ARTICLE 114 TREASON

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.

ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

77 PHIL 856

JANUARY 30, 1947

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio Laurel, herein petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested by the US
Army and was interned, under a commitment order ―for his active collaboration with the Japanese
during the Japanese occupation. He was charged with treason as defined and penalized by Art. 114 of
the Penal Code. However, in September 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth government
and since then he has been under the custody of the Director of Prisons. Petitioner then filed a petition
for habeas corpus mainly asserting that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reason
(1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUES:

Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens were suspended during the Japanese occupation.

Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for the crime of treason by giving aid and support to the
enemy during the Japanese occupation.

HELD:

NO. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy‘s occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government must be distinguished from the
exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but
it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out
of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that
what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of
the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; x x x and that as a corollary of
the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation,
the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable to treason committed against the national
security of the legitimate government because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound
by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy‘s occupation. Just as a citizen or subject of a
government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way a inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may
commit treason against his own legitimate or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by
giving them aid and comfort.

TREASON

PEOPLE v. CAYETANO MANGAHAS, GR Nos. L-5367 & L-5368, 1953-06-09

Facts:
The Makapilis, among whom were Cayetano Mangahas, Mariano de los Santos Mangahas and Francisco
Castillo, arrived, surrounded the... house, some of them went up; and took and brought to the garrison
of the Makapilis near the municipal building foodstuff intended for the guerrillas at Victory Hill,
consisting of 5 sacks of rice, 2 cans of salted beef, a basketful of camote and another of tomatoes, a small
bag... of salt and a half sack of sardines, salmon and corned beef.

Enriqueta B. de la Merced and Engracia de la Cruz testified to the foregoing overt acts.

In the morning of 29 December 1944 a group of armed Makapilis, among whom were the two
defendants, took and carried away rice, shoes, helmet, clothes and anything they could get hold of in the
house of Primo S. Cruz at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and at the same time apprehended him... and, together
with other persons whose hands were tied, was brought to the San Jose garrison where Japanese
soldiers were stationed and since then he has not returned and has not been seen

Issues:
annot be deemed sufficient to constitute treason for lack of two witnesses, because... the arrest of
Primo S. Cruz is established only by the testimony of his widow Maria S. Cruz and that of Artemio Nicolas
only by the testimony of his widow Virginia Boluran.

Ruling:
ere is no doubt that the two defendants were present when they arrested Moises Legaspi at his house
on 30 December 1944. A mere denial by Cayetano Mangahas that he was with those who arrested
Moises Legaspi is not... sufficient to outweigh the testimony of Purita Ramos and Matias Legaspi who
pointed to the appellants as among the five Makapilis who apprehended Moises Legaspi.

he acts of arresting guerrillas, commandeering foodstuffs, doing sentry work, drilling in the plaza, going
around the town carrying firearms, and the fact that before the outbreak of the war they... were
members of the Ganap Party and in the latter period of the Japanese occupation of the Makapili
organization, are more than sufficient proofs of adherence to the enemy.

The acts of arresting guerrillas, commandeering foodstuffs, doing sentry work, drilling in the plaza, going
around the town carrying firearms, and the fact that before the outbreak of the war they... were
members of the Ganap Party and in the latter period of the Japanese occupation of the Makapili
organization, are more than sufficient proofs of adherence to the enemy.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

TREASON

People v. Perez G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923 Sedition, Freedom of Speech

https://www.pinayjurist.com/people-v-perez-g-r-no-l-21049-december-22-1923-sedition-freedom-of-
speech/

FACTS:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality met and engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood,
an executive official of the Philippines appointed by the President of the United States.

In the said discussion, Perez shouted a number of times: “The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
cutting off Wood’s head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence.”

Perez was charged with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, for contempt of ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority.

Perez was subsequently convicted thereof.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

What crime, if any, did the accused commit?

RULING:

In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but
rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace.

The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition,
which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.

Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of
measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or
the subversion of the Constitution.
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to
abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.

Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how
severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech,
unless the intention and effect be seditious.

But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of
the State.

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of
government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks.

But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech as
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection
among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a
statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
statement and done an act which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made
a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or
order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may
be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law,
and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.

[ GR No. 21049, Dec 22, 1923 ]

PEOPLE v. ISAAC PEREZ +
DECISIONG.R. No. 21049
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1725

MALCOLM, J.:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1922, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became
engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for
having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with
contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has
appealed the case to this court. The question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the
accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in translation as follows:

"That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, the
said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters, did
criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such authority, insult by word,
without his presence, said Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many
persons, and in a public place, the following phrases: 'Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co,
maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag
raot can Filipinas,' which in English, is as follows: 'And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting
off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.'

"Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code."

At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on
behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal
president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was this: "The Filipinos, like myself, should
get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has recommended a bad
administration in these Islands and has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has
assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained
independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the
peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution,
corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the Filipinos
including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into,
the sea.

The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April 1,
1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to explain that the discussion was
between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista
Party, while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the
discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-
General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he stated that his words
were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take into
account that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood who controls everything, and I
told him that the day on which the Democratas may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos,
will install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."

The trial Judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision and
set out in the information. The question of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of
which the accused should be convicted.

It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal Code as having
been infringed and the trial Judge so found in his decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the
appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the
Penal Code is no longer in force.

In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705[1]), the accused was charged with having
uttered the following language: "To hell with the President of the United States and his proclamation!"
Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the court
of origin for a new trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is
still in force.

In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with having published
an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court
holding that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
over the Philippines, and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so
much of article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information
and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the
Libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: "Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256,
but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."

It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion must
bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of
article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under
the Libel Law, exists and must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary,
namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and
Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.

Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code,
it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this article but rather a portion of the
Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused did
not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in
the community.

In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but
rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace.
The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition,
which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.
Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of
measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or
the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U. S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437;
People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to
abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetriate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention
and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of
assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's
Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.)

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of
government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency
in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds his office at the pleasure of
the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised
in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the
Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the
rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599;
U. S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have
been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:

"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish, utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any
act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty,
or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or
incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or
which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years,
or both, in the discretion of the court."

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a
statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and
may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended,
is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged. The
designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged
is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused
may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the information, if such
graver offense is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by the
proof presented during the trial. (Guevara's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal
Procedure, p. 9.)

The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law,
and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.

That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our course is justified
when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court, in
speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two articles
removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the 'exuberant expressions of meridional speech,' to
use the expression of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U. S., 452, 456). Indeed they
are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest the query whether their superlative
vilification has not overleapt itself and become unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922],
258 U. S., 298.) While our own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the
conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame
of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers the
general public peace.

The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused
of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is
affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant
and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.

Street, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

[1] March 16, not reported.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

VILLAMOR, J., with whom concurs Avanceña, J.:

I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor with
costs, as imposed by the court a quo, under the provisions of article 256 of the Penal Code, but not
under section 8 of Act No. 292. The accused, in my opinion, should not be convicted of the crime of
sedition because there is no allegation in the complaint nor proof in the record, showing that when the
accused uttered the words that gave rise to these proceedings, he had the intention of inciting others to
gather for an illicit purpose, or to incite any conspiracy or rebellion, or to disturb the peace of the
community or the safety and order of the Government, which are the acts penalized by section 8 of Act
No. 292. On the contrary, having due regard to the place and time when the discussion arose between
Lodovice and the accused, the political rivalry between them and the difference of opinion that they
entertained regarding the administration of the Governor-General, the Honorable Leonard Wood, it
would appear evident that the accused expressed himself in biting and poignant language, unbecoming
and improper of a law-abiding citizen and highly detrimental and insulting to the authority of the
Governor-General which is the thing prohibited and punished by article 256 of the Penal Code.
Johnson, J., concurring with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Villamor, J.: I agree with the
opinion of Mr. Justice Villamor. I cannot give assent to a doctrine which permits a complaint to be
presented upon one theory and the trial to be carried through upon that theory and then to condemn
the defendant upon a theory which he nor the prosecution ever dreamed of.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL., DefendantsAppellants.

G.R. No. 2189. November 3, 1906 CARSON, J.
https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/new-era-university/juris-doctor/us-v-bautista-case-
digests/24243577

FACTS:

In 1903, a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos in Hongkong, for
the purpose of overthrowing the government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by force of
arms and establishing a new government. Francisco Bautista (1), a close friend of the chief of military
forces (of the conspirators) took part of several meetings. Tomas Puzon (2) held several conferences
whereat plans are made for the coming insurrection; he was appointed Brigadier General of the Signal
Corps of the revolutionary forces. Aniceto de Guzman (3) accepted some bonds from one of the
conspirators. The lower court convicted the three men of conspiracy. Bautista was sentenced to 4 years
imprisonment and a P3,000 fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years imprisonment and P1,000.

Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of at least
two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a conviction for the crime
of treason should be applied in this case.
ISSUE:

Whether the accused are guilty of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the Philippine
Islands.
RULING:
Yes. Bautista and Puzon are guilty of conspiracy.

Bautista was fully aware of the purposes of the meetings he participated in, and even gave an
assurance to the chief of military forces that he is making the necessary preparations. Puzon
voluntarily accepted his appointment and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance. This may be considered as evidence of the criminal connection of the accused with the
conspiracy. However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. He might have been helping the
conspirators by accepting bonds in the bundles, but he has not been aware of the contents nor does he
was, in any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to those bonds. The court held, in
conformance with the decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring
to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this
constitutional
[ GR No. 2189, Nov 03, 1906 ]
US v. FRANCISCO BAUTISTA ET AL. +
DECISION
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c25a

The appellants in this case were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the. Government of the United States in the
Philippine Islands and the Government of the Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in section 4 of
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.

The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000
fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of them, to three years' imprisonment, with
hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all and each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate share
of the costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to
pay their respective fines.

The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of the year 1903 a junta was
organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong, for
the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by force of
arms and establishing in its stead a government to be known as the Republica Universal Democratica
Filipinos; that one Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio
Ricarte as chief of the military forces to be organized in the Philippines in the furtherance of the plans of
the conspirators; that toward the end of December, 1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila from
Hongkong in hiding on board the steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he held a
number of meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the above-
mentioned conspiracy hatched in Hongkong; that at these meetings new members were taken into the
conspiracy and plans made for the enlistment of an army of revolution and the raising of money by
national and private loans to carry on the campaign; that to this end bonds were issued and
commissions as officers in the revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators,
empowering the officers thus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and that the
conspirators did in fact take the field and offered armed resistance to the constituted authorities in the
Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing the Government because of their failure to
combat successfully with the officers of the law who were sent against them and of the failure of the
people to rise en masse in response to their propaganda.

It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a resident of the city of
Manila, was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and notified Bautista of his coming
to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the
arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was present,,taking part in several of the above-mentioned meetings whereat
the plans of the conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetings Bautista,
in answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations had been made and that
he "held the people in readiness."

It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the conspirators through the agency of
one R. Muñoz, who was proven to have been a prime leader of the movement, in the intimate
confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain
officials, including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that at
the time when the conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several
conferences with the said Muñoz whereat plans were made for the coming insurrection; that at one of
these conferences Muñoz offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-general of the signal corps of the
revolutionary forces and that Puzon accepted the commission and voluntarily united himself with the
conspirators and undertook to do his part in organizing troops; and that at a later conference he assured
the said Muñoz that he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly organized in
accordance with the terms of his commission.

Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the conspirators; that he had accepted
the appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of the revolutionary forces with no intention of
ever taking any further action in the matter, and merely because he did not wish to vex his friend Muñoz
by refusing to do so; and that when Muñoz offered him the appointment as brigadier-general he did so
in "a joking tone" and that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the conspiracy
at that time.

These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the testimony of Muñoz as to the fact
that he had had several interviews with Puzon at which plans were entered into for the advancement of
the cause of the conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the light of a written statement signed by
Puzon himself at the time when he was first arrested, part of which is as follows:

"Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and occupation? A. My name is Tom&s Puzon;
born in Binondo, in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age; married; by profession a teacher of primary
and secondary schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of Quiapo.

"Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? A. Personally I do not know him, but by name, yes.

"Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and with what object he came here?
And if you know it to be true, through whom did you get such information? A. In the first place I had
notice of his coming to the Islands as well as his object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and
secondly because J. R. Munoz told me the same on one occasion when I was in his house to visit him.

"Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? A. No, sir; I have no more information
than that which I have mentioned.

"Q. Are you a part of this new revolution presided over by Ricarte? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What is the employment (empleo) which you have in this organization and who is it who invited you
to join it? A. J. R. Muñoz, who is general of division of this new organization, spoke to me with much
insistence, asking me to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to which I, on
account of his request and in view of the fact that the said Muñoz is a friend of mine from my youth,
acceded; nevertheless I have organized absolutely nothing in respect to this matter.

"Q. Did you accept this employment and did they give you any commission for it? A. Yes, sir; I accepted
said employment and although they gave me an order to organize my brigade I did not do it, because I
had neither the confidence nor the will.

"Q. If you didn't have faith in the said organization nor the will to carry out what was intrusted to you,
why did you accept employment as general of the brigade? A. I accepted it on account of friendship and
not to vex a friend, but I never had the intention of fulfilling the obligations."
Puzon, When on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this statement, but he
attempted to explain it away by saying that when he made it he was so excited that he did not know just
what he was saying. He does not allege that improper means were taken to procure the confession, and
it was proven at the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence,
intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an intelligent
man and was for eighteen years a school-teacher and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish
Government, and during the insurrection he held a commission as an officer in the signal corps of the
revolutionary army. His confession is clear and intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he
was so excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and accuracy in so far
as it inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record in this case.

It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the military forces
of the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against him in the light of the decisions of this
court in the cases of the United States vs. Antonio de log Reyes[1] (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs.
Silverio Nunez et al.[2] (3 Off. Gaz., 408), United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al.[3] (3 Off. Gaz., 528),
and United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al.[4] (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be
distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly discloses that the accused
actually and voluntarily accepted the appointment in question and in doing so assumed all the
obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact
that the accused accepted the appointment is taken irito consideration merely as evidence of his
criminal relations with the conspirators. In the first of these cases the United States vs. De los Reyes the
accused was charged with treason, and the court found that the mere acceptance of a commission by
the defendant, nothing else being done either by himself or by his companions, was not an' "overt act"
of treason within the meaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that

"The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence, * * * the playing of the game of government like children,
the secretaries, colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags and seals, and commissions, all on paper, for
the purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant and the visionary, * * * should not be dignified by the
name of treason."

In the second case the United States vs. Nunez et al. wherein the accused were charged with brigandage,
the court held that, aside from the, possession of commissions in an insurgent band, there was no
evidence to show that they had committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had
never united with any party of brigands and never had been in any way connected with such parties
unless the physical possession of these appointments proved such relation," and that it appeared that
each one of the defendants were separately approached at different times by armed men while working
in the field and were virtually compelled to accept the commissions."

In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et aL it was contended that de la Serna had confessed
that "he was one of the members of the pulajanes, with a commission as colonel," but the court was of
opinion that the evidence did not sustain a finding that such confession had in fact; been made, hence
the doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession of such an appointment, when it is
not shown that the possessor executed some external act by virtue of the same, does not constitute
sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies only to the case of Enrique Oamonas, against
whom the only evidence of record was "the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at
his house."
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there was testimony that four appointments
of officials in a revolutionary army were found in a trunk in the house of one Valentin Colorado, and the
court in said case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere possession of documents of this kind is not
sufficient to convict," and held, furthermore, that there was "evidence in the case that at the time these
papers were received by the, appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the assistant councilmen of
the barrio in which he lived, a witness for the Government, showed him the envelope, and stated to him
that he had received these papers; that he didn't know what they were and requested this councilman
to open them. The councilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent it to the
councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this envelope contained the appointments in question and
that the appellant did not act under the appointment but immediately reported the receipt of them to
the authorities."

It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wise connected with
them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such person would afterwards accept the
commission and thus unite himself with them, and it is even possible that such an appointment might be
forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the person thus nominated,
and that such appointment might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person in
whose possession the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all intention to join the
conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators to use his name in this manner nor to send such a
commission to him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has
been proven that such appointments have been concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the
accused persons, so that when later discovered by the officers of the law they might be used as evidence
against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is
proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment, as an officer in that conspiracy, we think
that this fact may properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the conspirators.

Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a conviction for the crime of
treason should be applied in this case, but this court has always held, in confonnance with the decisions
of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate
and distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in
such cases. (In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)

The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt
rests substantially upon his acceptance Of a number of bonds from one of the conspirators, such bonds
having been prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out the plans of
the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of the existence of the
conspiracy or that, when he received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the
bundle was, nor that he ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds. He,
himself, states that when he opened the bundle and discovered the nature of the contents he destroyed
them with fire, and that he never had any dealings with the conspirators in relation to the conspiracy or
the object for which it was organized. A We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence
before us, in so far as it affects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his proportionate
share of the costs of both instances de oficio, and that the said Aniceto de Guzman should be acquitted
of the crime with which he is charged and set at liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence
of the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby,
affirmed, except in so far as it imposes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to
pay their respective fines, and, there being no authority in law for such provision, so much of the
sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby reversed.

After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the record will be returned to the
trial court for execution. So ordered.

Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.
MALCOLM, J.
Criminallaw.lawstudentph.com

FACTS:
• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and
in the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between
the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas
manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of
the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were
made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in
the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is
found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.

YES.
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment
of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.

 At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural
effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
People vs Lol-lo, GR No. 17958, February 27, 1922
Facts:
https://batasfilipinas.com/case-digest-people-vs-lol-lo/?expand_article=1

FACTS:

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7
o’clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed.

The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked
some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All
of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people,
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women,
and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Issue:
W/N the appellants are guilty of piracy,
W/N the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
FIRST ISSUE:
Yes. The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

SECOND ISSUE:
Yes. It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law
hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may
be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all
so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-
mile limit of a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

Astorga vs People GR No. 154130 October 1, 2003/August 20, 2004

https://batasfilipinas.com/case-digest-astorga-vs-people/?expand_article=1

Facts:
On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on
possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18
meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.

There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the
boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for
reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at
the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and
drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is guilty of the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

Held:

No, on the ground of reasonable doubt. The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence
of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no
proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties. The court failed to
discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted
the DENR Team during their mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the
house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence,
it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them
to travel by boat.

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter
of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption
of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict
an innocent man.

G.R. No. 154130. October 01, 2003 (Case Brief / Digest)

© 2024 - batas.org | 1
Title: Astorga vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:
The case involves Benito Astorga, the then Mayor of Daram, Samar, who was charged with
arbitrary detention of five Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
employees. On September 1, 1997, these employees, escorted by police officers, were on an
official mission against illegal logging within Daram, Samar. They encountered boats they
suspected of being constructed illegally. Upon questioning a local, they were referred to
Michael Figueroa, the boats’ owner.
In the course of their duties, the team approached two more boats under construction and
met Mayor Astorga. Upon discussing their mission, Mayor Astorga exhibited aggressive
behavior, including slapping the team leader, Mr. Elpidio Simon. Mayor Astorga prevented
the team from departing by summoning armed men, who surrounded the team. Despite
having dinner later with Mayor Astorga, the team was effectively detained until 2:00 a.m.
the following day.
Charges were filed against Mayor Astorga, leading to his arraignment on July 3, 2000,
where he pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution presented testimonies and
affidavits but encountered the withdrawal of key eyewitnesses—the team members—who
later filed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. In spite of this, the Sandiganbayan found Mayor
Astorga guilty on July 5, 2001, sentencing him to a prison term. Astorga’s motions for
reconsideration were denied, which led him to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether the finding of guilty of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan was based on
mere speculations, surmises, and conjectures, especially in the face of an Affidavit of
Desistance executed by complaining witnesses.
2. Whether the presence of armed men and the conduct of Mayor Astorga constituted
sufficient intimidation to prove that the DENR team members felt compelled to restrict their
own freedom of movement.
3. The relevance of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants in the
determination of Mayor Astorga’s guilt.
4. Whether the trial evidence, specifically the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian, was sufficient
to convict Mayor Astorga.
5. Whether Mayor Astorga was denied the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” due to the
G.R. No. 154130. October 01, 2003 (Case Brief / Digest)
© 2024 - batas.org | 2
alleged participation of the ponente as advocate during the trial by asking extensive
clarificatory questions.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Mayor Astorga and upheld the decision of the
Sandiganbayan. It was held that:
– The restraint of the DENR team was out of fear from being surrounded and threatened by
armed men on Mayor Astorga’s orders, which established the detention against their will.
– The Affidavit of Desistance did not negate the established facts and was viewed as an
insufficient basis for acquittal when considering the weight of the other evidence.
– The testimony of SPO1 Capoquian was deemed credible and relevant. The fact that
Capoquian was not one of the formal complainants did not affect the admissibility or the
weight of his testimony.
– The Sandiganbayan’s impartiality was not compromised by asking clarificatory questions,
which is permissible and often necessary for judges to understand the case better.
Doctrine:
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who detains a person
without legal grounds. The physical confinement of an individual is not a prerequisite for the
crime; rather, intimidation or other acts causing a person to feel unable to leave also fulfill
the elements of detention. An Affidavit of Desistance by complainants is not an absolute
ground for acquittal and does not automatically negate the evidence established during the
trial.
Class Notes:
– Arbitrary Detention Elements: (a) Offender is a public officer/employee; (b) Detains a
person; and (c) The detention is without legal grounds.
– Intimidation or threats can suffice to prove detention.
– Affidavit of Desistance does not automatically void prior evidence.
– Testimony from witnesses other than the complainants can be used to convict.
– Judicial questioning is permissible and does not imply partiality.
Historical Background:
The case exemplifies the assertion of judicial authority against unlawful actions by public
officials, showcasing the Philippines’ legal system stance against impunity for arbitrary
detention—reiterating the principle that everyone, including public officers, must abide by