US VS LAGNASON
revolver, and a bolo. Most of his men wore
FACTS:
1. The defendant [Dalmacio Lagnason] was
charged under section 1 of Act No. 292 with the
crime of treason, was convicted and sentenced to
death.
2. SECTIONS 1 AND 3 OF ACT NO. 292 OF
THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ARE AS
FOLLOWS:
"SECTION 1. Every person, resident in the
Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the
United States, or the Government of the
Philippine Islands, who levies war against them
or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason, and, upon
conviction, shall suffer death or, at the discretion
of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor
for not less than five years and fined not less
than ten thousand dollars."
"SECTION 3. Every person who incites, sets on
foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United
States, or of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives aid or
comfort to anyone so engaging in such rebellion
or insurrection, shall, upon conviction, be
imprisoned for not more than ten years and be
fined not more than ten thousand dollars."
3. On October 29, 1902, the defendant with this
band made an attack upon the pueblo of Murcia
in said province, but was driven off by the force
of Constabulary there stationed.
4. During that night, 2 inspectors of the
Constabulary arrived with additional forces and
early in the morning they left the pueblo in
search of the defendant.
5. He was encountered with his party about three
kilometers from the pueblo and was attacked by
the Constabulary. The fight lasted an hour and a
half. The defendant was captured in the battle
and about 20 of his men were killed. On the side
of the Constabulary were killed two policemen
of the vicinity who were acting as guides. The
defendant’s band consisted of between 70-80
men.
6. They had for arms five or ten rifles, bolos,
daggers, and one small cannon. The defendant
when captured was armed with a rifle, a
black shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps.
They carried no banners, but did carry two large
wooden crosses which were captured, together
with the cannon.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OF THE
DEFENDANT, WITH HIS ASSOCIATES,
INTENDED TO OVERTHROW THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTES LEVYING WAR AGAINST THAT
GOVERNMENT.
RULING:
Yes, The foregoing facts, in my judgment are sufficient
to indicate that the said defendant, with his associates,
intended to overthrow the Government of the United
States, as constituted in the said town of Murcia, in the
Province of Occidental Negros, in the Philippine Islands.
Whatever differences there may have been among the
early judges as to whether an armed resistance to the
enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, sec. 5, 1)
constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not
treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding that the
acts of violence committed by an armed body of men
with the purpose of overthrowing the Government was
"levying war against the United States," and was
therefore treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten
thousand.
TWO MODES OF COMMISSION (TREASON)
1. Levying War
2. Adherence to the enemy and Giving of Aid and
Comfort
ELEMENTS OF LEVYING A WAR
1. The defendant was a resident in the Philippine
Islands, and owed allegiance to the United States
Government in the Philippine Islands.
2. World War 2 (1939-1945)
3. The defendant’s band consisted of between 70-
80 men.
4. His acts, as disclosed by the proof in this case,
show clearly that it was not his intention to
oppose the constituted authority in these Islands
in the administration of the Government, but to
absolutely overthrow the Government.
Any organized attempt, by force of arms, on the part of
persons joined together in a band, who owe allegiance to
the Government, to overthrow and destroy the
constituted Government is the levying of war against
that Government. The evidence in this case of the United
States v. Lagnason clearly shows that the defendant and
his band intended to destroy the constituted Government
of the United States in the Pueblo of Murcia in these
Islands, and is therefore guilty of the crime of treason.
No formal declaration of war is necessary in order that
the parties shall be guilty of levying war against the
Government. War may exist without a proclamation to
that effect. Actual hostilities may determine the date of
the commencement of war, though no proclamation may
have been issued, no declaration made, and no action of
the executive or legislative branches of the Government
had.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Per JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
It is not necessary that there be any formal declaration of
the existence of a state of war or that those attempting to
overthrow the government by force of arms should have
the apparent power to succeed in their design in whole or
in part to justify the conclusion that those engaged in
such an attempt are levying war and therefore guilty of
treason.
LAUREL VS MISA
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for
habeas corpus based on a theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the
latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code.
2. The petitioner gave two reasons where the first
one is (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended;
and the second one is (2) that there was a change
of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
3. Petitioner’s theories have been unaccepted that it
shows without merit and the court resolves,
without prejudice to write later on a more
extended opinion, to deny petitioner’s petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ANASTACIO
LAUREL CAN BE PROSECUTED FOR THE
CRIME OF TREASON UNDER ARTICLE 114 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AS THE
ALLEGIANCE OF THE FILIPINOS IS NOT
SUSPENDED DURING THE ENEMY
OCCUPATION.
RULING:
Yes, Anastacio Laurel can be prosecuted for the crime of
treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner’s theories lacks merit for (1) this absolute and
permanent allegiance of citizens is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier. Sovereignty itself is
not suspended and subsists during enemy occupation;
what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, the same being passed temporarily to the
occupant.
In effect, the allegiance of the citizens to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, hence, there is no
such thing as suspended allegiance as theorized by
Laurel. Such theory would sanction the action of
invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign
country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving
themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political
suicide;
(2) That the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an
offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people.
PEOPLE VS VICTORIA
FACTS:
1. The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses
Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria,
Carling Victoria, Carlos Victoria of the crime of
treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows:
2. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a
member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the
Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose
of giving and with the intent to give said enemy
aid and comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol
composed of about eight spies and a Japanese
soldier, which went to the house of Federico
Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak
Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused
Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said
patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when
some guerrillas appeared and killed one of the
spies and the patrol left; that said accused
directed several men in the patrol in picking up
the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in
the afternoon of the same day, the same party of
spies, including the accused and eight members
of the Japanese Military Police, went again to
the house of Federico Unson and did
feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and
treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias
Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at
the house; that with their hands bound, the three
were tortured and then taken along by said patrol
after setting fire on the house of Federico Unson
and that of Isaias Perez were found lying nearby
with numerous bayonet wounds; and that Ruben
Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in
Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed.
3. That on or about December 21, 1944, the
accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies,
Pedro Raviñera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda,
Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others
who were all armed, for the purpose of giving
and with the intent to give said enemy aid and
comfort, went to the house of Jose Unson, in
Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson
and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the
charge that he had a short wave radio; that he
was furnishing radio information to the
guerrillas and at the same time supporting them;
 that said Unson was released on the same day,
but on the next day he was again arrested and
brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena,
Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned.
4. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused,
in company with Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo
Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and
Pedro Raviñera, all members of the Intelligence
Unit of the Kempei Tai, were all armed, for the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give said
enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of
Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed
him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and
turned him over to the Japanese Military Police
who on that occasion were concealing
themselves near the house of Romulo; and that,
since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was
heard of him.
5. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5
o'clock in the morning, the accused,
accompanied by two Japanese Military Police
and two undercover operatives, for the purpose
of giving and with the intent to give said enemy
aid and comfort, went to the house of
Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and
apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that
said two Japanese Military Police and the
accused conducted a search of the house and
afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese
garrison where he was subjected to inhuman
torture on the charge being pro-American and
adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
6. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5
o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting
as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with
intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably cause the Japanese
Military police to arrest and apprehended
Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who
was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and
there torture and unlawfully detained up to
September 20, 1944.
7. That on or about June, 1944, the accused
accompanied by an armed group of undercover
operatives, for the purpose of giving and with
intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went
to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., and
arrested and brought him to the Japanese
garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was
tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
8. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a
member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
joined the Makapili organization designed to
support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying
war against their enemies; that he took military
training from the Japanese and bore arms and
joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier,
taking orders from the Japanese; that he
participated in the raid and burning of the barrio
of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of
the Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and
foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista
to the mountains of Susong Dalaga and Mt.
Malipuño, Laguna; that he performed sentry
duty for the Japanese Army in Mount Malipuño,
where he was stationed with Japanese and other
Makapili soldiers.
9. That the commission of the above-mentioned
acts was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed
persons to insure or afford impunity, and
deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing
other wrongs not necessary in the commission
thereof.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY IMPOSED
IS UNJUSTIFIED, AND THAT THE ACTS
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED DO NOT
CONSTITUTE TREASON BUT ORDINARY
CRIMES AGAINST THE VICTIMIZED PERSONS.
RULING:
No. Although this Court is unanimous in finding
appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court,
there is disagreement as to the penalty that should be
imposed, because, while nine of the ten members taking
part in the decision of this case voted for the affirmance
of the death penalty imposed by the lower court, the
writer of this opinion takes the position that the penalty
the accused deserves is that of reclusion perpetua, the
medium penalty provided by law.
The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as
follows:
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was
attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity,
and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other
wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances
should be considered as aggravating, while the
undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the
circumstances in question are essential elements of the
treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature
that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of
acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single
time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes
as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil.,
801), so much so that there are some accused of treason
for just one count and there are others for several counts,
their number not changing the nature of the offense
committed.
For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the
members of this Court in the imposition of the death
penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and
appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P15,000 and costs.
PEOPLE VS MANAYAO
FACTS:
1. On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the
guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong
Tindahan, Municipality of Angat, Province of
Bulacan.
2. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of
Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among
them the instant appellant, Pedro Manayao,
conceived the diabolical idea of killing the
residents of Barrio Banaban of the same
municipality.
3. Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and
their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and
bayonets, gathered the residents of Banaban
behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945,
set the surrounding houses on fire and proceeded
to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting
the small children.
4. In fact, Pedro Manayao would also have killed
the small children if he had been allowed to have
his way where he proposed to kill them too, but
the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the
children knew nothing of the matter.
5. Appellant’s counsel contends that appellant was
a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was
subject to military law, and not subject to the
jurisdiction of the People's Court and that the
appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and
was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law
of treason.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT, BY
JOINING MAKAPILI ASSOCIATION, HAD LOST
HIS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND WAS
THEREFORE NOT AMENABLE TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAW OF TREASON.
RULING:
NO, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. The Court
considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized
to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the
Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said
army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure
and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by
appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable.
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an
oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
Japan. The members of the Makapili could have sworn
to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to
support her constitution and laws.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by
appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or air
service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant
had ever been declared a deserter in the Philippine
Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor even that he was a
member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most
fundamental and elementary principles governing the
duties of a citizen toward his country under our
Constitution. It would shock the conscience of any
enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the
very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged
against him, the doing of which under the circumstances
of record he does not deny, divested himself of his
Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself
beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so,
his very crime would be the shield that would protect
him from punishment.
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a
crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the character
of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their
coercion. They would never prescribe an illegal act
among the legal modes by which a citizen might
disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance,
innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the
obligation of the criminal to his country. (Moore,
International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)
696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred
the loss of his nationality, shall take up arms against his
native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and
treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.
PEOPLE VS PEREZ
FACTS:
1. Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez
was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of
the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and
sentenced to death by electrocution.
2. Seven counts were alleged in the information but
the prosecution offered evidence only on counts
1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the
court, were substantiated.
3. Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together
with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended
and commandeered numerous girls and women
against their will for the purpose of using them,
as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral
purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini.
4. It sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the
testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on
June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to
get her and told her that she was wanted in the
house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought
to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to
Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came
again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her
to be his Information Clerk. That a week later
the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and
succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet
Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor
Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted
her to be his wife. Colonel Mini threatened her
with a sword tied her to a bed and with force
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her;
that on the following night, again she was
brought to Colonel Mini and again she was
raped; that finally she was able to escape and
stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came
out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left
Tagbilaran.
5. Count no 2: That accused in company with some
Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and
her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home to
attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor
of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, that
said Japanese Colonel might select those first
 who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal
appetite and that by means of threat, force and
intimidation, the two sisters were brought to the
headquarters of the Japanese.
6. Count No. 4: The two girls named Eduardo S.
Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from
their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused
and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and
delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas
to satisfy his carnal appetite.
7. Count No. 5: the said accused commandeered
Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana
Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee
taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in
the investigation of a case against a certain
Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving at
Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the
aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel
Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed
Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat
and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused
and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana
Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of
Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and
intimidation, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her against her will.
8. Count No. 6: That the accused, together with his
Filipino companion apprehended Natividad
Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima
Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for
not having attended a dance and reception
organized by the Puppet Governor. That upon
being brought the Puppet Governor, they were
severely reprimanded against said nurses were
forced to attend another banquet and dance in
order that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas
might make a selection which girls would suit
best their fancy.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OF
COMMANDEERING WOMEN TO SATISFY THE
LUST OF THE ENEMY WOULD CONSTITUTE
TREASON.
RULING:
No. In a carefully written brief for the appellant these
findings are not questioned, but it is contended that the
deeds committed by the accused do not constitute
treason.
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the
enemies was treason because women's company kept up
their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining
them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and
kindred acts, would be treason.
For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the
same general result. yet by common agreement those and
similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment are
not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social,
business and political intercourse between the belligerent
occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants.
What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend
upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line
between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not
always easy.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid
and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of
the enemies' hostile designs.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's
first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of
Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment
held in their honor was not treason even though the
women and the entertainment helped to make life more
pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was
not guilty any more than the women themselves would
have been if they voluntarily and willingly had
surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment.
Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not
directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts
or to weaken the power of the United State.
The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication,
calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army
or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta
Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana
Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his
cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes
could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason
finds express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682, which says: Provided further, That where,
in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support
the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court may,
nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any
crime included in the acts alleged in the information and
established by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his
provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article
III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused
the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." The contention is not well
taken.
The provision in requires that the private crimes of
which an accused of treason may be convicted must be
averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In
the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of
the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he
was innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity
to prepare and meet them.
In facts under the general law of criminal procedure
convicted for crime different from that designated in the
complaint or information is allowed and practiced,
provided only that such crime "is included or described
in the body of the information, and afterwards justified
by the proof presented during the trial."
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of
the offended girls but these assaults are not charged
against him and should be ruled out. The crime of
coercion alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not
be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the
other crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of
rape and sentence him for each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor
to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended
women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it
being understood that the total duration of these
penalties shall not exceed forty years.
PEOPLE VS PANGANIBAN
FACTS:
1. In the early part of 1942, the Japanese invading
forces occupied the municipality of Lobo,
Province of Batangas. The mayor and other town
officials and a great portion of the population
left the town, however, defendant Amado
Panganiban who was then a chief of police,
remained in his post and met the Japanese
forces, thus initiating a close contact of
collaboration with the enemy.
2. He was prosecuted before the People's Court and
was found guilty of four counts of treason under
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. On the first count of treason, the prosecution,
proved that on December 27, 1943 in Lobo,
Batangas, defendant shot Feliciano Godoy and
as a result thereof the victim died, without any
help to save his life, because defendant
prohibited members of the family of the victim
from taking his son to the municipality of
Batangas, because according to him Godoy
should die because he was "a bad and a
guerilla."
4. On the second count, Emilio Boruel, who was a
guerrilla captain attached to the Fil-American
guerrilla forces, was arrested on April 29 by the
municipal police of Lobo, locked in the
municipal jail and later taken to the Japanese
garrison and executed on the same day. It was
testified by several witnesses that the defendant
was instrumental in the arrest of Boruel and his
final disposition.
5. On the third count. — Frank O. Bacon and three
other American were hiding in the barrio of
Sawang, Lobo while trying to contact Mindoro
guerrillas. The defendant knew of their
whereabouts, and fearing that the Japanese
 would know sooner or later about their pressure mind that the American sovereignty would not be
in the town, advised them to surrender to the restored in the Philippines.
Japanese, but the Americans refused to do so.
In fact on the third Sunday of June, 1943, a few days
Gabriel Gutierrez testified that while he was in
before the alleged attempt to assassinate him, in a speech
the office of the commander of the Japanese
he delivered in the cockpit of Lobo, he admonished
garrison in Batangas, the accused arrived and
those who had relatives among the guerrillas, to tell
reported to the Japanese officer that he had
them to surrender to the Japanese because Japan was
confiscated the firearms and other personal
bound to win the war and the Americans could not be
belongings of the four Americans, who were
expected to return until after many years.
hiding in the barrio of Sawang. This fact was
corroborated by Francisco Boruel. The People's Court sentenced the appellant to the penalty
6. The last count of treason is based on the of death, but, upon careful consideration of the
testimony of witnesses who stated that the on treasonable acts committed by this appellant, The court
March 25, 1945 the appellant sent foodstuffs, was satisfied that the ends of justice will be served if the
consisting of vegetables, chickens, eggs, one pig penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed herein. Amado
and so forth to Japanese soldiers who had Panganiban is therefore sentenced to reclusion perpetua
retreated to the hills in the barrio of Calo, Lobo, with the accessories of the law. Thus modified, the
Batangas. Those foodstuffs were collected by judgment under review is otherwise affirmed, with
defendants from the townspeople who were judgment under review is otherwise affirmed, with costs.
compelled to give what they could to feed those
Japanese soldiers formerly stationed in the
poblacion of Lobo.
7. In his defense, the defendant said that in the
afternoon of May 27 he received a note from
Captain Terada, the officer in command of those
Japanese soldiers, demanding that food be sent
to his command quickly, otherwise they will kill
the people and come down from the mountain to
burn the town and massacre its inhabitants.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT, AMADO
PANGANIBAN, SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF
TREASON.
RULING:
In the face of the facts proven in this case, the
conclusion is inevitable that the appellant is guilty of
treasonable acts in violation of the provisions of article
114 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Even if we
should consider that he cannot be held responsible for
the death of Emilio Boruel, a guerrilla captain, and
regard that the killing of Felicisimo Godoy was caused
by this appellant to avenge an alleged attempt against his
life, yet the record contains abundant proof that, during
the three years of occupation of the municipality of Lobo
by the Japanese garrison, he had done his best to further
the war effort of the enemy to the prejudice of the
interest of his countrymen, because notwithstanding the
fact that he, as a Filipino citizen, owed allegiance to the
United States of American and the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, he had made up his

PEOPLE VS. MENOR
FACTS:
1. On December 1, 1944, with the active
cooperation of a group of Filipinos, among
whom was Amado Menor, the Japanese
established a "military cordon" in the barrio of
Tipas, municipality of Taguig, Province of
Rizal, in order to prevent the inhabitants from
leaving the place.
2. They gathered all the inhabitants, particularly
the men, and caused them to parade before a
group of hooded persons, known as "magic eye."
As each person was caused to pass before
"magic eye," the latter, by a nod of the head,
indicated to the Japanese whether or not a
particular individual was a guerrilla or connected
therewith.
3. Those who were not pointed out as guerrillas
were released, while those who were designated
to have connections with the guerrillas were
never seen or heard from thereafter.
4. By the testimonies of the witness, the
prosecution has established the charge made by
the prosecution in that this defendant, not only
adhered to the enemy but with positive acts gave
the Japanese aid and comfort in carrying out
their plans of destroying the underground
resistance movement and thus consolidate their
occupation of the country.
5. Appellant alleged that when the Japanese
conducted the zoning in question, he was forced
by them to row their banca which took them to
the place of the zoning. While he claims that the
Japanese compelled him to row for their banca,
he says nothing, however, regarding his active
participation in the zoning in question. The fact
is that, according to the evidence, this appellant
not only rowed the banca for the Japanese, but
also took active part in establishing the military
cordon and in gathering the inhabitants of the
barrio.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTIONS OF THE
ACCUSED CONSTITUTE THE ADHERENCE
AND GIVING AID AND COMFORT TO THE
ENEMY, WHICH ARE THE ELEMENT OF
TREASON UNDER ARTICLE 114 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
RULING:
The active participation of this appellant in the zoning in
question and the subsequent arrest of Ernesto Buenviaje
and his disappearance and possible death by killing,
undoubtedly constitutes the adherence and giving aid
and comfort to the enemy, which constitutes the element
of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
It cannot be denied that the two counts under which this
appellant has been convicted have been sufficiently
proven and that the two-witness requirement of the law
has been more than sufficiently complied with by the
prosecution. The People's Court, in finding him guilty of
having violated article 114 of the Revised Penal Code,
took into consideration the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction of this defendant,
with no aggravating circumstance to offset the same, and
therefore imposed the penalty prescribed by said article
114 in its minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal.
We are not unmindful of the long-established doctrine of
this Court that in the consideration of the circumstance
of lack of education of the culprit, under article 11 of the
old Penal Code (now article 15 of the Revised Penal
code), the trial court has ample, opportunity to estimate
the degree of intelligence, instruction, appearance and
demeanor of the accused and this court will not interfere
in the exercise of such discretion by the trial court, this
court, departing from said rule, stated that in that
particular case the accused had shown sufficient
intelligence to be entrusted with the possession of a
revolver, indicating a degree of intelligence and
instruction beyond that of persons who are entitled to the
benefit of said circumstance. In the case at bar, the acts
executed by this appellant show that he is in possession
of that degree of intelligence to have capacitated him to
act as an able and efficient informer of the Japanese who
were bent on disrupting and destroying the guerrilla
underground movement which was the main obstacle to
the accomplishment of the occupation of these Islands.
The subservience of this defendant, and his co-members
of the Makapili, and those of his ilk, no doubt greatly
enhanced the chances of the Japanese to carry out their
plan of domain of the Philippines through the aid and
cooperation of Filipinos who played traitors to their
country. The trial court did not state the reason for the
consideration of the circumstance in question, and we
are more inclined to think that in this particular instance
the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction should
not be entertained. In view of the above considerations,
and for lack of any modifying circumstance, the penalty
that should be and is hereby imposed upon this appellant
is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion
temporal to death prescribed by the law, which is
reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE VS ALVERIO
FACTS:
1. Aurelio Sevilla Alvero alias Reli was charged
with treason on twenty-two (22) counts before
the People's Court. After trial, said Court found
the defendant guilty on all counts except the
10th relative to his interview with Leonardo
Garcia, and the 18th which refers to his alleged
ordering, helping in and causing the burning of
the buildings west of Taft Avenue and south of
Libertad Street in Pasay. Accused appealed
from that decision of conviction.
2. The People's Court grouped the 22 counts under
three main classifications — economic, political,
and military collaboration. Under economic
collaboration, come counts 2 and 3 referring to
appellant's business or trading activities, buying
war materials and selling them to the enemy,
under his company called ASA TRADING. In
political collaboration are included three groups,
namely: the letter of congratulations to President
Laurel relative to his declaration of war against
the United States and Great Britain (count 4);
defendant's membership in the KALIBAPI
(count 1); and the formation and organization of
the New Leader's Association (counts 6, 7, 8, 9,
12, 19, 21, and 22). Under military
collaboration, come five groups, which are:
defendant's relations with and membership in the
MAKAPILI (count 5 and 20); his organization
of the "Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala" (counts 13, 14,
15, 16, and 17); the meeting at the
Ayuntamiento de Manila ([City Hall], count 17);
organization of OUR PEOPLE'S OWN
GUERRILLA ([O.P.P.G.], count 11); and the
burning of buildings in Pasay (count 18).
3. Thereafter, an amnesty proclamation was
promulgated. Invoking the benefits of said
Amnesty Proclamation, appellant filed a motion
for dismissal of the cultural, political and
economical counts of the information. The Court
granted said motion and dismissed the counts of
the information referring to economic and
political collaboration as above enumerated and
discussed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT BY REASON OF THE
APPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF THE
AMNESTY PROCLAMATION TO APPELLANT'S
ACTS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
COLLABORATION, HIS ACTS OF ADHERENCE
HAVE ALSO BEEN WIPED OUT.
RULING:
No, the Court finds the appellant guilty of treason. There
is more than sufficient proof of adherence in the other
counts. The entries in his diaries make mention of his
countless Japanese friends in high officialdom, not only
among the Japanese civilian entities attached to or
collaborating with the Japanese Armed Forces, but also
in the Army and the Navy itself. His diary records
almost daily conferences, interviews, dinners, luncheons,
rides, etc. with such Japanese officials. Some of his
conferences and parleys were by himself described as
secret.
Regarding this same adherence, had appellant
confined himself within the realm of mere adherence —
disloyal state of mind and treasonous thoughts,
intentions, and sympathies, however great may have
been the disappointment, disapproval, and even hatred of
his countrymen for such disloyalty to them and to their
country, the law and prosecuting officials could not have
taken action against him. Adherence alone is not
indictable. But when he translated such treasonous
sympathies and intentions into overt acts of treason such
as joining the Makapili, establishing his military
organization Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala and offering its
services to take charge of the maintenance of peace and
order, which included the suppression of the guerrillas,
so that the Japanese could concentrate their forces in
defending the City of Manila by fighting against the
American and guerrilla forces trying to enter and liberate
it, then he (appellant) breached as it were the walls of
allegiance and loyalty which the treason law has erected
to surround and protect the security and integrity of the
nation, and he may then be held criminally liable.
CRISOLOGO VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
1. On March 12, 1946, Juan D. Crisologo, was
accused of treason under article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code in an information filed in
the People's Court.
2. Before the accused could be brought under the
jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13,
1947, indicted for violation of Commonwealth
Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of
War, before a military court, the indictment
containing three charges, two of which, were
those of treason consisting in giving information
and aid to the enemy leading to the capture of
United States Army Forces in the Far East
(USAFFE) officers, while the second was that of
having certain civilians killed in time of war.
3. He was only found guilty of the second charge;
thus, he was sentenced by the military court to
life imprisonment.
4. With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic
Act No. 311 abolishing the People's Court, the
criminal case in that court against the petitioner
was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act,
transferred to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga and there the charges of treason
were amplified.
5. Arraigned in that court upon the amended
information, petitioner presented a motion to
quash pleading double jeopardy because of his
previous sentence in the military court.
6. The court denied the motion and, after the
petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to
trial, whereupon, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court
to have the trial judge desist from proceeding
with the trial and dismiss the case.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEPARATE OVERT
ACTS, CHARGED TO THE PETITIONER IN THE
AMENDED INFORMATION, FILED IN THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE IN ZAMBOANGA
CONSTITUTE SEPARATE OFFENSES DISTINCT
FROM TREASON.
RULING:
No, the amended information filed in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from
those charged in the military court. But the certain overt
acts specified in the amended information in the
Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in
the court martial, they all are embraced in the general
charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and one
who commits it is not criminally liable for as many
crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt acts "he
has done or might have done for that purpose constitute
but a single offense."
In other words, since the offense charged in the amended
information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
is treason, the fact that the said information contains an
enumeration of additional overt acts not specifically
mentioned in the indictment before the military court is
immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in
themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from
that of treason, and this Court has repeatedly held that a
person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same
time also guilty of overt acts specified in the information
for treason even if those overt acts, considered
separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason
that those overt acts are not separate offense distinct
from that of treason but constitutes ingredients thereof.
In the present case, no new facts have supervened that
would change the nature of the offense for which the
petitioner was tried in the military court, the alleged
additional overt acts specified in the amended
information in the civil court having already taken place
when petitioner was indicted in the former court.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
granted and the criminal case for treason against the
petitioner pending in that court ordered dismissed.
Without costs.
PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
1. Hernandez is charged with and has been
convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders,
arsons, and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely
to life imprisonment.
2. On or about March 15, 1945, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with
each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31)
defendants and also with others whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown,
have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the
said purpose by then and there making armed
raids, sorties, and ambushes, attacks against
police, constabulary and army detachments as
well as innocent civilians.
3. And as a necessary means to commit the crime
of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof, have then and there
committed acts of murder, pillage, looting,
plunder arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property. To create and spread chaos,
disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose. Then
follows a description of the murders, arsons, and
robberies allegedly perperated by the accused
"as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof."
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME OF
REBELLION CAN BE COMPLEXED WITH
MURDERS, ARSONS AND ROBBERIES.
RULING:
Rebellion cannot be complexed with murders, arsons
and robberies. According to Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, one way of committing rebellion is by
“engaging in war against the forces of the government
and committing serious violence in the prosecution of
said war. Being within the purview of “engaging in war
and committing serious violence” said resort to arms
with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and
property constitutes not two or more offenses, but only
one crime – that of rebellion plain and simple.
The court find that there is no concrete evidence proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez)
actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion.
The court absolves the appellant from the crime charged.
the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches
favoring Communism would not make him guilty of
conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the
hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there
agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the
overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged
by the principles of Communism.
 Yes. Where the prosecution had established that during
the Japanese occupation, appellant, who is a Filipino
Citizen, and owing allegiance to the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
gave the enemy aid and comfort by rendering service
with the Japanese Imperial Army as secret agent,
informer and spy, of its Detective force in the province
of Iloilo, and that in the performance of such service, he
participated actively and directly in the punitive
expeditions periodically made by the Japanese forces in
the guerrilla-infested areas of the said province and
PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA committed robberies, arson and mass-murders, said
accused is guilty of the crime of Treason.
FACTS:
The specific overt acts of appellant as testified to by
1. During the Japanese occupation, appellant Pedro eyewitnesses who have survived the harrowing
T. Villanueva, who is a Filipino citizen, and massacres, speak eloquently that his adherence to the
owing allegiance to the United States of enemy in giving it aid and comfort, was accompanied by
America and the Commonwealth of the cruelty and ruthlessness, in wanton disregard of the
Philippines, gave the enemy aid and comfort by feelings and decency of his fellow citizens.
rendering service with the Japanese Imperial
Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its Anent the defense of duress allegedly exerted by the
Detective Force in the province of Iloilo. Japanese upon appellant for which he had to serve in the
2. In the performance of such service, he detective force of the Japanese Army, we agree with the
participated actively and directly in the punitive Solicitor General that "except the lone and self-serving
expeditions periodically made by the Japanese testimony of the appellant that he was coerced to
forces in the guerilla-infested areas of the cooperate with and serve the Japanese soldiers, there is
province of Iloilo, and committed robberies, not an iota of proof that he was in fact compelled or
arson and mass-murders. coerced by the Japanese. Much less is there any evidence
3. The appellant personally manhandled Gloria showing that the alleged compulsion or coercion was
Escorido, a girl barely 16 years of age at the grave and imminent."
time (Count 10) and killed in cold blood Cosme
Calacasan by bayoneting him three times (Count
8), Julia Cabilitasan by likewise bayoneting her
three times, with the added ignominy of
stripping her stark naked moments before killing
her (Count 9), and Sofia Tambirao (Count 10).
4. The foregoing facts were not impugned by any
evidence for appellant, his defense in the lower
court merely consisting of (1) his denial of the
overt acts imputed upon him, and (2) that if he
ever served in the detective force of the Japanese
Army, it was because he was made to accept the
position under duress, and that his acceptance of
such position was for the good of the people, he
having saved many Filipino lives from Japanese
atrocities.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT IS
GUILTY OF TREASON.
RULING:

US vs BAUTISTA
Topics: Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Treason
Art 115
FACTS:
1. The appellants (Tomas Puzon, Francisco
Bautista and Aniceto de Guzman) were
convicted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow,
put down, and destroy by force the Government
of the United States in the Philippine Islands.
2. The evidence of record established that during
the latter part of the year 1903 a junta was
organized and a conspiracy entered into by a
number of Filipinos for the purpose of
overthrowing by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands.
3. Puzon at the trial declared that he had never
united himself with the conspirators; that he had
accepted the appointment as brigadier-general of
the signal corps of the revolutionary forces with
no intention of ever taking any further action in
the matter, and merely because he did not wish
to vex his friend Muñoz by refusing to do so,
and that when Muñoz offered him the
appointment as brigadier-general he did so in "a
joking tone," and that he, Puzon, did not know
that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the
conspiracy at that time.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANTS WERE
GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
TREASON.
RULING:
With regards to Puzon and Bautista, yes, they were
guilty. However, De Guzman was acquitted.
The court held that acceptance of an appointment as an
officer of a group conspiring to overthrow a government
is guilty of conspiracy to commit treason.
1) It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an
appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against
him in the light of the decisions of this court in the cases
of the United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes (2 Off.
Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio Nuñez et al. (3 Off.
Gaz., 408), the United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et
al. (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United States vs. Bernardo
Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is
to be distinguished from these and like cases by the fact
that the record clearly disclose that the accused actually
and voluntarily accepted the appointment in question and
in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of
conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the
appointment is taken into consideration merely as
evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators.
2) It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators
might appoint a person in no wise connected with them
to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that
such person would afterwards accept the commission
and thus unite himself with them, and it is even possible
that such an appointment might be forwarded in the mail
or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the
person thus nominated, and that such appointment might
be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this,
the person in whose possession the appointment was
found might be entirely innocent of all intention to join
the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators
to use his name in this manner nor to send such a
commission to him.
Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of criminal
prosecutions wherein it has been proven that such
appointments have been concealed in the baggage or
among the papers of the accused persons, so that when
later discovered by the officers of the law they might be
used as evidence against the accused. But where a
genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this
case, and it is proven that the accused voluntarily
accepted an appointment as an officer in that conspiracy,
we think that this fact may properly be taken into
consideration as evidence of his relations with the
conspirators.
The court explained that conspiring to commit treason
and treason are separate and distinct offenses.
3) Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open
court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason
should be applied in this case, However, in conformance
with the decisions of the Federal courts of the United
States, that the crime of conspiring to commit treason is
a separate and distinct offense from the crime of treason,
and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in
such cases.
The court declared that Aniceto de Guzman was not
guilty.
4) The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction
of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest
substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds
from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been
prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising
funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it
does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of
the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he received
the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the
contents of the bundle was, nor that ever, on any
occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these
bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the
bundle and discovered the nature of the contents, he
destroyed them with fire, and that he never had any
dealings with the conspirators in relation to the
conspiracy or the object for which it was organized.
In the end, the court partially affirmed the sentence of
the RTC resulting to the following outcome: the
appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years'
imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and
Tomas Puzon was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and
all and each of the said appellants to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of the trial. On the other
hand, De Guzman was acquitted and freed.
PEOPLE VS SAAVEDRA
FACTS:
1. On January 14, 1977, Ernesto Pulmares, was
stabbed by Henry Fernandez, and was
accompanied by Romeo Saavedra and Reynaldo
Quilala.
2. Henry Fernandez, along with Saavedra and
Quilala was charged with the murder of Ernesto
Pulmares and were subsequently arrested and
held without bail. On arraignment Quilala and
Saavedra pleaded "not guilty" while Fernandez
on the other hand plead "guilty".
3. Unknown to the Court the accused were released
by the Philippine Constabulary and ordered
thereafter their arrest and recommitment but
only Saavedra and Fernandez were apprehended
while Quilala remained at large.
4. Fernandez did not appeal the decision and has
since become final and took the stand for the
prosecution against Saavedra.
5. Romeo Saavedra testified that after Quilala saw
him and went to fetch Fernandez and they
proceeded to San Jose de la Montana aboard a
red taxi cab. Upon arrival, Quilala instructed
him and Fernandez to look for the deceased.
Saavedra testified that they did not know the
deceased. A red automobile soon arrived which
was driven by Pavon, beside him sat the victim.
Saavedra averred that he did not know Pavon.
Thereafter they pursued Pavon's car until Kan-
Irag Hotel. When Pavon and the deceased got
off the car he testified that Quilala ordered
Fernandez to tell the victim that he wants a word
with him, Quilala ordered Saavedra to
accompany Fernandez. He declared that he was
about seven meters away from the incident and
then ran back to the car. He denied that they had
 plotted todo away with the victim and insisted can make Saavedra a co-conspirator. It is possible that
that he happened to be with them during the he joined Fernandez and Quilala, admittedly two old
drinking. He further stated that after the stabbing friends of his, out of camaraderie — not conspiracy —
they went to Cebu City Collages where they and it is not remote that he went with them to San Jose
resumed drinking but he went straight home. dela Montafia out of the same sense of comradeship.
6. He admitted that he did not inform the
This court is further hard put to accept the argument that
authorities of the incident. He disclosed that
Saavedra should have given a statement to the police
Quilala saw him the following day and
authorities upon his arrest if he were truly innocent of
threatened to ill him if he squealed, saying that
the charges. An accused has the right to remain silent.
Quilala has a lot of tough guys. He did not
Saavedra's silence should not be therefore construed as
inform his parents nor brothers or sisters for the
an admission of guilt.
same reason. He reiterated that he did not know
why they were going to San Jose de la Montana But what should not be lost sight of is the fact that
and was just told to go along. He added that he Saavedra, as he claims, feared reprisals from Quilala. It
did not know the victim and, most of all, the is a natural reaction, to our mind, and does not of
purpose for which Quilala wished to see him. necessity suggest Saavedra's guilt, let alone his
7. The accused, Romeo Saavedra, was found guilty participation in a common criminal design.It should be
beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of noted that Saavedra had no motive to take the life of the
Ernesto Pulmares, as co-principal. victim. The records show that he did not know him at all.
ISSUE: The accused-appellant's neglect in informing the
authorities of the incident except some twelve days
WHETHER OR NOT SAAVEDRA SHOULD BE
thereafter cannot be taken-against him. Failure to report
HELD LIABLE AS CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE
violations of the law, save in certain cases — misprision
KILLING OF ERNESTO PULMARES.
of treason for one, concealing "evil practices" during a
RULING: sedition for another — is not a crime.
No. Romeo Saavedra's complicity has to been
established beyond reasonable doubt. A conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
Commit it.
We find nothing in the records that would satisfactorily
establish Saavedra's involvement in the plot, if there was
one, to liquidate the victim.
The fact that the trio of Fernandez, Saavedra and Quilala
had earlier met, engaged in a drinking session and
proceeded to the hotel, and the chain of events prefacing
the tragedy, is not enough indication that they had
conspired to kill Pulmares.
Even after Saavedra saw Fernandez stab the victim , he
did not separate or run away to report the incident to any
authority or to his own father who was a policeman.
There must be a logical relationship between the
commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators,
evidencing a clear and more intimate connection
between and among the latter such as by their overt acts
committed in pursuance of a common design.
We do not likewise see how Saavedra's failure to
separate from Fernandez and Quilala after the incident

SANTOS VS MISA
TOPIC: ESPIONAGE
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Go Tian Sek Santos avers that he is a
Chinese citizen apprehended by the United
States Army and turned over to the
Commonwealth Government of the Philippines.
2. Since then, he has been detained by respondent
as a political prisoner, which he claims is illegal
because he has not been charged nor convicted
before, and because he may not be confined
under Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No.682
as he does not owe allegiance neither to the
United States or the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
3. The Solicitor General admits the petitioner’s
detention for his active collaboration with the
Japanese, however, argues that he may be
charged for espionage, a crime against national
security wherein allegiance is immaterial, and
may therefore be detained.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY BE
HELD IN CUSTODY FOR THE CRIME OF
ESPIONAGE.
RULING:
Yes, his foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto
from the scope of the provisions of Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 68 because he may be
prosecuted for espionage, a crime not conditioned by the
citizenship of the offender, and is considered as an
offense against national security.
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682:
Upon delivery the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the
persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the
Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special
Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits
and such other things as the Government of the United
States may have turned over in connection with and/or
affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid
records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily
as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided,
however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the
interest of public security, the provisions of article one
hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby
suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are
concerned, until the filing of the corresponding
information with the People's Court, but the period of
suspension shall not be than six (6) months from the
formal delivery of said political prisoners by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
We concur with the majority pronouncement to the
effect that petitioner is not excluded from the group of
persons contemplated by section 19 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682, notwithstanding his foreign status as a
Chinese subject. We also agreed that, if there are facts
and evidence to justify it, he might be prosecuted for
espionage, or any other crime not conditioned by the
citizenship of the offender. But we disagree as to the
denial of the petition, it appearing that petitioner is being
deprived of his personal liberty without any due and
legal process of law, and as to this question, we refer to
the stand we have been taken in our dissenting opinion
in case G.R. No. L-200, Laurel vs. Director of Prisons
(p. 372, ante), the contentions therein we reiterate here.
 based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a
public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT LOL-LO AND SARAW CAN
BE CHARGED OF THE CRIME OF PIRACY.
RULING:
Yes
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of
PEOPLE VS LO-LO AND SARAW the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or
forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
FACTS:
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and
1. On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left intention of universal hostility.
matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was
Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one
done in the lover court and as is again done in this court,
individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat
that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction
eleven men, women, and children, likewise
of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
second boat arrived between the Islands of
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies.
or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of
There the boat was surrounded by six vintas
piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As
manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The
it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it
Moros first asked for food, but once on the
matter that the crime was committed within the
Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo,
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
two of the women by methods too horrible to the
described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat,
with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in
it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a
Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder
were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women,
and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able
to escape.

2. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in

South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was
interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros,

PEOPLE VS BANDOJO
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellants, Eduardo Bandojo and
Mamerto Artuz, in conspiracy with each other,
while on board a pump boat on the seawaters of
Bantayan, Cebu, fatally shot Consolacion Alfar,
took her money (5,000.00), threw her dead body
into the sea, and forced the other passengers to
jump overboard. (Fortunately, they were saved
by another pump boat.)
2. Bandojo and Artuz admitted the charge (piracy
in violation of P.D. 532) in extrajudicial
confessions.
3. During the questioning by the trial court,
Bandojo, denied the allegation of conspiracy
between him and Artuz. He avers that Artuz was
the one to blame for the killing and that he was
just a companion. He explained that he entered
the plea of guilty so that the case will not be
dragged.
4. Artuz, on the other hand, while affirming his
plea of guilty, maintained that he was forced by
Bandojo to go with him because he had a long
weapon. He claims that he cannot do anything
and the shooting was due to Bandojo’s order. He
also said that the money was received by
Bandojo.
5. Bandojo denied having ordered Artuz to shoot
the victim and said the latter fired because he
was “rattled”.
ISSUE:
WON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, BANDOJO
AND ARTUZ, COMMITED A CRIME OF
PIRACY.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the accused-appellants
committed a crime of piracy. It is significant that
although the accused-appellants disagreed on the details
of the offense and in fact blamed each other therefor,
both of them insisted on pleading guilty.
While Bandojo had earlier disclaimed complicity in the
killing, he declared later that "if they will resist, we are
going to fight back" adding that "Consolacion Alfar
rushed at Mamerto Artuz, that's why she was shot,
because Consolacion was a big woman. "
The robbery was, of course, never seriously denied by
either of the accused-appellants, and the money stolen,
less only P100.00, was found in their possession at the
time of their arrest.
We are convinced that the accused-appellants committed
the crime of piracy under the circumstances alleged in
the information. Their guilt, which they repeatedly
confessed in court, has been established beyond the
shadow of a doubt.
“WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED
but with the modification that the death penalty is
reduced to reclusion perpetua and the civil Idemnity is
increased to P30,000.00. Costs against the accused-
appellants.”
Note:
All the elements of Piracy are present. (Mode 2 / Seizing
the Cargo)
Vessel is on the Philippine waters.
Offenders are NEITHER members of its complement
nor passengers of the vessel.
The offenders attacked or seized the vessel.
There is intent to gain. (In the present case, through
robbery of money from Consolacion)
With qualifying circ. - Homicide

PEOPLE VS PETALCORIN
FACTS:
1. Joemarico Porcadilla and Bonifacio Paden were
riding a pumpboat bound for Banacan island
from Cebu when another pumpboat, piloted by
Bertoldo Abais bumped into them. The
passengers of the second pumpboat, Mauricio
Petalcorin and Paul Sagarino assaulted the
passengers of the first boat. Petalcorin shot
Paden three times at the back causing the latter
to fall offboard. Petalcorin boarded Paden’s
pumpboat and fired at Porcadilla, hitting him on
the arm. Porcadilla defended himself by rushing
to Petalcorin in an attempt to seize the weapon.
Petalcorin called for Sagarino and he boarded
the pumpboat where the two were fighting for
the weapon. Sagarino fired at Porcadilla, but
failed to do so because his gun was jammed. He
picked an empty one liter bottle and struck
Porcadilla in the head once and again after he
recovered from the first strike. Porcadilla
attempted to defend himself from the two
assailants but was ganged up on causing him to
fall off board. Petalcorin and Sagarino drove off
in the pumpboat that Porcadilla and Paden
initially rode, dragging along Paden who was
able to hold tonto the outrigger. Abais, who was
on the second pumpboat left.
2. Porcadilla was left to drift in the sea for
sometime before he was rescued by a pumpboat
which happened to pass by. He was brought to
the house of the barangay captain in Nasingin
Island and was later brought to Banasan Island
where he received medical treatment for his
injuried. Meanwhile, Paden died due to his
injuries. The crime was only discovered when
the police commander apprehended Abais as a
suspect in a series of burglaries. During the
investigation, Abais revealed the commission of
piracy in the island of Pandanon, Bohol
sometime in 1979.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME OF PIRACY
WAS COMMITTED.
RULING:
Yes, the Court held that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. After due deliberation of the evidence
presented during the trial, the Court is convinced through
several findings of the guilt of the accused. That the
commission of the offense state in the investigation was
conspiracy among the accused clearly shown in their
conduct. Petalcorin, Abais and Sagarino were riding the
same pumpboat when they chased and overtook the
pumpboat that Paden and Porcadilla were on board.
Abais did not prevent Petalcorin from inflicting injuries
upon Porcadilla and the murder of Paden. That Abais
accompanied the police authorities in recovering the
stolen goods. There was an active cooperation by all the
accused in the perpetration of the crime of piracy, and
with the existence of the conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all. That the accused shot at Porcadilla and Paden
upon boarding the pumpboat with no reason and causing
the victims to fall off board, leaving Porcadilla in to his
own devices, with no means of saving himself while
Paden was last seen alive left hanging onto the outrigger
of the pumpboat.
In view of all these actions, the crime of Piracy as
defined in Art. 122 of the Revised Penal Code has been
committed by the accused Petalcorin, Abais and
Sagarino.

PEOPLE VS TULIN
FACTS:
1. In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T
Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation was sailing
off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
2. The vessel was suddenly boarded, by seven fully
armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older
brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco.
The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16
rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos.
They detained the crew and took complete
control of the vessel. The vessel was then
painted with the name "Galilee," with a registry
at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced
to sail to Singapore.
3. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T
Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the
hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong
San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride"
in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an
interruption, with both vessels leaving the area,
was completed on March 30,1991. On March
30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same
area and completed the transfer of cargo to
"Navi Pride."
4. On October 24 1991, an Information charging
qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters)
was filed against accused-appellants
5. RTC found the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of
the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined
in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532
and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as
accomplice, to said crime.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CHEONG COMMITTED THE CRIME OF
PIRACY.
RULING:
Yes. As regards the contention that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant
Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack
on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T
Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later
brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the
attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of
the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed
in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of
the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to
the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under
the penal code but under a special law, Presidential
Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters.
It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law
penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
[1922]).

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE v. ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL
G.R. No. 178552
October 5, 20202
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372),
"An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act
of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the
Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the
filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions,
except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief
Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions
likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council
like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency,
National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of
Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence
Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center,
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP
intelligence and investigative elements.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions should prosper.
RULING:
The petitions are dismissed.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases
is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged. This rationale is inapplicable to plain
penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect"
in deterring socially harmful conduct.
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by
which a criminal statute may be challenged" and
"underscored that an ‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal
statutes x x x may not be allowed."
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes
on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case
of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would
effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy
before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A
facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force
the court to consider third parties who are not before it.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that
the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the
element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some
form of expression protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to
penalize is conduct, not speech.
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected
conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited
conduct. Since speech is not involved here, the Court
cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither
an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution
under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the
assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally
impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a
statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor
allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-
appellants.
Doctrine: Article 123 Qualified Piracy
FACTS
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI (accused), fired
their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman
and Antonio de Guzman were traveling at that time from
the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas.
The accused with intent to gain and by the use of
violence or intimidation, boarded the said pumpboat and
stole and carried away all the victims cash money, wrist
watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal
belongings amounting to the total amount of P
18,342.00.
Anotonio De Guzman victim and the only lone survivor
of the incident attested to the incident, to which the
accused denied the allegation and stated that they too
were victims of the crime.
ISSUE
Whether the accused are guilty of Qualified piracy under
Article 123 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD
Yes, Article 123 of the Revised Penal Code qualified
piracy are crimes committed under any of the following
circumstances (1) Whenever they have seized a vessel
by boarding or firing the same (2) Whenever the pirates
have abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves; or (3) Whenever the crime is accompanied
by murder homicide, physical injuries or rape. The facts
of the case showed tha the accused have performed all
the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of
causes in dependent of their will. (side note: that is,
Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and
get timely medical assistance)
Furthermore, no evidence was presented and nothing can
be inferred from the evidence of the defense showing
reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or
fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified
piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder.
Wherefore, the court ruled that the accused are guilty of
the said crime and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua
and shall render payment to the heirs of the victims.

Note incase Atty asks: The number of persons killed on

the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide
is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a
special complex crime punishable by death regardless of
the number of victims.