorily
established if it is proved that the accused had
deliberately planned to commit the crime and
had persistently and... continuously followed it
notwithstanding that he had ample and
sufficient time to allow his conscience to
overcome the determination of his will, if he had
desired it, after meditation and reflection. It con-
templates cold and deep meditation and
tenacious persistence in the... accomplishment
of the criminal act.[65] In the case at bar, from
the time the insurance was taken in November,
1972, and even after the boy insured got lost, the
culprits did not relent in the pursuit of their
scheme for money culminating in the... killing of
the substitute boy and the filing of a death claim
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with the Cardinal Life Insurance Corporation.
In deciding every criminal case, the civil
responsibility incurred by the accused,
consequent upon his criminal liability, must be
declared because every person criminally liable
is also civilly liable.
March 9, 2018 – Article 249 – HOMICIDE
DUQUE, Francis Lester M
[G.R. No. CA-263. August 19, 1948.]
People v. TIMOTEO PENESA, Defendant-
Appellant.
FACTS:
Timoteo Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived, as
husband and wife, Their daughter and five
children of Rosario by her late husband lived
with them. Due to continuous wrangles between
Timoteo and Rosario’s children by her late
husband, both agreed to part. Timoteo left the
house. The following day, Timoteo returned to
the house and asked Rosario to live with him in
another place. The request was refused. Santiago
Cerrado, a cousin of Rosario, came to the house
and, upon seeing Timoteo, asked the latter why
he was there after they had agreed to live apart.
Angered by this remark, Timoteo unsheated his
bolo and assaulted Santiago. Crescencio Doro,
the eldest son of Rosario, who tried to prevent
another blow upon Santiago and had made a
remark similar to that of Santiago before the
latter came to the house, was also assaulted by
Timoteo. At this juncture, Rosario went down
through the stairway, preceded by Santiago.
Crescencio and Timoteo grappled for the
possession of the bolo and both fell to the floor.
A brother of Rosario appeared upon the scene
and snatched the bolo and a dagger from the
hands of Timoteo. As a result of the assault upon
Santiago Cerrado, three wounds were inflicted
upon him, one on the left forearm and another
under the left axilla. They were not serious but
the one in the left palm was serious and, if the
hemorrhage was not stopped, it would have
resulted in Crescencio’s death. Trial court found
Timoteo Penesa guilty of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
WON Timoteo has intent to kill
HELD:
No. The SC ruled that when Timoteo went to the
house of Rosario, it was not with the intention to
kill anybody, for he went there to entreat Rosario
Aguillon to live with him in another house. The
bolo with which the appellant inflicted was one
ordinarily used by farm laborers. The dagger was
carried for self-defense. The wounds inflicted
upon the offended parties by the appellant were
caused indiscriminately and not deliberately.
Appellant’s purpose in going to the house, and
not the kind of weapons he carried, nor the parts
of the victims’ bodies on which the wounds were
inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and
determinative of his intent. The accused was
convicted only of slight physical injuries.
G.R. No. L-17666 June 30, 1966
ISIDORO MONDRAGON vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:

While complainant Serapion Nacionales was
opening the dike of his ricefield, he heard a shout
from afar telling him not to open the dike,
Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the
same voice shouted again, "Don't you dare open
the dike." When he looked up, he saw Isidoro
Mondragon coming towards him. Nacionales
informed appellant that he was opening the dike
because he would plant the next morning.
Without much ado appellant punched the
compalinant but the latter was able to dodge.
Petitioner then drew his bolo and struck
complainant on different parts of his body.
Complainant backed out, unsheathed his own
bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and
forearm and between the middle and ring fingers
in order to defend himself. Trial court found the
petitioner guilty of attempted homicide
ISSUE:
WON the facts established do not show that
petitioner has the intent to kill
HELD:
Yes. SC finds that the intention of the petitioner
to kill the offended party has not been
conclusively shown. It may be assumed that the
petitioner drew his bolo and hit the offended
party with it only when the offended party had
shown a defiant attitude, considering that the
complainant himself had a bolo, as in fact the
offended party had also drawn his bolo and hit
the petitioner with it.
Pertinent testimony is as follows (Petitioner was
asked):
QUESTION: In other words you want to tell us
that you will do everything you could to stop
Nacionales digging the canal, because you need
water? ANSWER - Yes, sir, because I need the
water.
The answer of the petitioner is not a categorical
statement of an intention on his part to kill the
offended party. The term "will do everything" has
a broad meaning and it should be construed in a
manner as to give the petitioner the benefit of the
doubt as to what he really meant to do.
1Petitioner was guilty only of less serious
physical injuries.
The intent to kill being an essential element of
the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide,
said element must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. That element must be
proved with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The
inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in
the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove
such intent beyond reasonable doubt (People vs.
Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488).
G.R. No. 1509 February 16, 1904
THE UNITED STATES vs. NICOLAS GLORIA,
defendant-appellant.
Intent to kill is a conclusive presumption when
death resulted.
FACTS:
Nicolas Gloria had a quarrel with Tiburcio de la
Cruz which was followed by a fight. In the course
of the struggle, Gloria inflicted upon Cruz with a
pocketknife he was carrying, a wound in the left
side of the trunk above the abdomen, from which
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wound the said Dela Cruz died. Romualdo
Asuncion testified that the deceased himself told
him that the wound had been inflicted by Nicolas
Gloria. In view of the evidence for the
prosecution, the judge decided that the facts
constituted the crime of assault (lesiones) or
physical injuries.
ISSUE:
WON the judge is correct finding the accused
guilty of lesiones since there be no clear showing
of intent to kill.
HELD:
No. The crime must be classified as homicide and
not as assault (lesiones), notwithstanding the
opinion of the trial judge. All acts punished by
the law are presumed to be voluntarily in the
absence of proof to the contrary. With respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the
unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible
for all the consequences thereof.
G.R. No. L-2095 , January 28, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
FAUSTO CLAMANIA
FACTS:
Apolinario Inciso and Modesto Delantar, two
witnesses for the prosecution, testified in
substance that on the night of September 26,
1942, in barrio Lawaan, Balangiga, Samar, they
were forced by the accused at the point of a
revolver to accompany him to the beach. At the
beach they saw Juan Grafil and Apolinario
Gahoy in a boat with their hands tied behind
their backs. With Apolinario Inciso at helm,
Delantar and the accused rowed the boat with
the victims on board to Can-usod Island. There,
Grafil and Gahoy were taken ashore and beaten
to death by Fausto Clamania with an oar. After
Grafil and Gahoy were killed the accused ripped
their abdomens to let out the bowels, attached
stones as weights to the bodies, tied the bodies
to the craft, and then hauled them to deep water
where they were released.
As above stated, the defendant admitted the
above testimony, except that which says he had
a firearm and coerced the prosecution witnesses
into following him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused is liable for
murder.
2. Whether or not the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime, uninhabited place and
ensañamiento found by the trial court were
erroneously appreciated.
RULING:
Yes, accused Clamania is liable for murder.
The Court agree with the Solicitor General that
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
uninhabited place and ensañamiento found by
the trial court, have been erroneously
appreciated. Nocturnity is absorbed by treachery
by which the killing is qualified; there is no proof
that Can-usod Island was uninhabited, and the
disemboweling of the deceased was not an
unnecessary mutilation or deliberate and
wanton augmentation of the suffering of the
offended parties. For when the disemboweling

was affected, the victims were already dead, and
the operation was conceived solely for the
purpose of facilitating the sinking of the cadavers
and preventing their discovery.
G.R. No. 121828, June 27, 2003
PEOPLE vs, PILOLA
FACTS:
On February 5, 1988 11:30 pm: Elisa Rolan was
inside their store waiting for her husband to
arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were
drinking beer. Although already drunk, Edmar
Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba joined them. Edmar
had a heated argument with Julian. Elisa
pacified Edmar and advised them to go home as
she was already going to close up. Edmar and
Odilon left then returned to block Joselito and
Julian. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and
punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: “Tama
na. Tama na” but she was ignored as they
continued until they reached the end of the
street. Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile
of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and
Julian swapped punches. As Joselito tried to
stop the fight, Odilon pulled out his knife with
his right hand and stepped down from his perch.
He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck,
and stabbed him. Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola,
who were across the street, saw their gangmate
Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join
the fray. Ronnie took a knife from the kitchen of
Teresita and rushed together with Pilola to the
scene and stabbed Joselito. As Joeslito was
stabbed 11 times (6 fatal stab wounds), he fell in
the canal. Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie
went after Julian who ran dear life. When Julian
noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after
him, he looked back and saw Ronnie pick up a
piece of hollow block and bashed Joselito’s head.
Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and
struck Joselito once more before fleing from the
scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to
Joselito’s house and informed his wife and
brother of the incident.
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw
Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito and fled
towards the direction of the mental hospital. She
did not see Odilon.
Elisa cross-examination had an inconsistency,
she stated that it was Edmar who struck the
victim (before it was Ronnie)
RTC: Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pilola is guilty of murder.
HELD:
YES. Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
The identity of the person who hit the victim with
a hollow block is of de minimis importance.
Elisa’s testimony is corroborated by the autopsy
report of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz. No showing of
any improper motive on the part of a witness to
testify falsely against the accused or to falsely
implicate the latter in the commission of the
crime. The trial court gave credence and full
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probative weight to Elisa’s testimony.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal
liability must be proved separately from and with
the same quantum of proof as the crime itself.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are
essential features of a successful conspiracy. It
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the
crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be
implied if it is proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. There may be
conspiracy even if an offender does not know the
identities of the other offenders, and even though
he is not aware of all the details of the plan of
operation or was not in on the scheme from the
beginning. One need only to knowingly
contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One
who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts
as his own the criminal designs of his co-
conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the
conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since in contemplation of law, the
act of one would be the act of all. Each of the
conspirators is the agent of all the others.
The mere presence of an accused at the situs of
the crime will not suffice. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with
a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. Even if two or more offenders do
not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they
may be held criminally liable as principals by
direct participation if they perform overt acts
which mediately or immediately cause or
accelerate the death of the victim. Art. 4.
Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
o 1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
Art. 18. Accomplices. – Accomplices are the
persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.
o To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must concur:
1. the community of criminal design; that is,
knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in
his purpose;
2. the performance of previous or simultaneous
acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime
Accomplices come to know about the criminal
resolution of the principal by direct participation

after the principal has reached the decision to
commit the felony and only then does the
accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime
should be committed; they merely assent to the
plan of the principal by direct participation and
cooperate in its accomplishment
However, where one cooperates in the
commission of the crime by performing overt acts
which by themselves are acts of execution, he is
a principal by direct participation, and not
merely an accomplice. Odilon all by himself
initially decided to stab the victim. However,
while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the
appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt
acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the Pilola before,
during, and after the stabbing incident
indubitably show that they conspired to kill the
victim. Since the victim is not yet dead, the crime
is not yet consummated so Pilola is a principal
by direct participation.
Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in
a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to
concoct but hard to disprove. To serve as basis
for acquittal, it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. For it to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was absent
from the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been present then.
Pilola knew that he was charged for the stabbing
but instead of surrendering to the police
authorities, he evaded arrest and this flight is
evidence of his guilt.
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is
the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on his
part - attack on the unarmed victim was sudden.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by treachery.
March 10, 2018 – Article 250 – PENALTY FOR
FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE, MURDER OR
HOMICIDE.
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
UNITED STATES VS CANDIDO POBLETE
GR NO. L-4354. MARCH 25, 1908
ISSUE:
Whether the court can imposed penalty lower
than what was being prescribed by law?
FACTS:
On the morning of May 19, 1907, a 19 year old
woman together with her two companions were
walking in the direction of the church.
Unexpectedly they met the accused when they
are nearing the parish house who immediately
seized the victim and attacked her chest, back,
sides, arms and thighs.Although she fell to the
ground senseless the accused continued
attacking her. The victim's companions
attempted to help but they were also attacked by
the accused. The victim sustained sixteen
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wounds but through the assistance of a military
surgeon in the hospital she was able to survived.
The wounds healed in about three weeks.
HELD:
Yes. After taking into consideration the
circumstances of the deed, and in the present
case the trivial nature of the wounds inflicted
upon the injuref party, which were cured in less
than one month, Article 407 of the Penal Code
(Article 250 RPC) authorizes courts to punish,
within their rational discretion, the crime of
frustrated murder with a penalty lower by one
degree, imposing in its medium grade the penalty
of presidio correccional in its maximum degree to
presidio mayor in its medium grade, which is the
penalty next lower to that imposed by Article 65
of the Penal Code ( Article 50 RPC).
March 10, 2018 – Article 251 – DEATH
CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 10, 2018 – Article 252 – PHYSICAL
INJURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 10, 2018 – Article 253 – GIVING
ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 15, 2018 – Article 254 – DISCHARGE OF
FIREARMS
NASH, Regina Mercado
GERONIMO DADO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO.
131421)
November 18, 2002
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of homicide instead of
illegal discharge of firearm only.
FACTS:
The present case is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and
Francisc o Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
The information charged both Dado and Eraso
with murder allegedly committed by said the
accused armed with firearms, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and treachery, and
shot Silvestre Balinas thereby in flicting gunshot
wounds upon the latter which caused his instant
death.The antecedent facts as narrated by
prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas and Rufo
Alga wereas follows:
On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza,
Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three
teams to intercept some cattle rustlers. The
Team composed of the petitioner SPO4Geronimo
Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso,
AflredoBalinas and Rufo Alga waitedbehind a

large dike. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who
were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, were
positioned between the petitioner, who was
armed with a caliber .45 pistol, andaccused
Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16
armalite rifle. At around 11:00 of that
sameevening, the team saw somebody
approaching at a distance of 50 meters. When he
was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo
Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso was
making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to
wait, but before Balinas could beam his
flashlight, Eraso firedhis M16 armalite rifle at the
approaching man. Immediately thereafter,
petitioner fired a singleshot from his .45 caliber
pistol. The victim turned out to be Silvestre
―Butsoy‖ Balinas, thenephew of Alfredo Balinas.
Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas to show his
repentance for his deed.
HELD:
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found that conspirac
yattended the commission of the crime. The
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner Dado and
accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased,
thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who
caused the fatal wound in as much as conspiracy
makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
Although the agreement need not be directly
proven, circumstantial evidence of such
agreement must nonetheless be convincingly
shown. In the case at bar, petitioner and accused
Eraso’s seemingly concerted and almost
simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous
reaction rather than the result of a common plan
to ki ll the victim. Evidently, the prosecution
failed to prove that the metallic fragments found
in the fatal wound of the victim were particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45
caliber pistol fired by petitioner. Hence, the
Supreme Court set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of
petitioner for the crime of homicide and acquitted
the petitioner of the crime charged on the ground
of reasonable doubt. A new decision was entered
finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11)
months of prision correccional, as maximum
penalty.
March 11, 2018 – Article 255 – INFANTICIDE
OLACO, Jan- Lawrence P.
PEOPLE VS. JOSEFINA BANDIAN
G.R. NO. 45186 SEPTEMBER 30, 1936
FACTS:
One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor,
Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to
respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later,
Bandian emerged from the thicket with her
clothes stained with blood both in the front and
back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not
being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid,
he brought her to her house and placed her on
the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help
them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe
near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before. She
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claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno
declared that the appellant gave birth in her own
house and three her child into the thicket to kill
it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bandian is guilty of infanticide
HELD:
No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to
be punishable, must be committed willfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission.
The evidence does not show that the appellant,
in causing her child’s death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did
so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had
no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to
death, because her affair with a former lover,
which was not unknown to her second lover,
Kirol, took place three years before the incident;
her married life with Kirol—she considers him
her husband as he considers him his wife—
began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial,
he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and
that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the
child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be
ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth,
or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was
unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which
cause may be considered lawful or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting
circumstance, to take her child from the thicket
where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing
its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child
in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than
that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she could not be blamed
because it all happened by mere accident, with
no fault or intention on her part. The law
exempts from liability any person who so acts
and behaves under such circumstances (Art.
12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances in her favor, she is
acquitted of the crime that she had been accused
of.
PEOPLE VS SEVERA JACA AND PROCESO
RASALAN
G.R. NO. L-34866 AUGUST 18, 1931
FACTS:
On November 1930, the above-named accused,
Severa Jaca and Proceso Rasalan, aiding and
abetting each other for the purpose of concealing
the dishonor of said Severa Jaca, did willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously put to death the child
which she had given birth to, before it was 3 days
old. Having heard the case, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) acquitted Severa Jaca, but
convicted Proceso Rasalan of the crime charged
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Proceso
Rasalan appealed from this sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imputed upon
Rasalan was correct.

HELD:
YES. There is no dispute about the fact that
Severa Jaca's new-born baby die a violent death;
this has been sufficiently proved. The evidence
for the prosecution points to Proceso Rasalan as
the offender, that two eyewitnesses, both of them
related to the appellant, the first by consaguinity
and the second by affinity, testified that Rasalan
wrapped up the baby in a cloth which
asphyxiated it — resulting in its death. Tomas
Jaca, the appellant's father-in-law, testified that
when the latter handed to him the corpse of the
newly-born child in order that he might secretly
throw it into the river, the accused revealed to
him that he, Rasalan, had killed it in order to
conceal the dishonor of Severa Jaca. The
defendant questions the veracity of these three
witnesses, alleging that they had a grievance
against him and his family. The grievance
mentioned was not sufficient to make the
witnesses tell a falsehood in accusing their own
relative of so serious crime.
Moreover, as it has been established in the
record that the crime charged was committed,
and that the defendant committed it; that,
inasmuch as he is not an ascendant of the dead
child, he has incurred, according to the law the
penalty for murder and is guilty of this crime.
Hence, the penalty imputed is correct as against
to Rasalan.
March 12, 2018 – Article 256 – INTENTIONAL
ABORTION
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
UNITED STATES V. MARIANO BOSTON
G.R. NO. L-4795 (NOVEMBER 23, 1908)
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Boston should be liable
of Intentional Abortion
FACTS:
In this case, the child was born three months in
advance of the full period of gestation. The
accused Boston, believing that the child in the
womb of the woman was a sort of a fish-demon
(which he called a balat), gave to her a portion
composed of herbs, for the purpose of relieving
her of this alleged fish-demon. Two hours after,
she gave premature birth to a child.
After the birth of the child, Boston, with the
permission and aid of the husband and the
brother of the infant child, destroyed it by fire in
order to prevent its doing, which the Boston
believed it was capable of doing.
HELD:
Yes. The guilt of appellant is conclusively
established by the evidence of record, the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution
leaving no room for reasonable doubt. These
facts constitute, in our opinion, prima facie proof
of the intent of the accused in giving the herb
potion to the mother of the child, and also of the
further fact that the herb potion so administered
to her was the cause of its premature birth. The
defense wholly failed to rebut this testimony of
this prosecution and we are of opinion, therefore,
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that the trial court with which he was charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE V. FILOMENO SALUFRANIA
G.R. NO. L-50884 (MARCH 30, 1988)
ISSUE
Whether or not Salufrania should be liable with
the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion
FACTS
The accused Salufrania was found guilty by the
trial court of the complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion. Several witnesses were
presented by the prosecution and the defense
throughout the trial. Pedro Salufrania, son of the
accused, was one of the witnesses of the
prosecution which stated that he saw his father
box his pregnant mother on the stomach and,
once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her
to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes
and nose of his mother and that she died right
on the spot where she fell.
HELD
No. The accused Salufrania should not be held
guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of
Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The
elements of Unintentional Abortion are as
follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant
woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the fetus
dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled therefrom.
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that
appellant intended to cause an abortion because
he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which
caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find
that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has
not been sufficiently established.
Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with
the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight,
is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause
an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely
intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to
cause an abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes
beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno
Salufrania committed and should be held liable
for the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion.
March 12, 2018 – Article 257 –
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
U.S VS. JEFFREY
15 PHIL 394 MARCH 5, 1910
ISSUE:
W/N Jeffrey was liable under Art. 257 of the RPC
FACTS:

On the evening of March 1, 1909, while
Teodorica Saguinsin was in a Chinese shop
situated in Guadalupe, municipality of San
Pedro Macati, Rizal Province, a man named D. B.
Jeffrey appeared therein, and, without any
apparent reason whatever, struck the woman
three times on the hip with a bottle that he was
carrying, in consequence of which the woman fell
to the ground with an abundant hemorrhage
from the womb; she was immediately taken to
her home in a carretela, and being three months
pregnant she had a miscarriage on the following
day, according to the examination made by the
president of the municipal board of health. The
woman was ill and unable to attend to her usual
duties for forty-five days.
HELD:
Yes. Even though it was not the criminal intent
of the defendant to cause the abortion, the fact
that, without any apparent reason whatever, he
maltreated Teodorica Saguinsin, presumably not
knowing that she was pregnant, as author of the
abuse which caused the miscarriage, he is liable
not only for such maltreatment but also for the
consequences thereof, to wit, for the abortion;
and it was also proven that on the said occasion
the defendant was drunk, which circumstance
explains how he came to strike the woman with
a bottle without any known motive. It does not
appear that he is a habitual drunkard. The
penalty of prision correccional as fixed by the
aforesaid article should be imposed upon him in
the minimum degree, there being no aggravating
circumstance to counteract its effect.
PEOPLE VS. GENOVES
G.R. NO. L-42819, APRIL 15, 1935
ISSUE:
W/N there can be a complex crime of homicide
with abortion
FACTS:
In the morning of the 28th of May, 1934,
appellant and deceased Soledad Rivera were
laborers in adjoining cane fields. Soledad
claimed that the yoke of the plow which appellant
was repairing belonged to her and tried to take it
by force. Appellant struck her with his fist,
causing her to fall to the ground. She got up and
returned to the fray, whereupon she received
another blow with the fist on the left cheek which
caused her again to fall to the ground.
Immediately after the incident deceased
proceeded to the municipal building, a distance
of about four kilometers, and complained to the
chief of police about the maltreatment. At the
time Soledad was heavy with child, and as she
complained to the chief of police of pain in the
abdomen, she was seen by the president of the
sanitary district. According to testimony
deceased was in good health the day before.
From the time of the incident there was
hemorrhage and pain which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Deceased remained in this
condition until June 10, 1934. On that date the
condition culminated in the painful and difficult
premature delivery of one of the twin babies that
she way carrying, but the other baby could be
delivered. Both babies were dead.
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HELD:
Yes. Appellant was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex
crime of homicide with abortion.
The first assignment of error is the contention of
appellant that the death of the offended party
was not the direct result of the assault upon her
by the defendant. It is generally known that a fall
is liable to cause premature delivery, and the
evidence shows a complete sequel of events from
the assault to her death. The accused must be
held responsible for the natural consequences of
his act.
The other defense is that the accused did not
strike the deceased, but this fact is clearly
established by the prosecution. We find the
mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and
provocation, as the offended party by force
induced the appellant to use force on his part.
The abortion in this case is unintentional
abortion denounced by article 257 of the Revised
Penal Code. On the whole case, the period of
confinement is fixed at twelve years and one day
to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal.
GELIG VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 173150, JULY 28, 2010
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner can be convicted of
Unintentional Abortion.
FACTS:
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the
morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning
from Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy
while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the
cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to
fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias
violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in
her maxillary area, as shown by a medical
certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General
Hospital. However, Gemma continued to
experience abdominal pains and started bleeding
two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981,
she was admitted in the Southern Islands
Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to
have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly,
a medical certificate was issued.
HELD:
No. The prosecutions success in proving that
Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does
not necessarily mean that the same physical
force she employed on Gemma also resulted in
the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no
evidence on record to prove that the slapping and
pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on
July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the
abortion. While the medical certificate of
Gemmas attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca
(Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to prove
that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in
the document to prove that her medical
condition was a direct consequence of the July
17, 1981 incident. It was therefore vital for the
prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was

competent to establish a link, if any, between
Lydias assault and Gemmas abortion. Without
her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the
exact effect of the assault on Gemmas abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted
and confined in a hospital for incomplete
abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days
after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of
time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of
the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct
outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and
abdominal pain two days after the said incident
were not substantiated by proof other than her
testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the
abortion may have been the result of other
factors.
March 12, 2018 – Article 258 – ABORTION
PRACTICED BY THE WOMAN HERSELF OR BY
HER PARENTS.
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 13, 2018 – Article 259 – ABORTION
PRACTICED BY A PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE
AND DISPENSING OF ABORTIVES
RIVERA, Marynit P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 14, 2018 – Article 260 –
RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN A
DUEL
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 13, 2018 – Article 261 – CHALLENGING
TO A DUEL
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
PEOPLE VS RAMY VALLES
G.R. NO. 110564. JANUARY 28, 1997
ISSUE:
Is the crime of challenging to a duel committed?
FACTS:
The victim, Elmer Porcullo, [4]who was a worker
of Sta. Monica Canning Corporation went there
to collect his salary with two of his co-employees,
Rizza Pelegrino and Paulita Palencia. Upon
reaching the gate of Sta. Monica. Rizza and
Paulita were allowed by the security guards to
enter the compound of the company, but not
Porcullo who was prohibited by the accused
Ramy Valles, a security guard of the company,
since the former was only wearing "sando" and
pants and had no identification card to present
which was in violation of the company rules
requiring employees to enter the company's
premises in proper uniform. Porcullo then
approached Valles not only once but four times
insisting to get inside the compound of the
company, it was at the third and fourth time that
Porcullo got mad and started insulting Valles.
Porcullo berated Valles and challenged him to go
out of the compound and have a fist fight with
him. Porcullo then pointed his finger at Valles
and said “Putang ina mo, akala mo sino ka, hindi
mo ba alam na ex-army ako?”
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When Porcullo turned and walked away from
Valles, the latter without warning shot Porcullo.
He turned sideways to look at his wound but,
again, he was shot by the accused. The victim
sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, one on the
left buttock and the other was below the right
armpit.
HELD:
NO. The act of berating and challenging Valles to
a fistfight apparently incited the fury of the
accused-appellant, and, at this instance,
Porcullo should naturally expect and anticipate
the possible consequences of his rebellious acts
like the consequent retaliation by the accused-
appellant against his life. He courted obvious
danger, and when it came, it can not be defined
as sudden, unexpected and unforeseen. It
entitled Valles to the mitigating circumstance of
obfuscation.
March 14, 2018 – Article 262 – MUTILATION
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL
BORCE
G.R. No. 124131 April 22, 1998
FACTS:
Samuel Borce was convicted for Rape and
Frustrated Murder.
For Rape:
That on April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in
the morning, at the hill of the western part of
Bariquir, Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of
Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines with lewd
design and with the use of deadly weapon, raped
REGINA BAGA against her will and consent and
this was repeated for the second time around, to
the great damage and prejudice.
For Frustrated Murder:
That on April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in
the morning, at the hill of the western part of
Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Bangued,
Province of Abra, Philippines SAMUEL BORCE,
hack the face of one REGINA BAGA, inflicting
multiple hack wounds on her face, by reason of
the timely medical attendance rendered to said
victim which prevented her death.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of Mutilation under Article 262 is
committed?
HELD:
No. Crime of Rape was committed.
In fine, relevant to the case at bar, when the
crime of rape is committed "with the use of a
deadly weapon," the penalty prescribed is
reclusion perpetua to death. The death penalty
is imposed when by reason or on the occasion of
rape, the victim has suffered "permanent
physical mutilation."
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. —

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with
the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has become insane, the penalty shall
be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.The imposition of the death penalty
on accused-appellant by the trial court on each
count of rape has been premised on the infliction
of three scars on the victim's face.
The phrase "permanent physical mutilation" has
not been defined in the law. Neither Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, nor any of the chapters
in Title Eleven, entitled "Crimes against
Chastity," provides any further clue on the
meaning that should be given to the term. In Title
Eight on "Crimes against Persons,"14 the Code
simply states in Article 262 thereof that —
Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of from
reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall intentionally mutilate another
by depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
No specific ascription having been given by the
law to the word, "mutilation" must perforce be
understood in its generic sense and ordinary
usage. Webster15 defines mutilation as cutting
off or permanently destroying a limb or an
essential part thereof. Black16 defines the term,
in its criminal law concept, as one that would
deprive a person of the use of any of those limbs
which may be useful to him in fight, the loss of
which amounts to mayhem.
A thorough reading of the records of the case
would fail to disclose that accused-appellant
inflicted the wounds on the victim deliberately to
maim her. It would, in fact, appear that the
victim sustained the wounds only as a result of
a clear attempt by appellant to kill her and cover-
up his misdeeds. The injury thus borne by
private complainant should not be taken as a
circumstance which would raise the penalty to
death for the crime of rape but should instead
rightly be taken up and absorbed in the crime of
frustrated murder.
March 14, 2018 – Article 263 – SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
US VS ANDRES VILLANUEVA GR. NO. 10606,
SEP 11, 1915. 31 PHIL. 412
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty
FACTS:
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Villanueva is charged "while quarreling with his
opponent, Isidoro Benter, with having suddenly
snatched the bolo which the latter was carrying
at his belt and with it inflicting upon him a
wound in the palm of the right hand that
incapacitated the aggrieved party from
performing work for more than thirty days and
which rendered the said principal member
entirely useless."
But it turns out that Villanueva was not Benter's
opponent nor was there any quarrel between the
two. Neither did Villanueva inflict any wound
upon Benter. The latter injured himself by an
accident arising out of his own act.
Benter testified that he agreed to take Villanueva
to the town of Pola in his boat. At the landing,
Villanueva took hold of the bolo which
complainant carried at his belt. The complainant
tried to retain it and that in doing so he caught
it by the blade and cut himself in the palm of the
right hand; that without a word being said the
complainant left.
Benter was able to testify that the wound delayed
in healing for more than forty days.
The trial court opined that the act constitutes
lesiones graves by reckless negligence under
Article 568 of the Penal Code.
RULING:
NO.
The law speaks of a person who by reckless
imprudence commits an act which, if maliciously
performed, would constitute a grave felony. (Art.
568, Penal Code.) But the act of the accused in
the case at bar does not constitute a felony,
grave, or menos grave, nor is it a misdemeanor.
The only act which he performed was to take, or
attempt to take, from its sheath the bolo which
Benter was carrying at his belt, and that was an
act which is not defined in any law as being a
crime ov misdemeanor.
The defendant did not wound Benter. It was the
latter who, by his own act in catching hold of the
edge of the blade of the bolo, wounded himself,
or as is said in the judgment appealed from, the
bolo, by its edge or by its own weight, in slipping
from Benteu's hand into the scabbard because
he did not grasp it firmly, wounded Benter; the
bolo did this, not the defendant.
The crime of lesiones graves (physical injuries)
which the trial court understands to be
committed without malice or with reckless
imprudence is thus classified in article 416 of the
Penal Code: "Any person who shall wound, beat,
or assault another * * * shall suffer: 1. * * *. 2.
The penalty of prision etc., if in consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted the injured person
shall have lost an eye or any principal member,
etc."
The defendant did not wound, beat, or assault
Benter; consequently he cannot be guilty of the
crime of inflicting serious physical injuries, not
even by reckless imprudence.
S/SGT. CORNELIO PAMAN, PETITIONER, V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 210129, JULY 05, 2017

ISSUE:
Whether or not Paman is guilty
FACTS:
On October 14, 2004, at about 1:20 p.m., Ursicio
Arambala (Arambala) was on board a motorcycle
traversing Roxas Street, Pagadian City towards
the direction of the Southern Mindanao Colleges
Main Campus. When he was nearing the
intersection of Roxas and Broca Streets in
Pagadian City, a multicab driven by S/Sgt.
Cornelio Paman (Paman), a military personnel,
crossed his path and collided with his
motorcycle. Arambala was thrown from his
motorcycle thus hitting his head on the road
pavement. Emilda Salabit, who was then
standing beside the road, saw Arambala being
thrown away after the collision; she went to
Arambala and hailed a tricycle and rushed him
to the hospital.
A Computed Tomography Scan report shows that
Arambala suffered hematoma at the cerebral
portion of his brain. After his confinement at the
Mercy Community Hospital on October 15, 2004,
Arambala was again admitted on October 24,
2004 at the Zamboanga del Sur Provincial
Hospital due to erratic blood pressure and
slurring speech caused by the hematoma.
On February 21, 2005, an Information for the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries was filed.
The MTCC found Paman guilty.
The RTC reversed MTCC decision. RTC pointed
out that Arambala was the cause of the collision
since he already saw the multicab driven by
Paman ahead of time; that he had the
opportunity to take precaution to avoid the
accident, but he failed to do so.
The CA reversed RTC decision.
RULING:
YES.
A perusal of the records of this case clearly shows
that it was Paman who was at fault since he was
driving at the wrong side of the road when the
collision happened. The CA observed that the
evidence indubitably shows that before the
collision, Arambala's motorcycle was cruising
along its rightful lane when S/Sgt. Paman's
multicab suddenly crossed his (Arambala) path
coming from his left side using the wrong lane to
cross the said intersection. The accident would
not have happened had S/Sgt. Paman, the
multicab driver, stayed on his lane and did not
overtake the vehicle of the private complainant
Ararnbala.
Paman's act of driving on the wrong side of the
road, in an attempt to overtake the motorcycle
driven by Arambala, and suddenly crossing the
path which is being traversed by the latter, is
sheer negligence. It is a settled rule that a driver
abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road
is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot
do so in safety. If, after attempting to pass, the
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driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that he
cannot make the passage in safety, the latter
must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger
of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if
necessary.20 This rule is consistent with Section
4l(a) of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code.
Here, Paman was violating a traffic regulation,
i.e., driving on the wrong side of the road, at the
time of the collision. He is thus presumed to be
negligent at the time of the incident, which
presumption he failed to overcome. For failing to
observe the duty of diligence and care imposed
on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane,
Paman, as correctly held by the CA, must be held
liable.
Nevertheless, there is a need to modify the
penalty imposed by the CA.
Under Article 263(4) of the RPC, the penalty for
serious physical injuries, when the injuries
inflicted caused incapacity for more than 30
days, is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period; the
maximum period of the foregoing penalty -
prision correccional in its minimum period - is
merely a correctional penalty and, thus, should
be considered a less grave felony.
Accordingly, pursuant to Article 365 of the RPC,
Paman should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to
four (4) months. Since the maximum term of
imprisonment in this case, i.e., four (4) months,
does not exceed one (1) year, the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law find no application
and Paman should be meted a straight penalty
taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. In view of the lack of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances in this
case, Paman should be made to suffer the
straight penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.
March 14, 2018 – Article 264 –
ADMINISTERING INJURIOUS SUBSTANCES
OR BEVERAGES
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
US V. CHIONG SONGCO
G.R. NO. L-6503 FEBRUARY 27, 1911
ISSUE:
Whether or not Songco is guilty of administering
injurious substance or beverage as contemplated
in Article 264 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
The defendant and appellant threw the contents
of a bottle of sulphuric acid into the face and on
the body of the complaining witness, inflicting
wounds which resulted in the illness of the
injured man for more than thirty days. It was
further proven that the attack was made
treacherously, as that circumstance is defined in
article 10 of the Penal Code, it having been made
at night, from behind the shelter of a sheet of
zinc, and at a time when the victim was wholly
unprepared to make any defense, he not having
any reason to anticipate an assault so
unexpected and unusual.

HELD:
No. The trial court found the defendant guilty of
the crime of lesiones defined in subsection 4 of
article 416 read together with article 417 of the
Penal Code, marked with the aggravating
circumstance of the nocturnity, and sentenced
him to imprisonment for 1 year and 1 day. But
the commission of the crime having been marked
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
the special penalty prescribed in the last
paragraph of article 416 should have been
inflicted, that is to say, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium degree.
The penalty should have been imposed in its
medium degree, the commission of the offense
not having been marked by aggravating or
extenuating circumstances, the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity as found by the trial
court being taken into consideration in the
finding of the existence of the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.
We should add that the crime as committed is
not in any wise related to the offices defined and
penalized in article 417 of the code, as found by
the trial court, the provisions of which clearly
relate to the use of poisons and the like in an
entirely different manner.
The sentence imposed by the trial court is
therefore reversed, and instead thereof, we
sentence the defendant and appellant to two
years of prision correccional, together with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to the
payment of the cost of both instances.
March 14, 2018 – Article 265 – LESS SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 167766 APRIL 7, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of “Less Serious
Physical Injuries” was committed in this case
FACTS:
On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking
with his brother-in-law. After consuming ½
bottle of gin, he left and went to the house of a
certain Siababa to buy coffee and sugar. He was
accompanied by his four- year-old son. On their
way there, a gray automobile coming from the
opposite direction passed by them. After a while,
he noticed that the vehicle was moving backward
towards them. When the car was about two arms’
length from where they were, it stopped and he
heard the driver of the vehicle call him by his
nickname Parrod. Rudy came closer, but after
taking one step, the driver, which he identified
as the petitioner, opened the door and while still
in the car drew a gun and shot him once, hitting
him just below the left armpit. Rudy immediately
ran at the back of the car, while petitioner sped
away. After petitioner left, Rudy and his son
headed to the seashore. Rudy later went back to
the place where he was shot and shouted for
help. The people who assisted him initially
brought him to the Municipal Hall of Gonzaga,
Cagayan, where he was interrogated by a
policeman who asked him to identify his
assailant. He informed the policeman that
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petitioner was the one who shot him. After he
was interrogated, he was later brought to the
Don Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital at
Gonzaga, Cagayan. The following day, he was
discharged from the hospital.
On June 1, 1999, an Information was filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Aparri, Cagayan,
charging the petitioner of frustrated murder.
Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to
the crime as charged. The RTC rendered a
Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Attempted Murder. The CA found him only guilty
of less serious physical injuries.
HELD:
This Court also concurs with the conclusion of
the CA that petitioner is guilty of the crime of less
serious physical injuries, not attempted murder.
The principal and essential element of attempted
or frustrated murder is the intent on the part of
the assailant to take the life of the person
attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear
and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.
In the present case, intent to kill the victim could
not be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim
once and did not hit any vital part of the latter’s
body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could
have shot the victim multiple times or even ran
him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the
inference that intent to kill existed should not be
drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient
to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.
When such intent is lacking but wounds are
inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not
attempted murder but physical injuries only.
Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the
doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound
would only require ten (10) days of medical
attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the
following day, the crime committed is less
serious physical injuries only. The less serious
physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that "Any person who inflicts upon
another physical injuries not described as
serious physical injuries but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten
(10) days or more, or shall require medical
attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of
less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.
March 15, 2018 – Article 266 – SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose
GEORGE BONGALON vs PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169533
March 20, 2013
FACTS:
May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and
Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined
the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro
Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession
passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the
latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor,

threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy";
that the petitioner confronted Jayson and
Roldan and called them names like "strangers"
and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson
at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson
on the face; that the petitioner then went to the
brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela
Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not
come out of the house to take on the petitioner;
that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi
City Police Station and reported the incident;
that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at
the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson
issued two medical certificates attesting that
Jayson suffered contusions.
On his part, the petitioner denied having
physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and
Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his
minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and
Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about
Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied
shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando
to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary
Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or
slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why
Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why
he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose
denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling
him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead
Jayson who had pelted her with stones during
the procession. She described the petitioner as a
loving and protective father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner is guilty of Child
Abuse or Slight Physical Injuries.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is
guilty of Slight Physical Injuries under Article
266 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court
disagreed that the petitioner in striking the back
of Jayson with his hands constituted child
abuse. he records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the
"intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records
showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have
been done at the spur of the moment and in
anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed
by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of
his own minor daughters who had just suffered
harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With
the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury
required five to seven days of medical attention,
the petitioner was liable for slight physical
injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RUSTICO
TILOS
FACTS:
Geralyn Narciso, the 12-year old daughter of the
victim, was on her way to a neighbors house to
watch a betamax movie when she came upon
accused-appellant inflicting fist blows on her
father. From a distance of about 15 meters, she
saw accused-appellant holding the victim by the
nape with his right hand, and boxing him on the
abdomen with his left hand. Geralyn called to her
mother, Florida Narciso, for help and the latter
arrived and pulled the victim away from accused-
appellant. While Florida was hugging the victim,
accused-at-large Mateo Mahinay came from
behind them and struck the victim three times:
on the left eye, the right eye, and the nape. The
victim fell to the ground. Florida sought the help
of two bystanders, Mercy Siquijod and Paniong
Agustino, in bringing the victim home. Teotimo
Narciso died two days later.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty
of conspiracy to murder.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that accused-appellant
is guilty of slight physical injuries only. In People
vs. Laurio, 200 SCRA 465 (1991), the Court held
that where conspiracy to murder is not proved,
and the gravity or duration of the physical injury
resulting from the fistblows by the accused on
the victim was not established by the evidence,
the accused is presumed, and is held, liable for
slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code
ARTICLE 266-A TO 266-D AS AMENDED BY
RA 8353
Republic Act No. 8353 (ANTI-RAPE LAW) - AN ACT
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME
AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
PEOPLE VS ORITA
GR no. 88724, April 3, 1990
FACTS:
March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S.
Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at the St.
Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house
after her classmates brought her home from a
party. She knocked at the door of her boarding
house when a frequent visitor of another boarder
held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite
pleading for her release, he ordered her to go
upstairs with him. Since the door which led to
the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they
used the back door to the second floor. With his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right
hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged
her up the stairs. When they reached the second
floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at
her neck, to look for a room. They entered
Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her
head on the wall. With one hand holding the
knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her

to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her
T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to
lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He
made her hold his penis and insert it in her
vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told
but since she kept moving, only a portion of his
penis entered her. He then laid down on his back
and commanded her to mount him. Still only a
small part of his penis was inserted into her
vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the
floor. She dashed out to the next room and
locked herself in. When he pursued her and
climbed the partition, she ran to another room
then another then she jumped out through a
window. Still naked, she darted to the municipal
building, 18 meters in front of the boarding
house and knocked on the door. When there was
no answer, she ran around the building and
knocked on the back door. When the policemen
who were inside the building opened the door,
they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying.
Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it
around her. Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house where
they heard and saw somebody running away but
failed to apprehend him due to darkness. She
was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital
where she was physically examined. Her vulva
had no abrasions or discharges.
• RTC: frustrated rape
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was frustrated rape.
HELD:
NO. RTC MODIFIED. Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no
debate that the attempted and consummated
stages apply to the crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
(1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony
(2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender
must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency
which intervenes and compels him to stop prior
to the moment when he has performed all of the
acts which should produce the crime as a
consequence, which acts it is his intention to
perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and
voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it
can not be an attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the
offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen
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or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there
is no penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the
accused may be convicted even on the sole basis
of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora
did not rule out penetration of the genital organ
of the victim.
PEOPLE VS BENJIE RESURRECCION
GR no. 185389
FACTS:
On 20 June 2001, BENJIE was charged before
the RTC with Rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8353. He allegedly raped AAA, an 11 year-old
girl.
Dr. Marlyn Valdez-Agbayani examined AAA and
found that the victim had no laceration in her
external organ or her hymen. The former also
testified that there were no spermatozoa in the
victim’s vagina. Despite these findings, Dr.
Valdez-Agbayani clarified that if the hymen of a
woman is elastic and so thin, as in AAA’s case,
laceration may not be present. As to the absence
of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina, Dr. Valdez-
Agbayani said that it was possible that the victim
washed her genitalia, especially since she was
examined only after two days following the
alleged rape incident.
BENJIE was convicted by the RTC, which was
subsequently affirmed by the CA. Upon appeal to
the SC, BENJIE points out that 1) the testimony
of AAA on how he allegedly raped her was highly
improbable, and 2) the negative findings of
spermatozoa and laceration must acquit him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BENJIE guilty of rape?
HELD:
Yes. This Court itself, in its desire to unveil the
truth as borne out by the records, has
painstakingly pored over the transcripts of
stenographic notes of this case, and like the RTC,
finds the victim’s testimony of the incident
candid and straightforward, indicative of an
untainted and realistic narration of what
transpired on that fateful day.
BENJIE tries to discredit the victim's testimony
by questioning the odd position at which the rape
was done. While BENJIE’s position, i.e., covering
AAA’s mouth with his left hand and pinning her
down with the right hand, may be considered
difficult, such does not exclude the possibility
that rape can be consummated under said
situation. Depraved individuals stop at nothing
in order to accomplish their purpose. Perverts
are not used to the easy way of satisfying their
wicked cravings. It should be noted that the
victim was a very young and fragile 11-year-old,
who was easy to be subdued by an abuser who
was used to manual labor and was already 18 or
19 years old.
In his last-ditch effort to be exculpated, BENJIE
calls this Court’s attention to the medical
findings that no sperm cells were present in the
victim’s vagina just two days following the rape.

He intimates that no rape occurred because of
the absence of the sperm cells.
This contention is not well-taken. The absence of
spermatozoa in the victim’s genitalia does not
negate rape, the slightest penetration even
without emission being sufficient to constitute
and consummate the offense. The mere touching
of the labia of the woman’s pudendum or lips of
the female organ by the male sexual organ
consummates the act.
PEOPLE VS. GACUSAN
G.R. NO. 207776, APRIL 26, 2017
FACTS:
An information for rape was filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Dagupan City
against Gacusan.
The information provided:
That at around 11 [0]’clock in the evening of
October 14, 2009 in Brgy. [Inmalog], San Fabian,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge [of AAA], a 15 year old minor, by
having sexual intercourse with her, against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by [Republic Act No.] 8353.
Upon arraignment, Gacusan pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Gacusan is the common-law
partner of the mother of the victim. The mother
of the victim moved in with Gacusan, however,
the victim’s mother died within 8 months of their
common-law relationship.
When BBB was still alive, AAA slept in a separate
room in Gacusan’s house. When BBB died, AAA
began sleeping beside Gacusan because of her
fear of ghosts.
At around 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of October
14, 2009, “AAA was trying to sleep beside
[Gacusan] when” she felt Gacusan’s hand
touching her private parts inside her shorts.
DDD, Gacusan’s 19-year old son, was sleeping
on a folding bed in the same room. AAA said that
she did not attempt to remove Gacusan’s hand
because she was already used to it.1 Gacusan
“brought out his penis and inserted it through
the leg opening of [AAA]’s shorts. During this
time, AAA was on her back while [Gacusan] was
on his side, facing her and trying to lift her leg.
Gacusan was able to penetrate AAA’s vagina then
proceeded to do a ‘“push and pull’ movement”.
When AAA felt Gacusan’s penis inside her, she
got up to go to the bathroom to urinate.
Thereafter, “AAA went back to sleep beside
[Gacusan].
According to AAA, although she felt pain when
Gacusan raped her, “she did not shout [because]
she was . . . afraid of him . . . [S]he was afraid to
lose [a] family and she depended on [Gacusan
for] support[.] She also claimed that she “was
already 15 years old [on the date of the alleged
rape] and had been living with [Gacusan] for five
years. AAA confessed that Gacusan was already
molesting her two (2) years after BBB’s death.
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The Regional Trial Court convicted Gacusan of
simple rape.
The trial court also ruled that in rape committed
by a father to his daughter, it is the father’s
moral ascendancy that replaces violation and
intimidation. Thus, this principle “applies in the
case of a sexual abuse of a stepdaughter by her
stepfather and of a goddaughter by a godfather
in the sacrament of confirmation.” Furthermore,
the medico-legal findings were consistent with
AAA’s testimony that she was raped. Hence,
there is a sufficient basis to conclude that the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge have
been established.
The Court of Appeals ruled that “in incestuous
rape or those committed by the common law
spouse of the victim’s parent, evidence of force
and intimidation is not necessary to secure a
conviction.” “[I]n rape committed by an
ascendant, close kin, a step parent or a common
law spouse of a parent, moral ascendancy takes
the place of force and intimidation.”Furthermore,
AAA’s testimony and positive identification of
Gacusan as the person who raped her, as well as
the medical findings confirming the rape, prevail
over the bare denials of Gacusan.
Gacusan filed an appeal alleging failure of the
prosecution to prove that he employed force,
threat, or intimidation in raping AAA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gacusan is guilty of rape
HELD:
Yes. Sections 266-A and 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provide that:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed.
– Rape is Committed-
1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
Through force, threat, or intimidation;
…
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph
1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
AAA admitted that despite the pain she felt, she
neither protested nor shouted at the time of the
rape incident
The testimony of AAA reveals that the reason she
did not shout during the alleged rape was that
she was afraid of losing a family. It is reasonable
to assume that she was terrified of losing
someone who provided her support after losing
her biological mother. She testified that she
could not find comfort from her grandmother.
“[D]ifferent people react differently to a given type
of situation, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.” One person may react aggressively,
while another may show cold indifference. Also,
it is improper to judge the actions of children who
are victims of traumatic experiences “by the
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

norms of behavior expected under the

circumstances from mature people.” From AAA’s
view, it appeared that the danger of losing a
family was more excruciating than physical pain.

Furthermore, a victim should never be blemished

for her lack of resistance to any crime especially
as heinous as rape. Neither the failure to shout
nor the failure to resist the act equate to a
victim’s voluntary submission to the appellant’s
lust.

Recent cases reiterating that moral ascendancy

replaces violence or intimidation in rape
committed by a close-kin cited People v. Corpuz.
In Corpuz, the accused was the live-in partner of
the victim’s mother. The victim, AAA, was 13
years old when accused Corpuz started raping
her. The repeated rape incidents made AAA
pregnant.

In People v. Fraga, accused Fraga raped the

daughters of his common-law partner. Fraga
tried evading his conviction by shifting from his
defense of alibi to lack of force or intimidation.
While this Court affirmed Fraga’s conviction
since force and intimidation was sufficiently
proven, it also emphasized that:

[A]ccused-appellant started cohabiting with

complainants’ mother in 1987. As the common-
law husband of their mother, he gained such
moral ascendancy over complainants that any
more resistance than had been shown by
complainants cannot reasonably be expected.
(Emphasis provided)

In People v. Robles,accused Robles raped his

common-law wife’s daughter. This Court
affirmed his conviction and likened Robles’ moral
ascendancy over the victim to that of a biological
father; thus:

Moral ascendancy and influence by the accused,

stepfather of the 12 year-old complainant, and
threat of bodily harm rendered complainant
subservient to appellant’s lustful desires…
Actual force or intimidation need not even be
employed for rape to be committed where the
over powering influence of a father over his
daughter suffices. (Emphasis provided, citation
omitted)
Gacusan had moral ascendancy over AAA.

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TITLE NINE – CRIME AGAINST PERSONAL
LIBERTY AND SECURITY
March 15, 2018 – Article 267 – SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RUBEN
ABLAZA
G.R. NO. L-27352 OCTOBER 31, 1969
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not Ablaza committed kidnapping
with serious illegal detention.
b. Whether or not there was an error of
considering motor vehicle as aggravating
circumstance attending the commission of the
crime.
FACTS:
Accused Ruben Ablaza forcibly took her from her
aunt's place in Caloocan City and brought her to
a house in a barrio in Hagonoy, Bulacan, where
she was criminally abused by her abductor. After
her rescue by the Philippine Constabulary men,
a criminal case for forcible abduction with rape
was filed against Ablaza.
While that case in Bulacan was still pending,
Annabelle Huggins, who was sweeping the front
of her aunt's house in Makati, Rizal, was again
grabbed by two men and forcibly taken to a
taxicab where a third man, who turned out to be
Ablaza, was waiting. Then the vehicle sped away
before anybody could come to the aid of the
struggling girl. Inside the cab, Annabelle was
seated at the rear between Ablaza and a
companion; her head was pressed down to the
floor of the taxi, with Ablaza covering her mouth
with his hand to prevent her from crying out for
help. She was first brought to the house of
Ablaza's compadre in Caloocan, but then,
informed that the police were already in their
pursuit, she was moved to the house of another
compadre, where she was kept for a week. Later,
at the instance of Ablaza, Annabelle was taken to
Bulacan to ask for the complaint against him be
dropped. This did not materialize, because when
they were inside the Malolos municipal building
Annabelle's uncle, in company of Constabulary
men, came and took her. She also testified that
for the duration of her detention the accused and
his compadres were always guarding her to
prevent her escape.
The CFI of Rizal, in its decision dated March 7,
1967, found the accused guilty of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention, attended by the
aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle, and was sentenced to death. Hence, this
automatic review of the decision of the CFI of
Rizal.
HELD:
a. Yes. Ablaza’s contention that he should be
adjudged of abduction with rape rather than
kidnapping with serious illegal detention bears
no merit. He stood trial for kidnapping with
serious illegal detention, and the deprivation of
the complainant’s liberty, which is the essential
element of the offense was duly proved and other
crimes committed in the course of the victim’s
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confinement is immaterial to the case. The
kidnapping became consummated when the
victim as actually deprived of her freedom which
makes it proper to prosecute the accused under
Article 267 of the RPC. The surrounding
circumstance make it clear that the main
purpose of Ablaza in detaining Huggins was to
coerce her to withdraw her previous charges
against him.
The Court also finds no reason not to believe the
judgment of the trial judge giving credence to
Huggins’ declaration. The records of the case are
convincing that the complainant’s testimony on
the facts of the kidnapping rang of truth. Not
only that her narration was coherent, plausible
and unshattered by the defense counsel’s cross
examination, but also no motive has been
adduced by Huggins, who, since the first
incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore,
would have wanted least public exposure of her
harrowing experiences, would come out and
undergo another legal scrutiny of her
unfortunate encounters with the accused, other
than her desire to tell the truth.
b. No. The said contention is untenable. Contrary
to the protestation of the accused, the fact of use
of motor vehicle which facilitated the taking away
of the complainant and her consequent detention
was established not only by her declaration in
court but also by the accused’s own admission
that he took away Huggins from her Aunt’s
residence in Makati by taxi cab.
Considering the extant evidence on record, the
Court fully agree with the decision of the trial
court’s decision that the accused Reuben Ablaza
committed the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention attended by aggravating
circumstance of the use of motor vehicle. The
Court thus confirms the death penalty imposed
by the lower court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIMA
MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO
CHUA
G.R. NO. 187534 APRIL 4, 2011
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein appellants are guilty for
violating Article 267 on Serious Illegal Detention.
FACTS:
Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia a.k.a. Alice
Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald
Norva and Eduardo Chua, concocted a plan to
kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after several days of
conducting surveillance on their intended victim,
on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap
Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City. However,
the intended kidnapping failed, because Rafael
did not show up at the said place. On February
5, 1998, a second attempt was made, but they
encountered an accident before they could even
execute their original plan.
Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia
called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to
tell her that she wanted to meet her and Rafael
at Jollibee, BBB, Valenzuela City to settle the
former's loan of P350,000.00. She requested

Rosalina to bring the land title which she was
given as collateral for the said loan.
Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of
Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same
date, Alicia showed up outside the store aboard
a car. She was with appellant Ronald Norva.
Alicia motioned Rosalina and Rafael to approach
the car, which the two did as requested. While
inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced appellant
Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed
Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them at
her place.
When the car passed by the street where Alicia's
house was located, Rosalina asked the former
where they were going. Alicia answered that they
had to drop by the house of her financier who
agreed to redeem her title and substitute as her
creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did
not protest. They finally reached a house in
Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.
Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the
vehicle and talked to a man inside a store, later
identified as Jonard Mangelin. The gate of the
house was then opened by appellant Dima. The
car proceeded to the garage and Rosalina and
Rafael were asked to go inside the house.
Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed
Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen door.
They passed by a man (Jessie Doe) who was
washing his hands in the sink. While Rosalina
was walking behind Alicia, she suddenly heard a
dull moan coupled with the sound of stomping
feet. She looked back at the direction where the
sounds came from and saw Rafael being forcibly
dragged inside a room. She decided to look for
Rafael and on her way, she saw Jessie Doe place
his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a gun at
him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina
pleaded with Jessie Doe to have pity on Rafael
because of his existing heart ailment.
Appellant Ronald rushed towards her, poked a
gun at her mouth, tied her to a bed and warned
her not to make any noise. He told her that all
they want is her money, upon which, Rosalina
said that if they really wanted money, they
should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on
the verge of having a heart attack. Rosalina was
untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael and
began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard,
who had just entered the room, to help her pump
Rafael's chest while she applied CPR on the
latter. Jonard did as told. While CPR was being
administered, appellant Dima started removing
all of Rafael's personal belongings, which include
his ring, wallet, watch and other items inside his
pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald.
Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard
to take Rosalina to another room. While inside
the room where she was brought, Rosalina
begged Jonard to help her escape. Jonard was
moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed to help her.
During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina
that two women had tipped them off as the
kidnap victims. When asked who they were,
Jonard refused to reveal their identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's
bedroom around 12:00 noon because certain
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female visitors arrived. After the visitors left,
Rosalina was returned to the room where she
was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard
about Rafael's condition, to which he replied that
Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A little
later, at around 1 p.m., Jonard went to check on
Rafael and confirmed that he was still alive.
Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of
someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she
asked Jonard the whereabouts of Rafael and was
told that he was brought to the hospital. But
unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just died and
his body was placed inside the trunk of a car.
Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that
she will be brought to another safe house. She
was taken to a car and placed at the back seat,
together with Jonard and three other men, later
identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The driver of
the car was appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald
instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head with
a jacket which Jonard did. As they were about to
leave, the man seated beside Ronald started to
talk. Rosalina recognized the voice of Robert. She
then lifted the jacket covering her head and was
able to confirm that the one talking was Robert.
Rosalina cried, Robert, Robert, why did you do
this, we did not do anything to you and Robert
responded, Pasensiyahan na lang tayo.
By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in
Pandi, Bulacan where there was no electricity.
Thus, they lit candles for illumination. Rosalina
found the house familiar and concluded that it
was Alicia's. Rosalina was brought to a room on
the second floor and while inside the room, she
was told by one of the men guarding her that one
of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the
leader's instruction, the guard put out the candle
light. The man then seated himself beside
Rosalina and warned her against escaping as
they were a large and armed group. Rosalina
recognized the voice as that of Robert's. Before
he left the room, Robert gave instructions to
Jonard and the other men inside. Meanwhile, the
group started digging a pit at the back of the
same house near the swimming pool.
Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February
18), the group buried Rafael's body in the pit.
Thereafter, Robert instructed appellant Ronald
to tell Jonard that the latter should kill Rosalina,
which Jonard refused to do. Nonetheless, Robert
instructed Jonard and the others to guard
Rosalina well, as he himself would deal with her
upon his return.
Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of
the same day. Sensing that Jonard was
sympathetic to her, Rosalina begged him again
to help her escape for the sake of her children.
When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one
of the men guarding Rosalina turned off the light
inside the room. The room was only illuminated
by a light coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw
a person wearing a wig and sunglasses enter the
room. Rosalina recognized him as Robert. Trying
to mimic a woman by modulating his voice,
Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital
and that he could still sign a check. He asked
Rosalina the whereabouts of the other land titles

and the identities of the other financiers whom
she knew. Rosalina replied in the negative.
Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted,
That's impossible, and then left the room. He
gave instructions to his members and left.
At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told
her about Robert's order to kill her, which
caused the latter to panic and cry. She then
implored the help of Jonard for her escape.
Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions
Larry, Jack and Boy and told them that he would
help Rosalina escape. His companions
immediately cocked their guns and an argument
ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged
them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's
companions told Rosalina that if they would
allow her to escape, they too would get into
trouble. Taking advantage of the situation,
Rosalina suggested that all of them should
escape. They all agreed to escape in the early
morning.
Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack
and Boy left the safe house. They walked through
a rice field for about 30 minutes and then
boarded a jeepney bound for Balagtas, Bulacan.
From Balagtas, they took a bus going to Cubao
and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her
pieces of jewelry for P1,500.00 and gave the
P1,000.00 to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told
Jonard to stay with Rosalina so that she would
have a witness and, in case Rosalina would
further need their help, left their address with
Jonard.
When the three left, Rosalina immediately called
Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened
to her and his brother. When Tito asked Jonard
which hospital Rafael was brought to, Jonard
revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died at the safe
house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.
Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty. Teresita Agbi
and asked her to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao.
When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied them
to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) where an investigation was
conducted.
The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from
the DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the
appellants, and Robert. Alicia and Josie were not
at their homes, while appellants Ronald and
Dima were arrested at the residence of Robert.
While at the DILG office, Rosalina positively
identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her
kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied
the police authorities to the safe house in Pandi,
Bulacan and showed them where the body of
Rafael was buried. The remains of Rafael was
later on exhumed.
HELD:
Yes. First of all, it must be emphasized that the
crime committed by the appellants, as ruled by
the trial court and affirmed by the CA, is the
special complex crime of Kidnapping with
Homicide.
Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, now provides:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any
private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of
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his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained;
or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a
minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer;
In People v. Ramos, the court held that Where
the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing
was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall
be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA
No. 7659.
In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses
with the same precision that would be necessary
if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659
amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
by adding thereto this provision: "When the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed; and that this provision gives
rise to a special complex crime.
In the cases at bar, it specifically alleges that the
victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in
connection" with her detention and was killed
"subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof.
"Considering that the prosecution was able to
prove each of the component offenses, appellants
should be convicted of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape. It appearing from the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that
there is a "direct relation, and intimate
connection" between the kidnapping, killing and
raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered
merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a
component offense forming part of the herein
special complex crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS FELIPE
MIRANDILLA JR.
G.R. NO. 186417 JULY 27, 2011
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mirandilla is guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.
FACTS:
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies
in a nearby store. While making her way back
through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his
arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knifes point
thrust at her right side. She will come to know

the mans name at the police station, after her
escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. He told her
not to move or ask for help. Another man joined
and went beside her, while two others stayed at
her back, one of whom had a gun.
They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd,
walked farther as the deafening music faded into
soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the
grassy fields, they reached the Mayon
International Hotel, where they boarded a
waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay
Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone
with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a
companion, drove the tricycle farther away and
into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached
the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis.
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and
pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint
he ordered her to remove her pants.[6] When she
defied him, he slapped her and hit her arms with
a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her
panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three
fingers and rotated them inside. The pain
weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down
and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis
inside.[7] Sayang ka, she heard him whisper at
her,[8] as she succumbed to pain and
exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she
found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting
until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No
rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together
with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered
her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed.
He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling
through her hair with his left hand and slapping
her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he
dragged her into the tricycle and drove to
Bogtong, Legazpi. At the roads side, Mirandilla
pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her
mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and
lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her
underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandillas
penis inside her vagina. A little while, a
companion warned Mirandilla to move out. And
they drove away.
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown
inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth.
Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank,
grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and
again inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang
brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered
the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at
daytime, moved her back and forth from one
place to another on the following nights, first to
Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was
locked up in a cell-type house and was raped
repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her
cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a
small house in the middle of a rice field. She was
allegedly raped 27 times.
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in
opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy
playing cards, she rushed outside and ran,
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crossed a river, got drenched, and continued
running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a
rock; she walked through the fields and stayed
out of peoples sight for two nights. Finally, she
found a road and followed its path, leading her
to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her
to the police station. It was 11 January 2001.
AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless.
Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police
gave her food. When the police presented to her
pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized
the mans face she was certain it was him. He was
Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her.
HELD:
Yes. Mirandilla is guilty of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with
rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had
sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened
almost nightly during their cohabitation. He
contended that they were live-in partners,
entangled in a whirlwind romance, which
intimacy they expressed in countless passionate
sex, which headed ironically to separation
mainly because of AAAs intentional abortion of
their first child to be a betrayal in its gravest form
which he found hard to forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandillas tale of a love
affair, is AAAs claim of her horrific ordeal and her
flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during
which Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
The accused bare invocation of sweetheart
theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it
must be corroborated by documentary,
testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are
letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible
testimonies of those who know the lovers.
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however,
necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first
element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the
prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love,
is not a license for lust.
This admission makes the sweetheart theory
more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof;
after the prosecution has successfully
established a prima facie case, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to
adduce evidence that the intercourse was
consensual.
A prima facie case arises when the party having
the burden of proof has produced evidence
sufficient to support a finding and adjudication
for him of the issue in litigation.
Burden of evidence is that logical necessity
which rests on a party at any particular time
during the trial to create a prima facie case in his
favour or to overthrow one when created against
him.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape
committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had
carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force,
threat, or intimidation. She was also able to
prove each element of rape by sexual assault

under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her
mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is provided for under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days. xxx
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes
had been committed in the special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is
only one kidnapping with rape. This is because
these composite acts are regarded as a single
indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty.
In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness
of rape because no matter how many times the
victim was raped, like in the present case, there
is only one crime committed the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape.
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND
MARON LAJIM VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 179570 FEBRUARY 4, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein appellants committed acts
constituting serious illegal detention as
enshrined in Article 267 of the RPC
FACTS:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt
Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in
Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan.
Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards
them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to
run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the
hair of AAA and told her, Sara, you go with me.
If you will not go with me, I will kill you. Inon
Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to
hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself
with a plastic container. AAA was crying while
she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his
gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at
Inon Dama and said, If you will not go, I will
shoot you. Inon Dama went home and reported
the incident to AAA's mother.
When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's
father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told
AAA to come with them. When AAA refused,
Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her
back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth,
and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was
untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on.
While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded
with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her
that if she would submit to his desire, her life
would be spared. Sajiron held her breast,
touched her private parts and inserted his sex
organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted, but to no
avail. She felt pain and she noticed blood on her
private parts. She was sexually abused three
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times on the ground, where she was made to lie
down on a bed of leaves.
During the entire time that AAA was being
abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and
watched them. They left the forest at around
10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day
and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she
was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap
to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would
attempt to escape.
On July 2, 1994, AAAs mother came to get AAA,
but Egap refused and threatened to kill her
daughter if she would report the matter to the
authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter,
she went home and did not report the incident to
the police authorities.[6] Egap asked AAA if she
wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA
was then forced to sign an unknown document,
which she was not able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11,
1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron
were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The
marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and
without the presence of her parents. After the
marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of
Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and
mother-in-law.
AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While
detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her
house was very far from the place where she was
held captive, and her captors threatened to kill
her and her family if she would attempt to
escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her
twice every night. She was free to roam within
the vicinity of the house but she was usually
accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her
guard. She was also guarded and threatened by
Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.
HELD:
Yes. Herein appellants are guilty of violating
Article 267 pertaining to serious illegal detention.
In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's
testimony credible. The trial court held that
AAA's testimony was clear, categorical and
consistent. She remained steadfast in her
assertions and unfaltering in her testimony given
in court on the unfortunate incident. The trial
court found that AAA positively identified Sajiron
and Maron as her abductors and narrated how
she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the
forest.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to
death threats does not affect the credibility of the
complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The
charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the
delay was unreasonable and unexplained. BBB
explained that she did not immediately report the
abduction, rape and detention of her daughter to
the authorities, because Egap threatened to kill
AAA, who was then in his custody.
Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion,
Egap threatened to kill her if she dared to report
the matter to the authorities. True enough, when
Egap learned that she did what he forbade her to
do, he made good his threat and shot her at the

back.Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident
for five months should not be taken against her.
It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as
AAA, would concoct a horrid story and impute to
the accused a crime so grave and subject herself
and her family to the humiliation and invasive
ordeal of a public trial just to avenge the alleged
non-payment of the dowry, unless she be
impelled by a genuine desire to expose the truth,
vindicate her honor and seek justice she so
greatly deserves.
Neither is the Court convinced of the sweetheart
theory, the defense of the accused, by alleging
that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three
years prior to their elopement and marriage. If
there were indeed romantic relationship between
AAA and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal
reaction would have been to cover up for the man
she supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost
no time in reporting the incident to the National
Bureau of Investigation, right after she was
rescued by the authorities.
The accusatory portion of the information alleges
that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron
and Maron against her will and brought to the
forest; and, on the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by
means of force, threat, violence and intimidation
-- had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code are:
(1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal;
and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances are present:
(a)the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
than 3 days; or
(b)it is committed by simulating public authority;
or
(c)any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or
(d)the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are
private individuals, forcibly took and dragged
AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive
against her will. The crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in
an enclosure, but also of detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For
there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home. Its essence
is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of
the accused to effect such deprivation.
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In the present case, although AAA was not
actually confined in an enclosed place, she was
clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty,
because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed
with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to
physically drag her to the forest away from her
home.
March 15, 2018 – Article 268 – SLIGHT
ILLEGAL DETENTION
ALAMEDA Jr., Manuel F.
PEOPLE VS SALIENTE, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-2427 JUNE 28, 1949
FACTS:
at about 9 o'clock in the evening , the defendants
came to the house of Telesfora Alentejo where
Telesfora's niece, Juana Briones, was then
staying. Telling Juana that they had come for by
her by order of their "chief," they asked her to go
along with them and when she refused she was
threatened by defendant Montilla with a bolo and
by defendant Saliente with a pistol and then
taken against her will to the latter's house in the
barrio of Tambis, about two kilometers away. It
would appear that the defendants were
accompanied by some soldiers, although these
were neither named nor identified. Once in
Saliente's house, defendants let Juana know
that what they had told her in private so that he
could persuade her into marrying him. Juana
retorted that she did not want to marry anybody.
Juana was kept in Saliente's house for two
nights and one day. On the third day, Juana was
able to persuade the defendants to take her to
the house of her brother, Brigido Enclona, so
that they could talk the matter over with him.
There they were joined by Montilla's father who,
in behalf of his son, asked for Juana's hand in
marriage. As Juana turned a deaf ear to the
proposal, the trio took their departure, leaving
her in the house of her brother.c In the evening
of that same day, however, the defendants came
back and, complaining that Juana had fooled
them, they forcibly took her downstairs. Montilla
then led her away, while Saliente stayed behind
to wait for Enclona, who, was then absent.
Meeting Enclona on the road, Juana warned him
that Saliente was lying in wait for him with the
intention of doing him harm. On hearing this,
Enclona ran away, while Montilla, on his part,
left Juana to herself and went back to rejoin
Saliente. The defendants Montilla admitted
having taken Juana from the house of her aunt,
but put up the defense that this was done with
her consent, since they had long been
sweethearts and had, on the day in question,
exchanged notes regarding their elopement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of slight illegal
detention is tenable in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. The crime committed is that of slight illegal
detention under the third paragraph of article
268 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 18, approved on September 25,
1946, it appearing that the defendants
voluntarily released Juana Briones within three
days from the commencement of her detention
without having attained the purpose intended

and before the institution of the criminal action
against them. The penalty prescribed is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods and
a fine not exceeding P700. As the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and dwelling, not compensated by
any mitigating circumstances, the said penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period.
LUIS ASISTIO v. LOURDES P. SAN Diego
GR No. L-21991
Mar 31, 1964
FACTS:
That on or about the 26th day of December,
1962, Luisito Asistio et, al., being private
individuals with the exception of the accused
VICTORINO ARANDA and LORENZO MENESES
who are public officers, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with threats to kill the
person of CHUA PAO alias "SO NA", and for the
purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) from
the said CHUA PAO alias "SO NA" or from his wife
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, detain and deprive the
person of the said CHUA PAO alias "SO NA" of
his liberty, to his damage and
prejudice.Petitioners applied for bail on the
ground that the record of the ex parte
investigation conducted by the fiscal showed,
from the testimony of the offended party himself,
Chua Pao alias So Na, that the latter was (a)
voluntarily released by his captors (b) within 24
hours from seizure and (c) without any ransom
being, in fact, paid. But the respondent judge
denied the application for bail.
ISSUE:
whether or not the last paragraph of Article 268
applies not only to slight illegal detention but
also to kidnapping and serious illegal detention
penalized by Article 267.
HELD:
That kidnapping under Article 267 depended
solely on the circumstances in which the
kidnapping took place, irrespective of the end
sought by the kidnapper; That the third
paragraph of Article 268 already existed in the
original version, and plainly was not intended to
apply to crimes under Article 267; Article 268
then described two variants of dig illegal
detention;
(a) Slight detention where none of the
circumstances specified in Article 267 was
present (Article 268, par. 142), penalized by
prision mayor;
(b) Slight detention where, in addition to the
absence of any of the circumstances mentioned
in Article 267, there were, besides three other
circumstances, the voluntary release of the
kidnappee within 3 days from seizure, plus the
fact that the purpose intended (whatever it
should be, ransom, marriage, disclosure of
secrets, etc.) was not attained, plus the third fact
that the release was effected before the
institution of criminal proceedings against the
culprit or culprits. Clearly, therefore, Articles
267 and 268 were originally mutually exclusive.
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Thus, the last paragraph of article 268 applies to
slight illegal detention only not to Article 267.
Articles 267 and 268 are independent of each
other.
March 16, 2018 – Article 269 – UNLAWFUL
ARREST
ALILIAN, Enna B.
G.R. NO. 138859-60
FEBRUARY 22, 2001
ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP VS. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the cases
against him - violation of RA 3019, and unlawful
arrest of the RPC, grounded on the lack of
preliminary investigation. Ombudsman denied
the motion.
ISSUE:
WoN preliminary injunction was required in
cases of unlawful arrests
HELD:
No. A preliminary investigation was not required
because unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the
Revised Penal Code was punishable by arresto
mayor - imprisonment of one month and one day
to six months. The Rules of Court requires only
such investigation before an information for an
offense punishable by at least four years, two
months and one day may be filed in court.
G.R. No. L-44335
July 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs. KAGUI MALASUGUI
FACTS:
The accused was charged with the crime of
robbery and homicide after the victim, while still
sprawled on the ground with blood all around,
dying, said the name of the accused as the one
who attacked him, thus prompting the officials
to immediately search the accused. With the
accused was found the victim’s identification
card and pocketbook containing P92 in bills. The
accused was thereafter arrested.
ISSUE:
WoN the arresting officer violated Art 269 RPC
unlawful arrest
HELD:
No. The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly. The appellant was then charged with
the crime, imputed to him by Tan Why before the
latter's death, of having assaulted the "deceased;
that he was then also known to be carrying much
money; and that a few moments before he was
brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after
the assault on Tan Why, he was able to redeem
two pairs of bracelets from two persons to whom
he had pledge them several months before. These
are circumstances which undoubtedly
warranted his arrest without a previous judicial
warrant. This is so because under the law,
members of Insular Police or Constabulary as
well as those of the municipal police and of

chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even
of townships (secs. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and
2383 of the Revised Administrative Code) may
make arrests without judicial warrant, not only
when a crime is committed or about to be
committed in their presence but also when there
is reason to believe or sufficient ground to
suspect that one has been committed and that it
was committed by the person arrested by them.
An arrest made under said circumstances is not
unlawful but perfectly justified; and the agent of
authority who makes the arrest does not violate
the provisions of article 269 of the Revised Penal
Code which defines and punishes unlawful
arrest.
March 16, 2018 – Article 270 – KIDNAPPING
AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR
ARANCES, Javy Ann
PEOPLE VS AIDA MARQUEZ
GR NO. 181440, APRIL 13, 2011
PONENTE: JUSTICE LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Aida Marquez should
be charged of Kidnapping and failure to return a
minor.
FACTS:
According to the complainant, Carolina
Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at
the beauty parlor where she was working as a
beautician, whom she easily trusted because
Marquez was close to her employers and was
nice to her and her co-employees.
On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in
Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Meranos
then three-month old daughter Justine
Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some
clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed
because it was not unusual for Marquez to bring
Justine some things whenever she came to the
parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine in
the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her
employer’s house to ask them for Marquez’s
address. However, Merano said that her
employers just assured her that Justine will be
returned to her soon.
But a few months have passed and Merano
discovered through Modesto Castillos that
Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife and
that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) supposedly for Merano who was
asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano a
photocopy of the handwritten Kasunduan dated
May 17, 1998, wherein Merano purportedly gave
Justine to the Castillo spouses.
HELD:
A reading of the charge in the information shows
that the act imputed to Marquez was not the
illegal detention of a person, but involves her
deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to
her parent after being entrusted with said baby’s
custody. Contrary to Marquez’s assertions,
therefore, she was charged with violation of
Article 270, and not Article 267, of the Revised
Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code considers it
a crime when a person who has been entrusted
with the custody of a minor later on deliberately
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fails to return said minor to his parent or
guardian. This may be found in Article 270,
which reads:
Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a
minor. The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who, being entrusted
with the custody of a minor person, shall
deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents
or guardians.
This crime has two essential elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of
a minor person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the
said minor to his parents or guardians.
This Court, in elucidating on the elements of
Article 270, stated that while one of the essential
elements of this crime is that the offender was
entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping
but the deliberate failure of that person to restore
the minor to his parents or guardians. As the
penalty for such an offense is so severe, the
Court further explained what deliberate as used
in Article 270 means: “Indeed, the word
deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code must imply something more than
mere negligence - it must be premeditated,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and
maliciously wrong.” (Emphasis ours.)
PEOPLE VS GENEROSO JO, ET AL.
GR NO. L-69236, AUGUST 19, 1986
PONENTE: JUSTICE MELENCIO-HERRERA
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in charging Roca, one of
the defendants, with Kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code but convicted him of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 (4)
[supra] of the same Code.
FACTS:
Complainant Elisa Casal Jo was married to
accused Generoso Jo on July 27, 1969. They
begot three children, namely, Eligen, Allan and
Riza, whose ages at the time of the subject
incident were 9 years old, 7 years old and 6 years
old, respectively.
Sometime in December 1975, the couple
separated. On July 27, 1980, Elisa met Felipe
Lapitan, a witch-doctor. Lapitan told Elisa that
Generoso had hired him to kill her, that he had
already set in motion the evil spirit which would
put an end to her life in a few days; and that the
effect of the evil spirit would be averted if she
would submit herself for treatment. Helpless and
not knowing what to do, Elisa believed the witch-
doctor and consented to submit for treatment.
Lapitan conducted an 'oracion' or strange prayer
on her and then let her drink a glass of water
concoction. Accused Felipe Lapitan and Virgilio
Roca took her three children on a jeep to the
Tacloban Wharf. Lapitan made them board a
motorboat with him while Virgilio Roca sent them
off. The boat left for Samar before noon.

On August 9, 1980, Capt. Angelo Marcos, Station
Commander of the La Paz Police Station filed a
criminal complaint for kidnapping of minors
against Felipe Lapitan, Virgilio Roca and
Ceferino Lopez.
HELD:
The offense as charged, which is Kidnapping and
Failure to Return a Minor under Article 270 of
the Revised Penal Code, is necessarily included
in the offense proved, which is Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention of a minor under Article
267 (4) of the same code, inasmuch as the
essential ingredients of the offense charged
constitute or form a part of those constituting the
offense proved. Thus, deliberate failure to restore
a minor under one's custody and kidnapping of
a minor who is not in custody both constitute
deprivation of liberty. Consequently, ROCA can
be convicted of the offense proved included in
that which is charged. Besides, there is authority
to the effect that paragraph 1 of Article 270 might
have been superseded by Article 267, as
amended, which punishes as serious illegal
detention the kidnapping of a minor, regardless
of the purpose of the detention.
PEOPLE VS BERNARDO
GR NO. 144316, MARCH 11, 2002
PONENTE: JUSTICE MELO
ISSUE:
Whether defendant Bernardo should be charged
of Article 270 - Kidnapping and failure to return
a minor.
FACTS:
On May 13, 1999, 12-year old Maria Roselle
Tolibas y Aguada and her 15-day old sister,
Rosalyn Tolibas, were with their mother, Rosita
Tolibas y Aguada, at the Fabella Memorial
Hospital for medical check up. While Rosita was
undergoing medical checkup inside the hospital,
her two daughters waited at the lobby. Roselle
was seating on a bench with her 15-day old sister
on her lap when the appellant sat beside her.
Appellant befriended Roselle. After a while, the
appellant gave P3.00 to Roselle and asked her to
buy ice water. The appellant took the 15-day old
baby from Roselle and assured her that she
(accused) would take care of her (Roselles) sister,
while she was buying ice water. Roselle was not
able to find ice water for sale and on her way
back to the hospital, she saw the accused
running away with her baby sister. She chased
the appellant and when she caught up with her,
the appellant told her that she was running after
her (Roselle’s) mother. Roselle did not believe the
appellant and she held and pulled the appellants
skirt to prevent her from getting away with her
(Roselles) baby sister, but the appellant persisted
in running with Roselle holding on to the
appellants skirt. Roselle shouted for help,
thereby attracting the attention of Emerento
Torres, a Barangay Kagawad.
Appellant contends that there was no deliberate
failure on her part to restore the minor Rosalyn
Tolibas to her parents or guardians, stating that
the charge filed against her was a mere
overreaction on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to her act of going out of the hospital
to look for the mother of the child.
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HELD:
Yes. The essential element of the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that
the offender is entrusted with the custody of the
minor, but what is actually being punished is not
the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to
restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply
something more than mere negligence - it must
be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.
When Roselle entrusted Roselyn to appellant
before setting out on an errand for appellant to
look for ice water, the first element was
accomplished and when appellant refused to
return the baby to Roselle despite her
continuous pleas, the crime was effectively
accomplished. In fine, we agree with the trial
courts finding that appellant is guilty of the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor.
March 17, 2018 – Article 272 – SLAVERY
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
US VS. CABANAG
G.R. NO. 3241 MARCH 16, 1907
TRACEY, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabanag committed slavery.
FACTS:
An Igorot orphan girl called Gamaya, 13 years of
age was taken from the possession of her
grandmother by one Buyag, also an Igorot;
whether this was done with or against the will of
the grandmother is not altogether clear in the
evidence. It was testified by a witness that Buyag
came to the house and took her away, although
the grandmother objected, saying "Do not take
off that little girl," but not speaking when she
went away. The man brought her to his house,
about a half mile distant, where she was not
confined, but on the contrary was allowed to go
back alone to her grandmother, with whom she
would spend a little while, returning the same
day. She testified that on last evening, the
grandmother was angry and did not wish her to
go, but did not prevent her. According to her
recollection she remained with Buyag, in the
vicinity of her grandmother's residence, some
two or three months. Buyag testified that more
than two years before, in order to help the family
after the father's death and for the purpose of
keeping the child at home, he had bought her for
three pigs, twenty-five hens, two measures of
rice, and a cloak worth two pigs, from her
mother, with whom she remained until the third
year, when (her mother presumably having died)
she was brought away by one Eusebio, at the
instance of himself and another Igorot named
YogYog, who had furnished part of the purchase
price. Together they instructed Eusebio to sell
her for a carabao and 50 pesos. Eusebio, in the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and sold her to the
accused, Tomas Cabanag, for 100 pesos.
Cabanag had previously been instructed to buy
a girl by one Mariano Lopez to whom after a few

days Gamaya was delivered in return for the
price, which appears to have been 200 pesos. In
his hands she remained for about two months
until she was taken away by an officer of
Constabulary. Afterwards this prosecution was
instituted. Although Gamaya made objection to
leaving the house of Cabanag she appears to
have gone without actual constraint and at no
time in any of these places was she physically
restrained of her liberty; she was not under lock
or key or guard, went into the street to play,
returned at will, and was not punished or ill used
in any way, but was employed about the
household tasks; in short, she appears to have
been treated by Mariano Lopez as a household
servant and to have been well earned for while in
the custody of the accused.
It is proved in the case that it is an Igorot custom
to dispose of children to pay the debts of their
fathers, the transaction in the native language
being termed a sale, and the defendant appears
to have engaged in the business of buying in
Nueva Vizcaya children to sell in the lowlands of
Isabela.
RULING:
No. The judge below quotes the Bill of Rights of
the Philippines contained in the act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, declaring that "neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist in said
Islands." This constitutional provision is self-
acting whenever the nature of a case permits and
any law or contract providing for servitude of a
person against his will is forbidden and is void.
For two obvious reasons, however, it fails to
reach the facts before us:
First. The employment or custody of a minor with
the consent or sufferance of the parents or
guardian, although against the child's own will,
cannot be considered involuntary servitude.
Second. We are dealing not with a civil remedy
but with a criminal charge, in relation to which
the Bill of Rights defines no crime and provides
no punishment. Its effects cannot be carried into
the realm of criminal law without an act of the
legislature.
To sum up this case, there is no proof of slaver
or even of involuntary servitude, inasmuch as it
has not been clearly shown that the child has
been disposed of against the will of her
grandmother or has been taken altogether out of
her control. If the facts in this respect be
interpreted otherwise, there is no law applicable
here, either of the United States or of the
Archipelago, punishing slavery as a crime. The
child was not physically confined or restrained
so as to sustain a conviction for illegal detention,
nor are the acts of the accused brought within
any of the provisions of the law for the
punishment of offenses against minors;
consequently the conviction in this case must be
reversed, in accordance with the
recommendation of the Attorney-General, with
costs de oficio, and the prisoner is acquitted.
REYES VS. ALOJADO
G.R. NO. L-5671 AUGUST 24, 1910
TORRES, J.:
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ISSUE:
Whether or not slavery was committed by Reyes.
FACTS:
On or about January 22, 1905, Veronica Alojado
received, as a loan, from Benito de los Reyes that
the sum P67 .60, for the purpose of paying a debt
she owed to Olimpia Zaballa. It was agreed
between Alojado and Reyes that the debtor
should remain as a servant in the house and in
the service of her creditor, without any
renumeration whatever, until she should find
some one who would furnish her with the said
sum where with to repeat the loan. The
defendant, Veronica Alojado, afterwards left the
house of the plaintiff, on March 12, 1906,
without having paid him her debt, nor did she do
so at any subsequent date, notwithstanding his
demands. The plaintiff, therefore, on the 15th of
march, 1906, filed suit in the court of the justice
of the peace of Santa Rosa, La Laguna, against
Veronica Alojado to recover the said sum or, in a
contrary case, to compel her to return to his
service. The trial having been had, the justice of
the peace, on April 14, 1906, rendered judgment
whereby he sentenced the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the sum claimed and declared that,
in case the debtor should be insolvent, she
should be obliged to fulfill the agreement
between her and the plaintiff. The costs of the
trial were assessed against the defendant.
The defendant appealed from the said judgment.
The defendant, in her written answer of August
15, 1906, to the aforesaid complaint, denied the
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the complaint and alleged that, although she had
left the plaintiff's service, it was because the
latter had paid her no sum whatever for the
services she had rendered in his house. The
defendant likewise denied the conditions
expressed in paragraph 4 of the complaint,
averring that the effects purchased, to the
amount of P11.97, were in the possession of the
plaintiff, who refused to deliver them to her. She
therefore asked that she be absolved from the
complaint and that the plaintiff be absolved from
the complaint the wages due her for the services
she had rendered.
RULING:
YES. The duty to pay the said sum, as well as
that of P11.97 delivered to the defendant in small
amounts during the time that she was in the
plaintiff's house, is unquestionable, inasmuch as
it is a positive debt demandable of the defendant
by her creditor. (Arts. 1754, 1170, Civil Code.)
However, the reason alleged by the plaintiff as a
basis for the loan is untenable, to wit, that the
defendant was obliged to render service in his
house as a servant without remuneration
whatever and to remain therein so long as she
had not paid her debt, inasmuch as this
condition is contrary to law and morality. (Art.
1255, Civil Code.)
Domestic services are always to be remunerated,
and no agreement may subsist in law in which it
is stipulated that any domestic service shall be
absolutely gratuitous, unless it be admitted that
slavery may be established in this country

through a covenant entered into between the
interested parties.
When legal regulations prohibit even a usurious
contract and all abuses prejudicial to
subordinates and servant, in connection with
their salaries and wages, it will be understood at
once that the compact whereby service rendered
by a domestic servant in the house of any
inhabitant of this country is to be gratuitous, is
in all respects reprehensible and censurable; and
consequently, the contention of the plaintiff, that
until the defendant shall have paid him her debt
she must serve him in his house gratuitously is
absolutely inadmissible.
March 17, 2018 – Article 273 – EXPLOITATION
OF CHILD LABOR
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 18, 2018 – Article 274 – SERVICES
RENDERED UNDER COMPULSION IN
PAYMENT OF DEBT
DAHIROC, Janice L.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 18, 2018 – Article 275 –
ABANDONMENT OF PERSONS IN DANGER
AND ABANDONMENT OF ONE'S OWN VICTIM
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
G.R. NO. 93475 JUNE 5, 1991
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, PETITIONER,
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
prosecution for abandonment under Article 275
of the same Code.
FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14
March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro
Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by
petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle
then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in
damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto
Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. The petitioner
abandoned them and failed to help or render
assistance to them, without justifiable reason.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were
filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries under
Article 365 and; b) an Information for violation of
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal
Code on Abandonment of one's victim.
On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its
decision in finding the petitioner guilty of the
crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined
and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed
from said Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the
meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
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arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered
a plea of not guilty.
He filed a petition for review in the CA but which
was denied. He raised before the SC that that he
cannot be penalized twice for an “accident” and
another for “recklessness.” He maintained that
since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless
imprudence, which offense carries heavier
penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, he could no longer be charged under
Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing
to render to the persons whom he has
accidentally injured.
HELD:
No, because said Articles penalize different and
distinct offenses. The protection against double
jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple
act may be an offense against two different
provisions of law and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction under one does
not bar prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses
— the first against a person and the second
against public peace and order — one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on
double jeopardy.
The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner
has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the
petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
March 18, 2018 – Article 276 – ABANDONING
A MINOR
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
PEOPLE VS. BANDIAN
G.R. NO. 45186, SEPTEMBER 30, 1936
FACTS:
One morning, Josefina Bandian went to a thicket
to respond to the call of nature. After a while,
Bandian went out of the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood. She showed signs of not
being able to support herself. She was seen by
her neighbor Valentin Aguilar who asked the
help of Adriano Comcom to bring her to her
house. When Comcom rushed to aid Bandian, he
saw a newborn baby near a path adjoining the
thicket where Bandian was seen moments
before. When asked if the baby was hers, she
responded in the affirmative. Dr. Emilio
Nepomoceno testified that Bandian gave birth in
her house and thereafter threw the baby to kill
it. The Solicitor-General maintains that Bandian
may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under
Article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the
abandonment having resulted in the death of the
minor allegedly abandoned. The trial court gave
credit to the opinion of Dr. Nepomoceno.
ISSUE:
Was the crime infanticide or abandonment of
minor?
HELD:
No crime was committed since the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstance are present in
this case. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that

the wounds found in the body of the child were
not caused by the hand of man but by bites
animals, the pigs that usually roamed through
the thicket where it was found. Infanticide and
abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must
be committed willfully or consciously, or at least
it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and
free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence,
the person who commits them, under said
circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of
his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his
acts, in order that he may be held liable. In this
case, she had no cause to kill or abandon it,
because her affair with a former lover, which was
not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took
place three years before the incident. Kirol
testified at the trial that he knew that Bandian
was pregnant, he believed from the beginning
that the child carried by Bandian in her womb
was his, and that he and she had been eagerly
waiting for the birth of the child. Therefore,
Bandian had no cause to be ashamed of her
pregnancy to Kirol.
March 18, 2018 – Article 277 –
ABANDONMENT OF MINOR BY PERSON
ENTRUSTED WITH HIS CUSTODY;
INDIFFERENCE OF PARENTS
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
DE GUZMAN VS PEREZ
G.R. NO. 156013
JULY 25, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Roberto De Guzman and private
respondent Shirley Aberde became sweethearts
while studying law in the University of Sto.
Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when
Shirley became pregnant. She gave birth to
Robby Aberde de Guzman. Shirley and Roberto
never got married. In 1991, Roberto married
another woman with whom he begot two
children.
Roberto sent money for Robby’s schooling only
twice — the first in 1992 and the second in 1993.
In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, Roberto
gave Shirley P7,000. Other than these instances,
Roberto never provided any other financial
support for his son.
Shirley worked in Taiwan for two years. However,
she reached the point where she had just about
spent all her savings to provide for her and
Robby’s needs. The child’s continued education
thus became uncertain.
Despite his fabulous wealth, however, Roberto
failed to provide support to Robby. On June 15,
2000, Shirley filed a criminal complaint for
abandonment and neglect of child under Article
59(2) and (4) of PD 603 .
ISSUE:
Whether or not Roberto alone may be charged for
abandonment and neglect of child under Article
59 (2) and (4) of PD 603
HELD:
Yes. Article 59(4) of PD 603 provides that:
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Art. 59 .Crimes. – Criminal liability shall attach
to any parent who:
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the
education which the family’s station in life and
financial conditions permit.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a parent;
(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;
(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to
the child and
(4 the offender’s station in life and financial
condition permit him to give an appropriate
education to the child.
There is a prima facie showing from the evidence
that Roberto is in fact financially capable of
supporting Robby’s education. The notarized GIS
of the RNCD Development Corporation indicates
that petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paid-up
shares in the company.
The crime may be committed by any parent.
Liability for the crime does not depend on
whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect.
The law intends to punish the neglect of any
parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure
to give the child the education which the family’s
station in life and financial condition permit. The
irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself
from the consequences of his neglect by invoking
the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or
her own parental duties.
The "neglect of child" punished under Article
59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as
"indifference of parents") penalized under the
second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised
Penal Code.
March 19, 2018 – Article 278 – EXPLOITATION
OF MINORS/ REPUBLIC ACT 7610 (Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act)
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
G.R. No. 203114, June 28, 2017
VIRGILIO LABANDRIA AWAS vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
AAA, a Grade III pupil declared that [petitioner]
is the boyfriend of her sister. Sometime in
January 2010, [petitioner] was in their house in
Valenzuela City. [Petitioner] called her and
brought her inside the room. [Petitioner] touched
her vagina. [Petitioner] made her lie down beside
him and again touched her vagina. Thereafter,
[petitioner] put on his shoes and warned her not
to tell her mother and father about the incident.
AAA was wearing leggings and panty at the time
of the incident. Petitioner never removed
anything from her when he touched her. At the
time of the incident, they were the only person
(sic) inside the room. Her father and other
siblings were then asleep in another room while
his brother was downstairs.
AAA's brother came to know about the incident
when he saw her crying in a corner of their
house. Her brother told her mother about the

incident. Her mother called a police and
petitioner was later apprehended. Her mother
gave her statements at the police station.
On January 25, 2010, Ortiz, a medico-legal
officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, received a
request for Physical/Genital Examination on the
person of AAA. His examination states: "ano-
genital examination reveals essentially normal
gross findings." He observed that AAA's hymen
was annular, thin with central orifice and no
abnormality noted. There was no evidence of any
sexual abuse because of his findings that AAA's
genital organ is normal.
As mentioned, the RTC found the petitioner
guilty of acts of lasciviousness as defined in
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized pursuant to Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts committed by the
accused are considered as an lascivious acts
which is penalized under section 5, Republic Act
7610.
RULING:
YES.
The acts committed by the petitioner against AAA
constituted acts of lasciviousness. The elements
of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code are, to wit: (1) the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) the act is done under any of the following
circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation,
or (b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious or (c) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3)
the offended party is another person of either
sex. Such acts are punished as sexual abuse
under Republic Act No. No. 7 610, whose
elements under Section 5 of the law are namely:
(1) the accused commits the acts of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is
performed with· a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. No. 7610 defines
lascivious conduct as:
The intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.
G.R. NO. 198732 , JUNE 10, 2013
CHRISTIAN CABALLO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23
years old, in her uncle’s place in Surigao City.
Her uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was
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one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was a
sophomore college student at the University of
San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in
Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went
to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and
there, visited AAA. After spending time together,
they eventually became sweethearts. Sometime
during the third week of March 1998, AAA went
home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle.
In the last week of March of the same year,
Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual
intercourse with him. This was followed by
several more of the same in April 1998, in the
first and second weeks of May 1998, on August
31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which
happened in Surigao City, except the one in
August which occurred in Cebu. In June 1998,
AAA became pregnant and later gave birth on
March 8, 1999.
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that
Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose her
virginity due to promises of marriage and his
assurance that he would not get her pregnant
due to the use of the "withdrawal method."
Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked
upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and
consequently, advised her to have an abortion.
She heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts
were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution
averred that when AAA’s mother confronted
Caballo to find out what his plans were for AAA,
he assured her that he would marry her
daughter.
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that
during their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no
longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate
her and that there was no bleeding. He also
maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends
prior to him. Further, he posited that he and AAA
were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one
(1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and another
week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually,
they broke up due to the intervention of AAA’s
parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even
told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA
because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he
repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was
always rejected because she was still studying.
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found
Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610,
in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child
Abuse Cases.
On January 28, 2011, the CA dismissed the
appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC’s
ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Caballo filed a motion
for reconsideration which was, however, denied
on September 26, 2011. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty under
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
RULING:
Yes.
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in
sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due

to the coercion or influence of any adult, the
child is deemed to be a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this
manner, the law is able to act as an effective
deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against
children, prejudicial as they are to their
development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under
the coercion or influence of any adult exists
when there is some form of compulsion
equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended party’s free will.
Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on
Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse
involves the element of influence which
manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or
assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the
"improper use of power or trust in any way that
deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another’s objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the
"improper use of x x x power to compel another
to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that
Caballo’s actuations may be classified as
"coercion" and "influence" within the purview of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority.
It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old
at the time of the commission of the crime and is
hence, considered a child under the law. In this
respect, AAA was not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the import of her
actions and in consequence, remained
vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of
adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that
consent is immaterial in cases involving a
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as
such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were
sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling
is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under
RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly
give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to
punish "those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in
cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual
intercourse or committing lascivious conduct
with a child who is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the
offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under
our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she
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can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as
parens patriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because
of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve
its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad
decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely
more damaging to her than a bad business deal.
Thus, the law should protect her from the
harmful consequences of her attempts at adult
sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should
not be deemed to have validly consented to adult
sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act
of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which
seeks to afford her special protection against
abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
(Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will
be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the
law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable
prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law
to be incapable of giving rational consent to any
lascivious act or sexual intercourse. Second,
coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s
seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23
years old at the time of the commission of the
offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA,
more or less. The age disparity between an adult
and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position
over AAA so as to enable him to force his will
upon the latter. Third, Caballo's actions
effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and
influence.1âwphi1 Records reveal that Caballo
repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and
even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also
guaranteed that she would not get pregnant
since he would be using the "withdrawal method"
for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to
influence AAA to set aside her reservations and
eventually give into having sex with him, with
which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first
sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash
and unexpected manner in which Caballo
pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to
have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a
certain extent, a position of duress .. An
important factor is that AAA refused Caballo's
incipient advances and in fact, asked him to
leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it
stands to reason that she was put in a situation
deprived of the benefit of clear thought and
choice. In any case, the Court observes that any
other choice would, nonetheless, remain
tarnished due to AAA's minority as above-
discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute
"coercion" and "influence" within the context of
the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual
intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with
Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse"; as such, the second element of the
subject offense exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the
Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

G.R. NO. 173988, OCTOBER 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael
Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the
Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally
bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo
sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked
Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael
did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat,
petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on
his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits
and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael
Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost
consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick
Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan
cried.
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach
her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella
Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying
and told his mother about the incident. His
mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales
reported the incident to their Barangay Captain,
Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have
Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael
Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto
Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr.
Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the
incident to the Police Station. The medical
certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador
reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears
1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-
L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1
cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially
at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child
abuse in the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City
(RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27
of that court. The information alleged as follows:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval
and Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for
the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the
crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as
follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996,
in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of
Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary
Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a
seven year old child, by pinching him on different
parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan
Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has
suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting the petitioner of child abuse.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005, with a
modification of the penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the petitioner
constitute child abuse penalized under Section
10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and not under
the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
YES.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child
abuse thusly:
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs
for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment
to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
In the crime charged against the petitioner,
therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act
by deedsor by words that debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be
habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner
"went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a
helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and
when she held him in the armpits and threw him
on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body
hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness
[but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the
accused-appellant further held the boy up by his
ears and pushed him down on the floor." On her
part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated
by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop
going to school altogether out of fear of the
petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him
to another school where he had to adjust again.
Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty
of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical
maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her
first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution
witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced the

petitioner’s cruelty.The petitioner was also
convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in
Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of
another child named Dariel Legayada. Such
previous incidents manifested that the petitioner
had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge
stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the
information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the
essential elements of the crime charged were not
properly alleged therein; and that her
constitutional and statutory right to due process
of law was consequently violated.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the
petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty
or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts
of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development including those covered by
Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
“The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by
imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years,
two months and one day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the
offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a
public schoolteacher. It cited Section 3 l(e) of
Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that
the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed
in its maximum period if the offender is a public
officer or employee." Her being a public
schoolteacher was alleged in the information and
established by evidence as well as admitted by
her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however,
because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610
punishes the crime committed by the petitioner
with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose
three periods are six years and one day to six
years and eight months, for the minimum period;
six years, eight months and one day to seven
years and four months, for the medium period;
and seven years, four months and one day to
eight years, for the maximum period. The
maximum of the indeterminate sentence should
come from the maximum period, therefore, and
the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and
one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from
prision correccional in the maximum period, the
penalty next lower than prision mayor in its
minimum period, whose range is from four years,
two months and one day to six years.1âwphi1
Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days,
and the maximum is seven years, four months
and one day of prision mayor.”
G.R. NO. 193854 ; 24 SEPTEMBER 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINA
DULAY
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FACTS:
On 3 July 2005, AAA was introduced to the
accused during the wake of a relative of AAA.
Thereafter, the accused convinced AAA to
accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio,
Paranaque City. However, before they went to the
wake, they went to look for the boyfriend of the
accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port were
they found the boyfriend of the accused. They
proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of
the Bulungan Fish Port. Upon arrival, the
accused suddenly pulled AAA inside a room
where a man known only as “Speed” was waiting.
AAA saw “Speed” give the accused some money,
then the latter left. “Speed” wielded a knife and
tied AAA’s hands to the papag and raped her.
AAA asked for appellant’s help when she saw the
latter peeping into the room while she was being
raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape,
“Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone
what had happened or else they would get back
at her. AAA, accompanied by her sister and
mother filed a complaint for Rape. The RTC
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as
a co-principal by indispensable cooperation for
the crime of Rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be held liable
as a co-principal for the crime of Rape
HELD:
No, in order to be considered as a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate
in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity
in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another
act without which it would not have been
accomplished. The Supreme Court held that the
accused did not participate in the criminal
resolution of the crime of Rape but merely
delivered AAA to “Speed”.
However, the accused is still liable for violation
of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610 or a) Those
who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce
child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following: (1) Acting as a procurer
of a child prostitute.
MALTO V. PEOPLE
GR 16473 , SEPTEMBER 21, 2007
FACTS:
Sometime during the month of November 1997
to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a
minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several
times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner
and AAA had a “mutual understanding” and
became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the
petitioner’s threat to end their relationship, AAA
succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s
mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant City
Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an
Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III,
RA 7610. During the month of November 1997
up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z.
Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and
exert influence, relationship and moral
ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his

student at Assumption College, complainant,
AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct for several
times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge.
The trial court found the evidence for the
prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s
conviction and rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA
7610, as amended and sentenced him to
reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his
conviction even if it found that his acts were not
covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision
mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining
petitioner’s conviction on the grounds that there
was no rape committed since their sexual
intercourse was consensual by reason of their
“sweetheart” relationship
RULING:
NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong. Petitioner
violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as
amended. The first element of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts
committed by the accused. The second element
refers to the state or condition of the offended
party. The third element corresponds to the
minority or age of the offended party. Since all
three elements of the crime were present, the
conviction of petitioner was proper.
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal
cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of RA
7610. Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his
kisses and touches and consented to have sexual
intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts
out of mutual love and affection. The sweetheart
theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape,
felonies committed against or without the
consent of the victim. It operates on the theory
that the sexual act was consensual. It requires
proof that the accused and the victim were lovers
and that she consented to the sexual relations.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under
RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly
give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person. A child cannot give consent to a contract
under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that
she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as
parens patriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because
of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve
its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad
decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely
more damaging to her than a bad business deal.
Thus, the law should protect her from the
harmful consequences of her attempts at adult
sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should
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not be deemed to have validly consented to adult
sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act
of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which
seeks to afford her special protection against
abuse, exploitation and discrimination. In other
words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable
of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse.
To provide special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination. As well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the
parents, guardian, teacher or person having care
or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect
the child against abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination or when such acts against the
child are committed by the said parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care and
custody of the same.
The best interest of children shall be the
paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities, and legislative
bodies, consistent with the principles of First
Call for Children as enunciated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life.
March 19, 2018 – Article 279 – ADDITIONAL
PENALTIES FOR OTHER OFFENSES
DUQUE, Francis Lester M.
G.R. NO. 179090 JUNE 5, 2009
LEONILO SANCHEZ ALIAS NILO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Private complainant is VVV, a minor. FFF, VVV's
father, was leasing a portion of the fishpond
owned by Escolastico. Appellant, one of the heirs
of escolastico went to FFF’s house to inquire
about the whereabouts of the latter’s, MMM,
FFF's wife told appellant that FFF was not
around. Right then and there, appellant told
them to leave the place and started destroying
the house. MMM got angry and told appellant
that he could not just drive them away since the
contract for the use of the fishpond was not yet
terminated. VVV left to fetch a barangay tanod
but failed to do so. On her way back to their
house, she saw appellant with a gallon of
gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant
warned VVV then to better pack up her family’s
things because he would burn their house.
Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother,
BBB, get a piece of wood to defend themselves
and their house from appellant. However,
appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of
wood and started beating him with it. At the
sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed
him. Irked by what she did, appellant turned to
her and struck her with the piece of wood three
(3) times. As a result, the wood broke into several

pieces. MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to
fight back. After which, appellant left, bringing
with him the gallon of gasoline. The RTC finds
the accused guilty of R.A. 7610.
ISSUE:
WON appellant can be charged with additional
penalties for other offenses violated which is PD
603.
HELD:
Yes. Here, the applicable laws are Par 09, Article
59 of P.D. No. 603 (Inflicts cruel and unusual
punishment upon the child or deliberately
subjects him to indignation and other excessive
chastisement that embarrass or humiliate him)
and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which
provides: SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect,
Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. — (a) Any person who shall
commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603...
In the case of Araneta v. People, SC held that the
provision punishes not only those enumerated
under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse,
(b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d)
being responsible for conditions prejudicial to
the child’s development. The prosecution need
not prove that the acts of child abuse, child
cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in
the prejudice of the child because an act
prejudicial to the development of the child is
different from the former acts. Moreover, it is a
rule in statutory construction that the word "or"
in Section 10 of R.a 7610 is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one
thing from other things enumerated.
March 19, 2018 – Article 280 – QUALIFIED
TRESPASS TO DWELLING
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
VS
AURELIO LAMAHANG
G.R. NO. L-43530
AUGUST 3, 1935
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed by the accused?
FACTS:
At early dawn of March 2, 1935,a policeman was
patrolling along the streets of the city of Iloilo
caught the accused in the act of making an
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of
cheap goods. At the time the owner of the store
was sleeping inside. The accused had only
succeeded in breaking one board and in
unfastening another from the wall when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested
him and placed him under custody.
HELD:
The court was of the opinion and held that under
consideration the crime committed was
attempted trespass to dwelling. Under Article
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is
committed when a private person shall enter the
dwelling of another against the latter's will. The
accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall
of the said store by breaking a board and
unfastening another for the purpose of entering
the store and the accused did not succeed due to
the presence of the policeman. Under the
circumstances of this case the prohibition of the
owner or inmate is presumed.
SALVADOR MARZALADO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 152997, NOVEMBER 10,2004
ISSUE:
Whether the accused violated article 280 of the
Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
Accused was charged with violation of article 280
of the Revised Penal Code when he forcibly
entered the leased unit of Cristina Albano.
Accused claimed that when he was on his way
home he saw water in a continuous stream
flowing out of Albano's unit. He searched for
Albano but he did not find her so he asked for
the assistance of the Barangay Tanods and went
inside the unit and found an open faucet, with
water flooding on the floor.
HELD:
No. The Court ruled that as certified by Barangay
Lupon secretary, the unit rented by Albano was
forcibly opened by the owner because of the
strong water pressure coming out of the faucet.
Since Albano and her children already left,
nobody was left to attend the unit. Clearly
accused acted for the justified purpose of
avoiding further flooding and damage to his
mother's property. No criminal intent could be
clearly imputed to accused for the remedial
action he had taken. There was an exigency that
had to be addressed to avoid damage to the
leased unit.
March 20, 2018 – Article 281 – OTHER FORMS
OF TRESPASS.
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
[NO CASES FOUND]
March 20, 2018 – Article 282 – GRAVE
THREATS
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
RONNIE CALUAG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO.: 171511, MARCH 4, 2009
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s action constitutes to grave
threats.
FACTS:
Complainants Nestor and his wife Julia Denido
inquired to Caluag and Sentillas why their guests
were mauled during their earlier drinking spree.
Caluag butted in and said, “bakit kasama ka ba
doon?” And boxed and mauled Nestor. The
victims quickly went back to their house. Julia,
on her way to the baranggay hall to report the
incident, was confronted by Caluag and poked
and threatened her with a gun to her forehead
and said, “saan ka pupunta? Gusto mo ito?”

Despite the threats, she was able to report the
crime. Soon after, 2 informations was filed
against petitioner; 1) for grave threats, and 2) for
light physical injuries. The MTC, RTC found the
petitioner guilty of the crime grave threats and
slight physical injuries. Hence the appeal.
HELD:
Yes, the SC uniformly found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of grave threats and
slight physical injury. Under article 282 of the
Revised Penal Code – any person who shall
threaten another with the infliction upon the
person, honor or property of the latter or of his
family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall
suffer;
(2) the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos if the threat shall not have
been made under subject to a condition.
In this case, the act of pointing a gun to her
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill. Thus,
action speaks louder than words considering it
be taken in to context the earlier surrounding
circumstances.
March 23, 2018 – Article 284 – BOND FOR
GOOD BEHAVIOR
NASH, Regina Mercado
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 23, 2018 – Article 285 – OTHER LIGHT
THREATS
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
US V. ANDRES V. ESTRADA
GR NO. 4418, MAR 26, 1908
FACTS:
Cecilia went inside a billiard room, seeing this,
Anastasio Delgado, who was also present inside
the billiard room said to his friend, who was by
his side " Are women allowed to come into billiard
rooms? Cecilia took offense on the remark made
and hot words passed between her and the said
Delgado. Thereafter, Andres V. Estrada, the
woman's husband, took part in the quarrel and
notwithstanding the fact that Delgado had left
the place, hiding himself in the next house, the
accused also went out and returned shortly
thereafter provided with a revolver and
commenced to look for Delgado who, fearing
injury, returned to his home. Moreover, his
friends told him to stay hidden because the
accused was looking for him in order to kill him.
The court sentenced Estrada for a higher penalty
and he appealed for a lower one.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Estrada liable for
other light threats and be awarded with a lower
penalty.
HELD:
YES. The court stated that the act complained do
not constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor
for uttering threats. A person who, in the heat of
anger, threatened to kill another without
persisting in the idea involved in his threat is
liable only under the paragraph 2 of Article 285
of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore,
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Flaviano Delgado, testifies that the accused and
his wife, after the information had been filed,
called at the house of the witness to implore
pardon, Estrada alleging that the threat was
uttered without premeditation, and that it was
done unintentionally. Hence, the accused
Estrada is only liable for other light threats and
consequently his penalty must be lowered.
RONNIE CALUAG VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 171511, MARCH 4, 2009
FACTS:
Nestor learned that two of his guests from an
earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time,
Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store
owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor
inquired from several people what happened,
Caluag butted in and replied “Bakit kasama ka
ba roon?”and immediately boxed him without
warning. Nestor retaliated but he was
overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia, wife
of Nestor, saw Caluag and Sentillas box her
husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they
did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants,
Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. In
the evening, same day, Nestor told his wife to
report the boxing incident to the barangay
authorities. Thereafter, Julia and her son Rotsen
were on their way to their barangay hall, she
encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the
alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia
with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said
“Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Despite this
fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to
the barangay hall where she reported the gun-
poking incident to the barangay authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caluag is liable for other light
threats under Article 285 of the RPC.
HELD:
NO. The court stated that Under the Revised
Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats:
grave threats (Article 282), light threats (Article
283) and other light threats (Article 285). In grave
threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a
crime which may or may not be accompanied by
a condition. In light threats, the wrong
threatened does not amount to a crime but is
always accompanied by a condition. In other
light threats, the wrong threatened does not
amount to a crime and there is no condition. In
the instant case, Julia Denido left her house to
go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of
her husband which she witnessed earlier in the
afternoon. On her way there, Caluag confronted
her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at
the same time saying “Saan ka pupunta, gusto
mo ito?” Considering what transpired earlier
between petitioner and Julia’s husband,
Caluag’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead
clearly announces a threat to kill or to inflict
serious physical injury on her person. Taken in
the context of the surrounding circumstances,
the uttered words do not go against the threat to
kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by
petitioners accompanying act. Article 285, par. 1
(other light threats) is inapplicable since it
presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong
will not constitute a crime. That the threat to
commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute

a crime is the distinguishing factor between
grave threats on one hand, and light and other
light threats on the other. Given the surrounding
circumstances, the offense committed falls
under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1)
killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime,
and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a
condition.
March 21, 2018 – Article 286 – GRAVE
COERCIONS
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
ALEJANDRO V. BERNAS
GR NO. 179243 (SEPTEMBER 7, 2011)
ISSUE
Whether or not grave coercion can be committed
through intimidation alone without violence
FACTS
Petitioner Alejandro is a lessee-purchaser of a
condominium unit in Pasig City, under the
Contract of Lease with Option to purchase with
lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI).
Alejandro sub-leased the unit to other petitioners
(Firdausi, Abbas and Francisco) to be used as a
law office. However, a defect in the air-
conditioning unit prompted petitioners to
suspend payments until the problem is fixed by
the management. Instead of addressing the
defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment
before the MTC.
During the pendency of the case, respondent
Atty. Bernas ordered the unit to be padlock.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for
grave coercion against respondents Atty. Bernas,
Atty SIa-Bernas, Amor and Aguilar. Petitioners
claimed that the padlocking of the unit was
illegal, felonious and unlawful which prevented
them from entering the premises. Petitioners also
alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off
of facilities had unduly prejudiced them and
thus constituted grave coercion. Moreover, there
was sufficient intimidation by the mere presence
of the security guards.
HELD
No. The second element of grave coercion is
absent in this case.
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements
must be present:
1. That a person is prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be
it right or wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion is effected
by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. That the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so, or in
other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful
right.
In this case, the mere presence of the security
guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the
petitioners.
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There is intimidation when one of the parties is
compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded
fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his
person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or
ascendants, to give his consent. Material
violence is not indispensable for there to be
intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind
of the victim which restricts or hinders the
exercise of the will is sufficient.
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through
material force or such a display of it as would
produce intimidation and, consequently, control
over the will of the offended party is an essential
ingredient.
Moreover, it was not alleged that the security
guards committed anything to intimidate
petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards
were not customarily stationed there and that
they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To
determine the degree of the intimidation, the age,
sex and condition of the person shall be borne in
mind. Here, the petitioners who were allegedly
intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights.
In this case, the crime of unjust vexation is the
proper complaint filed instead of the grave
coercion against respondents.
UNITED STATES V. MENA
GR NO. 4812 (OCTOBER 30, 1908)
ISSUE
Whether or not defendant Mena is liable for grave
coercion
FACTS
Three carabaos of defendant Mena trespassed
upon the rice paddies of complainant Flora,
doing considerable damage thereto. The latter
took possession of the animals and refused to
return them to Mena without compensation for
the damage done. Mena was still unable to pay.
Flora and his son set out to take the carabaos to
the justice of the peace, for the purpose of
depositing them in his care until the question of
damages could be settled in his court. On the
road to the justice of the peace, they met
defendant Mena in company with some other
persons. By refusal to surrender them to the
defendant or his friends, defendant Mena drew
his bolo, rushed at Flora’s, cut the mecate by
which the son was leading the carabao, and with
threats of bodily injury, compelled him to turn
the other loose; and then with further threats of
bodily injury, compelled Flora himself to turn
loose the carabao which he was riding.
HELD
Yes. The acts committed by the defendant clearly
fall within the foregoing definition of the crime of
grave coercion. With violence he compelled the
complaining witness to do that which he did not
desire to do — that is to say, to turn over the
possession of the carabaos.
It is a maxim of the law that no man is authorized
to take the law into his own hands and enforce
his rights with threats of violence, except in
certain well-defined cases, where one acts in the

necessary defense of one’s life, liberty, or
property, against unlawful aggression, and
manifestly the defendant can not successfully
maintain that his action was taken in defense of
life, liberty, or property.
The defendant was guilty of the crime of grave
coercion unless he was lawfully authorized to
enforce his demand when the complaining
witness refused compliance therewith.
March 22, 2018 – Article 287 – LIGHT
COERCIONS
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
ONG CHIU KWAN VS. PEOPLE
GR NO. 113006
November 23, 2000
ISSUE:
W/N the court was proper in finding petitioner
guilty for violating Art. 287 par. 2 or unjust
vexation of the RPC
FACTS:
Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of
Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court,
Bacolod City an information charging petitioner
with unjust vexation for cutting the electric
wires, water pipes and telephone lines of "Crazy
Feet," a business establishment owned and
operated by Mildred Ong.
That on April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the
morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo
Infante to "relocate" the telephone, electric and
water lines of "Crazy Feet," because said lines
posed as a disturbance. However, Ong Chiu
Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate
authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires,
water pipe and telephone lines of the business
establishment.
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the
Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan
guilty of unjust vexation, and sentenced him to
"imprisonment for twenty days." On appeal, both
the RTC and CA affirmed such decision by the
MTC. Hence, this petition.
HELD:
Yes. Unjust Vexation is any conduct which
annoys, vexes, disturbs or irritates another,
provided there was no force, threat, violence or
intimidation.
In the present case, petitioner admitted having
ordered the cutting of the electric, water and
telephone lines of complainant’s business
establishment because these lines crossed his
property line. He failed, however, to show
evidence that he had the necessary permit or
authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed
the interruption of electric, water and telephone
services during peak hours of the operation of
business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s
act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant.
Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable
for unjust vexation.
MADERAZO VS. PEOPLE
GR NO. 165065
SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
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ISSUE:
W/N Maderazo is guilty of unjust vexation under
art. 287 of the RPC
FACTS:
Verutiao (offended party) had been the lessee of
a stall in the Biliran public market and paid a
monthly rental of P200.00. She was allowed to
finish the construction of the market stall with
the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the
Municipal Treasurer.
She spent P24, 267.00 for the construction of the
market stall but was not reimbursed by the
Municipality of her expenses.
Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-
year lease contract, renewable every year with a
monthly rental of P400.00. It is also provided
that, any violation of the conditions therein
agreed shall be sufficient cause for its
cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that the
contract has not yet expired.
The Municipality partially paid her P10, 000.00
of her total expenses in the construction of the
market stall. However, considering that she had
not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the
construction of the stall, she did not pay her
rent.
Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to
Mindanao where she spent the Christmas
holidays and returned a month after. She and
her husband received a letter-order from Mayor
Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the
stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her
failure to pay the rentals for the stall and the
cancellation of the lease contract.
Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises.
The locks were opened on the authority of the
Mayor. The contents of the market stall were
inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the
police station for safekeeping
HELD:
Yes. In unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo,
malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good
faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust
vexation because good faith negates malice. The
paramount question to be considered is whether
the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of
the person to whom it is directed. The main
purpose of the law penalizing coercion and
unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the
principle that no person may take the law into
his hands and that our government is one of law,
not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take
into his own hands the administration of justice.
In the present case, the overt acts of petitioners
Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo,
Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and
caused embarrassment to her. It was petitioner
Melchor Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor
Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to
conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and
to effect the transportation of the goods to the
police station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who
was a Sangguniang Bayan member, obeyed the
order of the Mayor.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it
was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken
from the stall and brought to the police station,
the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless
committed. For the crime to exist, it is not
necessary that the offended party be present
when the crime was committed by said
petitioners. It is enough that the private
complainant was embarrassed, annoyed,
irritated or disturbed when she learned of the
overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their
collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from
her stall and prevented her from selling therein,
hence, losing income from the business.
March 22, 2018 – Article 288 – OTHER
SIMILAR COERCIONS
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 22, 2018 – Article 289 – FORMATION,
MAINTENANCE, AND PROHIBITION OF
COMBINATION OF CAPITAL OR LABOR
THROUGH VIOLENCE OR THREATS
RIVERA, Marynit P.
G.R. No. L-1340
October 13, 1947
HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG
WORKERS' UNION (CLO)
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE and BISIG NG
CANLUBANG (NLU)
ISSUE:
Whether or not peaceful picketing is prohibited
FACTS:
The Bisig ng Canlubang Union (BCU) demanded
from the Canlubang Sugar Estate (CSE) the
salary increase of its employees and other
benefits. CSE refused and so BCU staged a
strike. A case was filed which the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) ordered the striking
union to return to work and that any employee
who shall fail to return to their post shall be
substituted by CSE with a new employee. The
CIR also prohibited any form of picketing while
the case is pending. CSE was ordered to accept
the returning employees and to maintain status
quo. Both parties complied.
RULING:
NO. Peaceful picketing is part of freedom of
speech and, therefore, cannot be prohibited.
Picketing in a peaceful and and orderly manner
is absolutely legal. It cannot be prohibited for it
is part and parcel of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution.
March 23, 2018 – Article 290 – DISCOVERING
SECRETS THROUGH SEIZURE OF
CORRESPONDENCE
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 23, 2018 – Article 291 – REVEALING
SECRETS WITH ABUSE OF OFFICE
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 24, 2018 – Article 292 – REVELATION
OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Vs.
PENNSWELL, INC.
G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007
FACTS:
Pennswell sold and delivered to Air Philippines
Corporation industrial chemicals, solvents, and
special lubricants amounting to P450,000.00.
When Air Philippines refused to pay the
obligation, Pensswell filed a collection case before
RTC Makati. In its Answer, Air Philippines
alleged that: it refused to pay because it was
defrauded in the amount of P600,000.00 by
Pennswell for its previous sale of 4 items; said
items were misrepresented by Pennswell as
belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in
fact, identical with products it had previously
purchased from Pennswell; and, Pennswell
merely altered the names and labels of such
goods. During the trial, Air Philippines filed a
motion to compel Pennswell to give a detailed list
of the chemical components and the ingredients
used for the products that were sold. Pennswell
opposed the motion for production, contending
that the requested information was a trade secret
that it could not be forced to disclose.
ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals ruled in accordance
with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it
upheld the ruling of the trial court that the
chemical components or ingredients of
respondents products are trade secrets or
industrial secrets that are not subject to
compulsory disclosure.
HELD:
Yes
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process,
tool, mechanism or compound known only to its
owner and those of his employees to whom it is
necessary to confide it. The definition also
extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals
using it in compounding some article of trade
having a commercial value.
A trade secret may consist of any formula,
pattern, device, or compilation of information
that:
(1) is used in one's business; and
(2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not
possess the information.
Generally, a trade secret is a process or device
intended for continuous use in the operation of
the business, for example, a machine or formula,
but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized
customer list.
It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute
proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or
possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation
has rights therein which may be treated as

property, and ordinarily an injunction will be
granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade
secret by one who obtained the information "in
confidence" or through a "confidential
relationship." American jurisprudence has
utilized the following factors to determine if an
information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known
outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known
by employees and others involved in the
business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer
to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer
and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by
the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be
easily or readily obtained through an
independent source.
The chemical composition, formulation, and
ingredients of respondents special lubricants are
trade secrets within the contemplation of the law.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is
beyond quibble. The protection that this
jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is evident in
our laws. The Securities Regulation Code,
expressly provides that the court may issue an
order to protect trade secrets or other
confidential research, development, or
commercial information belonging to the debtor.
Moreover, the Securities Regulation Code is
explicit that the Securities and Exchange
Commission is not required or authorized to
require the revelation of trade secrets or
processes in any application, report or document
filed with the Commission. This confidentiality is
made paramount as a limitation to the right of
any member of the general public, upon request,
to have access to all information filed with the
Commission.
Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection
to trade secrets under the following articles:
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office.
The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
manager, employee or servant who, in such
capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal
or master and shall reveal such secrets.
art. 292. revelation of industrial secrets. the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in
charge, employee or workman of any
manufacturing or industrial establishment who,
to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal
the secrets of the industry of
the latter.
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged
the private character of trade secrets. There is a
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privilege not to disclose ones trade secrets.
Foremost, this Court has declared that trade
secrets and banking transactions are among the
recognized restrictions to the right of the people
to information as embodied in the Constitution.
We said that the drafters of the Constitution also
unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national
security matters and intelligence information,
trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant
to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure.
Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with
examples of a protectionist stance towards the
trade secrets of employers. For instance, this
Court upheld the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company, on the rationalization that
the company has a right to guard its trade
secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors. Notably, it was in
a labor-related case that this Court made a stark
ruling on the proper determination of trade
secrets.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on
Section 77 of Republic Act 7394, or the
Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to
compel respondent to reveal the chemical
components of its products. While it is true that
all consumer products domestically sold,
whether manufactured locally or imported, shall
indicate their general make or active ingredients
in their respective labels of packaging, the law
does not apply to respondent. Respondents
specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease,
Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-
Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not
consumer products. Consumer products, as it is
defined in Article 4(q),[ refers to goods, services
and credits, debts or obligations which are
primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include, but
not be limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and
devices. This is not the nature of respondents
products. Its products are not intended for
personal, family, household or agricultural
purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use,
specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and
engines.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical
formulation of respondents products is not
known to the general public and is unique only
to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these
ingredients are not within the knowledge of the
public.
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

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TITLE TEN – CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY
March 25, 2018 – Article 293 – WHO ARE
GUILTY OF ROBBERY
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
G.R. No. L-12453 July 15, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY and MARCOS
MADANLOG, defendants-appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed Robbery
with Multiple Homicide
FACTS:
In 1912, the complaint the two children were
staying with Juana, their grandmother, in a
house some distance removed from that
occupied by Roman and Rosa and located farther
back from the shore. The grandfather, Francisco,
had gone to the beach. After the grandmother
and the children had gone to rest on a mat where
they slept together, the two accused appeared
and demanded money of Juana. She gave them
P100 in money in response to this demand, and
the accused then required the three to leave the
house and go in the direction of the sea. A further
demand was made upon the old woman for
money, which demand she was unable to comply
with. Lahoylahoy then struck her with a bolo just
below her breast, killing her instantly. The two
children, being greatly frightened, they ran away
separately for some distance and remained
hidden during the night in the bushes.
The next morning the children made their way to
the house where the old couple had lived, which
was vacant. Going in that direction they stopped
at the house of their sister, the wife of the
defendant Madanlog. When they went a little
later to the house where their parents had lived,
the fact was revealed that Francisco, Roman, and
Rosa had also been killed. All the bodies were
collected and buried early in the morning by the
two accused, assisted by Eugenio Tenedero, son-
in-law of Lahoylahoy. The two children Miguela
and Bartolome say that they were threatened
with death if they should make complaint.
At the trial the two children gave a very
consistent account of the robbery and of the
murder of their grandmother.
They were charged crime of robbery with multiple
homicide
HELD: No.
An important question arises upon the matter of
the complaint in connection with the proof as to
the ownership of the property which was taken
by the accused. The part of the complaint here
material to be considered reads as follows:
Xxx According to the proof the person robbed
was Juana; while the complaint charges that the
property taken belong to Roman Estriba.
Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No.
58 declares that a complaint or information shall
show, among others things, the names of the
persons against whom, or against whose
property, the offense was committed, if known.
The complaint in this case therefore properly
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contained an averment as to the ownership of the
property; and upon principle, in charging the
crime of robbery committed upon the person, the
allegation of the owner's name is essential.
It is elementary that in crimes against property,
ownership must be alleged as matter essential to
the proper description of the offense.
To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement,
obtaining money by false pretenses, malicious
mischief, etc., the property obtained must be
that of another, and indictments for such
offenses must name the owner; and a variance in
this respect between the indictment and the
proof will be fatal. It is also necessary in order to
identify the offense. Xxx
Now a complaint charging the commission of the
complex offense of robbery with homicide must
necessarily charge each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the subject of
separate complaints.
To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a
charge of robbing one person when the proof
shows that he robbed an entirely different
person, when the first was not present, is
violative of the rudimentary principles of
pleading; and in addition, is subject to the
criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in
a position where he could not be protected from
a future prosecution by a plea of former
conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or
acquit these defendants today of the robbery
which is alleged to have been committed upon
the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly
clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow for
robbery committed upon the property of Juana;
and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no
avail.
It is evident that, by reason of the lack of
conformity between the allegation and the proof
respecting the ownership of the property, it is
impossible to convict the two accused of the
offense of robbery committed by them in this
case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of
the complex offense of robbery with homicide,
penalized in subsection (1) of article 503 of the
Penal Code. No such difficulty exists, however,
with respect to the quadruple homicide
committed upon the persons named in the
complaint; and in conformity with the provisions
of article 87 of the Penal Code, the penalties
corresponding to all these crimes must be
severely imposed. This court has already held in
United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260),
that where more than one offense (not complex
offenses) are charged in the complaint, and the
accused fails to demur or ask for a severance, the
penalties corresponding to all of the offenses
which are charged and proved may be imposed.
The doctrine announced in that case applies with
even greater propriety offenses in one complaint.
(See sec. 11, General Orders No. 58.)
The acts causing the violent death of the four
deceased must be qualified as homicide, as the
record does not satisfactorily show how and in
what manner they were executed.

G.R. NO. 200922 JULY 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE,
VS.
CESAR CONCEPCION Y BULANIO,
APPELLANT,
ISSUE:
Whether the crime committed was Theft or
Robbery
FACTS:
The crime of robbery with homicide under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against
Cesar Concepcion y Bulanio (Concepcion).
At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004,
while private complainant Jennifer Acampado
was at the corner of Mother Ignacia Street,
Quezon City and at another street which she
could not remember and seemed to be deserted
at that time, a male person riding at the back of
the driver of a motorcycle whom she later
identified in open court as accused Cesar
Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag with
black strap which at that time, was placed on her
left shoulder. The black motorcycle with white
covering at the back side and with plate number
which is not visible to the eye, came from behind
her. As the motorcycle sped away, the accused
even raised and waved the bag that he snatched
from Jennifer who was unable to do anything but
just cry and look at the snatcher so much so that
she recognized him in the process.
Meanwhile, while prosecution witness Joemar de
Felipe was driving his R & E Taxi, in the same
vicinity, he witnessed the subject snatching
incident. As the accused was waving the bag at
Jennifer, he blew his horn. Ogardo drove faster
so that de Felipe gave a chase and kept on
blowing his horn. Eventually, Ogardo lost control
of the motorcycle and it crashed in front of his
taxi, sending its two occupants to the pavement.
De Felipe immediately alighted from the taxi with
the intention to arrest the snatchers. At that
juncture, some policemen from the Kamuning
Police Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City, arrived.
HELD: Theft
Article 293 of the RPC defines robbery as a crime
committed by "any person who, with intent to
gain, shall take any personal property belonging
to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything."
Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any
person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.
By definition in the RPC, robbery can be
committed in three ways, by using: (a) violence
against any person; (b) intimidation of any
person; and/or (c) force upon anything. Robbery
by use of force upon things is provided under
Articles 299 to 305 of the RPC.
The prosecution failed to establish that
Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force
in snatching Acampado’s shoulder bag.
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Acampado herself merely testified that
Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which
was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did
not say that Concepcion used violence,
intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder
bag. Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of
Acampado’s shoulder bag constitutes the crime
of theft, not robbery. Concepcion’s crime of theft
was aggravated by his use of a motorcycle in
committing the crime.
March 24, 2018 – Article 294 – ROBBERY
WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION
OF PERSONS – PENALTIES
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CESAR
CONCEPCION Y BULANIO
G.R. NO. 200922
JULY 18, 2012
ISSUES:
Whether or not the snatching of the shoulder bag
in this case is robbery as contemplated in Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not Concepcion employ violence or
intimidation upon persons, or force upon things,
as contemplated under Article 294, when he
snatched Acampado’s shoulder bag.
FACTS:
At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004,
while Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of
Mother Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at
another street which she could not remember
and seemed to be deserted at that time, a male
person riding at the back of the driver of a
motorcycle whom she later identified in open
court as accused Cesar Concepcion, snatched
her brown Avon bag with black strap which at
that time, was placed on her left shoulder. The
black motorcycle with white covering at the back
side and with plate number which is not visible
to the eye, came from behind her. As the
motorcycle sped away, the Concepcion even
raised and waved the bag that he snatched from
Jennifer who was unable to do anything but just
cry and look at the snatcher so much so that she
recognized him in the process.
HELD:
NO. The prosecution failed to establish that
Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force
in snatching Acampado’s shoulder bag.
Acampado herself merely testified that
Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which
was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did
not say that Concepcion used violence,
intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder
bag. Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of
Acampado’s shoulder bag constitutes the crime
of theft, not robbery. Concepcion’s crime of theft
was aggravated by his use of a motorcycle in
committing the crime. Under Article 14(20) of the
RPC, the use of a motor vehicle as a means of
committing a crime is a generic aggravating
circumstance. Thus, the maximum period of the
penalty for the crime of theft shall be imposed
upon Concepcion due to the presence of a
generic aggravating circumstance and the
absence of any mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO
REGALA
G.R. NO. 130508
APRIL 5, 2000
ISSUE:
Whether or not Regala committed the crime of
robbery with rape as contemplated in Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in
the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy,
Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala
and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were
sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and
his two other companions entered the formers
house. Regala and his companions entered the
house through the kitchen by removing the
pieces of wood under the stove. Regala went to
the room of Nerissa and her grandmother and
poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the
other. Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied
by Regala and his companions. Thereafter,
Nerissa was raped by Regala in bed while her
grandmother was on the floor. After the rape,
Regala and his two companions counted the
money which they took from the "aparador."
HELD:
YES. There was sufficient evidence to establish
the identity of accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the
witness stand. She was sleeping with her
grandmother in the latters house when Regala,
together with the unidentified companions
entered the house. Regala pointed a gun, about
8 inches long, at her grandmother, and then at
her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took off her
panty and her shorts, and removed his own
"porontong" pants, and made sexual intercourse
("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her
grandmother was at the floor. She saw the
aparador of her grandmother being opened. She
could not shout because the gun was pointed at
her, and she was afraid. Two companions of
Regala entered the room as she was being raped.
Two rings and money was taken by Regala and
his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa
saw Regala counting the money taken from the
aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the
kitchen, still hogtied, and raped again. On cross-
examination, Nerissa stated that although there
was no electricity, and the light in the house was
already off, she was able to see the face of Regala
because at the time Regala was counting the
money, one of his companions was holding the
flashlight "beamed to the money" and there was
"some reflection" on the face of Regala. She
remembered the face of Regala because of an
earring on his left ear which he was wearing
when presented at the police line-up.
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the
testimony of her granddaughter. On cross-
examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she
was able to see Regala because he used her
flashlight, and he took off the mask he was
wearing; she recognized Regala because of his
earring and his flat top hair cut.
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The Court gives its approbation to the finding of
the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to
clearly establish the identity of Armando Regala
as the person who, with two companions,
committed the crime of robbery accompanied by
rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa
Tagala positively identified Armando Regala
because at the time he was counting the money
on her bed, the other companion of the accused
beamed the flashlight towards the money and
there was a reflection on the face of Regala.
Although the three intruders were wearing
masks when they entered the house, they
removed their masks later.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
NORBERTO VILLAGRACIA, ELMER
PAGLINAWAN, ALFONSO PASTORAL,
NELSON LEDESMA, NIXON LEDESMA, AND
WILFREDO GAMPA
G.R. NO. 94311
SEPTEMBER 14, 1993
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed robbery
with rape as contemplated in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On the 23rd day of September 1987, at Barangay
Pamampangin, Municipality of Lopez, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, the accused, armed with
short firearms of unknown caliber and a fan
knife and forming a band, with intent to gain and
with force upon things, by means of force,
intimidation and violence and taking advantage
of nighttime, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the house of spouses Thelma
Villasanta and Cenon Villasanta, and once
inside, take, steal and carry away therefrom the
latter’s personal properties. On the occasion
thereof said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one
another, by means of force, threats, violence and
intimidation and with lewd design, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
turn in having carnal knowledge of said Thelma
Villasanta, against the latter's will.
HELD:
YES. The law uses the phrase "when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape" which
means that the offender must have the intent to
take the personal property belonging to another
with intent to gain, and such intent must
precede the rape.
In this case, appellants employed violence
against and intimidation of persons when they
divested the Villasanta spouses of cash and other
valuables. Three of the appellants were armed
with short firearms and the other three carried
fan knives.
April 3, 2018 – Article 295 – ROBBERY WITH
PHYSICAL INJURIES, COMMITTED IN AN
UNINHABITED PLACE AND BY A BAND, OR
WITH THE USE OF FIREARM ON A STREET,
ROAD OR ALLEY
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.

PEOPLE vs. APDUHAN JR. ET.AL.
G.R. No. L-19491
August 30, 1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalties under Article 295 is
applicable in this case.
FACTS:
On the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00
o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of
Mabini, Bohol, the accused and five (5) other
persons,all of them armed with different
unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other deadly
weapons by means of violence, the dwelling
house of the spouses Honorato Miano and
Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling
house of their children, the spouses Geronimo
Miano and Herminigilda de Miano. Once inside
the said dwelling house, the above-named
accused with their five (5) other companions, did
attack, hack and shoot Geronimo Miano and
another person by the name of Norberto Aton,
who happened to be also in the said dwelling
house, thereby inflicting upon the said two (2)
persons physical injuries which caused their
death; they took and carried away from said
dwelling house cash money amounting to Three
Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00). Act
committed was contrary to the provisions of Art.
294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code with the
special aggravating circumstance that the crime
was committed by a band with the use of
unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code),
and other aggravating circumstances –
committed in the dwelling, at nighttime and with
abuse of superior strength.
RULING:
The disposition of the question at hand
necessitates a discussion of the interrelation
among articles 294, 295 and 296 of the Revised
Penal Code. As previously stated, art. 295
provides that if any of the classes of robbery
described in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294
is committed by a band, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the proper
penalty. Correspondingly, the immediately
following provisions of art. 296 define the term
"band", prescribe the collective liability of the
members of the band, and state that "when any
of the arms used in the commission of the offense
be in unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be
imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the
maximum of the corresponding penalty provided
by law." Viewed from the contextual relation of
articles 295 and 296, the word "offense"
mentioned in the above-quoted portion of the
latter article logically means the crime of robbery
committed by a band, as the phrase "all the
malefactors" indubitably refers to the members
of the band and the phrase "the corresponding
penalty provided by law" relates to the offenses
of robbery described in the last three
subdivisions of art. 294 which are all
encompassed within the ambit of art. 295.
Evidently, therefore, art. 296 in its entirety is
designed to amplify and modify the provision on
robbery in band which is nowhere to be found
but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4,
and 5 of art. 294. Verily, in order that the
aforesaid special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearm may be appreciated to
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justify the imposition of the maximum period of
the proper penalty it is a condition sine qua non
that the offense charged be robbery committed
by a band within the contemplation of art. 295.
To reiterate, since art. 295, does not apply to
subdivision 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special
aggravating factor in question, which is solely
applicable to robbery in band under art. 295,
cannot be considered in fixing the penalty
imposable for robbery with homicide under art.
294(1), even if the said crime was committed by
a band with the use of unlicensed firearms.
March 26, 2018 – Article 296 – DEFINITION OF
A BAND AND PENALTY INCURRED BY THE
MEMBERS THEREOF
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
PEOPLE VS PANCHO PELAGIO ET AL.
G.R. No. L-16177 May 24 1967
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable under
Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Pancho Pelagio came to visit the spouses Jose
Guico and Evelyn Villanueva asking to borrow
money for the hospital expenses for his wife who
has just delivered a child. Upon hearing the
conversation between Pelagio and Guico
Armando Manalang took advantage of the
situation informed Pelagio of a robbery he was
planning with some other friends who were later
revealed as Jose Guico, Oscar Caymo and
Arcadio Balmeo.
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando
Manalang and Arcadio Balmeo set out for the
execution of their plan. They all walked together
towards Aling Nena's residence although before
reaching the place, Caymo ordered Manalang to
hail and hold a taxi which the latter did. Then,
too, only Balmeo and Caymo actually entered the
victim's premises because, as was earlier agreed
upon, Pancho Pelagio acted as the lookout for the
two and he simply posted himself by the gate of
the said house.
Caymo and Balmeo gained entrance to the house
through its back kitchen door which they found
to be open. Once inside, Caymo drew his gun and
sought out its occupants. Only an old woman,
Mrs. Severina de Gloria, however, was in at the
time. Caymo then pointed the gun at the old lady
and intimidated her into producing all the money
and jewelry she could. All in all, the pair got
about P437 in cash, three pieces of jewelry worth
about P205.00 and a watch worth about
P300.00. After they had taken the above items,
Caymo ordered Mrs. de Gloria to lie face
downward, covered her with a blanket, and
cautioned her against moving or otherwise
sounding out an alarm. The two then went down
the house and out into the street. At the gate,
however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio.
From G. Villanueva Street where the victim's
house was located, Caymo and Balmeo walked
till they got to the corner of F. Fernando street
where they found Armando Manalang waiting for
them in a taxi. Caymo and Balmeo then rode on
it.
As the taxi was about to leave, however, a jeep

from the opposite direction blocked its way and
as the two vehicles were thus stopped, a man
alighted from the jeep and started to walk
towards the taxi. When the stranger was very
near the taxi already, Manalang instructed
Caymo to shoot at the man as the latter was a
police officer. Whereupon, Caymo leveled several
shots at the latter, about six in all; and the man,
who was later identified as Patrolman Francisco
Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department, fell
dead.
From the scene of the shooting, Manalang,
Caymo and Balmeo went direct to a house in
Buendia Street owned by Manalang's sister
where they changed clothes and hid the death
weapon and the money and jewelry they had
robbed. Shortly thereafter, Caymo and Balmeo
proceeded to a house in Blumentritt where they
met Pancho Pelagio whom they called to account
for his absence at the gate during the robbery.
The latter explained that he had to scamper away
before Caymo and Balmeo had gone down
because he, Pelagio, saw someone slip out of the
house apparently to summon the police.
RULING: NO.
When Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo hurried
out of the victim's house after the robbery,
Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled from his
lookout post because the pair, Balmeo and
Caymo, failed to locate him at the gate where he
was supposed to have stationed himself. To be
sure, the said decision itself renders the account
that it was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked
together from the said house to the corner of
Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets where then
they saw Armando Manalang waiting for them in
a taxi and that it was only when these three had
taken to the said taxi, and the cab was about to
leave, that the shooting of Pat. Trinidad
happened. When the homicide was committed,
therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have had the
least intervention or participation as might
justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing.
So far as the records disclose, the conspirators
were agreed only on the commission of robbery;
there is no evidence that homicide besides was
determined by them when they plotted the crime.
All these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio
from any responsibility for the said killing.
(People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493)
Considering that those who actually participated
in the robbery were only three, Pancho Pelagio
included, and only one of them was armed, the
same evidently was not "in band." (Art. 296,
Revise Penal Code) This being the case, then it
would indeed be irregular or questionable to hold
Pancho Pelagio similarly responsible as Caymo
and Balmeo for the killing of Pat. Trinidad. Under
the code, it is only when the robbery is in band
that all those present in the commission of the
robbery may be punished, for any of the assaults
which its members might commit. Thus, in
People v. Pascual, G.R. No. L-4801, June 30,
1953 (unreported), we held that where three
persons committed robbery and two of them
committed rape upstairs on its occasion, while
the third guarded the owner of the house
downstairs, only the two who committed the
assault should be punished for robbery with rape
while the third was liable for robbery only.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALFONSO
HAMIANA ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-3491-93 MAY 30 1951
MAY 30, 1951
ISSUE:
Whether or not the other members of the band
are also guilty of robbery with rape.
FACTS:
About ten o’clock in the evening of April 9, 1947,
Rosita Colantro, residing at the crossing of
Atipuluan, Bago, Negros Occidental, heard one
of the appellants call for "uncle, uncle." Rosita
Colantro did not make any reply, whereupon the
appellants hammered at the walls of her house
which caused Rosita Colantro to ask what they
wanted. The appellants ordered her to light her
lamp and not to move. Rosita Colantro saw rifles
aimed at her, her house being low. The
appellants asked palay, and Rosita Colantro
answered that she had a few seedlings. Rosita
Colantro was then ordered to go down. With lamp
in one hand and her small child in the other,
Rosita Colantro met Alfonso Hamiana (her
neighbor) with a bolo, Emiliano de la Cruz and
Ceferino de la Cruz, armed with rifles, and
Silvino Jabin, armed with a bolo. Undaunted by
the presence of appellants, she attempted to flee
but was caught in the arm by Anastacio
Blancada. The latter ordered Rosita Colantro, at
the point of his gun, to put her child down. She
was taken by Anastacio Blancada to a place away
from the house and, throwing her down,
Anastacio Blancada, also at the point of his gun,
raped her. After Anastacio Blancada had raped
Rosita Colantro, the latter proceeded to the
house of Federico Nava wherein she stayed
during the night. Accompanied by Federico Nava,
Rosita Colantro returned to her house the next
morning where she found that the appellants
carried away her palay worth P35.
RULING: NO.
The evidence shows that appellant Anastacio
Blancada caught Rosita Colantro while the latter
was trying to get away and that the rape was
committed in a place away from her house, in
which the robbery was committed. There is no
positive proof in the record that the other
appellants were aware of, much less abated, the
criminal act committed by appellant Anastacio
Blancada against the person of Rosita Colantro.
Therefore, only Anastacio Blancada is guilty of
robbery with rape while the other members of the
band are only liable for simple robbery by a band.
March 25, 2018 – Article 297 – ATTEMPTED
AND FRUSTRATED ROBBERY COMMITTED
UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS
JOSEPH BARRA
G.R. NO. 198020 JULY 10, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted
robbery with homicide
FACTS:

That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003,
the accused, while armed with a firearm, after
gaining entrance into the residence of his victim,
with intent to gain, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money
from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the occasion
of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling him to take and steal the money, the
herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan,
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound
which caused his death, to the prejudice of his
heirs.
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained
a gunshot wound due to the circular and
inverted edges of the point of entry. She
concluded that since there was no point of exit,
the victim was shot at close range.
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew
appellant for a long time. He stated that he was
on his way home to the neighboring barangay,
when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9, 2003,
in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant
enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a
lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right
forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid
behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim
stated that the money was not in his possession,
appellant shot him. He went home and reported
the incident the following morning.
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9,
2003, he was on his way to the victim’s house to
collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in
the yard of the victim’s house. He inquired from
appellant if the victim was around. Appellant
responded that the victim was not around. Asor
went home. It was while Asor was in his house
that he heard a gunshot. It was the following
morning that he learned that the victim died.
Asor then proceeded to report the incident.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges
against him. Appellant claimed that he was in
Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin,
visiting his sister when he was arrested and
brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the
crime of "robbery with murder."
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
The Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty
of attempted robbery with homicide.
HELD:
Yes. The accused is guilty of attempted robbery
with homicide
In People v. Quemeggen, this Court gave the
requisites to be proven by the prosecution for
appellant to be convicted of robbery with
homicide, to wit:
1. The taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
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4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion
thereof, homicide is committed.
In the case before us, appellant’s intention was
to extort money from the victim. By reason of the
victim’s refusal to give up his personal property -
his money - to appellant, the victim was shot in
the head, causing his death.
We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals
that the element of taking was not complete,
making the crime one of attempted robbery with
homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was
convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore,
liable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal
Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by
the RTC.
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery
committed under certain circumstances. —
When by reason or on occasion of an attempted
or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed,
the person guilty of such offenses shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua, unless the
homicide committed shall deserve a higher
penalty under the provisions of this Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297
were discussed in People v. Macabales, to wit:
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as
defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1)There is an attempted or frustrated robbery.
(2)A homicide is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery
remained unconsummated because the victim
refused to give his money to appellant and no
personal property was shown to have been
taken. It was for this reason that the victim was
shot. Appellant can only be found guilty of
attempted robbery with homicide, thus
punishable under Article 297 of the Revised
Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of
Appeals found appellant's crime to be aggravated
by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the maximum penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
FRANCISCO HAMTIG, ET AL.,
FRANCISCO HAMTIG, EUTIQUIO HAMTIG
and MARIANO alias ALEJANDRO OSORIO,
G.R. No. L-27431 August 22, 1969
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed Robbery
with frustrated homicide
FACTS:
Hilaria Vda. de Hondolero, a widow, lived with
her son, Mastito, in Barrio Manloy, Carigara,
Leyte. Sometime after 8 o'clock in the evening of
June 14, 1966 they went to sleep: Hilaria and her
grandson Antonio Dandan — who decided to stay
with them that evening — occupying the only
room of the house, while Mastito lay down on a
table found in the "sala" where they had a vigil
lamp.

At about three o'clock the following morning,
they were suddenly awakened by noise coming
from the kitchen. Mastito sat down on the table,
took hold of his flashlight and focused its light
towards the door leading to the kitchen from
which emerged four armed persons whom he
recognized as his brother-in-law, Francisco
Hamtig, Eutiquio Hamtig, Mariano Osorio and
Francisco Gaston. As the four intruders were
advancing towards him, his mother came out of
the room where she had been sleeping and upon
seeing Francisco Hamtig she exclaimed: "It is you
Kikoy." Thereupon Francisco, who was Hilaria's
son-in-law, fired at her with a rifle hitting her in
the abdominal region. Mastito immediately went
to the aid of his mother and pulled her inside the
room where the four armed persons followed
them. As they continued firing they hit Hilaria
again on the right and left arms. Mastito then
decided to counter attack, and arming himself
with a bolo he found in the room, he hacked the
hand of Francisco Gaston with it, forcing the
latter to go back to the sala. The other intruders,
however, continued firing and hit Mastito on the
right forearm. During all this time, Antonio
Dandan was in hiding among the buri bags of
rice in the room. On the other hand, in spite of
their wounds, Hilaria and Mastito succeeded in
escaping through the window, and went towards
the house of Gonzalo Dandan — Antonio's father
and son-in-law of Hilaria — located around thirty
meters away.
As Gonzalo Dandan was also awakened by
successive gunshots coming from the direction of
the house of his mother-in-law, he went down his
house with a flashlight. Nearby he met his
mother-in-law and Mastito — both wounded —
and helped them go upstairs. Thereafter, he went
down again to look for his son. Near the house of
his mother-in-law he focused his flashlight
towards it and was thereby able to recognize
Francisco and Eutiquio Hamtig, Mariano, alias
Alejandro Osorio and Francisco Gaston who were
then going down the house.
As stated heretofore, Antonio Dandan hid
himself behind several buri bags of rice found in
the room where he and his grandmother had
slept. From that place he later saw the four
intruders drag a trunk into the middle of the
room where they forced it open and from which
Francisco Hamtig got a bag full of money while
the rest stood by, and afterwards they went
downstairs together. Antonio then jumped out of
the window and ran to his house.
Hilaria and her son were brought to the Rural
Health Officer of Capoocan, Leyte, upon whose
advice they were taken to the Leyte Provincial
Hospital in Tacloban City where the Senior
Resident Physician operated upon Hilaria. The
latter, however, died on June 24, 1966 as a
result of Generalized Peritonitis due to her
wounds, and secondary infection, while Mastito
was able to return home the next day.
HELD:
Yes. The accused were guilty of the crime
charged.
It was found by the court that the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another and all armed with guns and
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pointed bolos with intent of gain and by means
of violence against and intimidation upon
persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously enter the house of one HILARIA
VDA. DE HONDOLERO and MASTITO
HONDOLERO and once inside rob, steal, take
and carry away against their will and content the
amount of P1,400.00 Philippine Currency to
their damage and prejudice in the said
mentioned sum and that by reason and on the
occasion of the said robbery the above-
mentioned accused in conspiracy did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
Hilaria Vda. de Hondolero and Mastito Hondolero
with the weapons which the accused have
provided themselves for the purpose.
Thus the accused performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime
of Homicide as a consequence thereof with
respect to said Mastito Hondolero but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason or
causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is, the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Mastito Hondolero which
prevented his death.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON,
MELCHOR LAO and RICARDO SERRANO,
ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON
and RICARDO SERRANO,
G.R. No. L-10398 June 30, 1960
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused were guilty of
violating Article 297 on Attempted and frustrated
robbery committed under certain circumstances.
FACTS:
On October 7, 1950, Alice Lake, more popularly
known as movie actress Anita Linda, lived at No.
13 Pasong Tamo, Makati, Rizal, together with her
son, her sister Mrs. Mamey Lake Hewell, and the
latter's children, Josephine, Patricia, Johnny
and Helen. At about 7 p.m. of said date, Alice,
who was then in her bedroom, requested her
niece Josephine, then 12 years old, to get her a
glass of milk from the kitchen. As Josephine
entered the kitchen, she suddenly came face to
face with a man holding a gun. This gunman was
small in stature, fairly built and was wearing a
checkered shirt with long sleeves, dark colored
pants, gloves and army shoes. On his head had
a balangot hat, and over his face a black mask
with two holes for the eyes. Instinctively,
Josephine screamed. The gunman told her to
keep silent and to return to sala. With the gun
held against her back, the gunman followed her
into the sala, where they found Patricia. The
gunman motioned Patricia to come nearer to
Josephine.
At this time, Alice and her sister, Mrs. Hewell,
startled by Josephine's scream, rushed out of the
their respective bedrooms. When they reached
the sala they came upon Josephine and Patricia,
and the gunman who had his gun stuck at
Josephine's back. As Mrs. Hewell knelt before
the gunman and pleaded for her daughters,
saying: "Maawa po kayo, huwag po", Patricia and
Josephine ran to their aunt Alice. Without

compunction, the gunman levelled his gun
straight at Mrs. Hewell's face.
Meanwhile, Alice, together with her nieces, had
fled into her bedroom. Shortly thereafter, several
shots, not less than five, were heard coming from
the sala. Alice and the children screamed. Alice
wanted to go out to help her sister, but the two
girls prevented her by locking the bedroom door.
A moment later, they heard someone knock on
and then kick the door to Alice's bedroom. Then
complete silence. After some minutes, Alice
heard the noise of a jeep moving away and going
towards Sta. Ana. Feeling certain that the
malefactors had left for good, Alice shouted for
help. Her outcries were heard by the driver of a
passing taxicab, who lost no time in bringing the
Makati police to the scene.
Upon entering the sala, the police came upon
Mrs. Hewell's bullet—ridden body lying on the
floor. In the course of their investigation, the
policemen come across three .45 caliber empty
shells about a meter from where Mrs. Hewell lay,
and four other empty shells outside the
premises. They also discovered five slugs, three
of which were extracted from the wall leading to
Alice's bedroom, and about two meters from Mrs.
Hewell's feet, and the remaining two from the
wooden cabinet which stood between the doors
leading to the sala and the kitchen. On entering
Mrs. Hewell's bedroom, the police found that it
had been ransacked. After the removal of Mrs.
Hewell's corpse, Alice went into her sister's
bedroom and found it in the same condition as
the policemen had found it, but she did not
notice anything missing therefrom.
The prosecution established by means of the
testimony of Joseph Ebrada, one of the original
accused but who was discharged in order to be a
prosecution witness, that: On October 5, 1950,
Melchor Lao went to see Ebrada in his place in
Cavite, in order to borrow the jeep which Ebrada
had in turn borrowed from a certain Terio
Manimbao of Malagasang, Imus, Cavite. The jeep
bore a PI plate number. At Lao's invitation,
Ebrada went with him. They were then joined by
appellants Dagundong and Serrano in going to
the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal.
There, Lao and appellants Serrano and
Dagundong visited Pablo Rabaton, an inmate.
After thirty minutes they left and proceeded to
Makati, Rizal. Along the way, appellant
Dagundong stated that they must raise money
with which to bail out Rabaton, and if necessary
to commit robbery in order to do so. Ebrada, Lao
and appellant Serrano agreed to this proposal.
HELD:
Yes. The accused are guilty of the crime charged.
The court ruled that appellants Bulaon and
Serrano are guilty of the crime of frustrated
robbery with homicide, under Article 297,
Revised Penal Code, in relation with Article 296,
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 12 inasmuch as it has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt that they actually took part in
the commission thereof, appellant Serrano by
standing guard outside the victim's house while
appellant Dagundong inside the house and
helped him ransack the victim's room.
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The Court believes, however, that the lower court
erred in finding appellant Dagundong guilty of
murder. It was established that it was he who
had fired the fatal shots at Mrs. Hewell. But
though that slaying was attended by treachery,
his crime was not murder. The term "homicide"
in paragraph 1, Article 294, Revised Penal Code,
is used in its generic sense and the offense
defined therein comprehends not only robbery
with homicide in its limited sense, but also
robbery with murder. So, an offense is not taken
out of the purview of this article merely because
the homicide "rises to the atrocity of murder"
(People vs. Manuel, et al., 44 Phil., 333). And the
same definition must be given to the term as it is
used in Article 297, Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes frustrated robbery with homicide.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
SILVERIO MORADOS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-46973 November 19, 1940
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin Mendoza is guilty only
of attempted theft and not under Article 297 of
the RPC
FACTS:
On the night of March 15, 1939, while Ceferino
Ricasata, Rufino Aro and Lucio Enriquez were
sleeping in the latter's hut in the sitio of Pasong
Tabla, barrio of Bagbag, municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, a place where they had been
treshing palay, several malefactors suddenly
assaulted them. Ricasata who was awakened by
the blows being inflicted upon his companions,
tried to flee from the hut, but his dash for salvage
was frustrated when hardly had he gone out the
hut one of the ruffians shot him hitting him in
the right thigh as a result of which he fell at a
certain distance from the hut. His companions
were beaten to unconsciousness.
The evidence shows that through an agreement
made between them, Felipe Moral who had a
paltik (a homemade gun) and a flashlight,
together with Silverio Morados, were to go to the
hut to watch the inmate, while Benjamin
Mendoza - who had also a paltik - and Florentino
de los Reyes were to take away the carabaos.
They all did their part of agreement: Morados and
Moral effected their entrance into the hut,
inflicting injuries upon Aro and killing Enriquez.
While De los Reyes and Mendoza were untying
the carabaos, the firmer heard the scream:
"Naku agawin and buhay ko!" (Oh! save my life!),
which interrupted by a pistol shot. Fearing that
the might summon help, the malefactors escape
without taking the carabaos, although one of
them had already been untitled. The motive for
killing was robbery of the carabaos which were
tied near the hut, three of which belonged to the
deceased (Lucio Enriquez), and the fourth, to one
Turi.
It is argued that Benjamin Mendoza did not enter
the hut and did not take part in the assault, and
he should only have been found guilty of
attempted theft of large cattle.
HELD:

No. This contention is without merit.
In U.S. vs. Landasan et al. (35 Phil., 359, 369),
we observed that "neither the divisibility of this
crime (robbery with homicide) into two crimes,
nor the divisibility of the liability of the criminals
who took part is allowable."
And in U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil., 1, and People
vs. Bautista 49 Phil., 389, 396, we held that
"whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the
commission of the robbery will also be held guilty
as principals in the complex crime of robbery
with homicide, although they did not actually
take part in the homicide, unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide." It has not been shown that Mendoza
endeavored to prevent the homicide.
The Solicitor-General recommends the
imposition of the death penalty in view ;of the
fact that the killing of Lucio Enriquez was
qualified by treachery and attended by the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
dwelling. For lack of humanity, however, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
respects, with costs.
Article 297 of the Revised Penal code provides
that "When by reason or on occasion of an
attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is
committed the person guilty is such offenses
shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period of reclusion perpetua, unless
the homicide committed shall deserve a higher
penalty under the provisions of this Code."
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
EUGENIO OLAES,
G.R. No. L-11166 April 17, 1959
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed the crime
charged in Article 297 of the RPC
FACTS:
Between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. of November 9,
1954, Bus No. 64 of the Laguna Transportation
Company, driven by one Feliciano Limosnero,
with one conductor, left the town plaza of Binan
Laguna, bound for Manila. Among the
passengers were Mariano Inobio, a resident of
Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas, Rizal, Maria Argame and
Elena Loyola. When the bus reached the curve in
Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas, a man later identified by
passenger Inobio as Cosme Isip, holding a rifle or
carbine, suddenly appeared on the right side of
the road and signalled the bus to stop.
Limosnero, taking him for a prospective
passenger, applied his brakes and slowed down,
but before the vehicle could come to a complete
stop, seven other men, also carrying guns, such
as, garands or carbines, emerged from the left
side of the road. Isip shouted, "Para, pasok!" The
appearance of these armed men on both sides of
the road must have affected the equanimity of
Limosnero on the wheel, and he must have
forgotten to press the clutch with his foot,
resulting in the engine stalling or stopping.
Probably convinced that the eight men were not
passengers but were bent on holding-up the bus
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and robbing the passengers, Limosnero started
the engine and sped away from the place despite
the shouts of the men on both sides of the road
for him to stop. Those men immediately
commenced firing at the bus which was riddled
with bullets.
One of the shots grazed the head of Limosnero.
Another shot hit the passenger Maria Argame on
the back, the slug penetrating the abdominal
wall and entering the abdominal cavity. Still
another shot struck passenger Elena Loyola on
the shoulder, fracturing her right clavicle. When
the bus was out of range of the guns of the eight
men on the road and they had ceased firing,
passenger Inobio on rising from his prone
position in the bus, saw driver Limosnero's
wound on the head, which was bleeding
profusely, the blood dimming his vision, and so
he took over the wheel. On reaching Zapote, an
inspector of the Laguna Transportation
Company took over the wheel from Inobio and
drove the bus straight to the Las Pinas Municipal
Building where the incident and shooting was
reported to the police. Thereafter, the same bus,
with a police officer, drove straight to Manila and
to the Philippine General Hospital. Maria Argame
was pronounced dead on arrival. The fracture of
the right clavicle of Elena Loyola necessitated an
operation, which was performed, and she was
confined in the hospital for about twenty days,
after which she was discharged, though she was
not completely recovered, to continue treatment
at home. The expert testimony on her condition
is that if she had not been given prompt medical
attention, she would have died from her wound.
Driver Limosnero was treated at the same
hospital for his head would and was released,
but treatment was continued by the bus
company for about a month.
HELD:
Yes. The accused is guilty of the committing the
crime provided for in Article 297 of the RPC.
After a careful study of the case, the court fully
agrees with the trial court that defendant
Eugenio Olaes is guilty. However, it will be
remembered that the charge against him was for
attempted robbery with homicide and frustrated
homicide. Under this charge, as the Solicitor
General well said, he may not convicted of
consummated robbery with homicide as the trial
court did. Moreover, we agree with the
prosecution that inasmuch as no overt acts
pointing to robbery or even an attempt thereof
have been established, the killing of one
passenger and the wounding of two others
should be considered as plain murder, frustrated
murder, and physical injuries respectively.
The trial court found that the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and in band, there
being more than three armed men in the group
of malefactors, attended the commission of the
crimes. The aggravating circumstance of in band
may be considered to qualify the act of killing of
Maria as murder, and the wounding of Elena as
frustrated murder. The evidence for the defense
was to the effect that appellant surrendered to
the authorities when he found out that he was
wanted by the constabulary. This was not
refuted by the prosecution and so, it can be

regarded as a fact. This mitigating circumstance
will compensate the other aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity. The penalty for
murder which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum degree to death, should therefore be
imposed in its medium period, namely reclusion
perpetua, so that in the result, we agree with the
trial court as to the penalty imposed by it.
March 25, 2018 – Article 298 – EXECUTION OF
DEEDS BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE OR
INTIMIDATION
ALAMEDA Jr , Manuel F.
G.R. NO. L-28547
FEBRUARY 22, 1974
PEOPLE V. JARANILLA
FACTS:
Heman Gorriceta had just come from Ford San
Pedro in Iloilo City and was driving a Ford pickup
truck belonging to his sister.
In front of the Elizalde Building on J.M. Basa
Street, he saw defendants Ricardo Suyo, Elias
Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They asked
Gorriceta to bring them to Mandurriao, a district
in the city, as Jaranilla told Gorriceta that he had
to get something from his uncle’s place.
Gorriceta initially demurred but the appellants
eventually prevailed. Upon reaching Mandurriao,
they parked the pickup truck at a distance 50 –
70 meters away from the provincial hospital and
Gorriceta was instructed to wait for the
defendants as they alighted. After twenty
minutes, the three accused arrived carrying two
roosters each. They ran to the truck and
instructed Gorriceta to drive immediately as they
were being chased. Gorriceta then drove the
truck to Jaro, another city district. The four of
them were on the front seat of the truck.
Gorriceta, as the driver, was on the extreme left
and to his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was
Brillantes and on the extreme right was
Jaranilla. In the middle of the road, they were
intercepted by Policemen Ramonito Jabatan and
Benjamin Castro. Gorriceta stopped the truck
near the policemn after Jabatan fired a warning
shot. Jabatan went to the right side of the truck
near Jaranilla and ordered all of them to step out
which they did not heed. Brillantes pulled his
revolver but did not fire it while Suyo did nothing.
Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman
Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta who
immediately started the truck and drove straight
home while Jaranilla kept on firing towards
Jabatan. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted
in front of Gorriceta’s house where the latter was
instructed not to tell anybody about the
inicident. Gorriceta went to his room and after a
while, he heard policemen calling his name
asking him to come down. He initially hid in the
ceiling of his house and it wasn’t until 8am the
following day that he decided to come down and
was brought to police headquarters.
ISSUE:.
Whether or not defendants Suyo and Brillantes
are liable as co principal in the crime of
Homicide.
Was there violence and intimidation in the taking
of roosters?
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HELD:
The killing of the peace officer is characterized as
homicide because the act was made during the
spur of the moment and the treacherous mode of
attack was not consciously or deliberately
adopted by the offender. In addition, only
persons who perpetrated the killing is
responsible for such action. Furthermore, mere
presence in the crime scene does not necessarily
make a person co-principal thereof. Hence, only
the accused, Elias Jaranilla, who perpetrated the
killing is responsible and liable for robbery and
homicide. The co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes,
are convicted of theft.Therefore, the decision of
the lower court is reversed and sentenced the
accused, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes, as
co-principals in the crime of theft. The crime was
theft and not robbery.There was no evidence that
violence or intimidation was employed in the
taking of the roosters hence, Art. 298 of the RPC
(Robbery with violence against or intimidation)
could not be invoked. It also could not fall under
Art. 299 (which penalizes robbery in an inhabited
house, public building or edifice devoted to
worship) as the chicken coop was outside
Baylon’s house. Nor was it a dependency thereof
as contemplated under Art. 301.
March 27, 2018 – Article 299 – ROBBERY IN
AN INHABITED HOUSE OR PUBLIC BUILDING
OR EDIFICE DEVOTED TO WORSHIP
ALILIAN, Enna B.
G.R. No. L-2725
February 27, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ESTEBAN SEBASTIAN Y PANGILINAN (alias
ERNING) and MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA,
MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA (appellant)
FACTS:
The appellant allegedly entered the house no.
179 Simon street, City of Manila, and by means
of threat and intimidation took, stole, and carried
away cash money, and other personal things of
the inhabitants. The appellant pleaded guilty
and was convicted by the lower court of robbery
under article 299 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
WoN the lower court correctly convicted the
appellant for robbery under Art 299 RPC
HELD:
No. The fact that the information to which
appellant pleaded guilty does not allege that the
robbery was committed under any of the
circumstances enumerated in said article, such
as entering the house through an opening not
intended for entrance or egress, the breaking of
doors, etc., it is now settled that were robbery,
though committed in an inhabited house, is
characterized by intimidation, this factor
"supplies the controlling qualification", so that
the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299
of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory
that "robbery which is characterized by violence
or intimidation against the person is evidently
graver than ordinary robbery committed by force
upon things, because where violence and
intimidation against the person is present there

is a greater disturbance of the order of society
and the security of the individual."
G.R. No. 181138
December 3, 2012
RICKY "TOTSIE" MARQUEZ, ROY
BERNARDO, and JOMER MAGALONG vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The appellant was found guilty of robbery under
Art 299 RPC for destroying the door lock of the
stall of one SONIA VALDEROSA and
passing/entering thru the same, once inside,
took, robbed and carried away the items inside
the store.
ISSUE:
WoN the Trial Court and CA correctly convicted
the appellants for robbery under Art 299 RPC
HELD:
No. The records show that the store alleged to
have been robbed by petitioners is not an
inhabited house, public building or building
dedicated to religious worship and their
dependencies under Article 299 and as defined
under Article 301. From Valderosa’s testimony,
it can be deduced that the establishment
allegedly robbed was a store not used as a
dwelling. In fact, after the robbery took place,
there was a need to inform Valderosa of the same
as she was obviously not residing in the store.58
"If the store was not actually occupied at the time
of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling,
since the owner lived in a separate house, the
robbery committed therein is punished under
Article 302, not 299.
March 26, 2018 – Article 300 – ROBBERY IN
AN UNINHABITED PLACE AND BY A BAND
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
THE UNITED STATES VS JUAN MORADA, ET
AL.
G.R. NO. L-8183, NOVEMBER 19, 1912
PONENTE: JUSTICE ARELLANO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents should be
charged of Robbery in an uninhabited place and
by a band.
FACTS:
On December 24, 1911, Juan Morada entered
the shop to get, as he did, coin amounting to P20
and various articles such as cans of salmon and
sardines, rice, penknives, a razor and comb, all
together worth P31.80 and not recovered,
excepting some worth P1.17. The owner of the
shop, the Chinese Iyong, awoke and caught up a
stick, but as he did, so some things fell and made
a noise, so Morada fled. The next day a penknife,
a can of sardines, and another of salmon were
found in the possession of Librado Sugcay, who
voluntarily confessed to the municipal police
sergeant of Mambajao, the scene of the
occurrence, and through him, the other
defendants were soon discovered.
Evidence of alibi having been rejected and proof
of conviction being well established, the Court of
First Instance of Misamis classified the crime as
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simple robbery, but found against all the
defendants the generic aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and a gang, and a
moreover against Juan Morada, Isidro Babano,
and Librado Sugcay that of previous conviction,
and against Gil Revilla that of vagrancy.
Isidro Babano and Gil Revilla appealed from this
judgment, while Morada and Sugcay submitted
to it. Later, Babano withdrew his appeal to this
court.
HELD:
Under the Penal Code of the Philippines, robbery
with force upon things, in order to be qualified,
must be committed in an uninhabited place and
in a gang.
It did not think applicable to article 300,
because, according to its interpretation, the
robbery is qualified when it is committed in an
uninhabited place and in a gang, these two
qualifications concurring, which does not
happen in the present case, for it does not appear
that the house wherein the robbery was
perpetrated was located in an uninhabited place.
March 26, 2018 – Article 301 – WHAT IS AN
INHABITED HOUSE, PUBLIC BUILDING OR
BUILDING DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
WORSHIP AND THEIR DEPENDENCIES
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 27, 2018 – Article 302 – ROBBERY IN
AN UNINHABITED PLACE OR IN A PRIVATE
BUILDING
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
MARQUEZ VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 181138 DECEMBER 3, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not all of the accused are guilty of the
crime of robbery with force upon things.
FACTS:
At around 2:30 a.m. of April 6, 2002, Marlon
Mallari (Mallari) was with petitioners and Benzon
in front of the University of the East (U.E.),
Caloocan City. Marquez suggested that the group
rob the Rice-in-a-Box store located at the corner
of U.E. Marquez then got a lead pipe and handed
it to Magalong, which he and Bernardo used to
destroy the padlock of the store. Mallari was
designated as the look-out while petitioners and
Benzon entered the store and carried away all
the items inside it which consisted of rice
cookers, a blender and food items.13 They then
brought the stolen items to the house of Benzon’s
uncle. Apprehensive that Mallari might squeal,
the group promised to give him a share if they
could sell the stolen items.
At 9:30 a.m. of the same day, Valderosa received
information from the daughter of the owner of
the premises where her Rice-in-a- Box franchise
store was located, that her store had been
forcibly opened and its padlock destroyed. Upon
her arrival thereat, she discovered that the
contents of her freezer were missing along with
other items inside the store. he total value of

these stolen items was approximately
P42,000.00. She reported the robbery to the
police. Meanwhile, on April 7, 2002, Mallari
informed his older brother of his involvement in
the said robbery. At around 4:00 p.m. of the next
day, he again confessed but this time to
Valderosa.
Both the RTC and CA found them guilty of the
crime of robbery with force upon things. Hence,
this petition.
RULING:
Yes, the petition of the accused has no merit.
ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in
a private building. - Any robbery committed in an
uninhabited place or in a building other than
those mentioned in the first paragraph of Article
299, if the value of the property taken exceeds
250 pesos shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, provided that any of the following
circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any
opening not intended for entrance or egress;
2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or
window has been broken;
3. If the entrance has been effected through the
use of false keys, picklocks, or other similar
tools;
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or
closed furniture or receptacle has been broken;
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been
removed, even if the same be broken open
elsewhere.
When the value of the property taken does not
exceed 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.
Under Article 293 of the RPC, robbery is
committed by any person who, with intent to
gain, shall take any personal property belonging
to another by using force upon anything. When
committed in an uninhabited place or a private
building with the circumstance, among others,
that any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or
window has been broken, the same is penalized
under Article 302.
Article 302 of the RPC provides that when the
robbery is committed in an uninhabited place or
in a private building and the value of the property
exceeds P250.00, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods provided that, among other
circumstances, any wall, roof, floor, or the
outside door or window has been broken.
Considering that petitioners burglarized the
store of Valderosa which was not used as a
dwelling by breaking its door and stealing
property therein with a total value of P42,000.00,
the penalty that must be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
PEOPLE VS. JARANILLA
G.R. NO. L-28547 FEBRUARY 22, 1974
AQUINO, J.:
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
ISSUE:
Whether the taking of the six roosters is covered
by article 302 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
On January 9, 1966, Gorriceta was driving a
pickup truck and while going home he saw
Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes. They hailed
Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla
requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a district
in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred.
He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta) was on his
way home. Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to
take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla
ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's
place. So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded
the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to
Mandurriao. Upon reaching Mandurriao, the
three passengers alighted from the truck and
instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. 20 minutes
had passed when they reappeared. Each of them
was carrying two fighting cocks. Jaranilla
directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they
were being chased.
While traversing the detour road, they saw the
Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro running towards
them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after
Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and
was signalling with his flashlight that the truck
should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near
the policeman. Jabatan approached the right
side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all
the occupants of the truck to go down. They did
not heed the injunction of the policeman.
Jaranilla shot Patrolman Jabatan. He
immediately started the motor of the truck and
drove straight home. Jaranilla kept on firing
towards Jabatan. After reaching Gorriceta’s
home, Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not to tell
anybody about the incident. The next morning,
all of them were arrested.
RULING:
No, one essential requisite of robbery with force
upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that
the malefactor should enter the building or
dependency, where the object to be taken is
found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate
that the malefactor should enter the building
(casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If
the culprit did not enter the building, there
would be no robbery with force upon things. The
term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the
old Penal Code, was construed as embracing any
structure not mentioned in article 299 (meaning
not an "inhabited house or public building or
edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency
thereof) used for storage and safekeeping of
personal property. As thus construed, a freight
car used for the shipment of sugar was
considered a private building. The unnailing of a
strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary
manner of sealing a freight car, was held to
constitute breaking by force within the meaning
of article 512, now article 302.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from
their coop should be characterized as theft and
not robbery. The assumption is that the accused
were animated by single criminal impulse. The
conduct of the accused reveals that they

conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is
punishable as a single offense of theft.
PEOPLE VS. TUBOG
G.R. NO. L-26284 NOVEMBER 17, 1926
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed the crime
of robbery in an uninhabited place.
FACTS:
That on or about June 22, 1926, in the
muncilipality of Jagna, Province of Bohol,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the above-named defendants did
willingly and criminally, with intent of gain and
through force upon things, conspiring and
armed with weapons, did take, steal and carry
away the iron safe "Safe Thomas Perry & Son,
Bilston" containing the sum of P1,930 and other
articles in the store, said defendants having
broken the lock of one of the doors of the store
and a part of the safe for the purpose of opening
the same, and the defendant Juan Tubog as
accessory after the fact. Upon arraignment, all
accused pleaded guilty and as to the defendant
Santiago Rubi (alias Santiago Lucero) and the
appellant, as principal, each was sentenced to
ten years and one day of presidio mayor, with the
accessory penalties, and to pay one-fourth of the
costs. The defendant Juan Tubog was sentenced
to five months and ten days of arresto mayor.
From this judgment the defendant Florencio
Postrero appeals without assigning any error.
The Attorney-General then says that in the
instant case, the information does not allege that
the store in which the robbery was committed
was inhabited at the time of the commission of
the crime, and that for want of which, the penalty
should be imposed under article 512 (Article 302
of the RPC) of the Penal Code.
RULING:
Yes. In the instant case, the appellant is not
specifically charged with a violation of article
508, and the information alleges that the
entrance was made by breaking "the lock of one
of the doors of the store." The fact that entrance
was made in that manner clearly implies and
carries with it the further fact that there was no
person inside the store at the time the lock was
broken, and that the defendants had to break the
lock to get into the store.
For failure of the information to allege that the
store was used occupied as "an unhabitted
place" at the time of the commission of the crime,
the contention of the Attorney-General must be
sustained.
As the law now exists, the penalty for the
commission of robbery committed in "an
inhabited place" comes under article 508, and
the penalty for the commission of that crime in a
store, standing alone and within itself comes
under the provisions of article 512 which
provides:
Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place
or in any building other than those mentioned in
paragraph one of article five hundred and eight
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shall be punished by presidio correccional in its
medium and maximum degrees, etc.
For such reasons, the penalty of the lower court
is modified and reduced.
March 27, 2018 – Article 303 – ROBBERY OF
CEREALS, FRUITS, OR FIREWOOD IN AN
UNINHABITED PLACE OR PRIVATE BUILDING
CEBALLOS, Jesus C
PEOPLE V. RADA
GR NO. L-16988
DEC. 30, 1991
ISSUE:
WoN they were properly charged in court.
FACTS:
Rada, Bahenting and Canas were charged with
the crime of robbery in an uninhabited house,
under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The accused allegedly entered a bodega owned by
Bastida and stole nine (9) sacks of palay. On
arraignment, they pleaded not guilty because the
crime was supposedly under Art. 303 of the RPC.
Thereupon, they filed a motion to quash which
the court granted.
HELD:
No, they were not.
The Court held that the term rice does not only
mean hulled rice but also includes palay, as the
seed is locally known, as well as the plant itself.
If the word rice includes the grain in its original
state without the hull being taken away, then the
conclusion is inevitable that “rice” is included
under the term “semilla alimenticia” or cereal
seeds.
March 27, 2018 – Article 304 – POSSESSION
OF PICKLOCKS OR SIMILAR TOOLS
DAHIROC, Janice L.
PEOPLE VS. RAMON LOPEZ
GR No. L-18766, May 20, 1965
ISSUE:
Whether or not the possession of 7 false keys
constitute the crime in article 304 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
At 10:00 A.M. of December 21, 1960, the Chief of
Police of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte, apprehended
three suspicious-looking strangers who were
loitering in Pagao, a sitio of Bacuag. A bag which
they were carrying was confiscated with the
following contents: three carbines, caliber .30
M1; one revolver, caliber .22; three flashlights
with batteries; two carbine ammunition
magazines, fully loaded; twelve rounds of carbine
ammunition; one balisong; a screw driver; seven
false keys, one of which was a master key;
trousers; shirts; and a pair of shoes.
After an investigation the aforesaid persons
Ramon Lopez, Manuel Buico and Arturo Caniete
were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Bacuag with the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and, in a separate complaint, the crime
of illegal possession of false keys. They pleaded

guilty to illegal possession of firearms, not guilty
to illegal, possession of false keys.
HELD:
Article 304 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar
tools. Any person who shall without lawful cause
have in his possession picklocks or similar tools
specially adapted to the commission of the crime
of robbery, shall be punished by arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correctional in
its minimum period."
Such crime of illegal possession of picklocks or
similar tools has, accordingly, two elements: (1)
possession of picklocks or similar tools specially
adapted to the commission of the crime of
robbery; (2) such possession is without lawful
cause.
The information alleged that the accused
possessed, "without lawful cause seven (7) false
keys, one of which is a picklock or master key".
A picklock a tool used in picking locks is in itself
specially adapted to the commission of robbery
of the kind provided for in Articles 299 (a) 3 and
302, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or
public building or Office devoted to worship. Any
armed person who shall commit robbery in an
inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to religious worship, shall be punished
by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property
taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if the
malefactors shall enter the house or building in
which the robbery was committed, by using false
keys, picklocks or similar tools."
Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in
a private building. - Any robbery committed in an
uninhabited place or in a building other than
those mentioned in the first paragraph of article
299, if the value of the property taken exceeds
250 pesos, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods provided that any of the following
circumstances is present:
"3. If the entrance has been effected through the
use of keys, picklocks or other similar tools."
Since picking of locks is one way to gain entrance
to commit robbery, a picklock is per se specially
adapted to the commission of robbery. The
description in the information of a picklock as
"specially adapted to the commission of robbery"
is therefore unnecessary for its sufficiency.
Notwithstanding the omission of such
superfluous description, therefore, the charge of
the offense of illegal possession of a picklock is
.valid. We find both elements of the crime clearly
alleged in the information in question.
It follows that the term "false keys" appearing in
the information sufficiently describes such tools.
Wherefore, the order quashing the information is
hereby set aside and the case is remanded for
further trial, without costs.
March 28, 2018 – Article 305 – FALSE KEYS
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
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G.R. No. L-4429 December 24, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIXTO GALURAN, ET AL., defendants. SY-
TOC, appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of robbery with the use
false keys was committed?
FACTS:
Galuran was a porter in the warehouse of the
firm of Smith, Bell and Co. The appellant, Sy-
Yoc, quite frequently went to the said firm in
order to arrange for the sale of certain boxes that
the manufactured. On one of these visits he
proposed to Galuran that he, Galuran, should
get some of the cases of whiskey that were stored
in the warehouse and take them over to the
appellant's house, and that he would pay P16 for
each case. Sy-Yoc suggested that he take an
impression of the key of the warehouse in soap
paste and have another key made by a
locksmith. Galuran duly obtained an impression
of the key and took it to Sy-Yoc; the latter sent
for a locksmith, whom he paid for a key as soon
as it was made according to the mold. Galuran
was able to open the warehouse, from which,
assisted by Dizon, he took two cases of whisky.
These cases they at once took in a carromata to
the store or establishment of Sy-Yoc, where they
were surprised, while in the act of depositing the
cases in question inside, and arrested by a
secret-service agent who had been watching
them from the street and had followed them.
HELD:
Yes. These facts, which we hold to have been
proven, clearly show the guilt of the appellant,
Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein
prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the
robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea of
its commission, and, being unable unwilling to
carry it out himself, he employed Galuran,
impelling him to the material execution of the
crime by a promise to pay him P16 for each case
of whisky that he was able to steal. The better to
induce him to commit the offense, he cleverly
demonstrated how easily he could be
accomplished, instructed him as to the best
means of carrying it out, and offered him money
to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the
difficulties in the way of determination to
execute, and the actual execution of the robbery
in question. These acts constitute a real
inducement made directly for the commission of
the said robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-
Yoc, in the position of principal in accordance
with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code.
March 28, 2018 – Article 306 – WHO ARE
BRIGANDS; PENALTY
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
PEOPLE V. LAURANTE, GR NO. 116734,
MARCH 29, 1996
FACTS:
Larry Laurente together with Melvin Dagudog
and Richard Disipulo, who are still at large,
robbed Herminiano Artana of his earnings in an
undetermined amount along F. Concepcion St.,

Bgy. San Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila, which is
a Philippine Highway. For insuring success of
their criminal act, said accused strangled the
victim with a leather belt and hit him with a
blunt instrument, causing him to sustain
physical injuries which directly caused his
death. SPO1 Crsipin Pio received a case
assignment relative to Herminiano Artana and
went to the place of incident. He saw inside the
taxicab a dead man. He then conducted a crime
scene search inside the taxicab and within the
vicinity, he found a brown wallet containing a
Social Security System (SSS) ID of Larry
Laurente and a leather belt supposedly used in
strangling the dead man. He requested the SSS
to secure the complete record of Laurente. From
the SSS records, the police authorities learned
that Laurente lived somewhere in Pasig;
accordingly, a follow-up team was formed to
arrest him. Several witnesses were presented by
the prosecution. On the other hand, Laurente
interposed the defense of alibi.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed was
brigandage.
HELD:
No. Presidential Decree No. 532 is a modification
of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is
evident from the fact that the relevant portion
thereof which treats of highway robbery
invariably uses this term in the alternative and
synonymous with brigandage, that is, as
highway robbery/brigandage. This is but in line
with previous rulings that highway robbers and
brigands are synonymous.
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to
prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The
heart of the offense consists in the formation of
a band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of Art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution
under it, that a member or members of the band
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime
is proven when the organization and purpose of
the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by Art. 306. On the other hand, if
robbery is committed by a band, whose members
were not primarily organized for committing
robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not
be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because
robbery was committed by a band of more than
three armed persons, it would not follow that it
was committed by a band of brigands. Therefore,
the coincidental fact that the robbery in the
present case was committed inside a car which,
in the natural course of things, was casually
operating on a highway, is not within the
situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree
in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular
provision precisely defines highway
robbery/brigandage and, as we have amply
demonstrated, the single act of robbery
conceived and committed by appellants in this
case does not constitute highway robbery or
brigandage. In the instant case, there is not a
shred of evidence that Laurente and his co-
accused, or their acts, fall within the purview of
P.D. No. 532Thus, Laurente cannot be validly
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
convicted for highway robbery with homicide
under P.D. No 532.
March 28, 2018 – Article 307 – AIDING AND
ABETTING A BAND OF BRIGANDS
(PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532)
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
VIERNES VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 161970
June 30, 2006
FACTS:
On November 15, 1992, at around 7:00 in the
evening, while Josefina and her husband
Ronaldo Lopango were on board a passenger
jeepney, four of eight co-passengers declared a
hold-up. Ronaldo resisted the attempt to hold
him up by one of the four by kicking him, but
another stabbed him three times causing him to
fall from the jeepney. Josefina also fell from the
jeepney upon which she brought Ronaldo to the
hospital where he died after a few minutes.
Josefina reported the incident to the police
station. The trial court found the accused guilty
of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532. It was
modified on appeal by the Court of Appeals to
simple robbery.
ISSUE:
WON the accused are guilty for a violation of PD
No. 532 (The Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974)
HELD:
In crimes of robbery, the offender must be proven
to have unlawfully taken personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon anything.
While the general rule is that contradictions and
discrepancies between the testimony of a witness
and his sworn statement do not necessarily
discredit him since ex parte statements are
generally incomplete, the rule is not without
exception as, e.g., when the omission in the
sworn statement refers to a very important detail
of the incident which the one relating the
incident as an eyewitness would not be expected
to fail to mention, or when the narration in the
sworn statement substantially contradicts the
testimony in court.
Josefina's assertion that the taking of her bag
slipped from her mind because of her husband
taxes credulity as the hold-up occurred only
three hours earlier. To forget to mention the loss
of the bag maybe excusable, but to categorically
state that nothing was taken from them when
she was asked, infirms Josefina's overall
credibility.
Josefina's uncorroborated testimony is tainted
with inconsistencies on material points to thus
lead the Court to discredit it and uphold the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the
accused.
Accused-petitioner Viernes is, on reasonable
doubt, acquitted of the charge of violation of P.D.
No. 532.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES VS AGOMO-O
ET AL
GR NO. 131829
JUNE 23,2000
FACTS:
On September 22, 1993, at around 7:30 in the
evening, a passenger jeepney driven by Rodito
Lasap was stopped by three men-Eddy Paneza
and Oscar Servando, and Ronnie Agomo-o, who,
armed with a gun,and bladed weapons
announced a hold-up and ordered the driver to
turn off the engine. Ronnie Agomo-o shot the
driver Rodito Lasap. He died as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds. They had stolen a
wrist watch and cash money for a total value of
three thousand three eighty pesos from the
driver and passengers. Freddie Agrabio was also
stabbed with a bladed weapon during such
event.
ISSUE:
WON the accused are guilty of highway robbery
under PD No. 532
HELD:
Accused-appellants assert that they cannot be
convicted of highway robbery as the crime was
not committed by at least four persons, as
required in Article 306 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, highway robbery is now governed by
P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. This law
provides:
Sec. 2. (e).Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The
seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or
other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
the property of another by means of violence
against or intimidation of person or force upon
things or other unlawful means, committed by
any person on any Philippine Highway.
In the case of People v. Puno,it was held that P.D.
No. 532 amended Art. 306 of the Revised Penal
Code and that it is no longer required that there
be at least four armed persons forming a band of
robbers. The number of offenders is no longer an
essential element of the crime of highway
robbery. Hence, the fact that there were only
three identified perpetrators is of no moment.
P.D. No. 532 only requires proof that persons
were organized for the purpose of committing
highway robbery indiscriminately. The robbery
must be directed not only against specific,
intended or preconceived victims, but against
any and all prospective victims.
In this case, the accused, intending to commit
robbery, waited at the Barangay Mapili crossing
for any vehicle that would happen to travel along
that road. The driver Rodito Lasap and his
passengers were not predetermined targets.
Rather, they became the accused's victims
because they happened to be traveling at the
time when the accused were there. There was,
thus, randomness in the selection of the victims,
or the act of committing robbery
indiscriminately, which differentiates this case
from that of a simple robbery with homicide.
The accused were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the provisions of
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Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Presidential Decree
No. 532.
March 29, 2018 – Article 308 – THEFT
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921
THE UNITED STATES vs. NIEVES DE VERA Y
GAYTE
FACTS:
on the 20th of February, 1920, three Igorots
named Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the
Escolta, of this city, trying to dispose of a bar of
gold when an Ilocano invited them to go to his
house, stating that there was a woman there who
would buy the precious metal. they accompanied
the Ilocano to the house indicated by him where
they met a woman, the accused herein, who
apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and
requested them to hand it to her so that she
might take it to a silversmith and have it
examined, stating that she would return within
a short time to report the result. The Igorot Pepe,
who was the owner of the bar of gold, thereupon
handed it to her, together with P200 in bank
notes which her requested to her to have
changed into silver coins were more desirable in
the Mountain Province. The woman then left the
house at about 12 o'clock on that day, asking the
Igorots to wait there. But the woman did not
return. They waited in vain for hours for her and
at nightfall they agreed that one of them should
remain on watch while the other two went to the
Meisic police station to report the matter. The
police acted promptly and effectively. The
policeman Jose Gonzales, assigned to take
charge of the case, soon identified the woman
who had taken away the bar of gold, by the
description which the Igorots had given him, and
at a few minutes after 11 o'clock he already was
in a house on Calle Barcelona, examining the
accused as to the whereabout of the bar of gold
and the bank notes of the Igorots. As the woman
gave evasive answers, it became necessary to ask
for assistance from the office of the police, and
shortly thereafter, two other policemen, Mr.
Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, who took the
woman to the house at No. 541 Calle Regidor,
followed by Gonzales and the three Igorots. There
the bar of gold divided into three pieces was
found wrapped in a handkerchief and placed
inside the water tank of a water-closet. The
accused requested one Mamerta de la Rosa to let
her have P150 which she in turn handed to the
policeman.
According to Exhibit B, which is a certificate
issued by the Bureau of Science, the bar of gold
delivered to the accused weighed 559.7 grammes
and was worth P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per
gramme; whereas, the three bars found by the
police weighed only 416 grammes, and were
therefore, 143.7 grammes short. Of the P200
bank notes delivered to the accused, she
returned only P150.
In view of the above stated facts, which appear in
the cause to have been duly proven, the accused
was sentenced by the court a quo to the penalty
already mentioned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence does not establish
the essential elements of theft.
HELD:
No.
The argument advanced in support of the
contention of the defense is that the goods
misappropriated were not taken by the accused
without the consent of the owner who had
delivered them to her voluntarily, and this
element being lacking, it cannot be the crime of
theft.
It is well to remember the essential elements of
the crime of theft, as expounded in the
textbooks, which are as follows: First, the taking
of personal property, second, that the property
belongs to another; third, that the taking away
be done with intent of gain; fourth, that the
taking away be done without consent of the
owner; and fifth, that the taking away be
accomplished without violence or intimidation
against persons or force upon things.
The commentators on the Spanish Penal Code,
from which ours was adopted, lay great stress on
the first element which is the taking away, that
is, getting possession, laying hold of the thing, so
that, as Viada says if, the things is not taken
away, but received and then appropriated or
converted without the consent of the owner, it
may be any other crime, that of estafa for
instance, but in no way that of theft, which
consists in the taking away of the thing, that is,
in removing it from the place where it is kept by
the legal owner, without the latter's consent, of
the legitimate owner.
The American decisions an textbooks on
"larceny," a crime which has the same
characteristics as those oaf theft under our Penal
Code, contain abundant illustrations of the
question raised in the present case.
The intention of the owner to part with his
property is the gist and essence of the offense of
theft (larceny), and the vital point on which the
crime hinges and is to be determined.
A felonious taking necessary in the crime of
larceny, and generally speaking, a taking which
is done with the consent or acquiescence of the
owner of the property is not felonious. But is the
owner parts with the possession thereof for a
particular purpose, and the person who receives
the possession avowedly for that purpose has the
fraudulent intention to make use of it as the
means of converting it to his own use, and does
so convert it, this is larceny, for in such case, the
fraud supplies the place of the trespass in the
taking, or, as otherwise stated, the subsequent
felonious conversion of the property by the
alleged thief will relate back and make the taking
and conversion larceny. And it has been said that
the act goes farther than the consent, and may
be fairly said to be against it. If money is given to
a person to be applied to a particular purpose, it
is larceny for the receiver to appropriate it to his
own use which was not the purpose
contemplated by the owner. Obtaining money
under the false pretense that it is to be bet on a
horse race, and with the intent at the time to
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convert it to the bailee's own use, the race being
a mere sham to aid this purpose, is larceny. The
rule has been applied also to cases in which a
person takes a piece of money from another to
change, and keeps it with the unlawful intent to
convert it and refuses to deliver the money given
to him or the change therefore, on demand; and
the fact that the taking was open and from the
owner is of no consequence, if the intent to steal
existed. This is so for the reason that the delivery
of money to another for the sole purpose of
getting it changed is a parting with the custody
only and not the amount does not relieve him
from liability for the larceny of the entire amount
given him.
Where the parties are engaged in a cash sale the
whole transaction is incomplete until the
payment is completed; and the possession of the
goods remains in the seller and that of the money
in the buyer, until they are simultaneously
exchanged. If, in such case, the buyer gets
control of the goods and makes off with them
without paying for them, he is guilty of larceny.
And conversely if the seller gets the money and
refuses to give up the goods, it is larceny. Thus,
where one surrenders up his watch with the
understanding that he is immediately to receive
50 dollars for it, the keeping of the watch without
payment of money is larceny. And where a
tradesman handed good to a customer to
examine and the latter ran away with them, he
was held guilty of larceny. Similarly, where one
unloaded onions which he owned on the
premises of a prospective buyer, who thereupon
refused to pay for the onions or to allow the seller
to remove them, it was held larceny, as the owner
never intended to part with the possession of the
onions until he received his money therefor. One,
waiting in crowd to purchase a railway ticket,
requested another nearer the ticket office to buy
a ticket for her, handing him the money to pay
for it. He made off with money and was held
guilty of larceny.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion,
and so hold, that the crime proven in the cause
to have been committed by the appellant by
appropriating the gold bar delivered to her for
examination, and by converting to her own use,
without the consent of the owner, the bank notes
which had been handed her to be exchanged for
silver coins, is that of theft, defined and punished
in article 518, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
And the appealed judgment being in accordance
with law, it must be, as is hereby, affirmed with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 210760 , January 26, 2015
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution tends to
establish that Zabala is a jeepney driver who
earns Two Hundred Pesos (₱200) to Four
Hundred Pesos (₱400) per day on an alternate
day basis. Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works
at the Manila City Hall. It is through this job that
he was able to save the Sixty-Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱68,000) stolen by Zabala. Piñon, on the
other hand, had been the girlfriend of Zabalafor

about five months when the incident pertinent to
this case occurred.
Alas testified that he and Zabalawere neighbors
in San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan. As
neighbors,he had treated Zabala as his kumpare
and would often invite the latter to drinking
sessions inside his house. At times, he would
also call Zabala to repair his vehicle, because
Zabala is also a mechanic. He would allow Zabala
to follow him to his bedroom to get cash
whenever spare parts are to be bought for the
repair of his vehicle.
Alas further testified that on June 18, 2007, at
about 4:00 in the morning, he left his house to
go to work. When he returned from work, at
around 11:00 in the evening, he discovered that
his money amounting to Sixty Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱68,000), which he kept in an envelope
inside his closet, was missing. During that time,
there were only five (5) persons living in their
house: Alas, his parents, his nine (9) year-old
son, and his aunt. He asked his parents and
aunt if they knew where he kept his money, but
they did not know.
Witness Piñon, on the other hand, testified that
in the early morning of June 18, 2007, she and
Zabala, her boyfriend at the time, were together
at a store owned by the latter, which was six to
seven steps away from the complainant’s house.
She then saw Zabala climb the fence and scale
the tree in front of the complainant’s house, and
enter the house. When he returned, she noticed
that he had a bulge in his pocket, which she later
found to be a plentiful sum of money. Zabala
then brought her home, and agreed to meet her
again at about 10:00 in the morning. They then
went to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two
Nokia mobile phones, which cost about Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱8,500).
On July 7, 2011, the RTC rendered its Judgment
convicting petitioner of the offense charged.
Aggrieved by the Judgment, petitioner appealed
to the CA, attributing to the lower court the
following errors: (1) there was a grave error in not
giving credence to petitioner’s version; (2)
petitioner was convicted of the crime charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) petitioner
cannot be convicted based on circumstantial
evidence.
In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on
July 15, 2013, the CA denied the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the trial court, but with
modification as to the penalty to be imposed
upon petitioner. The CA ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the appellant through
circumstantial evidence.
The CA then found that the series of
circumstances present in this case supports a
conviction, and constitutes the basis for a
reasonable inference of the existence of the facts
thereby sought to be proved.
Rejecting the defense of petitioner, the CA ruled
that he offered no evidence other than an alibi to
exculpate him from the crime charged. It then
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cited the rule that alibi is a weakdefense, and
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
truthful witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty for theft.
HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to establish, by
circumstantial evidence, that petitioner is guilty
of theft.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court
finds that the prosecution failed to present
sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the
petitioner of the offense charged. We find that the
pieces of evidence presented before the trial court
fail to provide a sufficient combination of
circumstances, as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
To recall, the evidence of the prosecution
purports to establish the following narrative:
first, that the complaining witness Alas hides
₱68,000 in cash in his closet inside their house;
second, that petitioner is aware that Alas hides
money in his bedroom closet; third, that on the
night of the incident, petitioner was with his then
girlfriend, witness Piñon; fourth, that petitioner
climbed through the fence of Alas’s house, and
was able to successfully gain entrance to his
house; fifth, that petitioner later went out of the
house with a bulge in his pockets; and sixth, that
later that day, petitioner and Piñon went
shopping for a cellphone.
The foregoing narration––based on the
testimonies of the two witnesses of the
prosecution, even if given full faith and credit
and considered as established facts––failsto
establish that petitioner committed the crime of
theft. If at all, it may possibly constitute evidence
that petitioner committed an offense, but not
necessarily theft.
In the case before the Court,the evidence
presented by the prosecution fails to establish
the corpus delicti of theft. In Tan v. People, this
Court said:
Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of
the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the
fact that the crime has been actually committed."
The "essential elements of theft are (1) the taking
of personal property; (2) the property belongs to
another; (3) the taking away was done with intent
of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation
against persons or force upon things." In theft,
corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that
the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that
it was lost by felonious taking.
First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of
Alas, where the money amounting to ₱68,000
was allegedly kept and hidden. It is interesting to
note that while Alas testified that there were
other persons living in that house, i.e. his family
members, the prosecution failed to put any of
them on the witness stand, to testify that they
saw or heard something out of the ordinary at
the time the incident allegedly took place, or to
explain why nobody else was able to notice that
the theft took place while Alas was absent.
Witness Piñon, meanwhile, merely testified that

she saw Zabala scale the fence of Alas’ house and
enter it. She did not actually see Zabala enter the
room of Alas, where the money was hidden.
Second, the evidence presented below is
insufficient to determine without a reasonable
doubt that the ₱68,000 in cash was lost due to
felonious taking, and, more importantly, that it
was petitioner who committed the felonious
taking. Even if believed in its entirety, the
testimony of witness Piñon does not show that
when petitioner left the house of Alas, he was
carrying the ₱68,000 incash which was
supposedly lost. All that Piñon saw was the bulge
in petitioner’s pockets. Piñon’s testimony can
considered as evidence to prove that when
petitioner entered the house of Alas, he did so
because of his intent to commit asportation.
Third, Piñon' s testimony fails to establish that
Alas' pocket indeed contained the stolen money,
as she never actually saw what was inside the
pocket of Zabala. While she testified that later
that day, they went to buy 2 cellphones
amounting to ₱8,500, she failed to testify
whether the money that Zabala used in paying
for the cellphone was retrieved from the very
same bulging pocket which she saw earlier in the
day, which would have led to the conclusion that
Zabala's pocket contained money. Failing this,
what is left is the fact that Pifion saw a bulge in
Zabala's pocket, and there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that his pocket in fact was
used to hide the money that he allegedly stole.
The trial and appellate courts committed error in
accepting as fact that Zabala's pocket contained
money, when there is a dearth of evidence to
support such allegation.
And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence
cases is that the evidence must exclude the
possibility that some other person committed the
crime.21 In the case here, however, the
prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it
was impossible for some other person to have
committed the crime of theft against Alas. The
prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the
time the theft was committed, there was no other
person inside the house of Alas, or that no other
person could have taken the money from the
closet of Alas. Alas himself admitted that there
were other residents in the house, but these
persons were never presented to prove their
whereabouts at the time the incident took place.
This failure of the prosecution leads the Court to
no other conclusion but that they failed to
establish that culpability could only belong to
Zabala, and not to some other person.
Given the foregoing discussion, We find that
petit10ner was wrongfully convicted of
theft.1âwphi1 In the absence of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence
must be upheld, and thus, petitioner should be
acquitted.
G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013
RYAN VIRAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Private complainant Vedua maintains seventy-
five (75) dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavite
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City. To assist her in feeding the dogs and
cleaning their cages, private complainant
employed the accused who would report for work
from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On October 19,
2006, at around 6:30 in the morning, accused
arrived for work. Half an hour later or at 7
o’clock, private complainant left for Batangas.
Before leaving, she locked the doors of her house,
and left the accused to attend to her dogs. Later,
at around 7:00 in the evening, private
complainant arrived home, entering through the
back door of her house. As private complainant
was about to remove her earrings, she noticed
that her other earrings worth PhP 25,000 were
missing. She then searched for the missing
earrings but could not find them.
Thereafter, private complainant also discovered
that her jacket inside her closet and her other
pieces of jewelry (rositas) worth PhP 250,000
were also missing. A Gameboy (portable
videogame console), a compact disc player, a
Nokia cellular phone and a Nike Air Cap were
likewise missing. The total value of the missing
items supposedly amounted to PhP 297,800.
Private complainant immediately checked her
premises and discovered that the main doors of
her house were destroyed. A plastic bag was also
found on top of her stereo, which was located
near the bedroom. The plastic bag contained a t-
shirt and a pair of shorts later found to belong to
accused. Witness Nimfa Sarad, the
laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbor, testified
seeing Viray at Vedua’s house at 6:00 a.m. By
11:00 a.m., she went out on an errand and saw
Viray with an unidentified male companion
leaving Vedua’s house with a big sack.
Another witness, Leon Young, who prepares
official/business letters for Vedua, testified that
he went to Vedua’s house between 10:00 and
11:00 am of October 19, 2006 to retrieve a
diskette and saw petitioner with a male
companion descending the stairs of Vedua’s
house. He alleged that since he knew Viray as an
employee of private complainant, he simply
asked where Vedua was. When he was told that
Vedua was in Batangas, he left and went back
three days after, only to be told about the
robbery.
Prosecution witness Beverly Calagos, Vedua’s
stay-out laundrywoman, testified that on
October 19, 2006, she reported for work at 5:00
a.m. Her employer left for Batangas at 7:00 am
leaving her and petitioner Viray to go about their
chores. She went home around 8:30 a.m. leaving
petitioner alone in Vedua’s house. Meanwhile,
petitioner never reported for work after that day.
For his defense, Viray averred that he did not
report for work on the alleged date of the incident
as he was then down with the flu. His mother
even called up Vedua at 5:30 a.m. to inform his
employer of his intended absence. Around
midnight of October 20, 2006, Vedua called
Viray’s mother to report the loss of some
valuables in her house and alleged that Viray is
responsible for it. Petitioner’s sister and aunt
corroborated his version as regards the fact that
he did not go to work on October 19, 2006 and
stayed home sick.

After the parties rested their respective cases, the
trial court rendered a Decision dated December
5, 2009, holding that the offense charged should
have been robbery and not qualified theft as
there was an actual breaking of the screen door
and the main door to gain entry into the house.
Similarly, Viray cannot be properly charged with
qualified theft since he was not a domestic
servant but more of a laborer paid on a daily
basis for feeding the dogs of the complainant.
The trial court found that there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to conclude that Viray
was the one responsible for the taking of
valuables belonging to Vedua. Hence, the RTC
found petitioner Viray guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery and sentenced him.
In the present controversy, while the CA modified
the decision of the trial court by convicting
petitioner of qualified theft rather than robbery,
the facts as found by the court a quo were the
same facts used by the CA in holding that all the
elements of qualified theft through grave abuse
of confidence were present. It is not, therefore,
incumbent upon this Court to recalibrate the
evidence presented by the parties during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable only for
simple theft, not robbery nor qualified theft.
HELD:
YES.
Art. 308 in relation to Art. 310 of the RPC
describes the felony of qualified theft:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against, or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without
the latter’s consent.
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft
shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in
the next preceding article, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of the
plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery
or property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
The crime charged against petitioner is theft
qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this
mode of qualified theft, this Court has stated that
the following elements must be satisfied before
the accused may be convicted of the crime
charged:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to
gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
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As pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, the
prosecution had proved the existence of the first
four elements enumerated above beyond
reasonable doubt.
First, it was proved that the subjects of the
offense were all personal or movable properties,
consisting as they were of jewelry, clothing,
cellular phone, a media player and a gaming
device. Second, these properties belong to private
complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial
evidence places petitioner in the scene of the
crime during the day of the incident, as
numerous witnesses saw him in Vedua’s house
and his clothes were found inside the house. He
was thereafter seen carrying a heavy-looking
sack as he was leaving private complainant’s
house. All these circumstances portray a chain
of events that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner took the personal
properties with intent to gain, especially
considering that, fourth, Vedua had not
consented to the removal and/or taking of these
properties.
With regard to the fifth and sixths elements,
however, the RTC and the CA diverge in their
respective Decisions.
The RTC found that the taking committed by
petitioner was not qualified by grave abuse of
confidence, rather it was qualified by the use of
force upon things. The trial court held that there
was no confidence reposed by the private
complainant on Viray that the latter could have
abused. In fact, Vedua made sure that she locked
the door before leaving. Hence, Viray was
compelled to use force to gain entry into Vedua’s
house thereby committing the crime of robbery,
not theft.
The CA, on the other hand, opined that the
breaking of the screen and the door could not be
appreciated to qualify petitioner’s crime to
robbery as such use of force was not alleged in
the Information. Rather, this breaking of the
door, the CA added, is an indication of
petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by
private complainant. The CA held that "[Viray]
enjoyed the confidence of the private
complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s
pets. He was given access to the outside premises
of private complainant’s house which he gravely
abused when he forced open the doors of the
same house and stole the latter’s belongings."
Committing grave abuse of confidence in the
taking of the properties, petitioner was found by
the CA to be liable for qualified theft.
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that
the taking committed by petitioner cannot be
qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was
not alleged in the Information. However, we
disagree from its finding that the same breaking
of the door constitutes the qualifying element of
grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner
Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft.
Instead, We are one with the RTC that private
complainant did not repose on Viray "confidence"
that the latter could have abused to commit
qualified theft.
The very fact that petitioner "forced open" the
main door and screen because he was denied
access to private complainant’s house negates
the presence of such confidence in him by private

complainant. Without ready access to the
interior of the house and the properties that were
the subject of the taking, it cannot be said that
private complaint had a "firm trust" on petitioner
or that she "relied on his discretion" and that the
same trust reposed on him facilitated Viray’s
taking of the personal properties justifying his
conviction of qualified theft.
To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition
of the penalty for qualified theft, there must be
an allegation in the information and proof that
there existed between the offended party and the
accused such high degree of confidence or that
the stolen goods have been entrusted to the
custody or vigilance of the accused. In other
words, where the accused had never been vested
physical access to,or material possession of, the
stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she
exploited such access or material possession
thereby committing such grave abuse of
confidence in taking the property. Thus, in
People v. Maglaya, this Court refused to impose
the penalty prescribed for qualified theft when
the accused was not given material possession or
access to the property:
Although appellant had taken advantage of his
position in committing the crime
aforementioned, We do not believe he had acted
with grave abuse of confidence and can be
convicted of qualified theft, because his employer
had never given him the possession of the
machines involved in the present case or allowed
him to take hold of them, and it does not appear
that the former had any special confidence in
him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines to the
prospective customers was entrusted, not to
appellant, but to another employee.
Inasmuch as the aggregate value of the machines
stolen by appellant herein is ₱13,390.00, the
crime committed falls under Art. 308, in relation
to the first subdivision of Art.309 of the Revised
Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of
prisión mayor in its minimum and medium
periods.1âwphi1 No modifying circumstance
having attended the commission of the offense,
said penalty should be meted out in its medium
period, or from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8
years and 8 months of prisión mayor. The
penalty imposed in the decision appealed from is
below this range.
The allegation in the information that the
offender is a laborer of the offended party does
not by itself, without more, create the relation of
confidence and intimacy required by law for the
imposition of the penalty prescribed for qualified
theft. Hence, the conclusion reached by the
appellate court that petitioner committed
qualified theft because he "enjoyed the
confidence of the private complainant, being the
caretaker of the latter’s pets" is without legal
basis. The offended party’s very own admission
that the accused was never allowed to enter the
house where the stolen properties were kept
refutes the existence of the high degree of
confidence that the offender could have allegedly
abused by "forcing open the doors of the same
house."
Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of
confidence and considering that the use of force
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in breaking the door was not alleged in the
Information, petitioner can only be held
accountable for the crime of simple theft under
Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.
As for the penalty, We note with approval the
observation made by the appellate court that the
amount of the property taken was not
established by an independent and reliable
estimate. Thus, the Court may fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant
circumstances of the case or impose the
minimum penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC. In
this case, We agree with the observation made by
the appellate court in accordance with the rule
that "if there is no available evidence to prove the
value of the stolen property or that the
prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding
penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
should be the minimum penalty corresponding
to theft involving the value of ₱5.00."
Accordingly, We impose the prescribed penalty
under Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. The
circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if
proven during trial, cannot be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance as it was not
alleged in the Information. Thus, the Court finds
that the penalty prescribed should be imposed in
its medium period, that is to say, from two (2)
months and one (1) day to three (3) months of
arresto mayor.
Lastly, We delete the order for the reparation of
the stolen property. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code is
clear that one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him, as he has duly proved. Since, as
aforesaid, the testimony of the private
complainant is not sufficient to establish the
value of the property taken, nor may the courts
take judicial notice of such testimony, We cannot
award the reparation of the stolen goods.
WHEREFORE, the C Decision of August 31,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Ryan Viray is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
SIMPLE THEFT and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months and
one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor.
Further, for want of convincing proof as to the
value of the property stolen, the order for
reparation is hereby DELETED.
March 29, 2018 – Article 309 – PENALTIES
FOR THEFT
DUQUE, Francis Lester M
G.R. NO. L-30859 NOVEMBER 25, 1929
PEOPLE VS. JUAN CARPIO
FACTS:
Raymundo Silos hired automobile No. 376
known as "Star," and was driven by the
chauffeur Resurreccion Ledesma. In one
restaturant, Silos invited Ledesma to come in
with him to eat something and while they were
thus engaged, Ledesma's car No. 376 was stolen
and was not to be found when Silos and Ledesma
emerged from the restaurant. The next day the
stolen car was found, stripped of three tires with
the rims. A few days thereafter, the three tires

taken from car No. 376 were found on the "Star"
car which was being driven by Juan Carpio.
When the owner of the car No. 376 asked Carpio
how his three tires came to be on Carpio's car,
the latter admitted that said three tires belonged
to the owner of the car No. 376; and they were in
fact readily identified by their numbers.
ISSUE:
WON Carpio should be guilty of theft with respect
to the tires only and not to the automobile.
HELD:
No. The gist of the offense of larceny consists in
the furtive taking and asportation of property,
animo lucrandi, and with intent to deprive the
true owner of the possession thereof. The act of
asportation in this case was undoubtedly
committed with intent on the part of the thief to
profit by the act, and since he effectively deprived
the true owner of the possession of the entire
automobile, the offense of larceny comprised the
whole car. The fact that the accused stripped the
car of its tires and abandoned the machine in a
distant part of the city did not make the
appellant any less liable for the larceny of that
automobile. The deprivation of the owner and the
trespass upon his right of possession were
complete as to the entire car; and the fact that
the thieves thought it wise promptly to abandon
the machine in no wise limits their criminal
responsibility to the particular parts of the car
that were appropriated and subsequently used
by the appellant upon his own car. Since subject
car was less than 1 year after being bought by
the owner, it was practically new. Upon taking
judicial notice, the car valued at 250. This put
the penalty under par 3 of Art 309 with the
penalty of prision correcional in its medium and
minimum period since the value of the property
is more than 200 but does not exceed 6,000
which runs from one year, eight months and
twenty-one days to two years, eleven months and
ten days.
G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
SESINANDO MERIDA vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged in RTC for cutting,
gathering, collecting and removing a narra tree
inside a Mayod Property over which Tansiongco
claims ownership.
Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra
tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported
the tree-cutting to the DENR forester Hernandez
who ordered petitioner not to convert the felled
tree trunk into lumber. Later, Tansiongco
informed Hernandez that petitioner had
converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Hernandez went to the Mayod Property and saw
that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller
pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the
lumber,9 and issued an apprehension receipt to
petitioner. A complaint was filed for violation for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705 known as
Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. The trial
court found petitioner guilty as charged,
sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal. Merida appealed before SC
contending that the penalty imposed was
excessive.
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ISSUE:
WON the penalty imposed by the RTC is correct.
HELD:
No. RTC is not Correct. Violation of Section 68 of
PD 705 is punishable as Qualified Theft. Under
Art. 309. Penalties. - 1.) The penalty of prisión
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period... 6.) Arresto Mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if such value does not exceed
five pesos.
The Information alleged that the lumber valued
in the amount of P20,930.40. To prove this
allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandez's
testimony that these amounts, are his
"estimates" based on "prevailing local price." This
evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount
of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309
of the RPC, the prosecution must present more
than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such
fact. In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may
either apply the minimum penalty under Article
309 or fix the value of the property taken based
on the attendant circumstances of the case. In
the case of People v. Dator with the same set of
facts, SC imposed the minimum penalty under
Article 309 (6)45 of the RPC.
Applying penalty for qualfied theft (imposed
penalty higher by two degrees) and taking into
account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the SC
imposed penalty of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correcional, as maximum.
March 29, 2018 – Article 310 – QUALIFIED
THEFT
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS SYOU HU
G.R. NO. L- 45765, JANUARY 29, 1938
ISSUE:
Whether accused violated article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
Accused was living in the house of the victim,
who had sheltered him out of charity. In August
of 1937, the sum of P435 in cash was taken from
the offended party without his consent.
HELD:
Yes, article 310 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that qualified theft is committed when
"grave abuse of confidence is present," making it
understood thereby that the relation of cause
and effect must exist between the abuse of
confidence and the crime. The grave abuse of
confidence does not produce the crime of theft as
effect. It is the asportation, with intent of gain, of
personal property belonging to another without
the owner's knowledge and consent, which

produces it. The relation of cause and effect,
therefore does not exist between the two
concepts.The grave abuse of confidence is a mere
circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the
commission of the crime of theft. It is not
necessary for said circumstance to be
premeditated in order to be taken into
consideration as an aggravating circumstance
qualifying said crime. Its presence in the
commission of the crime is sufficient. The fact
that the accused was living in the house of the
ofended party, who had sheltered him out of
charity, when he took the money belonging to his
protector, aggravates the crime committed by
him, inasmuch as he gravely abused the
confidence which the owner of the house reposed
inhim upon permitting him, out of charity, to live
therein, stiffling the sentiment of gratitude
awakended in his bosom by his benefactor's
charitable act. This abuse of confidence was all
the more grave because it happened between
fellow countrymen.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS EDGARDO T. CRUZ
G.R. NO. 200081, JUNE 08, 2016
ISSUE:
Whether the accused violated Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
Complainant Eduardo S. Carlos put up a
business engaged in the sale of tires, batteries
and services for wheel alignment, wheel
balancing and vulcanizing. During the infancy of
the business,complainant sought the help of the
accused to tend the needs of the business
including the financial aspect. When the
business started to gain recognition and despite
the the rise of the number of clients they were
serving, its financial capital remained
unimpressive. Thus, by suspicion complainant
discovered through the accused's sister that he
was stealing from the company. When
complainant checked the daily sales report
containing the list of payments and balances of
customers he found out that the remaining
balances of their customers and accused's
advances totaled to P97, 984.00. At the bottom
of the balance sheet was an acknowledgement of
the accused that the amounts declared lost were
actually used by him for his personal use.
Complainant also discovered other irregularities
in the business dealings of the accused.
HELD:
Yes. When theft as defined in article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed with grave
abuse of confidence, the crime appreciates into
qualified theft punishable under article 310 of
the same code. All the elements of Qualified Theft
are present in this case such as;
1.) Taking of personal property
2.) That the said property belongs to another
3.) That the said taking be done with intent to
gain
4.) That it be done without thebowner's consent
5.) That it be done without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things
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6.) That it be done with grave abuse of
confidence.
The accused was found guilty and was sentenced
to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
was ordered to pay the amount of the value of the
property stolen which is P97,984.00.
ONG VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 190475, APRIL 10, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of violating P.D. 1612
(Anti- Fencing Law)?
FACTS:
Private complainant was the owner of 44
firestone truck tires of which 6 were sold and 38
remained inside the warehouse. Complainant,
marked the tires using a piece of chalk before
storing them inside the warehouse. The following
day all the 38 tires were stolen, the gate was
forcibly opened. Together with his caretaker they
reported the incident to the police. While
investigation was still pending complainant upon
chance happened to inquire in a store if they
have tires that has same specifications with the
ones stolen. Accused answered in affirmative
and showed it to him. Complainant happened to
notice the marking he made during inventory.
Complainant left the store and reported the
matter to the police. A buy bust team was formed
and the accused was arrested and the total of 13
tires were confiscated.
HELD:
Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D.
1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are
as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a
principal or on accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have known that the said article,
item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
March 31, 2018 – Article 311 – THEFT OF THE
PROPERTY OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY AND
NATIONAL MUSEUM
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 31, 2018 – Article 312 – OCCUPATION
OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF
REAL RIGHTS IN PROPERTY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.

US V. FUSTER
G.R. NO. 1366, NOVEMBER 18, 1903
ISSUE:
Whether accused violated article 312 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Accused forcibly entered and usurped the land
in questioned which was in possession of Dofia
Carolina Gomez de la Serna. Dofia Carolina
herself says that this land "does not belong to
anybody," and that, although she is occupying it,
it is only because she is in possession of it. There
is, therefore, no evidence that the land is the
property of those alleged to have been injured by
the offense charged.
The defendant offered to prove, by authentic
documents, that he was the lawful owner of the
land in question. This evidence was rejected in
the court below. In this the court erred, for it
unquestionably is an error to exclude proof of the
ownership of property in litigation when, as in
the case of usurpation, this ownership
constitutes a necessary and indispensable
element for the determination of the defendant's
guilt or innocence. If the defendant herein had
shown that he was the owner of the land in
question, there would have been no ground on
which he could have been convicted of the
offense charged, because no one can, in a legal
sense, be guilty of the usurpation of his own
property.
HELD:
The law requires that the real property or the real
right seized be the property of another, in order
that the crime of usurpation may exist. The error
of law into which the court fell in refusing to
admit the evidence of ownership offered by the
defendant, and against which ruling the
defendant duly excepted, would be a sufficient
ground for remanding the case for a new trial. We
do not, however, consider it necessary to do this,
in view of the fact that the prosecution has not
proven that the land alleged to have been
usurped was not the property of the defendant.
The burden lay with the prosecution to prove this
fact, and, having failed to do so, we must acquit
the defendant, even in the absence of any
evidence in his behalf, because of the
presumption of innocence to which every
defendant is entitled until proven guilty.
We therefore reverse the judgment appealed and
acquit the defendant, with the costs of both
instances de oficio. So ordered.
QUINAO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 139603, JULY 14, 2000
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are guilty of the crime of
Usurpation of Real Property.
FACTS:
On February 2, 1993 at around 9am in the
morning, accused together with their relatives,
suddenly appeared in the land in questioned
owned by Francisco Del Monte and used force,
violence and intimidation and took possession of
the land claiming that it is their inheritance from
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their ascendants and while there, they gathered
coconuts and made them copra.
Accused testified that they are the grandchildren
of Lorenzo Cases, and during his lifetime, he
acquired the real property in question and
declared the same in his name.
RTC rendered judgement finding accused guilty
of violation of article 312 of the Revised Penal
Code. The accused are further sentenced not to
enter or intrude upon this property rightfully
adjudged to belong to Francisco Delmonte,
private complainant herein and they are ordered
under pain of imprisonment for Contempt of
Court, to Cease and Desist forever from
disturbing or molesting the peaceful and quiet
possession and ownership of the herein private
offended party over the property subject of
litigation, hence the appeal.
HELD:
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused
took possession of anothers real property or
usurped real rights in anothers property; that
the possession or usurpation was committed
with violence or intimidation and that the
accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain
a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales,"
the proof must show that the real property
occupied or usurped belongs, not to the
occupant or usurper, but to some third person,
and that the possession of the usurper was
obtained by means of intimidation or violence
done to the person ousted of possession of the
property.
More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the
Court stated that the elements of the offense are
(1) occupation of anothers real property or
usurpation of a real right belonging to another
person; (2) violence or intimidation should be
employed in possessing the real property or in
usurping the real right, and (3) the accused
should be animated by the intent to gain.
In the present case, based on the above findings
and the sketch maps submitted, it is clear that
the disputed land which is the red shaded area
(Exh. "B-2") is within the boundary of the land
awarded to the complainant in Civil Case No.
3516 [should be 3561]. The issue of ownership
over the land in question having been decided in
Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561] in favor of
the complainant in 1949, the same will not be
disturbed. The accused has to respect the
findings of the court., it is indeed very clear that
the area claimed by the accused encroached the
area of the plaintiffs.
March 31, 2018 – Article 313 – ALTERING
BOUNDERIES OR LANDMARKS
LAZO II, Joseph Artfel T.
[NO CASES FOUND]
March 31, 2018 – Article 314 – FRAUDULENT
INSOLVENCY
NASH, Regina Mercado
G.R. No. 38618
September 15, 1933
PEOPLE VS. SY GESIONG
ISSUE:

Whether or not Sy Gesiong is guilty of fraudulent
insolvency?
FACTS:
Sy Gesiong, was convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Bohol of the crime of estafa for having
concealed or otherwise disposed of certain
personal property belonging to him for the
purpose of defrauding his creditors, and
sentenced to one year of presidio correccional, to
indemnify Ignacio Molina and Vicente Gaviola in
the sum of P2,997.76 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. From this judgment the present appeal
was taken. Appellant has assigned five errors as
having been committed by the trial court. The
first error assigned raises the question of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the information
filed against the appellant.The theory of the
prosecution is that the facts alleged in the
information constitute the crime of estafa defined
in article 523 of the old Penal Code and in article
314 of the Revised Penal Code. It will be noticed
that one of the essential elements of the crime
thus defined is that the absconding of the
property by the defendant must result in
prejudice to his creditors. The information filed
in this case contains no such allegation. It is true
that it alleges that the defendant fraudulently
concealed his property mentioned in the
information, but such allegation is not sufficient
to fulfill the requirement of the law. A person may
fraudulently dispose of some of his property, and
yet such act may not necessarily result in
prejudice to his creditors; for he may have some
other property with which to satisfy his
obligations. It is too well-settled to require the
citation of authorities that to warrant conviction,
every element of the crime must be alleged and
proved. The second assignment of error attacks
the findings of fact of the trial court. On this
point, the evidence for the prosecution shows
that the goods alleged to have been concealed
and otherwise disposed of by the appellant were
shipped from Bohol to Cebu under suspicious
circumstances. Appellant admitted having
shipped the goods to Cebu, but claimed that he
did so as a commission or purchasing agent for
a firm in that city. Appellant further claimed that
he had no knowledge of the order of the court of
July 31, 1931, which was notified to him by his
attorney only on August 15, 1931; and that,
besides the goods alleged to have been
fraudulently disposed of or concealed by him, he
still had in his possession property valued at
P4,600.
HELD:
No, Sy Giong was not guilty of fraudulent
insolvency. Upon a careful consideration of the
facts and circumstances of the case, the court
believe that the guilt of the appellant has not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
In view of the above conclusions, we do not deem
it necessary to discuss the other errors assigned
by the appellant.
The judgment appealed from was reversed, and
the defendant was acquitted with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-39177
February 21, 1934
PEOPLE vs. TAN DIONG (alias TANGO),
PASTORA PADLA, and EUSTAQUIO BARANDA
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Tan DIong, Pastora Padla and
Eustaquio Baranda are guilty of fraudulent
insolvency?
FACTS:
As appeal has been brought to reverse a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, finding the three appellants,
Tan Diong (alias Tango), Pastora Padla, and
Eustaquio Baranda, guilty of the offense of
making way with the property in fraud of
creditors, in violation of article 523 of the old
Penal Code (article 314, R.P.C.), and sentencing
them as follows: Tan Diong to imprisonment for
six years and one day, presidio mayor, and
Pastora Padla and Eustaquio Baranda to
imprisonment for four years, two months and
one day, presidio correccional, and requiring
them to pay proportional costs.
Prior to the acts with which we are here
concerned the appellant Tan Diong was a
merchant in good standing in the municipality of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Pastora Padla is
his wife and Eustaquio Baranda is the husband
of the latter's niece. Prior to June, 1931, Tan
Diong had become indebted to various
merchants of Cebu, and a judgment against him
had been rendered in favor of Lim Tian Ting &
Co. for more than five thousand pesos. Upon this
judgment an execution had been issued, but it
realized only the sum of P198.23 from certain
personal property levied upon in Tan Diong's,
store. Tan Diong and his wife had previously
owned various parcels of real property in the
municipality, but investigation showed that prior
to the events mentioned they had transferred all
to their co-defendant Eustaquio Baranda.
The proof amply shows that these conveyances
were made for the purpose of putting the
property beyond the reach of Tan Diong's
creditor's, and that the consideration mentioned
in the deeds of conveyance from Tan Diong and
wife to Baranda was fictitious. No error, in our
opinion, was committed in finding the appellant
Tan Diong guilty of the offense charged.
As to Eustaquio Baranda, we note that the
conveyances by which these properties were
conveyed to him were unilateral character.
Baranda did not participate in the conveyances,
and his alleged participation in the fraud
consisted only of the fact that he has asserted
ownership in the property conveyed. In our
opinion, this does not justify his conviction as a
participant in the fraud. His resolution to accept
the benefit of the fraudulent conveyances may
have been formed only after the act. His guilt as
a co-conspirator in the fraud is therefore not
proved.
HELD:
The judgment appealed from is therefore
reversed as to Pastora Padla and Eustaquio
Baranda, without prejudice to the right of the
creditors, or any creditor, of Tan Diong to bring
a civil action against Baranda. So ordered, with
costs de oficio against said appellants. As to Tan
Diong, the judgment appealed from is modified
by sentencing him to an indeterminate period of

from one year, prision correccional, to eight years
and one day, prision mayor; and as thus
modified, the judgment as to him is affirmed,
with costs.
March 31, 2018 – Article 315 – ESTAFA
(SWINDLING)
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
LITO CORPUZ VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
ISSUE:
Whether or not Corpuz is guilty of the crime of
Estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC.
FACTS:
Lito Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy
pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the
same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to
return the same if not sold, after the expiration
of 30 days.The period expired without Corpuz
remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz
and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will
pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for
estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
However, Corpuz argued as follows – that the
proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is
inadmissible for being a mere photocopy and the
fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
HELD:
YES. The court agreed that the admissibility of
evidence, which was only a mere photocopy was
valid, stating that the established doctrine is that
when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived. In the instant, Corpuz
never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked
and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz
also failed to raise an objection in his comment
to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and
even admitted having signed the said receipt.
Moreover, the court pointed out that no specific
type of proof is required to show that there was
demand. Demand need not even be formal; it
may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need
not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a
mere query as to the whereabouts of the money,
in this case, property, would be tantamount to a
demand. The court cited the case of Tubb vs.
People, where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, the query was tantamount to a
demand. Hence, Lito Corpuz is liable for the
crime of Estafa.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JULIE
GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
G.R. NO. 163662, FEBRUARY 25, 2015
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villanueva commit Estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 2(d), of the RPC.
FACTS:
The complainant Madarang went to Villanueva's
residence and was able to sell to Villanueva five
sets of jewelry worth P 1,010,000.00. Villanueva
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made out nine checks drawn against Philippine
National Bank (PNB), eight of which were
postdated for the payment of such jewelries.
Madarang received the checks because of
Villanueva's assurance that they would all be
honored upon presentment. However, the
draweee bank paid only one of the eight
postdated checks since the remaining checks
were dishonored by reason of Account Closed or
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Villanueva
denies the crime and insists on the absence of
fraud when she drew the postdated checks. She
claims that (a) the checks were issued as
replacement; (b) the checks could only be
deposited or encashed after Madarang was
notified of the sufficiency of funds; and (c) the
receipt presented by the Prosecution failed to
embody the real intention of the parties. She
further contends that the checks were not
executed prior to or simultaneous with the
alleged fraud and that Madarang had instigated
her to issue the checks, hence, she cannot be
held liable for estafa.
HELD:
YES. The estafa charged under Article 315
paragraph 2(d) may be committed when: (1) the
offender has postdated or issued a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time
of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of
postdating or issuance of said check, the
offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds
deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount
of the check; and (3) the payee has been
defrauded. The deceit should be the efficient
cause of the defraudation, and should either be
prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the
fraud. In the present case, all the elements of
estafa were present.
In the instant case, the first element was
admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she
had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange
for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no
question that Madarang accepted the checks
upon the assurance of Villanueva that they
would be funded upon presentment. The second
element was also established because the checks
were dishonored upon presentment due to
insufficiency of funds or because the account
was already closed. The third element was also
proved by the showing that Madarang suffered
prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva
the balance of P995, 000.00. In her defense,
Villanueva adverts to an agreement with
Madarang whereby the latter would deposit or
encash the checks only after being informed of
the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's account.
This defense, however, was bereft of merit
because she did not present proof of the
supposed agreement. Hence, Villanueva is guilty
of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) of the
RPC.
March 31, 2018 – Article 316 – OTHER FORMS
OF SWINDLING
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
ESTRELLADO-MAINAR V PEOPLE
GR NO. 184320 ( JULY 29, 2015)
ISSUE
Whether or not accused Mainar is liable under

Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code
FACTS
Petitioner Mainar offered for sale to Eric Naval,
portions of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao
City. During the negotiations for this sale, the
petitioner told Naval that the title to the land she
was selling had no problems. The petitioner also
informed Naval that the area subject of the
proposed sale would "still be segregated from the
mother title.”
Subsequently, representatives from JS Francisco
& Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's
house. It was only then that Naval discovered
that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a
dispute between the petitioner's family and JS
Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner
the return of the amount he paid for the land, as
well as to pay the value of the house demolished,
but the latter refused to heed these demands.
The prosecution charged petitioner with the
crime of other forms of swindling under Article
316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The
MTCC found petitioner guilty of Article 316,
paragraph 2 of the RPC, which the RTC affirmed.
The petitioner Mainar challenged the RTC ruling
in the CA, but the latter denied it.
HELD
No. The information in the present case,
expressly indicated in its caption that it is
charging the petitioner under Article 316,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. We
reiterate that the Information in the present case
did not allege that the petitioner made an express
representation that the property sold is free from
any encumbrance. This Information was crafted
in such a way that only one particular crime was
charged did not constitute ground for conviction
under paragraph 2, which may be committed
even by the owner of the property.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot be charged
under Article 316 paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The presented pieces of evidence do
not also warrant a conviction for the crime for
which the petitioner had been charged, that is,
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.
PEOPLE V. GALSIM
GR NO. L-14577 ( FEBRUARY 29, 1960)
ISSUE
Whether or not accused Galsim is liable under
Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS
Accused Galsim obtained a loan from Mauro
Magno in the amount of P2,500.00 payable
within a period of five years, and to secure its
payment the former executed in favor of the latter
a deed of chattel mortgage assigning and
conveying by way of first mortgage a two-story
house located in the City of Manila.
Magno subsequently found out that the house in
question had already been previously mortgaged
by its owner to a certain Dela Torre. As a result,
the deed of mortgage executed by the accused in
favor of Magno was refused registration by the
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register of deeds. Magno demanded the return of
his money from the accused but the latter failed
to do so.
HELD
Yes. It is evident that the appellant obtained the
loan from complainant through false
representation or deceit which is one of the
elements constituting the crime of estafa. It is
apparent that the complainant had granted the
loan to appellant in the belief that the security
offered was good and sufficient to guarantee his
investment because it was free from any lien or
encumbrance. Had he known that it was already
encumbered, the likelihood was that he would
not have granted the loan, which proves the
fraud of which he was a victim.
April 01, 2018 – Article 317 – SWINDLING A
MINOR
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 01, 2018 - Article 318 – OTHER DECEITS
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
PEOPLE VS. GANASI
C.A., 61 O.G 3603
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ganasi was guilty of other deceits
under Article 318 and not under paragraph 1(a)
of Article 315.
FACTS:
Ganasi incurred a debt from Dacanay in the
amount of P3,500. As security for the debt,
Ganasi offered to mortgage Lot No. 1 to Dacanay.
Ganasi then showed to Dacanay a plan to the lot,
and accompanied him for an ocular inspection of
the premises. Finding the land suitable for a
carpentry shop he intended to build, Dacanay
consented to the execution of a deed of mortgage.
When said obligation became due, Ganasi, being
unable to raise the amount, decided to sell the
mortgage property to Dacanay, the same to
answer for everything he owed to the latter.
Thereafter, Dacanay went to the Register of
Deeds of Benguet to have his ownership over Lot
No. 1 registered. Much to his surprise, he was
informed that what Ganasi sold to him was not
Lot No. 1 but Lot No. 2 composed mostly of
uneven and hilly terrain and which was
worthless for what he intended to use it.
HELD:
Yes, Ganasi was guilty of other deceits under
Article 318 and not under paragraph 1(a) of
Article 315.
The Solicitor General erred in stating that the
offense comes within the purview of paragraph
1(a) of Article 315. Under such provision, the
obligation to deliver already exists, and the
offender on making delivery has altered the
substance, quantity or quality of the thing
delivered. The facts of this case were not
foursquare with such provision of law. Here,
Ganasi deceitfully pointed to Dacanay one parcel
of land, offering it as security, on the strength of
which deceit, Dacanay parted with his money.
The deceit practiced by Ganasi preceded the

alienation of substance, quantity or quality in
the sense intended by paragraph 1(a) of Article
315 in Ganasi’s execution of the mortgage and
later of the sale.
Thus, the offense committed by Ganasi must
perforce come within the meaning and
intendment of the blanket provisions of Article
318 since it was not covered by Article 315, 316
and 317.
JOVITA SALES v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47817. August 29, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
ISSUE:
Did the act of Sales in causing the "stop
payment" order of the checks in questions
constitute the deceit referred to in Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
Jovita Sales issued two checks, one, for the sum
of P2 000.00 and another one, for the sum of
P6,000.00, both dated January 30, 1971. The
said checks were issued in favor of Renato
Magdaluyo. When both checks were presented
for encashment or deposited for clearance with
Magdaluyo’s bank, they were dishonored
because Sales made a communication to her
bank to issue a "stop payment" order regarding
the same.
Magdaluyo then looked for Sales and the latter
promised him the payment of the amount of the
dishonored checks in cash. However, the
promise was never fulfilled. A formal demand
was subsequently made, and when no
compliance was still made, the charge of estafa
was filed.
After trial, instead of convicting Sales of the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, the City Court of Pasay
found her guilty of the crime "Other deceits"
under Art. 318 of the same Code.
HELD:
Yes, the act of Sales in causing the "stop
payment" order of the checks in questions did
constitute the deceit referred to in Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d), the elements
are:
1) Postdating or issuance of a check in payment
of an obligation contracted at the time the check
was issued;
(2) Lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and
(3) Damage to the payee thereof (People v. Sabio,
86 SCRA 568).
Sales’ act of causing the "stop payment" order of
the checks in question undoubtedly makes her
liable for the crime of estafa. It was only the
failure on the part of the prosecution to show
that Sales had insufficient funds in the bank to
cover the checks in question at the time she
postdated them that prevented Sales’ conviction
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of the crime as charged. Since, the other
elements of the crime under Art. 315, paragraph
2(d) were proved which included those of deceit
and damage, it was correct to convict Sales of the
crime under Article 318 (Other deceits) of the
Revised Penal Code.
GUINHAWA VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 162822, AUGUST 25, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guinhawa was guilty of other
deceits under Article 318.
FACTS:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of
selling brand new motor vehicles under the
business name of Guinrox Motor Sales in Naga
City.
On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a
brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van. When
said van was transported from Manila to Naga
City it suffered an accident. Guinhawa then
repaired the van and later offered it for sale in his
showroom.
On October 1995, spouses Ralph and Josephine
Silo went to Guinhawa’s office to buy a new van
and were shown the L-300 Versa Van which was
on display. Unaware that the van had been
damaged and repaired on account of the
accident, the couple decided to purchase the
van.
When the spouses noticed the defects of the van
and were informed that it had been involved in
an accident before, they filed a criminal
complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code against
Guinhawa.
HELD:
YES. The false or fraudulent representation by a
seller that what he offers for sale is brand new
(when, in fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful
acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code.
For one to be liable for other deceits under the
law, it is required that the prosecution must
prove the following essential elements:
(a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense
other than those in the preceding articles;
(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or
pretense must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; and
(c) as a result, the offended party suffered
damage or prejudice.
It is essential that such false statement or
fraudulent representation constitutes the very
cause or the only motive for the private
complainant to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable
deceit other than those enumerated in Articles
315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is

intended as the catchall provision for that
purpose with its broad scope and intendment.
April 1, 2018 – Article 316 – REMOVAL, SALE
OR PLEDGE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY
RIVERA, Marynit P.
G.R. No. L-9892
April 15, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FRANCISCO BASALO
ISSUE:
What is the proper penalty for the accused?
FACTS:
Francisco Basalo was charged with having
unlawfully and fraudulently sold and disposed of
eighty cavans of palay, he had mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank, without the knowledge
and consent of the mortgagee, to the damage and
prejudice of the said bank in the sum of at least
P280. Upon arraignment, the accused interposed
the defense of prescription on the ground that
more than five years had elapsed from the time
the offense was allegedly committed to the filing
of the information on June 5, 1953. Answering
the defense of prescription, the prosecution
claimed that the Bank discovered the offense
only in the year 1953.
HELD:
Under Article 319, the penalty for the offense is
arresto mayor or a fine double the value of the
property involved. In other words, the fine is an
alternative penalty. In conclusion, to determine
the prescriptibility of an offense penalized with a
fine, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, such fine should not be
reduced or converted into a prison term, but
rather it should be considered as such fine under
Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code; and that for
purposes of prescription of the offense, defined
and penalized in Article 319 of the Revised Penal
Code, the fine imposable therein if correctional
or afflictive under the terms of Article 26, same
Code, should be made the basis rather than that
of arresto mayor, also imposable in said Article
319.
April 3, 2018 – Article 320 AMENDED BY PD
NO 1613
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
PEOPLE VS BALUNTONG
G.R. No. 182061
MARCH 15, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baluntong is guilty of Double
murder with frustrated murder or the crime of
arson.
FACTS:
At around 10:30 p.m. while then 12-year old
Jovelyn Santos was sleeping in the house of her
grandmother,she was awakened by heat
emanating from the walls of the house. She thus
roused her cousin Dorecyll and together they
went out of the house.Jovelyn saw appellant
putting dry hay (dayami) around the house near
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the terrace where the fire started, but appellant
ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellants neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona,also saw
appellant near Celerinas house after it caught
fire, following which, appellant fled on seeing
Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the house,
as other neighbors repaired to the scene to help
contain the flames. Felicitas also saw Celerina,
who was at a neighbors house before the fire
started, enter the burning house and resurface
with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.Celerina
and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led
to their death. Joshua sustained second degree
burns.
RULING:
No. Apellant is only guilty of arson.In cases
where both burning and death occur, in order to
determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain
the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the
main objective is the burning of the building or
edifice, but death results by reason or on the
occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and
the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the
other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is,
likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact
the offender has already done so, but fire is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing,
then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed homicide/murder and arson.
The Court finds that there is no showing that
appellants main objective was to kill Celerina
and her housemates and that the fire was
resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the
main motive was to kill the occupants of the
house, the crime would only be arson, the
homicide being a mere consequence thereof,
hence, absorbed by arson.
PEOPLE VS. CEDENIO
G.R. NO. 93485 JUNE 27, 1994
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant should be charged
by a complex crime of arson with murder.
FACTS:
On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was
gutted with fire. Five members of the family, then
occupying the house were burned to death. The
five bodies retrieved were those of Mario Hilario
Dorio, with wounds on the head and chest, Flora
Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost
severed, Mario Dorio with wounds on the leg and
left nipple, Nicanora Tabanao with a wound in
the stomach and infant Dioscora with no wounds
at all but charred to the bone.
Two witnesses testified that the three appellants
namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and
Felipe Antipolo were seen running out of the
burning house, holding bolos stained with blood.

Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio
borrowed from him a bolo on the night of
November 26, and the following morning, the
bolo was returned to him with a bloodstain on
the handle. The accused Pedro Cedinio, also told
him “do not worry, if this incident reaches the
court, I will answer (for) everything”
The trial court found the accused-appelants
guilty of Arson with Multiple Murder as defined
and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613.
RULINGS:
No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino
cites Groizard-
…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a
particular person who may be in the house and
that the objective is attained by burning the
house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal
Code declares that killing committed by means
of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be
purposely adopted as a means to that end. There
can be no murder without a design to take life.
In other words, if the main object of the offender
is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder.
But if the main objective is the burning of a
building, the resulting homicide may be
absorbed by the crime of arson.
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that
after the victims were hacked and stabbed to
death, appellants set the house afire to hide their
gruesome act. Thus, the appellant are guilty of a
separate crime of four counts of murder and
arson. And not the complex crime of arson with
murder.
April 2, 2018 – Article 321 – OTHER FORMS
OF ARSON
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
G.R. No. L-10849 April 30, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VICTORIANO BUENO, alias VICTOR
ISSUE:
Whether article 321 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable in this case?
FACTS:
Victoriano Bueno was the owner of a parcel of
agricultural land covered with rice hays set fire
to the rice hays on his land in a careless and
imprudent manner without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent its spread to the
neighbouring properties. Pedro Tanap’s hut
which was situated on the adjoining land owned
by Victoriano was burned, including all the
farming implements and properties kept in it and
surrounding trees belonging to Pedro. The entire
loss of said hut and properties in it in the value
of five hundred pesos (P500).
Victoriano was subsequently convicted with the
crime of arson through reckless imprudence.
HELD:
YES. Paragraph 5 of article 321 of the Revised
Penal Code which states:
When the arson consists in the burning of other
property and under the circurmstances given
hereunder, the offender shall be punished:
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xxxxxxxxx
By prision correccional in its medium period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, when the
damage caused is over 200 pesos but does not
exceed 1,000 pesos, and any of the property
referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the next
preceding subdivision is set on fire; but when the
value of such property does not exceed 200
pesos, the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed in this subdivision shall be imposed
when the property burned is a building used as
a dwelling in an uninhabited place, and the
penalty of arresto menor and a fine ranging from
fifty to one hundred per centum of the damage
caused shall be imposed, when the property
burned consists of grain fields, pasture lands,
forests or plantations shall be applied and must
be read in relation to article 365 of the same
code. The issue hinges on the penalty for the
crime of Arson through Reckless Imprudence
which has resulted only in damage to the
property of another.
The applicability of the third paragraph of said
Article 365 was not considered in said case. In
any event, the first paragraph of Article 365,
pursuant to which "any person who, by reckless
imprudence shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would have constituted a less
grave felony," shall suffer the penalty of "arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods,"
merely establishes a general rule. The same is
subject to the exception found in the third
paragraph of the same article, namely, when the
execution of said act shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damage to
three times such value, but which shall in no
case be less than 25 pesos." The present case is
precisely the one contemplated in said exception.
Inasmuch as the reckless and imprudent act of
herein accused has "only resulted in damage to
property," worth, according to the complaint and
the information, P500, the maximum penalty
imposable is, therefore, a fine of P1,500, which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the
Peace Court. As a consequence, neither was the
Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, competent to hear and
decide this case on its merits over defendant's
objection. The decision appealed from is hereby
set aside and this case is dismissed.
April 2, 2018 – Article 322 – CASES OF ARSON
NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRECEDING
ARTICLES
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 323 – ARSON OF
PROPERTY OF SMALL VALUE
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 324 – CRIMES
INVOLVING DESTRUCTION
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.

[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 325 – BURNING ONE'S
OWN PROPERTY AS MEANS TO COMMIT
ARSON
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 326 – SETTING FIRE TO
PROPERTY EXCLUSIVELY OWNED BY THE
OFFENDER
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 4, 2018 – Article 327 – WHO ARE LIABLE
FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE UNITED STATES
v.
CATALINO GERALE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 1768 February 17, 1905
ISSUE:
Whether or not Catalino and Bartolome are guilty
of the crime of Malicious Mischief under Article
327 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
In the early hours of the morning of July 23,
1903, the defendants, Catalino and Bartolome
Gerale, father and son, proceeded to the property
in question, situated in the barrio of Tanque,
town of Talisay, Province of Cebu.
The defendants climbed some coconut trees
which were growing upon said property and
immediately proceeded to cut about eighty
shoots and forty small trees that were producing
tuba; that when Eugenia Bacho saw them she
scolded them and asked how and why they cut
the coconut shoots on her property and warned
them not to continue damaging her property. The
defendants then becoming angry, came down out
of the trees and advanced toward her, raising
their bolos and saying, "Here we shall all die;"
that as the woman started to run, crying for help
in order to bring the neighbors to her assistance,
the defendants followed her as far as the road;
that each one of the shoots was of the value of 5
pesos and that said shoots produced tuba to the
value of 2 reales per day; that the coconut trees
which were planted on the land had been planted
about twelve years previously by said Eugenia
Bacho and her husband, Luis Abarques; that the
land was part of the hacienda of Santo Niño, the
property of the friars; that this hacienda was
then transferred to the Compania Agricola de
Ultramar; that Abarques and Bacho, after
leasing the land from the manager of said
hacienda, planted therein some coconut trees
some twelve years ago, by their laborers called
mananguetes, cleaned off the land and cultivated
the same and obtained tuba from the trees
thereon, without any opposition whatever for
about four months prior to September of said
year.
HELD:
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Yes. The crime of damage to property is not
determined solely by the mere act of inflicting
injury upon the property of a third person, but it
must be shown that the act had for its object the
injury of the property merely for the sake of
damaging it. Without this circumstance the
essential element of the crime is lacking and the
criminal intention of the culprit cannot be
established.
The facts clearly proven in this case is that the
two defendants cut eighty cocoanut shoots,
which were producing tuba, without having any
right so to do; that they occasioned thereby
serious damage to the interests of those who
planted the trees; that the damage caused
amounted to 400 pesos. The defendants
executed this act, prompted, doubtless, by
grievance, hate, or revenge, because the injured
party and her husband had leased the land from
the manager of the hacienda after Catalino
Gerale, one of the defendants and the father of
the other defendant, had been expelled from said
land by the attorney of the owners. When the
injured party tried to stop the damage they were
causing to the property, defendants threatened
her and followed her as far as the road.
It is clearly proven that the defendants knew very
well that they were not the owners of the
property; they had consented to the injured party
herein profiting by said trees, extracting the tuba
by means of her laborers, mananguetes, and
therefore, when the defendants cut said shoots,
they acted with malicious intention of injuring
the property of the offended party.
Therefore,, taking into consideration the
provisions of articles 83 and 92 of the Penal
Code, the court sentenced Catalino Gerale and
Bartolome Gerale to pay a fine of 400 pesos.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RESTITUTO FALLER (alias R. Aguilar)
G.R. No. L-45964 April 25, 1939
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of malicious mischief
may be committed through reckless imprudence
FACTS:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of
damage caused to another's property maliciously
and willfully. After hearing the evidence, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal found that the
damage was not cause maliciously of and
willfully, but through reckless imprudence, and
sentenced Restituto Faller, under paragraph 3 of
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
principal in the crime of damage through
reckless imprudence, to pay a fine of P38 and to
indemnify the offended party Ramon Diokno in
the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
HELD:
Yes. There is a crime of malicious mischief
through reckless imprudence
Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is
simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability.

The information alleges that the appellant acted
willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and criminally.
To this information no objection was interposed.
Negligence being a punishable criminal act when
it results in a crime, the allegation in the
information that the appellant also committed
the acts charged unlawfully and criminally
includes the charge that he acted with
negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION:
If malicious mischief (art. 327, Revised Penal
Code) is an offense distinct from damage to
property by reckless imprudence (art. 365,
Revised Penal Code) and the latter is not
necessarily included in the former or the
situation does not call for the application of other
exceptions laid down by this court, the
conviction of the accused under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding his
prosecution under article 327 thereof, was
erroneous. An accused is entitled to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him (par. 17, sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to section 15, par. 2, and
section 6, par. 3, of General Orders, No. 58), and
for this purpose the law requires that a
complaint or information must charge but one
offense, subject to a single exception (sec. II,
General Orders, No. 58). There are two reasons,
however, why the decision of the lower court
should be affirmed. First, because the
constitutional and legal purpose has been amply
served in this case, it appearing that the accused
himself, in the course of the trial, put up the
defense that he was at most responsible for the
offense of damage to property by reckless
imprudence.
Secondly, assuming that the two offenses here
are dinstinct, I think that they are at least akin
to each other so as to justify the application of
the rule laid down in United States vs. Solis
MARIO VALEROSO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 149718 September 29, 2003
ISSUE:
Whether or not Valeroso is guilty of the crime of
malicious mischief under article 327 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Valeroso was a former barangay captain of Balon
Anito, Balanga, Bataan. On August 21, 1996, the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) hired him as
caretaker of its lot situated in Porto del Sol
Subdivision, Balon Anito, Balanga, Bataan.
Consequently, the petitioner put up on the said
lot a sign which reads “No Trespassing, PNB
Property” to ward off squatters.
Sometime in April 1997, despite the sign, Mrs.
Julita Castillo, believing that the said lot was
owned by her grandparents, constructed a nipa
hut thereon. She spent P12,350 for the huts
construction.
On June 5, 1997, the petitioner, together with
Jorge Valeroso, Fernando Operario, Peter
Morales and Rolando de Guzman, tore down and
demolished Mrs. Castillos hut.
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She thus filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Bataan a criminal complaint for
malicious mischief against the petitioner.
Valeroso admitted in his counter-affidavit and
during his oral testimony that he indeed
demolished the structure of complainant Julita
Castillo in his capacity as caretaker of the owner,
PNB, Republic Bank, after he warned her and all
illegal occupants to vacate the premises even
posting NO TRESPASSING signs to indicate that
the place is privately owned; he also absolved all
his co-defendants from any liability alleging that
he acted alone during the demolition of said
structure.
Valeroso admits that he deliberately demolished
Mrs. Castillos nipa hut. He, however, contends
that the third element of the crime of malicious
mischief, i.e., that the act of damaging anothers
property be committed merely for the sake of
damaging it, is not present in this case. He
maintains that he demolished Mrs. Castillos nipa
hut to safeguard the interest of his employer, the
PNB, and for no other reason. His motive was
lawful and that there was no malice in causing
the damage to the private complainants
property. In other words, he did not act out of
hatred, revenge or other evil motive.
HELD:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of Malicious
Mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal
Code are present.
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief
under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender deliberately caused damage
to the property of another;
2. That such act does not constitute arson or
other crimes involving destruction;
3. That the act of damaging anothers property be
committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, all the
foregoing elements are present in this case. First,
he admits that he deliberately demolished the
nipa hut of Mrs. Castillo. Second, the demolition
does not constitute arson or any other crime
involving destruction.
Neither can the petitioner rightfully invoke
paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code
which states:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following
do not incur any criminal liability:
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
The requisites of the foregoing justifying
circumstance are:
(1)that the accused acted in the performance of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and
(2)that the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office.
In this case, Valeroso deliberately demolished
the property of Mrs. Castillo without any lawful

authority. Thus, while the first requisite is
present, the second is unavailing. Valeroso was
not acting in the fulfillment of his duty when he
took the law into his own hands and summarily
demolished Mrs. Castillos hut.
ROBERT TAGUINOD,
-versus-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 185833 October 12, 2011
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taguinod is guilty of the crime of
Malicious Mischief under article 327 of the
Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his
Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement
parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was
driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd
basement parking. When they were about to
queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the
respective vehicles were edging each other. The
CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried
to overtake, which resulted the touching of their
side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the
Vitara was pushed backward and naturally, the
side view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward.
This prompted the private complainant's wife
and daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann,
respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront
the petitioner.
Taguinod appeared to be hostile, hence, the
private complainant Ang instructed his wife and
daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were
returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the
Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The
CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara, took
another lane. Private complainant was able to
pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of
petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward
ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the
CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it
hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit
portion of the ramp.
As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained
damage at the back bumper spare tires and the
front bumper, the repair of which amounted to
P57,464.66.
HELD:
Yes. Taguinod is proven beyond reasonable
doubt to have committed the crime of Malicious
Mischief.
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief
under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage
to the property of another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or
other crimes involving destruction;
(3)That the act of damaging another's property be
committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
The incident involving the collision of the two
side view mirrors is proof enough to establish the
existence of the element of hate, revenge and
other evil motive. Here, the accused entertained
hate, revenge and other evil motive because to
his mind, he was wronged by the complainant
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when the CRV overtook his Vitara while
proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking
fee, as a consequence of which, their side view
mirrors collided. On the same occasion, the hood
of his Vitara was also pounded, and he was
badmouthed by the complainant's wife and
daughter when they alighted from the CRV to
confront him for the collision of the side view
mirrors.
These circumstances motivated the accused to
push upward the ramp complainant's CRV until
it reached the steel railing of the exit ramp.
First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV
by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as
indicated by the evidence on record. The version
of the private complainant that the petitioner
chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV
until it reached the stairway railing was more
believable than the petitioner's version that it
was private complainant's CRV which moved
backward and deliberately hit the Vitara
considering the steepness or angle of the
elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too
risky and dangerous for the private complainant
and his family to move the CRV backward when
it would be hard for him to see his direction as
well as to control his speed in view of the
gravitational pull.
Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of
the CRV does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the
Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just
giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a
heated encounter between him and the private
complainant.
April 4, 2018 – Article 328 – SPECIAL CASES
OF MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
ALAMEDA, Manuel
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 5, 2018 – Article 330 – DAMAGE AND
OBSTRUCTION TO MEANS OF
COMMUNICATION
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 5, 2018 – Article 331 – DESTROYING OR
DAMAGING STATUES, PUBLIC MONUMENTS
OR PAINTINGS
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 5, 2018 – Article 332 – PERSONS
EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF DE CARUNGCONG
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 181409. FEBRUARY 11, 2010
CORONA, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can apply for the
benefits under article 322 of the Revised Penal
Code.
FACTS:

On November 24, 1992, William Sato induced
Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, who
was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign
and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy
Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused,
making her believe that said document involved
only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that
said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or
otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of
her properties all located at Tagaytay City.
Mediatrix Carungcong, the duly appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong, filed a complaint for estafa against
her brother-in-law, William Sato.
William Sato filed a motion to quash the
information alleging that he is exempt from
criminal liability under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. In an order dated April 17, 2006, the
trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case. Dissatisfied with
the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of
Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
which, however, in a decision dated August 9,
2007, dismissed it. Hence, this petition.
RULING:
No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
felonies of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the
offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State
waives its right to prosecute the offender for the
said crimes but leaves the private offended party
with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly
limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
plain, categorical and unmistakable language of
the provision shows that it applies exclusively to
the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any
of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through
falsification.
In this case, The Information against Sato
charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts
alleged in the Information, not by the designation
of the offense. A reading of the facts alleged in
the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents. Since the crime with which
respondent was charged was not simple estafa
but the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, Sato cannot
avail himself of the absolutory cause provided
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in
his favor.
DOLORES G. GOMEZ VS. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
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G.R. NO. L-63202 APRIL 9, 1985
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is exempt from
criminal liability under Article 322 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, Rodrigo Gomez,
husband of accused, went to the residence of his
sister Belen, in Angeles City because there was
somebody in Manila interested in buying some
pieces of jewelry. Belen, together with Lourdes
Balajadia and Rodrigo, went to the residence of
accused. At the house of Rodrigo and Dolores
Gomez and in the presence of Rodrigo and
Lourdes, Belen delivered to Dolores three pieces
of jewelry. On November 21, 1973, Milagros
Gomez, sister-in-law of Dolores, accompanied by
Belen Tiotuico, brought to her residence a pair of
dangling earrings. The four pieces of jewelry were
left with Dolores without any acknowledgment
receipt as they were relatives, under the
condition that, if after two or three days, the
jewelry would be sold, Milagros would give
Dolores and Rodolfo Punongbayan P2,000.00
except for the dominic ring in which she would
give them P200.00; and if they could sell the
jewelry for more than her price, the difference
would belong to them (Dolores and Rodolfo) but
should they fail to sell the same, they would
return the same.
A few days after the consignation, Belen kept on
reminding Dolores about the jewelries but
Dolores always answered that the jewelries were
not yet sold. Sensing something was wrong after
she again talked with Rodolfo in the evening of
the same day, Belen reported the matter to the
Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and asked them to look for Dolores,
Rodrigo, and Wilson. Only the dominic ring was
returned to Belen. The remaining two were
pledged to Jose Lontok. When Belen tried to
redeem the 7 Karat pink ring, Lontok declined
her because the receipt she handed was not the
original receipt. The next day, Belen returned to
Jose to redeem the jewelry and told him she had
merely asked Dolores to sell it for her. Jose
promised to give her the jewelry if Willie would
come with her and bring the original receipt. The
next day when Willie and Belen came, she was
able to recover the ring after paying Jose the
amount of P25,000.00. After Wilson had given
Belen the receipt of Antonio Tambunting's
Pawnshop, as to the jewelry Dolores pledged to
guarantee payment of P6,000.00, and after she
(Belen) executed an affidavit that she was the
real owner of the jewelry pledged, Belen was able
to redeem it after paying the amount of P6,000-
00. As to the pair of dangling earrings, Belen was
not able to recover the same and so she had to
pay on installments, the value thereof to Belen
Tiotuico from whom she had received the jewelry.
On February 24, 1977, the Court of First
Instance of Manila convicted Dolores Gomez of
the crime of estafa or swindling under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. A motion for
reconsideration filed by Dolores Gomez was
denied by the respondent court in a resolution
dated October 19, 1982.
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

RULING:
Yes. Both Rodrigo and Wilson were exempt from
criminal liability since they were the brothers of
Belen. In Dolores’ case, the Supreme Court ruled
to acquit her criminal charges. There are other
circumstances in the records strongly suggesting
that the transactions were between Belen and
her two brothers and that the petitioner came
into the picture only because she was the wife of
one of the brothers.

In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the

people to establish the presence of conspiracy is
even murkier than the proof on the commission
of the crime itself. The factual findings of the
respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court
do not show the participation of the petitioner in
the events that followed after the pieces of jewelry
were delivered to her and her husband, Rodrigo.
The records show that the only participation of
the petitioner in the transaction was when she
and her husband received the pieces of jewelry
from Belen Gomez Espiritu on November 10 and
21, 1973 at their residence. After the same were
received, Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez took
possession of the said pieces of jewelry and
disposed of them without the knowledge of the
petitioner. Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez alone
absconded with the pieces of jewelry. As a matter
of fact, the petitioner did not even know the
whereabouts of Rodrigo and Wilson who were
then in possession of the said pieces of jewelry.
The participation of petitioner Dolores in the
attempts to locate the missing brothers and to
compel them to return the jewelry to their sister
is not proof of conspiracy in a crime. It was
understandable why she was involved in looking
for her own husband at the behest of her sister-
in-law. To establish conspiracy, there must be
evidence of intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose (People v. Agda,
111 SCRA 330). There is no evidence of such
kind of participation. Without conspiracy, the
petitioner cannot be held liable as she had no
direct participation in the commission of the
crime charged. The presumption of innocence in
favor of the petitioner has not been successfully
overcome by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

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TITLE ELEVEN – CRIMES AGAINST
CHASTITY
April 6, 2018 – Article 333 – WHO ARE GUILTY
OF ADULTERY
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
GR NO. 80116
JUNE 30, 1989
ISSUE:
WoN Pilapil can be charged by Geiling with
adultery.
FACTS:
Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich
Geiling, a German citizen, were married in
Germany. Subsequently, Geiling filed a divorce
against Pilapil in Germany, which the
Schoneberg Court granted on January 15, 1986.
Geiling then filed a case of adultery against
Pilapil at the RTC of Manila on June of 1986. He
alleged that in 1982, Pilapil had an affair with
William Chia and Jesus Chua in 1983.
HELD:
No, she cannot be charged.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive
grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of
the criminal action.
Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time
of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery.
In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained
a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as Geiling is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the matter of status of persons. Thus, Geiling
ceased to be the lawful spouse of Pilapil at the
time he initiated the criminal complaint against
Pilapil.
April 6, 2018 – Article 334 – CONCUBINAGE
DAHIROC, Janice
PEOPLE VS. PEDRO PITOC AND MARCIANA
DEL BASCO
G.R. NO. 18513 SEPTEMBER 18, 1922
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pedro Pitoc and Marciana del
Basco cohabition constitutes the crime of
concubinage.
FACTS:
February 21, 1921, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc,
was legally married to Petronila Roque in the city
of Manila. For several years prior to their
marriage, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, had
sustained illicit relations with Marciana del
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Basco. In a short time after the marriage, the
defendant, Pedro Pitoc, and his wife left the city
of Manila and went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to
reside. Later Pedro Pitoc returned to Manila,
leaving his wife at Calumpit, promising to return
March 15, 1921. For his failure to return on
March 17, 1921, his wife came to Manila to look
for him. March 17, his wife came to Manila where
she found the defendant living in the same house
and under the same roof with his former
paramour, staying around her store and keeping
company with her, under circumstances which
strongly tend to show that they had resumed
their former relations.
HELD:
Yes. The word cohabit has many different
meanings, each depending upon the sense in
which it is used. Here, we have a law intended to
prohibit a married man from keeping a mistress
in his dwelling or anywhere else under
"scandalous circumstances." Hence, the
meaning of the word cohabit here must relate
and he confined to the subject matter of the law
itself. When used in that sense, it should be
construed to mean "to dwell or live together as
husband and wife; to live together as husband
and wife although not legally married; to live
together in the same house, claiming to be
married; to live together at bed and board."
(Corpus Juris, vol., 11, p. 950.)
Applying the facts to such definition, it is
undisputed that before his marriage to Petronila
Roque, the defendant and his coaccused were
living together for a number of years in illicit
relations. The defendants, Pedro Pitoc, legally
married Petronila Roque in the city of Manila on
February 21, 1921, and together they went to
Calumpit, Bulacan, to live. In a short time he left
his wife there and came to Manila, promising to
return on March 15, twenty-three days after
their marriage. He never did return. March 17,
his wife came to Manila where she found the
defendant living in the same house and under
the same roof with his former paramour, staying
around her store and keeping company with her,
under circumstances which strongly tend to
show that they had resumed their former
relations. It is, indeed, significant that the
defendant Pitoc would leave his wife whom he
married on February 21, and return to Manila
and go direct to, and obtain a room in, the same
house where his former paramour was living,
and violate his promise to return tho his newly
wedded wife on March 15.
Petronila Roque testified that she asked her
husband if that woman, meaning his coaccused,
was his paramour, and that he answered yes,
and that she asked him what would be her
situation and "he answered me that he could not
abandon that woman, referring to Marciana del
Basco, and that I could do anything I pleased."
This evidence was not denied by the defendant,
Pedro Pitoc. When this is considered with the
defendant's conduct and all the other evidence,
surrounding facts and circumstances, the proof
is conclusive that the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, did
cohabit "with a woman who is not his wife," and
that he is guilty of the crime charged.

They were both found guilty as charged.
BUSUEGO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
MINDANAO AND ROSA BUSUEGO
G.R. NO. 196842 OCTOBER 9, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed a
grave abuse of discretion in finding probable
cause to indict Alfredo and Sia for Concubinage.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed
a complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children); and (3) Grave
Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman
against her husband, Alfredo. Alfredo is the Chief
of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital. They have
2 children. However, their marriage turned sour.
Rosa went to the US and was eventually joined
by her 2 children, Alfred and Robert. Robert
eventually returned to Davao City to study
medicine. Sometime in 1997, Rosa learned that
a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their
conjugal home. When Rosa asked Alfredo, he
said that Sia, nurse at the Regional Hospital, was
just in a sorry plight and was allegedly raped by
Rosa's brother-in-law so he allowed her to sleep
at the maids' quarters.
In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo's
extra-marital relationships. Robert and the
housekeepers executed a joint affidavit to
support Rosa's allegations. Rosa and the other
son Alfred flew to Davao without informing
Alfredo. She gathererd and consolidated
information of her husband's sexual affairs. She
also averred that during the course of the
marriage, Alfredo physically and verbally abused
her and her family. Alfredo denied all
accusations. In their subsequent exchange of
responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained Alfredo's
culpability, and naturally, Alfredo claimed
innocence.
In the course thereof, the procedural issue of
Rosa's failure to implead Sia and de Leon as
respondents cropped up. Alfredo insisted that
Rosa's complaint ought to be dismissed for
failure to implead his alleged concubines as
respondents.
HELD:
No. The Ombudsman has full discretionary
authority in the determination of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation. This is the
reason why judicial review of the resolution of the
Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and
duty to investigate and prosecute felonies and/or
offenses of public officers is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to
substitute their judgment for that of the
Ombudsman.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
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tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. In this regard, petitioner failed to
demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much
less grave abuse, of discretion.
The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions
of its Rules of Procedure. No information may be
filed and no complaint may be dismissed without
the written authority or approval of the
ombudsman in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbyan, or of the proper
Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
Notably, Rosa's complaint contained not just the
Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation
of Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats.
Upon the Ombudsman's perusal, the complaint
was supported by affidavits corroborating Rosa's
accusations. Thus, at that stage, the
Ombudsman properly referred the complaint to
Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while the
Ombudsman found no reason for outright
dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory
hearing to discuss the applicability of Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code, the issue having been
insisted upon by Alfredo.
Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the
complaint to respondent for comment and
thereafter the holding of a clarificatory hearing is
provided for in paragraph b, Section 2 and
paragraphs d and f, Section 4 of Rule II, which
the Court have at the outset underscored. The
Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment
of the complaint to cure the defect pointed out by
Alfredo. The Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction,
albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of crimes involving
public officers, without regard to its commission
in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen.
Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of DOJ.
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan
Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officers or employees. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is
concurrent with other government investigating
agencies such as provincial, city and state
prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over,
at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not
precluded from conducting any investigation of
cases against public officers involving violations
of penal laws but if the cases fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that
the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation,
the respective heads of said offices came up with
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the
proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors
in the conduct of their investigations.
WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED.
April 7, 2018 – Article 335 WHEN AND HOW
RAPE IS COMMITTED
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
Note:
Art. 335 has been repealed by Rep. Act. No. 8353,
other- wise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997"
which took effect on October 22, 1997. See page
523 of this Book II. (Article 266-A)
April 7, 2018 – Article 336 ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for Acts of
Lasciviousness can be sustained.
FACTS:
Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where
public schoolteacher Ester Gonzales was
conducting her classes. Without warning and
right after complainant had finished writing on
the blackboard, Balbar placed his arms around
her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked,
complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away
and tried to flee. Balbar brought out his "daga"
(a local dagger) and pursued her, catching up
with her before she was able to get out of the
room. Balbar embraced her again, at the same
time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to
the floor, as a result of which complainant
sustained slight physical injuries. Gonzales
injured her right arm which required 3 to 4 days
to heal. Two informations, one for Direct Assault
Upon a Person in Authority and another for Acts
of Lasciviousness were filed by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the
CFI Batangas. Balbar filed separate motions to
quash, contending that with respect to Criminal
Case for Acts of Lasciviousness, the accused
would be placed in double jeopardy and that the
complaint charges two offenses.
HELD:
NO. Upon examination of the events which gave
rise to the filing of the 2 informations, the offense
of Acts of Lasciviousness does not appear to have
been committed at all. The presence or absence
of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the
acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. In the instant case, considering
the manner, place and time under which the acts
complained of were done, even as alleged in the
information itself, lewd designs can hardly be
attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a
schoolroom in the presence of complainant's
students and within hearing distance of her co-
teachers, rules out a conclusion that the accused
was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or
that his conduct was lewd or lascivious. It may
be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but,
this of itself would not necessarily bring the case
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within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code.
April 7, 2018 – Article 337 – QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIANO
FONTANILLA
G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable
under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
On September 1960, Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old
virgin, was brought by her mother to the house
of Mariano Fontanilla and his second wife,
Magdalena Copio, a sister of Fe's mother, to serve
as a helper. Fe Castro testified that during her
stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three
months, the accused succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her repeatedly, the total number of
times she could not recall. Prior to this incident,
the accused had made amorous overtures and
advances toward her.
Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently
repeatedly yielded to the carnal desires of the
accused, as she was induced by his promises of
marriage and frightened by his acts of
intimidation. The accused made love to her
during the day when his wife was away and at
night when the latter was already asleep. Their
intimacies lasted for almost three months until
her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in
flagrante on the kitchen floor. The following day
she returned to her parents, and revealed
everything to her mother two days later.
HELD:
Yes. It is nevertheless settled that deceit,
although an essential element of ordinary or
simple seduction, does not need to be proved or
established in a charge of qualified seduction. It
is replaced by abuse of confidence. When the
offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a
servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any
title is in charge of the education or keeping of
the offended woman, as in the present case, the
act is punishable although fraud or deceit may
not have been used or, if employed, has not been
proved. The seduction of a virgin over twelve and
under eighteen years of age, committed by any of
the persons enumerated in art. 337 "is
constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ...
even though no deceit intervenes or even when
such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the
part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law
takes for granted the existence of the deceit as
an integral element of the said crime and
punishes it with greater severity than it does the
simple seduction ... taking into account the
abuse of confidence on the part of the agent
(culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies
deceit or fraud."
There is no evidence on record that Fe Castro,
then a 15-year old single girl, was unchaste prior
to her living with the Fontanilla spouses. Such
being the case, her virginity before she was
seduced by the appellant must be presumed.

Presumption of a woman's virginity arises
whenever it is shown that she is single, and
continues until overthrown by proof to the
contrary.
G.R. Nos. 104942-43
November 25, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAPOLEON
SUBINGSUBING
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty under
Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Accused Napoleon was charged with the crime of
rape in three separate informations.
The complainant Mary Jane in all of these
actions is sixteen years old and unmarried. She
was living with her grandmother and the accused
Napoleon who was her uncle. On November 25
and 28, 1989, the accused poked his garand rifle
and then boxed the belly of Mary Jane, which
rendered her unconscious. He proceeded having
carnal knowledge with her against her will and
without her consent. On November 30, 1989, the
accused put over the nose of the victim
handkerchief soaked with chemical which
rendered her unconscious. He then proceeded
having carnal knowledge with her.
Mary Jane did not reveal to anybody the things
that happened to her for fear that the accused
might really kill her as the accused had
threatened to do. Months later, Mary Jane finally
divulged everything to her mother. They reported
the incidents to the police station.Thereafter, she
had herself physically examined and was found
pregnant.
At the trial, the accused Napoleon denied the
charge of rape as narrated above and proferred a
different story. He interposed consent on the part
of the complainant as a defense. Three other
witnesses for the defense were presented who
corroborated the story of the accused and
testified that indeed, the complainant and the
accused were seen going out together and
sharing happy moments months after November
1989.
HELD:
The evidence for the prosecution cannot, on its
own, stand and suffice to establish the guilt of
the accused for the crime of rape beyond
reasonable doubt. A perusal of the records and
the testimony of the complainant discloses
contradictions and inconsistencies on vital
details which lead one to seriously doubt the
veracity of her story.
The complainant admitted that she still went out
with the accused to watch betamax movies or get
food for the pigs in the ricefields. Such behaviour
directly contradicts the normal or expected
behaviour of a rape victim.
Appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape
does not mean, however, that his responsibility
is merely moral and not penal in character. He
was found guilty of qualified seduction in one of
the informations.
Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal
knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18 years of
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age and committed by any of the persons
enumerated in Art. 337 of the Revised Penal
Code. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying
circumstance in the offense. Notably, among the
persons who can commit qualified seduction is a
"domestic". And a "domestic," for purposes of
said legal provision, has been interpreted
judicially as —
. . . Upon the word domestic being employed in
said legal provision segregating it from that of a
servant, the term is applied to persons usually
living under the same roof, pertaining to the
same house, and constituting, in the sense, a
part thereof, distinguishing it from the term
servant whereby a person serving another on a
salary is designated; in this manner, it has been
properly used.
The verified complaint for rape contains
allegations, sans averment on the use of force,
which impute the crime of qualified seduction.
Any deficiency in the complaint is supplied by
the supporting affidavit, where complainant
averred that the accused Napoleon
Subingsubing, her uncle, who was living in the
same house as the complainant, had sexual
intercourse with her. The accused took
advantage of his moral ascendancy if not
dominance over the complainant. She was
presumably a virgin. As already stated, the
accused was a domestic in relation to the
complainant within the meaning of Art. 337 of
the Revised Penal Code.
April 8, 2018 – Article 340 - CORRUPTION OF
MINORS
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
FRANCISCA ALIMAGNO & JOVITA MELO
VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-36458, FEBRUARY 21, 1983
ISSUE:
Whether Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code
was violated by the accused?
FACTS:
Victim was employed as a domestic helper when
she came to know the accused who was then
bringing money to her employer. One time,
accused tried to convince her to leave the house
of her employer promising her a better job.
Accused succeeded in pursuing the victim to
leave. Upon leaving the house of her employer a
note was left saying " Ako ho ay nagtanan
kasama ko ay lalake. Your utusan" which was
admitted to have been written by the accused.
After abandoning the house of her employer,
victim was brought by the two accused to a hut
and there allowed her to be ravished by a man
whom she saw for the first time.
RULING: Yes. Article 340 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that any person who shall
promote or facilitate or corruption of persons
under age to satisfy the lust of another shall be
punished.
The Court clearly found through evidence and
witnesses presented that the accused violated
this article. The accused Alimagno was found
guilty as principal to the crime and accused Melo
was found guilty as an accomplice in the the
consumated crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS SIMPLICIO DELANTAR
G.R. NO. 169143, FEBRUARY 2, 2007
ISSUE:
Was the accused guilty for violation of R.A. No.
7610 in relation to Article 340 of the Revised
Penal Code?
FACTS: The victim was a minor below 12 years
old and through her testimony showed that
accused procured her as a child prostitute for at
least two clients: the first, an Arab national
named Mr. Hammond and the second, then
Congressman Romeo Jalosjos.Victim testified
that she was brought to the first client at least
eleven (11) times. Once left alone with the victim,
the client would perform lascivious acts, the
recurrent salient points of her harrowing
experience revolved around the client's kissing
her, touching her breasts, embracing her, and
inserting his finger in her private parts. After
their first visit to the client, victim told accused
that she did not want to go back because the
client was "bastos." Accused promised her that
they would no longer go back but the promise
was broken as they went back a few more times.
As with the first client, accused would tell the
victim that they had to go to the second client
because they had obligations to pay. During each
of these visits, the client would give the victim
money ranging from P2,000.00 to P10,000.00.
The details of what transpired when victim was
left alone with the second client were vividly
recounted in People v. Jalosjos, where the second
client was convicted of two (2) counts of rape and
six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness, all
committed against the victim on various dates.
HELD:
Yes. There is no doubt, drawing from the
evidence, that the victim was a child who was
exploited in prostitution as defined in Section 5,
Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The law punishes not
only the person who commits the acts of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with the child
but also those who engage in or promote,
facilitate or induce child prostitution. Accused is
one such person. Accused in his brief, does not
deny that he brought the victim to the clients.
He, however, attempts to exculpate himself by
stating that he did not coerce or influence the
victim to go to the two clients to be exploited in
prostitution. Verily, it was against the victim's
will and consent to see the two clients. But even
if the victim had in fact consented, appellant may
still be prosecuted for child prostitution under
Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 because the
child's consent or lack of it is not an element of
the offense.
April 8, 2018 – Article 341 – WHITE SLAVE
TRADE
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
PEOPLE V. NUEVAS
ISSUE:
WON accused Nuevas is guilty for violating
Article 341 of the RPC
FACTS:
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Jesus Nuevas contracted the services of 4 women
of ill repute whom he brought and maintained in
a house he rented in Batangas to engage in
prostitution. He provided them food and lodging
and in return he would receive ½ of the
prostitutes’ earnings in their illicit traffic with
soldiers. It was established that the prostitutes
would charge the soldiers for 10 pesos each
sexual intercourse. The accused now contended
that under article 341 of the Revised Penal Code
the prosecution (a) must identify the alleged
house of ill fame, (b) must proved it to be really a
house of ill fame, and (c) must further proved
that the accused is either the owner or the lessee
of the house.
Held: Yes. The accused is guilty of the said
felony. Under Article 341 penalizes three acts: (a)
engaging in the business of prostitution, (b)
profiting by prostitution, or (c) enlisting the
service of women for the purpose of prostitution.
Any person committing any one of these acts
comes within the purview of said article. The
proofs show beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant (a) enlisted the services of the women
for the purpose of prostitution and (b) profited
thereby. Even if the appellant were not the lessee
of particular house, he could not escape the
penalty imposed by the law for the immoral and
illicit trade in which he engaged. As a matter of
law, once it was proved that the accused had
enlisted the services of women for the purpose of
prostitution, he was criminally liable even if
there were no proof that he had shared in the
profit. And even if there were no proof that he
had enlisted the services of women for the
purpose of prostitution, he would still be
criminally liable because there is indubitable
proof in this case that he had share in the income
of the prostitutes.
April 10, 2018 – Article 342 – FORCIBLE
ABDUCTION
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
G.R. NO. 131914 APRIL 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. JAIME
ABLANEDA
FACTS:
On February 18, 1993, at around 7:00 o’clock in
the morning, 6-year old Magdalena Salas, a
Grade I pupil at the Baldovino Elementary
School, Camambugan, Daet, Camarines Norte,
was walking to school. Along the way, accused-
appellant Jaime Ablaneda, also known as Joey
Capistrano, approached her and asked if he
could share her umbrella, because it was
raining. Suddenly, Ablaneda boarded a tricycle
with Magdalena and brought her to a small hut.
While inside, Ablaneda removed his underwear
and the Magdalena’s panties. He applied cooking
oil, which he had bought earlier, on his organ
and on’s. Then, he proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with the little girl. Magdalena felt
pain but was too terrified to speak or cry out.
After satisfying his lust, Ablaneda ordered
Magdalena to go home. When Magdalena arrived
at their house, Ailene Villaflores, her uncle’s
sister-in-law, noticed that she looked pale and
weak, and found traces of blood on her dress.
Ailene asked her what happened, but Magdalena
merely said that her classmate had pushed her.

Ailene did not believe this, so she brought her to
a quack doctor. The latter told her that
Magdalena had been raped. Ailene then brought
Magdalena to the Daet Police Station and, later,
to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital to
have her medically examined. When Ailene saw
Magdalena’s bloodied panties, she again asked
her what happened. This time, Magdalena
confessed that she was raped by a man who had
a scar on the stomach.
The lower court found that the Ablaneda guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape.
ISSUE:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain
the conviction of the accused?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to convict Ablaneda. All
elements of the crime of forcible abduction were
proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman,
was taken against her will, as shown by the fact
that she was intentionally directed by accused-
appellant to a vacant hut. At her young age,
Magdalena could not be expected to physically
resist considering that the lewd designs of
Ablaneda could not have been apparent to her at
that time. Physical resistance need not be
demonstrated to show that the taking was
against her will. The employment of deception
suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting
young girl. Considering that it was raining, going
to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as
probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio
girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the
taking advantage of their innocence that makes
them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally,
the evidence shows that the taking of the young
victim against her will was effected in
furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such
lewd designs in forcible abduction is established
by the actual rape of the victim
In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open
court that accused-appellant inserted his penis
into her private parts. The fact of sexual
intercourse is corroborated by the medical
findings wherein it was found that the victim
suffered from complete hymenal laceration.
Whether or not she consented to the sexual
contact is immaterial considering that at the time
thereof, she was below twelve years of age. Sex
with a girl below twelve years, regardless of
whether she consented thereto or not,
constitutes statutory rape.
G.R. NO. 199100
JULY 18, 2014
PEOPLE V. ROSENDO AMARO
FACTS:
26th day of March, 1998, at 5pm in the
afternoon, in front of Boots and Maya, AAA a 7
year old girl was forcibly abducted by appellant
Rosendo Amaro. AAA testified that on her way
home from school, she met appellant and asked
her to buy him some cigarettes. Appellant offered
her food. As she was finished eating the food, she
felt dizzy and was unconscious. She later awoke
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in the house of appellant and saw the appellant
naked and was rape. Victim was raped 5 times
and was detained for 6 days.
The RTC rendered judgement finding the
accused guilty of violating Art. 342 of Forcible
Abduction with Rape.
In his appeal, appellant contends that there were
no sufficient evidence to convict him. According
to him, he did not rape AAA because she was not
in his custody at the time said incident allegedly
happened. Appellant adds that he entrusted AAA
to the custody of Florante Magay’s sister because
he was working. Appellant also insists that AAA
voluntarily went with him to his house.
ISSUE:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain
the conviction of the accused?
HELD:
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction,
as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any
woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will;
and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when
the woman is deprived of reason or is
unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve
years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these
elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a
seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her
will by appellant who told her that he knew her
mother and that he would bring her home. At her
tender age, AAA could have easily been deceived
by appellant. The employment of deception
suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting
young girl. It is the taking advantage of their
innocence that makes them easy culprits of
deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual
rape of the victim.
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or
acquittal depends on the complainant's
testimony because of the fact that usually only
the participants are witnesses to their
occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to
credibility.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given
full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, saysthat she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show thatrape has in fact been
committed.
Wherefore, the decision was affirmed finding the
accused guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape.
April 10, 2018 – Article 343 – CONSENTED
ABDUCTION
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
The following cases could not be found:
PEOPLE VS CRISOSTOMO, 46 PHIL 775
PEOPLE VS AMANTE, 49 PHIL 679

April 12, 2018 – Article 344 – PROSECUTION
OF THE CRIME OF ADULTERY,
CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION,
RAPE, AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS.
NASH, Regina Mercado
G.R. No. L-8520. June 29, 1957
PEOPLE v. ENGRACIO SANTOS, ET AL.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “salaysay’ or written
statement of Policarpia Bansuelo, the offended
party filed with the Fiscal and not in court is the
complaint contemplated by Art. 344 of RPC?
FACTS:
Respondent Engracio Santos was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal with the crime of
rape. After trial, said respondent was convicted a
pd sentenced to the maximum period of
reclusion temporal, from 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years, and to pay the costs. Appealing
to the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a
motion to quash and for discharge, on the
ground that the trial court was without
jurisdiction, there having been no valid
complaint subscribed and sworn to by the
offended party as required by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code. Said motion was granted.
Hence this appeal by the petitioners.
It is contended that the "salaysay" executed and
signed by petitioner Policarpia Bansuelo on
January 12, 1954, before and in the presence of
Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas of Rizal and Capt.
Hermogenes Marco of the PCAC, is sufficient in
form and substance to serve as the complaint
required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. That the law requiring that the crime of
rape, among others, shall be commenced by a
complaint filed by the offended party is merely
"designed for the protection of the offended party
and her family who may prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through with
the scandal of a public trial" (Samilin v. Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304);
that when petitioner Bansuelo executed said
"Salaysay", she had manifested her desire to
prosecute the maniacal abuse committed against
her; that said "salaysay" has conformed
substantially to the requisites of a, valid
complaint; that it cannot be considered as her
testimony during the preliminary investigation
because, if it were so, the other witnesses should
have also signed it.
After a thorough examination of the "salaysay" in
question, we agree with the appealed decision
that it is a narration of how the crime of rape was
committed against petitioner Bansuelo. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in
his comment on the motion for reconsideration,
such sworn statement "salaysay" is not the
complaint contemplated in and required by
sections 1, 2 and 5 of Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
"The complaint is the process which begins the
criminal action, and no other pleading on the
part of the government is necessary. So, if a
criminal action, had been commenced by
complaint in appropriate cases, it would be error
for the court to dismiss it, because it was not
presented through the mediation of the
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prosecution officer. The complaint contemplated
by the law and the rules is necessarily that one
filed in court. The "salaysay" was filed with the
Fiscal and not with the court; it did not start the
criminal proceedings
"In front of these provisions of law, it cannot be
certainly pretended that the aforementioned
‘salaysay’ or written statement of the offended
party, Exhibit 1, could be considered as the
complaint required by law for the proper
initiation of the present case of rape.
"It is argued, however, that said Exhibit 1 should
be considered as the complaint required by law,
for on the basis thereof the provincial fiscal of
Rizal conducted the preliminary investigation
and then filed the information at bar. It is further
argued that since under Republic Act No. 732,
provincial fiscals have now the same authority as
the Justice of the Peace to conduct preliminary
investigation, said Exhibit 1 should be
considered as the complaint contemplated in the
Rules of Court and the Revised Penal Code. We
cannot concur to this theory, for according to
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 732, after the
provincial fiscal has conducted an investigation
of a case, he has the duty to have prepared an
information or complaint. The pertinent portion
of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 732 provides:
‘A provincial fiscal shall have authority to
conduct investigation into the matter of any
crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made
against persons charged with the commission of
the same.’
And the complaint mentioned in this provision of
law is precisely what is defined and mentioned in
the Rules of Court and the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, we hold the view that in the case at
bar, after the fiscal has investigated the case, he
should have procured the filing of a complaint by
the offended party to properly initiate this case
and not file by himself an information as he did."
It is also argued that in affixing her signature and
swearing to the allegations of the information
together with the fiscal, petitioner Bansuelo had
complied with the requirement of a valid
complaint. Respondent Santos has answered
this argument by saying that such fact is not
borne out by the records; that such assertion has
never been made before the Court of Appeals;
that the opening paragraph of the information
clearly and unmistakably shows that the fiscal
alone accuses respondent Santos of the crime of
rape; that the offended party has never been
referred to in the body of the information as
having requested its filing.
We cannot consider the information, although
signed by petitioner Bansuelo together with the
fiscal, as equivalent to the complaint required by
law, because said information lacks the oath of
the complainant; the jurat contained therein is
the subscribed and sworn certification of the
fiscal that he had conducted the preliminary
investigation in which obviously the offended
party had taken no participation whatsoever; in
very unequivocal terms, the information
commences with the statement that "the

undersigned fiscal accuse Engracio Santos of the
crime of rape", the offended party not having
been mentioned at all as one of the accusers.
It is not altogether true that to require the
offended party to draft the complaint in legal
form and terminology, — otherwise the
complaint will be insufficient, — would impose a
penalty on ignorance, and that a person with no
legal training will not be able to institute a
criminal action for private crimes; because, as
may be gathered from the provisions of Section 2
of Republic Act 732, it is the duty of the
Provincial Fiscal to prepare the necessary
complaint after having taken down the testimony
of the offended party and his witnesses during
the preliminary investigation. Indeed, the law
required this, since the victims of crimes which
cannot be prosecuted except upon their
complaint may be ignorant of the law.
This Court has invariably maintained strict
compliance with the jurisdictional requirement
of a complaint by the offered party, as defined in
Section 2 of Rule 106 and Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the case of People v.
Palabao (L-8027, August 31, 1954), we
considered insufficient an information filed with
the Provincial Fiscal, wherein the offended party
signed at the bottom thereof and above the
signature of the prosecuting officer, the
information even reciting that the Provincial
Fiscal charged defendant with the crime of
seduction at the "instance of the offended party."
In the case of People v. Martinez, (76 Phil. 559),
this Court motu proprio dismissed the case for
failure of the aggrieved party to file the proper
complaint for the offense of oral defamation,
although the accused never raised the question
on appeal, thereby showing the necessity of strict
compliance with the legal requirement even at
the cost of nullifying all the proceedings already
had in the lower court.
HELD:
The decision appealed from was affirmed without
costs.
April 11, 2018 – Article 345 – CIVIL LIABILITY
OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST
CHASTITY
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND
MARON LAJIM VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 179570 FEBRUARY 4, 2010
FACTS:
Fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama
were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.)
Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron
arrived, running towards them and carrying a
badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but
Sajiron overtook them. Sajiron then drew his
gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at
Inon Dama and said, “If you will not go, I will
shoot you”. Inon Dama went home and reported
the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama
left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly
appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with
them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied
her hands behind her back, covered her mouth
with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the
forest. There, while Sajiron was undressing AAA,
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she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but
Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his
desire, her life would be spared. Sajiron had
carnal knowledge with AAA against the latter’s
will. During the entire time that AAA was being
abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and
watched them. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard
AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to
escape. Nine days after the abduction, upon
instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were
married by an Imam. The marriage was
solemnized against AAA's will and without the
presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA
and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together
with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-
law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While
detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her
house was very far from the place where she was
held captive, and her captors threatened to kill
her and her family if she would attempt to
escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her
twice every night. She was free to roam within
the vicinity of the house but she was usually
accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her
guard. She was also guarded and threatened by
Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time. A
crime of abduction with rape was charged
against the appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime imputed and the
corresponding civil liability under ART. 345 was
correct.
HELD:
YES. The court held that Sajiron and Maron, who
are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged
AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive
against her will. The crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in
an enclosure, but also of detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty.For
there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home.Its essence
is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of
the accused to effect such deprivation. In the
present case, although AAA was not actually
confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because
she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a
piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to
physically drag her to the forest away from her
home. The crime of rape was also proven beyond
reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the
use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing
her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to
Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Consequently, the court further stated that, AAA
was sexually abused and gave birth. There was
no showing that AAA had previously been
sexually abused or had sexual relations with
other men. Therefore, it can be logically deduced
that Sajiron is the father of the child. Under Art.
345 of the Revised Penal Code, he is civilly liable
for the support of his offspring. Hence, he is
directed to provide support to the victim's child
born out of the rape, subject to the amount and
conditions to be determined by the trial court,
after due notice and hearing, in accordance with
Art. 201 of the Family Code.
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS. SGT. MORENO BAYANI

G.R. NO. 120894. OCTOBER 3, 1996

FACTS:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties provided by law; to
indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto. On
the other hand, the People, through the
Appellees Brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, refuted the accuseds arguments, and in
closing, recommended that apart from the FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.000) PESOS as indemnity,
appellant should be made to support his
illegitimate child with Maria Elena, in conformity
with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bayani is accountable under
ART. 345 of the RPC.

HELD:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction,
or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify
the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him
from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support
the offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil
Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child
as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction,
and seduction when the period of the offense
coincides, more or less, with the period of the
conception. It has been held, however, that
acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a
married man, with only support for the offspring
as part of the sentence. Article 176 of the Family
Code confers parental authority over illegitimate
children on the mother, and likewise provides for
their entitlement to support in conformity with
the Family Code. As such, there is no further
need for the prohibition against acknowledgment
of the offspring by an offender who is married
which would vest parental authority in him.
Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offender in a rape case who is married
can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim
and support the offspring, if there be any. In the
instant case, the accused should also be ordered
to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen
Nieto,with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of
Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount and
terms thereof to be determined by the trial court
only after due notice and hearing.

April 10, 2018 – Article 346 – LIABILITY OF

ASCENDANTS, GUARDIANS, TEACHERS, OR
OTHER PERSONS ENTRUSTED WITH THE
CUSTODY OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.

[NO CASE FOUND]

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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

TITLE TWELVE – CRIMES AGAINST THE
CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
April 11, 2018 – Article 347 – SIMULATION OF
BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR
ANOTHER, AND CONCEALMENT OR
ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P
G.R. NO. 9279
MARCH 25, 1915
U.S. VS. CAPILLO, ET AL.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Capillo is guilty of concealment
or abandonment of a legitimate child
FACTS:
That on or about the 12th day of August, 1913,
in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
defendants Saturnino Capillo and Petrona
Paduga, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously expose a
child, 1 month old, the legitimate son of the
accused Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta
Umanbang to lose his civil status in the following
manner to wit: That the defendant Saturnino
Capillo, with intent to cause his legitimate child
to lose his civil status and in cooperation with
the defendant Petrona Paduga, took the said
child without the permission of his mother
Vicenta Umanbang or the authority of the courts
of this city and agreed with one Chua Pue Tee to
deliver to him the said child and never to claim it
again, asking the said Chua Pue Tee at the same
time to lend them the sum of P150 to defray the
expenses incurred by the defendant Saturnino
Capillo during the last sickness and death of his
wife Vicenta Umanbang, and received from said
Chua Pue Tee the sum of P106 of which P50
corresponded to the defendant Saturnino Capillo
and P56 to defendant Petrona Paduga. That the
living of said child under such circumstances in
the possession of said Chua Pue Tee and his wife
Sio Suat King exposes said child to lose his civil
status, to wit, that of the legitimate son of the
said defendant Saturnino Capillo and his wife
Vicenta Umanbang to that of an unknown and
nameless child or at the most to that of the child
of one Chua Pue Tee and his wife.
HELD:
Yes. The exposition which is caused by
abandoning a new-born child in a place where it
cannot be easily assisted, intending that it
should perish and save the honor of the mother,
is a crime against life. The exposition of a child
and the abandonment thereof in a place where it
may not be in danger may be a crime against the
safety of persons. Only that which has for its
purpose the deprivation of the new-born child’s
civil status is what constitutes the present crime.
In order that it may be so, it is necessary
therefore that the acts committed by the guilty
party plainly show his intent. The fact that one
abandons, in the midst of a lonely forest, an
unfortunate child that needs all kinds of
assistance during the first moments of coming
into the world cannot be admitted as intent to
destroy its civil status, but as an attempt against
its life. On the contrary, he who places at the
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door of a charitable person, a new-born child
which is in condition to stand the first
inclemencies of the weather, is supposed to do it
in order that it may be taken up and protected,
and therefore the legal presumption must be that
he does not act with any other purpose than to
cause the loss of any trace as to the filiation of
the child. Finally, the same penalty is imposed
upon anyone who conceals or exposes a
legitimate child with the intention of making him
lose his civil status. It must be remembered that
by the word child must be understood a fully
developed and living being, as the child born not
capable of living has no status, nor can he
transmit any rights whatever. It is, therefore, an
essential condition of this crime, that the child
who has been exposed or concealed shall have
been born alive.
April 11, 2018 – Article 348 – USURPATION OF
CIVIL STATUS
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 11, 2018 – Article 349 – BIGAMY
RIVERA, Marynit P.
G.R. No. 200233
JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLEOF THE
PHILIPPINES
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be charged
with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC
FACTS:
The prosecution adduced evidence that Nicanor
Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry
him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow
then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite
the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-
law that if she wanted to remarry, she should
choose someone who was "without
responsibility."
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that
she could not be included as an accused in the
crime of bigamy, because she had been under
the belief that Santos was still single when they
got married.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal
case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on
which occasions the former introduced herself as
the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only
in August and September 1997, or after she had
already married Santos.
HELD:
Yes.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, this Court enumerated
the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the
offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c)
that he contracts a second or subsequent

marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of
the first marriage.
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-
accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.
instructs that she should have had knowledge of
the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing
prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which
makes her responsible as an accomplice.
In the present case, there was a clear showing
that she knew of the first marriage as shown by
the totality of the following circumstances: (1)
when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner
in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed
their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for
a learned person like petitioner to not know of
his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the
more credible witness compared with petitioner
who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already
told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos. Given that petitioner
knew of the first marriage, the petitioner was
validly charged with bigamy.
G.R. No. 188775
August 24, 2011
CENON R. TEVES vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. BONGALON
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be charged
with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC
FACTS:
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was
solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and
Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the
marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would
only come home to the Philippines for vacations.
While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed
that her husband had contracted marriage with
a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify the
information, she went to the National Statistics
Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of
Marriage indicating that her husband and Edita
contracted marriage on 10 December 2001. On
13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of
Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner of
committing bigamy. Petitioner was charged on 8
June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
During the pendency of the criminal case for
bigamy, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision dated 4 May 2006 declaring the
marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void
on the ground that Thelma is physically
incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Refusing to accept such verdict,
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petitioner appealed the decision before the Court
of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred
in not ruling that his criminal action or liability
had already been extinguished. Petitioner claims
that since his previous marriage was declared
null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at
all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of."
HELD:
Yes.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.
The instant case has all the elements of the crime
of bigamy. Petitioner was legally married to
Thelma. He contracted a second or subsequent
marriage with Edita. At the time of his second
marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma
was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality
of the decision declaring the nullity of his first
marriage with Thelma was only about five (5)
years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally,
the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner
with Edita has all the essential requisites for
validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the
validity of such subsequent marriage. Thus, it is
evident therefore that petitioner has committed
the crime charged.
April 12, 2018 – Article 350 – MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF
LAWS
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 12, 2018 – Article 351 – PREMATURE
MARRIAGES
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10655 on
March 13, 2015
and DECRIMINILIZED the crime of PREMATURE
MARRIAGES
April 12, 2018 – Article 352 – PERFORMANCE
OF ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
RENE RONULO, vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014
FACTS:
The presented evidence showed that Joey
Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta.
Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding,
the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza,
refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning
that the couple failed to secure a marriage
license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then
dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a
wedding gown, together with their parents,

sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a
ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they
had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled
a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the
groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited
guests.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to
the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary
Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while
Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk
down the aisle.
She also saw the couple exchange their wedding
rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. She
heard the petitioner instructing the principal
sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch
and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there.
She also identified the wedding invitation given
to her by Joey.
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified
that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband
and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no
marriage license was issued to the couple.
The petitioner, while admitting that he
conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of
blessing the couple was tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated
by law.
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation
of Article 352 of the RPC.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
WON Ronulo is guilty of violation of Art, 352 of
the RPC
HELD:
Yes
The elements of the crime punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony.
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer
(2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony.
In the present case, the RONULO admitted that
he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence,
the only issue to be resolved is whether the
alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount
to the performance of an "illegal marriage
ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352
of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does
not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and
what constitutes its "illegal" performance,
Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear
on these matters. These provisions were taken
from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage
Law with no substantial amendments.
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "no
prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting
parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife."
Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the
Family Code and particularly defines a marriage
ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law
are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage –
Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the
Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the
authorization in force when called upon to do so
by the parties or parents, grandparents,
guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any
church, religion or sect the regulations and
practices whereof require banns or publications
previous to the solemnization of a marriage in
accordance with section ten, who authorized the
immediate solemnization of a marriage that is
subsequently declared illegal; or any officer,
priest or minister solemnizing marriage in
violation of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor
more than two years, or by a fine of not less than
two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand
pesos.
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage

Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation

of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we
find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is
that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No.

3613 do not include the present case. As
correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was
not found violating the provisions of the Marriage
Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It
is only the imposition of the penalty for the
violation of this provision which is referred to the
Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls
squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act
No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any
violation of the regulations to be promulgated by
the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage
Law, is one of such regulations.

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Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

TITLE THIRTEEN – CRIMES AGAINST
HONOR
April 13, 2018 – Article 353 – DEFINITION OF
LIBEL
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
G.R. No. L-47971 October 31, 1990
LOPE O. DAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of libel
under Article 353
FACTS:
Appellant Lope Daez was the chairman of the
Liberal Party in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and in
that capacity helped the complainant Celso
Legaspi campaign for the position of Mayor of
that town. When Legaspi was already serving as
Mayor of Meycauayan, he often received
recommendations from appellant regarding the
employment of certain persons in the police or
other departments of the municipality. In 1972,
appellant recommended a certain Villareal for
the position of policeman and a certain Rubio for
that of performance officer. However, Legaspi
failed to appoint these persons. This omission of
Legaspi as well as the prejudice which his
subsequent renovation of the public market
caused appellant's relatives resulted in
appellant's resentment of him.
On April 19,1972, while Legaspi was on leave as
mayor, appellant wrote the then acting mayor,
Vicente Barazon stating:
"Sala-ula at bulok ang iyong pangasiwaan, ang
iyong polisia ay tinuruan mong maging collector
mo ng tong, ang daan libong pisong buwis ay
ayaw mong ipakolekta sa Ingat Yaman Bayan,
ang tanong ng bayan, kangino napupunta ang
daan libong buwis na ito? At mabuti na lamang
kung hindi mahalungkat sa fael ng army ang
Salaysay laban sa iyo nuong ikaw ay hulihin ng
7th BCT. Kaya mag-ingat ka Alkalde sapagkat
hindi mabilang ang iyong atraso. Ang bahay mo
ay nakatayo sa buhangin, mabuay at sa
bahagyang ihip ng hangin ay babagsak."
Thus causing to the complaining witness Celso
R. Legaspi dishonor, discredit and contempt to
his damage and prejudice.
Trial Court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty. Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision.
RULING:
Yes.
The elements of libel are: 1) The imputation of a
discreditable act or condition to another; 2)
publication of the imputation; 3) Identity of the
person defamed; and 4) existence of malice.
There is no doubt as to the presence of the first
three elements in the instant case. A simple
perusal of the letter will show the injurious
nature of the imputations made to the
complainant mayor. The charges in the disputed
letter against the mayor that the latter was guilty
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of misconduct in public office, bribery,
malversation of public funds, graft and
corruption, if true, would constitute actual
crimes punishable under the Penal Code or
special laws. The gravity of the imputations are
sufficient to impeach the complainant's honesty,
virtue, integrity and reputation as a public
official.
The matter of publication was also proven on the
basis of evidence on record as found both by the
appellate court and the trial court. As indicated
in the letter, copies thereof were distributed in
the municipal court and municipal council of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and chief of police in that
place. Several witnesses testified as to having
read the libelous letter. Further, evidence shows
that petitioner even read the questioned letter
before a gathering at a local party meeting
wherein the complainant was present.
Anent the last element of malice, the law
presumes that every defamatory imputation is
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in cases concerning privileged
communications (Article 354, Revised Penal
Code). Hence, the burden of proving justifiable
motive is upon the author of the libel.
As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to
make a complaint of any misconduct on the part
of public officials, which comes to his notice, to
those charged with supervision over them. Such
a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the
author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege,
however, imposes an additional requirement.
Such complaints should be addressed solely to
some official having jurisdiction to inquire into
the charges, or power to redress the grievance or
has some duty to perform or interest in
connection therewith (US v. Galeza, 31 Phil.
365). In the instant case, none of the persons to
whom the letter was sent, was vested with the
power of supervision over the mayor or the
authority to investigate the charges made
against the latter.
OGIE DIAZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 159787, MAY 25,
2007
ISSUE:
Whether the subject article is libelous.
FACTS:
On or about December 28, 1991, the accused
being then the Managing Editor and writer,
respectively of Bandera, a newspaper of general
circulation written, published or caused to be
published in the movie section of said newspaper
an article. In which words and phrases, which
were used by many people, the said accused
meant and intended to convey as in fact, they
meant and conveyed false and malicious
imputations that the said Florinda Bagay is a
sexual pervert and possesses lascivious and
immoral habits, the accused well knowing that
said imputations are devoid of truth and without
foundation in fact whatsoever, highly libelous
and offensive to the good name, character, and
reputation of the said Florinda Bagay.
Florinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified
that she is a graduate of medical secretarial

course. She tried her luck in the movies under
the guidance of her godmother, Mila Parawan, a
writer covering the entertainment industry.
Florinda adopted and used "Patricia Santillan" as
her screen name.
Florinda claimed she was the "Miss S" alluded to
in petitioner’s column "Pakurot" considering that
her screen name is "Patricia Santillan."
Mila Parawan also took the witness stand and
corroborated Florinda’s testimony. She further
testified that after Philip and Florinda parted
ways, her former press relations officer, who
used the nom de plume "Isko Peta," wrote an
item entitled "Ibinulgar namin ang babaeng
inanakan ni Philip Henson" which appeared in
the December 2, 1991 issue of Artista Magazine.
Philip believed that Florinda released their story
to the press. He then caused the publication of
the libelous article against her.
Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a
well respected family in their community. Thus,
she could not have done the acts being imputed
to her.
On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she
was certain the "Miss S" referred to in the article
is Florinda because petitioner and Pichel, her
good friends, told her that "Miss S" is her "alaga"
(ward).
Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote
the column "Pakurot" where the alleged libelous
statements appeared, however, he did not know
the complaining witness or "Miss S." The source
of his article was Philip Henson.
RULING:
NO.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must
be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable. Absent one of these elements, a case
for libel will not prosper.
We find the first element present. In determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and
should be taken in their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by the persons reading them, unless
it appears that they were used and understood
in another sense.
In the instant case, the article in question details
the sexual activities of a certain "Miss S" and one
"Philip Henson" who had a romantic liaison. In
their ordinary sense, the words used cast
aspersion upon the character, integrity, and
reputation of "Miss S." The words convey that
"Miss S" is a sexual libertine with unusually
wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society
such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized
among young ladies, the behavior attributed to
"Miss S" by the article in question had
besmirched both her character and reputation.
As to the element of malice, we find that since on
its face the article is defamatory, there is a
presumption that the offender acted with malice.
In Article 354 of the same Code, every
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
There is malice when the author of the
imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the person who
claims to have been defamed. (Alonzo v. Court of
Appeals, supra.). We agree with the Court of
Appeals that there was neither good reason nor
motive why the subject article was written except
to embarrass "Miss S" and injure her reputation.
On the element of publication, there can be no
question that the article appeared in the
December 28, 1991 issue ofBandera, a local
tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim is
identified or identifiable from the contents of the
libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit,
it is essential that the victim be identifiable,
although it is not necessary that the person be
named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication
contains matters of description or reference to
facts and circumstances from which others
reading the article may know the person alluded
to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous
circumstances so that those knowing such
person could and did understand that he was the
person referred to.
Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid
the rule that this requirement is complied with
where a third person recognized or could identify
the party vilified in the article.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S,"
does not give a sufficient description or other
indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the
article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda
Bagay are one and the same person.
Although the article is libelous, we find that
Florinda Bagay could not have been the person
defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen,7
we held that where the requirement for an
identified or identifiable victim has not been
complied with, the case for libel must be
dismissed.
April 13, 2018 – Article 355 – LIBEL MEANS BY
WRITINGS OR SIMILAR MEANS
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
G.R. No. 159787
MAY 25, 2007
OGIE DIAZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject article is libelous.
FACTS:
Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz, Managing Editor
and writer, respectively for Bandera, were
accused of conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, with the
malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity,
honor and reputation of one Florinda Bagay. The
accused were alleged to feloniously wrote and
published an article about the sexual activities of
certain “Miss S” and Philip Henson, in which
through the words and phrases used in the
article meant and conveyed malicious

imputation that this “Miss S” is a sexual pervert
and possesses lascivious and immoral habits.
Florinda Bagay, who happened to use “Patricia
Santillan” as her screen name, claims that she
was this “Miss S” being referred to in the said
article.
HELD:
For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; © it must
be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable. 2 Absent one of these elements, a
case for libel will not prosper.
In the case at bar, it may be find that the first
element present. In determining whether a
statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be
taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood
by the persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another
sense. In the instant case, the article in question
details the sexual activities of a certain “Miss S”
and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic
liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used
cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and
reputation of “Miss S.” The words convey that
“Miss S” is a sexual libertine with unusually
wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society
such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized
among young ladies, the behavior attributed to
“Miss S” by the article in question had
besmirched both her character and reputation.
As to the element of malice, since on its face the
article is defamatory, there is a presumption that
the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of
the same Code, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown. There is malice when the author of
the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the person who
claims to have been defamed. There was neither
good reason nor motive why the subject article
was written except to embarrass “Miss S” and
injure her reputation.
The last element of libel is that the victim is
identified or identifiable from the contents of the
libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit,
it is essential that the victim be identifiable,
although it is not necessary that the person be
named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication
contains matters of description or reference to
facts and circumstances from which others
reading the article may know the person alluded
to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous
circumstances so that those knowing such
person could and did understand that he was the
person referred to.
The libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,”
does not give a sufficient description or other
indications which identify “Miss S.” In short, the
article fails to show that “Miss S” and Florinda
Bagay are one and the same person.
Although the article is libelous, Florinda Bagay
could not have been the person defamed therein.
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, where the
requirement for an identified or identifiable
victim has not been complied with, the case for
libel must be dismissed.
April 14, 2018 – Article 356 – THREATENING
TO PUBLISH AND OFFER TO PRESENT SUCH
PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
UNITED STATES VS EGUIA
38 PHIL 857
FACTS:
Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano,
conspiring and confederating with each other,
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally threatened
one Maria S. Tuason to publish in The
Independent, a weekly newspaper edited and
published in the said city of Manila, a libel
consisting of certain letters which, according to
the said defendants, would expose the name of
said Maria S. Tuason to public contempt, the
said defendants promising at the same time,
moved by a desire to gain, to prevent the
publication of said letters in the above-
mentioned newspaper, should the
aforementioned Maria S. Tuason agree to pay
them the sum of P4,000, Philippine currency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of threats
to publish libel.
RULING:
YES.
Section 10 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) is as
follows:
"Every person who threatens another to publish
a libel concerning him, or any parent, husband,
wife, or child of such person, or any member of
his family, and every person who offers to
prevent the publication of any libel upon another
person, with intent to extort any money or other
valuable consideration from any person, shall be
punished by a fine of not exceeding one
thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not
exceeding six months, or both."
In common parlance, blackmail and extortion
are synonimous, although the latter term may
have the wider signification. Blackmail, in its
metaphorical sense, may be defined as any
unlawful extortion of money by an appeal to the
fears of the victim, especially extortion of money
by threats of accusation or exposure. Two words
are expressive of the crime hush money. The
gravamen of the offense is the intent to extort
money or other thing of value. The extortion is
committed by obtaining property from another
without his consent, induced by wrongful use of
fear. The end is the same as in crimes against
property, but the means employed are different.
Indeed, certain classes of threatening letters
have been held in the United States when
followed by extortion to constitute robbery.
The circumstances of this case are such that
they lead to the irresistible conclusion that Eguia
was the prime mover in this nefarious scheme.
The only reasonable deduction is that he took the
letters from the post office box of Mrs. Tuason.
He was the only person who had possession of
the key to the box. He knew that Mrs. Tuason
was writing to Dr. Harmer. Not all the letters

found in the possession of Lozano were from Mrs.
Tuason but all had been addressed to Dr.
Harmer. The post office box used by Mrs. Tuason
was in the name of Dr. Harmer and so if any mail
was returned to Manila with his name on it, it
would be put in this box. The night on which the
letters were delivered, Lozano went in the
direction of Eguia's house to get the letters.
Eguia composed the note that fixed the price for
the letters at P8,000. He entered into and agreed
to the plot made up by Villaba. He introduced
Villaba to Lozano. Though Eguia never appeared
in the open he was always lurking in the
background.
Defendants attack the evidence from two
directions. They contend, in the first place, that
the court erred in taking into consideration
against each appellant evidence presented at the
trial of the other defendant. While the court
rendered but one judgment, it is nevertheless
true that practically the same facts were adduced
in the two trials. Each defendant, moreover,
endeavors to shield himself behind the acts of his
codefendant. Of course, such a contention
cannot be permitted to avail for a moment, where
the proof shows that both defendants are
inculpated.
We hold that Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian
Lozano have been proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt
April 14, 2018 – Article 357– PROHIBITED
PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN
THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 14, 2018 – Article 358 – SLANDER
Alameda Jr., Manuel F.
VILLANUEVA VS PEOPLE
APRIL 10, 2006
G.R. NO. 160351
FACTS:
The Councilor and Vice-Mayor of a town, both
holders of exalted government positions, became
slaves to their human limitations and engaged in
a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they
were ordinary men in the streets. A moment of
unguarded emotional outburst lead to the long-
drawn out twists and turns of this case, which
should have been avoided if only they have
imbedded in their complex emotions, habits and
convictions that consciousness to regulate these
deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either
to their own detriment or to that of the public
they serve. This is the high price they have to pay
as occupants of their exalted positions.
On September 12, 1994 around four thirty (4:30
P.M.) in the afternoon, more or less, at the
Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, where
public authorities are engaged in the discharge
of their duties, and in the presence of several
persons, the accused Noel L. Villanueva while in
the process of hurling verbal insults at the
complainant, then and there unlawfully,
feloniously and contemptuously gave the
complainant what is commonly known as "dirty
finger" by poking his hand at complainant's face
with the middle finger extended and the rest of
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his fingers half-closed, an act tending to cause
dishonor, discredit and contempt on the
complainant and causing her mental anguish,
wounded feelings and moral suffering for which
she is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
in an amount to be determined by the honorable
court. Contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners act of poking a dirty
finger at complainant constitutes grave slander
by deed
HELD:
Yes, but only simple slander by deed.
Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which
is committed by performing any act, which casts
dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another
person. The elements are (1) that the offender
performs any act not included in any other crime
against honor, (2) that such act is performed in
the presence of other person or persons, and (3)
that such act casts dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon the offended party. Whether a
certain slanderous act constitutes slander by
deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the
social standing of the offended party, the
circumstances under which the act was
committed, the occasion, etc.[32] It is libel
committed by actions rather than words. The
most common examples are slapping someone or
spitting on his/her face in front of the public
market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting
dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the
person of another.
Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the
phrase Fuck You, which is similar to the
expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local
parlance. Such expression was not held to be
libelous in Reyes v. People,[38] where the Court
said that: This is a common enough expression
in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its
literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection
on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and
in light of the fact that there was a perceived
provocation coming from complainant,
petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at
complainant constitutes simple slander by deed,
it appearing from the factual milieu of the case
that the act complained of was employed by
petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at
complainant for procrastinating the approval of
his leave monetization. While it may have cast
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon
complainant, said act is not of a serious nature,
thus, the penalty shall be arresto menor
meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days
or a fine not exceeding P200.00.
PEOPLE VS PADER
G.R. NO. 139157
8 FEBRUARY 2000
FACTS:
Atty. Benjamin Escolango (ESCOLANGO) was a
candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in
the 8 May 1995 Elections. Escolango and Pader
were neighbors. On the evening of 20 Apr 1995,
Pader was drunk. Pader was angry at Escolango
because of something that Escolango had done
when Pader’s father had died. On 20 Apr 1995,

Escolango was conversing with his political
leaders at the terrace of his house. Rogelio Pader
(PADER) a political opponent of Escolango
suddenly appeared at the gate and shouted
“putang ina mo Atty. Escolango.
Napakawalanghiya mo!”
ISSUE:
Was Pader guilty of slight oral defamation, or of
serious oral defamation.
HELD:
The defamatory words only amounted to SLIGHT
ORAL DEFAMATION. DOCTRINE:
Defamatory words will fall under slight or serious
oral defamation, depending not only upon their
sense, grammatical significance, and accepted
ordinary meaning judging them separately, but
also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended
party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.
“Putang ina mo” is a common enough utterance
in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an
expletive that punctuates one’s expression of
profanity.
DE LEON VS PEOPLE
JAN 11, 2016
GR NO. 212623
FACTS:
The said accused, with the deliberate intent to
besmirch the honor and reputation of one SPO3
PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously publicly proffer against
the latter slanderous words and expressions
such as "WALANGHIYA KANG
MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG
YABANG MO NOON. PATAY KA SA AKIN
MAMAYA [,]" and other words and expressions of
similar import, thereby bringing the said SPO3
PEDRITO L. LEONARDO into public contempt,
discredit and ridicule.
Version of the Prosecution:
The first hearing was scheduled on April 17,
2006 at the PLEB office on the 5th Floor of the
Manila City Hall; At around 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, while waiting outside the PLEB office
on the 5th floor of the Manila City Hall, SPO3
Leonardo noticed De Leon and several of his
companions approaching. Before entering the
PLEB office, De Leon uttered these words to
SPO3 Leonardo, "Walanghiya kang
mangongotong na pulis ka, ang yabang yabang
mo noon. Patay ka sa akin ngayon."
The words uttered by De Leon caused SPO3
Leonardo embarrassment because there were
several persons present at the PLEB premises.
He could have arrested De Leon but he did not
want to make a scene. Afterwards, De Leon's
wife, Concepcion, emerged from the said office
and apologized to Leonardo for her husband's
actuations. SPO3 Leonardo calmly proceeded to
the Special Operations Group of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) located at the Manila City
Hall to have the incident entered in its blotter.
On the same day, SPO3 Leonardo filed his
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complaint at the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) together with Principe.
Version of the Defense
Prior incident,when De Leon, with his son John,
while having breakfast with their fellow joggers
at the Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban
Station, were approached by SPO3 Leonardo who
arrived on his scooter. With his gun drawn, SPO3
Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at a
distance of two meters, more or less, he said,
"Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy, referring
to De Leon." He pressed the trigger but the gun
did not fire, when he was to strike again, De Leon
was able to escape with the help of John.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of slander tenable in
this case.
HELD:
The crime committed is only Slight Oral
Defamation. Oral Defamation or Slander is libel
committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in
writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice
another in his reputation, office, trade, business
or means of livelihood."[35] The elements of oral
defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, status or
circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4)
and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or
juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which
tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt
of the person defamed. Oral defamation may
either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when
it is of a serious and insulting nature.An
allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes
to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary
or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or
discredit or put him in contempt or which tends
to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To
determine whether a statement is defamatory,
the words used in the statement must be
construed in their entirety and should be taken
in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as
they would naturally be understood by persons
reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense. It must
be stressed that words which are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander
per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for
an action for defamation in the absence of an
allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not
make it actionable by itself. In this case, the
Court agrees that the words uttered by De Leon
were defamatory in nature. It is, however, of the
view that the same only constituted simple oral
defamation. Whether the offense committed is
serious or slight oral defamation, depends not
only upon the sense and grammatical meaning
of the utterances but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, like the social
standing or the advanced age of the offended
party. "The gravity depends upon: (1) the
expressions used; (2) the personal relations of

the accused and the offended party; and (3) the
special circumstances of the case, the
antecedents or relationship between the offended
party and the offender, which may tend to prove
the intention of the offender at the time. In
particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory
words in the heat of anger, with some
provocation on the part of the offended party
constitutes only a light felony."
VICTORIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NOS. L-32836-37
MAY 3, 1989
FACTS:
Appellant-petitioner called Atty. Ruiz,
"estapador", which attributes to the latter the
crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation. Appellant-petitioner imputed the
crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-
time Justice of the Peace and member of the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of
law and for sometime a president of the Nueva
Ecija Bar Association.
ISSUE:
whether or not the defamatory words constitute
serious oral defamation or simply slight oral
defamation.
HELD:
The term oral defamation or slander as now
understood, has been defined as the speaking of
base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39).
Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the
demarcation line, between serious and slight oral
defamations, as follows: " Oral defamation shall
be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature,
otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or
a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People,
18 SCRA 280 [1966]). The scurrilous words
imputed to the offended party the crime estafa.
The language of the indictment strikes deep into
the character of the victim; He 'has sold the
union; he 'has swindled the money of the
vendees; he 'received bribe money in the amount
of P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is
engaged in racketeering and enriching himself
with the capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of
the union for his personal use.'
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed
the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer
one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of
law and for sometime a president of the Nueva
Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous
imputation strikes deep into the character of the
victim, no special circumstance need be shown
for the defamatory words uttered to be
considered grave oral defamation
US vs. TOLOSA
G.R. No. L-12696
November 19, 1917
FACTS:
The two families were living in houses about 15
meters apart. They had several altercations. The
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defendant was described as having the natural
temperament, vehemence of expression, and
other peculiar characteristics which indicates
the kind of a woman that would stir up
disturbances with the least provocation or
whenever she feels offended.
As a result, the defendant hurled at the
complainant offensive and scurrilous epithets,
including words imputing unchastity to the
mother and tending to injure the characters of
her daughters.
ISSUE:
WON the oral words imputing unchastity to a
woman were actionable without proof of special
damage.
HELD:
Yes. The words of the defendant were uttered
with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin
her reputation, and to hold her in public
contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will
thus seek to impute vice or immorality to
another, the consequences of which might
gravely prejudice the reputation of the person
insulted, in this instance, apparently an
honorable and respectable lady and her young
daughters, all prominent in social circles,
deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is
time for the courts to put the stamp of their
disapproval on this practice of the vile and loud
slander, which so debauches and degrades
womanhood. Shrews must be tamed in the
modern Philippines.
PEOPLE VS ATIENZA
OCTOBER 26, 1968
G.R. NO. L-19857
FACTS:
Damaso Atienza, was charged with grave oral
defamation in the said Court upon a sworn
complaint signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee.
The defamatory word allegedly uttered by the
defendant were: "Pauli na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka
puta kat bilaw." The translation given in the
complaint itself is: "Go home, you prostitute. Yes,
you are a prostitute, really a prostitute." Damaso
Atienza, was charged with grave oral defamation
in the said Court upon a sworn complaint signed
by the offended party, Pilar Lee. The defamatory
word allegedly uttered by the defendant were:
"Pauli na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka puta kat bilaw."
The translation given in the complaint itself is:
"Go home, you prostitute. Yes, you are a
prostitute, really a prostitute."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the word "puta" connotes
prostitution thus defamatory.
HELD:
The word "puta" alleged to have been uttered by
the defendant in referring to the offended party
does not necessarily connote the crime of
prostitution as defined in Article 202 of the
Revised Penal Code.
REYES VS PEOPLE
G.R. NOS. L-21528 & L- 21529
MARCH 28, 1969

FACTS:
Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of
the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City,
whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961.
In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group
of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration
staged in front of the main gate of the United
States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They
carried placards bearing statements such as,
"Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con
Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;"
"Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan
for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin,
dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and
others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister,
called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine
Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in
charge of preserving harmonious relations
between personnel of the naval station and the
civilian population of Cavite City. The three jeeps
carrying the demonstrators parked in front of
Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice
Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself
at the gate, and with his right hand inside his
pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he
shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka,
papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep
and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and
the other demonstrators, stayed inside the
house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the words "putang ina mo
constitute oral defamation.
HELD:
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the
utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina
mo". This is a common enough expression in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its
literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection
on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it
should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by
appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to
make the same more emphatic. On the basis of
the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged
on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and
grave oral defamation, respectively
BALITE VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-21475
SEPTEMBER 30, 1966
FACTS:
The Democratic Labor Association declared a
strike against the Cebu Stevedoring Company. A
copra exporter affected by the strike offered the
union president Mercader P10,000 as aid to the
union and presumably to pave the way for the
amicable settlement. At first, it was decided that
the amount be distributed amongst all the
members. However, at a subsequent meeting
Balite proposed that the amount should be given
solely to the officers. Passions seemed to have
run so high that Balite walked out of the meeting,
threatened to destroy the union and to expose
president and pursued a smear campaign
against Mercader.
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Subsequently, Balite met with the Marine
Officers Guild and engaged in conversation with
Marine Officer Canlas, while the latter’s
companions gathered around and within hearing
distance of the two. Balite then uttered the
words, as already translated –
"Mr. Mercader sold the Union. The money of the
Union was swindled in the strike staged by the
Democratic Labor Association against the Cebu
Stevedoring Company. Atty. Mercader received
bribe money in the sum of P10,000.00 from the
copra exporter Richard Corominas & Co. and
another P6,000.00 from the Cebu Stevedoring
Company/ Atty. Mercader is engaged in
racketeering and that he is enriching himself
with the capitalists. The money of the Union was
spent by him to his own personal benefit".
At the time of the incident, Mercader was legal
counsel of the Marine Officers Guild. The
imputation apparently affected the guild's feeling
and attitude towards Atty. Mercader. For,
subsequently, he was eased out as the guild's
legal counsel.
Mercader filed a complaint for grave oral
defamation against Balite.
Balite pleads prescription as it was merely one
for slight oral defamation which lapses in two
months.
ISSUE:
WON there is slight oral defamation.
HELD:
No. Rather there is grave oral defamation.
The scurrilous words impute to the offended
party the crime of estafa. The language of the
indictment strikes deep into the character of the
victim:
• He "has sold the union"
• He "has swindled the money of the members"
• He "received bribe money in the amount of
P10,000.00 . . . and another P6,000.00"
• He "is engaged in racketeering and enriching
himself with the capitalists"
• He "has spent the funds of the union for his
personal use."
No amount of sophistry will take these
statements out of the compass of grave oral
defamation. They are serious and insulting. No
circumstances need be shown to upgrade the
slander. And, no circumstances were alleged in
the complaint.
Balite wanted the union officers to pocket the
amount. He was frustrated in his wish. Then he
conducted a smear campaign against the union
president. For these, he was expelled from the
union. Long after, came the meeting with the
officers of the Marine Officers Guild. There, in
cool and forceful deliberation, he let go the
slanderous statements— in the absence of
Mercader. This time, he had his way. Mercader
was eased out as legal counsel of the Marine
Officers Guild. The People has thus clinched a
case for grave oral defamation.

CRUZ VS CA
G.R. NOS. L-56224-26
NOVEMBER 25, 1982
FACTS:
Purisima Gestoso Cruz, and Santiago Gayomali
were next-door neighbors, being residents of
houses standing on adjacent lots at Rizal Street,
Guimbal, Iloilo. At about 9:00 a.m. on August 5,
1976, while Severina Gayomali, wife of Santiago
Gayomali, was at the ground floor of their house
at Rizal, Street, Guimbal, Iloilo (which ground
floor was also used as a store) she saw petitioner
and heard her utter the following words from a
distance of about five meters:
... Usurper of land. They are shameless. They go
to church but they are shameless; they steal the
land of others. They ride in an automobile and
when they walk on the road they are as if
somebody but they are shameless. The land in
Igcocolo would better be surveyed and given to
Santiago Gayomali'.
The next day Santiago Gayomali was at the store
at the ground floor of his residence at Rizal
Street, Guimbal, Iloilo. With him were his wife,
Severina, and their maid. At that time, petitioner,
who stood on the boundary of the lot of her
mother and that of Santiago Gayomali, and while
facing the store of the latter from a distance of
about five meters, uttered the following words:
... Judge who is a thief. Santiago is a land
usurper. Che. Punyeta, a lawyer who is a thief.
Thunder, if I only know that to be a lawyer is a
good course, I would have taken it. Because if
you are an attorney, you just have the land of
others surveyed, it becomes yours, the genital
organ of Severina is dilated in smile and the
penis of Santiago is in erection in stealing the
land of others', and other similar words of
import.
ISSUE:
whether or not the abusive remarks be
considered as serious oral defamation.
HELD:
Although uttered on three different occasions;
they originated from the same anticedents, and
were fomonted by the same basic dispute.
Fanning fire to the situation was a feeling of
desperation and anxiety, over the final
consequences because of the position. and
alleged influence of complainant Judge
Gayomali..Although the abusive remarks may
ordinarily be considered as serious defamation,
under the environmental circumstances of the
case, there having been provocation on
complainant's part, and the utterances
complained of having been made in the heat of
unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is
liable only for the crime of Slight Oral
Defamation. Article 358 of the Revised Penal
Code penalizes Slight Oral Defamation with
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00.
April 14, 2018 – Article 359 – SLANDER BY
DEED
ALILIAN, Enna B.
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June 28, 2017
G.R. No. 223844
DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D.
SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA
FACTS:
Claiming that the statements in the blotter
entries were completely false and were made to
dishonor and discredit him, Cariaga filed a
complaint against respondents for in their
respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and
Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan,
Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries in the
barangay blotter.
ISSUE:
WoN respondents were liable under Art 359 rpc
HELD:
No. The questioned blotter entries were all made
in good faith and merely for recording purposes;
done in the performance of respondents' official
duties; and based on personal knowledge of what
actually transpired.
November 13, 1934
G.R. No. L-41757
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs. ANTONIO NOSCE
FACTS:
Antonio Nosce slapped the Reverend Father Ulric
Arcand, a catholic priest, before a large
congregation.
ISSUE:
WoN appellant was liable under Art 259 RPC
HELD:
Yes. The offended party is invested with
sacerdotal dignity in his religion and was
officiating as such priest during solemn religious
ceremonies before a large congregation. There
certainly could have been no other
circumstances under which greater dishonor,
discredit and contempt could be cast upon him
before the faithful over whom he held so high a
dignity.
April 14, 2018 – Article 360 – PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR LIBEL
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
BONIFACIO ET AL VS RTC OF MAKATI AND
JESSIE JOHN GIMENEZ
G.R. NO. 184800, Marh 5, 2010
Ponente: Justice Carpio Morales
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offended party can file the
criminal case for libel in the place where he
gained access to the libelous article published
over the Internet.
FACTS:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the
crime of libel after private respondent Gimenez,
on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan
Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint before
the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article
355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The complaint alleged that petitioners, together
with several John Does, publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue,
honor and integrity, character and reputation of
Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco
family for exposing them to public hatred and
contempt, and published in the said website
(http://www.pepcoalition.com) a defamatory
article persuading the public to remove their
investments and policies from the said company.
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of
Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it
failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the
acts complained of in the Information are not
punishable by law since internet libel is not
covered by Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners
maintained that the Information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed
and first published or that the offended parties
resided in Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and first
published, and the prosecution erroneously laid
the venue of the case in the place where the
offended party accessed the internet-published
article. Since the article was first published and
accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to
Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.
HELD:
No. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions
such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the
action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.
Art. 360 of the RPC provides:
“Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause
the publication or exhibition of any defamation
in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
xxxx
The criminal action and civil action for damages
in cases of written defamations, as provided for
in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the RTC of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense. xxxx”
That venue of libel cases where the complainant
is a private individual is limited only to:
1. Where the complainant actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense; or
2. Where the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was
printed and first published was used as basis for
the venue of the action, the Information must
allege with particularity where the defamatory
article was printed and first published. The same
measures cannot be reasonably expected when it
pertains to defamatory material appearing on a
website on the internet as there would be no way
of determining the point of its printing and first
publication. To give credence to Gimenez’s
argument would spawn the very ills that the
amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to
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discourage and prevent. It would do chaos
wherein website author, writer, blogger or
anyone who post messages in websites could be
sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines.
The information is quashed and the case is
dismissed.
TULFO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 161032, SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
PONENTE: JUSTICE VELASCO, JR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not lack of participation in the
preparation of libelous articles does shield the
persons from liability of libel.
FACTS:
Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs
filed and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as
author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing
editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn
Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as
president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of
the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel.
That private respondent was indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler
and having acquired his wealth illegally.
Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate,
testified that she classifies the news articles
written by the reporters, and that in the Editorial
Division, the officers are herself; Briones, her
supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as news and city editor;
and Salao as national editor. She testified that
petitioner Barlizo is her subordinate, whose
duties and responsibilities are the typesetting,
editing, and layout of the page assigned to her,
the Metro page. She further testified that she had
no participation in the writing, editing, or
publication of the column of Tulfo because the
column was not edited. She claimed that none
among her co-accused from the Remate
newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the
publication and editing of the subject articles
were the responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was
given blanket authority to write what he wanted
to write. She also testified that the page wherein
Tulfos column appeared was supervised by
Bueno as news editor.
HELD:
The Court held that the publisher could not
escape liability by claiming lack of participation
in the preparation and publication of a libelous
article.
The claim that they had no participation does not
shield them from liability. The provision in the
RPC does not provide absence of participation as
a defense, but rather plainly and specifically
states the responsibility of those involved in
publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It
is not a matter of whether or not they conspired
in preparing and publishing the subject articles,
because the law simply so states that they are
liable as they were the author. Neither the
publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for
libelous articles that appear on their paper by
simply saying they had no participation in the
preparation of the same. They cannot say that
Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate,
on which the subject articles appeared, when

they themselves clearly hold positions of
authority in the newspaper, or in the case of
Pichay, as the president in the publishing
company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable
because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a
journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply
say that they are not liable because they did not
fulfill their responsibilities as editors and
publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper,
who has active charge and control of its
management, conduct, and policy, generally is
held to be equally liable with the owner for the
publication therein of a libelous article.
On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or
manager to know and control the contents of the
paper, it is held that said person cannot evade
responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees, so that it is immaterial whether or
not the editor or manager knew the contents of
the publication.
Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author
of the subject articles, has been found guilty of
libel, so too must Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and
Pichay.
TIME, INC. VS REYES
G.R. NO. L-28882 MAY 31, 1971
PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES
ISSUE:
Whether or not, under the provisions of RA 4363
the respondent CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the civil suit for damages
arising from an allegedly libelous publication,
considering that the action was instituted by
public officers whose offices were in the City of
Manila at the time of the publication.
FACTS:
The petition alleges that petitioner Time, Inc., is
an American corporation with principal offices at
Rocketfeller Center, New York City, N. Y., and is
the publisher of "Time", a weekly news magazine;
the petition, however, does not allege the
petitioner's legal capacity to sue in the courts of
the Philippine.
In the aforesaid civil case, therein plaintiffs-
respondents Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce
Enrile seek to recover from petitioner Time, Inc.
damages upon an alleged libel arising from a
publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in
its issue of Aug. 18, 1967, of an essay, entitled
"Corruption in Asia", which talks about the
investigation of Manila mayor Antonio Villegas
due to the discovery of his excessive and
unreasonable resources. More specifically, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Time magazine
published a libelous article, publicly, falsely and
maliciously imputing to plaintiffs the
commission of the crimes of graft, corruption and
nepotism, that said publication particularly
referred to plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas as
a case in point in connection with graft,
corruption and nepotism in Asia; that said
publication without any doubt referred to co-
plaintiff Juan Ponce Enrile as the high
government official who helped under curious
circumstances plaintiff Mayor Villegas in lending
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the latter approximately P30,000.00 without
interest because he was the Mayor's compadre;
that the purpose of said Publications is to cause
the dishonor, discredit and put in public
contempt the plaintiffs. At the time of the
publication of the allegedly offending essay,
private respondents Antonio Villegas and Juan
Ponce Enrile were the Mayor Of the City of
Manila and Undersecretary of Finance and
concurrently Acting Commissioner of Customs,
respectively, with offices in the City of Manila.
On February 26, 1968, respondent court
deferred the determination of the motion to
dismiss until after trial of the case on the merits,
the court having considered that the grounds
relied upon in the motion do not appear to be
indubitable. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the deferment private respondents again
opposed. Respondent judge issued an order re-
affirming the previous order of deferment for the
reason that "the rule laid down under Republic
Act. No. 4363, amending Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions
against non-resident defendants, and because
questions involving harassment and
inconvenience, as well as disruption of public
service do not appear indubitable. ..."
Failing in its efforts to discontinue the taking of
the depositions, previously adverted to, and to
have action taken, before trial, on its motion to
dismiss, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
HELD:
The respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil
Case.
Provisions of RA No. 4363 provides that Art. 360
of the of the Revised Penal Code is further
amended to read that any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The limitation of the choices of venue, as
introduced into the Penal Code through its
amendments by Republic Act 4363, was
intended " to minimize or limit the filing of out-
of-town libel suits" to protect an alleged offender
from "hardships, inconveniences and
harassments" and, furthermore, to protect "the
interest of the public service" where one of the
offended parties is a public officer. But since the
offending publication was not printed in the
Philippines, the alternative venue was not open
to respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila and
Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were the
offended parties.
CAMPITA VS VILLANUEVA
G.R. NO. L-20228, NOVEMBER 28, 1964
PONENTE: JUSTICE CONCEPCION
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a complaint by the offended
party necessary in action for oral defamation.
2. Whether or not an action for defamation
imputes a crime which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, dismissing the petition
in the above entitled case.
In a complaint filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, the municipal mayor of
Lukban, was charged by petitioner Romana
Campita with the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
On June 7, 1962, an officer of the Constabulary,
in turn, accused petitioner of serious oral
defamation, for having allegedly made on May
27, 1962, the following defamatory statement:
"Yang si Mayor Dator ay walang hiya, bastos,
masamang tao at manggagahasa". Petitioner
moved to dismiss this complaint against her
upon the ground that the said Municipal Court
had no jurisdiction over the case, because the
aforementioned defamatory statement imputes
to Dator the crime of either rape or acts of
lasciviousness, none of which may be prosecuted
except upon complaint of the offended party,
pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code.
HELD:
1. The fourth paragraph of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code requiring the complaint in an
action for defamation imputing a private offense
to be expressly filed by the offended party,
applies not only to written but also to oral
defamation. Consequently, a complaint for oral
defamation imputing rape does not confer
jurisdiction on the lower court where it was not
expressly filed by the offended party but by a
Constabulary Officer.
2. A statement in a complaint for defamation that
the accused therein allegedly used the term
"manggagahasa" in referring to the offended
party, is held to impute a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio because the word "gahasa"
does not refer to force in general but only to force
or violence when applied to a woman for the
purpose of satisfying the lust of the actor.
The crimes which may not be prosecuted de
oficio are adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, and acts of lasciviousness (Art. 344,
Revised Penal Code).
April 16, 2018 – Article 361 – PROOF OF THE
TRUTH
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
G.R. No. L-48498 September 30, 1942
SALVADOR G. TUMANG vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Ponente: YULO, C.J.
FACTS:
TUMANG made many imputations against Felix
Manalo. He was then filed with libel and found
guilty on the lower courts.
It appears that the libelous article contained
imputations which insinuate the commission of
criminal acts as well as of many other acts which
do not constitute a crime.
As to those imputations insinuating the
commission of a crime, the Court of Appeals
found that the petitioner was allowed to
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introduce evidence on the truth thereof but that
said evidence was insufficient.
CA: The case before us does not fit within the
rules just cited and, therefore, TUMANG cannot
seek the protection of the provisions of said
article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, in order to
justify his criminal intent and secure his
acquittal, it appearing that many of the
imputations made against Felix Manalo in the
libelous article in question do not constitute a
crime; while in others where an insinuation was
made of some criminal, act, the evidence
submitted to prove the truth has completely
failed to support the stand of the accused, and in
general the imputations made against Manalo
are not at all connected with the discharge of the
duties of a Government official or employee, as it
is well known that Felix Manalo is not a
Government employee and proof of the truth of
the imputations would not be admissible.
LEGAL ISSUE:
W/N TUMANG should be acquitted based on
Article 361 of the RPC.
HELD:
NO. Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal
prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the court and if it appears that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and moreover,
that it was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the defendant shall be
acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or
omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted unless the imputation shall have been
made against Government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their
official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth
of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted.
In view of the above, we find no merit in
petitioner's contention that he had been
unlawfully deprived of his right to prove the truth
of the libelous imputations. The Court of Appeals
has rightfully held that proof of the truth of those
acts imputed the offended party which do not
constitute a crime can be admitted, since he is
not a government employee, and, consequently,
none of those imputations can have any
reference to facts related to the discharge by a
government employee of his official duties. This
is in consonance with the second paragraph of
article 361 which limits the scope of the general
rule set forth in the first paragraph of the same
article.
G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011
DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR.
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals
that in the early part of November 2002, while
exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz

City, private respondent saw billboards with the
printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank
space before the word "NEVER" directly under
said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the
corner of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of
Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola
warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued
and wondered on what the message conveyed
since it was incomplete.
Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private
respondent received a phone call relating that
the blank space preceding the word "NEVER"
was filled up with the added words "BADING
AND SAGAY." The next day, he saw the
billboards with the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full.
Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned
and dishonored with the printed phrase and of
being a "tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after
consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused
the filing of a complaint for libel against
petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted
in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him
and his family. He thus prayed for damages.
Petitioner admitted having placed all the
billboards because he is aware of all the things
happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned
"BADING" because he was not in conformity with
the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz
City. He insisted that he has no intention
whatsoever of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta"
of Sagay. He contended that it was private
respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of
Sagay. He further maintained that his personal
belief and expression was that he will never love
Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the
message in the billboards is just a wake-up call
for Cadiz City.
LEGAL ISSUE:
W/N Lopez should be acquitted on the crime of
libel based on Article 361 of the RPC.
HELD:
YES. For that matter, granting that the
controversial phrase is considered defamatory,
still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant
to Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the
defamatory statement is made against a public
official with respect to the discharge of his official
duties and functions and the truth of the
allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled
to an acquittal even though he does not prove
that the imputation was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. As the Court
held in United States v. Bustos,22 the policy of a
public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly
with every argument which ability can find or
ingenuity invent. The public officer "may suffer
under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear
conscience. A public [official] must not be too
thin-skinned with reference to comments upon
his official acts."
In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on
petitioner, both lower courts heavily relied on the
testimony of the petitioner pertaining to the
reasons behind the printing of the phrase
"CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER." Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony,
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however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the
prosecution mainly relate to the discharge of
private respondent’s official duties as City Mayor
of Cadiz City.
April 16, 2018 – Article 362 – LIBELOUS
REMARKS
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
DORR, ET. AL. VS. UNITED STATES
195 U.S. 138 (1904)
DAY, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed the crime
of Libelous remarks.
FACTS:
The case was a prosecution for libel, brought at
the instance of Don Benito Legarda, a member of
the Philippine Commission, against the plaintiffs
in error, Dorr and O'Brien, who were proprietors
and editors of a newspaper published in the city
of Manila known as the 'Manila Freedom.' It
appears that Legarda was the prosecuting
witness against one Valdez, editor of a certain
Spanish newspaper called the 'Miau.' At the time
of the trial of Valdez, under the Spanish law then
in force in the islands, the truth could not be
given in defense in a prosecution for criminal
libel. Notwithstanding this fact, counsel for
Valdez, in the form of an offer of proof, read a
paper in court, making certain statements with
reference to the libel charged, tending to show
the truth thereof. In what purported to be a
report of the proceeding, the Manila Freedom
printed an article containing the matter set forth
in the offer to prove, with headlines in large type,
as follows:
'TRAITOR, SEDUCER, AND PERJURER.
SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS AGAINST
COMMISSIONER LEGARDA.
MADE OF RECORD AND READ IN ENGLISH-
SPANISH READING WAIVED.
Wife would have killed him.
Legarda pale and nervous.'
The prosecution of the plaintiffs in error was
based upon the [195 U.S. 138, 150] publication
of these headlines, which were charged to be a
false and malicious libel, printed in the English
language, of and concerning Don Benito Legarda.
At the time Valdez was tried, in which case the
occurrence undertaken to be reported took place,
the Spanish law was in force, denying the right
to put in evidence the truth of the alleged libelous
matter. At the time of the trial of the plaintiffs in
error the Philippine Commission had passed act
No. 277, known as the libel law. Sec.8 of the said
law provides that: Libelous remarks or
comments connected with matter privileged by
the last section receive no privilege by reason of
being so connected.
RULING:
Yes. The contention is that the publication is
privileged under 7 and 8, the claim being that the
publication was a fair and truthful report of
judicial proceedings. Testimony was introduced
in the court below tending to show malice, and
there was no proof to support the truth of the
charges in the alleged libel, which were found to

be without basis and wanton, and as the findings
of the two lower courts in a case brought in
review here are not ordinarily disturbed, the case
upon this branch might rest upon that
proposition. It is evident, however, that the
publication in question did not stop with a
simple report of the judicial proceedings. Indeed,
the paper offered in evidence could not have been
received under the law then in force,-a fact
concerning which no comment was made in the
report of the proceedings. Furthermore, 8 of the
law, while permitting, as privileged, a fair and
truthful report of judicial proceedings, except
upon express proof of malice, does not make
privileged libelous remarks or comments in
connection with the privileged matter. The
draftsman of the law evidently had in mind the
law of criminal libel in newspaper publications
as it exists in this country. The privilege extends
to a full and correct report of judicial proceedings
without prejudicial comment.
These headlines were not privileged matter at the
common law, and were libelous remarks or
comments if the matter could be deemed
otherwise privileged, within the meaning of 8 of
the Philippine libel law. An inspection of them
would seem to be sufficient to demonstrate this
fact. The complainant was held up to the public
where the paper circulated in striking headlines
as 'Traitor, Seducer, Perjurer,' and while these
words were quoted, as well as the phrase 'Wife
would have killed him,' their publication in this
manner was certainly the equivalent to a remark
or comment unnecessary to a fair and truthful
report of judicial proceedings, and likely to raise
inferences highly detrimental to the character
and standing of the one concerning whom they
were printed and published.
April 16, 2018 – Article 363 – INCRIMINATING
INNOCENT PERSON
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
PEOPLE V. RIVERA
G.R. NOS. 38215 & 38216
DECEMBER 22, 1933.
ISSUE:
WoN Rivera was guilty of Art. 363 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
Vito and Moreno were charged with theft by Sgt.
Ranas, Q. with Faustino Rivera as the witness of
the crime. The charge against them was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance of
Lucena. Thereafter, Vito and Moreno filed a case
against Rivera for violation of Art. 363,
Incriminating innocent person. The case was
also dismissed. The Attorney-General appealed
to the Supreme Court.
HELD:
No, he is not guilty of the crime.
Art. 363 do not apply to the instant case since it
would open the door to a flood of prosecutions in
cases where the defendants were acquitted. The
gravamen of the offense is performing an act
which "tends directly" to such an imputation
It will be observed that under article 326 of the
former Penal Code, the gravamen of the offense
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is the imputation itself when made before an
administrative or judicial officer, whereas in
article 363 of the Revised Penal Code the
gravamen of the offense is performing an act
which "tends directly" to such an imputation.
Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes false
prosecutions whereas article 363 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes any act which may tend
directly to cause a false prosecution.
The subject article punishes the acts of
“planting” evidence and the like, which do not
themselves constitute false prosecutions but
tend directly to cause false prosecutions.
April 16, 2018 – Article 364 – INTRIGUING
AGAINST HONOR
DAHIROC, Janice L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
BENEDICTO BAO
G.R. No. L-12102 September 25, 1959
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence adduced by the
prosecution establish the crime of intriguing
against honor penalized by article 364 of the
revised Penal Code and not the oral defamation
as appealed.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the Government from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, dismissing, upon defendant-
appellee's motion the case against him for
serious oral defamation.
On May 13, 1955, Benedicto Bao was charged
with oral defamation in the justice of the Peace
Court of Aloran, Misamis Occidental, in a
complaint filed by the offended party, Maximina
Banguis for allegedly speaking publicly and
uttering "Si Maximina Banguis, aking nakuha"
(Maximina Banguis was carnally taken by me)
and other words of similar import and meaning
implying that the offended party no longer a
virgin despite her being a single woman, thus
exposing her to public contempt, disrepute and
ridicule. The said complaint was later amended
to charge the crime or serious defamation. The
defendant having waived his right to the
preliminary investigation and the justice of the
peace court being of the opinion that the case did
not fall within its jurisdiction, the record of the
case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance
of the province for trial on the merits.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of
not guilty and the case was tried. After the
prosecution had rested its case, the accused,
thru his counsel, filed a motion to quash on the
grounds the facts alleged in the information did
not constitute the crime of serious oral
defamation and that the evidence presented was
insufficient to convict him of any criminal
offense. The prosecution opposed the motion to
quash, but the trial court, in its order of
November 3, 1956 - finding that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution establish the crime
of intriguing against honor penalized by article
364 of the revised Penal Code, which is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court to try, and not oral defamation as

defined and punished under article 358 of the
same code - granted the motion and dismissed
the case with costs de oficio. In that the same
order the court directed the provincial fiscal to
file the corresponding action before the proper
justice of the peace court. The prosecution
moved for reconsideration of the order but the
motion having been denied, it appealed directly
to this Court.
HELD:
We believe the appeal if bereft of merit.
This Court has already held that the dismissal of
a criminal case on the ground of variance
between the allegations in the information and
the evidence amounts to an acquittal. (People vs.
Opemia, et al., 98 Phil., 698; 52 Off. Gaz., 1951.)
And while there appears to be merit in the
Solicitor General's contention that the offense of
intriguing against honor is necessarily included
in the crime of serious oral defamation charged
in the information and therefore the accused
could be validly convicted by the trial court of
that crime under the same information, the fact
remains that the case was dismissed after the
prosecution had rested its case and upon motion
by the defendant on the grounds that the fact
remains that the case alleged in the information
did not constitute the crime charged and that, at
any rate, the evidence presented was not
sufficient to establish his guilt. The dismissal,
likewise, amounts to an acquittal or discharge of
the defendant, from which the prosecution
cannot appeal without doing violence to the
constitutional provision on double jeopardy.
(People vs. Cabarles, 54 Off. Gaz., 7051, and the
case cited therein). It goes without saying that
such dismissal constitutes a bar to another
prosecution not only for the offense charged, but
also "for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included" therein.
Wherefore, the appeal filed on behalf of the
Government must be, as it is hereby, dismissed
with costs de oficio.
Article 244. Unlawful Appointments. - Any public
officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint
to any public office any person lacking the legal
qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villapando is guilty of the crime
of Unlawful appointment under article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Office
of the Ombudsman towards the decision of the
Sandiganbayan, granting private respondent
Alejandro A. Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code.
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal
Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged
crime was committed. On July 1998, the accused
appointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998
election, as Municipal Administrator of the said
municipality. However, respondents contend
that the appointee possesses all the
qualifications stated in Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation
of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not
complement the provision on the one-year
prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and
the Local Government Code.
HELD:
Yes. Villapandos contention and the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Divisions interpretation
of the term legal disqualification lack cogency.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification
cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the
legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991. Its
interpretation of the term legal disqualification in
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal
cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as
excluding temporary disqualification in order to
exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under
the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991.
We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non
distinguit nec nosdistinguere debemus. Basic is
the rule in statutory construction that where the
law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having
acted with grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the basic rules of statutory
construction resulting in its decision granting
Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting the latter, we can do no less but
declare its decision null and void.
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, in granting private respondent
Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Let the case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, for further proceedings.

TITLE FOURTEEN – QUASI-OFFENSES
April 19, 2018 – Article 365 – IMPRUDENCE
AND NEGLIGENCE
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
G.R. NO. L-24084 NOVEMBER 3, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
VS.
PEDRO RAMIREZ,
ISSUE:
Is the defendant criminally liable, and if so, did
he act with malice?
FACTS:
The defendant, along with Victoriano Ranga, the
deceased, and Agustin Menor, were invited by
one Bartolome Quiaoit to hunt in the mount
Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era,
Province of Ilocos Norte. The three proceeded to
hunt, leaving Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1
kilometer from the scene of the crime. Upon
arrival on said mount Balitok, defendant, who
was then carrying the shotgun of Quiaoit and a
lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and thereafter
told his companions to stay there, watch over the
prey, while he was going away looking for
another; that being far away from his
companions, he seemed to have seen with his
lantern something like the eyes of a deer about
fifty meters from him and then he shot it. But
much to his surprise, on approaching what he
thought was a deer, it proved to be his
companion, Victoriano Ranga.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that although there
was no malice on the part of the defendant, he is
still criminally liable for homicide through
reckless imprudence. The defendant, knowing
that he had two companions, should have
exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid
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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST
every undesirable accident. Furthermore, the act
of offering to the mother of the deceased a
carabaos and a horse by way of indemnity,
indicates on the one hand that the defendant
admitted the commission of the crime, on the
other it shows that he performed that act without
criminal intent and only through a real
imprudence.
G.R. NO. 195671 JANUARY 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, PETITIONER,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rogelio is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
MDouble Serious Physical Injuries and Damage
to Property punishable under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the RPC.
FACTS:
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25,
1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was
driving his motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Don
Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc of the
same municipality, to bring his two (2) minor
children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and
Cherry Inguito (Cherry), to school. While they
were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc
on their proper lane on the right side of the road,
a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by
Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane
from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew
the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land
Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land
Cruiser remained.8 In order to avoid collision,
Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the
Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the
same direction and collided head-on with the
motorcycle.
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his
2 children were thrown off the motorcycle.
Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land
Cruiser, while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were
thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell
on the side of the road, causing injuries to their
legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann
Aquino, who were traversing the same road
aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help
and placed the victims together on the rightmost
side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc, while
Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser.
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial
prosecutor filed an Information charging Rogelio
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property "with the aggravating
circumstance that accused failed to lend on the
spot to the injured party such help that was in
his hands to give" before the RTC. Upon
arraignment, Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty.
HELD:
YES.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of
the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of
 CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
to give." Based on case law, the obligation under
this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in
the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and
degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and
place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b)
requires adequate proof.

In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the

negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown
that there was a direct causal connection
between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense
of reckless driving, the act must be something
more than a mere negligence in the operation of
a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard
of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton
or reckless disregard for the safety of others
within the meaning of reckless driving statutes
has been held to involve a conscious choice of a
course of action which injures another, either
with knowledge fserious danger to others
involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person.
Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or
conscious indifference to the consequences of
the conduct which supplies the criminal intent
and brings an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal
law, without regard to whether the private
offended party may himself be considered
likewise at fault.

In the present case, the RTC and the CA

uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very
fast on the wrong side of the road was the
proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the
death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical
injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the
road where the incident occurred was a curve
sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the
Inguitos were bound and descending towards the
opposite direction where Rogelio was going.
Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such
circumstances, is indicative of imprudent
behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to
exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at
a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with
the conditions encountered, as this would enable
him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid
injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it
is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows
down before negotiating a curve as it may be
reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may
appear from the opposite direction at any
moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with
other circumstances such as the occurrence of
the accident on or near a curve, as in this case,
constitutes negligence. Consequently, the Court
finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and
imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the
wrong side of the road while approaching the
curve where the incident happened, thereby
rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly
accountable for the material damages resulting
therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and the
RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the
collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA
Decision made no mention as to the presence or
absence of the limiting element in the last
paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which
imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon
the offender who "fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in his hands
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