World Bank Afg ICT

Public Disclosure Authorized
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: ICR00004450

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

IDA-H6650
ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR(X31.8) MILLION
(US$50 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
FOR THE
AFGHANISTAN ICT SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ( P121755 )
August 10, 2018

Digital Development Department

South Asia Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective {Feb 01, 2018})
Currency Unit = Afghani (AFN)

AFN 69.2 = US$1
US$ 1.42 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
July 1 - June 30
Regional Vice President: Hartwig Schafer

Country Director: Shubham Chaudhuri
Global Practice Director: Boutheina Guermazi
Practice Manager: Jane Lesley Treadwell
Task Team Leader(s): Rajendra Singh
ICR Main Contributor: Masatake Yamamichi
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
$ All dollars are in United States dollars unless otherwise indicated

ATRA Afghan Telecommunications Regulatory Authority
CIO Chief Information Officer
CPF Country Partnership Framework
ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan
GoIRA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ICT Information and communication technologies
ISP Innovation Support Program
ISR Implementation Status and Results Report
m-apps Mobile applications
M&E Monitoring and evaluation
MCIT Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
MoE Ministry of Economy
MoF Ministry of Finance
NPV Net present value
PDO Project Development Objective
PMO Project Management Office
SDP Service delivery platform
SDR Special Drawing Rights
CONTENTS
DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 5
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................5
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) .......................................9
II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 11
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................11
ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ..........................................................................................12
C. EFFICIENCY ...........................................................................................................................18
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ....................................................................19
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (if any) .............................................................................19
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 21
A. Key Factors During Preparation.............................................................................................21
B. Key Factors During Implementation ......................................................................................22
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 23
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................23
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE .....................................................24
C. BANK PERFORMANCE ...........................................................................................................26
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .......................................................................................27
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 28
ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 29
ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 37
ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 39
ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 40
ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 41
ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ..................................................................... 42
The World Bank
Afghanistan ICT Sector Development Project ( P121755 )
DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information
Project ID Project Name
P121755 Afghanistan ICT Sector Development Project
Country Financing Instrument
Afghanistan Emergency Recovery Loan
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
Ministry of Finance Ministry of Communications and IT (MCIT)
Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO
The Project Development Objective is to expand connectivity, mainstream use of mobile applications in strategic
sectors in the government and support development of the local IT industry.
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FINANCING
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing
50,000,000 45,052,496 41,664,877
IDA-H6650
Total 50,000,000 45,052,496 41,664,877
Non-World Bank Financing
Borrower 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0
Total Project Cost 0 45,052,496 41,664,877
KEY DATES
Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

26-Apr-2011 14-Jun-2011 27-Jan-2014 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017
RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

22-Feb-2012 3.86 Other Change(s)
28-Feb-2015 28.68 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
14-Jun-2017 41.58 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
Actual
No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements
(US$M)
01 17-Sep-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.75
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02 19-Feb-2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.86

03 28-Oct-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.48
04 23-May-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.98
05 24-Dec-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 18.68
06 20-Jun-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 21.46
07 21-Dec-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.72
08 29-Jun-2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 30.78
09 12-Feb-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 34.83
10 01-Dec-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 39.64
11 30-Jun-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.82
SECTORS AND THEMES
Sectors
Major Sector/Sector (%)
Public Administration 14
Other Public Administration 14
Information and Communications Technologies 82

Public Administration - Information and
18
Communications Technologies
ICT Infrastructure 56
ICT Services 5
Other Information and Communications Technologies 3
Education 4
Tertiary Education 4
Themes
Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)
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Private Sector Development 27

Business Enabling Environment 9
Regulation and Competition Policy 9
Jobs 2
Job Creation 2
Public Private Partnerships 10
Enterprise Development 6
MSME Development 6
Finance 6
Financial Infrastructure and Access 6
MSME Finance 6
Public Sector Management 11

Public Administration 11
Transparency, Accountability and Good
11
Governance
Urban and Rural Development 66
Urban Development 2
Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 2
Rural Development 64
Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 64
ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Hartwig Schafer
Country Director: Nicholas J. Krafft Shubham Chaudhuri
Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Boutheina Guermazi
Practice Manager: Philippe Dongier Jane Lesley Treadwell
Task Team Leader(s): Tenzin Dolma Norbhu Rajendra Singh
ICR Contributing Author: Masatake Yamamichi
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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL
Context
Country Context
1. In the years preceding project appraisal, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA)
had made good progress in many areas of development. These included primary education, basic health services,
irrigation rehabilitation, telecommunications and rural development. There was strong albeit fluctuating economic
growth. GDP growth (annual %) varied between 1.1 percent (2003/2004) and 21 percent (2008/2009) while per
capita income had increased from $210 in 2004 to $460 in 2009. 1
2. These achievements, however, were fragile and security remained a serious obstacle to the delivery of
reconstruction assistance and implementation of reconstruction programs. Afghanistan’s poverty and social
indicators were among the lowest in the world, and despite ongoing reconstruction efforts, Afghanistan remained
one of the poorest countries. The GoIRA’s capacity remained weak, and the pace of implementing reconstruction
programs fell short of popular expectations. Afghanistan is also one of the most sparsely populated countries in the
world, which has presented significant challenges for ensuring essential services are offered to the rural population.
In 2010, Afghanistan was ranked 155 out of 169 countries on the global United Nations Human Development Index.
3. As Afghanistan entered the new decade, it continued to face significant challenges. These included:
deteriorating security conditions, and citizen’s growing frustration with GoIRA’s limited ability to deliver basic
services. Therefore, it was important for GoIRA to improve governance, expand the reach of public services, and
accelerate economic growth to instill confidence in citizens, and improve opportunities to attract local and foreign
investments.
Sector Context
4. In the early 2000’s, GoIRA began implementing a comprehensive telecommunications sector reform
program that led to the liberalization of the sector. GoIRA recognized the potential power of ICT infrastructure,
applications and services to enhance competitiveness, productivity, and the efficiency of institutions. In 2006 GoIRA
established the Afghan Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ATRA) as an independent regulatory authority. To
increase competition in the ICT sector, ATRA introduced regulatory regimes on interconnection, tariffs, and licensing.
Among other donors, USAID (United States Agency for International Development) provided the GoIRA with
technical assistance and capacity building to help develop the ICT sector.
5. Under the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the GoIRA developed a framework and
strategy for universal access to telecommunications services. The Ministry of Communication and Information
Technology (MCIT) identified a strategic vision for the ICT sector as “…making affordable information and
communication services available in every district and village of Afghanistan through enabling market economy.” The
focus was to achieve an appropriate and self-sustaining level of access to telephony and public Internet/information
1 World Bank Indicators. All dollars are in United States dollars unless otherwise indicated.
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services in all underserved areas, particularly in rural areas that were unlikely to see sufficient private investment
without intervention in the form of financial support.
6. As a result of these efforts, Afghanistan’s information and communication technologies (ICT) sector had
developed significantly at the time of project appraisal. In 2002, there were fewer than 60,000 fixed telephones in
operation across the country. By late 2010 the number of mobile telephone subscriptions was estimated at 15
million, and mobile telephone networks covered about 80 percent of the population. The private sector had
invested over $1.6 billion, and 60,000 jobs had been created in the sector.
7. Further, through the implementation of the eAfghanistan Strategy (2010), the GoIRA aimed to develop the
foundations for developing a knowledge-based information society by enhancing the use of ICTs across all sectors.
The main strategic focus of the eAfghanistan strategy included: (i) Establishing an improved legal and policy
environment for ICT development; (ii) Creating an adequate and quality information and communications
infrastructure; and (iii) Use of ICT in government to build a citizen-centered and results-oriented government.
8. Despite the initial successes in the ICT sector, the GoIRA faced many challenges in achieving its
development objectives in the eAfghanistan Strategy; these included:
• Significant disparities in access to ICT infrastructure and services between rural and urban areas of the
country.
• High cost of providing services, and challenges associated with attracting private investments in rural areas.
These included: the country’s size and geography, security challenges, and the consequent high cost of
providing rural communications infrastructure. While MCIT was responsible for providing rural services, it
had limited resources and capacity to rollout services in a timely and efficient manner. Private operators
were not mandated to provide services in rural areas and were unwilling to expand services in commercially
unviable areas without GoIRA’s financial support for making capital investments.
• GoIRA’s inadequate capacity to proactively regulate, develop, and implement the growing agenda in the ICT
sector. With the implementation of the first phase of sector reforms, ATRA needed to build institutional
capacity to consolidate reforms, promote competition, and to address convergence in the ICT sector; though
it lacked the capacity and resources to do so.
• GoIRA’s limited leadership in promoting ICT policies, and limited implementation capacity and resources to
deliver its vision and action plan for the ICT sector. The GoIRA’s agenda for ICT policy was ambitious, yet the
institutional arrangements (such as funding, and capacity in coordination, skills, and human resources) to
deliver comprehensive programs in this sector were weak. Despite announcing the rollout of an e-
Government master plan, GoIRA lacked many of the key enablers of e-Government such as: infrastructure,
interoperability frameworks, standards, and adequate legal and regulatory frameworks.
9. The Project sought to support the GoIRA in its efforts to mainstream the use of ICT for social and economic
development. Since 2002, Afghanistan made considerable progress to expand access to basic telecommunications
services and improve international connectivity. By Project appraisal in 2011, the GoIRA recognized the potential of
ICT as an enabler of public service delivery and economic growth, and sought to put the required infrastructure in
place to catalyze the second phase of ICT sector development.
Rationale for Bank Assistance
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10. The World Bank was well positioned to play a crucial role in supporting the core strategic objectives of the
eAfghanistan Strategy. The World Bank support was deemed critical: (a) to expand connectivity, mainstream the
use of m-apps (mobile applications) across government agencies and ministries, and develop the capacity of
Afghanistan’s information technology (IT) sector to facilitate improved delivery of public services; (b) to leverage
increased private investments in the sector, and establish a transparent approach for private sector investment in
the IT sector; and (c) to provide resources to finance the design and implementation of key ICT policy and regulatory
activities to foster private sector led growth, and improve the public sector’s access to ICTs.
11. The World Bank had experience providing support to similar projects across regions, including in
Bangladesh, Ghana, and Kenya. Creating an enabling environment and making strategic investments in the sector
was deemed essential for supporting the expansion of connectivity and strengthening Afghanistan’s position as a
strategic hub along a ‘digital silk’ road that connects Central, North, and South Asia with the Middle East. In addition,
improved connectivity supports the expansion of mobile telephony services in traditionally underserved
communities; and potentially enables wider access to m-apps to connect Afghanistan’s citizens to financial services,
information, and markets. The proliferation of m-apps would offer GoIRA opportunities to expand the reach of
public services, and to create a focus area for development of applications led by the private sector.
12. The Project built on the successful outcome of the World Bank’s previous engagements in Afghanistan’s
ICT sector. These included the Emergency Communications Development Project (IDA-38250, $24 million, closed in
September 2009), ARTF supported activities (P090933, Recipient-executed, $6 million, closed in July 2004), and the
Strengthening Telecommunications Regulation (P082131, $0.47 million PPIAF-funded, closed in July 2004).
Theory of Change (Results Chain)
13. The underlying logic of the Project was clear (Figure A6.1); and illustrated how each activity led to the
outputs and outcomes that supported the project’s development objectives. The Theory of Change shows that
expanding connectivity (Objective 1) is critical to achieving mainstreaming use of mobile applications (Objective 2) and
to fostering the development of the local IT industry (Objective 3). The expansion of reliable connectivity increases
the reach of high-quality mobile telephone and Internet services to citizens throughout the country. It offers
requisites to improve public service delivery, simplify access to information and markets, and to foster the IT industry.
eAfghanistan’s core strategic objectives were embedded in all three objectives. The existing guidelines at the
Project’s appraisal (March 2011) did not require the task team to formulate a Theory of Change.
Project Development Objectives (PDOs)
14. The PDO as stated in the Emergency Project Paper (59662-AF, March 2011) was “to expand connectivity,
mainstream the use of m-apps in strategic sectors in the government, and support the development of the local IT
industry.”
Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators
15. The three objectives in the PDO were: (a) to expand connectivity, (b) to mainstream use of mobile
applications in strategic sectors in the government, and (c) to support the development of the local IT Industry. At
appraisal, the PDO was measured through eight PDO-level indicators: two overarching, three Component-1 related,
two Component-2 related, and one Component-3 related indicators. The Results Framework (Annex 1) provides the
details of outcomes and indicators. Each component included a technical assistance and/or capacity building
subcomponent. Given the close relation of the components, one overarching PDO-level indicator ‘Revised ICT Policy
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adopted by the Government’ was used to assess the subcomponents for technical assistance and/or capacity building.
This is reflected in Figure A6.1.
Components
16. The Project was structured around four components:
(a) Component 1: Expanding Connectivity. The GoIRA sought to promote the rollout of Internet services while
ensuring the competitiveness of high-quality mobile telephone services ($30 million). Using a two-pronged
approach, the Project financed the expansion of backbone networks and supported the creation of an enabling
environment to increase the use of high-quality mobile telephone and Internet services. At appraisal the
component was to finance:
• Technical assistance to MCIT: to update the ICT sector policy to spur access to ICTs; to assist ATRA to
implement regulatory reforms to create an enabling environment in which to deploy the broadband
network; to provide wider access to high-quality mobile telephone services; and to acquire spectrum
management and monitoring tools.
• The extension of the national backbone network (about 1,000 km) to central, northeast, and southern
provinces of Afghanistan would support the expansion of telephony and Internet services in the central
provinces, the northeast, and in the south, and allow redundancy for the national backbone network.
• Capacity building activities for MCIT and ATRA.
(b) Component 2: Mainstreaming m-apps ($9.3 million) financed activities to build on the wide reach and use of
mobile telephones in Afghanistan to mainstream the use of mobile telephone-based applications (m-apps,
which rely on short message service and interactive voice response across government ministries, agencies,
and programs)—including those that expanded the reach and improved the quality of public services and
applications that support program management. At appraisal the component was to finance:
• Technical assistance to create an mGovernment strategy and roadmap that would lead to the development
of required policy or regulatory instruments to enable the m-apps ecosystem, capacity building activities;
and strategic advisory and capacity building support to promote the mainstreaming of m-apps;
• The creation of shared services and infrastructure for use by various ministries, agencies, and programs
that would enable lower cost and faster design, testing, deployment, and operation of mGovernment
services, including the creation of a service delivery platform (SDP); a technical architecture that houses
various mGovernment applications, and offers unified connectivity of Afghanistan’s telephone networks
for unified delivery of content.
• The Innovation Support Program (ISP) to fund the most innovative ideas selected through a competition
that addressed specific development challenges in priority areas identified by various government
ministries and agencies.
(c) Component 3: IT Industry Development ($4.2 million). There was scope for Afghanistan’s IT companies to
serve local demand from the increased use of IT in the government, the growing private sector, and the
international community. However, growth was constrained by gaps in the ecosystem, such as Afghanistan’s
lack of a skilled talent pool, and high-quality office facilities. At appraisal the component expected to finance:
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• Technical assistance to define an IT sector development policy within the context of the ICT policy update,
and to develop the required legal, regulatory, and investment instruments to attract growth in the sector;
• A skills development program to develop a pool of skilled and qualified IT professionals;
• Technical assistance to develop a business plan for the ICT Village being developed by MCIT, and shared
services and facilities (such as high-capacity telecommunications connectivity and a back-up power supply)
that would make the ICT Village an attractive location for ICT firms; and
• An incubator for ICT firms in the ICT Village, and operational support (including rental charges for the
incubator space, the acquisition of furniture, and some communications facilities, and the hiring of an
incubator manager).
(d) Component 4: Project Management Support ($4.2 million) financed the creation and operation of the Project
Management Office (PMO) that would become part of the MCIT’s Project Implementation and Coordination
Unit and support the MCIT in the Project’s implementation. This component financed training and capacity
building activities for MCIT’s high-performing staff, to respond to MCIT’s need to build capacity within its
finance, procurement, and administration departments.
17. The Project Cost by Subcomponent (at appraisal and actual), (Table A6.1) lists details of the activities under
each component with the projected cost at appraisal, and the actual costs at closing. The GoIRA received an IDA
grant of 31,800,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR), equivalent to $50 million. The details presented here describe
Project’s funding allocation (at closing) 2: (i) Grant amount: SDR 31.8 million (equivalent to $44.69 million; reduced due
to the exchange rate fluctuation); (ii) Disbursed: SDR 29.71 million (equivalent to $41.75 million); (iii) Allocated to
special commitments: SDR .36 million (equivalent to $.51 million); (iv) Undisbursed: SDR: SDR 1.73 million (equivalent
to $2.43 million) and (v) Disbursement rate: 93.43 percent.
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)
Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets
18. There were no revisions to the PDO during the Project.

Revised PDO Indicators
19. There were no official revisions to the PDO-level indicators, however, one of the Intermediate Results
Indicator for Component 3, ‘Employment in IT firms located in the ICT Village during the Project’, was removed. The
business plan for the ICT Village was supported under Subcomponent 3.3, however, MCIT decided that the village could
not be established within the life of the Project, and the indicator was eventually removed (details are given in para.
52).
2The exchange rate as of July 24, 2018 is used to convert from SDR to United States dollars, therefore there is
some difference in the Project’s actual disbursement figures mentioned in the Datasheet (Page 2). As of July 24,
2018, there are outstanding payments (amounting to approximately $.3 million) made by the PMO that are not
documented by the World Bank.
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Revised Components
20. The project components as designed during appraisal did not change but some activities were modified, the
details of which are described in ‘Other Changes.’
Other Changes
21. The first Restructuring was approved in February 2012, to introduce the Capacity Building Incentive Program
under Component 4. The objective was to provide officials in each of MCIT’s departments (including Procurement,
Finance, Planning, and ICT) with a financial incentive to compensate the time and resources needed to implement the
capacity-building program. The Financing Agreement was revised in June 2012 to reflect inclusion of the incentive
program. The estimated budget for capacity building was $400,000 ($100,000 per year). In December 2013, MCIT and
the World Bank task team agreed to close the capacity building incentive program, as the Ministry informed the Bank
team of its findings (through internal discussions) that awarding the incentive might cause perceptions of favoritism
among staff. A restructuring was not needed for the closure of the incentive program, since it did not entail changes to
the Project’s legal documents.
22. The second restructuring in February 2015 reallocated funds to respond to evolving demands and extended
the project’s closing date by 12 months.
• Reallocation of Funds. The ISP was originally set up to fund innovative ideas selected through a competition
that addressed specific development challenges in priority areas identified by ministries and agencies.
However, the program’s implementation was slow due to a limited pool of applicants, slow definition of the
challenges by potential beneficiary agencies, and the limited level of participation (especially for the higher-
value awards). In addition, given the limited capacity of MCIT, it should have focused its efforts on other
subcomponents that were under implementation. It was agreed to reallocate the Grant’s proceeds to reflect
the change in the size of the ISP from $5 million to $1 million, and to reallocate unused proceeds originally
allocated to the ‘Refund of the Preparation Advance’ (Category 3) for use in ‘Eligible Expenses,’ Category 1,
‘Goods, works, non-consulting services, and consultants’ services, Training and Operating Costs’ for the Project.
• Closing Date Extension. The deployment of the fiber optic backbone network (Subcomponent 1.1) along some
part of Afghanistan’s Central section had proceeded more slowly than expected due to security-related issues
and the lack of road alignments. It was unlikely that the originally planned sections would be completed within
a reasonable time. Consequently, the route of the fiber optic backbone was changed to replace sections from
Yakawlang to Chagcharan and to Daikundi with sections in Kunar, Kapisa, and from Bamyan to Mazar-e-Sharif.
In addition, fiber optics were also extended to the third border point with Pakistan (from Khost capital city to
Pakistan at Ghulam Khan border) to enhance international redundancy. The total length of the backbone
network deployed through the Project remained at 1,000 km. No changes were made to the PDO or to the
safeguard category. To complete these new segments, the Project closing date was extended by one year to
June 30, 2017.
23. The third Restructuring was processed in June 2017 to extend the closing date of the Project by an additional
six months (to December 31, 2017). No other changes were made. The six-month extension would allow
implementation to proceed on the following activities: (i) Complete ongoing fiber work in Mazar e Sharif-Bamyan
(Component 1); (ii) Launch 30 m-apps (Component 2); and (iii) Transact the final disbursement for the innovation
component (Component 3).
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24. Subcomponent 3.4: Redesign of the ICT incubator program (a restructuring was not needed for this change).
The original design was for the ICT incubator program to be hosted within the ICT Village, scheduled originally to break
ground in 2013. However, delays in the development of the ICT Village led MCIT to relocate the incubator program to
its ICT Institute. This change in location did not cause other changes to the subcomponent. MCIT’s timely action to
identify an alternative location for the incubator mitigated the delays in its implementation.
Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change
25. The Restructurings and changes were made in a timely and efficient manner. The change in the routing of the
fiber optic backbones, the most substantial change, did not cause significant delays in implementation. This change
allowed the Project to achieve the PDO, specifically, to expand connectivity.
26. A Split Rating is not triggered for this ICR since the PDO was unchanged, though other minor changes were
made.
II. OUTCOME
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs
Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating
27. At Board approval (April 2011) the Project was closely aligned with the three pillars of the World Bank
Group’s Interim Strategy Note for Afghanistan for the period of FY2009-2011. The Project was included in the IDA
FY09-11 lending program of the Interim Strategy Note. The Project sought to: (a) Support Afghanistan’s capacity to
expand the reach of public services through mobile services, and its accountability to its citizens by improving its ability
to monitor and supervise programs; (b) Promote growth of Afghanistan’s rural economy; support social inclusion
through lower cost telecommunications connectivity, and the use of m-apps to support rural livelihoods; and support
education, health, and infrastructure programs; and (c) Support the growth of Afghanistan’s IT and telecommunications
industries, creating jobs and increasing private sector participation that lead to economic growth.
28. The Project remains relevant to the World Bank Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Afghanistan, 2017–
2020 (Report No.108727-AF), approved in October 2016. The CPF recognizes the pivotal role that telecommunications
and ICT play in achieving some of Afghanistan’s most important national priorities. The Project serves Objective 2.2
(Improved domestic and regional integration (transport, trade, and ICT connectivity)) under Pillar 2 (Supporting Inclusive
Growth) of the CPF by improving Afghanistan’s growth prospects and ensuring greater regional integration.
29. In addition, the Project is relevant to the World Bank’s regional strategy for the South Asia Region. The South
Asia Region’s strategy (Board discussion in March 2015) is based on three strategic pillars: (1) accelerating economic
growth including investments in infrastructure, energy, urbanization, and agriculture while expanding access to finance
and promoting regional and global integration; (2) enhancing social inclusion by addressing the severest exclusions
while improving the quality/access to health, education, other public services and finance, and social protection and
increasing labor force participation; and (3) undertaking climate and environment management to help countries
prevent disasters and improve their readiness. While the Project focused mainly on (1) and (2), ICTs can form an
effective platform for climate change and disaster risk management, such as installation of remote sensors,
establishment of early warning mechanism, and data management and analytics.
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30. Based on the details given in this section, the overall relevance of the Project is rated High.
ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome
31. The ICR’s analysis on efficacy is structured around the three objectives encompassed by the PDO: (i) Expand
connectivity (Component 1); (ii) Mainstream the use of m-apps in strategic sectors in the government (Component 2);
and (iii) Support the development of the local IT industry (Component 3).
Component 1: Expand Connectivity
32. Three activities were associated with this objective: Technical assistance to MCIT and ATRA, the extension of
the national backbone network, and capacity building activities for MCIT and ATRA.
33. Subcomponent 1.1, provided technical assistance in a timely manner and supported the effective deployment
of the fiber optic networks. The technical assistance equipped MCIT and ARTA with the skills to facilitate the
expansion of connectivity. The completed technical assistance included: (a) Backbone Open Access Policy and Tariff
Regulations (Consultancy for ATRA); (b) Support for Financial Management Specialist (Consultancy for ATRA);
(c) Regulatory Issues for Developing Broadband and Mobile Sector Development (Consultancy for ATRA); (d) Planning
of Efficient use of Telecom Development Fund (Consultancy for ATRA); (e) Tender preparation for fiber optics network
deployment (Consultancy for MCIT); and (f) Support for Afghanistan Faiz Satellite Communication Operations
(Consultancy for MCIT)
34. In October 2016, Afghanistan adopted its Open Access Policy, which was supported by technical assistance
provided to MCIT through subcomponent 1.1. The technical assistance combined with support from other donors
involved in the ICT sector in Afghanistan significantly contributed to the adoption of the policy. The policy aimed to
develop the telecommunications sector by promoting open access and offering competitive provisioning in fiber
optics and broadband sectors. The guiding principles and the legal framework were formulated to authorize
operators to build and operate physical infrastructure. Specifically, the policy sought to: (a) encourage owners of
communications infrastructure to share their network resources, but did not obligate such action unless their
capacities exceed their requirements; (b) determine conditions for nondiscriminatory access to infrastructure;
including a list of circumstances where it was permitted to refuse requests for access; and (c) stipulate that pricing for
access should be negotiated by the parties involved, except for Aftel’s tariff which was to be based on incurred cost
and ATRA’s guidance, due to Aftel’s significant market power.
35. Subcomponent 1.2, extension of the national backbone network was fully achieved. The backbone network
was built on a turnkey basis and then handed from MCIT to the state-owned Afghan Telecom (Aftel) for operation and
maintenance. Table 1(a) shows the three PDO-level Results Indicators; Table 1(b) shows the two Intermediate Results
indicators, that met or exceeded the projected end targets. The Project delivered a significant effect on Internet
access: the 200-fold increase in the number of Internet uses in new geographical areas (the number of people who
reside in the provinces that are newly connected by fiber optics network), and the Internet tariff was reduced by more
than 90 percent of the baseline. At the second Restructuring (February 2015), there was a change of cable routing to
replace sections of from Yakawlang to Chagcharan and to Daikundi with sections in Kunar, Kapisa, and from Bamyan
to Mazar-e-Sharif, however the total length of the backbone network remained the same (approximately 1,000 km).
Please refer to ‘Other changes’ in Section I-B.
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Table 1(a). PDO-level Results Indicators
Achievement
Baseline (as of Dec 31, 2017)
PDO-level Results Indicators (As of Apr 25, 2011) End Target
Length of fiber optic network built under 0 1,000 1,014
the Project (km)
Access to Internet services (%) 3 10 25
Access to telephone services (%) 55 80 85
Table 1(b). Intermediate Results Indicators
Achievement
Baseline (As of Dec 31, 2017)
Intermediate Results Indicators (As of Apr 25, 2011) End Target
Internet users 15,000 50,000 3,500,000
Average retail price of Internet 450 250 37

connectivity ($)
Note: Internet users refers to the number of people that reside in the provinces that are newly connected by fiber optics
network.
Source: Interview with MCIT and ATRA in April 2018
36. The newly installed fiber optic backbone network connected five provincial capitals and 13 districts that were
previously unconnected. Before the fiber optic cable, these provinces relied on microwave links that offered slow and
unreliable connection. Since fiber optic cables offer high bandwidth, longer transmission, and better resistance to
electromagnetic interference, the new fiber optic backbone provides high-quality mobile telephone and Internet
services for citizens. The fiber optics were deployed by six local companies that hired local temporary workers to work
on the network, thus contributing to economic development. The project managers of these companies understood the
local situation (including security concerns), effectively coordinated the work, and executed the installation of the fiber
optics.
37. Data on the backbone’s traffic, while not identified as an indicator at appraisal, illustrates the success of the
objective to expand connectivity. The project installed fiber optic backbone carries approximately 45 Gbit/s of Internet
traffic. This is far more than the previous microwave-based network (tens of Mbit/s range). Furthermore, with fiber
optic, the bandwidth can be enhanced to support the increasing demand for Internet access. For instance, some
sections of the backbone will have capacity of 100 Gbit/s by the end of 2018.
38. The expanded network offers additional readiness for international connectivity to China and Pakistan. This
is important for land-locked Afghanistan since it lacks landing stations for international submarine cables. In
combination with the backbone network, GoIRA has funded other initiatives to expand the telecommunications
backbone infrastructure nationwide, except in the areas where major security concerns still exist. Figure A6.2 illustrates
the deployed (and future), backbone network.
39. Subcomponent 1.3, Capacity building activities were completed successfully. The activities focused on topics
of strategic interest in the telecommunications sector and fortified the hands-on capacity of MCIT and ATRA to address
the connectivity expansion. These included: (a) Support for structured twinning and peering arrangements between
ATRA and regulatory agencies in other countries (sent to TRAI-India) to build capacity and knowledge-sharing on specific
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regulatory issues; (b) Support the training of MCIT staff on topics related to ICT policy, broadband strategy and policy
development, and telecommunications policy; and (c) Acquire appropriate library resources for ATRA.
40. Despite the tremendous challenges faced by the Project (persistent security issues leading to fiber optic route
changes and major landslides leading to re-laying of cables), the objective of expanding connectivity was fully
achieved The backbone network expansion under the Project was critical to Afghanistan’s security and citizen welfare
as it provided critical and strategic redundancy of the network between major cities (specifically, between Kabul and
Parwan as well as between Parwan and Mazar-e-Sharif). The extended backbone offered an alternate path for the
existing vulnerable connection passing through the Salang Tunnel. In fact, in 2017, the network’s redundancy enabled
uninterrupted connectivity to seven provinces despite the sabotage of the Kabul and Bamyan connectivity line. The
newly expanded connectivity was a remarkable success for the Project, and it created the basis for the achievement of
the other two PDO objectives through Components 2 and 3.
Component 2: Mainstreaming the Use of M-apps in Strategic Sectors in the Government
41. Three activities were related to this objective: technical assistance for the enabling environment, the creation
of shared services and infrastructure (the SDP), and the Innovation Support Program (ISP) to develop the m-apps.
42. Subcomponent 2.1, Technical assistance to create the enabling environment for mGovernment was
conducted focusing on formulation of strategy and provision of training. In total, 189 government CIOs and officials
(30 of which were selected from provincial governments) were trained. Forty CIO level officials were trained in Turkey.
The training was structured on the following pillars: (i) National, organizational, and sectoral issues (national ICT
strategy, transformation of public sector and change management, and the ICT and mobile sectors); (ii) e-Government
and m-Government; (iii) Mainstreaming of m-Government (user-centric approach, capacity building, usability and
adoption, priority applications and services); (iv) Technologies (telecommunications network; devices); and (v) Practice
presentations and demonstrations.
43. Subcomponent 2.2, Creation of shared services and infrastructure (the Service Delivery Platform) was
successfully established with the capability to handle sophisticated m-apps. In total, thirty m-apps for government
services, in 17 government agencies were developed. The m-apps were selected based on the expectation to provide
key public services to citizens. Government agencies made strong efforts to ensure that m-apps provided a combination
of delivery mechanisms (for instance, short message service, interactive voice response, and email), and ease of use by
citizens that did not have a smartphone. Table A6.2 shows the details of the m-apps.
44. Despite the successful preparation of the SDP and associated m-apps, its launch was delayed and remained
pending due to an ongoing audit by the Attorney General’s Office (as of July 2018), and m-apps that were developed
and expected to be hosted on the SDP are not live. According to the MCIT, by July 2018 the audit was close to
completion. Five m-apps were piloted (prior to the audit) and connected directly to the SALAM network, but the
number of transactions was limited during this short period. The details are noted in ‘Key Factors During
Implementation,’ Section III.
45. Subcomponent 2.3, Innovation Support Program (ISP) to develop the m-apps, suffered from limited progress
and resulted in the scope of work being modified. It evolved from the competition for innovative m-apps (that address
specific development challenges in priority areas identified by GoIRA), to awarding the innovative m-app ideas of
university students. The change was made because the ISP did not generate much interest from the ICT industry, and
few good innovative solutions were presented. MCIT attempted to change the scope to foster the innovation culture
through the ISP. Section I notes the size of the ISP was reduced (from $5 million to $1 million) in the second
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restructuring in February 2015 (‘Other Changes,’ Section B). The World Bank team’s May 2017 implementation review
mission noted that the total disbursement for this program was $181,000, and nearly $800,000 in award money
remained undisbursed. In consultation with the Ministry of Finance (MoF), it was decided MCIT would use $50,000 for
this component, and the balance of $750,000 would be canceled.
46. Despite the setback with the ISP, good progress was made on the objective of mainstreaming the use of m-
apps in strategic sectors in the government. Mainstreaming m-apps requires developing and launching the SDP
capable of handling apps as needed by strategic sectors. This involved establishing a SDP (done through the project)
and a link between SDP and mobile providers through memoranda of understanding with the government (transacted
by the government but outside the Project). The establishment of the SDP (and associated m-apps) was completed.
47. Related indicators were identified at appraisal and are detailed in Tables 2(a) and (b): three Results Indicators
(two at the PDO-level and two at Intermediate-level), and the one PDO-level indicator reached their end targets.
Achievement
Number of Government agencies or 0 10 0
programs using m-apps for public service (m-apps of 17
delivery or program management agencies developed,
but pending for
launch)
Number of ministry CIOs and other 0 100 189
officials trained under the Project services
Achievement
Service Delivery Platform established No Yes Service Delivery
Platform
established, but
pending for launch
Number of transactions conducted 0 150,000 limited
Note: Five m-apps were piloted and connected directly to the SALAM network, but the number of transactions was limited.
Component 3: Support the Development of the Local IT Industry
48. This component encompassed four activities, technical assistance to the ICT sector, ICT skills training, support to
the ICT Village, and the support to the incubator program.
49. Subcomponent 3.1, Technical assistance was conducted, which efficiently supported the IT industry’s
development through the needs assessment, the development of the curriculum for ICT skills training, and a survey for
ICT industry development policy.
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50. Subcomponent 3.2, The successful outcome of ICT skills training stemmed from the results of an intensive
needs assessment. Consultations were conducted with officials from academia and the private sector to identify the
ICT-related skills needed in Afghanistan. The outcome of the assessment was the preparation of the curricula,
‘Advanced-Level IT Training for IT Professionals.’ It coincided with the timing of new IT solutions and applications
becoming available in the commercial market. Recent graduates (university or college) found the training worthwhile,
and were motivated to apply for the program, as per MCIT’s final report on the training program. MCIT’s supervision
and quality assurance of the training program contributed to its successful implementation. The training included
courses in several specializations, including but not limited to: systems administrator, Microsoft technologies specialist,
web design and development specialist, networking and cyber security specialist, database administrator, software
development specialist.
51. MCIT conducted research to follow-up on the survey, and it showed that after the training about 40 percent
of the trainees were hired for jobs in the ICT field, and about 70 percent were hired for jobs (by May 2018). In
addition to the technical training, career development services and a job fair helped to match jobs and trainees.
Although this activity was not included in the Project’s Results Framework, the survey results show the effectiveness of
this training program on the market’s needs, and on its potential to improve employment opportunities for trainees.
Nonetheless, the skills development programs would have had greater impact if the labor market had been
strengthened so that those trained could, more easily, find jobs. According to the Client’s ICR (see Annex 6), the labor
market in Afghanistan tends to favor expatriates to fill skilled- and semi-skilled jobs, making it more difficult for local
workers (particularly those trained in Afghanistan) to find employment opportunities in the ICT sector.
52. Subcomponent 3.3, The support to the ICT Village was conducted as planned. MCIT was to develop the village
outside of the project, originally envisaged as place that, as noted in the Emergency Project Paper, would be an
“attractive location for Afghan ICT firms.” The village would convene stakeholders in Afghanistan’s ICT community
(government agencies, private sector companies, academia). However, due to the deteriorating security situation, the
establishment of the village was considered unrealistic and was halted. The deliverable of the subcomponent, a
business plan for the ICT Village, was not used. The World Bank canceled the related Intermediate Results indicator,
“Employment in IT firms located in the ICT Village” in January 2014.
53. Subcomponent 3.4, The incubator program was successfully implemented and provided entrepreneurship
support to youths and early stage startup teams to develop their own businesses in the ICT sector. It provided young
Afghanistan-based technology startups with office space and facilities, mentoring and coaching services and business
advisory services. The program supported them with access to markets and funding through various networking events
and tradeshows. All the startups engaged in high-level ICT business that required advanced skills, such as website
design/development, m-apps development, system integration, management Information system installation, and
enterprise resource planning. As stated in ‘Other Changes,’ Section I-B, the incubator program was implemented at
MCIT’s ICT Institute and accommodated up to 14 start-ups at a time Start-ups were granted six-months of support in the
incubator program, though the duration of the incubation can be extended as needed.
54. The incubator program successfully met the needs of local young people in the ICT field. The management
program graduated 30 business units—this exceeded the end target (10 business units). Out of these companies, 21 are
currently active. The graduated companies have sustainable business with estimated income of $1,500 per month and
work on multiple concurrent projects. Additionally, the graduated companies created job opportunities for 248
employees, (207 males, and 41 females). Since the departure of the incubator manager (an international consultant),
the program is managed by MCIT. The incubator program was continued after the Project closed in December 2017. In
2018 five companies graduated from the program, and by May 2018 another five were being supported.
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55. The objective to support the development of Afghanistan’s local IT industry was almost achieved (all relevant
results indicators exceeded their targets (Tables 3(a) and 3(b) below). One PDO-level Results Indicator and two
Intermediate Results Indicators were identified at appraisal. Two changes were made in the indicators after the
Project’s approval: (a) the end target of the PDO-indicator was increased from 1,500 to 2,025 in February 2016, because
1,500 people had been trained in ICT skills, and an additional 500 youth (including 200 women) were trained by June
2016; and (b) one of the Intermediate Results indicators was removed (see para. 52).
Achievement
Number of people trained under the 0 1,500 2,352
Project (Changed to 2,025
in Feb 2016)
Achievement
Employment in IT firms located in the ICT 0 180 Deleted in Jun 2014
Village
Participation in incubation activities 0 10 30
Overarching PDO-level Indicators
56. Two overarching PDO-level indicators were designed to assess the high-level affects. The indicator for the
number of direct Project beneficiaries, surpassed the projected end target. Data on the number of people benefiting
directly from the activities included in the Project can be estimated by MCIT based on improved access to ICT, training,
and inclusion in other activities. The data was also analyzed to estimate the number of female beneficiaries, and it
surpassed the end target.
57. The status of second indicator, ‘Revised ICT Policy adopted by GoIRA,’ is pending (and was not met by the
Project’s closing), but is expected to be met by January 2019. The Policy was prepared and is being translated into the
local language for submission to Ministry of Justice, and to the Cabinet/Parliament. However, as of July 2018, the
adoption of the Policy is regarded as MCIT’s top priority, and it is expected to be adopted within six months. The
second indicator represented technical assistance and/or capacity building subcomponents that were supported by
each of the Components.
Table 4. PDO-level Results Indicators
Achievement
Baseline (as of Dec 31, 2017)
PDO-level Results Indicators (as of Apr 25, 2011) End Target
Direct Project Beneficiaries 0 1,000,000 1,100,000
(Female: 100,000) (Female: 110,000)
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Revised ICT Policy adopted by the GoIRA No Yes Expected to be

adopted by Jan
2019
Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating
58. The overall efficacy is rated Modest. Table 5 summarizes the outcomes and the objectives from the “Theory of
Change.” The outcome of Component 1 and the objective to expand connectivity was fully achieved, and as illustrated
in the Theory of Change, was critical to the Project’s success. The outcome of Component 2 and the objective ‘to
mainstream of the use of mobile applications in strategic sectors in the government’ was partially successful (m-apps
yet to be launched and limited success of ISP). The outcome of Component 3 and Objective ‘to support to the
development of the local ICT industry’ was almost fully achieved (the business plan for the ICT Village was not used by
the client). The overarching PDO-level indicators are expected to be met in the foreseeable future. Overall, the ICR
rates the efficacy as “Modest.”
Table 5. Outcomes and Objectives
Component Outcomes Objectives
1. Expanding Connectivity Expanded reach and availability of Expand connectivity

telecom services enabled by national - User increased
backbone network - Price reduced
2. Mainstreaming m-apps Wider usage of mobile applications for Mainstream the use of mobile
government services applications in strategic sectors in
the Government
3. IT Industry Development Improved capacity of Government to use Support the development of the
IT strategically local IT industry
C. EFFICIENCY
Assessment of Efficiency and Rating
59. This section focuses on Component 1 because it is the largest component (60 percent of the entire Grant
amount) and the other components are oriented towards technical assistance.
Efficiency of the Design Stage
60. At appraisal MCIT considered several options to finance the national backbone and decided on a public
sector-led model, given Afghanistan’s security situation. The three options considered were: (a) private sector-led;
(b) a public-private partnership; and (c) public sector-led. The option for public sector led was adopted because: (a)
the regulations did not allow private sector companies to invest in the backbone; (b) even if the regulation issues had
been resolved, the private sector showed no interest in making the required up-front investments to deploy a high-
capacity fiber-optic backbone; and (c) the GoIRA was keen to invest in this infrastructure to ensure shared and open
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access to the network’s capacity to facilitate the rapid expansion of affordable Internet and mobile services in
Afghanistan.
61. At Appraisal, the economic analysis showed a positive net present value (NPV) of $27.01 million and internal
rate of return of 7.45 (Emergency Project Paper, Annex 10). Given Afghanistan’s sensitive security situation, and the
lack of general statistics, the analysis was based on assumptions related to bandwidth needed per user, revenue per
bandwidth, etc. The report included route analysis, and regulatory recommendations for building effective backbone
infrastructure, such as a ‘dig-once’ policy in collaboration with road and energy roll-outs. However, during the ICR it
was identified that at appraisal an incorrect formula was used to calculate NPV, resulting in an NPV of $ 27.01 million,
rather than the correct value of $.01 million. However, due to the Project’s strategic importance and the positive
economic analysis results at the time of ICR (NPV and internal rate of return, see paras. 62 to 64.), the Project is
justified.
Efficiency of the Implementation Stage
62. The ICR follows the structure of the cost-benefit analysis at Appraisal and updates the analysis for a
meaningful comparison. The analysis at implementation completion attempted to use recent datasets, to the extent
possible (namely, population, broadband users, and ratio of OPEX against CAPEX). However, these datasets were not
obtained for the ICR. The ICR uses the assumptions/projections from the appraisal (except for bandwidth needed per
user and revenues which are hypothetically increased by two to four times and reduced by 20 percent, respectively, for
this ex-post analysis given the significant end-user tariff reduction in Afghanistan.
63. The results of the ex-post financial evaluation exceed the projections at Appraisal (Annex 4). The summary of
the results is as follows: (i) NPV was $.01 million at appraisal; and at the Project’s closing, it is expected to be $12.7
million; and (ii) Internal rate of return was 7.45 percent at appraisal. At the closure of the Project, it is expected to be
20 percent.
64. Despite the fragile situation in Afghanistan, the price per km paid under the project (approximately $ 25,000)
was reasonable by international standards (the average cost of cases in Cameroon, Sierra Lone, Tanzania, and Uganda
in 2009-13 was $24,753 per km.).
65. The overall efficiency is rated Substantial. Given the financial soundness of Component 1 and the importance
of strategic redundancy of connectivity, the ICR gives a rating of Substantial for the overall Efficiency.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING
66. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, given the ratings for: Relevance = High,
Efficacy = Modest, and Efficiency = Substantial.
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (if any)
Gender
67. The Project focused on gender issues. Affordable access to the Internet can help improve economic growth,
through job creation, transparency, accountability, and social inclusion; and contributed to the goal of ending extreme
poverty and promoting shared prosperity. Vulnerable groups benefit the most from greater access to communications,
these include women, the poorest people, and people living in remote areas. Mobile phone access can alleviate
constraints women face in coordinating their family and work lives. It can reduce the cost of money transfers, improve
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information gathering, and give women access to more career opportunities, particularly in countries where the
division of labor and professions are highly gendered.
68. Component 3 (Support the Development of the Local IT Industry) showed a reasonable level of participation
by females. In Subcomponent 3.2, among 2,352 IT professionals obtaining training 492 were female (approximately 21
percent). In Subcomponent 3.4, the graduated start-ups eventually hired 41 females out of 248 employees. This was a
positive achievement in Afghanistan where female participation in the workforce is traditionally low (Afghanistan has
one of the world’s lowest rates of female labor force participation at 19 percent, and only 25 percent of women are
engaged in paid employment (CPF for Afghanistan FY17-20), and the generally low levels of human capital (female)
were identified as strong underlying constraints to reducing poverty. The gender issues would have been better
addressed if:
• The gender-disaggregated data was officially adopted within the Results Framework for better recognition
among all Project stakeholders.
• A campaign was conducted to raise awareness of this initiative to improve social perceptions about the sector
and illustrate women’s roles in the ICT sector.
• Innovative approaches were designed to collect data to assess the impact of the training on employment in a
timely and proactive manner (though the Project trained a relatively high number of females, the impact was
not efficiently measured, and not enough data is available to capture the results).
69. Female staff were underrepresented at the PMO. Female staff, including female support staff, constituted 12
percent of the total staff (7 out of 54). This number is considered low. To enhance gender equality, it would have been
advisable to have a gender officer within the PMO; and to coordinate with the gender unit of MCIT for knowledge
sharing and support.
Institutional Strengthening
70. MCIT’s capacity in procurement and financial management was strengthened by activities under Component
4 (Project Management). At appraisal the capacity was weak in Afghanistan’s government, and MoF was in the
process of establishing the legal and regulatory framework for accountable public procurement throughout GoIRA.
While MCIT was a well-performing ministry and exhibited strong leadership in the ICT sector, the Ministry was
supposed to follow the government-wide initiative led by MoF to fortify the capacity to implement the Project
effectively. Component 4 served this purpose.
71. The Project’s Components each supported technical assistance and capacity building, which contributed to
institutional strengthening. The policy and regulatory reform supported by Component 1 contributed to the ongoing
dialogue among stakeholders and helped to modernize the telecommunications sector. Technical assistance under
Components 2 and 3 strengthened MCIT’s ability to energize the ICT sector by creating the enabling environment.
72. Dependence on consultants to support Project implementation might lead to capacity substitution. Country
conditions need to be considered in project design and implementation, and inadequate capacity in implementing
agencies must be addressed. The appointment of consultants for project implementation accounted for delays,
starting at the inception of the Project (for instance, the time needed to prepare terms of reference and select the
consultants). Moreover, although such implementation support is mainly meant to assist implementing agencies, it
substitutes for inadequate assignment of human resources. This means that hiring consultants may not be conducive
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to on-the-job learning within implementing agencies. Please see the section, ‘Lessons and Recommendations,’ for
recommendations related to this matter.
Mobilizing Private Sector Financing
73. While the public sector-led model was adopted under Component 1 to expand the backbone network, there
remains a need to strengthen the optical fiber cable connectivity market—the Open Access Policy was adopted in
October 2016 to open the market to private investment. Based on the enactment of this new policy, ATRA conducted
a Request for Proposals for direct investment of fiber optics. Six operators (two wholesale providers and four mobile
operators) submitted a proposal and five of them (two wholesale providers and three mobile operators) were
shortlisted, as of May 2018. It is expected that this will result in investment of hundreds of millions of dollars, spur
competition in the market, and eventually reduce end-user tariffs. Component 1’s technical assistance played an
important role to equip ATRA staff with the necessary skills to promote the open market for optical fiber cable, and to
lead discussions with stakeholder consultations to encourage further investment by the private sector.
Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity
74. The Project was fully aligned with the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty and
promoting shared prosperity. Access to affordable and reliable Internet will have significant impact on achieving
inclusive economic growth to address poverty. By providing access to information, equalizing opportunities in rural
areas, and contributing to pro-poor market developments (such as microfinance and mobile money) digital
technologies offer new tools that address poverty. Contributing to growth the ICT sector indirectly reduces poverty
(for example, investing in infrastructure, networks, and ICT service industries). Recent evidence suggests that
increasing high-speed Internet connections can be a key source of economic growth (WBG ICT Sector Strategy, 2012,
Annex 2).
Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts
75. During Project implementation, MCIT’s senior management gained a stronger understanding of the ICT
sector. For instance, they enhanced their understanding of the influence of the National ICT strategy/policies and
related implementation on the development of mobile government, and mobile technologies; and their effects on the
ways governments and organizations operate. Since they had not shown much interest in these issues, this was an
unintended effect of the Project and it eventually sparked the Government’s interest to expand the progress in the
sector through the Afghanistan Digital Central Asia South Asia (Digital CASA 1, P156894, IDA D2820, $51 million),
approved by the World Bank Board in March 2018. The Digital CASA project is based on the outcomes of this Project
and seeks to increase the effects through its components for regional and domestic connectivity, government network,
Internet exchange point, e-Government, and an enabling environment.
KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
A. Key Factors During Preparation
76. Project preparation was swift. Design and quality at entry featured comprehensive analysis, rapid
resource mobilization, and the introduction of design concepts that addressed multiple aspects of the ICT
sector. The World Bank’s task team had experience in Afghanistan through its previous engagement
(Emergency Communications Development Project, P083720), and the experience facilitated the preparation of
this Project. The team had also undertaken extensive technical assistance in Afghanistan on upstream analyses
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related to telecommunications connectivity challenges (P114808, P108582, P118449) and the m-apps
opportunity (P118896). Moreover, the Project benefitted from strong support from the Afghanistan Country
Management Unit of the World Bank, and from MCIT’s strong championing. The overall project risk rating was
Medium-Impact at appraisal.
77. The background analysis conducted for the Project was efficient. The cost-benefit analysis was
prepared by an independent expert hired by the World Bank task team. The analysis captured the necessary
aspects, such as increasing number of end-users and required bandwidth, but had to rely on some assumptions
(ex. required bandwidth per user, estimated revenues) due to security situation and the lack of statistics.
However, the analysis provided sound projections despite the miscalculation of NPV. As to the financing
mechanism of the construction of the national backbone, the public sector-led model was chosen as an
appropriate choice for the quick deployment of the network.
B. Key Factors During Implementation
78. Security concerns continued to have impact on project implementation. Particularly security issues in
the central area caused delays in fiber optics network construction (Component 1). This triggered the second
restructuring in February 2015 (almost four years after Effectiveness) that enabled the route change. Other
than that, the construction work often experienced minor delays due to the deteriorating security situation. In
addition, for the same reason, the ICT Village was not established and the business plan for the village
(prepared under Subcomponent 3.3) was not used.
79. The construction of the fiber optics network (Component 1) was completed in a challenging
environment. For instance, the construction was often disrupted due to landslides in the north-east region
connecting to China (the connection to China is currently under preparation). One major landslide in 2015
washed away approximately 1 km of the fiber cable, and the fiber had to be redeployed. Winter weather
conditions (seven months a year) slowed the progress of the network in between Bamyan and Mazar-e-Sharif
in the central region; and due to the narrow width of the road, work needed to pause whenever a car passed.
80. The launch of the m-Government SDP was pending in connection to private sector mobile networks
(Subcomponent 2.2). SDP was successfully prepared. However, despite the World Bank team’s efforts it took
approximately three years for MCIT to negotiate with all mobile operators (AWCC, ETISALAT, SALAM, Roshan,
and MTN) and obtain signed memoranda of understanding. The negotiation was more difficult than originally
envisaged, since the operators cautiously considered how they would collaborate with 17 concerned ministries
and how commercially reasonable it would be. In addition, as of May 2018, the Attorney General’s Office of
GoIRA opted to undertake an audit (details of the audit inquiry are not available to the World Bank), which
halted the SDP’s launch. Due to the inactive SDP, m-apps that were developed and were to be hosted on SDP
have not been launched. According to MCIT, as of July 2018, the audit was nearing completion, and MCIT
requested the Attorney General’s Office to launch the m-apps and SDP after the audit is finalized.
81. Cross-agency coordination had room to improve to deploy the fiber optics, especially on the ground
level. GoIRA has demonstrated its commitment to cross-sector infrastructure sharing. Based on the Council of
Ministers’ decision No.16, dated October 12, 2015, infrastructure sharing board was established in the Ministry
of Economy for cross-agency infrastructure sharing and the MoF mandated all government agencies to account
for infrastructure sharing budget planning. Additionally, the Ministry of Economy established a special task
force to facilitate such collaboration. However, the coordination was not as effective as originally envisaged.
As of May 2018, two memoranda of understanding were in the process of being signed between the MCIT,
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Ministry of Public Works, and the Kabul municipality. Civil works contractors for activities in other sectors (for
example, road construction, power transmission line layout, etc.) can follow such coordination if they are
notified in advance (for example, the terms of reference for the road construction Project should stipulate the
“dig-once” policy), but this was rarely the case. This caused delays in the deployment of the fiber optics. One
of the indicators for DPO (Development Policy Program Series; P118027, IDA H8740, $50 million.) was ‘number
of projects with shared passive infrastructure.’ But among three end targets, only one had been implemented
(later discussed in Section V “Lessons and Recommendations.”), according to its Implementation Completion
Report Review (Report number: ICRR 0020413, June 20, 2017).
82. Once the Project started, it was clear that MCIT (and GoIRA) did not fully understand and recognize
the PMO’s mandate and jurisdiction. The PMO was to focus on the implementation of the project, but
occasionally MCIT had it work on miscellaneous tasks not related to the Project. This hindered the PMO in
making decisions and taking corrective actions in a timely fashion, and it did not allow a streamlined reporting
line.
83. Despite the PMO’s limited knowledge of safeguards related issues and World Bank procurement
guidelines, implementation was not significantly hampered. There were some inefficiencies in handling
safeguards and procurement related issues due to the hired specialists’ limited experience and knowledge.
However, in the end it did not have significant impact on the implementation timeline due to support provided
by other members of the PMO. Please see the “Environmental, Social, and Fiduciary Compliance” part of
section IV-B for details.
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)
M&E Design
84. The Project used collectable and monitorable indicators to establish an adequate M&E scheme. It included
well-defined indicators to capture all components. As discussed in “Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators,”
Section A, it was decided to have one overarching PDO-level indicator to assess all technical assistance and/or capacity
building subcomponents under each component, based on their close relationship. However, this indicator relied on
factors external to the project at Cabinet/Parliament. The ICR team collected the indicators at the project completion
(mostly) through interviews with officials from MCIT and ATRA. This was judged to be the most reliable way to confirm
the numbers, since third-party data or analyses are significantly lacking in country due to the security situation. A few
indicators could have been better designed/managed, such as:
• Some end targets were conservative (especially, ‘Internet users’ for Component 1), while it was difficult to
precisely predict the end target given the security situation and lack of general statistics.
• The number of Internet users could have been counted in one of the overarching PDO-level indicators (Direct
Project Beneficiaries).
85. A few adjustments or clarifications should have been made, especially from the bottom-up and from the
standpoint of citizen-use in the M&E framework. This would have allowed evaluating the Project on its effects on the
lives of the beneficiaries, providing causal pathways between the Project’s activities/outputs and achieved outcomes,
as well as conducive to the achievement of PDO with clearer logic flows. These include:
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(a) To gauge actual Internet use of the beneficiaries, some traffic data for Component 1 could be an effective
indicator.
(b) When (if) these m-apps are launched, to assess the level of the use of the mobile-based public services, the
number of citizens that have used the m-apps should be another indicator for Component 1. (This could have
complemented “number of transactions conducted,” which might not be an effective indicator if a single person
used m-apps multiple times.)
(c) To figure out the effects of the Project, there should be a precise mechanism to track what the trainees did and
how the training under Subcomponent 3.2 (a mechanism was in place to track the employment status of
trainees) led to employment, based on the assumption that job creation leads to the development of the local IT
industry.
(d) One of the indicators for Subcomponent 3.4 “Participation in incubation activities” needed more clarity, since
some incubators might be still in their infancy (for example, have been launched but have undertaken no
activities) and this might impede the accuracy of the indicator.
86. Among these four suggestions adopting all but item (c) might lead to relatively easily collectable and
monitorable indicators. Item (c) might be costly and cumbersome, but it might have been possible to give incentives to
the training participants, for example, by installing a continuous mechanism to put them in touch with potential
employers.
M&E Implementation
87. Throughout the Project the PMO collected and reported the indicators in an effective manner. Along with
tracking the budget disbursements, this allowed the PMO and the World Bank task team to monitor the Project’s
implementation and to take timely corrective actions. Under Component 4, an M&E Specialist was hired to (among
other tasks) track the indicators—this led to efficient implementation of M&E.
M&E Use
88. The M&E mechanism was effectively used. Adequate systems were in place and indicators were systematically
monitored by the PMO through a dedicated M&E Specialist with responsibility for data collection and quality control.
The information collected helped to assess progress during implementation, and it informed MCIT and ATRA on
strategic decisions and operations. It would be advisable if the indicators would be reviewed five years after Project
completion, since more impacts will be later generated especially in Components 2 and 3.
Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E
89. The overall Quality of M&E is rated Modest. While there were some weaknesses and a need for fine-tuning,
the M&E mechanism was installed and managed relatively effectively.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE
Environmental and Social Safeguards
90. In terms of environmental and social safeguards, the Project was classified as environment Category B
and did not entail resettlement or damage of cultural properties.
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91. The biggest concern was that PMO lacked staff dedicated to monitor safeguard compliance. The M&E
officer followed-up on safeguard-related issues. Environmental and social issues were not account for by PMO
staff and contractors. Safeguards-related problems during implementation included:
• Environmental and Social Management Framework and Resettlement Policy Framework were not
needed (Involuntary Resettlement Policy (OP4.12) was not triggered) and therefore not prepared.
However, since the Project site was specific and thus the Project had prepared the Environmental and
Social Management Plans (ESMP) for subprojects but the World Bank task team did not receive periodic
reports on safeguards compliance and monitoring of ESMP.
• Based on the agreed actions during the final implementation support mission, the PMO shared the
reports on lessons learned and on implementation of the ESMP. These reports have information useful
for upcoming activities, particularly, the recommendations sections should be reviewed in the context of
the Afghanistan: Digital CASA Project.
• There is little information available on the social and environmental safeguards implemented by the
contractors. The PMO did not conduct effective training to contractors. Related to this, the
occupational safety and health concerns (for example, workers did not take enough breaks, and did not
wear a safety jacket, etc.) raised by the World Bank task team were not fully considered.
• The Grievance Redress Mechanism was not fully functional at the initial stage of the implementation,
but later the mechanism worked effectively.
• In terms of grievance, two complaints (out of 36 registered) are still outstanding as of May 2018
(outstanding payment of fuels of the contractor and low quality of Internet in Kapisa Province). These
outstanding complaints were resolved as of June 2018.
• The PMO made great efforts to document land transactions (transferred, purchased, or voluntarily
donated) for deploying of fiber optics. As noted in the final implementation support mission, the PMO
had obtained the confirmation from the Afghanistan Independent Land Authority of the purchase of
Yazdan Chashma land.
92. The management of the safeguard-related issues improved towards the Project’s closing. The overall
safeguards rating was Moderately Unsatisfactory at the final Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR)
(Sequence 11 in June 2017), since several inadequacies were identified. However, given that the PMO took the
necessary actions, a better rating (Moderately Satisfactory or higher) was expected at closing. MCIT and ATRA
gained experience implementing and managing World Bank lending operations. For instance, a well-
documented report on lessons learned on the Grievance Redress Mechanism could be a useful resource during
implementation of activities in the pipeline.
Financial Management
93. The PMO maintained sound financial management arrangements and complied with reporting and
accounting requirements stated in the Grant Agreement. The Financial Management specialist at the PMO
was knowledgeable and experienced with fiduciary aspects of project management, and came to the position
with a history of timely audit report submissions to the World Bank. Financial Management was rated
Satisfactory in the final ISR. The PMO lacked a sophisticated financial management system, but the Financial
Management specialist maintained an ‘issues tracking sheet’ to monitor issues and deadlines, and identify
concerned parties, etc., to conduct financial management efficiently.
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Procurement
94. The capacity for procurement was weak, and remained so at the Project’s closing. At appraisal a
procurement capacity assessment was conducted with MCIT, and MCIT confirmed that its procurement
capacity was very limited. In response to the assessment, a Procurement Specialist was hired within the PMO
(Component 4). By the midterm review in January-February 2014, progress was made, and the Project’s
Procurement was rated Satisfactory. However, it was later discovered that the Procurement Specialist left the
PMO, and the PMO did not replace the Procurement Specialist. Instead the Project Management Specialist (a
contractor), and other staff from the PMO—with limited experience and knowledge of procurement—
performed the Project’s procurement functions. The World Bank task team insisted that the matter be
addressed, but the issue remained unaddressed through Project’s closing.
95. Procurement was conducted, but relevant skills should have been effectively transferred.
Procurement was rated Moderately Satisfactory in the final ISR; despite the lack of a dedicated Procurement
Specialist in the PMO. The lack of specialized procurement skills caused problems in the procurement of
activities in the Project’s pipeline. This was not good practice for a World Bank lending operation, but the PMO
completed all procurement processes (with no misprocurement). There was little attention paid to the transfer
of skills to MCIT and ATRA, leading to a limited retention of institutional memory.
96. The final ISR identified two procurement delays, both of which were solved before the closure of the
project. They were related to fiber optics construction (Subcomponent 1.1). They were completed and the
fiber optics were successfully handed over to Aftel for maintenance and operation.
C. BANK PERFORMANCE
Quality at Entry
97. The Project’s design at entry was sound and considered lessons learned from the World Bank team’s sector
experience in Afghanistan, the South Asia region and in other countries categorized as post-conflict. The Project’s
strategic relevance, environmental and social development issues, fiduciary aspects, implementation arrangements,
and risks were satisfactorily addressed at entry, while M&E design had some areas for improvement (See “M&E
Design” section). The task team possessed abundant experience in telecommunications infrastructure building, online
government services, and ICT industry promotion, which resulted in an appropriate project design and preparation.
Quality of Supervision
98. Despite the challenging and fragile situations (level of capacity, security, etc.) the Bank’s task team closely
supervised Project implementation. The frequency of supervision was adequate (approximately twice a year), except
during times when the security status prevented supervision missions from traveling to Kabul. The supervision was
supplemented by remote support (audio conferences, video conferences, email exchanges) to the client by the task
team. While there were two changes in Task Leadership during implementation, MCIT and the PMO agree that that
World Bank support was suitable, with smooth transitions between Task Leaders. The World Bank team worked
closely with the PMO’s focal points for safeguard and procurement, but it could have taken a stronger stance with the
PMO to ensure safeguard compliances, and hire a Procurement Specialist in a timely manner.
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99. The relatively successful implementation of this Project was factored into the GoIRA’s request for the
Afghanistan: Digital Central Asia South Asia Project, which was approved by the Board in March 2018.
Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance
100. The overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory despite the challenging and fragile
environment. There were challenges and design flaws (m-apps and SDP are pending launch (Subcomponent 2.2); and
some weakness in M&E design), yet the World Bank task team delivered sufficient implementation support to the
client at entry, and at supervision. The task team’s guidance and support was instrumental for the Project to achieve
the PDO.
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
101. Development outcomes may not be maintained for these activities:
Component 1: Expanding Connectivity

• Lack of capacity of Aftel. The newly built fiber optic network was handed to Aftel and maintained by the
state-owned incumbent operator. However, Aftel lacks the capacity (equipment, skills, maintenance
program) to make timely repairs to remedy (potential) malfunctions of the fiber optic network.
• Effective implementation of the Open Access Policy. The Policy was enacted in October 2016 to promote
competition in Afghanistan’s ICT sector. It’s possible that MCIT and ATRA may not be able to effectively
implement the Policy for security reasons. This would be a lost opportunity to spur competition in the
sector.
Component 2: Mainstreaming m-apps
• Launch of an SDP and m-apps (30). The m-apps were prepared but have not been launched due to the
current audit being conducted by the Attorney General’s Office. As of July 2018, the audit has been almost
completed; and the World Bank should continue to follow-up on its progress. Once completed, the audit
report should be shared with the task team; and the Bank should advise MCIT to launch the SDP and m-apps
as quickly as possible.
• When (if) these m-apps are launched, their rollout should include (as envisaged by the Project) a program to
introduce citizens and businesses to the benefits and uses of the m-apps.
• User adoption. Unless effective public awareness campaigns are undertaken, citizens and businesses may
not easily or readily adopt online public services through the m-apps developed under the Project. All
government agencies should develop m-apps and participate in the SDP, in combination with cross-agency
integration of datasets to move towards the vision, “whole-of-government.”
Component 3: IT Industry Development
• Need for continuing education. ICT skills training and the incubator program were successfully conducted,
but the rapid advances in technologies and in the ICT sector will cause the trainees’ and the incubator’s skills
to become obsolete.
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V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
102. In the context of FCV (Fragility, Conflict, and Violence), it is best to keep the project design simple. If
the PDO has multiple objectives, it is advisable to detail the relative importance (priority) of each objective. In
this Project, achieving Objective 1 (expansion of connectivity) should have been given higher importance than
achieving the other two objectives, since the success of these two objectives relied on the success of Objective
1. Given the security and governance issues in Afghanistan, the challenges encountered in achieving the other
objectives were difficult to foresee at appraisal.
103. The national backbone network’s deployment was completed successfully and delivered positive
results to Afghanistan by increasing access to affordable broadband services. The backbone constructed
under this Project, in combination with networks supported by other initiatives funded by GoIRA, now forms
the basis of a robust communications system. With the Policy enacted, the operators (other than Aftel) can use
the backbone through the open access arrangement and/or to make direct investment in fiber optics. Given
the significant immediate- and long-term impacts that broadband connectivity can generate, it might have
been worthwhile to include a rural connectivity component, as was done in the Tanzania: Regional
Communications Infrastructure Project (RCIP 3, P111432, IDA 46124, $100 million). This would have been less
ambitious and more in line with the nature of the financing mechanism of the project (emergency recovery
loan) than Objective 2 and 3, which would be a better fit for the next phase.
104. The transfer of skills from consultants to the agency’s staff is important. The PMO benefits from hiring
consultants to support Project implementation; though long-term dependence on consultants may hinder
capacity within the government agencies. The consultants in the PMO should be hired to perform high-level
strategic tasks, one of which should be training and mentoring (permanent) staff in the implementing agencies.
105. The PMO’s mandates and role should be clear and supported within the implementing agencies. The
reporting line should be streamlined and strong to promote effective communication. This allows the PMO to
make decisions and take corrective actions in a timely manner, and will result in smoother implementation of
the Project.
106. The World Bank could play a more prominent role in facilitating cross-sector coordination. This is
particularly true in the case of the ‘dig-once’ policy in transport and electricity projects—that can improve
efficiency and (likely) save a significant amount of money on deployment of fiber optics. Good communication
is important to ensure that decisions at the central government level are transmitted to the implementation
level. Guidance and leadership on this matter from Country Management Unit is advised. For instance, the
Salang-By-pass Road construction, one of the components of the Afghanistan: Tran-Hindukush Road
Connectivity Project (P145347, IDA D0930, $250 million, approved on October 20, 2015, effective on January
17, 2016), that includes the laying of communication/fiber optic ducts based on detailed discussion between
Ministry of Public Work and MCIT. The construction is expected be completed in 2020—it is a good example of
cross-sector coordination.
107. Special attention should be paid to develop the M&E framework especially in FCV countries that have
major security concerns. The Project showed that it is challenging to identify M&E indicators that are
trackable. It is important to ensure that the M&E framework is designed to capture the most relevant data that
will feed into the evaluation of the project’s PDO. This underscores the importance to formulate the Theory of
Change, to identify a project’s achievements, and methods by which the achievements will be met. It helps
build consensus among all project stakeholders in the project’s design, and casts a light on binding constraints
to achieve expected outcomes.
.
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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS
A.1 PDO Indicators
Objective/Outcome: Component 1
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target
Target Completion
Length of fiber optic network Number 0.00 1000.00 1000.00 1014.00

built under the project
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets):

Target Completion
Access to Internet services Percentage 3.00 10.00 10.00 25.00
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017

Target Completion
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Access to telephone services Percentage 55.00 80.00 80.00 85.00
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Target Completion
Number of ministry CIOs and Number 0.00 100.00 100.00 189.00

other officials trained under
the Project services 25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017

Target Completion
Number of Government Number 0.00 10.00 10.00 0.00

agencies or programs using
m-apps for public service 25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Jun-2017 30-Dec-2017
delivery or program
management
Comments (achievements against targets): m-apps of 17 agencies developed, but pending for launch.
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Target Completion
Number of people trained Number 0.00 1500.00 2025.00 2352.00

under the project
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Objective/Outcome: Overarching
Target Completion
Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 1000000.00 1000000.00 1100000.00
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Female beneficiaries Number 0.00 1000000.00 100000.00 110000.00
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017

Target Completion
Impact of Technical Text 2003 Policy Revised Policy Revised ICT Policy Optical Fiber
Assistance adopted by liberalization policy
Government along with unified
licensing is prepared
by ATRA and MCIT
through a consultation
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process with various

stakeholders. The
policy was approved
by the cabinet in
October 2016.
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Revised ICT Policy adopted Text None Yes Yes Expected to be

by the Government adopted by Jan 2019
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The ICT Policy is prepared and is being translated into the local language for onward submission to Ministry of
Justice and then to Cabinet/Parliament. The Project closed in December 2017, and as of July 2018, the Policy is expected to be adopted by the
Government by January 2019.
A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Component 1
Target Completion
Average retail price of Text US$450 US$250 US$250 US$37

Internet connectivity
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
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Target Completion
Internet users Number 15000.00 50000.00 50000.00 3500000.00
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): "Internet users" refer to the number of geographical reach of Internet users (the number of people that reside
in the provinces that are newly connected by fiber optics network).
Target Completion
Number of transactions Number 0.00 150000.00 150000.00 0.00

conducted
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): 5 m-apps that are connected directly to SALAM network on a pilot basis, but the number of transaction was
limited.

Target Completion
Service Delivery Platform Text No Yes Yes Yes

established
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Dec-2017 30-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Service Delivery Platform and 30 m-apps were developed, but 5 m-apps are connected to Afghan Telecom
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(SALAM)'s GSM network. The launch is pending, due to an audit by the Attorney General’s Office. According to MCIT as of July 2018, the audit had been
almost completed, and MCIT had submitted a request to the Attorney General’s Office so that MCIT can launch the m-apps and SDP once the audit
process is finalized.
Target Completion
Participation in incubation Number 0.00 10.00 10.00 30.00

activities
25-Apr-2011 30-Jun-2016 30-Jun-2017 30-Dec-2017
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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
Objective/Outcome 1
1. Length of fiber optic network built under the Project (km)
Outcome Indicators 2. Access to Internet services (Percentage)
3. Access to telephone services (Percentage)
1. Internet users
Intermediate Results Indicators
2. Average retail price of Internet connectivity ($)
Key Outputs by Component 1. Fiber optics deployed

(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) 2. Capacity building conducted
Objective/Outcome 2
1. Number of Government agencies or programs using m-apps for
public service delivery or program management
Outcome Indicators
2. Number of ministry CIOs and other officials trained under the
Project services
1. Service Delivery Platform established
Intermediate Results Indicators 2. Number of transactions conducted
1. 30 m-apps developed [pending for launch]

2. Service Delivery Platform established [pending for launch]
Key Outputs by Component
3. Technical assistance to create the enabling environment for
(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)
mGovernment was conducted
4. ISP not implemented successfully
Objective/Outcome 3
Outcome Indicators 1. Number of people trained under the Project
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1. Employment in IT firms located in the ICT Village

Intermediate Results Indicators
2. Participation in incubation activities
1. A pool of skilled and qualified IT professionals created
2. Incubators supported and trained, which then start incubation
Key Outputs by Component
activities
(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 3)
3. Technical assistance conducted
4. Support to ICT Village was conducted but not used
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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION
A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS
Name Role
Preparation
Supervision/ICR
Rajendra Singh Task Team Leader(s)
Aimal Sherzad, Rahimullah Wardak Procurement Specialist(s)
Ahmed Shah Ahmadzai Financial Management Specialist
Andrea Ruiz-Esparza Team Member
Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola Team Member
Abdullah Noorzad Team Member
Mohammad Arif Rasuli Environmental Safeguards Specialist
Masatake Yamamichi Team Member
Abdul Hameed Khalili Team Member
Mohammad Asif Qurishi Team Member
Junko Narimatsu Team Member
Qais Agah Social Safeguards Specialist
B. STAFF TIME AND COST
Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle
No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation
FY11 13.850 161,995.28
Total 13.85 161,995.28

Supervision/ICR
FY11 .650 480.22
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FY12 27.418 179,069.84

FY13 38.420 205,252.69
FY14 28.610 184,522.51
FY15 27.548 173,328.78
FY16 20.691 125,659.31
FY17 14.175 101,376.77
FY18 20.188 85,256.70
Total 177.70 1,054,946.82
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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Amount at Approval Actual at Project Percentage of Approval

Components
(US$M) Closing (US$M) (US$M)
Expanding Connectivity 30 27.1 90.3 %
Mainstreaming M-apps 9.3 4.4 47.3 %
IT Industry Development 4.2 4.4 104.8 %
Project Management 4.2 4.1 102.4 %
Unallocated 2.3 2.97 1.29 %
Total 50.0 43.60 87.2 %
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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

At Appraisal a report offered a positive indication for NPV and internal rate of return (Emergency Project Paper,
Annex 10). Given Afghanistan’s sensitive security situation, and the lack of general statistics, the report was
based on assumptions related to bandwidth needed per user, revenue per bandwidth, etc. The report included
route analysis, and regulatory recommendations for building effective backbone infrastructure, such as a ‘dig-
once’ policy in collaboration with road and energy roll-outs. It was identified during the ICR that at appraisal, a
spreadsheet with an incorrect formula was used to calculate the NPV. The Emergency Project Paper showed
the NPV was $27.01 million, rather than the correct value of $.01 million.
The ICR follows the structure of the cost-benefit analysis at Appraisal and updates the analysis for a meaningful
comparison. The analysis at implementation completion attempted to use recent datasets, to the extent
possible (namely, population, broadband users, and ratio of OPEX against CAPEX). However, these datasets
were not obtained for the ICR. The ICR uses the assumptions/projections from the appraisal (except for
bandwidth needed per user and revenues which are hypothetically increased by two to four times and reduced
by 20 percent, respectively, for this ex-post analysis given the significant end-user tariff reduction in
Afghanistan).
The results of the ex-post financial evaluation exceed the projections at Appraisal (Annex 4). The summary of
the results is as follows:
• NPV was $.01 million at appraisal; and at the Project’s closing, it is expected to be $12.7 million.
• Internal rate of return was 7.45 percent at appraisal. At the closure of the Project, it is expected to be
20 percent.
At appraisal
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Population (2.7% growth) 3,203,541 3,290,036 3,378,867 3,470,097 3,563,789 3,660,011 3,758,832 3,860,320 3,964,549 4,071,592 4,181,525
Number of Users (5%-40%) 160,177 329,004 608,196 867,524 890,947 1,024,803 1,127,650 1,351,112 1,387,592 1,628,637 1,672,610
Bandwidth Required / (User .25 – 1 Mbps,
25:1 Contention Ratio 1,640 3,369 6,228 13,325 13,685 20,988 33,288 39,885 55,504 65,145 66,904
Revenue @ US 250-150/Mbps/Annum 410,053 758,024 1,401,284 2,665,034 2,736,990 3,672,895 5,825,437 6,979,845 9,713,145 9,771,820 10,035,659
Cumulative Revenue 410,053 1,168,078 2,569,361 5,234,395 7,971,386 11,644,280 17,469,718 24,449,563 34,162,707 43,934,528 53,970,187
Expenditure (US m) 27 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
Cash flow -26.59 -0.05 0.59 1.86 1.93 2.86 5.02 6.17 8.90 8.96 9.23
Discount Rate 15.00%
NPV $27.01
IRR 7.45%
At the closure of the Project
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ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
As per the guidelines, the ICR was submitted to the Borrower for their comments. MCIT and ATRA were given
sufficient time to respond and provided feedback as follows. The task team took these comments into account
and incorporated them in the ICR draft.
At first, ATRA raised a question on the project’s role on the adoption of Open Access Policy. After MCIT and
ATRA reconciliated the list of technical assistance (Subcomponent 1.1) and capacity building activities
(Subcomponent 1.3), the client responded to the task team:
Please find bellow the forwarded email from Mr. Sailab, Deputy Chairman of ATRA regarding TA and
Capacity Building Support given to ATRA under ICTDP. Following is the updated table of information, i.e.
after confirmation with ATRA:
Package Description Amount in Delivered Remarks

USD to
G-1.3 Books for ATRA Library 22,038 ATRA
C-1.4 Regulatory Issues for Mobile Sector 779,568 ATRA
Development
C-1.1 Bidding Documents for OFC Backbone 18,945 MCIT
Network
C-1.3 Backbone Open Access Policy and Tariff 70,000 MCIT
Regulations
C-1.6 Regulatory Advisor 120,000 MCIT
C-1.7 Planning of Efficient Utilization of TDF 101,111 ATRA
C-1.9 FMS for ATRA 22,801 ATRA
C-1.12 Regulations and Models for Backbone 48,000 MCIT
Tariffs
C-4.26 Support for AFSAT Operations 180,000 MCIT AFSAT was under Afghan
C-4.30/1 AFSAT Operations 67,536 MCIT Telecom and a board member
C-4.30/2 AFSAT Operations 44,048 MCIT of ATRA was acting Head of
AFSAT.
Training Under Training Component, two ATRA Two batches of 3 and 5
batches, each having Board Members members each spent one week
and Directors of ATRA were sent to TRAI- in Delhi for the training.
India for Training
Based on the list, the task team identified that the adoption of Open Access Policy was actually supported by
the project, among other donor support (paras. 34 and 73).
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ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)
1. The client’s ICR is found at:

http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/drl/objectId/090224b085bdb3c2
2. The report provides detailed description of 30 m-apps prepared under Subcomponent

2.2 is found at: http://wbdocs.worldbank.org:/wbdocs/drl/objectId/090224b085ae8f1a
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Figure A6.1. Theory of Change
PDO: Expand connectivity, mainstream use of mobile applications in strategic sectors in the
government and support development of the local IT industry.
Activities Outputs Outcomes Objectives
Good backbone infrastructure enables

Supporting policy and Formulation of sector policy
end-users to access m-apps. Expand connectivity
regulatory reforms and regulatory reform in the
(Objective 1) is an
(Subcomponent 1.1) telecom sector
important condition to
Component 1 Expanded reach and achieve Objective 2 and 3.
Expanding Deployment of fiber optics Deployment of fiber optics availability of telecom Objective 1:
Connectivity (Subcomponent 1.2) (Length (km)) Expand connectivity
services enabled by
Security concerns cleared User increased
national backbone •
network • Price reduced
Capacity building Enhanced capacity in the
(Subcomponent 1.3) telecom sector
Creating the enabling

environment for Formulation of mGovernment
mGovernment strategy and roadmap
(Subcomponent 2.1)
Wider usage of mobile
Component 2 Creation of shared services
m-apps developed which are applications for
Mainstreaming and infrastructure,
hosted on shared government services
m-apps development of m-apps
services/infra Objective 2:
(Subcomponent 2.2)
Mainstream the use of
Implementation of Innovative m-apps awarded, mobile applications in
innovation support program which address development strategic sectors in the
(Subcomponent 2.3) challenges of government Shared services and infrastructure are Government
connected to mobile operators’ network
Private sector organizations with
sufficient capacity participate
IT industry development
Creation of an IT industry
policy and regulatory
development policy, legal &
support
(Subcomponent 3.1)
regulatory framework
Implementation of skills
A pool of skilled and qualified
Component 3 development program
IT professionals created
IT Industry (Subcomponent 3.2) Improved capacity of Objective 3:
Development Government to use IT Support the
Support for ICT Village Formulation of business plan strategically development of the
(Subcomponent 3.3) of ICT Village local IT industry
Support of incubators in the Incubators supported and Services developed by IT industry

ICT Village trained, which then start can be effectively utilized, based
(Subcomponent 3.4) on widely available connectivity.
incubation activities
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Table A6.1. Project Cost by Subcomponent (at Appraisal and Actual)
Note: The numbers were retrieved in early-June 2018, which was before the disbursement was completed
on June 30, 2018. Therefore, there is a slight difference from the final numbers.
PAD Actual (as of Jun 11, 2018)

At Appraisal (US$ % of the total At Closing (US$ % of the total
Activities
million) amount at appraisal million) amount at closing
Component 1: Expanding
30.0 60% 27.1 63.2%
Connectivity
1.1 Supporting policy and
2.0 4% 1.7 4.0%
regulatory reforms
1.2 Backbone connectivity 27.0 54% 24.3 56.5%
1.3 Capacity building 1.0 2% 1.1 2.6%
Component 2:
Mainstreaming 9.3 19% 4.4 10.2%
mGovernment
2.1 mGovernment strategy
0.6 1% 0.4 1.0%
development
2.2 mGovernment Service
3.1 6% 3.5 8.1%
Delivery Platform
2.3 Innovation Support
5.6 11% 0.5 1.1%
Program
Component 3: IT industry
4.2 8% 4.4 10.3%
development
3.1 IT industry development
0.4 1% 0.4 1.0%
strategy
3.2 IT skills development
2.0 4% 2.6 6.0%
program
3.3 ICT Village 0.8 2% 0.3 0.7%
3.4 Support to ICT incubator 1.0 2% 1.1 2.7%
Component 4: Project
4.2 8% 4.1 9.5%
management
4.1 Project management
3.4 7% 3.0 7.1%
staff, office, and training
Operating costs for the PMO 0.4 1% 0.1 0.3%
Capacity building 0.4 1% 0.9 2.1%
Unallocated 2.3 5% 2.97 6.9%
Total 50.0 100% 42.98 100%
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Figure A6.2. Afghanistan’s Optical Fiber Network
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Table A6.2. M-apps for eGovernment

Name of m-app Concerning ministries/agencies
1 Citizen Surveying MoPH, MoAIL, Municipalities, MRRD, Others
2 Utility Outage Alerts DABS, MoI/Traffic Dept, MoPH, Others
3 Exam Results MoHE, MoE
4 Mobile Health Alerts MoPH
5 School Admissions MoE, MoHE
6 Question & Answer MoI/Traffic Dept, MoI/Passport Dept, MoHE,
MoE, MoPH
7 Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Reporting MoPH
8 Request & Tracking MoI/Passport Dept, Municipalities, MoHE
9 Transport Alerts and Information MoCTA, MoI/Traffic Dept
10 Weather Alerts MoCTA
11 Verification of high school/university Diploma MoE, MoHE
12 First Graders’ Registration, Notification of teachers MoE
resignations/terminations and Students’ drop outs,
transfers and deaths
13 Verification of the Validity of Driver License MoI
14 Verification of Tazkira Number and Birth Certification MoI/Tazkira Distribution Dept
15 Income Tax Notification MoI
16 Child Labor Tip Line MoL
17 Notification of Payments for Retirees MoL
18 Unemployed Youth MoL
19 Refugees Help Line MoRR
20 Flight Verification, Airport updates MoT
21 Water Bill notification and Payment Application MoUD, Municipalities
22 Hajj Program Application MoHRA
23 mCurrency Da Afghanistan Bank
24 Court Notification Application Supreme Court
25 Business license verification and Renewal (Ministry of MoC, AISA
Commerce and AISA)
26 Passport Information MoFA
27 Public Libraries’ books’ return and late fee notification Ministry of Guidance and Culture
28 Gun License Verification MoI
29 Verification of Vehicle Registration and License Plates MoI

and their renewal
30 Tax Status Verification MoF
Source: MCIT. For detailed information of each of 30 m-apps (ex. scopes of application and their features,
refer to Annex 6.
Page 46 of 46

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Public Disclosure Authorized

Report No: ICR00004450

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR(X31.8) MILLION

(US$50 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN ICT SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ( P121755 )

August 10, 2018

Digital Development Department

Currency Unit = Afghani (AFN)

Regional Vice President: Hartwig Schafer

$ All dollars are in United States dollars unless otherwise indicated

DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1

P121755 Afghanistan ICT Sector Development Project

Country Financing Instrument

Afghanistan Emergency Recovery Loan

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Borrower Implementing Agency

Ministry of Finance Ministry of Communications and IT (MCIT)

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

02 19-Feb-2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.86

SECTORS AND THEMES

Information and Communications Technologies 82

Private Sector Development 27

Public Private Partnerships 10

Public Sector Management 11

Regional Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Hartwig Schafer

Country Director: Nicholas J. Krafft Shubham Chaudhuri

Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Boutheina Guermazi

Practice Manager: Philippe Dongier Jane Lesley Treadwell

Task Team Leader(s): Tenzin Dolma Norbhu Rajendra Singh

ICR Contributing Author: Masatake Yamamichi

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

Rationale for Bank Assistance

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

16. The Project was structured around four components:

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

18. There were no revisions to the PDO during the Project.

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Table 1(a). PDO-level Results Indicators

Access to telephone services (%) 55 80 85

Table 1(b). Intermediate Results Indicators

Average retail price of Internet 450 250 37

Component 2: Mainstreaming the Use of M-apps in Strategic Sectors in the Government

Table 2(a). PDO-level Results Indicators

Table 2(b). Intermediate Results Indicators

Component 3: Support the Development of the Local IT Industry

Table 3(a). PDO-level Results Indicators

Table 3(b). Intermediate Results Indicators

Source: Interview with MCIT and ATRA in April 2018

Overarching PDO-level Indicators

Table 4. PDO-level Results Indicators

Revised ICT Policy adopted by the GoIRA No Yes Expected to be