CRIMINAL LAW II (CASE
DIGEST)
TITLE I: CRIMES AGAINST
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS
ARTICLE 114: TREASON
U.S. v. ABAD
1 Phil 437
FACTS:
The defendant has been convicted of section
14 of Act No. 292 of the United States
Philippine Commission of which punished
those who have breached the oath of
allegiance to the United States.
The defendant was a former insurgent
officer and is entitled to the benefit of the
proclamation of amnesty as long as the
offense is one mentioned in the
proclamation.
The offense charged was that the defendant
denied the existence of certain rifles to an
officer of the United States Army, which
have been concealed during his time of
surrender.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge of “treason and
sedition” was proper.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the
violation of oaths of allegiance, and kindred
crimes provided for in Act 292, United
States Philippine Commission, are included
in the general terms "treason and sedition"
as used in the amnesty proclamation of July
4, 1902.
The acts, therefore, by which the offense of
violation of oaths of allegiance, as defined in
section 14 of Act No. 292, is committed, is
not necessarily identical, although it may be
in particular cases, with that by which the
technical crime of treason or that of sedition
is committed.
PEOPLE v. MARCAIDA
79 Phil 283
FACTS:
Marcaida was found guilty of treason. It
appears that, although three witnesses
testified, for all legal purposes, it is the same
as if no witness had testified at all. The
second witness contradicted the first one on
very important facts, and the third
contradicted both the first and the second.
ISSUE:
Can the appellant be held guilty of treason?
RULING:
No. Each and every one of the three
witnesses for the prosecution testified to the
effect of belying the testimonies of the other
two, in such a way that it is not possible to
accept the testimony of one of them without
rejecting at the same time the testimonies of
the other two. Even without the two-witness
rule in treason cases, there is no legal basis
to convict appellant upon the testimony of
any one of the three witnesses, as each one
is belied by the other two.
US v. LAGNASON
3 Phil 495
FACTS:
The defendant with this band made an attach
upon the pueblo of Murcia in the Province
of Occidental -Negros" but was driven off
by the force of Constabulary there stationed.
During that night two inspectors of the
Constabulary arrived with additional fortes
and early in the morning. They left the
pueblo in search of the defendant. He was
encountered with his party about three
kilometers from the pueblo and was attacked
by the Constabulary. The defendant was
captured in the battle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant commit
treason
RULING:
Yes, the act of the Philippine Commission
states that “A person who is a resident in the
Philippine Island owing allegiance to the
United States or the Government of the
Philippine Islands who levies war against
them or adheres to their enemies giving
them aid and comfort within the Philippine
Islands or elsewhere" is guilty of treason
U.S v. CRAMER
65 SC 918
FACTS:
Two witnesses have confirmed that Anthony
Cramer, met with Werner Thiel and Edward
John Kerling, enemies of the United States
for the purpose of giving and with intent to
give aid and comfort to said enemies.
However, there was no proof by two
witnesses of what they said, or in what
language they conversed; no showing that
Cramer gave them any information whatever
of value to their mission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cramer is guilty of treason
RULING:
No. Overt acts 1 and 2 as proved were
insufficient to support a finding that the
accused had given aid and comfort to the
enemy, and therefore insufficient to support
a judgment of conviction. The protection of
the two-witness rule of the Constitution in
such case extends at least to all acts of the
defendant which are used to draw
incriminating inferences that aid and
comfort have been given.
PEOPLE v. ROBLE
83 Phil 1
FACTS:
Charged with treason on three counts, the
defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to death by the First Division of the People's
Court. The court held that the facts alleged
in the information is a complex crime of
treason with murders, with the result that the
penalty provided for the most serious
offense was to be imposed on its maximum
degree. It opined that the killings were
murders qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident
premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and
an armed band.
ISSUE:
Is the penalty correct?
RULING:
No. As decided in People v. Racaza, evident
premeditation, superior strength, and
treachery are, by their nature, inherent in the
offense of treason and may not be taken to
aggravate the penalty. Considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the
appellant's spontaneous plea of guilty is
sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below
the maximum. The appealed decision is
therefore modified and the sentence reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE V. ABAD
78 Phil 766
FACTS:
Francisco Abad was found guilty on three
counts of the complex crime of treason with
homicide. The information charged
appellant of the crime of treason by giving
aid and comfort to the Empire of Japan and
the Japanese Imperial Forces. The first
question raised by appellant is that the lower
court erred in finding the accused guilty on
the first count, notwithstanding the fact that
only one witness testified to the overt act
alleged therein.
ISSUE:
Is the appellant correct?
RULING:
Yes. The two-witness rule must be adhered
to as to each and every one of all the
external manifestations of the overt act in
issue. Although both overt acts are inter-
related, it would be too much to strain the
imagination if they should be identified as a
single act or even as different
manifestations, phases, or stages of the same
overt act. Although both acts may logically
be presumed to have answered the same
purpose, the singleness of purpose is not
enough to make one of two acts.
ENRILE v. SALAZAR
168 SCRA 217
FACTS:
Enrille was charged with rebellion with
murder and was detained for the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and
none fixed in the arrest warrant. He then
filled for a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Enrile contested to maintain the Hernandez
as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course,
whether or not necessary to its commission
or in furtherance thereof.
RULING:
YES, Enrile was favored. The primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez,
remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.
PEOPLE V. CANA
87 Phil. 577
FACTS:
Eleuterio Caña, the acting mayor of Abuyog,
Leyte, recruited laborers to build stables for
the Japanese cavalry houses. He also called
people to meetings where he made speeches
in the Visayan dialect, telling the people that
the real government was the one established
and sponsored by the Japanese; that the
Americans will never come back to the
Philippines because they were afraid of the
Japanese forces who were stronger; that they
must pay their taxes for the support of the
Japanese-sponsored government; and that he
(defendant) was not afraid of the guerrillas
because the Japanese Army was behind him.
He was charged with treason under seven
counts and was sentenced to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal without
considering the mitigating and aggravating
circumstance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court is correct for not
considering the circumstances present in the
case.
RULING:
Yes. The commission of treason is punished
on the basis of the seriousness of the
treasonable acts, and of the presence or
absence of atrocities on the victims, rather
than on the presence or absence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Here, there has been no killing, not even
torture of prisoners, at least not on the part
of the appellant. The People's Court may
have been imbued with this same attitude
and viewpoint when it imposed an
imprisonment of 15 years without making
any reference to the existence of aggravating
or mitigating circumstances.
ARTICLE 115: CONSPIRACY AND
PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON
U.S v. BAUTISTA
6 Phil 581
FACTS:
Appellants were convicted of the crime of
conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and
destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands and
the Government of the Philippine Islands, as
defined and penalized in Section 4 of Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
Counsel for appellants contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the
same overt act, or confession in open court,
to support a conviction for the crime of
treason should be applied in this case.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of the appellant correct?
RULING:
No. In consonance with the decisions of the
Federal courts of the United States, the
crime of conspiring to commit treason is a
separate and distinct offense from the crime
of treason, and this constitutional provision
is not applicable in such cases.
ARTCILE 116: MISPRISION OF
TREASON
U.S v. CABALLEROS
4 Phil 350
FACTS:
The defendants have been sentenced as
accessories after the fact in the crime of
assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of American school-teachers
because, without having taken part in the
said crime as principal or accomplices, they
took part in the burial of the corpses of the
victims in order to conceal the crime. One of
the motives for the conviction which the
lower court took into consideration in his
judgment is the fact of the defendants not
reporting to the authorities the perpetration
of the crime.
ISSUE:
Is the finding of the lower court correct?
RULING:
No. The fact of the defendants not reporting
to the authorities the perpetration of the
crime is not punished by the Penal Code and
therefore that cannot render the defendants
criminally liable according to law. Thus,
defendants and appellants are acquitted.
 Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule
on territoriality in criminal law.

ARTICLE 122:PIRACY
PEOPLE V.
PEOPLE V. TULIN
RODRIGUEZ
[ G.R. No. 111709,
[ G.R. No. 60100,
August 30, 2001 ]
March 20, 1985 ] 220
Facts: Phil. 162

A cargo vessel named MT Tabangao Facts:

was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded
Rodriguez along with other crew
with barrels of Kerosene, gasoline and diesel
members of M/V Noria 767, robbed the
oil. Suddenly, the cargo vessel was boarded
vessel while within the territorial waters of
by seven (7) fully armed pirates named Tulin
Tawi-Tawi, armed with bladed weapons and
et. al., and took control over the vessel and
high caliber firearms. In the course of the
painted the logo and ship with black, then
robbing, several persons were killed and
painted with the name Galilee and was
injured. Lao, Municipal Health Officer of
forced to sail to Singapore. The said vessel
the said municipality went aboard the vessel
went back to the Philippines. A series of
M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de
arrests were effected against the accused-
Tawi-Tawi and saw at the wharf ten dead
appellants, charging them with qualified
bodies. Upon their arraignment the accused
piracy or violation of PD. No. 532 (Piracy in
pleaded guilty of the crime of piracy. The
Philippine Waters), however, one of the
trial court imposed the penalty of death upon
accusedappellant Hiong, argues that the acts
the accused. However, they contend that the
allegedly committed were executed outside
trial court erred in imposing the death
the Philippine waters and territory.
penalty despite their plea of guilty.
Issue:
Issue:
Is the contention of the appellant
Is the contention of the appellants
correct?
correct?
Ruling:
Ruling:
No. Suffice it to state that
No. Presidential Decree No. 532
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of
amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal
M/T Tabangao and its cargo were committed
Code, provides that if rape, murder or
in Philippine waters, although the captive
homicide is committed as a result or on the
vessel was later brought by the pirates to
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
abandoned the victims without means of
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
saving themselves, or when the seizure is
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a
supervision. Moreover, piracy falls under
vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal
be imposed. Further, Article 63 of the same
Code provides that in all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of
the deed.
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO
AND SARAW
[ G. R. No. 17958,
February 27, 1922 ] 43
Phil. 19
Facts:
Days after leaving Matuta, Dutch
East Indies (now Indonesia), two boats
carrying 12 Dutch nationals (1 person in one
boat, 11 men, women and children in
another) were boarded by 24 armed Moros
(including the accused Lol-lo and Saraw).
The Moros took all the cargo, raped and
abducted the two women on board. The
Moros poked holes in the boat and left the
rest of the Dutch in it (they were later
rescued). The two women were able to
escape once the Moros docked in the island
of Maruro (also a Dutch possession). Lol-lo
and Saraw were arrested after returning to
their home in Tawi-tawi. They were charged
with Piracy before the Sulu CFI and were
found guilty, with punishment of life
imprisonment; and to return the stolen 39
sacks of copra plus 924 rupees in damages,
plus costs. But, they demurred that it was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands.
Issue:
Is the contention of the appellants correct?
Ruling:
No. It cannot be contended with any degree
of force as was done in the lower court and
as is again done in this court, that the Court
of First Instance was without jurisdiction of
the case. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal
of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter
that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state,
for those limits, though neutral to war, are
not neutral to crimes.
PEOPLE V.
CATANTAN
[ G.R. No. 118075,
September 05, 1997 ]
344 Phil. 315
Facts:
Catantan was found guilty with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and
Highway Robbery Law of 1974. He
contends that the trial court erred in
convicting him of piracy as the facts proved
only constitute grave coercion. He further
argues that in order that piracy may be
committed it is essential that there be an
attack on or seizure of a vessel.
Issue:
Is the contention of Catantan correct?
Ruling:
No. Under the definition of piracy in PD
No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code, this case falls squarely within the
purview of piracy. While it may be true that
victims were compelled to go elsewhere
other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of
seizing their boat. The testimony of one of
the victims shows that the appellant actually
seized the vessel through force and
intimidation.
PEOPLE V. SIYOH
[ G.R. No. 57292,
February 18, 1986 ] 225
Phil. 313
Facts:
De Guzman together with his friends,
who were also travelling merchants were on
their way to Basilan onboard a pumpboat
operated by Kiram with Siyoh as his help.
While on their way, 2 armed men onboard a
pumpboat fired at them thereupon Kiram
turned off the engine and threw a rope
towards the other pumboat. While the
group’s boat was towed towards Mataja
Island, the armed men took their money and
goods as well as their clothes. After which,
Kiram uttered “It was good to kill all of you”
then Siyoh hacked de Castro and Hiolen
with his “barong.” de Guzman was able to
jump out of the boat but Kiram’s group fired
at him hitting him at the back. He was able
to survive the attack and reported it to the
Philippine Army. Appellants were found
guilty of the crime of qualified piracy with
triple murder and frustrated murder. They
contend that the lower court erred in finding
that their guilt has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Is the contention correct?
Ruling:
No. As can be seen from the lone
assignment of error, the issue is the
credibility of witnesses. The trial court
which had the opportunity of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses and how they
testified assigned credibility to the former
and an examination of the record does not
reveal any fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which was overlooked or the
significance of which was misinterpreted as
would justify a reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the claims of
the appellants are not convincing.
ARTICLE 123.
QUALIFIED PIRACY
PEOPLE V. ANG CHO
KIO
[ G.R. Nos. L-6687 y L-
6688, July 29, 1954 ] 95
Phil. 475
Facts:
Ang Cho Kio was onboard PAL
flight heading to Aparri from Laoag.
Somewhere over the airspace of Mt.
Province, he shot and killed the purser of the
flight, Eduardo Diago. He then ordered the
pilot, Pedro Perlas, to change route towards
Amoy. The pilot refused, prompting Kio to
shoot the pilot which caused his
instantaneous death. The lower court
sentenced him to life imprisonment. The
Attorney General maintains in its allegation
that the lower court committed error in not
declaring that the accused committed the
complex crime of grave coercion with
murder.
Issue:
Is the contention of the Attorney
General correct?
Ruling:
 No. Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that in the event that a single
fact constitutes two or more offenses or
when one of them is necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty is for the
most serious crime, applying it in its
maximum degree. The accused ran two
different facts, and not just one; therefore,
these two successive acts cannot constitute
the complex crime of coercion with murder.
If the pilot had followed the order of the
accused, this would not have felt the need to
kill him; the pilot was put in the hard choice
to comply with the order, or die.
TITLE II: CRIMES
AGAINST THE
FUNDAMENTAL
LAW OF STATE
Article 124 Arbitrary
Detention
ASTORGA V. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 154130,
October 1, 2003]
FACTS:
On September 1, 1997, private
offended parties together with SPO3 Cinco
and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the
Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence operations on possible illegal
logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m.,
the team found two boats measuring 18
meters in length and 5 meters in breadth
being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.
There they met petitioner Benito Astorga,
the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be
the owner of the boats. A heated altercation
ensued between petitioner and the DENR
team. Petitioner called for reinforcements
and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed
men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the
scene. The DENR team was then brought to
petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had
dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is
guilty of Arbitrary Detention
RULING:
Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The
determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention,
in the absence of actual physical restraint, is
fear. The court find no proof that petitioner
instilled fear in the minds of the private
offended parties. Furthermore, he admitted
that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is
possible that petitioner prevented the team
from leaving the island because it was
unsafe for them to travel by boat. The events
that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two
interpretations. When the circumstances are
capable of two or more inferences, as in this
case, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of
innocence must prevail and the court must
acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than
to convict an innocent man.
PEOPLE V. FLORES
[G.R. No. 116488. May
31, 2001]
Facts:
The victim, Sayam, was drinking
beer at the store where the defendants were.
He joined the four accused at their table.
Then, all the accused and the victim left the
store and walked towards the military
detachment headquarters. Afterwhich,
witnesses heard a single gunshot followed
by rapid firing coming from the direction of
the detachment headquarters. That was the
last time Sayam was seen. The trial court
gave credence to the prosecution's evidence
that Sayam was seen being forcibly dragged
out of the store and pulled towards the
direction of the detachment headquarters by
the accused. The trial court held that the
three accused were responsible for the
former's disappearance.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-
appellants are guilty of Arbitrary Detention.
Ruling:
No, there was no sufficient evidence
to prove that Sayam was detained arbitrarily.
Based on the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, there is no shred of evidence that
he was actually confined there or anywhere
else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not
been seen or heard from since he was last
seen with accused-appellants does not prove
that he was detained and deprived of his
liberty. In fact, the disappearance of the
victim has no bearing in this case because it
is not one of the elements of the crime of
arbitrary detention. Thus, the Court reverses
the decision of the trial court and acquits the
accused.
PEOPLE V. OLIVA
[G.R. No. L-6033-35,
September 30, 1954]
Facts:
The police force of Aparri, Cagayan,
investigating the reported murder, took turns
in taking up the maltreatment of the
detainees. One of the worst beating was with
Pablo. When Lt. Oliva knew, he
reprimanded the men and then ordered Pablo
to be placed inside the jail cells but the latter
died. Sgt. Villanueva took the Arreola
brothers and asked them to sign an affidavit
to the effect that Pablo fell from the truck
and that he was a Huk, but the brothers
refused it was not true. After the burial, Sgt.
Villanueva still did not permit the Arreola
brothers to go home, saying that they must
wait for Lt. Oliva. The Arreolas were
actually released only in the afternoon of
September 6 but was released the following
morning.
Issue:
Whether or not Lt. Oliva is guilty of
Arbitrary Detention.
Ruling:
No. There is no support for the trial Court's
finding that Oliva made the maltreatment
possible.
Neither can appellant Oliva be held
responsible for the Arreolas' detention until
September 6, since
Eliseo Arreola himself testified that he and
his companions voluntarily went to Aparri
with the patrol and that after the death of
Pablo, Lt. Oliva permitted the Arreola
brothers to sleep in the hall of the municipal
building.
PARULAN V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
[G.R. No. L-28519 February 17,
1968]
Facts:
The petitioner was confined in the
state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal,
serving a sentence of life imprisonment
which, however, was commuted to twenty
(20). While still serving his prison term, he
escaped from his confinement but was
recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted
for the crime of evasion of service of
sentence, before the Court of First Instance
of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was
found guilty of the offense charged and
sentenced accordingly. The petitioner
contends unlawful and illegal confinement.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of Article
124 Arbitrary Detention.
Ruling:
No. There are crimes which although all the
elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by
reason of the very nature of the offense
committed, the violation of the law is
deemed to be continuing.
As belonging to the second class, crimes of
kidnapping and illegal detention where the
deprivation of liberty is persistent and
continuing from one place to another. To
this latter class may also be included the
crime of evasion of service of sentence,
when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the
service of the sentence imposed upon him by
the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the
law, moves from one place to another; for,
in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is
a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by
a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long it may
be. It may not be validly said that after the
convict shall have escaped from the place of
his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to
evade the service of his sentence, he is
deemed to continue committing the crime,
and may be arrested without warrant, at any
place where he may be found.
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may
be invoked in support of this conclusion, for,
under section 6[c] thereof, one of the
instances when a person may be arrested
without warrant is where he has escaped
from confinement. Undoubtedly, this right
of arrest without a warrant is founded on the
principle that at the time of the arrest, the
escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime — evading the service
of his sentence.
ART 124 ARBITRARY DETENTION
Roberto Umil Vs. Fidel V. Ramos
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
Facts:
Military agents were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Quezon City, to verify a
confidential information which was received
by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound; the wounded
man in the said hospital was among the five
(5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before. The
wounded man's name was listed by the
hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon."
After realizing that Javellon was actually
Rolando Dural, one of the sparrows who
murdered the two CAPCOM Soldiers, he
was immediately placed under arrest and
detained without a warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and detention
prisoner was illegal
Ruling:
The arrest of Dural is legal and falls under
Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which requires two (2)
conditions for a valid arrest without warrant:
first, that the person to be arrested has just
committed an offense, and second, that the
arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested is the one who
committed the offense.
Said confidential information received by
the arresting officers, to the effect that an
NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being
treated for a gunshot wound in the named
hospital, is deemed reasonable and with
cause as it was based on actual facts and
supported by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was
truly in the said hospital.
People V. Reynaldo Lozada Y Salopesa
Facts:
On the early morning of 14 October 1998,
the lifeless body of Rosita Sy was found
inside her car. The post mortem examination
showed that Rosita Sy had died due to a
single stab wound inflicted on the right side
of her body. Her bag, containing at least
P4,000.00 cash and her ring worth
P2,000.00, was missing. The police
apprehended Reynaldo Lozada and
Geraldine Belleza who, together with
Ronnie Sanchez and Rey Andales, were
charged with the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. The evidence for the
prosecution hinges much on the testimony of
Reynaldo Diaz who recounted the events of
11 and 13 October 1998. Reynaldo Lozada
argues that the trial court erred in not finding
his warrantless arrest to be unlawful, in not
declaring as unconstitutional the search
conducted on his person and as being thus
inadmissible in evidence the items seized
from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was lawful.
Ruling:
The arrest was lawful. In the instant case,
the police officers, on the basis of the facts
gathered in the course of their investigation,
including the disclosure made by Reynaldo
Diaz on how the plan to commit the offense
was hatched, also had sufficient and
reasonable grounds of suspicion that
appellants were probably guilty of the crime
charged.
But even on the assumption that the police
erred in not securing warrants for the capture
of appellants, the latter could no longer
impugn the validity of their arrest. Any
objection against an arrest or the procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused should be
made at or before the arraignment; otherwise
the objection is deemed waived. Appellants
entered their plea of not guilty to the crime
of robbery with homicide and thereafter
participated in the trial without questioning
the legality of their arrest.
PEOPLE VS. MISA (CA) 30 O.G. 3496
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
People Of The Philippines Vs. Ruben
Burgos Y Tito
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
FACTS:
One Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,
and stated that he was forcibly recruited by
accused Ruben Burgos as member of the
NPA, threatening him with the use of
firearm against his life, if he refused.
Immediately, upon receipt of said
information, a joint team of PC-INP units,
composed of fifteen (15) members, was sent
to arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team
arrived at Tiguman where through the help
of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the
team was able to locate accused, who was
plowing his field.
Right in the house of accused, the latter was
caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked
accused about his firearm, as reported by
Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied
possession of said firearm but later, upon
question profounded by Sgt. Buncalan with
the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to
a place below their house where a gun was
buried in the ground. Pat. Bioco then
verified the place pointed by accused's wife
and dug the grounds, after which he
recovered the firearm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of accused-
appellant without valid warrant to be lawful.
RULING:
The arrest was unlawful.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed,
is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of
that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his
view.
There is no such personal knowledge in this
case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by
the arresting officers, it came in its entirety
from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was
not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be
described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the
sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that
the accused had committed a crime. They
were still fishing for evidence of a crime not
yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of
the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened
wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an
arrest without warrant is unlawful at the
moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterwards can
make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree
is necessarily also tainted.
Nicasio Salonga Y Rodriguez Vs. Jp
Holland
FACTS:
Nicasio Salonga y Rodriguez was referred to
the Director of Prisons on May 11, 1944, for
having been convicted by the Manila Court
of First Instance for the crime of firing
firearms. Since that day he has been held in
the Bilibid prison in Muntinglupa; he was
transferred on June 3, 1944, to Camp
Nichols, Rizal, under the custody of the
guards of the same institution; at 3.50 in the
afternoon of the same day he escaped; On
January 10, 1946, at 9.30 a.m., he was
arrested on Juan Luna Street, Manila, by a
policeman from the City of Manila and was
delivered the next day, January 11, at 2.58
p.m. to the Director of Prisons in the prison
of Bilibid in Muntinglupa, Rizal, to fulfill
the rest of the penalty not yet suffered. The
appellant's freedom is requested because he
was arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest was valid.
RULING:
The appellant is nothing more than a simple
prophet of the law and has no right to
demand that the one who arrest him be
armed with an arrest warrant: a prisoner who
evades the execution of his sentence,
escaping the surveillance of a police officer
or a criminal institution can be arrested,
without a warrant for arrest, not only by an
agent of authority but also by a private
individual.
Ricardo Parulan Vs. Director Of Prisons
G.R. No. L-28519 February 17,
1968
FACTS:
The petitioner was confined in the state
penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a
sentence of life imprisonment which,
however, was commuted to twenty (20)
years by the President of the Philippines. In
October, 1964, he was transferred to the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio at
Makati, Rizal. In that month of October,
1964, while still serving his prison term as
aforesaid, he effected his escape from his
confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in
the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime
of evasion of service of sentence, penalized
under Article 157 of the Revised Penal
Code, before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found
guilty of the offense charged and sentenced
accordingly with the imposable penalty
prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was
legal.
RULING:
The Arrest was legal. Undoubtedly, this
right of arrest without a warrant is founded
on the principle that at the time of the arrest,
the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime — evading the service
of his sentence.
ART. 125 – DELAY IN THE DELIVERY
OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE
PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
G.R. No. L-1159. January 30, 1947.
Cecilio M. Lino V. Valeriano E. Fugoso
FACTS:
Pascual Montaniel was arrested without
warrant by the police officers of Manila on
November 8, 1946, for inciting to sedition,
and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7,
1946, for resisting arrest and disobedience to
police orders. On November 11 when this
petition for habeas corpus was filed, these
two petitioners were still under arrest. They
were thus held in confinement for three and
four days, respectively, without warrants and
without charges formally filed in court. The
papers of their cases were not transmitted to
the City Fiscal’s office until late in the
afternoon of November 11.
Upon investigation by that office, no
sufficient evidence was found to warrant the
prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for
inciting to sedition and of Pacifico Deoduco
for resisting arrest, but both remained under
custody because of informations filed with
minuet charging Montaniel with unjust
vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to
an agent of a person in authority under the
second paragraph of article 151 of Revised
Penal Code. These informations were filed
on the same day when this case was heard
before this Court, that is, on November 12,
1946. And so far, no warrants of arrest or
orders of commitment are shown to have
been issued by the municipal court pursuant
to the informations thus filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their continued detention
after six hours without delivery to judicial
authorities is legal
RULING:
Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico
Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal.
Even assuming that they were legally
arrested without warrant on November 7 and
8, 1946, respectively, their continued
detention became illegal upon the
exploration of six hours without their having
been delivered to the corresponding judicial
authorities. Their cases were referred to the
City Fiscal late in the afternoon of
November 11, 1946, that is, four and three
days, respectively, after they were arrested.
The illegally of their detention was not cured
by the filing of information against them,
since no warrants of arrest or orders of
commitment have been issued by the
municipal court to the hearing of this case
before this Court.
G.R. No. L-1231 January 30, 1947
Macario Gunabe Vs The Director Of
Prisons
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged with murder and
frustrated murder and that, in virtue of said
cases (continued as criminal cases 1838 and
1839) which are still pending, the petitioners
have been detained by the respondent
Director of Prisons under proper
commitment orders.
Nevertheless, in the present petition for the
writ of habeas corpus, the petitioners pray
for their release on the grounds (1) that from
one to four months after their arrest, their
detention was unlawful as it was a brazen
violation of their right to be delivered to the
judicial authorities within six hours
following their arrest, petitioner Macario
Gunabe having been arrested on or about
July 8, 1942, petitioner Sulpicio Gunabe on
or about July 17, 1942, and petitioner
Margarito Drillon on or about October 5,
1942
ISSUE:
Whether or not their detention was unlawful.
RULING:
Yes. With respect to the first ground, it is
sufficient to state that the alleged failure of
the authorities (who arrested or are detaining
the petitioners) to deliver the latter to the
judicial authorities within six hours —
which may of course be the subject of
criminal prosecution under article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code — cannot affect the
legality of the confinement of the petitioners
which is admittedly under subsisting
process, issued by a competent court.
Indeed, if it appears that the persons alleged
to be restrained of their liberty are in the
custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge having jurisdiction to
issue the process, the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be allowed. (Rules of Court No.
102, section 4.)
G.R. Nos. L-9805-06. March 29, 1957
The People Of The Philippines Vs.
Dionisio Mabong
FACTS:
Rufo Verano, who was a rural policeman,
heard some people shouting that one
Dionisio Nabong went berserk. Verano went
out of his house armed with a club and saw
Mabong stab one Cipriano Tabel with a
bolo. After pursuing and attacking his
victim, Mabong faced Verano who told him
to drop his bolo, and when he refused,
Verano clubbed him on the face which
caused him to stumble to the ground.
Thereupon, Verano grabbed the bolo of the
accused, tied him with a rope and brought
him on a small boat to Lianga where he
delivered him to the chief of police.
On May 23, 1955, after proper investigation,
Mabong was charged with murder in two
separate informations by the chief of police.
When the latter conducted the corresponding
preliminary investigation, Mabong pleaded
guilty, whereupon the Justice of the Peace
forwarded the two cases to the court of first
instance. In due time, the provincial fiscal
filed against the accused the informations
required by law, and when the court set the
same for arraignment, the accused filed a
motion to quash and a petition for habeas
corpus alleging as main ground that his
detention by the local authorities became
illegal upon the expiration of the period of
eighteen (18) hours without having been
proceeded with in accordance with law, and
that the filing later on of the two criminal
complaints against him by the chief of police
did not have the effect of validating his
detention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his detention was illegal
RULING:
The law indeed provides that a public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver
him to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of eighteen (18) hours if the crime
for which he is detained calls for an
afflictive or capital penalty, may be held
amendable to criminal prosecution, but there
is nothing said therein that the charge for
which he has been detained and for which he
has been properly indicted, becomes invalid
or nugatory. While a public officer who thus
detains a person beyond the legal period
may be held criminally liable, the
proceeding taken against him for the act he
has committed remains unaffected, for the
two acts are distinct and separate. As a
matter of fact, such an act on the part of the
public officer is not considered as one of the
grounds on which one can predicate a
motion to quash the complaint or
information under Rule 113, section 2, of the
Rules of Court.
It is true that the accused was detained in the
municipal jail of Lianga for more than three
(3) days before criminal charges were
preferred against him before the justice of
the peace court, and that since his detention
no warrant of arrest has been issued by the
court as a result of said charges, but the
absence of such warrant can have no legal
consequence it appearing that when the
charges were filed he was already under the
custody of the local authorities.
G.R. No. L-27331 : July 30, 1981
Alimpoos Vs The Honorable Court Of
Appeals
FACTS:
Reynaldo Mosquito has been accused of
Robbery w/ less Serious Physical Injuries.
He was detained by virtue of a warrant of
arrest which was issued without the
observance of the legal requirements for the
issuance thereof. Mosquito filed a petition
for Habeas Corpus before the Trial Court.
Mosquito named as defendants in the case
the Prov. Fiscal and the private offended
parties. He also filed a claim for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was valid.
RULING:
No the sole function of the writ is to relieve
from unlawful imprisonment, and ordinarily
it cannot properly be used for any other
purpose. Thus it has been held that the writ
cannot properly be used: To enforce a right
to service; to determine whether a person
has committed a crime; in determine a
disputed interstate boundary line; to punish
respondent or to afford the injured person
redress, for the illegal detention; to recover
damages or other money award.
G.R. No. L-200 March 28, 1946
Anastacio Laurel Vs. Eriberto Misa
FACTS:
General MacArthur issued a proclamation
upon his arrival in Leyte (December 29,
1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who
had voluntarily given aid, comfort and
sustenance to the Japanese. It announced his
purpose to to hold them in restraint for the
duration of the war, "whereafter they shall
be turned over to the Philippine Government
for its judgment upon their respective
cases." When active hostilities with Japan
terminated, General MacArthur ordered the
delivery of the Commonwealth of all the
prisoners theretofore taken under his said
proclamation. Criminal informations against
all, or a majority, or even a substantial
number of them could not be properly filed
in the six-hour period. They could not
obviously be turned loose, considering the
conditions of peace and order, and the safety
of the prisoners themselves.
So the President, by virtue of his emergency
powers, promulgated Executive Order No.
65 suspending article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, for not more than thirty days.
Congress later approved Commonwealth
Act. No. 682, establishing the People's Court
and the Office of Special Prosecutors for the
prosecution and trial of crimes against
national security committed during the
Second World War. It found the thirty-day
period too short compared with the facilities
available to the prosecution, and set the limit
at six months.
The petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was
arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by
the United States Army, and was interned,
under a commitment order "for his active
collaboration with the Japanese during the
Japanese occupation," but in September,
1945, he was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government, and since then
has been under the custody of the respondent
Director of Prisons.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his continued detention is
unlawful.
RULING:
NO considering the circumstances, we are
not prepared to hold the extension of the
period for the political detainees was
unreasonable. The Legislature chose to give
the prosecutor's office sufficient time to
investigate and to file the proper charge - or
to discharge those whom it may find
innocent. If time had not been granted, the
prosecutor would perhaps have been forced
to indict all the detainees indiscriminately;
reserving, of course, its right subsequently to
request the liberation of those it may think
not guilty. But such wholesale indictment
was obviously neither practical nor
desirable.
ART. 127. EXPULSION.
Villavicencio v Lukban
Facts:
Lukban, the Mayor of the City of Manila
and Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of
Police, took custody of 170 women without
the women’s consent and knowledge and
shipped them to Davao city as laborers. The
women were prostitution inmates and were
deported without their consent and in effect
Lukban forcibly assigned them a new
domicile in which they have no authority to
do so and there is no law authorizing the
deportation of the prostitutes.
Issue:
Whether or not, Lukban as the City Mayor
and Hohmann as the city’s Chief of Police,
has the authority to deport the women to
Davao City.
Ruling:
No. The Mayor and Chief of Police had no
authority to deport people by duress. There
is no law, order or regulation that authorizes
the Mayor and Chief of Police to force
citizens to change their domicile.
Article 127 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his
residence is punishable.
ART. 128 VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
People v Molina
Facts: Accused-appellants, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the
marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted
by the police officers was illegal.
Ruling: It could not be said that accused-
appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of
accused-appellants does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could
not be admitted as evidence against accused-
appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
choice but to find in favor of accused-
appellants.
People v Go
Facts: The Accused was searched as a
consequence to a valid warrantless arrest.
Issue: Whether or not the search against the
accused was valid.
Ruling: Where the gun tucked in a person’s
waist is plainly visible to the police, no
search warrant is necessary and in the
absence of any license for said firearm, he
may be arrested at once as he is in effect
committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. No warrant is necessary in
such a situation, it being one of the
recognized exceptions under the Rules. As a
consequence of the accused’s valid
warrantless arrest inside the nightclub, he
may be lawfully searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 126. This is a valid search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In fact, the
subsequent discovery in his car which was
parked in a distant place from where the
illegal possession of firearm was committed
[after he requested that he will bring his car
to the Police Station after his warrantless
arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and shabu,
CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN
MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
As such, the items do not fall under the
exclusionary rule and the unlicensed
firearms, drug paraphernalia and the shabu,
can be used as evidence against the accused.
People v Conde
Facts: The RTC ruled that Conde, Atis and
Perez, Jr. were guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide. Oscar Conde
claims that he was illegally arrested by the
authorities. He adds that the Indian Embassy
was pressuring the police to solve the
murder. He also wants the Court to disregard
as evidence the stolen items and weapons
illegally seized by the police.
Issue: Whether or not the items seized were
admissible as evidence.
Ruling: NO
The warrantless search in the house of a
certain Jimmy, based on the confession of
accused Perez, Jr., is definitely questionable.
PO3 Sevillano categorically stated that they
were able to recover the stolen items, i.e.,
the beach towel and the umbrella, because of
the confession of Perez, Jr. who was not
assisted by counsel when he confessed and
eventually led the police to the whereabouts
of the said items. The use of evidence
against the accused obtained by virtue of his
testimony or admission without the
assistance of counsel while under custodial
investigation is proscribed under Sections 12
and 17, Article III of the Constitution.
People v Hindoy
Facts: In the case at bar, upon
consummation of the illicit sale, PO3
Eugenio introduced himself and SPO1
Cariaga as police officers. ENRIQUE and
BELLA were apprised of their constitutional
rights. Thereafter, the officers searched the
room where BELLA supposedly got the first
block of marijuana. There, they found an
abaca bag under a folding table. Upon
inspection, the bag yielded twelve more
blocks of compressed marijuana inside a
plastic bag.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in
finding the search and arrest of the two (2)
accused-appellants without warrant to fall
under the doctrine of warrantless search, an
incident to a lawful arrest.
Ruling: The uncorroborated assertion of
ENRIQUE and BELLA that the abaca bag
belongs to a certain Marlyn who left it in
their care amounts to a bare denial which, by
itself, is insufficient to overcome this legal
presumption.
People v Cucubin
Facts: In this case, the arrest of accused-
appellant was effected shortly after the
victim was killed. Their knowledge of the
circumstances from which they allegedly
inferred that accused-appellant was probably
guilty was based entirely on what they had
been told by others, to wit: by someone who
called the PNP station in San Antonio,
Cavite City
Issue: Whether there was "probable cause"
for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the
arresting officers, to believe that accused-
appellant committed the crime.
Ruling: We hold that there was none. The
two did not have "personal knowledge of
facts" indicating that accused-appellant had
committed the crime. Thus, PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on
information given to them by others
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding
accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin,
Jr. guilty of the crime of murder, is
REVERSED and accused-appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
US v Vallejo
Facts: The accused stopped inside the
doorway, and asked us, 'Have you any
warrant to come in?' I replied that we had
none, and then he immediately struck
Tranquilino Saravillo with his list, and
immediately afterwards he struck me also.
When I felt him strike me here in the cheek,
I dodged and struck him with my club.
When he attempted to strike me again with
his fist, I caught his right hand. I said to
Salvador Vallejo, 'You are arrested.' We
arrested him because he did not come with
us but resisted.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest made by the
policemen against the accused was valid.
Ruling: It is clear from the testimony that in
this case the behavior of the defendant
amounted to more than private misconduct
and constituted a public annoyance and a
breach of the peace of the neighborhood
US v Delos Reyes
Facts: certain revenue officials went to the
house of the accused Valenriano to search
for opium; that having arrived there they
were refused admission to the house by
Valeriano upon the ground that they were
not authorized to search his premises, they
having no search warrant authorizing them
to do so; that, after a few moment’s
conversation, and upon their assertion that
they were officers of the law, while not
consenting, he offered no physical resistance
to their entry, and the search for the drug
began.
Issue: Whether or not the search was lawful.
Ruling: Peace officer without search
warrant cannot lawfully enter the dwelling
against the will of the owner, even if he
knew that someone in the dwelling is having
unlawful possession of opium. But the mere
fact that a visitor of the house of another is
suspected of having unlawful possession of
opium, is no excuse for entry into the house
by a peace officer for the purpose of search
against the will of its owner and without
search warrant.
People v Malasugi
Facts: The appellant had to be searched
after he had voluntarily produced the
bracelets Exhibit A and placed them on
Lieutenant Jacaria's table, because, upon
being asked if he had anything, he
tremblingly answered in the negative.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence against
the appellant is admissible in court.
Ruling: When one voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have it made upon his
person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof. The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly.
People v Villamiel
Facts: On the afternoon of the same day,
Villamiel, accompanied by other agents of
the Anti-Usury Board and a constabulary
soldier, executed the warrants, went to the
residences of the petitioners, searched them
seized documents and papers belonging to
both petitioners, placing them in two small
valises furnished by the petitioners
themselves. The special agent issued a
receipt to each of the petitioners, without
specifying the documents and papers seized
by him, which, together with the small
valises, were taken by him to his office in
Manila, keeping them therein until he was
ordered by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas to deposit them in the office of the
clerk of court.
Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal
search done in the case.
Ruling: At the hearing of the case, it was
shown that the documents and papers had
really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury
Board to conduct an investigation and later
use all or some of them as evidence against
the petitioners in criminal cases that may be
brought against them. The seizure of books
and documents by means of a search
warrant, for the purpose of using them as
evidence in a criminal case against the
person in whose possession they were found,
is unconstitutional because it makes the
warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to
a violation of the constitutional provision
prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to
testify against himself.
US v Macaspac
Facts: The owner of the house had objected
to the intended entrance
of and search by a barrio lieutenant who
entered and proceeded to search
the house.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation
of domicile.
Ruling: When the owner of the house had
objected to the intended entrance of and
search by a barrio lieutenant who entered
and proceeded to search the house,
inspecting some jars and baskets therein
found, there was a violation of domicile.
ARTICLE 129: SEARCH WARRANT
MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED , AND
ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF THOS
ELEGALLY OBTAINED
U.S. vs Addison, 28 Phil 580
Facts:
Addison, an informer of the Internal
Revenue , procured a search warrant against
the hotel, where he was a guest of, owned by
a certain Mr. McStay in response to the
former’s personal knowledge that there were
several opium bottles in said hotel. During
the search, no opium was found. McStay
argued that because of personal reasons and
altercations, Addison had malice and no
probable cause in acquiring said warrant.
During litigation, several witness
corroborated that opium was indeed present
in the hotel’s premises.
Issue:
WON Addison is guilty of violating
Article 129 of the RPC?
Held:
No. The court decided to acquit
Addison. His altercation and personal anger
against McStay was immaterial to his
acquiring of search warrant. He procured
said warrant in accordance with the Anti
Opium Law and it was later found out in the
proceedings that several people saw opium
in abovementioned hotel and that McStay
was warned about the search, which is why
no opium was found. Addison indeed had
probable cause in procuring the search
warrant.
Corro vs Lising, 137 SCRA 541
Facts:
Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the
Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service acquired a search and
seizure warrant for the office of Corro
(Philippine Times) in order to commandeer
materials that were and will be used for
committing the crime of inciting to sedition.
The raid was done and said materials were
seized, the office entrance was chained and
locked. Corro petitions that there was no
probable cause and the seizing was illegal,
despite the promulgation of Trial Court 95
Judge Lising. Corro prays for materials to be
given back and his office be unlocked.
Issue:
WON the seizure was illegal and was
without probable cause
Held:
YES. Reaction of the officials
towards Corro’s articles in his publication
were simply conclusions of law and would
not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Furthermore, it tramples on the
constitutional right to free expression. The
Supreme Court ordered the returning of the
materials as well as the unlocking of
abovementioned office.
Burgos vs Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
Facts:
Several AFP Officials acquired
search warrants for subversive and guilty of
conspiracy materials located in the office of
WE FORUM, represented by Burgos. The
warrants were not specific as to what
materials will be commandeered as well as it
was founded on the report of the
subordinates of said officials. Legality of
warrants were not questioned by the lower
courts, hence this petition.
Issue:
WON the search and seizure was
done without probable cause
Held:
YES. The broad statement of the
officials as to the materials to be seized were
insufficient to amount to probable cause in
the issuance of said warrant. The alleged
subversive acts were mere conclusion of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of a
probable cause. Furthermore, the reports by
the unit surveilling and investigating to the
AFP personnel do not meet the requirement
in issuance of such warrant as provided by
law that the oath of the warrant’s applicant
shall refer to the truth of facts known
personally or by his witness. This was not
met by the AFP officials, which in turn does
not amount to probable or just cause.
Alvarez vs Court of First Instance, et al.
64 Phil 33
Facts:
A search and seizure warrant was
issued to get Alvarez’s documents in
accordance with the Anti-Usury law, with
the chief of the Anti-Usury Board as
applicant. The chief’s oath says that he has
reports saying that Alvarez houses
documents that were pertinent to the case
they are formulating. Alvarez argues that the
search and seizure was illegal and was done
without probable cause.
Issue:
WON the warrant was issued without
probable cause
Held:
YES. The Supreme Courts decision
reads: “That the search and seizure made are
illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because
the warrant was based solely upon the
affidavit of the petitioner who had no
personal knowledge of the facts of probable
cause, and (b) because the warrant was
issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the
criminal proceedings that might be instituted
against the petitioner, for violation of the
Anti-Usury Law; That as the warrant had
been issued unreasonably, and as it does not
appear positively in the affidavit that the
articles were in the possession of the
petitioner and in the place indicated, neither
could the search and seizure be made at
night.
Mere reports do not amount to personal
knowledge or that of his witness, making the
arrest bereft of probable cause.
People vs dela Pena, et al., 97 Phil 669
Facts:
dela Pena and Ramos being members
of AFP acquired a search warrant with a
false deposition of witness. The warrant was
intended upon the property of a certain Mr
Tek. Upon Tek’s request to give back the
materials, some of his relatives were arrested
– then the dance of money extortion took
place.
Issue:
WON the accused had probable
cause in said search and seizure
Held:
NO. The attempt to extort money and
the false depositions vitiate the cause of the
arrest, rendering it unjust and not amounting
to a probable cause.
Alih vs Castro, 151 SCRA 279
Facts:
Members of the AFP raided the
abode of Alih, without a search warrant. In
the raid, several ammunitions were
commandeered. Present officials in the
search said they acted upon verbal order of
their superior officers.
Issue:
WON the search is illegal
Held:
YES. It lambasts the rights of Alih to
his abode. A warrantless search is one that is
void ab initio.
It follows that as the search of the
petitioners’ premises was violative of the
Constitution, all the firearms and
ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in
any of the proceedings against the
petitioners. They shall however remain in
custodia legis subject to the decision of the
court.
Stonehill vs Diokno, 20 SCRA 383
Facts:
Several documents and money were
seized incidental to the enactment of, but not
expressly stated in the many search warrants
– in response to alleged violation of Central
Law Banks. The warrants were also issued
to fish evidence against Stonehill.
Issue:
WON the search and seizure was
illegal
Held:
YES. If there is competent evidence
to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party
against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should
not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the Judge to find that there
is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Roldan, Jr., etc. and the Philippine Navy
vs Hon. Arca, etc., et al., 65 SCRA 336
Facts:
Members of the crew of the two
vessels were caught in flagrante illegally
fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license in violation of the Fisheries
code. The arrest was done without a warrant.
Issue:
WON the warrantless arrest was
legal
Held:
YES.
Search and seizure without search warrant of
vessels and air crafts for violations of the
customs laws have been the traditional
exception to the constitutional requirement
of a search warrant, because the vessel can
be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search warrant
must be sought before such warrant could be
secured; hence it is not practicable to require
a search warrant before such search or
seizure can be constitutionally effected.
Thus their apprehension without a warrant
of arrest while committing a crime is lawful.
Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its
equipment and dynamites therein was
equally valid as an incident to a lawful
arrest.
Uy Kheytin, et al., vs Villareal, et al., 42
Phil 886
Facts:
Constabulary officer Ramon
Gayanilo applied for and was granted of a
search warrant upon the store of Kheytin, as
it was allegedly containing opium. During
said arrest, several private documents
unrelated to opium, were gotten and would
be used against Kheytin.
Issue:
WON the officers acted in violation
of Art 129 of the RPC
Held:
YES. The commandeering of the
documents unrelated opium was illegal and
amounted to an excess of authority.
Furthermore, the seizure or compulsory
production of a man's private papers to be
used in evidence against him is equivalent to
compelling him to be a witness against
himself, and, in a prosecution for a crime,
penalty or forfeiture, is equally within the
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment (US).
Magoncia vs Palacio, 80 Phil 770
Facts:
During a lawful search in the house
of the petitioner, the authorities incidentally
seized weapons which were illegally owned
and used. Said weapons were not stated in
the warrant.
Issue:
WON the seizure of weapons was
illegal
Held:
NO. The commandeering of said
weapons were legal.There is a wide
distinction between the seizure of property
lawfully within the possession of a person
and the seizure of property held and used in
violation of law. Thus contraband articles,
and those things which under the law one
has no right to possess, for the purpose of
issue or disposition, are not embraced in the
protection of the constitutional guaranty.
Indeed, an individual in the possession of
such goods is entitled to no protection
whatsoever, for such goods are not subject
to ownership, and may be forefeited or
destroyed. They are, therefore, subject to
search and seizure
ARTICLE 130 SEARCHING DOMICILE
WITHOUT WITNESS
Papa vs Mago., 22 SCRA 857
Facts:
Following upon an informed tip that
a certain shipment were allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued. The
authorities from the Customs Commission
and the Ports of Manila searched the
suspected truck and seized said items. Mago
contends that such seizure was illegal as it
was headed towards his home and that in
such, a warrant is needed to be procured.
Issue:
WON the warrantless seizure is
illegal
Held:
NO. The authorities acted within the
confines of the law.
The Tariff and Customs Code does
not require said warrant in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store
or building, not being a dwelling house; and
also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop
and search and examine any vehicle, beast
or person suspected of holding or conveying
any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling
house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of
the peace”
ARTICLE 131: PROHIBITION,
INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION
OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS
[G.R. NO. L-6858. May 31, 1956.]
Fernando Ignacio and Simeon De La
Cruz, Petitioners-appellants, Vs. the
Honorable Norberto Ela, Mayor of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, Respondent-appellee.
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society, commonly known
as Jehovah’s Witnesses. Desiring to hold a
meeting in furtherance of its objectives,
Petitioners asked Respondent to give them
permission to use the public plaza together
with the kiosk, but instead of granting the
permission, Respondent allowed them to
hold their meeting on the northwestern part
corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy
not to allow the use of the kiosk for any
meeting by any religious denomination as it
is his belief that said Kiosk should only be
used “for legal purposes.” And when their
request for reconsideration was denied,
Petitioners instituted the present action for
mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Mayor
should be held liable for his refusal to grant
the petitioners a permit to hold a public
meeting at the public plaza.
Ruling:
The power exercised by Respondent cannot
be considered as capricious or arbitrary
considering the peculiar circumstances of
this case. It appears that the public plaza,
particularly the kiosk, is located at a short
distance from the Roman Catholic Church.
The proximity of said church to the kiosk
has caused some concern on the part of the
authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace
and order, or the happening of untoward
incidents, they deemed it necessary to
prohibit the use of that kiosk by any
religious denomination as a place of meeting
of its members. It cannot therefore be said
that Petitioners were denied their
constitutional right to assemble for, as was
said, such right is subject to regulation to
maintain public order and public safety.
[ G.R. No. 36453           September 28,
1932]
CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, Plaintiff-
Appellant, vs. TOMAS EARNSHAW,
Mayor of the City of Manila, Defendant-
Appellee.
Facts:
Petitioner addressed a letter to the mayor of
Manila requesting permit to hold a public
meeting. This meeting was to be held by the
Communist Party. Previously, in public
meeting held by the said Communist Party,
seditious speeches were delivered urging the
laboring class to unite in order to be able to
overthrow the government. Petition was
denied.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of the
petition violates Article 131 of the RPC.
Ruling:
No. Inasmuch as the doctrine and principles
advocated by the Communist Party were
highly seditious in that they suggested and
incited rebellious conspiracies and disturbed
and obstructed the lawful authorities in their
duties, the denial of the petition to hold a
public meeting is legal.
The mayor was justified in prohibiting the
holding of such meeting by refusing to issue
a permit for that purpose.
G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970]
NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J.
VILLEGAS, respondent.
Facts:
The petitioner applied for a permit to
conduct an assembly in Plaza Miranda
during a weekday. Repondent Mayor has
offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative,
guided by a lesson gained from the events of
the past few weeks. The mayor appraised
that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as
compared to one at Sunken Gardens as he
suggested, poses a clearer and more
imminent danger of public disorders,
breaches of peace, criminal acts, and even
bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent mayor
violated Art. 131 of the Revised Penal Code
in not the granting the petition to hold
assembly in Plaza Miranda.

Ruling:
No. Respondent Mayor possesses
reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used for the
assembly in order to secure convenient use
thereof by others and provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder and maintain public safety and
order; Respondent Mayor has expressly
stated his willingness to grant permits for
peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they
would not cause unnecessarily great
disruption of the normal activities of the
community and has further offered Sunken
Garden as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as
the site of the demonstration sought to be
held.
[G.R. No. L-18247. August 31, 1963.]
FLORENTINO GALLEGO, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
Facts:
That in the morning of March 10,
1957, appellant and his companions were
about to hold a meeting of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses in front of the Public market of
Lambunao, Iloilo. The chief of police,
Avelino Larrosa, approached appellant and
inquired of him whether he had a permit to
hold said meeting pursuant to a city
ordinance. As appellant could not produce
any, the chief of police enjoined him from so
proceeding with the meeting but instead of
desisting in obedience to the chief of
police’s intimation, appellant, in a
challenging vein, addressed his followers,
‘You must continue that, we will see what
they (referring to the chief of police and his
policeman) can do for us.’
"Whereupon the chief of police warned
appellant if he continued with the meeting,
he was to place him under arrest. However,
appellant, disregarding the warning,
continued the meeting for at least 30 minutes
more — whereupon, he was arrested and
charged accordingly. (slight disobedience of
an agent of a person in authority)
Issue: Whether or not his arrest violates the
constitutional guaranty of free assembly.
Ruling:
It is a settled principle growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of these rights is not absolute for it
may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the
sovereign "police power," which is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good
order of safety and the general welfare of the
people. This power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by
the enactment of laws regulating those and
other constitutional and civil rights and it
may be delegated to political subdivisions,
such as municipalities and cities, by
authorizing their legislative bodies called
municipal and city councils to enact
ordinances for the purpose. (Primicias v.
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71)
[G.R. No. L-1800             January 27,
1948]
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General
Campaign Manager of Coalesced
Minority Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of
City of Manila, respondent.
Facts:
This case is an action of mandamus
instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias,
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties,
against then Manila City Mayor, to compel
the latter to issue permit for holding public
meeting at the Plaza Miranda. The petitioner
requested to hold a “peaceful public
meeting”. However, the respondent refued to
issue such permit because he found that
there is a reasonable ground to belive that it
disrupted public order. Respondent based his
refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public
peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, “any
act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot; or collect with other persons in
a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose;
or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly.
Issue: Whether or not there is a legal ground
for the Mayor to refuse to the issuance of a
permit.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court states that
the freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitution. There is no
legal ground to refuse the issuance of the
permit. However, the right to peacefully
assemble is not absolute. They can be
regulated under the state’s police power
-that they should not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor to the rights of the community or
society. The Supreme Court concluded that
although the mayor may not refuse to issue
the permit he may determine or specify the
streets or public places to be used to
minimize the risk of disorder.
The power to regulate the exercise of such
other constitutional rights is termed the
sovereign “police power,” which is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and the general welfare of the
people.
[G.R. No. L-36277             October 26,
1932]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. CRISANTO EVANGELISTA and
ABELARDO RAMOS, Defendants-
Appellants.
Facts:
When a parade was about to be held,
Crisanto Evangelista spoke before the
people, raising his fist and accusing the big
ones of persecuting and oppressing them.
Then shouts were heard from the audience
saying: “Let us fight them.” Then Ramos
shouted, “Let us fight them until death.”
Evangelista and Ramos were arrested. The
Constabulary aksi dispersed the people by
using water pump.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of the
Constabulary violated Article 131 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
No. Under the circumstances of the
case, the statements made by the accused on
the occasion above related are clearly
seditious. The act of the Constabulary was
proper, the meeting not being peaceful.
[G.R. No. L-18853             August 22,
1922]
consequent dissolution of the meeting of the
municipal council is a violation of Sec. 1 of
Act No. 1755, which is similar to Articles
143 and 144 of the RPC.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, ARICLE 132: INTERRUPTION OF
vs.
EXEQUIEL ALIPIT and VICTORIO D. RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
ALEMUS, defendants-appellants.
[CA-G.R. No. 12980-R, December
Facts: 29, 1955]

The election of the municipal People vs. Mejica,

president was contested on the ground of
minority. He yielded the chair to the vice-
president. The meeting of the municipal
council that was presided over by the vice-
president was stopped by the chief of police
and the municipal president by arresting the
vice-president and threatening the councilors
to arrest them if they continued to hold the
meeting. Hence, the councilors dispersed
and they all left the premises.
Issue:
Whether or not interrupting and
dissolving the meeting of the municipal
council by a public officer is a crime
punished under Article 131 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Ruling:
No. Nobody has the right to dissolve
through violence, the meeting of a municipal
council under the pretext of lack of notice to
some members of the council, which was
not apparent. Any stranger, even if he be the
municipal president himself or the chief of
police must respect that meeting. The
disturbance or interruption and the
Facts:
In a barrio chapel, a priestwas ready to
conduct a mass and a number of barrio folks
were there to hear the mass. The barrio
lieutenant made an actual threat on the life
of the priest should the latter persist in his
intention to start the mass. As a result, the
mass was not celebrated and the people
dispersed.
Issue: Whether or not the barrio captain is
guilty of violating Article 132 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Ruling: Yes.
The elements for Interruption of religious
worship, pursuant to Art. 132 of the RPC are
as follows:
1. That the offender is a public officer
or employee
2. That religious ceremonies or
manifestation of any religion are
about to take place.
3. That the offender prevents or
disturbs the same.
In the instant case the accused was a barrio
lieutenant who was a public officer. The
mass was also about to be conducted which
is a religious ceremony. Lastly, it was due to
the actions of the accused which prevented
the religious ceremony. Clearly, all elements
of the said provision are attendant. Hence,
Mejica is guilty.
[G.R. No. 8722           September 10, 1913]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA
BALCORTA, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
The accused entered a private house,
uninvited, where services of the Methodist
Episcopal Church were being conducted
between ten and twenty persons, and
threatened the group with a club,
interrupting or the disturbing the divine
service. The accused contended that the
people dispersed by the defendant were not
holding religious services, as they were
simply reading some verses out of the Bible.
Issue: Whether or not Balcorta is guilty of
interruption of religious worship.
Ruling:
Yes. The argument of the accused is
untenable. There is no provision of law
which requires religious services to be
conducted in approved orthodox style in
order to merit its protection against
interference and disturbances. As stated in
Hull vs. State (120 Ind., 153):
It makes no difference that the
method of worship of those assembled was
singular or uncommon. The protection of the
statute is extended to all, irrespective of
creed, opinion, or mode of worship. Persons
who meet for the purpose of religious
worship, by any method which is not
indecent and unlawful, have a right to do so
without being molested or disturbed.
ARTICLE 133: OFFENDING THE
RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
[G.R. No. L-46000             May 25, 1939]
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
Facts:
Jose Baes, the parish priest of the
Roman Catholic Church of Lumban,
Laguna, charged and accused with an
offense against religion for causing the
funeral of a member of the “Church of
Christ” to pass through the churchyard
fronting the Roman Catholic Church,
belonging to said church and devoted to the
religious worship therof. The parish priest
opposed this, but through force and threats
of physical violence by the accused, was
compelled to allow the funeral to pass
through the said churchyard.
Issue: Whether or not Baes is guilty of
offending the religious feelings of the
Catholics punished under Art. 133 of the
RPC.
Ruling:
Yes. The motion raises a question of
law, not one of fact. Whether or of the act
complained of is offensive to the religious
feelings of the Catholics, is a question of
fact which must be judged only according to
the feelings of the Catholics and not those of
other faithful ones, for it is possible that
certain acts may offend the feelings of those
who profess a certain religion, while not
otherwise offensive to the feelings of those
professing another faith.
[ GR No. 40577, Aug 23, 1934, 60 Phil.
369 ]
PEOPLE v. PROCOPIO REYES 
Facts:
While the pabasa (the term pabasa is
applied to the act of the people, professing
the Roman Catholic faith) was going on the
evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and
12 o'clock, the defendants Procopio Reyes,
Policarpio Nacana, Florentine Clemente,
Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari,
Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at
the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and
started to construct a barbed wire fence in
front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who
was chairman of the committee in charge of
the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain
from carrying out their plan, by reminding
them of the fact that it was Holy Week and
that it was highly improper to construct a
fence at that time of the evening. A verbal
altercation ensued and the people at the
pabasa saw what happened and left the
chapel. Hence, the pabasa was discontinued.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty
of Article 133 of the RPC for offending
religious feelings.
Ruling:
No. The construction of fence in
front of the chapel, even though irritating
and vexatious to those present in the
“pabasa” is not notoriously offenseive to the
feelings of the faithful. “The crime
committed is only unjust vexation defined
and penalized in Article 287.
TITLE III- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC
ORDER
ART. 134. REBELLION OR
INSURRECTION.
People v. Hernandez
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956
FACTS:
Amado Hernandez the President of the
Congress on Labor Organizations (CLO)
and a member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines made numerous speeches
promoting the communist movement and
derogating the government.
Hernandez was then charged for the crime
conspiracy to commit rebellion on the
ground that he had conspired with the CPP
which also conspire to commit rebellion
with the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan
(HMB/Hukbalahap/Huk) which had risen
publicly and take arms to attain their main
purpose “removing a certain territory of the
Philippines” from its allegiance to the
government of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hernandez who delivered
speeches of propaganda in favor of
Communism and in favor of rebellion can be
considered as a criminal act of conspiracy to
commit rebellion as defined in the law.
RULING: NO.
The elements of Rebellion are the following:
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b)
taking arms against the Government.

2. That the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either —
a. to remove from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any
part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval or other
armed forces; or
b. to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives.
The Supreme Court held that, the mere fact
of Hernandez giving and rendering speeches
favoring Communism would not make him
guilty of conspiracy, because there was no
evidence that the hearers of his speeches of
propaganda then and there agreed to rise up
in arms for the purpose of obtaining the
overthrow of the democratic government as
envisaged by the principles of Communism.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. JUDGE
JAIME SALAZAR
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
Facts:
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
were charged with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murders
allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
Issue:
Whether or not Enrile is liable under Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code?
Ruling: YES.
Enrile and the Panlilio spouses should only
be charged with simple rebellion following
the Hernandez doctrine:
Murder and arson are crimes inherent when
rebellion is taking place. In the RPC,
rebellion is just a single crime (Article 134)
and there is no reason to complex it with
other crimes inherent in its commission.
Thus, Article 48 applies only when there are
two crimes committed and not when there is
only one such as in this case.
The OSG contends that this case does not
fall within the Hernandez ruling because the
information in Hernandez charged murders
and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against
Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
FRANCISCO R. CARIÑO vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-14752 April 30, 1963
Facts:
Cariño was charged with the crime of
rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies
and kidnappings, for having, as a high
ranking officer and/or member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and of
the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan
otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps
(Huks), agreed in conspiracy with 31 others
for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government and disrupting its activities.
Acts of rebellion were committed in
conspiracy with other members of the
communist party.
Cariño provided accommodation for the
night, giving cigarettes to the members of
communist and helping in opening of bank
accounts to the members of the communist
party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cariño is liable to the crime
of rebellion.
RULING: NO.
The crime of rebellion or insurrection has
been defined as follows:
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection — How
committed. — The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof,
of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive
or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers, or prerogatives
In the case at bar the Cariño did not take up
arms against the Government. Neither was
he a member of the Hukbalahap
organization.
Supreme Court held that, the sending of
food supplies and cigarettes does not prove
intention to help in committing rebellion.
Neither is the opening of the bank accounts
for the work of petitioner is an officer of the
bank which is a part of his function as an
employee.
These acts do not carry or prove any
criminal intent of helping the HUKS. This
does not precisely conclude that the
performed criminal intent of helping in the
execution or the carrying out of rebellion or
insurrection.
THE UNITED STATES v. PEDRO
CONSTANTINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 1186. November 18, 1903.
Facts:
On the morning of May 30, 1902, an armed
band composed of some fifteen men,
according to some of the witnesses, and of
over forty, according to others, entered the
town of Binangonan and kidnapped Don
Jose Suares, the municipal president; Don
Jose Tupas, provincial secretary, who
happened to be in the town; Don Sixto
Angeles, president of the board of health;
Don Lazaro Gergaray, and an American
whose name does not appear.
These people were led along the road toward
the town of Carmona; but when the party
had covered about half the distance to the
town three American soldiers were
encountered. In the course of the fight which
ensued, and as a result of the confusion
thereby produced, the prisoners succeeded in
escaping from their captors.
Issue:
Whether or not Constantino, et. al. is liable
for the crime of insurrection.
Ruling: NO.
It does not even appear what motive led the
defendants to kidnap the persons mentioned.
This act of simple kidnapping, without
evidence as to previous or attendant
circumstances, without data of any kind, in
short, to indicate the motive or purpose for
which the act was committed, is the one bare
fact which we find established in the record.
As to promoting or inciting to rebellion,
with which the defendants are specifically
charged in the information, not only does the
record contain no proof of their guilt of this
crime but absolutely no attempt has been
made to prove it. It follows, therefore, that
the accusation fails in its most essential
point — that is, with respect to the act
complained of, and which alone could make
the defendants guilty of the crime of
insurrection with which they are charged.
THE UNITED STATES v. DALMACIO
LAGNASON
G.R. No. 1582 March 28, 1904
Facts:
Lagnason was charged under section 1 of
Act No. 292 with the crime of treason, was
convicted and sentenced to death.
From the time of the occupation of the
Province of Occidental Negros by the
American troops, there had existed therein a
band of men in arms against the Government
of the United States, which band was led by
Lagnaso, in the southern part was another
similar band led by Dionisio Papa.
On October 29, 1902, the Lagnason with this
band made an attack upon the pueblo of
Murcia in said province, but was driven off
by the force of Constabulary there stationed.
Lagnason was captured in the battle and
about twenty of his men were killed. On the
side of the Constabulary were killed two
policemen of the vicinity who were acting as
guides.
Issue:
Whether or not Lagnason is guilty of the
crime of rebellion.
Ruling: Yes.
Acts of violence committed by an armed
body of men with the purpose of
overthrowing the
Government was levying war against the
US, and therefore treason, regardless of
number of men.
The crime of rebellion and insurrection
constitute treason, but when the treason
consists in engaging in an insurrection or
rebellion it is to be punished in accordance
with section 3 of Act No. 292.
BERNABE BUSCAYNO, JOSE MA.
SISON and JULIET SISON v.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS NOS. 1, 2,
6 and 25, GENERAL FABIAN VER, et.
al.
G.R. No. L-58284 November 19, 1981
FACTS:
Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante
and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrero,
alleged subversives classified as
"PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO” and Traditional
Armed Group personalities.
It was alleged that as ranking leaders of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its
military arms, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan and the New People's Army,
constituting an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the government by force or
placing it under the control of an alien
power.
It was alleged that on or about February 4,
1972 and for some time prior or subsequent
thereto the ninety two accused as officers
and leaders of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military arm, the New
People's Army, and as conspirators rose
publicly and took up arms against the
government in Navotas, Rizal and elsewhere
in the Philippines for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said
government or its laws the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof or of its
armed forces by organizing the Karagatan
Fishing Corporation and operating the M/V
Karagatan a fishing vessel, to procure
firearms and ammunition for the CPP and
NPA as in fact war materials and armaments
were landed at Digoyo Point, Palanan,
Isabela on July 2, 1972 from Communist
China and were used against the army.
Buscayno contended that rebellion is an
element for the crime of subversion and held
the defense of double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Buscayno is correct with his
contentions that rebellion is an element of
subversion
RULING:
NO. The contention is not correct because
subversion does not necessarily include
rebellion. Subversion, like treason, is a
crime against national security. Rebellion is
a crime against public order.
Rebellion or insurrection is committed by
rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws, Philippine territory or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or of depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Rebellion is distinct from participation or
membership in an organization committed to
overthrow the duly constituted government
(People vs. Hernandez, 120 Phil. 191, 220).
In the instant case, the rebellion charge
against the petitioners embraced the acts
committed by them on or about February 4,
1972 and during the period from August,
1973 to February, 1974. The subversion
charge against Buscayno involved his acts
committed in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and
1971. The subversion charge against the
Sison spouses referred to their acts
committed in 1968 and for sometime prior
and subsequent thereto. The common
denominator of the rebellion and subversion
charges is that the petitioners committed
overt acts as alleged communists or leftists.
The overt acts in the two charges are
different.
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in
the Penal Code for a long time. It may be
committed by non communists without
collaborating with the agents of an alien
power. In contrast, the crime of subversion
came into existence when the communists
sought to dominate the world in order to
establish a new social economic and
political order.

ART. 135. PENALTY FOR REBELLION,
INSURRECTION OR COUP D’ETAT.
THE UNITED STATES v. ALEJO
RAVIDAS ET AL.
G.R. No. 1503. December 29, 1903
FACTS:
Ravidas, et. al., was charged with the crime
of insurrection.
The counsel for the Government in this case
prays for the acquittal of both defendants, as
"it is not proven", he says with respect to
Alejo Ravidas, "that he permitted or
encouraged insurrection or engaged in the
same by abetting them directly or
indirectly."
The only fact disclosed by the evidence
adduced in the case is that Alejo Ravidas
knew that there were insurgents in a place
called Manila, jurisdiction of the town of
Agusan, of which he was municipal
president, and his duty as such president
required him to report this fact to the senior
officer of the province, but he did not do so,
nor did he take any steps toward pursuing or
denouncing the insurgents or to protect the
people from their probable depredations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused were guilty of
the crime of insurrection?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that Act No.
292 of the Civil Commission defines and
specifies the acts which shall be punished as
insurrection, but among those acts the
silence of the defendant as regards the
existence of some insurgents in a certain
place is not enumerated; however
reproachful the silence of the defendant may
be, it does not in itself constitute the crime
of insurrection.
There being no evidence showing that the
defendant had promoted, encouraged, or
aided any insurrection or that he in any way
participated in the same, he can not be
punished for the crime of insurrection.
The fact that the defendant sold rice in great
or small quantities to persons who
afterwards appeared to be insurgents is not
in itself conducive to criminal liability; and
therefore that fact alone cannot make the
defendant guilty of the crime of insurrection,
if it is not shown that he sold the rice to the
insurgents knowing that they were such and
with the deliberate purpose of aiding the
insurrection.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
BENITO CRUZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-11870 October 16, 1961
FACTS:
Paterno Cruz and Benito Cruz was charged
of "rebellion with robbery with homicide,"
and Fermin Tolentino with "rebellion with
arson, with murder and robbery”. Benito
Cruz together with a band of men staged a
raid by the HUKs in the province of Bataan,
more particularly in the Makabulos massacre
and has committed multiple crimes of arson,
robbery and murder on civilians and even to
the Philippine constabulary.
The penalty imposed upon Cruz, et al., is life
imprisonment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed upon
Benito Cruz et al, is proper?
RULING: NO.
It has been held as stated in the brief for the
Government, Cruz, et al. herein are guilty of
simple rebellion, inasmuch as the
information alleges, and the records show
that the acts imputed to them were
performed as a means to commit the crime
of rebellion and in furtherance thereof.
Following the Hernandez Doctrine, Benito
Cruz is guilty only of simple rebellion. For
the crime of rebellion constitutes only that of
a single crime.
Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino’s penalty
fall under the first paragraph of Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000, whereas Paterno Cruz
comes under the second paragraph of said
article, which prescribes the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
Accordingly, the penalty meted out to
appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin
Tolentino should be reduced to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay each
a fine of P10,000, and appellant Paterno
Cruz should be sentenced to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
JOSE LAVA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-4974-78 May 16, 1969
FACTS:
Jose Lava, et. al., being then high ranking
officers or otherwise members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP)
of which the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan" (HMB) otherwise or formerly
known as the Hukbalahap (Huks), with the
primordial objective of the Communist Party
of the Philippines and of its armed force, the
HMB, was to overthrow the Philippine
Government by armed struggle was caught
by the Philippine constabulary for his
criminal acts consisting of attacks against
Philippine Constabulary, murders, robberies,
kidnapping, arson which indicted by the trial
court the complex crime of the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies
and arsons, enumerating therein eight counts
regarding specific acts of murder, robbery
and arson and penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Lava, the appellants also contend that the
informations against them charge more than
one offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not the penalty imposed upon
Lava, et al., is proper.
RULING: No.
The Supreme Court ruled that, the question,
of whether or not a person may be
prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of
rebellion complexed with murder, arson,
robbery and/or other common crimes, is now
settled.
In the case of People vs. Hernandez, etc., et
al., the Court held that the crime of rebellion
cannot be complexed with other common
crimes. The accused in the Hernandez case
were charged, as are appellants in the instant
cases, "with the crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons, and robberies.
Court has held that acts of murder, arson,
robbery, physical injuries, etc. are absorbed
by, and form part and parcel of, the crime of
rebellion if committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the rebellion charged.
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article
135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime,
it follows necessarily that said acts offer no
occasion for the application of Article 48,
which requires therefore the commission of,
at least, two crimes.
Hence, Jose Lava is found guilty as principal
in the commission of the crime of simple
rebellion and is sentenced of prision mayor,
and a fine of P20,000, with the accessories
provided by law.
THE UNITED STATES v. AGUEDO
DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 1106 April 15, 1903
Facts:
On July 5, 1902, the high officials of the
society known as the Katipunan, Del
Rosario, et al. were arrested, as reconstituted
by them and others in December, 1901; that
this society had for its object the forcible
overthrow of the Government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands. That it had
organized what purported to be an army; and
that during a period extending from
December, 1901 to May 1, 1902, its leaders,
including Del Rosario, et al., were actively
engaged in plotting and organizing
insurrectionary movements.
Del Rosario, et al., that they could not be
convicted of the crime of rebellion, because
they had never recognized the Government
of the United States in these Islands, or
taken the oath of allegiance thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposable penalty upon
Del Rosario, et al., under Act. 292, sec. 3 is
proper..
Ruling: YES.
The crime is punishable by imprisonment
for not more than ten years and a fine of not
more than $10,000. (Act No. 292, sec. 3.)
The court imposed a fine of $5,000 and the
maximum of the penalty of imprisonment,
without, however, finding the existence of
any aggravating circumstance.
It is claimed that the penalty of
imprisonment fixed for the crime must be
divided into grades, and, in the absence of
either aggravating or extenuating
circumstances, should be applied in the
present case in the medium grade, in
accordance with the rules of the Spanish
Penal Code.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MELECIO AQUINO alias Darna and
EUGENIO CORTEZ alias RAMON.
G.R. No. L-13789 June 30, 1960
Facts:
Melecio Aquino and Eugenio Cortez were
charged and found guilty of murder the
death of Juan Mendoza.
It appears that in the afternoon of August 13,
1953, six armed men dressed in army
uniform appeared in barrio Pantay and
inquired about the whereabouts of Juan
Mendoza, who was then the barrio
lieutenant.
It also appears that at about 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of the day of the occurrence,
certain huk elements in Calaca, Batangas,
separated into two groups.
Ceferino Manalo was in the front yard of his
house talking with Juan Mendoza. While
they were thus talking, two huks arrived, one
of them Melecio Aquino, who was in fatigue
uniform.
Shortly thereafter, he heard a number of
gunshots. Maximo and Ceferino Manalo
went down from their respective houses and
upon reaching the place of the shooting, they
saw sprawled on the ground the dead body
of Juan Mendoza.
Issue:
Whether or not Aquino and Cortez is guilty
of murder for killing a person in pursuance
of the movement to overthrow the
government.
Ruling: NO.
Since it appears that the killing was
committed not because of any personal
motive on the part of the accused but merely
in pursuance of the huk movement to
overthrow the duly constituted authorities,
the proper charge against them would be
rebellion and not murder.
Based on the evidence presented, it
sufficiently appears, however, that the
killing in question was without personal
motive on the part of Aquino and Cortez,
and that it was merely in pursuance of the
movement participated in by them to
overthrow the duly constituted authorities of
the Government.
Considering the surrounding circumstances,
we cannot bring our mind to the conclusion
that Aquino and Cortez are responsible for
the death of Mendoza, there being no clear
evidence linking them with his death.
PEOPLE V HERNANDEZ
Facts:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez
and other appellants were accused of
conspiring, confederating and cooperating
with each other, as well as with the thirty-
one (31) defendants charged in the criminal
cases of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. They were accused of being
members of PKP Community Party of the
Philippines which was actively engaged in
an armed rebellion against the government
of the Philippines. With the party of
HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban
sa mga Hapon), they committed the crime of
rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting
plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on
government forces or civilians by HUKS.
Amado Hernandez and several others were
accused of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies. They were convicted
of the crime and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment.
The government, headed by the Solicitor
General, argued that the gravity of the crime
committed required the denial of bail.
Moreover, the complex crime charged by the
government against Hernandez has been
successfully imposed with other arrested
communist leaders and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Issue: WON there is a complex crime of
rebellion.
Held: No. The court rule that the murders,
arsons, and robberies described therein are
mere ingredients to the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by said defendants as
means ‘necessary’ for the perpetration of the
said rebellion. Such common offense is
absorbed or inherent of the crime of
rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in
Article 135 constitutes, one single crime it
follows that said acts offer no occasion for
the application of Article 48 which requires
therefore the commission of at least two
crimes. The crime therefore is only simple
rebellion.
** HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE: Rebellion
cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as killings, destruction of property, etc.,
committed on the occasion and in
furtherance thereof. The thinking is not
anymore correct more so that there is no
legal basis for such rule now. Rebellion
constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME.
PEOPLE V GERONIMO
Facts: On June 24, 1954 a Federico
Geronimo, et al. were charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnapping. These are the
ranking officers/ or members of CCP and
Huks.
In the information it alleged 5 instances
including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora
Quezon’s convoy on April 28, 1949 and
ending on February 1954 where Geronimo
killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant.
He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the
trial court found him guilty of the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies,
and kidnappings, sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the
sole question of whether the crime
committed by him is not the complex crime
of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus
punishable only by prision mayor.
Issue: WON rebellion be complexed with
murder, robbery or kidnapping?
Held: No. Even if the crime is not
committed in furtherance of rebellion,
without political motivation, the crime
would be separately punishable and would
not be absorbed in rebellion.
According to the Hernandez resolution; the
complexing of rebellion will lead to
undesirable results. It cannot be taken with
rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for
the constitutive acts and intent would be
unrelated to each other. He would be held
liable for separate crimes, and these cannot
be merged into a juridical whole.
ENRILE V SALAZAR
Facts: In the afternoon of February 27,
1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo
Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was
taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none
fixed in the arrest warrant.
Issue: WON the petitioner has committed a
complex crime arising from an offense being
a necessary means to commit another,
referred in the Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Held: NO. Enrile and the Panlilio spouses
should only be charged with simple
rebellion following the Hernandez doctrine:
Murder and arson are crimes inherent when
rebellion is taking place. In the RPC,
rebellion is just a single crime (Article 134)
and there is no reason to complex it with
other crimes inherent in its commission.
Thus, Article 48 applies only when there are
two crimes committed and not when there is
only one such as in this case.
The OSG contends that this case does not
fall within the Hernandez ruling because the
information in Hernandez charged murders
and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against
Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
ARTICLE 136: CONSPIRACY AND
PROPOSAL TO COMMIT COUP
D’ETAT, REBELLIO AND
INSURRECTION
U.S v FIGUERAS
Facts: Paulino Legaspi testifies that various
persons, some forty more or less in number,
were conspiring to overthrow the constituted
Government, and states that he knows that
the defendants were engaged in this
conspiracy because he heard them say so in
their conversations. Called upon to repeat
the words which he heard them say, he
stated the following: "What a life this is, so
full of misery, constantly increasing. When
will our wretchedness end? When will the
authorities remedy it? What shall we do?"
He does not state that he heard anything
beyond this, and it appears that he relies
solely upon these words, used by the
defendants, as a basis for his assertion that
they were conspiring.
As to other matters this witness testifies
solely from hearsay. "They say" (these are
his own words) "that these" (the accused)
"are the principal conspirators." "According
to my information," he adds further on, "this
agreement has existed" (referring to the
agreement to rebel against the Government,
which in the opinion of the witness
constitutes the conspiracy), "not only
between these two but also between them
and others."
Issue: WON there is conspiracy.
Held: No. No, because (1) there was no
agreement concerning the commission of
rebellion, and (2) there was no decision to
commit it. The facts do not suffice to sustain
a conviction of the crime of conspiracy to
overthrow the Government.
U.S V VERGARA
Facts: In the months of February and
March, 1903, the defendants were
organizing and did organize a society
commonly known as the "Katipunan
Society." Several witnesses also testified
that the object of the Katipunan Society was
to organize Filipino soldiers, and that the
end and purpose of the said organization was
against the United States Government in the
Philippine Islands.
It was shown also during the trial on the
court below that these defendants were
officers in the said society. each of them, at
various times in the months of February and
March, 1903, solicited funds from the
people of the pueblo of Mexico, in the
Province of Pampanga, P. I.
The defendants attempted to prove that they
were organizing a new, independent Filipino
church, known as the Aglipayan Church,
and that the money which they were
collecting was to the purpose of furthering
the interests of this new, independent
church.
Issue: WON there was a conspiracy to
overthrow the government.
Held: Yes. The defendants were charged as
having violated section 3 of Act No. 292 of
the United States Philippine Commission.
This section provides:
"Every person who incites, sets on foot,
assists, or engages in a rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the
United States . . . shall, upon conviction, be
imprisoned for not more than ten years and
be fined not more than $10,000."
The court held that the said defendants are
guilty, not of inciting, setting on foot, or
assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather
of the crime of conspiring to overthrow, put
down, and destroy by force the Government
of the United States in the Philippine
Islands, and therefore we find that the said
defendants, and each of them, did, together
with others, in the months of February and
March, 1903, in the Province of Pampanga,
Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow,
put down, and to destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the
Philippine Islands.
PEOPLE V BAUTISTA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
ARTICLE 139: SEDITION
PEOPLE V CABRERA
Facts: On December 13, 1920, policemen of
the city of Manila arrested a woman who
was a member of the household of a
Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa
Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the
woman was considered by some of the
Constabulary soldiers as an outrage
committed by the policemen, and it instantly
gave rise to friction between members of
Manila police department and member of
the Philippine Constabulary.
One day, a policeman (Mojica) was
patrolling when he encountered several
soldiers. Commotion took place, and a
soldier (Macasinag) was shot and mortally
wounded. This engendered resentment
among the soldiers in Sta. Lucia Barracks.
Word had gotten out: (1) Macasinag died,
and (2) Mojica allowed to continue his duty
in Intramuros.
A corporal persuaded a private in charge of
a quarter to be let out of the window. They
sawed out the window bars and brought
rifles and ammunition. They divided to
attack police officers. On “Calle Real”: 10-
12 soldiers attacked 2 policemen. They also
fired shot against a civilian car, killing the
driver and 3 passengers. They also killed the
assistant chief of police who was with a
policeman driving a motorcycle (also
killed). A police patrol went to the place and
was also gunned down by the soldiers (2
were killed).
On “Calle General Luna”: another platoon
of soldiers fired upon a police motorcycle on
its way to Calle Real, wounding 1. They also
fired indiscriminately in one police station,
where no one was harmed. Chief of the
Constabulary rounded up the soldiers, who
then came back one by one to the barracks.
No list of the soldiers was released. But an
investigation was made: there were around
74 soldiers who participated.
According to one soldier: the wife of a
soldier was arrested and abused by the
policemen, after which they gave her to an
American, then the unjustified arrest of 2
soldiers, and then the killing of the soldier
Macasinag.
2 separate charges were filed: (1) crime of
sedition, and (2) murder and serious physical
injuries.
Issue: Whether the accused soldiers
committed sedition?
Held: Yes. Sedition, in its more general
sense, is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. Defendants argue
that in a crime of sedition, (1) there should
be a private citizen as offender and public
functionary as offended party, and (2) what
transpired was a fight between two
government bodies. The Court said that the
law on sedition (1) makes no distinction on
who can be held liable, and (2) what
transpired was an unequal fight.
Act No. 292 (old law) the equivalent of
which is:
Article 139. Sedition - How committed. -
The crime of sedition is committed by
persons who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to attain by force,
intimidation, or by other means outside of
legal methods, any of the following objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or
execution of any law or the holding of
any popular election;
2. To prevent the National Government,
or any provincial or municipal
government, or any public officer
thereof from freely exercising its or his
functions, or prevent the execution of
any administrative order;
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of any
public officer or employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social
end, any act of hate or revenge against
private persons or any social class; and
5. To despoil, for any political or social
end, any person, municipality or
province, or the National Government
(or the Government of the United
States), of all its property or any part
thereof.
LEAGUE V PEOPLE
Facts: Jose League was the general treasurer
of the party called Sakdalista whose
objective was to obtain absolute
independence from the Philippines before
the end of year of 1935; The Sakdalists
planned an armed uprising in several
provinces, especially that of Laguna.
On the night of May 2, 1935 they connected
telegraph and telephone wires in the
municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, with
the border towns and with Manila and the
electricity were cut-off. Armed people stood
in the roads to stop the passage of vehicles,
and snatching their weapons. Several
hundred Sakdalistas, provided with bands,
flags and a diversity of arms, marched in
groups to seize the municipal building of
Santa Rosa and subtract said municipality of
obedience to the duly constituted
government
The accused contended that the crime
committed by him was only sedition,
because the uprising took place only in a
municipality, which was a small territory.
Issue: WON the contention of the accused is
correct.
Held: Yes. What distinguishes sedition from
rebellion is not the extent of the territory
covered by the uprising but rather the object
at which the uprising aims. The purpose of
the Sakdal uprising was to obtain the
independence of certain portions of the
territory from the government and
withdrawing it from the authority of the
central government. That is one of the
purposes of the uprising in rebellion. It is not
one of the objects of sedition as enumerated
in Article 139.
PEOPLE V UMALI
Facts: On the eve of the election, at the
house of Pasumbal's father, then being used
as his electoral headquarters, Congressman
Umali instructed Pasumbal to contact the
Huks through Commander Abeng so that
Punzalan would be killed. Pasumbal,
complying with the order of his Chief
(Umali), went to the mountains which were
quite near the town and held a conference
with Commander Abeng. It would seem that
Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that
Punzalan was going to win in the election
the next day, and that his death was the
surest way to eliminate him from the
electoral fight.
In the evening of the same day, Pasumbal
reported to Umali about his conference with
Commander Abeng, saying that the latter
was agreeable to the proposition and even
outlined the manner of attack.
After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his
troops numbering about fifty, armed with
garands and carbines, arrived. Congressman
Umali, holding a revolver, was seen in the
company of Huk Commander Torio and
about 30 armed men. Then shots were heard.
Afterwards they saw Umali and his
companions leave in the direction of
Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.
Issue: WON, the crime committed was
sedition.
Held: We are convinced that the principal
and main, though not necessarily the most
serious, crime committed here was not
rebellion but rather that of sedition. The
purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders
in rising publicly and taking up arms was
not exactly against the Government and for
the purpose of doing things denned in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. The
raiders did not even attack the Presidencia,
the seat of the local Government. Rather, the
object was to attain by means of force,
intimidation, etc., one object, to wit, to
inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the
person or property of a public official,
namely, Punzalan who was then mayor of
Tiaong.
U.S V ABAD
Facts: Maximo Abad was charged with
violation of oath of allegiance when he
denied to an officer of the United States
Army the existence of certain rifles at the
time of his surrender in April 1901 when in
fact, he was aware of the existence and
whereabouts of such rifles. Section 14 of
Article 292 of the United States Philippine
Commission states that: "Any person who
shall have taken any oath before any military
officer under the Civil Government of the
Philippine Islands, whether such official so
administering the oath was specially
authorized by law so to do or not, in which
oath the affiant is substance engaged to
recognize or accept the supreme authority of
the United States of America in these Islands
or to maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by its duly constituted
authorities and who shall, after the passage
of this act, violate the terms and provisions
of such oath or any of such terms or
provisions, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or
both."
Abad is a former insurgent officer and is
entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of
amnesty if the offense is one of those to
which the proclamation applies. The
denying of the whereabouts of the rifles can
be considered an act of treason, as being an
act of adhering to the enemies of the United
States, giving them aid and comfort, the
offense in this particular case might,
perhaps, be held to be covered by the
amnesty as being, in substance, treason
though prosecuted under another name.
Issue: Whether or not the offense of
violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the
category of “treason and sedition.”
Held: Yes. Treason is defined in section 1 of
Act No. 292 to consist in levying war
against the United States or the Government
of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within
the Philippine Islands or elsewhere. Sedition
is defined in section 5 of the same act as the
rising publicly and tumultuously in order to
obtain by force or outside of legal methods
certain enumerated objects of a political
character.
The offense of violation of oaths of
allegiance, being one of the political
offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included
in the general words "treason and sedition,"
as used in the amnesty proclamation of July
4, 1902.
The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include:
treason, misprision of treason, insurrection,
conspiracy to commit treason or
insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, seditious words and libels, the
formation of secret political societies, and
violation of oaths of allegiance. When the
framer of the proclamation used the words
"treason and sedition" to describe the purely
political offenses covered by the amnesty,
we think it was his intention, without
specially enumerating the political offenses
defined in Act No. 292, to include them all
under the terms “treason and sedition.”
PEOPLE V TAHIL AND TARSON
Facts: Commander Green, with a group of
soldiers, stationed himself about 50 meters
in front of the fort where he found a red flag
flying and demanded the surrender of Datu
Tahil, a warrant of arrest having been issued
against him and his followers. He did not
receive any reply to his intimation, and, in
turn, a group of armed Moros appeared at
the left flank of the Constabulary soldiers in
the act of attacking them, but were repelled.
It was again intimated that Datu Tahil
surrender, but again no answer was received,
and then a large group of Moros appeared in
an aggressive attitude, being likewise
repelled.
Issue: WON the crime of sedition was
committed.
Held: Yes. Having resisted the judicial
warrant of arrest by means of force and
thereby prevented the officers, charged with
the duty of arresting them, from performing
it, Datu Tahil and his men committed the
crime of sedition.
US VS LAPUS
FACTS:
On the night of June 3, 1902, a band
composed of about four hundred men,
among whom were the accused, armed with
guns, revolvers, talibones, bolos, and clubs,
raided the town of Cabiao; that said band
went through the streets of the town firing
shots, yelling, and frightening the
inhabitants thereof; that some of said band
went to the house of the municipal president,
while others raided several houses, taking
captive sixty or seventy of the inhabitants
thereof.
It is also proven by the testimony of
witnesses that the above-mentioned
association called "Santa Iglesia", to which
the said Felipe Salvador belongs, was
organized for the purpose of performing acts
of hatred and vengeance against the
authorities and the wealthy people in the
towns, as occurred to the residents of the
town of Cabiao, in which were put in
practice and execution acts tending to such
political-social ends.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused were
guilty of the crime of sedition.
HELD:
YES. The accused performed acts of
violence on the persons of the president and
other residents of the town, against the law
and the supreme authority and with political-
social purposes. For these reasons the acts
performed by the defendants constitute
sedition as defined by the aforesaid sections
of Act No. 292. The crime of sedition was
consummated, even though the object of the
defendants was not realized.
US VS APURADO, et al.
FACTS:
500 residents of the municipality assembled
near the municipal building, and upon the
opening of the session a large number of this
assembled about the building crowded into
the council chamber and demanded the
dismissal from office of the municipal
treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the
chief of police, and the substitution in their
places of new officials whose names were
suggested by the spokesman of the party and
that the persons who took part in the
movement were wholly unarmed except that
a few carried canes.
ISSUE: Whether or not sedition took place
in this instant case.
HELD:
No. Every instance of such disorderly
conduct by individual members of a crowd
as an excuse to characterize the assembly as
a seditious and tumultuous rising against the
authorities. The evidence of the record does
not establish the guilt of the accused of the
crime of sedition with which they are
charged, and they should be and are hereby
acquitted.
People vs Mendoza gr. L-2371
FACTS:
About the time compromised between June
9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in
the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken,
making it to appear as if he were hanging
lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended form the limb of the tree, when in
truth and in fact, he was merely standing on
a barrel. After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to
several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation not only in the Province of Bohol
but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide
note or letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by a fictitious suicide.
Such letter includes his grievances against
the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not he is liable for the
crime of sedition.
HELD:
No. The court held that though he has
written something that was against the
government, he has not made enough action
to perform such act. What was clear is that
he has made writings not to do sedition but
to incite the readers to do it. The court held
that the crime should be in violation to
article 142 which s inciting to sedition.
ART 142 INCITING TO SEDITION
People vs Perez
FACTS:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the
municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac
Perez, while holding a discussion with
several persons on political matters, insult
by word, without his presence, the
Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice
and in the presence of many persons, and in
a public place, the following phrases: "Asin
an mangña filipinos na caparejo co,
maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin
haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang
recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas,"
which in English, is as follows: "And the
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
cutting off Wood's head for having
recommended a bad thing for the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable for the
crime inciting to sedition.
HELD:
Yes. He has made a statement and done an
act which tended to instigate others to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes. He
has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious
conspiracies. He has made a statement and
done an act which tended to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities.
Pol vs Nabong
FACTS:
A meeting came to the attention of Major
Silvino Gallardo, in charge of the Philippine
Constabulary in Cabanatuan, and he was
informed that the red flag would be
displayed in this meeting as an emblem of
the communists. Major Gallardo accordingly
had an interview with the provincial fiscal
over the question whether the display of the
flag should be prevented. The fiscal gave an
opinion to the effect that the display of the
red flag would be unlawful, and a copy of
his opinion to this effect was placed in the
hands of Major Gallardo. After perusing the
opinion Nabong said that he did not agree
with the conclusion of the fiscal; and he,
therefore, refused to accompany the
Constabulary officers and the deputy
provincial fiscal to Santa Rosa, stating that,
if he were to go there, he would tell the
communists that no law prohibited the
display of the red flag and that he would
induce them to display the same.
Issue: Whether or not he is liable of the
crime inciting to sedition.
HELD: Yes. The language used by the
appellant clearly imported an overthrow of
the Government by violence, and it should
be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense
in which it was evidently intended to be
understood. The word "overthrow" could not
have been intended as referring to an
ordinary change by the exercise of the
elective franchise. The use of the whip, an
instrument designed to leave marks on the
sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the
mild interpretation which the appellant
would have us impute to the language.
Espuelas vs People
FACTS:
About the time compromised between June
9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in
the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken,
making it to appear as if he were hanging
lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended form the limb of the tree, when in
truth and in fact, he was merely standing on
a barrel. After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to
several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation not only in the Province of Bohol
but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide
note or letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by a fictitious suicide.
Such letter includes his grievances against
the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not he is liable for the
crime of inciting to sedition.
HELD:
Yes. The mere fact that a person was so
disgusted with his "dirty government" to the
point of taking his own life, is not merely a
sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to
arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction
against its duly constituted authorities.
US vs Tolentino
FACTS:
Aurelio Tolentino did utter seditious words
and speeches and did write, publish, and
circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands. He had said false, seditious, and
inflammatory words and scurrilous libels are
in Tagalog language in a theatrical work
written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which
was presented by him and others on the said
14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro
Libertad," in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, entitled 'Kahapon Ñgayon at Bukas'
(Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow).
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable
for the crime inciting to sedition.
HELD: Yes. The manner and form in
which the drama was presented at such a
time and under such conditions, renders
absurd the pretense that it was merely or
even principally a literary or artistic
production, and the clumsy devices, the
allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness,
past and future, of the events portrayed,
could not and in fact were not intended to
leave the audience in doubt as to its present
and immediate application, nor should they
blind this court to the true purpose and intent
of the author and director of the play.
Gitlow vs New York
FACTS:
Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for
distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto" that
called for the establishment of socialism
through strikes and class action of any form.
Gitlow was convicted under New York’s
Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished
advocating the overthrow of the government
by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that
since there was no resulting action flowing
from the manifesto's publication, the statute
penalized utterances without propensity to
incitement of concrete action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in
convicting him in the crime of inciting to
sedition.
HELD:
No. Court reasoned the government could
punish speech that threatens its basic
existence because of the national security
implications. Despite the small scale of
Gitlow’s actions, the majority was not
persuaded that they were too insignificant to
have an impact.
ART 143 ACT TENDING TO PREVENT
THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY
AND SIMILAR BODIES.
People vs Alipit
FACT: Exequiel Alipit had fired his
revolver in the air, enter the session room of
the municipality building of Cabuyao
wherein the municipal council of Cabuyao
was holding a meeting presided over by the
vice-president, Manuel Basa, and once in
said room, the aforesaid accused Exequiel
Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, abusing their
authority as municipal president and chief of
police respectively, the former with a
revolver in his hand, and both using violence
and intimidation not only upon the person of
said vice-president Manuel Basa, but also
upon those of the councilors present at the
aforesaid meeting, and without any
justifiable motive or legal authority and by
means of force, arrested said vice-president
Manuel Basa.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alipit violated
article 143 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
Yes. Nobody has the right to dissolve,
through violence, the meeting of a council
under the present of the existence of such a
legal defect which was not apparent, but
required an investigation before it could be
determined. Any stranger, even if he be the
municipal president himself or the chief of
the municipal police, must respect the
meeting of the municipal council which for
the time being, at least, raises the
presumption that no defect exists to render it
illegal.
ARTICLE 144.DISTURBANCE OF
PROCEEDINGS.
Lopez vs Delos Reyes
FACTS:
Candido Lopez attacked and assaulted,
without any justification, the Honorable Jose
D. Dimayuga, who was then and is now a
member of the House of Representatives of
the Philippine Islands, while said
Representative was going to the hall of the
House of Representative to attend to the
sessions which were then about to begin, as
a result of which attack and assault said
Representative was unable to attend the
sessions on that day and those of the two
days next following, by reason of the threats
which Mr. Candido Lopez made against said
Representative, Honorable Jose D.
Dimayuga.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lopez should be
held liable for the crime of disturbance of
proceedings.
HELD: Yes. The court has proven that such
act of the accused must be punished in the
immediate view or presence of said bodies.
The law expressly said to punish the
fraudulent altering of the draft of any bill,
resolution, ordinance, or act pending before
or enacted by any such body or the
Philippine Legislature; to compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence before the Philippine
Commission or Philippine Assembly or
before any committee of either or both said
bodies, and for other purposes.
ARTICLE 148 DIRECT ASSAULTS
US Vs DIRAIN
FACTS:
The president of the town was supposed to
pay the salaries of the policemen, hence,
Dirain, the Chief of poice, accompanied by
four armed men, went to the house of the
president, compelled him by force to leave it
and go to the presidencia and there kept him
confined until he had raised enough money
to pay what was due them as salaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dirain is liable for
direct assault.
HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the
defendant went to the house of the president
in the middle of the afternoon, armed; that
the latter at once went to the presidencia and
remained there about four hours; that
relatives of his brought to the presidencia
money sufficient to pay the salaries of the
policemen and that the president then went
home.
Clarin v. Justice of the Peace, G.R. No. L-
7661, April 30, 1955
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
US v. Tabiana, 37 Phil 515
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
US v. Cox, 3 Phil 140
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
US v. Gumban, 39 Phil 76
Facts:
Petronilo Gumban, municipal president of
Jaro, Iloilo, was in the barrio of Pavia,
inspecting thequarantine of animals. He was
getting some information from a councilor,
Magdaleno Suliano, regardingthe condition
of the animals in his barrio when Gregorio
Ismana, tenant of Suilano, arrived to report
thathe had surprised a carabao belonging to
Policarpio Gumban destroying the planted
area belonging to Suilano, and that having
seized the carabao, he brought the same to
the police station at Pavia, which iswithin
the zone affected by quarantine. Then,
Epifanio Gumban and the accused
Nicomedes Gumban,brothers of Policarpio,
arrived there and protested to the president
that their brother’s carabao was taken to
Pavia, which is within the zone affected by
the quarantine. The president, uponhearing
the protest, said that it was his opinion that
Gregorio Ismana was right in taking the
carabao tothe police station. However, he
promised to intervene in the matter and to
telephone to the man incharge of the
quarantine to find out whether, in the
following day, the said carabao could not
bewithdrawn from the zone affected by the
quarantine.
Upon hearing this statement of the president,
the accused insulted the said president and
gave him aslap on the face which struck his
left ear.
Issue: Whether or not there is assault upon
persons in authority?
Held:
Yes, according to the doctrine above set
forth, (art 250, now art 148) the facts proved
in this case invlolve all the necessary
elements that constitutes the crime of
assault, inasmuch as the offendedparty,
being a municipal president, was a person in
authority and was in the performance of his
officialduty. The difference in this case to
the other cases where a degree of force is
needed is that in thepresent case, the crime
involved is that of assault upon a person in
authority, in which the forcenecessary to
constitute an assault, since the law itself
defines concretely this force in providing
that itconsists in laying hands upon the
person. The law simply mentions the laying
hands. Without makingany distinction when
the law does not make it.
US v. Samonte, 16 Phil 516
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
People v. Carpizo, 80 Phil 234
Facts:
On or about the 29th day of April 1946, in
the municipality of nJolo, rovince of Sulu,
the accused being the husband of Mrs.
Martina Carpizo, the creditor of provincial
voucher no. A-2250, which voucher was on
pre-audit in the possession of Eutiquio de la
Victoria, clerk, duly appointed in the office
of the Provincial Auditor of Sulu, and while
said Eutiquio was in the point of writing on
the typewriter the tentative suspension of
said voucher, for being defective attacked
the said Eutiquio and took hold of his neck
with his left hand and at the same time
inflicted upon him a fistic blow on his left
cheek which produced a contusion. He was
then charged with assault upon an agent of
authority with slight physical injury
Issue.
Whether or not the accused commited an act
of direct assault
Held:
No. The second form of Direct assault
pursuant to Article 148 of the RPC has not
completey satisfied. The second element is
absent as the person assaulted is not a person
in authority. A mere clerk in the provincial
auditor’s office is not a person in authority
or an agent. Even if, it be possible that
particular clerk might be clothed with
functions that bring him under the definition
of an agent of a person in authority, still
such functions must be clearly shown in the
information.
People v. Balbar, 21 Phil 1119
Facts:
Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room
where school teacher Ester Gonzales was
conducting her classes. Without warning, he Complainant was a teacher. Direct assault is
allegedly placed his arms around her and committed "by any person or persons who,
kissed her on the eye. Shocked, Gonzales without a public uprising, shall attack,
instinctively pushed Balbar away and tried employ force, or seriously intimidate or
to flee. He allegedly brought out his "daga" resist any person in authority or any of his
(a local dagger) and pursued her, catching agents, while engaged in the performance of
up with her before she was able to get out of official duties or on occasion of such
the room. Balbar embraced her again, at the performance." By express provision of law
same time holding on to his "daga". They "teachers, professors, and persons charged
both fell to the floor, slight as a result of with the supervision of public or duly
which complainant sustained slight physical recognized private schools, colleges and
injuries. universities shall be deemed persons in
authority, in applying the provisions of
Two informations, one for Direct Assault Article 148." to give them protection,
Upon A Person in Authority and another for dignity, and respect while in the
Acts of Lasciviousness were filed. Balbar performance of their official duties.
was accused with of the crime of Assault
upon a Person in Authority, committed as he
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and People v. Ramos, 57 Phil 462
feloniously assault Gonzales, a public school
teacher, duly qualified and appointed as such Facts:
and while in the performance of her official Issue:
duties or on the occasion. That the crime
was committed with the aggravating Held:
circumstances of having committed it inside
the public school building and during school
classes. The accused filed separate motions US v. Baluyot, 40 Phil 385
to quash, contending that the complaint
charged two offenses which constitute only Facts:
one and that he shall then be placed in Issue:
double jeopardy. The Court a quo agreed.
Held:
Issue:
Whether or not quashing the information for
Direct Assault should be set aside by reason
of absence of knowledge of the accused that
the victim is a person in authority
Justo v. CA, 99 Phil 463
Held:
The lower court’s dismissal of the
information on the ground that there is no Facts:
express allegation in the information that the
Nemesio de la Cuesta is a duly appointed
accused had knowledge that the person
district supervisor of the Bureau of Public
attacked was a person in authority is clearly
Schools stationed at Sarat, Ilocos Norte. On
erroneous.
October 16, 1950, he went to Laoag to
answer a call from the said office to revise
the plantilla of his district. At About 11:25
am, De la Cuesta was about to leave his
office to take his meal when he saw Justo
(petitioner) conversing with Severino
Caridad, an academic supervisor. Justo
requested De la Cuesta to go with him and
Caridad to the office of the latter. In the
office, Caridad asked about the possibility of
accommodating a certain Miss Racela as a
teacher. Caridad said that there was no
vacancy except the position of shop teacher.
Justo abruptly said, Shet, you are a double
crosser. One who canot keep his promise.”
Justo grabbed a lead paper weight and
challenged Nemesio to go out. They left the
office. When they able of one of the clerk’s
tables. De la Cuesta asked Justo to put down
the paper weight but instead the Justo
grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt
of the de la Cuesta which was torn. Carlos
Bueno separated the protagonists, but not
before the complainant had boxed the
appellant several times. Petitioner Justo
argued that that when the complainant
accepted his challenge to fight outside and
followed him out of the room of Mr. Caridad
where they had a verbal clash, he
(complainant) disrobed himself of the
mantle of authority and waived the privilege
of protection as a person in authority.
Issue:
WON the offended party is still a person in
authority after accepting to “go out” and
fight
Held:
Yes. The character of person in authority is
not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches
to a public official until he ceases to be in
office. Assuming that the complainant was
not actually performing the duties of his
office when assaulted, this fact does not bar
the existence of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority, so long as the impelling
motive of the attack is the performance of
official duty. This is apparent from the
phraseology of Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code, in penalizing attacks upon
person in authority "while engaged in the
performance of official duties or on occasion
of such performance", the words "on
occasion" signifying "because" or "by
reason" of the past performance of official
duty, even if at the very time of the assault
no official duty was being discharged
(People vs. Garcia, 20 Phil., 358).
People v. Tilos, et al, CA,36, OG,54
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
People vs. Villasenor
GR No. L-28574. October 14, 1970
FACTS:
At about eight o’clock in the evening of
April 26, 1964, sergeant Madia, together
with patrolmen Serafin Sebua and Lope
Jimena, was patrolling the market place
of Boac. They were seated in a row with
their backs to and near the wall of the
Salvo drugstore, about one and one-half
meters from the police outpost at the
street intersection. Sergeant Madia was
seated on an empty wooden box with
patrolman Sebua to his left and to his right
was patrolman Jimena, who was then
seated on a batibot chair. Sergeant Madla
was then in civilian clothing consisting of
a dark pants and a striped polo shirt
tucked in his waist. His gun was buttoned
up inside the leather holster hanging from
his belt by his right waist. Beside the
outpost is an electric post from which
hanged a 50-watt bulb, which was then
lighted about four meters above the
ground. The said police outpost and the
Salvo drugstore are at the corner of Isok
Street and another street facing the
market place. While the three were
conversing between 8:00 and 8:30 that
evening, the accused suddenly appeared
about three feet in front of them with a
drawn gun, asked sergeant Madia whether
he was still mad at him, and
immediately fired four shots at Madla
before the latter could reply and before
anyone of them could do anything.
Fearing that they might be hit, policemen
Jimena and Sebua ran away, with
patrolman Sebua seeking cover in a
refreshment parlor across the street about
twenty-five meters away. As he sprinted
towards the other side of the street,
patrolman Sebua heard three more shots.
Thereafter, he saw the accused fleeing
towards the direction of the municipality
of Mogpog. After the accused had gone,
patrolmen Sebua and Jimena returned to
the place of the incident and saw
sergeant Madla lying on his back
drenched in his own blood, with his gun
still buttoned up inside its holster hanging
by his right waist and touching the
ground.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused knew that the
victim was then performing his official
functions as police sergeant.
HELD:
The crime of direct assault upon an
agent of a person in authority has not
been established by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. The record is bereft of
any proof even remotely suggesting that
the accused herein knew that the victim
was then performing his official functions
as police sergeant. The victim was not
in uniform at the time. The deceased was
then wearing dark pants and a polo shirt
tucked inside his waistline. While the
deceased then had his service firearm
buttoned inside its holster hanging by his
right waist, and was then with two of
his policemen, these facts alone do not
indicate that he was then in the
performance of his police duties. And
there is no showing that the accused
appellant personally knew of the entry in
the police blotter that deceased was then
on twenty-four-hour duty as field
sergeant. Much less is there proof that
the assault on the victim was provoked,
or by reason of an act performed, by the
victim in his official capacity.
People vs CFI Quezon, Br. V
GR No. L-41045. Nov, 28, 1975
FACTS:
No Facts ~
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused knew the
position held by the person attacked.
HELD:
Of importance in this case is the lack of
allegation in the complaint or in the
information that the offended party was an
agent of a person in authority and that such
fact was known to the accused. The absence
of such allegation is fatal in this case.
US vs Garcia
20 Phil 358. October 16, 1911
FACTS:
The justice of the peace was presiding at the
hearing of a suit between Carmen Pascual
and Calixto Espinosa, and when the decision
therein had been read, or just after it had
been announced, Prudencio Garcia uttered
these words: "We don't agree to the
decision," to which CarmenPascual added:
"Surely, not at all." The justice said to
them:"If you don't agree to the decision, you
can appeal by filing bond therefor." Garcia
replied with a disrespectful and
contemptuous remark, whereupon the justice
turned to him and said: "What have you do
with this case, when you are not a party to
it? Please get out of here." Garcia left, but
when he reached the stairway he turned back
toward the justice and said in a threatening
manner: "We'll see," then went downstairs.
A little later the justice started home.Garcia,
who was waiting for him near by, followed
him and when he turned a corner went up to
him, saying: "Now is a good time to get
even with you, you dirty justice of the
peace," and attacked him, striking him with
a cane he was carrying and also slapping his
face.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of
direct assault.
HELD:
It is plain that the defendant committed a
violation of article 249 of the Penal Code,
case 2, by attacking an officer in the
discharge of his duties as justice of the
peace, with the third of the aggravating
circumstances in article 250, in that he
placed his hands upon an officer of the law,
for which reason the penalty was raised to
the degree fixed in the judgment.
People vs. Hecto
GR L-52787. February 28, 1985
FACTS:
Sometime in January or February 1972,
brothers Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto
slaughtered a carabao in barrio San Isidro,
municipality of Dulag, Province of Leyte.
They did not pay the corresponding
“tumbada” or slaughter fee and upon
learning of this non-payment, Barangay
Captain Catalino Pedrosa asked him (Jesus)
to pay the same. Jesus replied that he could
not yet pay the required slaughter fee
because those who bought meat from him
had not also paid him yet. Thereafter,
Pedrosa met Municipal Treasurer Benedicto
de la Paz who informed him that according
to theHecto brothers they had already paid
the slaughter fee to him (Pedrosa). Pedrosa
denied having received the fee mentioned.
Thereafter, Pedrosa confronted the two
about the false information they gave the
municipal official concerning the alleged
payment of the slaughter fee to him. A
heated discussion ensued and the Hectos
tried to attack Pedrosa. Mrs. Caridad
Pedrosa pulled her husband away and the
trouble was averted.
About 6:00 in the afternoon of March 24,
1972, Catalino Pedrosa left his house in
barangay San Isidro to accompany a two-
year old nephew to the house of the child’s
parents.On his way back, about 6:30 he was
shot by Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto and
thereafter stabbed by Marcial Hecto and
Roberto Silvano. Caridad, could see Jesus
Hecto pointing a gun at her husband,
Catalino Pedrosa, who was already lying on
the ground face up. This was followed by
Pedro Hecto who also fired his own gun at
Pedrosa. Thereafter, Jesus Hecto,Pedro
Hecto, Marcial Hecto and Roberto Silvano
carried the victim to a nearby ditch where
Roberto and Marcial took turns in stabbing
him with their bolos. The four assailants
then walked away. Loreto Hecto and
Faustino Silvano who were at the door of the
house of the Pedrosas guarding Caridad
joined the four.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused guilty.
HELD:
The trial court erred in convicting them of
the complex crime of murder with assault
upon a person in authority. They pointed out
that when the barangay captain was killed he
was not in actual performance of his official
duties. Be that as it may, the fact is, the
attack on the deceased was occasioned by
the official duties done by him. As the
barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce
the laws and ordinances within the barangay.
If in the enforcement thereof he incurs the
enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him, the crime
committed is murder with assault upon a
person in authority.
Sarcepuedes v People
GR No. L-3857. October 22, 1951
FACTS:
Hilarion Sarcepuedes laid hands on Lucrecia
L. Bustamante, a teacher-nurse, in the school
building of the town by hitting her twice on
the face with his raincoat and violently
pushing her to the window.The assault took
place because Lucrecia had ordered the
closing of a pathway across her land thru
which Hilarion and his wife used to pass in
going to and from the school, closing which
Hilarion deeply resented. It seems that
Hilarion Sarcepuedes sought Lucrecia
Bustamante at the school premises to
demand an explanation. One word led to
another and to the criminal employment of
force already described.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant be punished
under Article 148.
HELD:
It appearing that at the time of the ill
treatment she was about to pierce an earring
hole on the ear-lobe of a school child in the
school clinic and that such work was
included in her mission of giving treatment
to the school pupils, the appellate court did
not make a mistake on this particular issue.
It is unquestioned that this defendant knew
Lucrecia was a teacher-nurse. Explaining
that the motive for the offense was a dispute
totally foreign to Lucrecia's educational
labors. However, inasmuch as we have
found that Lucrecia was hurt while
performing her ordinary Government tasks,
the motive for the aggression becomes
immaterial. She was pounced upon "while
engaged in the performance" of her official
duties, within the meaning ofArticle 148.
ART. 150. DISOBEDIENCE TO
SUMMONS ISSUED BY THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ITS
COMMITTEES OR SUBCOMMITTEES,
BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS, ITS COMMITTEES,
SUBCOMMITTEES OR DIVISIONS.
Uy Khaytin vs Villareal
42 Phil 886. September 21, 1920
FACTS:
Armed with that search warrant, the
respondent M. S. Torralba, lieutenant of
the Philippine Constabulary, accompanied
by some of his subordinates, on the
same day (April 30th) searched the house
of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found
therein 60 small cans of opium. They
wanted to search also the bodega on the
ground-floor of the house, but Uy
Kheytin positively denied that it was his
or that he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba
wanted to be sure, and for this reason he
placed a guard in the premises to see
that nothing was removed therefrom, and
then went away to find out who the
owner of the bodega was. The next
morning he learned from the owner of the
house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo,
that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the
one who was renting the bodega.
Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and his
subordinates resumed the search and then
and there found and seized a number or
items.
While said cause was in the Court of
First Instance, pending the filing of a
complaint by the provincial fiscal, the
defendants, petitioners herein, through
their attorney, filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance, asking for the
return of "private papers, books and
other property" which the Constabulary
officers had seized from said defendants,
upon the ground that they had been so
seized illegally and in violation of the
constitutional rights of the defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of books,
personal letters and other properties were
authorized.
HELD:
Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General
Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically
require that a search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The
evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search
warrant — to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that
"unreasonable searches and seizures" may
not be made, — that abuses may not be
committed.
That the officers of the law believed that
the books, papers, etc., which they seized
might be used as evidence against the
petitioners herein in a criminal action
against them for a violation of the
Opium Law, is no reason or justification
under the law for the seizure: First,
because they were not "particularly
described" or even mentioned in the
search warrant; second, because, even if
they had been mentioned in the search
warrant, they could not be legally seized,
for a search warrant cannot be used for
the purpose of obtaining evidence; and
third, because to compel a person to
produce his private papers to be used in
evidence against him would be equivalent
to compelling him to be a witness against
himself.
The seizure of the petitioners' books,
letters, telegrams, and other articles which
have no inherent relation with opium and
the possession of which is not forbidden
by law, was illegal and in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional rights.
Arnault vs Nazareno
Gr No. L-3820. July 18, 1950
FACTS:
A Senate investigation was thereafter held to
determine how the Philippine Government
was duped and who ultimately benefited
from the assailed transaction. One of the
issues pursued was to whom did Arnault
give the cash amounting to P400,000.
Arnault’s refusal to provide the name of the
person, initially because he couldn’t
remember it and later for fear of self-
incrimination, led to his being cited for
contempt. He was thereafter held in prison,
and was to be freed only after saying the
name of the person he gave the P400,000 to.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to
punish Arnault for contempt.
HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that such power is
necessary, especially in the conduct of
inquiries that fall within the Senate’s
jurisdiction. It is not a requirement that each
and every single question asked of witnesses
necessarily be material to the case. This is so
because the necessity for legislative action
and the form and character of the action
itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question.
ART. 151. RESISTANCE AND
DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY OR THE AGENTS OF
SUCH PERSON
US vs Ramayrat
GR No. 6874. March 8, 2012
FACTS:
Sabino Vayson filed suit against Cayetano
Ramayrat, in the justice of the peace court of
Misamis, for the recovery of possession of a
parcel of land belonging to the said Sabino
Vayson. The said justice of the peace court
rendered judgment by sentencing Cayetano
Ramayrat to deliver the possession of the
said land to the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson.
That, when Cosme Nonoy, the deputy
sheriff of the municipality of Misamis,
demanded of the defendant, Cayetano
Ramayrat, on April 29, 1910, in the
municipality of Misamis, Province of
Misamis, within the jurisdiction of this
court, that he deliver the said land to the
plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, the said defendant,
Cayetano Ramayrat, voluntarily, unlawfully
and criminally refused, and still refuses, to
deliver the said land to the aforementioned
Sabino Vayson.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the
crime of disobedience to a person in
authority.
HELD:
No. The defendant did not disobeyed any
judicial order whatever. The order issued by
the justice of the peace and alleged to have
been disobeyed, is a writ of execution and
addressed, as was natural and proper, to the
competent sheriff, and not to the defendant.
In it the sheriff is commanded to place the
plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, who had won in
the suit against the herein defendant for the
recovery of the property, in possession of
the said disputed land. Such command is
made solely and exclusively to the sheriff,
and not to the defendant. The order itself
leaves this to be clearly understood by
warning the sheriff, and no one else, that he
shall be liable to the penalties of the law in
case of noncompliance. The warning is
solely for the sheriff, because the writ must
be served by him, and he alone it was who
could fail to comply with or disobey it.
US vs. Bautista
GR No. 10678. August 17, 1915
FACTS:
An order of arrest was issued for the
defendant and placed in the hands of the
chief of police of the municipality of
Gerona. On or about the 15th ofNovember,
the chief of police, accompanied by another
policeman, went to the house where the
defendant was staying for the purpose of
making the arrest. Upon arrival at the house,
inquiry was made of some of the occupants
whether or not the defendant was there.
Upon being informed that he was in the
house, the policeman who accompanied the
chief of police entered the house without
permission and attempted to arrest the
defendant without explaining to him the
cause or nature of his presence there. The
defendant, according to the declaration of
the chief of police, resisted the arrest, calling
to his neighbors for assistance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the
crime of assault upon agents of the
authorities.
HELD:
No. The record does not disclose sufficient
facts to justify the sentence imposed by. The
defendant is not guilty of the crime
described in the complaint. The whole
record shows that the resistance given by the
defendant was done under the belief that the
persons who had entered his house were
tulisanes. We do not believe that the law
contemplates the punishment of persons for
resistance of the authorities under
circumstances such as those which are
disclosed in the present case. If the
defendant believed that those who had
entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he
was entirely justified in calling his neighbors
and in making an attempt to expel them
from his premises.
People vs Chan Fook
GR No. 16968. October 6, 1921
FACTS:
The accused, a Chinese subject, was a
passenger of the United States Military
Transport South Bend, which arrived in
Manila on April 6,1920. Having been
allowed by the immigration authorities to
land, he left the boat on the same day, April
6. At about 3or 4 o'clock in the afternoon of
the following day, he went to pier No. 1 to
get his baggage. After the search of the
baggage in which postcards of an indecent
character were found, a customs agent,
Eugenio M. Cruz, attempted to search the
body of the accused, to which the latter
apparently objected. A dispute took place
between the two, which terminated in the
secret agent seizing the Chinaman by the
arm with intent to search his body, after
showing him his police badge. The accused
resisted and struck the secret agent on the
stomach. The latter in turn struck him on the
neck. Here the customs inspector, Anastacio
Jacinto, intervened, and explained to the
accused that Cruz was a customs secret
service agent and had the right to search him
in order to find whether he had on his person
any contraband. Then the appellant made no
further resistance and allowed himself to be
searched.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed the
crime of resistance and disobedience to the
public authority as alleged in the
information.
HELD:
In the case at bar the action of the accused in
laying his hands on the agent Cruz is, in our
opinion, an adequate defense to repel the
aggression of the latter, who had seized him
by the arm for the purpose of searching him.
We are of the opinion that there is no ground
for finding the accused guilty of the crime.
That the accused had no intention to resist
and disobey the agents of the authority, in
the legal sense of the word, is shown by the
fact that by the mere explanation of the
customs inspector, Anastasio Jacinto, he
finally allowed himself to be searched.
Jacinto's words were sufficient to make
theChinaman submit himself peacefully to
the requirement of the agent Cruz.
US vs Tabiana
GR No. 11847. February 1, 1918
FACTS:
A warrant of arrest was issued, Callado and
Cabilitisan found the defendant around
4pm. Instead of coming he told the
policemen that he would come in later and
report at the municipal building with his
herdsman, the other defendant named in the
warrant.
At around 6pm, the defendant not having
appeared, the policemen were directed by
the chief of police to find him. They found
him at his house with his friends. The
policemen announced their errand. Tabiana
showed further resentment over the idea of
arrest but yielded and started to the
municipal building with the two. In passing
the market detached himself from the
custody of the policemen without the
consent and entered the market.
The policemen wait for about half an hour,
and then later went into the market and
found Tabiana with same friends. The
defendant asked for a warrant, Callado then
drew the warrant. The defendant took,
looked and put it into his pocket. After that,
he said “come along” and gave the
policeman a push, as did also by his friends.
When they arrived at the municipal, the
chief of police and other officials were gone.
This angered Tabiana, so he left with his
friends saying that they would find the
justice of peace.
The chief of police arrived at the municipal
building and learning what happened, he
ordered the two policemen together with
Cajilig to find and bring Tabiana back and
procure the return of warrant of arrest. Upon
finding Tabiana, in his tienda with friends,
he denied having taken the warrant. Tabiana
the approached Callado and hit him in the
breast with his hand/fist, at which instance
seized him. The policemen started to carry
him, when two bystander interfered and took
him away from the policeman. Justice of
peace Julian Canilla then arrived on the
scene and hit Callado in the back.
Tabiana retied to his apartment, and Julian
Canilles directed the policemen to go back.
The policemen then went away, which may
attributed not only to the command of the
justice of peace but also to the fact that some
of Tabiana’s friends indicated a
determination to fight if the policemen
should persist in their purpose of arresting
Tabiana.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the
crime of resistance to a person in authority.
HELD:
Yes. He is liable. Based on the proof of
records, the defendant clearly shows
resistance and grave disobedience. That
everything done by Tabiana upon his
occasion is properly referable to the idea of
resistance and grave disobedience. We
discern in his conduct no such aggression as
accompanies the determination to defy the
law and its representatives at all hazards.
Upon the previous occasions of his contact
with the policemen on this day, Tabiana
yielded, though with bad grace; and it is
evident that he would upon this occasion,
have gone to the police station again if it had
not been for the acts of others in rescuing
him, and for the intervention of the justice of
the peace, who ordered the policemen to
desist.
US vs Panaligan
GR No, 4674. August 23, 1909
FACTS:
The defendant, with a companion, was
attending the public market in the pueblo of
Luna in the Province of La Union on or
about the 18th day of September, 1907, and
was there for the purpose of selling his
goods, wares and merchandise of various
kinds; that soon after he had entered the
market a policeman, Nicomedes R. Nera,
offered to buy of the defendant some
sinamay, indicating a price which he was
willing to pay which was much less than the
price fixed by the defendant. Soon thereafter
a certain woman offered to buy some
sinamay of the defendant and the price was
agreed upon between the said woman and
the defendant. Thereafter the defendant, with
a pocket knife, cut off of a large piece 3
yards of sinamay for the said woman. After
the 3 yards had been cut off the woman
refused to accept or to pay for the same,
whereupon an altercation and quarrel arose
between the defendant and the woman.
Nera, the policeman, who had lingered near
the place where the defendant was selling
his wares, appeared upon the scene, drew
near and interfered or took part in the
discussion between the defendant and the
woman. The defendant requested the
policeman not to interfere in his private
matters. The policeman says that the
defendant drew his knife in a threatening
manner, whereupon he, the policeman, by
means of his club knocked the knife out of
the hand of the defendant. The defendant
asserts that the policeman took the knife out
of his pocket, where he had put it after
having cut off the sinamay as above
indicated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the
crime of attempt against an agent.
HELD:
From the evidence there seems to have been
no reason for the interference of the
policeman. There is nothing in the record
which justifies us in finding that the
defendant did in any way resist the
policeman or in any way show him
disrespect, or in any way interfere with him
in the performance of his duty. It seems to
us that the conduct of the policeman was
nothing more than that of meddlesome
interference in a matter with which he had
nothing to do; That the defendant was
justified under the circumstances of this case
in requesting the policeman not to interfere
with his private affairs.
People vs Veloso
GR No. L-23951. October 20, 1925
FACTS:
In May, 1923, the building located at No.
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was
used by an organization known as the
Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at
that time a member of the House of
Representative of the Philippine Legislature.
He was also the manager of the club. The
police of Manila had reliable information
that the so-called Parliamentary Club was
nothing more than a gambling house. Once
inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty
persons were apprehended by the police.
One of them was the defendant Veloso.
Policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso
only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit
Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him
a blow in another part of the body, which
injured the policeman quite severely.
Through the combined efforts of Townsend
and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down
on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of
reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and
chips were taken from his pockets. All of the
persons arrested were searched and then
conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso
again refused to obey and shouted offensive
epithets against the police department. It was
necessary for the policemen to conduct him
downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so
tenaciously that three policemen were
needed to place him in the patrol wagon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the
crime of resistance of the agents in
authority.
HELD:
Yes. The trial judge deduced from the
searched warrant that the accused Veloso
was sufficiently identified therein. Mention
was made by his Honor of the code
provision relating to a complaint or
information, permitting a fictitious name to
be inserted in the complaint or information,
in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-
General adds to this the argument that the
police were authorized to arrest without a
warrant since a crime was being committed.
We find it unnecessary to comment on this
contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the
exception and not the rule. The police
should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be
seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.
The police should not be hindered in the
performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the
best of conditions, by superficial adherence
to technicality or far fetched judicial
interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the
Attorney-General in their conclusions to the
effect that the search warrant was valid, and
that the defendant has been proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of
resistance of the agents of the authority.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
A search warrant was issued to
search the so-called Parliamentary Club
which was suspected to be a gambling
house. As such on 25 May 1923, they raided
the said establishment and apprehended
nearly fifty persons, one of which was
Veloso who is a member of the House of
Representative.
Representative Veloso said that the
police had no right to search the house
despite their search warrant; he also refused
to show the evidence of gambling which was
in his bulging pocket. This escalated to a
heated argument between Veloso and
Policeman Townsend which resulted to an
altercation between the former and another
policeman, who suffered injuries. Veloso
continued to disobey the policemen and
shouted offensive epithets against the police
department.
ISSUE:
Is Veloso liable for the crime of
Resistance and Disobedience to a Person in
Authority or the Agents of such Person
under Article 151 of the Revised Penal
Code?
RULING:
The Court held that YES. The
following elements must be present in order
for the crime of resistance and serious
disobedience to be appreciated: (1) That a
person in authority or his agent is engaged in
the performance of official duty or gives a
lawful order to the offender; (2) That the
offender resists or seriously disobeys such
person in authority or his agent; and (3) That
the act of the offender is not included in the
provisions of Articles 148, 149, and 150.
Here, while it is true that, in defense
of himself, any member of his family or his
dwelling, a man has a right to employ all
necessary violence. But even in the home,
and much less so in a club or public place,
the person sought to be arrested or to be
searched should use no more force than is
necessary to repel the unlawful act of the
officers. To authorize resistance to the
agents of the authority, the illegality of the
invasion must be clearly manifest. Here,
there was possibly a proper case for protest.
There was no case for excessive violence to
enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable
legal question. As such, Veloso is liable for
the crime of resistance of the agents of the
authority.
ARTICLE 153: TUMULTS and OTHER
DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LADISLAO BACOLOD, defendants-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-2578 July 31, 1951
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
On the 21st day of February, 1948, in
the municipality of Santa Fe, Cebu during
the a dance held in the municipal tennis
cour, BACOLOD fired a sub-machine gun
which wounded one Consorcia Pasinio,
thereby causing panic among the numerous
people present in the said dance who ran and
scampered in all directions.
ISSUE:
Is BACOLOD liable for the crime of
Tumults and Other Disturbance of Public
Orders under Article 153 of the Revised
Penal Code?
RULING:
The Court held that YES. The
abovementioned crime shall be committed
by any person who shall cause any serious
disturbance in a public place, office, or
establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb
public performances, functions or
gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is
not included in the provisions of Articles
131 and 132.
Here, BACOLOD’s act of firing a
sub-machine gun during the said dance
which caused many people to panic and be
terrified is constitutive of the crime of
tumults and other disturbance of public
orders.
ARTICLE 157: EVASION OF SERVICE
OF SENTENCE
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-1960 November 26,
1948
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
ABILONG, a convict which was
sentenced with destierro for attempted
robbery, was accused of the crime of
evasion of service of sentence because of
violation said sentence by entering the City
of Manila and committing vagrancy.
The accused alleged that the said
crime under Article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code does not cover evasion of
service of destierro.
ISSUE:
Is ABILONG liable for the crime of
Evasion of Service of Sentence under
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING:
The Court held that YES. Under the
said Code, Evasion of Service of Sentence is
committed by any convict who shall evade
service of his sentence by escaping during
the term of his imprisonment by reason of
final judgment.
Here, the word "imprisonment" used
in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the Spanish text which must be
the controlling in case of doubt. It was held
in the case of People vs Samonte that “it is
clear that a person under sentence of
destierro is suffering deprivation of his
liberty and escapes from the restrictions of
the penalty when he enters the prohibited
area." As such, although destierro does not
constitute imprisonment, it is a deprivation
of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as
in the present case, the appellant by his
sentence of destierro was deprived of the
liberty to enter the City of Manila. In
conclusion, ABILONG is guilty of evasion
of service of sentence when he entered the
said city.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOO HOE, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 12473 September 18, 1917
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
HOE was found guilty of a violation
of the Opium Law by the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Sulu,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and was
sentenced to be deported. The sentence was
executed. In the month of August, 1916, he
returned to the Philippine Islands, in
violation of the terms of said sentence.
ISSUE:
Is HOE liable for the crime of
jailbreaking?
RULING:
The Court said that NO. The
judgment of deportation was final. The
sentence had been duly executed. The court
had lost all jurisdiction over the defendant in
the case. The judgment was executed by the
executive department of the Government;
and if the defendant has escaped the penalty
imposed by the court, the executive
department of the Government has its
remedy by enforcing the terms of the
sentence again. As such, the penalties for
jailbreaking cannot be applied to the acts of
the defendant.
ARTICLE 158: EVASION OF SERVICE
OF SENTENCE ON THE OCCASION OF
DISORDER, CONFLAGRATION,
EARTHQUAKES, OR OTHER
CALAMITIES
MANUEL ARTIGAS LOSADA,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JUAN ACENAS, as Superintendent of
Davao Penal Colony at Inagawan,
respondent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-810 March 31, 1947
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
LOSADA, ET AL., was to be
released because they had earned earned a
special time allowance in the form of a
deduction of one-fifth of their respective
sentences under articles 98 and 158 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is due to the fact
that the abovementioned have not escaped
despite the war.
ISSUE:
Are the petititioners entitled to
special time allowance for loyalty under
Articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal
Code?
RULING:
The Court held that NO. Under the
said articles, a convict who shall give
themselves up to the authorities within the
period of 48 hours, after leaving the penal
institution where he shall have been
confined, on the occasion of disorder
resulting from a conflagration, earthquake,
explosion, or similar catastrophe, or during a
mutiny in which he has not participated shall
be entitled to a deduction of one-fifth of the
period of his sentence.
The special allowance for loyalty
authorized by articles 98 and 158 of the
Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts
who, having evaded the service of their
sentences by leaving the penal institution,
give themselves up within two days. Here,
LOSADA, ET AL., are not in that class,
because they have not escaped, they have no
claim to that allowance. For one thing there
is no showing that they ever had the
opportunity to escape, or that having such
opportunity they had the mettle to take
advantage of it or to brave the perils in
connection with a jailbreak. And there is no
assurance that had they successfully run
away and regained their precious liberty
they would have, nevertheless, voluntarily
exchanged it later with privations of prison
life impelled by that sense of right and
loyalty to the Government, which is sought
to be rewarded with the special allowance.
Wherefore, it is not plain that their case
comes within the spirit of the law they have
invoked. It must be observed in this
connection that the only circumstance
favorable to petitioners is the admission of
the respondent that they "remained in the
penal colony and did not try to escape
during the war."
(Read the dissenting opinion of Justice
Perfecto; the more appropriate decision, in
my opinion.)
FIDEL B. FORTUNO, petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-1782 February 2, 1948
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
 This is a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus in which the FORTUNO, a
prisoner whose aggregate penalty is more
than twenty years of imprisonment counted
from October 8, 1941, seeks his immediate
release. One of his grounds was that he was
entitled to the special time allowance for
loyalty under Articles 98 and 158 of the
Revised Penal Code because he stayed in
prison despite the war.

ISSUE:
Is FORTUNO entitled to special
time allowance for loyalty under Articles 98
and 158 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
The Court held that NO. The special
allowance for loyalty authorized by articles
98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code refers
to those convicts who, having evaded
service of their sentence by leaving the penal
institution, give themselves up within two
days, and not to those who have not escaped.
ARTICLE 159: OTHER CASES OF
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS
AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
TORRES was convicted for the
crime of estafa and imprisoned. However, he
was granted conditional pardon on the
condition that petitioner would "not again
violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the
manner prescribed by law."
Nevertheless, he was accused to have
committed estafa again, although it was still
pending for trial, which led to the
recommendation that his conditional pardon
should be cancelled. TORRES alleged that
he did not violate the condition of his pardon
because he is yet to be convicted by final
judgement of the said crime.
ISSUE:
Is TORRES liable for the crime of
Other Cases of Evasion of Service of
Sentence under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code?
RULING:
The Court held that the
determination of the occurrence of a breach
of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either
a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of
violation of a conditional pardon under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.
Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
In the matter of the petition of Antonio
Infante for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-4164 December 12, 1952
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
INFANTE was convicted for the
crime of murder and sentenced to 17 years.
On 1939, after serving for over 15 years, he
was granted a conditional pardon with the
condition that "he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines".
On 1949, he was found guilty of
driving a jeep without license resulting to
him being re-arrested and re-committed due
for breach of the condition of the aforesaid
pardon.
ISSUE:
Is INFANTE liable for the crime of
Other Cases of Evasion of Service of
Sentence under Article 15 9of the Revised
Penal Code?
RULING:
The Court held that NO. Although
the penalty remitted has not, in strict law,
prescribed, reimprisonment of the petitioner
for the remainder of his sentence, more than
ten years after he was pardoned, would be
repugnant to the weight of reason and the
spirit and genius of our penal laws. As such,
the condition of the pardon which the
prisoner was charged with having breached
was no longer operative when he committed
a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law.
NARCISO ALVAREZ Y CORTES,
petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-1809 January 23, 1948
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
ALVAREZ was convicted of
murder and sentenced to Reclusion
Perpetua. However, in December 1946, he
was granted absolute pardon. This pardon,
however, was granted after he was convicted
of the crimes of evasion of service of
sentence and illegal possession of firearm.
Thus, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus which was eventually denied. He
then filed for a motion for reconsideration
alleging that his conviction for evasion of
service of sentence is dependent upon his
conviction for murder, which was already
remitted as a result of the absolute pardon.
ISSUE:
Should ALVAREZ be released due
to the fact that he was granted absolute
pardon?
RULING:
The Court said that NO. There is no
parity, not even analogy, between evasion of
service of sentence and violation of
conditional pardon.
Evasion of service of sentence or
"jail breaking" is an offense defined and
penalized as a crime in this jurisdiction by
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
also punished as such in practically all
jurisdictions even those under the common
law; because it is an attempt at least to evade
the penalty inflicted by the courts upon
criminals and thus defeat the purpose of the
law of either reforming or punishing them
for having disturbed the public order. While
violation of a conditional pardon is a mere
infringement of the terms stipulated in a
contract between the sovereign power or the
Chief Executive and the criminal, to the
effect that the former will release the latter
subject to the condition that if he does not
comply with them, he will be recommitted
to prison and serve the unexpired portion of
his original sentence if higher than six years,
or prisión correccional in its minimum
period if less than six years.
Violation of conditional pardon is
not a public offense in the strict sense of the
word, for it does not cause harm or injury to
the rights of other person nor does it disturb
public order; and if it does cause any harm it
is to the violator himself who, for not
complying with the conditions of the pardon,
has to serve again the unexpired portion of
the penalty imposed upon him for the
commission of the offense which was
conditionally remitted or pardoned. While
the evasion of service of sentence is a public
offense or a wrongful act separate and
independent from. any other, and it is not
righted or effaced by the pardon or
remission of the penalty imposed in the
sentence against the accused for the crime.
the service of which the culprit tried to
evade before the pardon.
before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same, shall be punished by
the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.
Here, the accused have committed
the crime of murder while serving the
sentence of a conviction by final judgment.

ARTICLE 160: COMMISSION OF

ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR plaintiff-appellee,
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE vs.
ARTURO ALICIA and VICTOR
BANGAYAN, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-38176 January 22, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
PER CURIAM:
vs.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL.,
FACTS:
defendants,
ALICIA and BANGAYAN,
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO
convicts who are confined in the New
DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG,
Bilibid Prison, were charged with the crimes
AMADEO PERALTA, FLORENCIO
of Murder and of Multiple Frustrated
LUNA and GERVASIO LARITA,
Murder for the hospitalization and even
defendants-review.
death of some inmates.
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968
ISSUE:
PER CURIAM: Are ALICIA and BANGAYAN
quasi-recidivists as defined under Article
FACTS: 160 of the Revised Penal Code?
PERALTA, et al., convicts who are
confined in the New Bilibid Prison, caused RULING:
the death of several inmates. This is due to a The Court said that YES. Quasi-
riot that ensued between the two warring recidivism is a special aggravating
gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO". circumstance which imposes the maximum
of the penalty for the new offense. It makes
ISSUE:
no difference, for the purpose of the effect of
Are PERALTA, et al. quasi-
quasi-recidivism under Article 160 of the
recidivists as defined under Article 160 of
Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for
the Revised Penal Code?
which an accused is serving sentence at the
time of the commission of the offense
RULING:
charged, falls under the said Code or under
The Court said that YES. Under
special law. In the case at bar, both
Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, any
appellants Arturo Alicia and Victor
person who shall commit a felony after
Bangayan were serving sentence for robbery
having been convicted by final judgment,
by virtue of final judgment when they
committed the new felony.
ARTICLE 160. COMMISSION OF
ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE
OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE.
People vs. Bautista, et al, 65 SCRA 460,
July 25, 1975
Facts:
Prisoners George Daeng and Rolando
Castillo, already sentenced previously, were
accused of murder for wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault one Basilio Beltran,
another convicted prisoner serving final
sentence in the same institution, inflicting
upon him multiple stab wounds, which
caused the death of one Beltran.
Issue: Whether or not the accused shall be
imposed of the maximum penalty as stated
in Article 160 of the RPC.
Held:
Yes. Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "any person who shall commit
a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, ..., or while serving the same,
shall be punished by the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony". No other alternative than to affirm
the penalty
of death imposed by the trial court.
TITLE IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC
INTEREST
ARTICLE 163. MAKING AND
IMPORTING AND UTTERING FALSE
COINS.
U.S. vs. Basco, 6 Phil 110, April 11, 1906
Facts:
The defendant attempted to pay for a
package of cigarettes which he bought at a
certain store with what appeared to be silver
coin, but which, as a matter of fact, was a
Philippine copper cent; that he insisted that
the owner of the store should accept the
same as a peseta, that the latter refused to
accept it upon noticing what the real value
and denomination of the coin.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty
of counterfeiting money?
Held: No. No spurious or clipped coin was
use. The coins in question were genuine
copper cents and bore their original designs
and inscriptions. The defendant did not
make or attempt to make any alteration in
the designs and inscriptions of the said
coins. All that he did was to give them the
appearance of silver pieces for the purpose
of passing them as twenty-cent coins.
U.S. vs. Lyman, 26 Fed Cas. 1024
Facts:
The defendant was the owner of the ship
Alert, and of the 500 chests of tea in
question; and that the same were imported
by him into Boston. After the arrival and
entry of the ship at the custom house, the
500 chests of tea were purchased by one
Warren Lovejoy, who gave bonds at the
custom house, in the usual form, upon a
deposit of the teas; and afterwards, upon
giving other bonds as usual, was permitted
to receive the teas again, and they were re-
delivered to and sold by the defendant.
Issue: Whether importation is complete
before entry at the Custom’s house.
Held:
Importation is not the making entry of goods
at the custom house, but merely the bringing
them into port, and so is complete before
entry; so exportation is not the clearance
outward, but the actually going out of port.
ARTICLE 164. MUTILATION OF COINS
People vs. Tin Ching Ting, G.R. No. L-
4620, January 30, 1952
Issue: Whether or not the coins in this case
are mutilated?
Held: Mutilation is to diminish by ingenuous
means the metal in the coin. One who
mutilates a coin does not do so for the sake
of mutilating, but to take advantage of the
metal abstracted; he appropriates a part of
the metal of the coin. Hence, the coin
diminishes in intrinsic value. One who utters
said mutilated coin receives its legal value,
much more than its intrinsic value. It is
indispensable that the mutilated coin be of
legal tender.
(Note: The copy of the full text of the case
cannot be found; only the ruling)
ARTICLE 165. SELLING OF FALSE OR
MUTILATED COIN, WITHOUT
CONNIVANCE.
People vs. Go Po, G.R. No. 42697, V.I.J.
393, August 1985
Facts:
A Chinese merchant was paid by purchaser
of goods in the former’s store a false 50-
centavo coin. He placed it in his drawer.
During a search by some constabulary
officers, the false coin was found in the
drawer.
Issue:
Whether or not the Chinaman may be
convicted of illegal possession of false
coin?
Held:
No. Article 165 requires three things as
regards possession of false coins, namely:
(1) possession ; (2) intent to utter; and (2)
knowledge that the coin is false. The fact
that the Chairman received it in payment of
his goods and placed it in his drawer shows
that he did not know that such coin was
false.
ARTICLE 166. FORGING OF
TREASURY OR BANK NOTES OR
OTHER DOCUMENTS PAYABLE TO
THE BEARER; IMPORTING,
UTTERING SUCH FALSE OR FORGED
NOTES AND DOCUMENTS.
Del Rosario vs. People, 113 Phil 626
Facts:
After showing to complainant Apolinario del
Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills and
inducing him to believe that the same were
counterfeit paper money manufactured by
them, although in fact they were genuine
treasury notes of the Philippine Government
one of the digits of each of which had been
altered and changed, the aforementioned
defendants had succeeded in obtaining
P1,700.00 from said complainant, for the
avowed purpose of financing the
manufacture of more counterfeit treasury
notes of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the possession of said money
constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the
RPC.
Held:
It is clear from the provisions that the
possession of genuine treasury notes of the
Philippines any of "the figures, letters,
words or signs contained" in which had been
erased and or altered, with knowledge of
such notes, as they were used by petitioner
herein and his co-defendants is punishable
under said Article 168, in relation to Article
166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal
Code

U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil 403
Facts:
Gardner ordered Jameson to buy a bottle of
mucilage and blue pencil. That night, while
passing by a tailor shop, Gardner handed
Jameson a bill asking him to change it for
silver and promised to give him half its
value. Jameson cashed the bill and received
25 pesos. Gardner also had another bill on
which he had pasted a number "10". Gardner
tried to pass Confederate $10 in a Filipino
drug store. The Chinaman Ah Fun had given
25 pesos in exchange for an American bill
upon which the number 10 had been pasted.
He did not observe the defect in the bill at
first, but observed it afterwards and
immediately went to the people station to
file a complaint. Some other night, Gardner
through the witness Klip also attempted to
pass a one-dollar bill raised to a ten in a
house of prostitution. It was shortly after
returned to him saying that it was bad.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held
liable for falsification of notes or documents
equivalent to current money payable to
bearer.
Held:Yes. The falsification of bank notes
and of documents of credit payable to bearer
and issued by the State, to which class the
two certificates in question belong, is an act
severely punished by the law as tending to
bring such documents into discredit and
because such offenses produce a lack of
confidence on the part of the holders of said
documents to the prejudice of the interest of
society and of the State, and
People vs. Belmonte, 85 Phil 497
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Furia vs. CA, 101 Phil 623
Facts:
The petitioner was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila with estafa thru
falsification of a public,
official and commercial document in an
information filed by the Office of the City
Fiscal. Gregorio Furia and Simeon Monzon,
signed their signatures at the back of said
check as identifiers, thus causing it to appear
that the said Ines B. Bentoso duly signed
said U. S. Depository check and that she
(Ines B. Bentoso) took part in the
transaction, although they she did not,
thereby making untruthful statements in the
narration of facts.
Issue: Whether or not the accused has forged
treasury bank notes or other related
documents payable to bearer?
Held:
The identification of the latter and of her
signature made possible the cashing of the
check and the misappropriation of the
amount by the petitioner and the fictitious
woman other than the real payee. The crime
committed is the complex crime of estafa by
means of falsification of an official and
commercial document defined and penalized
in articles 315 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ARTICLE 168. ILLEGAL POSSESSION
AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR
BANK NOTES AND OTHER
INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT.
People vs. Digoro G.R. No. L-22032,
March 4, 1966
Facts: The petitioner, Martinez, was charged
with violation of Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code. The petitioner gave a fake P
500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a
bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail
bakery but refused because it was found out
that it was fake. Francis de la Cruz reported
the matter to jail officers. The jail guards
conducted a surprise inspection and found
out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of
the accused.
Issue:
Whether all the elements of the crime of
Illegal possession and use of false treasury
or bank note in this case are present
Held:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside
the findings of the lower courts and
acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal
possession and use of false bank notes
defined and penalized under Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro,
possession of false treasury or bank notes
alone, without anything more, is not a
criminal offense. For it to constitute an
offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the
possession must be with intent to use said
false treasury or bank notes. The prosecution
failed to show that petitioner used the
counterfeit money or that he intended to use
the counterfeit bills. Their account, however,
is hearsay and not based on the personal
knowledge.
People vs. Barraquia, 76 Phil 490
Facts:
Appellant is accused of illegal possession
and use of a false bank note of ten-peso
denomination. Accused appears to be an
illiterate laborer, who does not know how to
read or write. He testified that he happened
to know that the bill in question was a
counterfeit only when the postmaster of
Calamba informed him so, but for himself
he cannot distinguish a counterfeit note from
a genuine one.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant us guilty of the
accused crime under Article 168 of the RPC.
Held:
No enough ground to declare appellant
guilty of the crime charged. The only
evidence presented by the prosecution to the
effect that the bank note in question was a
counterfeit is the testimony of cashier of the
provincial treasury of Laguna who stated
that the printing of the bill is somewhat
blurred and the paper is very oily. We do not
believe that these two circumstances may be
considered as enough basis for declaring the
bill in question as falsified.
U.S. vs. De Leon, et al, 4 Phil 496
Facts:
The accused were De Leon brothers, and
that Juan de Leon having paid a debt with a
counterfeit 50-peso note of the Spanish-
Filipino Bank, and the creditor having
expressed some doubt as to the genuineness
of the note, the said Albino de Leon assured
him that the said note was good, and
promised that if it should prove to be
counterfeit he himself would make good the
loss. It was further shown that the note was
in fact counterfeit and that the said Albino
de Leon refused to make good the amount as
he had promised.
Issue:
Whether or not Albino De Leon is guilty of
the crime charged.
Held:
It was not proven that Albino de Leon was
aware that the note in question was
counterfeit when he aided his brother in
uttering it, and guilty knowledge of this fact
being an essential element of the crime with
which he was charged, he should not have
been convicted either as principal or
accomplice.
People vs Co Pao, 58 Phil 545
Facts:
The store owner sent one of his dependents
so that the paper money of P10 delivered by
the defendant on the same day will be
changed in another store and the employee
returned with the information that the proper
was forged. Then the store owner looked for
the defendant and returned the ticket telling
him that it was forged and the defendant
promised that the next day he would return
the change of P9.50.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused knew that the
bank note in question was a counterfeit
when he made use of it.
Held:
Yes. The accused knew that the bank note in
question was a counterfeit when he made
use of it. If the accused had been unaware
that Exhibit A, a counterfeit bank note, was
false, he would undoubtedly have
immediately explained the the circumstances
under which it came into his possession. The
burden was on the defendant to explain
satisfactorily his possession of said
counterfeit note. This he failed to do.
People vs Bacani
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
People vs Sendaydiego
Facts:
Provincial Treasurer Sendaydiego, in
conspiracy with Samson, an employee of a
hardware, in conspiracy with provincial
auditor, used six forged provincial vouchers
in order to embezzle from the road and
bridge fund. The auditor was acquitted while
the treasurer died in the course of appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is a complex crime
of malversation through falsification.
2. Whether or not a private person is also
guilty of malversation.
Held:
The falsification and malversation did not
constitute a complex crime because the
falsifications were not necessary means for
the commission of the malversation. Each
falsifications and each malversation
constituted independent offense which must
be punished separately. The overall result is
that in these three cases six separate offenses
of falsification and six separate crimes of
malversation were committed. appellant
Samson is a co-principal in each of he said
twelve offenses. A private person conspiring
with an accountable public officer in
committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.
ARTICLE 169: HOW FORGERY IS
COMMITTED
People vs Galano
Facts:
Restituto Villanueva, a patrolman, saw a
crowd chasing a man in Manila. When he
caught up, the crowd nabbed the man,
Benjamin Galano, who was bleeding.
Villanueva was informed that Galano bought
4 balut eggs and paid a false, prewar one
peso bill which was given to Villanueva.
Galano was brought to the police for
investigation. Said bill contained the word
“Victory” and when the balut vendor asked
Galano, he ran away. He avers that he wrote
Victory on the said bill and knew that the
bill won’t be honored by the vendor. He was
charged with violating RPC 166 and
convicted and sentenced of reclusion
temporal with fine. Galano claims that he
bought the eggs with genuine note, which
was different from the evidence presented to
Villanueva and the police. He made such
statement as the police were shouting at him
and was afraid that he would be harmed. The
police countered that at least 9 people were
chasing Galao and asserted that the bill
found indicated “Victory” contrary to
galano’s claim.
Issue: whether Galano is guilty for violating
article 169 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Galano’s escape was indicative of his
guilt. His extrajudicial confession is
untenable as the police had no ill-motive to
arrest him and mere shouting does not
constitute as intimidation or violence. The
forgery committed under RPC 169 may be
done by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting,
or altering by any means the figures, letters,
or signs contained therein. The forgery is
akin to, or worse than, affixing the seal to a
genuine signature on a document which is
invalid w/o seal. The alteration/desctruction
of the bill is harmless except to the holder
andwould not constitute a crime but for the
utterance of the bill so altered. There was
intention to deceive the state in its duty to
protect the public and the paper bills legally
issued. In this case, RPC (2) is inapplicable
as nothing was erase or latered of fugures,
letters, etc. Galano only added the world
Victory to make itappear genuine that it used
to have before it outlived its usefulness. So
Galano is liable for RPC 169 (1).
US vs Solito
Facts:
The defendant Mariano Solito, at the time
was the correspondence clerk and acting
chief clerk in the office of the division
superintendent of schools in the municipality
of Dumaguete; he was entrusted with the
care of the correspondence of said office. It
was alleged that Solito with intent to
defraud, did falsely forge, utter and pass an
obligation of the Government of the
Philippines Islands, securing the payment to
himself of the said sum and contrary to the
statute in such case made provided.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of
forging, uttering and passing an altered
obligation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with intent to defraud, in
violation of the provisions of Act. No. 1754?
Held: Yes. While the record does not
contain positive proof that the defendant did,
in view of all the facts and circumstances the
conclusion is irresistible that he did. The
record further shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did pass and utter
said warrant after the same had been altered
by said endorsement; and did, at the time
mentioned in the complaint, without the
authority of its owner, collect the mount due
thereon with intent to defraud.
ARTICLE 171: FALSIFICATION BY
PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE or
NOTARY
Llamoso vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
This case is about a false entry in the payroll
for March 16 to 31, 1981 of 12 laborers who
worked in the kind of improvement of Sta.
Rosa Street, municipality of Siquijor. The
anomaly involves the sum of P130.00 as the
wages for two weeks of one laborer at P13 a
day. Here, Cagais, caretaker of Llamoso’s
cottage had not been paid his wages due to
being listed in the payroll of the Pisong
bridge project. He could not be included as a
personnel of the district engineer’s office,
thus it was advised that there must be a
“stand-in” for Cagais, who as he suggested
was Aninipo.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty in the
crime of falsification of public documents
by having made it appear in the time book,
payroll and authority to hire employees that
Aninipo worked in the project where in fact
he did not.
Held:
No. the accused are not criminally liable
because they had no criminal intent. Making
no concealment or evasion, they admitted
that there was a false entry. They acted in
good faith. They may be disciplined
administratively for the irregularity but their
inclusion of Aninipo in the payroll is outside
the pale of criminal law. In the instant case,
as in the Arceo case, it can not be said that
the accused perverted the truth in including
Aninipo in the ayroll in order to attain any
felonius objective. Their honest motive was
to enable Cagais to receive his compensation
which he needed very badly.
Siquian vs People
Facts:
Jesusa Carreon was appointed by Siqulan as
a clerk in the office of the municipal
secretary and even said that her salary would
be included in the budget. It should be
noted that the Municipal council of Isabela
failed to enact the annual budget for the
municipality. As such, the annual budget for
the previous year was deemed re-enacted.
No such position existed yet.Carreon
worked for 5 months and was supposed to
receive her salary but the municipal
treasurer said that there was no money yet.
She sued Siquian for falsification of a public
document.
Issue:
Whether or not Siquian is guilty of
falsification of public documents?
Held:
Yes. He was found guilty under paragraph 4
of Article 171, “making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts.” In this
case all the elements for falsification were
met. Siquian stated that funds were available
for the position to which Jesusa was
appointed when she knew that the position
itself did not even exist. Wrongful intent to
injure a third person is not an essential
element of falsification of public document.
This is because the principial thing punished
in falsifying public documents is the
violation of the public faith and destruction
of truth. Siquian can not raise the defense of
good faith.
US vs Inosanto
Facts:
The crime under prosecution consists of the
making of a false entry in a registry book of
births of the municipality of Capiz, by
recording therein that the girl Maxima, the
daughter of Caridad was the latter’s
legitimate daughter and that her father was
Pedro Zausa, when in fact he was not her
father and she was not the legitimate, but the
natural daughter of Caridad Zausa.
Issue:
Whether or not Antero Inosanto is guilty for
having committed falsification in an official
register.
Held:
No. The court did not consider the defendant
guilty of the falsification committed in the
register itself, but held him liable for the
falsity contained in the certificate, issued in
accordance with that entry, for the reason
that he knowingly recorded a falsehood and
instead of correcting and rectifying the entry
in the register book, ratified and sanctioned
the falsification therein committed, by his
issuance of this certificate.
People vs Camacho
Facts:
The case is an appeal from a judgment of the
Court of first Instance of Pangasinan
convicting the defendant of the crime of
unfaithfulness in the custody of public
documents and sentencing him to suffer
prision correctional. The municipal treasurer
sent to Camacho, as municipal president, the
public documents and upon obtaining it,
voluntarily, illegally, and criminally put
aside, concealed and destroyed said
document.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the
offense charged.
Held:
No. The judgement appealed from is
reversed and the defendant will stand
acquitted of the offense charged in the
information. There was no deduction of the
alleged document in so far as it might have
been made serviceable. To hold that a mere
blank form in itself alone is a public
document would lead to the absurdity that a
person might be criminally prosecuted for
destruction of a printed blank form
containing no other writing whatever.
People vs Corral
Facts:
Corral wrote to the justice of the peace of
Corregidor Island, inquiring whether he
could file a complaint against her in the
court of the said justice. His letter being
answered, one day he met the wife of the
said justice of the peace and offered her his
services and informed her of the departure of
the woman Ramos. The warrant reached
Ramos in which she is charged with having
taken away one trunk and a diamond ring.
After, Corral made appearance and told the
policeman Quiogue that he could not
consent to the arrest of his wife and that the
warrant was just forged.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of falsification is
present in this case.
Held:
Yes. As the crime of falsification punished
by the Penal Code has been committed,
without any circumstances modifying the
liability therefore, the judgment appealed
from is in accordance with merits of the
case, the provisions of the law, and the
contentions of the Attorney-General.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed.
US vs Paraiso
Facts:
The accused has been charged with the
crime of falsifying a private document,
prohibited and penalized in the Penal Code.
Accused executed receipts in which he made
it appear that Isabelo Feril received payment
on account of the sale of of 100 picos of
maguey.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is guilty of the said
crime.
Held:
No. The mere drawing up of a false
document is not sufficient to constitute the
crime in question. The signing of a private
document in the name of another person
without authority to do can not be held to be
a crime according to Article 304. It is
necessary that an attempt be made to imitate
the writing, signature, or mark of the person
whose name is signed.
US vs Rampas
Facts:
This is an appeal from the judgement of the
Court of first Instance convicting the
accused of the crime of presenting as
evidence in the trial of a case a falsified
private document. That a hearing was held
between the complainant Chinaman Agapito
and defendant Pedro Rampas, regarding a
sum of money; the accused Rampas with
intention to gain and to the prejudice of said
Chinaman and knowingly, maliciously,
criminally and illegally presented as
evidence in said cause the falsified receipt
Exhibit B attached to the record.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be
convicted of the crime charged.
Held:
No. The accused can not be convicted of the
crime charged because the document
introduced in evidence is not one of those
described in Article 304 in connection with
article 300 of the Penal Code in that it is not
a document which has been falsified, it
appearing that the characters and marks
placed upon the document as the signature
of the Chinaman were not really his
signature and that the accused, therefore, did
not imitate the signature of the Chinaman. In
order for falsification of a private document
be committed, it is necessary that the author
shall have imitated the signature of the
person who purports to execute it.
Sps. Villamar vs. People (GR. No. 178652)
Facts:
Elena Matantan sold a parcel of land to her 9
children. 6 of them sold their share of land
to Simplicio Penuliar, Elena’s son, while the
other 2 remained ownership of their share of
land. Simplicio sold the land to her daughter
Corazon, which is married to Revelo
Villamar. The spouses had with them a
registered deed of sale between them and
Elena’s 9 children, which was signed and
notarized. The spouses contended that the
employees of the Assessor’s Office
committed the falsification by forging the
signatures of Elena’s 3 children. The court
held that they should have presented the
person from the Assessor’s Office who gave
them the document to corroborate their
claim if indeed they have no hand in its
falsification. The spouses were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of
public document.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses are correct in
accusing the officers from the Assessor’s
Office of falsifying the public document.
Ruling:
No, the court held that the spouses were the
authors and/ or masterminds of the
falsification is presumed from the fact that
they actually benefitted from it. They were
the ones who caused the registration of the
deed of sale and were the ones who received
the falsified document from the Assessor’s
Office. A comparison of the Deed of Sale
allegedly submitted by the spouses to the
Assessor’s Office and the falsified Deed of
Sale returned to them by the said Office
reveals that the two documents are totally
different from each other, both in the print or
font of the contents and the location of the
names of the signatories. The Court
therefore cannot see how the employees
could have inserted the names of Elena’s 2
children in the questioned document, much
less falsified their signatures, without
anyone noticing it.
US vs. Castro (6 Phil 11)
Facts:
The accused is charged with the falsification
of a private document. He signed the name
of one Regino Sevilla, deceased, to a certain
bill of sale of a boat, the property of the
estate of the said Sevilla. The accused did in
fact attach the signature of Regino Sevilla to
the document to defraud Sevilla's heirs and
depriving them of their property in the said
boat. However, there was no any attempt
made to simulate the genuine signature, and
there is evidence of record that Sevilla
himself did not know how to write or even
to sign his own name.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of
falsification.
Ruling:
No. The court, adopted the doctrine laid
down by the supreme court of Spain, where
it had frequently held that upon a charge of
falsification of attaching the signature of
another to a written document conviction
can not be had unless it appears that an
attempt has been made to simulate the
genuine signature of that person; and,
therefore, while the accused may have been
guilty of the crime of estafa or one of its
allied offenses, he can not be convicted of
the crime of falsification of a private
document as charged in the information and
as defined and penalized in article 304,
taken in relation with article 300 of the
Penal Code.
People vs. Villanueva (58 Phil 671)
Facts:
Irene Sanchez was sent a postal money order
from his son. Feliciano was also sent 5
postal money orders from her daughter. The
victims went to the postal office thrice to
claim the money orders, Virgilio Villanueva,
the defendant, they were informed that the
money orders were not yet received. When
Isidro went back to the postal office to claim
again but was informed by the accused
informed him that he had already received
the money orders and that he had
appropriated the amount thereof. The
defendant attempted to prove that he paid
the interested parties the amount of the
money orders. The defendant did not enter
the receipt of the money orders in the book
for registered matter and that the he further
affixed the victim’s name to the money
order to be drawn in his favor and in
different handwritings. It shows the
defendant's intent to conceal the crime he
was committing. The victims have denied all
such allegations of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the Villanueva is guilty of
falsification of public document.
Ruling:
Yes. Even if the signatures of victims were
not imitated on the money orders, since they
were signed to make it appear that they
intervened and received the corresponding
amounts, even though they did not, is
sufficient to qualify the crime of falsification
of public documents. The amount of these
money orders had the nature of a public fund
while it was under the custody of the
Villanueva as postmaster, and the
appropriation thereof by the said defendant
constitutes the crime of malversation of
public funds.
AM No. 2003-7-SC
Facts:
Noel Luna was seeking for a promotion and
later on appointed as Chief Judicial Staff
Officer. In the PDS that he accomplished,
respondent indicated that he had obtained
the degree in BS Electrical Engineering. His
degree was verified by the Office of
Administrative Services and it was
discovered that he wasn’t able to comply the
units to complete the academic requirements
of the prescribed course. He admitted that he
did not finish his course and claimed that he
indeed possess such degree. He did not have
any intention to conceal such fact since his
colleagues are also aware of it. He claimed
that he indicated all the information
necessary in his PDS and that he left blank
to those items which he had no response. He
claimed that it was not him who wrote such
information to his PDS. He was found guilty
of administrative offenses of Falsification of
Official Document and Dishonesty.
Issue:Whether or not respondent is guilty of
falsifying the document.
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that such information
could not have been indicated by someone
other than him since it was him who had the
interest of the promotion, hence it would not
benefit them. His claims were also
contradicting because he first claimed that
he personally wrote all the information in his
PDS, but later on claimed that it was his
wife who made his PDS. Such inconsistency
does not jibe with one’s practical experience
of veracity and credibility. The
accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) is required under Civil Service Rules
and Regulations for employment in the
government. The making of an untruthful
statement therein amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document that
warrant dismissal from the service even on
the first offense. Of these offenses,
respondent is clearly liable.
US vs. Capule (24 Phil 13)
Facts:
Nicasio Capule appropriated himself a tract
of coconut land, without the knowledge or
consent of the owners. Such deed of sale that
was made in his favor was prepared and
notarized by Inocente Martinez, who later
died. Said document indicated that it was
made and executed by the owners of the
land to be sold for P550. Capule exhibited
said document in the attempt to sustain his
alleged right to the said piece of land.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is liable of
falsification.
Ruling:
Yes. Nicasio Capule is not a public officer
and he is accused of the crime of
falsification of a notarial document of
official character equivalent to a public
document, the principle laid down in said
decision is totally inapplicable in his favor.
A person taking advantage of the occasion
when a power of attorney is presumably
being drawn up, prepares instead thereof,
contrary to the wishes of the interested
parties and with malice aforethought, an
instrument of sale in his own favor, using
deceit as to the parties and the witnesses,
and afterwards induces a notary to certify
falsely that them supposed vendors actually
appeared and ratified such instrument, is
guilty of the falsification of a notarial or
public document.
People vs. Quasha (93 Phil 333)
Facts:
Accused is a member of the Philippine bar
who committed a crime of falsification of a
public and commercial document for
causing it to appear that Arsenio Baylon, a
Filipino citizen, had subscribed to and was
the owner of 60.005 % of the subscribed
capital stock of Pacific Airways Corp.
(Pacific) when in reality the money paid
belongs to an American citizen whose name
did not appear in the article of incorporation.
Baylon did not have the controlling vote
because of the difference in voting power
between the preferred shares and the
common shares.
Issue: Whether or not accused should be
criminally liable.
Held:
No. Article 171(4) of the RPC is: 4. Making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
Falsification consists in not disclosing in the
articles of incorporation that Baylon was a
mere trustee (or dummy as the prosecution
chooses to call him) of his American co-
incorporators, thus giving the impression
that Baylon was the owner of the shares
subscribed to by him. The mere formation of
the corporation such revelation was not
essential, and the Corporation Law does not
require it. So far as American citizens are
concerned, the said act ceased to be an
offense within the meaning of the law, so
that defendant can no longer be held
criminally liable therefor.
People vs. Poserio, CA, (53 OG 6159)
Facts:
Defendant was appointed patrolman of the
Manila Police Department. In compliance
with one of the requirements of the Manila
Police Department, he filled in an
information sheet PDS. Defendant indicated
that he had not been previously convicted of
a criminal offense. In an investigation later
conducted, it was discovered that, he had a
previous conviction of the crime of theft.
Issue: Whether or not accused is criminally
liable.
Ruling:
No. The prosecution failed to point to any
law or ordinance imposing upon the
defendant the legal obligation to reveal his
previous conviction in filling in the personal
data sheet which members of the Manila
Police Department are required to file. The
element, therefore, of "legal obligation"
which is necessary in order that the
defendant may be convicted of the crime of
falsification of the public document under
Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, is wanting. The defendant was
acquitted.
US vs. Bayot (10 Phil 518)
Facts:
A pay roll was made out wherein it
contained the names of all the workmen and
a square against each name for each day in
the month. All of the square against each
name of Manuel Manalo contain a vertical
line. Defendant then signed the payroll
testifying that all the information were
correct. The defendant was complained for
falsifying a public document because
allegedly Manalo was not present during the
work hours.
Issue: Whether or not defendant is liable of
falsification of a public document.
Ruling:
No. The vertical lines do not necessarily
mean that the person against whose name
they appear was present in the building
during every hour of the day. Although the
defendant admitted that for sometime
before, Manalo was and had been the
defendant’s cook; that after he had finished
his work at the city hall in the morning, he
would go to the market and cook until 2pm.
The defendant can not be convicted of the
crime of falsification of a public document
by a public official.
US vs. San Jose (7 Phil 604)
Facts:
Since there was no owner claiming the
sunken banca, the employer of the accused
instructed him to take charge of it. The
accused took the banca to a shipyard
wherein it was rebuilt. It was later on
discovered in the river by an agent of the
previous owner. In order to secure
ownership of the banca by the time it was
fully repaired, he filed in the customs an
affidavit of ownership.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty
of falsifying the document.
Ruling:
No. The statement in the affidavit that the
affiant was the owner of a banca which he
had raised from the bottom of the estero by
virtue of a contract with the municipality
and that it remained unclaimed, is not
falsification because he believed that he was
entitled to its ownership.
Domingo vs. People (GR. No. 186101)
Facts:
Gina Domingo was accused for falsifying
commercial document by forging the
signatures of the victim in the encashment
slips. The victim held the bank liable for not
verifying her signature on the encashment
slips. The bank was able to ask for the
assistance of an expert from PNP to examine
the victim’s genuine signature. After the
examination, it was found out that the
victim’s signatures had been forged. CA
held that the presumption that she is the
material author of the falsification was
present for she was the only person who
stood to be benefited.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of
falsifying the encashment slips.
Ruling:
Yes, the court held that the elements of
falsification of a commercial document were
present. The second paragraph of Article
171 states falsification by a public officer
by: Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact participate. In relating
this to Art. 172, because the accused was a
private individual, such acts satisfy all
elements necessary for the falsification.
Accused was a private individual who
presented to the tellers of the bank forged
encashment slips on different dates and of
various amounts. The questioned
encashment slips were falsified by the
accused by filling out the same and signing
the name of the private complainant, thereby
making it appear that victim signed the
encashment slips and that they are genuine
in all respects, when in fact the victim never
signed the subject encashment slips.
Lonzanida vs. People ( GR. No. 160243-
52)
Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida was a former Municipal
Mayor of San Anotnio Zambales. He
allegedly notarized 13 Affidavit of
Ownership of parcel of land. The affiants
denied of signing the execution while some
of them were still minors. He also allegedly
notarized 13 Joint Affidavits, which was
executed and signed by one illiterate and one
deceased. Some names who have executed
the affidavit were claimed to be the children
of Lonzanida and the children of the
Municipal Assessor. He was charged by the
court 10 counts of falsifying public
documents.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty
of falsification.
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that Lonzanida is guilty
of falsifying a public document under the
second paragraph of Article 171: Causing it
to appear that persons have participated in
any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact participate. Witnesses claimed that they
were compelled by the political enemies of
the accused to testify against him and to sign
the document, the contents of which they did
not understand. The elements of the
falsification by a public officer were present
in the case since Lonzanida was a former
Municipal Mayor and that he made it appear
that some of the affiants were part of those
who executed the affidavit, when indeed
they were not part of it because some were
minors, illiterate and deceased.
People vs. Reodica and Cordero (62 Phil
567)
There is falsification under this paragraph
only when the date mentioned in the
document is essential. The alteration of the
date or dates in a document must affect
either the veracity of the document or the
effects thereof. Thus, when in the payroll,
the municipal treasurer certified that he paid
the salary of an employee on July 31, when
in fact it was done on July 23, it was held
that at any rate the employee having been in
fact paid, it was immaterial whether it was
done on July 23 or July 31. The employee
was granted a leave of eight days from July
23 to July 31 and for the purposes of the
payment of his salary, this amounted to his
having rendered services during that period.
People vs. Montano and Cabagsang (57
Phil 599)
Facts:
The defendant chief of police fraudulently
altered and falsified the municipal police
blotter and the book of records of arrests and
the return of the warrant of arrest and
Soriano's bail bond so as to make them show
that the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested
and gave bond on the 13th day of
September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in
fact, as said records showed before said
falsification, the said Arturo A. Soriano was
arrested and released on bond on the 6th day
of September, 1930. That the defendant
Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated
with his codefendant in making said
falsifications in order to meet the
administrative charges then pending against
him.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty
of falsification.
Ruling:
Yes. The court below rejected the defense of
the accused that said alterations were made
in good faith and corresponded to the true
facts of the case. There is no issue of law
raised in the assignment of errors.
PEOPLE VS MANANSALA (105 Phil
1253)
FACTS: Felix Manansala, accused-appellant
was driving TPU jeepney, was apprehended
by Corporal Vicente del Rosario of Manila
Police Department (MPD) for driving
outside of his authorized route. Required to
present his driver's license, accused
presented a Traffic Violations Report (TVR)
instead. Vicente noticed that the TVR was
altered. It was later found that the alterations
consisted of erasing the number “III” and the
word “three” after the word Pending cases
and replacing the figures with “I” and “one”
this changed the original meaning of the
TVR which previously stated 3 pending
cases to only 1 pending case.
At the investigation, the accused admitted
having made the alterations in question, in
order to hide his previous pending traffic
violation cases and thereby avoid immediate
arrest should he be caught committing a
fourth traffic violation
ISSUE: WON a person presumed to be the
author of the falsification be liable under
Art. 171 of the RPC.
HELD: NO. One of the essential elements
for a person to be held liable under Art.171
of the RPC is that, he must be a public
officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical
minister.
In this case, accused-appellant is a
jeepney driver. Although he is serving the
public as an aid for transportation, he cannot
be considered as a public employee because
he was not paid by the government.
Arriola vs Republic, (103 Phil 730)
FACTS: The petitioner presented himself as
a Chinese national. He resided in this
country and in the City of Manila for a
period of not less than 10 years immediately
preceding the date of the petition of
naturalization. He is a holder of the degree
of Bachelor of Science in Commerce (cum
laude) from the Far Eastern University. As a
whole, he is a person with good moral
standing. However, his attention was called
to the fact that in his residence certificate for
1955, there is false statement of his
nationality, which reflected “Filipino”
instead of “Chinese”. He took the necessary
steps to rectify that mistake, and instead of
doing it by himself he went to the person
whom he believed to be vested with
authority.
ISSUE: WON he can be held liable under
Art. 171 of the RPC for allegedly falsifying
citizenship in his residence certificate for
1955.
HELD: NO. For a person to be held liable
under Art. 171 of the RPC, he must be a
government officer or employee. Petitioner
is not a government officer or employee;
rather, he is merely a businessman applying
for naturalization. Furthermore, the court
held that it cannot find anything wrong in
the behavior of the petitioner or that he is
not of good moral character by reason of the
alleged correction of his aforementioned
certificate of residence. There is ample proof
on record that the petitioner presented
himself as a Chinese national and when his
attention was called to the fact that in his
residence certificate for 1955, which was
procured through an agent, he appeared as a
Filipino, which is a false statement of his
nationality, he took the necessary steps to
rectify that mistake, and instead of doing it
by himself he went to the person whom he
believed to be vested with authority to
accomplish the proper change desired,
namely, the Chief of the Residence
Certificate Section, City Treasurer’s Office,
Manila, Mr. Rufino Cervantes.
People vs Romualdez, et al., (57 Phil 151)
FACTS: Accused Estela Romualdez and
Luis Mabuhay were charged with the crime
of falsification of public and official
documents. The accused Estela Romualdez
was the secretary of Honorable Norberto
Romualdez, one of the Justices of the
Supreme Court. The latter was then the
Head of the Bar Examination Committee.
Because of such functions, she had under
her care the computations and other papers
and documents for the admission of the
candidate to the Bar of 1926. The
information filed alleged that the accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay
conspired together and erased the grade of
58% given by the correctors to the
composition in Remedial Law and replaced
it and, instead, wrote 64%. She also crossed
out and replaced the grade of the latter in
Civil law from 63% and wrote 75%. With
the said changes, Mabunay obtained an
average of 75%. The accused Estela
Romualdez contended that she has the
authority to make such alteration, both in her
capacity as the private secretary of the
Chairman of the Examination Committee
and as the correctors and at the same time
supervisor of the Correctors. The authority
was given by the then Chairman himself,
Justice Norberto Romualdez.  ARTICLE 172. FALSIFICATION BY
ISSUE: WON Estela Romualdez was guilty  FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS.
of Falsification.
HELD:YES. The acts of the accused Estela  ORERA (11 Phil 596)
Romualdez were covered by paragraphs 2, 3 
and 6 of article 300 of the Penal Code. She
made the alterations in the grades given by
the "correctors" in the papers in question in
such a way as to make it appear that said
"correctors" had participated therein,
because she blotted out the grades of the
"correctors" and wrote new and increased
grades opposite their initials, without
indicating by her own initials that she had
made the alterations. She, in that way,
attributed to the "correctors" statements
other than those in fact made by them.
U.S. vs Ponte, (20 Phil 379)
FACTS: Defendant Rufino Ponte was a
bonded employee of the provincial and
municipal government of Calabanga, Ambos
Camarines, and as municipal treasurer of
said pueblo had in his possession and in his
charge the sum of P3,795.93 and a safe
valued at P50. He was charged with the
crime of malversation of public funds, as
defined and penalized in Act No. 1740.
ISSUE: WON defendant can also be held
liable for falsification of public documents
under Art. 171 of the RPC.
HELD: YES. When the offender commits on
a document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Art. 171 as a necessary means
to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a
complex crime under Art. 48. However, the
document falsified must be public, official
or commercial.
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND USE OF
THE UNITED STATES, v. DAMIAN
FACTS: Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan)
was convicted by the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila, of the crime of having
falsified a Chinese theater ticket which
entitled the bearer thereof to admission to a
performance held in the theater by
counterfeiting and simulating the signature
and rubric of Eng Ning on the said ticket,
The accused was sentenced to be imprisoned
at the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period
of six months and one day, to pay a fine of
625 pesetas, Philippine currency, and the
costs of the suit, from which judgment the
accused appealed.
ISSUE: WON a counterfeiting a ticket is
considered a falsification of a private
document.
HELD: YES That the court below did not
err in qualifying such ticket as a document
in order to prosecute and punish the crime of
falsification, the subject matter of the
complaint, because if, according to the
authority cited by the appellant, a document
is "a deed, instrument or other duly
authorized paper by which something is
proved, evidenced or set forth," and a
private document is, according to another
authority cited by the same appellant, "every
deed or instrument executed by a private
person, without the intervention of a public
notary or of other person legally authorized,
by which document some disposition or
agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth,"
it follows that the ticket in question, being
an authorized document evidencing an
agreement for the rent of a place in a theatre
to enable the possessor to witness a
theatrical performance, is a private
document.
PEOPLE VS DOMINGO (49 PHIL 28)
FACTS: Benita Domingo and company
were accused of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents after they
had defrauded a Moises Bunzon for an
amount of P5,000. The property (fishpond)
in question is under the administration of
Josefa de Leon. Accused Benita Domingo
approached the administrator (representing
herself as a Realty broker) after learning that
de Leon was looking for a buyer of the
property. Domingo later stated that she had
found a buyer and asked if she could have
temporary possession of the Title deed and
other related documents to the property. The
documents were later handed to Domingo on
the promise that it would be returned later in
the afternoon. However, that promise was
broken. Shortly, Sanchez learned his
property was being mortgaged by accused
Modesto and company (comrades of
Domingo) but upon confrontation he was
merely told that he did not have possession
of the documents Modesto and Company
later approached a certain Moises Bunzon
and pretended to be Josefa de Leon and
representing the owner of the property. They
sold the subject property for P5000 to
Bunzon with the option of buying back the
property. This transaction criminally
defrauded and injured Moises Buzon.
ISSUE: WON the acts of the accused
constitute a falsification of public documents
HELD: YES .The crime charged in the
information and conclusively established by
the evidence. The crime could hot have been
committed if its perpetrators had not been in
possession of the certificate of title is
obvious and it has been proven beyond a
shadow of doubt that the appellant was the
person who obtained the certificate from
Sanchez. It is true that there is no direct
evidence that she delivered it to the two
women who signed the deed, but in view of
the fact that she offered no explanation as to
what she did with the certificate and even
denied that she received it, there is no escape
from the inference that she placed the
certificate in the hands of her confederates.
If she had not been a co-conspirator, she
would have revealed the name of the party
to whom the certificate was delivered. Her
position is analogous to that of a person who
immediately after a larceny has been
committed is found in possession of the
stolen goods and offers no explanation.
PEOPLE VS MANANSALA (105 Phil
1253)
FACTS: Felix Manansala, accused-appellant
was driving TPU jeepney, was apprehended
by Corporal Vicente del Rosario of Manila
Police Department (MPD) for driving
outside of his authorized route. Required to
present his driver's license, accused
presented a Traffic Violations Report (TVR)
instead. Vicente noticed that the TVR was
altered. It was later found that the alterations
consisted of erasing the number “III” and the
word “three” after the word Pending cases
and replacing the figures with “I” and “one”
this changed the original meaning of the
TVR which previously stated 3 pending
cases to only 1 pending case.
At the investigation, the accused admitted
having made the alterations in question, in
order to hide his previous pending traffic
violation cases and thereby avoid immediate
arrest should he be caught committing a
fourth traffic violation
ISSUE: WON being possessor of the
falsified TVR, the accused is presumed to be
the author of the falsification under Art 172
of the RPC.
HELD: YES. There are three acts that are
punished under Art 172. There are:
falsification of public, official or
commercial document by a private
individual, falsification of private document
by any person and use of falsified document.
In this case, the falsified TVR in question
was issued to the accused and the records
show that he had it in his possession as if
had been using it as a temporary driver's
permit from its issuance to the time he was
caught by Corporal del Rosario committing
a fourth traffic violation. Required to
explain the falsification therein, he could not
do so. It is an established rule that when a
person has in his possession a falsified
document and makes use of the same, the
presumption or inference is justified that
such person is the forger. Thus, all the acts,
mentioned in Art 172 are present.
Alonzo vs IAC, 151 SCRA 552
FACTS: Bartolome Alonzo, the personnel
officer of the Fire Department of Olongapo
City and entrusted with the preparation,
follow up and payments of payrolls,
vouchers, and other papers and documents
relative to the salary of the personnel
allegedly falsified the official voucher
pertaining to the salary of Wilfredo Cadua,
making it appear that Cadua had signed the
voucher, received the amount stated therein,
misappropriated it for his personal use and
benefit.
Alonzo, in his defense stated that Rogelio
Pangilinan, the messenger clerk, informed
him that he has already converted the
voucher into cash and handed to him.
Alonzo handed to Chua the full amount
appearing in the voucher in the amount of
P166.67. Alonzo informed Wilfredo Cadua
that he is badly in need for money for his X-
ray and asked a loan of P66.00 from Cadua
which the latter consented. No receipt was
signed for the loan since they worked in the
office "through trust and confidence." A
week after or on November 10, 1974, the
accused Bartolome G. Alonzo returned the
amount of P66.00 which he loaned from
Wilfredo Cadua in the presence of their Fire
Chief but the accused did not ask Cadua to
issue receipt for the return of his loan since
it was in the presence of their Fire Chief.
The version of the prosecution however
stated that Alonzo presented Chua a voucher
which amounted only to P100.00. When
Chua went to the treasurer's office, he
discovered that his signature had been
forged on the voucher and that the amount
he was entitled to receive was P166.67, not
P100.00. He then realized that the voucher
shown him by appellant was different. The
respondent court applied the rule that: "one
found in possession of and who used a
forged document is the forger or the one
who caused the forgery and, therefore, is
guilty of falsification.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of
falsification by forging another person's
signature on the salary voucher
HELD: NO. The fact that the petitioner
prepared the voucher, considering it was his
official duty to prepare the payroll,
vouchers, and other documents assigned to
him is not a sufficient reason for the
respondent court to conclude that "there is
no doubt that the forgery or falsification was
effected by the appellant. There is no direct
evidence showing that Bartolome G. Alonzo
himself forged Cadua's signature on the
original voucher. Nobody actually saw him
affix the alleged signature. Even Rogelio
Pangilinan. who was responsible for routing
the voucher to all those who had a hand in
approving the same could not categorically
state that he saw the accused forge
complainant's signature.
Siquian vs People, 171 SCRA 223
FACTS: Jesusa Carreon went to the office of
Manuel Siquian, the municipal mayor of
Isabela, to apply for a job in the office of the
mayor. Siquian then appointed her as a clerk
in the office of the municipal secretary and
told her that her salary would be included in
the budget. A certification of the availability
of funds through a form issued by Siquian
and addressed to the CSC, pursuant to the
requirements of the latter.
However, the municipal council of
Isabela failed to enact the annual budget for
the municipality of Fiscal Year 1975-76. In
view of the forgoing, the annual budget for
the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75, was
deemed re-enacted, thus, no position existed.
Carreon worked for five months and
was supposed to receive her salary of P120.
She approached the municipal treasurer to
ask for the money but the latter said that
there was no money yet. Carreon thereafter
filed to the court against Siquian for
falsification of a public document.
The RTC and CA ruled in favour of
Carreon. Siquian’s defense was there was no
criminal intent on his part and he did not
take advantage of his position as municipal
mayor.
ISSUE: Was Siquian guilty of falsification
of a public document?
HELD: YES. Petitioner's plea for acquittal
on the ground that the evidence for the
prosecution shows the absence of criminal
intent on his part must be denied. While this
Court has declared good faith as a valid
defense to falsification of public documents
by making untruthful statements in a
narration of fact, such defense cannot serve
to exonerate the petitioner since the element
of good faith has not clearly been shown to
exist in the case at bar.
As municipal mayor of Isabela, he
was thus aware that for failure to enact a
budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and
under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel
for that fiscal year, there were no funds
appropriated for the position of clerk to the
municipal secretary. His knowledge of these
facts is shown by the fact that he even
affixed his signature in attestation to the
correctness of these documents.
The offense of falsification by a
public officer under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by "any
public officer, employee or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts: Making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; . . ." It is
settled that in this fourth kind of
falsification, the following requisites must
concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him; and,
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender
are absolutely false.
All these requisites had been fully
met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public
officer, being then the mayor of the
municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made
an untruthful statement in the narration of
facts contained in the certification which he
issued in connection with the appointment of
complainant Jesusa Carreon. The
certification, having been issued by a public
official in the exercise of the function of his
office is a public document.It is immaterial
whether or not the Civil Service
Commissioner to whom the certification was
addressed received the document issued by
petitioner. Since the certification was
prepared by petitioner in accordance with
the standard forms prescribed by the
government pursuant to law, the certification
was invested with the character of a public
document falsification of which is
punishable under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code. Here, falsification of such
document was committed when the
petitioner stated that funds were available
for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was
appointed when he knew that, in reality, the
position itself did not even exist and no
funds had been appropriated therefor.
Bahilidad vs People, G . R. No. 185195
dated March 17, 2010
FACTS: Acting on a complaint filed by a
“Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province”
with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian,
Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the
Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain
Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their
alleged participation in the scheme of giving
fictitious grants and donations using funds
of the provincial government, a special audit
was conducted in Sarangani province.
The Special Audit Team, created for
the purpose, conducted its investigation
from June 1 to July 31, 2003. Included in the
list of alleged fictitious associations that
benefited from the financial assistance given
to certain Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), People’s Organizations (POs), and
Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was
Women in Progress (WIP), which received a
check in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in
the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as
the Treasurer thereof. Based on its findings,
the Special Audit Team recommended the
filing of charges of malversation through
falsification of public documents against the
officials involved.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of
malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents.
HELD: NO. In the instant case,the court find
petitioner’s participation in the crime not
adequately proven with moral certainty.
Undeniably, petitioner, as a private
individual, had no hand in the preparation,
processing or disbursement of the check
issued in her name. The Sandiganbayan
faulted petitioner for immediately encashing
the check, insisting that she should have
deposited the check first. Such insistence is
unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was
issued in petitioner’s name and, as payee,
she had the authority to encash it. All told,
there is reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s
guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an
accused must be acquitted even though his
innocence may not have been fully
established. When guilt is not proven with
moral certainty, exoneration must be granted
as a matter of right.
Lumiqued vs Exevea, G.R. No. 117565
dated November 18, 1997
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
U.S. vs Infante, et al., 36 Phil 146
FACTS: Appellants allegedly falsified a
pawn ticket issued by the Monte de Piedad
through changing the description of the
pawned article as it appeared on the face of
the pawn ticket and substituted therefor
another article of greatly superior value, and
that thereafter the falsified ticket was itself
pawned in the pawnshop of the complaining
witness for an amount largely in excess of
the true value of the article pawned in the
Monte de Piedad, for which the original
pawn ticket was issued.
The contention of counsel would
seem to be that, since both these tickets were
falsified at or about the same time and for
the same purpose, and since both were used
at the same time to procure unlawfully a
certain sum of money from the pawn-
broking establishment of the complaining
witness, there was but one crime committed.
ISSUE: WON separate and distinct crime
was initiated and consummated when the
second ticket was falsified.
HELD: YES. Such a contention cannot be
successfully maintained with relation to the
two separate charges of falsification of a
private document upon which the accused
were tried and convicted in the court below,
each of which constituted a single,
consummated offense wholly separate and
distinct from the other and wholly separate
and distinct from the crime of embezzlement
which was committed when illegal and
improper use was made of these falsified
pawn tickets to procure money from the
pawnshop of the complaining witness.
The two pawn tickets were wholly separate
and distinct documents. They had no relation
to each other as members of a series of
instruments, so intimately related, that the
falsification of one individual of the series
would be, in effect, a falsification of the
entire series. The crime of falsification of a
private document was complete and
consummated when, with intent to prejudice
a third person, the first pawn ticket was
actually falsified and a wholly separate and
distinct crime was initiated and
consummated when the second ticket was
falsified.
PEOPLE VS. TAN BOMPING
GR No. 24187 Mar. 15, 1926
Facts: Tan Bomping et al. were accused of
the crime of falsification of public
documents. Eight fictitious and simulated
documents acknowledged before a notary
public wherein Tan conveys to the co-
accused eight parcels of land belonging to
him making it to appear in the said
documents that these were executed on
1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1923. As a
matter of fact, said documents were
executed and signed by all the five co-
accused on November 21, 1923 and
acknowledged by a notary the following
day.
The Court of First Instance found all of the
accused guilty of the falsification of private
documents. In order to escape the
attachment of his properties in a civil action
then pending, Tan Bomping executed eight
deeds of conveyance of various parcels of
land to his codefendants and he intentionally
antedated the documents. The notary,
observing that the documents bore earlier
dates, apparently became suspicious and at
his instance, Tan Bomping stated under oath
that they were executed and signed on the
dates therein stated.
Issue: WON Tan Bomping is manifestly
guilty of the falsification of public
documents?
Held: Yes. He not only falsified private
documents, he was also directly instrumental
in causing them to be made public
documents.
The Court of First Instance erred in holding
that the crime committed was falsification of
private documents. A deed acknowledged
before a notary public is a public document
and the fact that the false dates were written
in to the documents here in question before
said documents were presented to the notary
does not alter the case if they were so
presented by the parties who committed the
falsification or at their instance.
US VS. NIETO
GR No. 2607 Feb. 2, 1906
Facts: Fernando Nieto was charged with the
falsification of a public document with
abuse of his office as municipal president.
Nieto bought a typewriter for the use of the
said municipality for which he paid $90,
gold, and at the same time caused the
vendors to sign a receipt and a
reimbursement voucher setting out the facts
connected with the sale of the machine and
the amount paid therefor. Nieto changed the
amount as set out in the receipt and voucher
from $90, gold, to $95, gold, and on the
presentation of these falsified documents,
recovered from the treasurer of the
municipality the sum of 190 pesos in
reimbursement of his expenditure in the
purchase of the machine.
The trial court found Nieto guilty of the
crime of falsification of a private document.
Issue: WON Nieto was guilty of the crime
of falsification of a private document?
Held: Yes. The documents in question at the
time when they were falsified were private
and not public documents and that the
offense was not committed with abuse of a
public office. In the purchase of the
machine, Nieto was acting as a private
person and not in his official capacity as
municipal president and the receipt and
voucher at the time when there were altered
were merely evidences of a private
transaction between him and the vendors of
the machine. They did not emanate from any
public office; they were not a part of any
public or official record nor were they
certified by any person authorized to certify
public documents. The mere fact that there
were intended for use in support of a claim
against the public funds could not of itself
raise them to the dignity of public
documents before they had become a part of
some official record and prior to their
certification by some public official, clothed
with authority for that purpose.
PEOPLE VS. PACANA
GR No. 22645-46 Dec. 19, 1924
Facts: Pedro Pacana first relates to the
falsification of the minutes of the meeting of
the provincial board on June 9, 1923 for the
alleged purpose of permitting the district
engineer to incur illegal expenses in the
reconstruction of a provincial road, second
to the falsification of minutes of the
provincial board on June 16, 1923, third to
the falsification of an excerpt from the
minutes of the provincial board on June 9,
1923, and lastly to the crimes of estafa
committed by means of falsification of
public documents whereby it is alleged
Adorable and Castro were each able to
collect the sum of P25 as per diems for two
fictitious meetings of the provincial board.
The board left on an inspection trip of the
province on May 23, 1923 and a session was
held at Tulisan on June 4, 1923. It returned
to the provincial capital on the morning of
June 18, 1923. It was kept busy during the
succeeding days.
The mistake of the secretary was attempted
to be rectified by the provincial board on
September 20, 1923, by changing the dates
of the excerpts to June 16, 1923, and thus
another error was perpetrated.
Issue: WON there was an intentional and
deliberate falsification of public documents
on the part of Pacana or whether there was
merely a human error committed, in which
criminal intent was wholly lacking?
Held: It is a serious matter to be responsible
for sending the accused to prison for long
terms. All reasonable doubt intended to
demonstrate error and not crime should be
indulged in to the benefit of the prisoners at
bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused of the crime charged and the other
consistent with their guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
The Court cannot bring itself to find these
accused guilty on the facts of record.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
GR No. L-5563 Jul. 31, 1953
Facts: Sergio Mendoza was employed as
inspector of the Division of Sanitary
Engineering of the Office of the City Health
Officer in Manila. He committed various
acts of falsification on a public and official
document. First, by erasing the name “Elena
Manansala” and the figure “P1.00” and
making it appear that the said receipt was
issued to one Roberto B. Almaden and that
the latter paid P46 to the City Treasurer’s
Office.
Mendoza entered a plea of not guilty but
eventually entered a plea of guilty for the
crime of falsification described and punished
in the last paragraph of Art. 172 of the
Revised Penal Code. He filed a motion
stating that he could not find a way to
question the legality of the penalty imposed,
which is the only question raised by the
appeal.
Issue: WON Mendoza could be considered
as a private person nowithstanding his
government employment he took no
advantage thereof in committing the
falsification?
Held: Falsification of a public document by
a public officer or employee or by a private
person is a very serious crime punished with
prision mayor to its full extend and with
prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, respectively, and in both
with a fine not to exceed P5,000.
The crime of falsification described and
punished in Art. 172 of the Revised Penal
Code is committed by a private individual
who does nay of the falsifications described
in the next preceding article in any public or
official document or letter of exchange or
any other kind of commercial document.
The last paragraph of Art. 172 punishes a
private person who introduces in evidence in
any judicial proceeding and uses any of the
false documents embraced in the next
preceding article or in any of the
subdivisions of the article.
ART. 173 – FALSIFICATION OF
WIRELESS, CABLE, TELEGRAPH, AND
TELEPHONE MESSAGES, AND USE
OF SAID FALSIFIED MESSAGES
US VS. ROMERO
GR No. 5805 Sep. 16, 1910
Facts: Joaquin Romero, as postmaster in
charge of the post-office and telegraph
station received from Eugenio two telegrams
for their transmission – on to Olongapo
addressed to Mariano de la Cruz, and the
other to Los Baños addressed to Severino
Maguigao. The messaged was supposed to
be “See whether there is money. I need it
because I am sick. Send if you can.
Eugenio.” However, Romero only sent
“Send me money soon, am sick, Eugenio.”
The original telegram was thus reduced to
nine words and twelve words were omitted.
Romero received P1.26 for the transmission,
the price charged for twenty-one words and
through the said reduction gained P0.72.
The second telegram was originally worded
as follows: “Please remit what you owe me.
I am very sick and need the money.
Eugenio.” Romero omitted words from the
telegram which was reduced to the
following: “Remit me money. Need. Am
sick. Eugenio.” By the reduction of words
made, Romero gained the price
corresponding to the difference of P0.48.
The provincial fiscal filed a complaint with
the Court of First Instance charging Romero
with the crime of falsification of telegrams.
The crime is provided for and punished by
Art. 303 in connection with Art. 300 of the
Penal Code, which reads: “A public official
in charge of the telegraph service who shall
originate or falsify a telegraphic message
shall incur the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Issue: WON Romero was a public official in
charge of the post-office and the telegraph
station was appointed by the government to
discharge the said positions, and as such
official received salary from the public
treasury?
Held: Romero admitted that he changed the
wording of the telegrams which he received
by omitting several words in each of them;
and the record of the cause shows no proof
of his allegation that he made an error in
recounting the amount received for each one
of the telegrams, owing to the number of
words they contained, and that he was
therefore obliged to diminish the number of
words of each of them.
From all of which it is concluded, as
aforesaid, that Romero obtained profit form
the remainder of the sum received by him,
equivalent to the price of the words omitted
by him from the two telegrams before
mentioned. Romero, therefore, with manifest
violation of a prohibitive law perpetrated the
unlawful act in question and has thereby
incurred the penalty which he merits for his
criminal act.
ART. 174 – FALSE MEDICAL
CERTIFICATES, CERTIFICATES OF
MERIT OR SERVICE, ETC.
US VS. MICHELENA
GR No. 1766 Apr. 29, 1905
Facts: In an application to the Civil Service
Board for examination, a document printed
which contains recommendations of Juan
Michelena, certificate No. 3 appears to be
subscribed by Frank N. West, the latter
having neither subscribed it nor written the
contents thereof, the same not being correct
in some respects, viz, as regards the age of
the party certifying and the length of time
which he knew the candidate recommended.
Issue: WON this was an attempted
falsification because the examination did not
take place, and not having taken place the
document was not put on record, for which
reason it never became a public document?
Held: The prosecution in this instance
considers the fact as a consummated crime
of falsification of a public document
comprised within Art. 301, in connection
with Pars. 2 and 4 of Art. 300 of the Penal
Code. The act done by Michelena is simply
the falsification of a certificate of merit
provided for in Art. 311 of the Penal Code.
US VS. DELOSO
GR No. 4411 Aug. 31, 1908
Facts: Rufino Deloso in order to take part in
the municipal elections called at the building
and stated under oath to the municipal
secretary that he was a resident of the said
town, and at the date of the next municipal
election, he would have resided therein for a
period of six months. That he was in every
way entitled to vote. Rufino Deloso was
elected by a majority vote to the office of
municipal president. The election was
protested by several residents of the town on
the grounds that the successful candidate
had no legal residence therein. Deloso stated
under oath that he had been, and was at the
time, a resident of the said town, and that he
had resided there in from the month of April
1902 until the above-mentioned date.
A complaint was filed by the provincial
fiscal charging Deloso with the crime of
falsification of official documents, and the
court, in view of the evidence adduced at the
trial, found him guilty of the crime defined
and punished by Art. 311, in connection
with Art. 310, of the Penal Code.
Issue: WON Deloso was guilty of the crime
of falsifying a certificate issued by a public
officer was committed by a private person
who used it?
Held: Yes. The document offered is not
strictly speaking a public document but it
belongs to the class of documents the
falsification of which is specially punished
by Arts. 306 – 311 of the Penal Code.
However, the provisions of Art. 301 and
302, in connection with Art. 300 of said
code, are not applicable to the present case.
ART. 175 – USING FALSE
CERTIFICATES
NEGROS MERCHANTS
ENTERPRISES VS. CBC
GR No. 150918 Aug. 17, 2007
Facts: Negros Merchants Enterprises, Inc.,
through its President and General Manager,
Jacinto Y. Tan Jr., applied for an P8 Million
Credit Accommodation with China Banking
Corporation with terms “One year loan line,
renewable and re-available annually
thereafter.” The loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage over its properties. Tan
applied for an additional case-to-case loan
worth P1,500,000. Both loans were
respectively paid on January 31 and March
27, 1996.
Tan allegedly re-availed the P8 Million
credit line under the original credit
accommodation through promissory notes
executed by him. Tan failed to settle the
obligation, hence, CBC sent a demand letter
with warning to foreclose on the real estate
mortgage.
Tan sent two letters to CBC requesting a
detailed statement of account and to hold in
abeyance any legal action. CBC replied that
said statement could not be released without
proper board resolution or authorization.
Tan’s properties were extrajudicially
foreclosed and sold in public auction with
CBC as the highest bidder.
Tan filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Foreclosure Sale with Damages and
Preliminary Injunction. CBC moved to
dismiss the same on the ground that Tan
failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that it is entitled to the relief
sought in the complaint.
CBC again sought to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state cause of action
and for failure to comply with the rules on
non-forum shopping.
The RTC denied CBC’s Motion to Dismiss.
CBC moved for reconsideration but was
likewise denied. The Court of Appeals
denied the same. The CA held that the
amended complaint should have been
dismissed because the accompanying
certification against forum shopping which
was signed by Tan’s secretary, Amelito
Lizares, was defective, for lack of
authorization from the board of directors.
Issue: WON Tan substantially complied
with the rules and that the substance of the
complaint should not be subordinated to
procedural lapses?
Held: No. There was no allegation that
Negros Merchants Enterprises Inc., through
a board resolution, authorized Lizares to
execute the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. Moreover, no such
board resolution was appended to the
complaint or amended complaint.
The Court has previously held that if a
complaint is filed for and in behalf of the
plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An
unauthorized complaint does not produce
any legal effect. Hence, the court should
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
has no jurisdiction over the complaint.
Lizares was not authorized to file the
complaint for and in behalf of Tan. Thus, the
complaint is not deemed filed by the proper
party in interest and should be dimissed.
ART. 176 – MANUFACTURING AND
POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENTS OR
IMPLEMENTS FOR FALSIFICATION
US VS. ANGELES
GR No. 2655 Sep. 11, 1906
Held: The evidence is sufficient to show
that Modesto Angeles, manufactured a seal
in imitation of the seal of the municipality of
Lipa, Batangas for the purpose of using it in
the making of false certificates of the
transfer by him of livestock. He therefore
violated Art. 312 of the Penal Code.
PEOPLE VS. MAGPALE
GR No. 46656 Jun. 26, 1940
Facts: A criminal complaint was lodged
against Felipe Magpale charging him with a
violation of Art. 176 of the Revised Penal
Code for having in his possession one brand
of the municipal government with the intent
of using it for falsifying the official brand of
the said municipality in public documents.
Convinced from the evidence before him
that there was a reasonable ground to believe
that the defendant committed the crime
complained of.
The Court rendered a decision guilty for
Magpale of a violation of Art. 176 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in finding
the acts imputed to Magpale punishable as
coming within the purview of Art. 176?
Held: Yes. Magpale himself admits that he
ordered the question iron brand to be made
wherefore he is criminally liable for the
making thereof.
ART. 177 – USURPATION OF
AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS
PEOPLE VS. HILVANO
GR No. L-8583 Jul. 31, 1956
Facts: When Mayor Fidencio Latorre
departed for Manila on official business
early in the morning, he designated
Francisco Hilvano, Councilor, to discharge
the duties of his office. Later, during office
hours, on that same day, Vice Mayor Juan
Latorre, went to the municipal building and
having found Hilvano acting in the place of
the mayor, he served written notices to the
corresponding municipal officers, in
including Hilvano, that he, as Vice Mayor,
was assuming the duties of the absent
mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield
arguing that he had been designated by the
mayor. Whereupon the Vice Mayor sent a
telegram to the Executive Secretary,
informing him of the letter of the
controversy. The said secretary replied by
letter, that under Sec. 2195 of the Revised
Adminstrative Code, it was the Vice Mayor
who should discharge the duties of the
mayor during his temporary absence.
Showing this official pronouncement,
Hilvano stil refused to surrender the
position. Again the Vice Mayor sought the
opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who later
replied that the vice mayor had the right to
the office. Notwithstanding such opinion
which was exhibit to him – Hilvano declined
to vacate the post, which he held for about a
month, appointing some policemen,
solemnizing marriages and collecting the
corresponding salary for mayor.
Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was
prosecuted – and after trial – was convicted
of usurpation of public authority under RA
No. 10.
Issue: WON he committed no usurpation of
authority because he was a councilor, an
official of the Government, and that such
crime may only be committed by private
individuals?
Held: There is actually no reason to restrict
the operation of Art. 177 to private
individuals. For one thing it applies to “any
person”; and where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.
In the beginning he might have pleaded
good faith, invoking the designation by the
Mayor; but after he had been shown the
letter of the Executive Secretary and the
opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no
right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the
position. He was rightfully convicted.
PEOPLE VS. LIDRES
GR No. L-12495 Jul. 26, 1960
Facts: Magdalena Echaves, a public school
teacher, applied for and was granted
maternity leave. To fill up the vacancy
expected to be created by said leave of
Echavez, Josita Diotay and Dionisio Lidres
filed their respective applications as
substitute teachers. Diotay was
recommended by the supervising teacher,
Hilario Laspiñas, to fill up the position of
Echavez. Laspiñas, however, requested
Diotay to sign an agreement wherein both
Diotay and Lidres agreed to take over
Echavez’ position on a “50-50” basis, that is
the period would bev equally divided
between them. Thereafter, Diotay received
her appointment as substitute teacher and
began teaching the second grade class.
On the strength of the agreement, Lidres
appeared armed with a prepared letter of
resignation for the signature of Diotay.
When Lidres asked Diotay to sign said letter
of resignation, the latter refused. Lidres
made known to Diotay that whether she like
it or not, he would take over her class. True
to his words, Lidres went to the classroom
where Diotay was conducting her classes,
and insisted to take over the same. Diotay
tried to hold on and as a consequence, both
held classes.
Issue: WON RA No. 10 is not applicable to
his case because this law is an emergency
measure and intended to apply only to
members of subversive organizations?
Held: Granting, arguendo, that RA No. 10 is
an amendment to Art. 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and not merely an
implementation thereof or an emergency
measure as state, the subsequent enactment
of RA No. 379 would constitute an
amendment thereof by restoring the element
of pretense of official position in the offense
of usurpation of official functions, originally
required by Art. 177 prior to its amendment
by the latter Act. Under RA No. 379, then
the law in force at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense by Lidres,
pretense of official position is an essential
element of the crime of usurpation of official
functions. But the information specifically
charges Lidres committed the offense
“without pretense of official position”.
Under the circumstances the facts alleged in
the information fail to constitute an offense.
Neither can Lidres be convicted of
usurpation of authority, as distinguished
from usurpation of official functions, under
the first paragraph of Art. 177, as amended
by RA No. 379, namely, that of representing
to be an officer, agent, or representative of
any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any government,
inasmuch as the information does not charge
the same/
ARTICLE 178: USING FICTIOUS NAME
AND CONCEALING TRUE NAME
US VS. TO LEE PIU
Facts:
The appellant was charged with
using a false name. The evidence is to the
effect that he came to the Philippine Islands
in 1911 and presented a section six
certificate, which is attached to the record as
Exhibit A, wherein his name appears as To
Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an
application for a passport the name Toribio
Jalijali
Issue:
Whether or not To Lee Piu violated
Art. 178
Ruling:
 From the fact and circumstances in
evidence it appears established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the appellant used the
name of another person for the purpose of
deceiving Government and, by that
deception, to obtain a passport. He came to
the Philippine Islands as a Chinese person
traveling for curiosity and pleasure.
On the trial the appellant testified in
the Chinese language by means of a Chinese
interpreter. He showed no familiarity with
the Spanish language or with any of the
Philippine dialects; and the trial court said,
with reference to his personal appearance
ONG HOCK LIAN ALIAS JULIAN
ONG VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-21197 MAY 19, 1966
Facts:
This is an appeal by the Solicitor
General from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental which
granted the petition for naturalization of Ong
Hock Lian alias Julian Ong. Appellee, a
citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in
the Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used
to reside in Zamboanga City but since
March 1, 1940 he has been living in
Dumaguete City. He is married to Tan Ko
Kiem, also known as Alice Tan, a Chinese
national, by whom he has three children, two
of whom are enrolled at the St. Paul's
College, Dumaguete City. Appellee himself
finished his first-year high school education
at the Zamboanga Chinese High School. He
speaks the English, language and the
Cebuano-Visayan dialect. To prove that he
has none of the disqualifications enumerated
in the Naturalization Law, he presented tax
and police clearances; clearances from the
Philippine Constabulary, the City Fiscal, the
Provincial Fiscal, the Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental and the Municipal Court
of Dumaguete City; and a medical certificate
of the City Health Officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused violated
the anti-alias law.
Held:
Yes. Under the law, except as a
pseudonym for literary purposes, no person
shall use any name different from the one
with which he was christened or by which
he has been known since childhood, or such
substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court (Section 1,
Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the
name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using
the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence
that appellee has been baptized with the
latter name or that he has been known by it
since childhood, or that the court has
authorized the use thereof. Appellee has
therefore committed a violation of the Anti-
Alias Law.
ARTICLE 181: FALSE TESYIMONY
AGAINST DEFENDANT
PEOPLE VS. MANEJA
Facts:
The sole question raised in this
appeal is whether the period of prescription
for the offense of false testimony which, in
the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No.
4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal
Code), should commence from the time the
appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the
supposed false testimony in criminal case
No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the
lower court held, or, from the time the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the
aforesaid basic case became final in
December, 1938, as the prosecution
contends.
Issue
Whether or not the accused violated
article 181.
Ruling:
If the period of prescription is to be
computed from the date the supposed false
testimony is given, it would be impossible to
determine the length of such period in any
particular case, depending, as it does
depend, on the final outcome of the basic
case. The mere fact that, in the present case,
the penalty for the offense of false testimony
is the name, whether the defendant in
criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or
acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter
of pure co-incidence. The case uniformly
presupposes a final judgment of conviction
or acquittal in the basic case as a
prerequisite to the action ability of the crime
of false testimony.
PEOPLE VS. REYES, C.A.
Facts:
The accused was the star witness in a
prosecution for robbery against Jemenia.
Before the trial, the accused executed an
affidavit in which he manifested that he was
not interested in the prosecution of the case
and that he wanted to give the accused “a
chance to earn his living wisely and in an
honest way.” When the case was called for
trial, the accused was asked to identify
Jemenia, testified that he could not
remember anymore the face of Jemenia. The
case was dismissed, resuting in acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not Art. 181 can be
appreciated.
Held:
Yes. The contention of the defense
that the acquittal of Jemenia was due to
failure of the fiscal to call other witnessed
who could have properly identified Jemenia,
is irrelevant. It is not necessary that the
testimony given by the witness should
directly influence the decision of acquittal, it
being sufficient that it was given with the
intent to favor the accused.
US VS. ADOLFO
Facts:
The accused falsely testified in a
criminal case in favor of one Tupas, the
defendant in that criminal case. Tupas was
convicted in spite of the favorable testimony
given by the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony favored
the accused
Held:
 Yes. The accused was guilty, even if
his testimony did not benefit Tupas
US VS. MCGOVERN
Facts:
Appellants developed a scheme to
defraud the seller of traveler's checks. One
appellant purchased the checks, the second
appellant negotiated them by signing the
first appellant's name, and the first appellant
reported the traveler's checks as stolen.
Appellants were convicted of transporting
traveler's checks bearing a forged
countersignature in interstate or foreign
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2314.
Issue: Whether or not the accused violated
article 181.
Held:
The court affirmed the convictions,
holding that appellant, who purchased the
traveler's checks, could not give authority to
the other appellant to sign the check's on his
behalf and, therefore, that attempted
negotiation of the checks by the second
appellant, accompanied by his intent to
defraud, constituted common law forgery,
the predicate of the federal statutory offense
of transporting forged traveler's checks.
US VS. SOLIMAN
Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf
in the course of another criminal case in
which he, with several others, was charged
with estafa, swore falsely to certain material
allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a
sworn statement offered in evidence in
support of the charge of estafa, which was in
effect an extrajudicial confession of his
guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and
that its execution had not been procured by
the police by the use of force, intimidation
and prolonged torture. 
Issue:
Whether or not the new penalties are
more favorable to the convict in the case at
bar than those imposed by the trial judge.
Ruling:
The penalties prescribed in the Penal
Code is less than that imposed in Section 3
of Act #1697. Hence, the penalty imposed
by the court below must be revoked and the
penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should
be imposed.
PEOPLE VS. AMBAL
Facts:
After a heated argument because of
Felicula’s failure to buy medicine for
husband Honorato Ambal who was afflicted
w/ influenza, Ambal assaulted and killed his
wife. He then surrendered himself to the
authorities. His counsel raised up the
defence of insanity. Doctor Balbas testified
that during the period from February 1
(twelve days after the killing) to November
3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under
observation, the latter did not show any
mental defect and was normal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ambal should be
criminally exempt
Held:
NO, there was no proof that the
defendant was not of sound mind at the time
he performed the criminal act. The legal
presumption is that he is sane. In order that
insanity may be taken as an exempting
circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the
commission of the act or that the accused
acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability. The alleged insanity of
Ambal was not substantiated by any
sufficient evidence.
ARTICLE 182: FALSE TESTIMONY IN
CIVIL CASES
U.S VS ARAGON
Facts
This was an action for the crime of
giving false testimony. The complaint filed
in said cause was as follows: The
undersigned accuses Isidoro Aragon of the
crime of false testimony in a civil cause,
about what he heard about the Pasay estate
prior to the last four Years
Issue
Whether or not Art. 182 can be
appreciated
Ruling
No. The evidence adduced during the
trial of this case is not sufficient to show that
the defendant committed the crime charged
in the complaint. The judgment of the
inferior court is therefore reversed and the
said cause is hereby ordered to be dismissed.
ARTICLE 183: FALSE TESTIMONY IN
OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN
SOLEMN AFFIRMATION
U.S. VS VASQUEZ
Facts
Issue
Ruling
U.S VS. ESTRANTA
Facts
Issue
Ruling
People v Cabero |61 Phil. 121
February 25, 2013
FACTS:
 Accused Hilaria Cabero presented a
written complaint, statement and affidavit to
the court of the justice of peace, duly
subscribed and sworn to by her before the
justice of the peace, when in fact she well
knew that the said complaint, statement and
affidavit were false and untrue. She was
charged with the crime of perjury. However,
the lower court dismissed the information as
it does not fall under Art. 183 of the RPC or
Art. 180 of the said Code. Hence, the
Solicitor- General brought this appeal.
ISSUE:
 Can a false affidavit in a complaint
give rise to perjury?
HOLDING: 
The indictment in the complaint
closely follows Art. 183 and alleges every
fact required by that article. An affidavit was
made upon material matters before the
competent person authorized to administer
an oath required by law. It is further clearly
alleged that the accused well knew that the
affidavit in question made by her was false
and untrue upon the material matters recited.
It would seem that the court had the opinion
that an affidavit to a criminal complaint has
an entirely different status from an ordinary
affidavit for other purposes.
In the case of People v. Rivera (1933, 59
Phil. 236), the court held that a false
affidavit was not a violation of Art. 363 of
the RPC but did not hold that it would not
violate Art. 183 of the RPC. The indictment
in the present case is more complete that in
the Rivera case in that it has an express
allegation of guilty knowledge. The holding
of the trial court that the complaint did not
properly change as offense was therefore
erroneous.
US VS. JURADO
31 Phil. 491
FACTS:
This cause was initiated by a complaint filed
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu by
the provincial fiscal on March 23, 1914,
charging Francisco Jurado with the crime of
perjury. On March 9, 1915, judgment therein
was rendered whereby the defendant was
sentenced to the penalty of two years'
imprisonment and the payment of the costs
of the trial.  From this judgment heappealed.
Jurado was called to testify as an
eyewitness to the crime he denied that he
was at home on the night of the robbery, as
he was then in a cinematograph with his
family. He further testified that he did not
know either Vicente Lizarraga or Alejandro
Albao. Such was his testimony given under
oath before the provincial fiscal Jacosalem,
but in the proceedings brought against
Ciriaco Singson for robbery, commenced on
September 24,1913, Jurado, testifying as a
witness for the defense, stated under oath
that he had known Vicente Lizarraga since
the month of June, 1913, and that he was
already acquainted with Alejandro Albao on
the date of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is
liable for perjury?
RULING:
NO. testimony, alleged to be false,
was material and important in its bearings on
the said testimony of the other witnesses
given in connection with the said crime of
robbery. If this cause had been instituted
after the final adjudication of the said cause
for robbery, as it should have been, perhaps
another result would have been obtained.
In a criminal cause the accused is presumed
to be innocent until his guilt is conclusively
proven, for even in a case of reasonable
doubt, and when his guilt does not appear to
be satisfactorily established, as occurs in the
case "at bar, he is entitled to acquittal.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment
appealed from should be and is hereby
reversed and the defendant, Francisco
Jurado, is hereby acquitted with the costs of
both instances de oflicio.   So ordered.
PEOPLE VS. ABAYA
74 PHILS. 59
FACTS:
On May 4, 1940, the defendant was
charged in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna with a violation of article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, in that he so the
information alleged wilfully, maliciously
and feloniously stated under oath in his
insolvency case that the undivided half of
the land therein mentioned was his, when he
fully knew that the same no longer belonged
to him, as it was and still is owned by
Zosimo Fernandez. The lower court,
sustaining the defendant's motion to, quash,
dismissed the information on the ground that
the acts charged therein do not constitute
false testimony as defined in article 183 of
the Revised Penal Code. Hence this appeal
by the Government.
to Zosimo Fernandez in the schedule,
probably in his very desire to be consistent
with the inclusion of the land in the
inventory and to safeguard the rights of
Zosimo Fernandez.

The appealed order is hereby affirmed

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is
liable for false testimony? PEOPLE VS. ANGGANGCO
RULING: G.R. NO. L-47693, OCT. 12, 1943
NO. The appealed judgment is correct.  Facts:
The record fails to show that the defendant
maliciously committed the acts imputed to Issue:
him. They could not be malicious because, Ruling:
at the time the petition for insolvency was
filed, the land in fact was still registered in
the name of the defendant; and it might' PEOPLE VS. CAINGLET
have been included in the inventory for fear
that he might be accused of concealing G.R. NOS. L-21493-94, APR. 29 ,1966
property standing in his name in the registry
Facts:
of property, in violation of the Insolvency
Law. In other words, the defendant who Issue:
could not be expected to determine the
propriety, from a legal point of view, of the Ruling:
inclusion merely stated a fact in said US VS. CAPISTRANO
inventory. The acts charged could not be
malicious as against the defendant's 40 PHILS. 902
creditors because, instead of concealing
assets, he listed property which should not
be included in the inventory. They could not FACTS:
be malicious as against Zosimo Fernandez
On the 29th of April, 1918, Barbara
because the Torrens titles covering the land
Capistrano made a sworn declaration before
and specified in the inventory, bore
the fiscal of the city of Manila, accusing her
annotations of the writ of execution issued in
father, Alejo Capistrano, of the crime of rape
civil case No. 6190 and of the auction sales
committed upon her person. After the
in favor of Zosimo Fernandez, which of
corresponding preliminary investigation was
course duly protected the letter's rights; and
conducted by said fiscal, the latter, on April
the defendant has not made any allegation
29, 1918, filed an information with the Court
either in the petition for insolvency or in the
of First Instance of the same city against the
inventory which could militate against or
said Alejo Capistrano for the crime of rape
defeat said rights. On the contrary, the
alleged to have been committed upon the
defendant made particular reference in the
person of his said daughter. On May 11 of
inventory to civil case No. 6190 and to the
the same year, several days before the
auction sales. He included his indebtedness
hearing of the cause No. 16900 instituted
upon said information, the said Barbara
Capistrano filed a motion with the court
praying for the dismissal of the cause against
her father on the ground that it was not the
latter who had raped her, as she has
previously stated before the fiscal of the
city, but a Spaniard named Juan, an
employee of the Lerma Park Cabaret,
Caloocan, Rizal Province, and that if she had
made a different statement before at the
police station, it was on account of the.
instructions of the said Spaniard Juan. At the
hearing of the cause aforementioned, after
recognizing having stated before the fiscal
concerning the fact of her father having
raped her on the night of April 26, 1918,
saying having made similar statement before
the fiscal because the Spaniard had
instructed her to denounce her said father,
the same Barbara Capistrano said that this
statement was not true and that the truth was
that which she was telling before the court,
or rather that it was the Spaniard Juan who
abused her person, and not her father. From
this testimony, the fiscal having been
obliged to move for the dismissal of the
cause, same was dismissed by the court in
his decree of the 15th of the same month of
May, ordering Alejo Capistrano's immediate
release. In view thereof, the fiscal filed
against said Barbara Capistrano the
information giving rise to the present cause
for the crime of perjury.  defendant, charged with homicide, in that
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for
perjury?
RULING:
NO. The testimony of the accused taken
under oath, which is alleged as false in the
information, was the second statement or
that one taken by her before the Court of
First Instance at the hearing of the cause for
rape, and the one alleged in said information
as true was her statement under oath before
the fiscal of the city at the preliminary
investigation. Wherefore, in order to hold
the accused guilty of the crime of perjury, it
was necessary to prove that she did not
believe said testimony as true or, what
amounts to the same thing, that which she
testified to before the Court of First Instance
was not true.
"A conviction for perjury cannot be
sustained merely on the contradictory sworn
statements of the defendant, but the state
must prove which of the two statements is
false and must show that statement to be
false by other evidence than the
contradictory statement”.
US VS. BALLENA
18 PHILS. 382
FACTS:
On the 21st of September, 1909,
there was tried  in the Court of First 
Instance  of the subprovince of  Masbate
criminal  case No. 163, entitled "United
States vs.  Ana Ramirez," in which the
defendant was charged with the crime of
perjury.   The basis of this  prosecution was
the false testimony given by the defendant 
in  a certain  criminal case tried in that court
wherein one Ciriaco Pellejera was
the said Pellejera did, by means of blows,
cause the  death of the husband of Ana
Ramirez. 
In the trial of this perjury case  one Estefania
Barruga, mother of the defendant Ana, was a
witness for the defendant, and  at  the
instigation of one  Leoncio Ballena she
testified that the fiscal, Senor Bailon, at the
time he was in Dimasalang making the
investigation into the  cause of the death of
Ana's husband, attempted to rape her
daughter Ana, and,asked for the hand of the
girl in marriage, but she did not desire  to
accept this  proposition of the fiscal because
he was a married  man.
Subsequently  thereto, and on the 29th  of  tribunal; that this witness so testified at  the
September, 1909, the fiscal filed an
information in the  Court  of First Instance  that the   defendant knew  that the  testimony
of that province  against the said Leoncio
Ballena, charging  him with  the crime of  witness so informed the defendant.
subornation of  perjury.
Upon this complaint the defendant was duly
tried, found guilty.   From this sentence and
judgment the defendant appealed, and now
insists that the testimony given  by Estefania
Barruga in that perjury case was immaterial
to the issues involved therein. If this
contention be true, the defendant is  not
guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is
liable for perjury?
RULING:
YES. There are  certain  well-defined
and  indispensable requisites which must be
established in every case of subornation of  necessarily follows that materiality is
perjury before  an accused  person, charged
with the commission of this crime, can be
convicted.  Every essential
element constituting  the crime of perjury
must be established by competent
testimony.   The prosecution must show the
nature of the proceedings in which  the
alleged perjury was committed, the court, or
officer, in which,  or before whom, the false
oath  was taken;  that the  witness  was duly
sworn; that the testimony was material, and
false; that the defendant knowingly and
willfully procured another to swear falsely,
and that the witness suborned did testify
under circumstances rendering him guilty of
perjury.
In the  case at bar the record shows beyond
any question of a doubt that the witness
Barruga, after being duly sworn, did
knowingly and willfully testify falsely in a
criminal case before a  duly constituted
 
instigation  of the defendant  Ballena; and
given by the witness Barruga was false.  The
  
Notwithstanding this information, the
defendant strongly insisted that by the
witness Barruga testifying that the  fiscal
committed those acts would be the only way
to save her daughter from imprisonment. 
The defendant not. only knowingly and
willfully induced this witness to swear 
falsely, but he did so maliciously, as it
appears from the record that he was an
enemy of  the fiscal at that time, the fiscal
having prosecuted him  previous to this
trial.   So the only question to be determined
is, as we have said, Was the testimony of
Barruga material to the  issues involved in
that criminal case against her daughter  for 
perjury? Materiality is an essential element
in the crime of perjury. (U.  S. vs. Estrafia, 
16 Phil. Rep., 520.)   It, therefore,
likewise an indispensable requisite in the
crime of subornation of perjury, as the latter
is derived from the former.
PEOPLE VS. PUDOL
66 PHILS. 382
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
ARTICLE 185 MACHINATIONS IN
PUBLIC AUCTIONS
DIAZ VS. KAPUNAN
45 PHILS. 482
FACTS:
In 1917, Vicente Diaz and Secundino
de Mendezona formed a partnership and
entered into extensive business transactions
in the Province of Leyte. Unfortunately,
however, the business failed to prosper. Luis
Velarde, the deputy sheriff of Leyte, is
authority for the statement that Kapunan told
him that he, Kapunan, was ready to bid on
the property up to P16,000 in order to assist
the Mendezona family which was in
financial straits. At any rate, the bidding was
opened by Kapunan offering P12,000 for the
property and with Diaz and Kapunan raising
the bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500.
There the bids stopped on account of Diaz
and Kapunan entering into the
agreementAlthough it was on December 23,
1922, that Diaz and Kapunan entered into
the agreement, Diaz could only wait until
January 4, 1923, following, of lay before
this court charges against Attorney Kapunan
for alleged unprofessional conduct.
Undoubtedly, before Kapunan had
knowledge of the disbarment proceedings,
on January 10, 1923, he presented a motion
in the Court of First Instance on Leyte
asking that he be permitted to retain the
P500 in question, in part payment of his
professional fees. Later, on February 4,
1923, when Kapunan must have had
knowledge of the disbarment proceedings,
he filed another motion, withdrawing his
former motion and asking the court to permit
him to turn over the P500 to Diaz, which
Judge Causing refused to do on the ground
that it was a personal matter. Nevertheless,
on July 10,1923, the clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte handed the P500 to
Diaz who, in turn, receipted for that amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable
under art. 185 for machinations in public
auctions?
RULING:
YES. This article punishes "any
person who shall solicit any gift or promise
as a consideration for agreeing to refrain
from taking part in any public auction." The
crime is consummated by the mere act of
soliciting a gift or promise for the purpose of
abstaining from taking part in the auction.
Not permitting our minds to be confused by
the varied explanations of Diaz and
Kapunan, the document formulated by them
and hereinbefore quoted, demonstrates that
Kapunan, on the promise of Diaz to pay
P1,000, refrained from further participation
in the sale of the property of Mendezona,
which is exactly the situation covered by
article 542 of the Penal Code.
Public policy discountenances combinations
or agreements on the part of bidders at
execution sales, the objects and effects of
which are to stifle competition. The courts
will consider an agreement between a
judgment creditor and one claiming an
interest in the thing about to be sold under
an execution, that neither shall bid against
the other, as void, unless all parties
concerned know of the arrangement and
consent thereat. Execution sales should be
open to free and full competition, in order to
secure the maximum benefit for the debtor.
Article 542 of the Penal Code is, therefore, a
wise provision even though rarely invoked,
and should be used to discourage the stifling
of bids at judicial sales.
ARTICLE 186 MONOPOLIES AND
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF
TRADE
US VS. FULGUERAS
4 PHILS. 432
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

ARTICLE 188 SUBSTITUTING AND

ALTERING TRADEMARKS, TRADE
NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS

US VS. KYBURS
28 PHILS. 475
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

NO CASE DIGESTS: SPINNER v

HESSLEIN- FLAMING vs CHUAN
TO BE SUBMITTED BY: LASACA