Justice and Politics in Moscow 1983-1986: The Ambartsumyan Case

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 52, No.
7, 2000, 1307–1329
Justice and Politics in Moscow 1983–1986:

The Ambartsumyan Case
LUC DUHAMEL
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980S the theme of corruption was very sensitive in the Soviet
Union, and both dissident writings and the Soviet press devoted much attention to it.
Attention was focused on of cials who pro ted from it and on the scale of the
phenomenon. In the meantime, there was information about its negative impact and
the necessity to ght it. The meaning here was that if there existed groups who
bene ted from corruption, there were also other forces who were dedicated to
eliminate it and who were on the rise. The KGB was leading these forces. On the
death of Leonid Brezhnev, KGB president Yurii Andropov had three advantages over
the other leaders in the Kremlin. First, no other organisations apart from the KGB had
collected as much information on the crisis that threatened the Soviet system. Second,
among the leaders of the Politburo, only Andropov had proposed a solution to the
crisis, advocating a campaign against corruption. Third, as the head of the KGB, he
had already shown some willingness to ght corruption. His appointment as General
Secretary of the CPSU in November 1982 thus coincided with the beginning of a
country-wide campaign against corruption.
Our purpose in this article is to analyse a case study in corruption. First, we will
examine the testimony given by Mkhitara Ambartsumyan, director of the Dzerzhinsky
District Fruit and Vegetables Of ce (kontora), against many party and government
of cials after his arrest in 1983. Then we will analyse how the new leaders in the
Kremlin tried to gain political advantages from his testimony. Research on corruption
in the Soviet Union has been based mainly on the testimony of dissidents and on the
Soviet press, which through the 1980s provided substantial documentation on the
subject. Research on this topic has thus usually been based on secondary sources. This
article aims to ll this gap by using primary sources from the Russian Prosecutor
General and the KGB.1
As certain scholars have shown, corruption can be functional or dysfunctional;
Holmes pointed out that the same could be said of corruption in the USSR and its
subsequent reporting. 2 By cracking down on corruption, the leaders of the country
expected to receive increased popular support. Another advantage is that a drive
against corruption can provide an opportunity for leaders to dismiss party and
government of cials. A new leader can remove them from of ce and appoint people
who are loyal and more competent. Nevertheless, such a campaign can become
dysfunctional for the authorities. To criticise or to dismiss a large part of the
ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/00/071307-23 Ó 2000 University of Glasgow
DOI: 10.1080/0966813002001130
1308 LUC DUHAMEL
bureaucracy may provoke a hostile reaction, leading to a serious crisis of legitimacy

and, possibly, to the overthrow of leaders and, ultimately, of the system.
Ambartsumyan’s testimony and its threat to the Soviet political system

For obvious reasons, Moscow was a main target in the campaign against corruption.
At the end of 1982 Andropov decided that Viktor Grishin, the Moscow First
Secretary, was no longer capable of dealing with the extensive corruption in the
capital. According to his adversaries, who were convinced that underhand dealings
were widespread in Moscow and that Grishin was doing nothing to ght them,
corruption seemed a suf cient reason to justify his dismissal.3 In recent years
Muscovites had formed the impression that economic irregularities were rampant in
their city. Their belief was con rmed by the KGB, which started its ght against
economic crimes some time before Brezhnev’s death. By punishing of cials who
committed irregularities, the new leaders hoped to convince Muscovites that they
were serious when they proclaimed that of cials should be punished when they broke
the law. Andropov had the opportunity to dismiss not only dishonest party and
government of cials but also those who were incompetent. Consequently, such a
campaign was also aimed at improving the country’s new leadership, by replacing a
large part of Brezhnev’s staff and planting new people more loyal to Andropov in the
cadre structure.4 During the Brezhnev era Moscow consumers complained mostly
about shortages in the grocery stores. Checks on these by different Soviet organisa-
tions, including the KGB, only con rmed that many irregularities occurred in these
stores.5 Still, the Moscow food trade agencies seemed to be headed by competent
executives, who had held their jobs for a long time and had earned awards and
honours. This contradiction was embodied in the person of Ambartsumyan, who was
responsible for the distribution in Moscow of the most scarce goods in the country,
namely imported fruit and vegetables.
Ambartsumyan was perceived by the Moscow leaders as one of the most able
executives in the trade network; he was the only executive to run two districts,
Dzerzhinsky and Babushkin, the former being one of the most important in the capital
owing to its centralised location and large population. It was only in this kontora that
fresh fruit and vegetables arrived all year round. 6 Although half of the imported fruit
and vegetables was received through the Sheremet’evo airport warehouse, which
maintained special relations with the Dzerzhinsky kontora, those products were
generally missing in the capital’s grocery stores. Ambartsumyan, who was arrested in
June 1983 on charges of accepting bribes and other economic crimes, appeared to be
a typical executive of the Moscow trade organisation. In fact, almost all the leaders
of the kontory (district fruit and vegetables of ces), raipishchetorgi (district food
trade organisations), Glavmosplodoovoshchprom (Moscow City Fruit and Vegetables
Of ce) and Glavtorg (Moscow City Chief Trade Administration) were suspected of
malfeasance. 7 Ambartsumyan’s case was therefore characteristic of a ‘model’ execu-
tive in the trade organisations during the Brezhnev period.
While one of the tasks of the police was undeniably to carry out an offensive
against corruption, in 1982 and 1983 law enforcement agencies such as the Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MVD) were frequently denounced for their shortcomings. Only
JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN MOSCOW 1309
TABLE 1
OFFICIALS ACCUSED OF GIVING BRIBES BY AMBARTSUMYAN
From Employees of the Dzerzhinsky District Fruit and Vegetables Of ce (Annually)
TREPELKIN M. YA. refrigerator n. 1—1000 rubles monthly 12000

GURYANOV V.A. refrigerator n.2—300–500 rubles monthly 3600
SHMEL’KOV A. N. refrigerator n. 3—300–600 rubles monthly 3600–7200
GALAI V. K. refrigerator n. 4—500 rubles monthly 6000
KOKOREV P.R. refrigerator n.28—500 rubles monthly 6000
AZAROVA A. M. warehouse n. 24—1000 rubles monthly 12000
LEPESHKIN I.V. warehouse Dzerzhinsky—1000 rubles monthly 12000
ROGANOV V.T. warehouse Sheremet’evo 4500
Note: From employees of some grocery stores Ambartsumyan took money equivalent to 608 rubles
monthly for the years 1981–82.
Source: Zayavlenie ot podsledstvennogo Mkhitara Adamovicha Ambartsumyana nachal’niku
sledstvennogo otdela UKGB SSSR po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti, A. V. Tro movu i st.
sledovatelyu po OVD UKGB po Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti V. I. Bunakovu’ , 11 July 1983, pp.
1–2.
the KGB remained an ef cient and reliable organisation against corruption. 8 In fact,
since the beginning of the 1970s, all the signi cant cases concerning economic crimes
in Russia were investigated by the KGB and not by the MVD as it should have been,
since it too was involved in corruption. 9
The KGB suspected the director of the Dzerzhinsky kontora, Ambartsumyan, of
making a lot of money illegally (see Table 1). The key aspect of his criminal activity
was his collaboration with V. T. Roganov, the director of the fruit and vegetables
warehouse at the Sheremet’evo airport. Through him, Ambartsumyan had access to
and control of the allocation of fruit and vegetables coming from abroad. Roganov,
who gave large bribes to Ambartsumyan—375 rubles monthly—had the privilege of
distributing these goods with him and consequently making considerable pro ts.10
The investigators learned that from 1970 to February 1983 Ambartsumyan had
received, in the form of bribes, more money than any other executive in Moscow’s
food trade organisations; according to the sentence, the payments totalled 366 800
rubles. Ambartsumyan himself also gave bribes; he needed protectors and friends in
the upper circles of Soviet society because he broke the law to an extent greater than
any of his colleagues.
Ambartsumyan’s revelations con rmed that his protectors were many and
in uential. The list of names he provided was remarkable for the large number and
high ranking of the of cials as well as for the accuracy of the data (see Table 2). He
detailed to whom he gave bribes, as well as how much and when. He denounced
important of cials who took bribes, such as the chairman of the Control Commission
and chiefs of the Department of Trade and Maintenance of the Moscow Party
committee; leaders of the party, apparatchiki and executives of the soviet and MVD
chiefs from the Dzerzhinsky, Babushkin and Sokol’nikov districts; high-ranking
of cials from the USSR Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Fruit and Vegetables.11
The testimony was shocking and controversial in that it gave the impression that the
Moscow Party committee and the upper echelon of the government structure were
largely corrupt.
Early in October 1983 the KGB decided to transfer to the USSR Prosecutor
1310 LUC DUHAMEL
TABLE 2
OFFICIALS ACCUSED OF TAKING BRIBES BY AMBARTSUMYAN
(rubles)
Of cials of the Moscow Party committee

BUCHIN K.S. 800
Chairman of the Control Commission
UDACHIN A. 1800
Head of the Department of Trade and Maintenance
MITROFANOV V.A. 3600
30 rubles monthly for 10 years
SMIRNOV YU.B. 2880
90 rubles 4 times a year for 8 years
POSPELOV O.O. 6000
Head of the food sector, Department of Trade and Maintenance
FILIMONOV YU.V. 9600
Instructor of the Department of Trade and Maintenance
CHERNIK D. G. 4320
Head of the Department of Finance
IVANOV V.N. 7200
Inspector of the Department of Trade and Maintenance
NIKOLAEV V.D. 12000
Instructor of the Department of Trade and Maintenance
Secretaries of Dzerzhinsky and Babushkin district Party committees

ABLOGIN M.A. 2760
90 rubles 4 times a year for 5 years, 60 rubles 4 times a year for 3 years, 30 rubles 4 times
a year for 2 years
ARKHIPOV V.I. 2400
90 rubles 4 times a year for 5 years, 30 rubles 4 times a year for 5 years
KOMAROV N.G. 3240
SELIKHOVA E.V. 1440
VINOGRADOV YU.I. 1440
SHISHOV YU.A. 2160
KOSTENKO A.I. 1920
CHERNOSOV V.G. 2080
60 rubles 4 times a year for 7 years, 4 orders worth 100 rubles
KUZNETSOV B.K. 720
Of cials of the Moscow Soviet

Vice Presidents of the Moscow Soviet executive committee
MARCHENKO I.G. 2160
ESAULOVA Z.A. 2800
ELCHIN S.A. 5 orders worth 90 rubles over 2 years 450
SHCHEGOLEV V. I. 300 rubles monthly for 3 years, 90 rubles 4 times a year for 3 years 11880
PLUZHNIKOV G. A. 100 rubles monthly for 3 years 3600
MOTORIN I. S. 100 rubles monthly for 6 years 7200
Of cials of the Moscow Soviet executive committee

NAUMENKO V. A., Assistant Vice-President, 4 years 2800
POPOV I. F., Assistant Vice-President, 3 years 1500
CHISTOTIN V. A., Director Department of Trade, 1 year 1100
Chairmen of district Soviet executive committees

AGAFONOV V. P. 2040
90 rubles 4 times a year for 4 years, 60 rubles 4 times a year for 2 years, 30 rubles 4
times a year for 1 year
SUVOROV V. V. 2160
BAVZALUK A. F. 2640
REBIZOV YU.I. 900
90 rubles in a few orders over 2 years, 60 rubles in 6 orders
VORFOLOMEV 450
90 rubles in 5 orders over 1 year
GRISHIN E. I. 150
2 orders
Of cials of USSR Ministry of Fruit and Vegetables and of USSR Ministry of Trade
KHOLOD I. I. 800
Deputy Minister of Fruit and Vegetables USSR, 2 years
POLYAKOV I. A. 36000
Deputy Minister of Fruit and Vegetables USSR, 300 rubles monthly for 10 years
KOLOMEITSEV I. N. 60000
Chief of All-Union Directorate of Warehouses for Imported Fruit and Vegetables, USSR
Ministry of Fruit and Vegetables
GRIGOREV and RYTOV 15000
Of cials of USSR Ministry of Trade
Executives of Moscow Fruit and Vegetables Of ce (Glavmosplodoovshchprom)

URAL’TSEV V. A. 50400
Director, 700 rubles monthly for 6 years
KORSHIKOV I. D. 16800
Deputy Director, 300 rubles monthly for 4 years 1 100 rubles monthly for 2 years
KOZLOVA M. V. 4750
Head of Planning Commission, 450–500 rubles a year for 10 years
1312 LUC DUHAMEL
TABLE 2
CONTINUED
(rubles)
SHUL’GA A. F. 850
Head of Commission for Labour and Wages, 450–500 rubles monthly for 2 years
GALKIN N. D. 24300
Head of Consignment Department, 200 rubles monthly for 10 years, 300 rubles over 3 years
DUNAEV E. N. 9000
Head of warehouse, 100 rubles monthly for 5 years, 50 rubles monthly for 5 years
NIKULENKO A. I. 12000
Head of goods control section, 100 rubles monthly for 10 years
Of cials of district Internal Affairs (MVD) sections

BARONIN YU. F. 6000
Director, Dzerzhinsky district MVD
Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation
SAPOZHNIKOV 2160
Director, Babushkin district MVD
BOIKO V. I. 3600
Director, Dzerzhinsky district Police Department vehicle inspectorate
ZYUKOV I. Z. 2160
Director, Sokol’nikov district Police Department vehicle inspectorate
Source: ‘Zayavlenie ot podsledstvennogo Mkhitara Adamovicha Ambartsumyana k nachal’niku sledstven-

nogo otdela UKGB SSSR po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti A. V. Tro movu i st. sledovatelyu po OVD
UKGB po Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti V. I. Bunakovu’ , 11 July 1983, pp. 2–3; ‘V dopolnenie k zayavleniyu
ot 21 iyunya 1983’, pp. 2–10.
General all the cases involving executives arrested in the trade agencies. The decision
was legitimate in that the Prosecutor General was responsible for deciding whether to
charge trade agency executives. But the timing was not a coincidence, since the KGB
now believed that it had collected enough evidence for the Prosecutor General to
bring accusations against the leaders of Glavmosplodoovoshchprom. Ambartsumyan’s
testimony played a key role in the decision to initiate criminal proceedings against the
leaders of that organisation. First, it was assumed that Ambartsumyan, having worked
in this sector, would give priority to his bosses in terms of bribes. Second, the police
received from other executives testimony that also indicated many economic irregu-
larities in the trade network. The prosecutors could now corroborate Ambartsumyan’s
testimony with that of other employees in the sector.
Yu. Burtsev was appointed head of the prosecution team assigned to the cases of
the Glavmosplodoovoshchprom executives accused of accepting bribes. The outcome
of the investigation was the conviction of Ambartsumyan’s bosses. In his testimony,
Ambartsumyan provided exhaustive information about the amount and circumstances
of the bribes given to the leaders of Glavmosplodoovoshchprom. There was no reason
to believe, furthermore, that he might not reveal similar truths about high-ranking
party and government of cials. According to Burtsev, the information revealed by
Ambartsumyan concerning corruption by party and government of cials had to be
taken seriously. In January 1985 the prosecutor took the initiative of asking the
Moscow MVD Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property
and Speculation to check all documents relevant to allegations of bribes accepted by
party and government of cials:
The directors of Glavmosplodoovoshchprom, Ural’tsev, Pospelov and others, Ambart-

sumyan, Gotloib, Tomashevsky and others, directors of Dzerzhinsky warehouses Lepeshkin,
Guryanov and others made statements and written confessions about their having bribed a
large group of of cials who were not charged with any crimes for lack of evidence.12
For the rst time, a prosecutor from the Moscow Prosecutor General’s of ce
suggested the possibility that Ambartsumyan and others had bribed party and soviet
of cials. The statements of certain executives from the fruit and vegetables trade
network could corroborate those of Ambartsumyan and thus give more credibility to
the accusations. To discover the truth, Burtsev spoke of ‘the need for further
veri cation concerning the statements of those convicted in these cases as well as the
of cials accused by them’.13 This means, in the Soviet context, that the of cials
should be interrogated and confronted. Thus, according to Burtsev, the of cials
accused by Ambartsumyan should be regarded as suspects. In sending his request to
the department for combatting the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation,
Burtsev expected Ambartsumyan’s controversial statements to be con rmed. At this
department, KGB of cials known for their toughness had already removed Nikolai
Shchelokov’s men.
As we have already noted, a campaign against corruption can have dysfunctional
effects. Although it was not all that unusual for trade organisation executives to be
sentenced for corruption, party of cials were rarely charged with economic crimes.
They received special treatment since they were usually judged by comrades who
were in collusion with them.14 Ambartsumyan’s testimony, which concerned leaders
of the trade agencies in Moscow as well as party and government leaders, might lead
to prosecution of trade network executives and also raised the question of whether to
put the incriminated party of cials on trial.
Andropov’ s policy was to pursue charges against trade agency executives and to
denounce party of cials for their lack of supervision and leniency towards the
executives. The following quotation is typical of such charges:
Certain leading of cials in the district illegally obtained cars for their personal use, spent
large sums of state farm and collective farm money to hold anniversary celebrations,
wedding and other festivities and violated norms for keeping livestock in personal auxiliary
farming operations. The Troits, Verkhneural’sk and Kasti District Party committees and
certain others were seriously reprimanded for taking an affable, pro-forma approach to this
important matter.15
Many party of cials were criticised and dismissed for incompetence or tolerance of
corruption, but according to tradition they were not expected to answer in court for
their actions. Moreover, such criticism was limited to the outlying areas of Russia and
1314 LUC DUHAMEL
the other Union Republics. Before 1985 no journalist was allowed to criticise of cials
from the Moscow Party organisation, which was perceived as a model for the entire
country. To allow otherwise was to risk undermining the reputation of the Communist
Party.
KGB behaviour was dictated not only by acceptance of the preponderant role of the
Communist Party but also by the propensity to maximise the in uence of leaders in
the political system. On the one hand, the KGB did not want public attacks on party
of cials; on the other, it had a policy of maximising the amount of information
collected even on the conduct of party and government of cials. This gave its leaders
the opportunity to use this information, especially in 1983, when Andropov, a former
KGB chairman, was the new leader in the Kremlin. Before perestroika a consensus
existed among party of cials not to allow the judiciary to scrutinise their behaviour.
Still more unacceptable to the party leaders was the assumption in Ambartsumyan’s
revelations that corruption prevailed among the elite.
Ambartsumyan’s arrest was just one part of a larger campaign against corruption.
In the autumn of 1983 the Federal Prosecutor General’s Of ce created a brigade of
58 investigators, headed by prosecutor Vladimir Oleinik, who were assigned the task
of bringing into custody all employees of the Moscow trade agencies who had broken
the law.16 In 1983 and 1984 the prosecutors found evidence that most of cials of
Glavtorg had committed crimes. In 29 of the 31 raipishchetorgi testimony existed that
directors and deputy directors were involved in corruption, including those of the
largest grocery stores (Elisevsky, GUM, Novoarbat and Smolensk), who were put
behind bars. 17 The trial in September 1984 of the Glavmosplodoovoshchprom leaders
and of the directors of a few district fruit and vegetables of ces ended with sentences
to long terms in labour camps. The culmination of the campaign seemed to be the trial
of the leaders of Glavtorg, which began in December 1985.
The impact of perestroika on the campaign against corruption

Late in 1984 the KGB and the Prosecutor General seemed to have succeeded in
putting all dishonest employees behind bars; already they had arrested thousands of
employees in Moscow alone.18 But the political situation changed in February 1985,
when Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary of the CPSU. The new
policies of perestroika would bring about major economic reforms. Limited pluralism
began to take hold in society and the Soviet economy was increasingly criticised,
particularly the trade and consumer sector. Many executives were convicted for
activities that were considered criminal infractions according to Soviet trade rules, but
basically as normal actions in a capitalist economy.
As perestroika gradually approached the private economy in more positive terms,
the question was raised whether to reconsider the accusations made against many
trade executives. In the judicial sphere divergences also appeared. One trend was to
question the campaign against corruption in the Moscow trade agencies. A new
interpretation emerged concerning many Glavtorg employees: they should be con-
sidered not criminals but victims of the Soviet system.
The anti-corruption brigade had carried out investigations using typically Soviet
methods. Many employees of the trade network were arrested and put behind bars for
months and even years without trial. Most were not allowed to see their relatives.
Those who pleaded not guilty were severely sentenced, while others who testi ed
against their colleagues received minor punishments or sometimes even saw the
charges against them dropped. With perestroika these methods of investigation
appeared as gross violations of civil rights, making their authors vulnerable to attacks.
Many trade employees could not deny their guilt for certain economic infractions;
nonetheless, they realised that the new period of openness offered them the oppor-
tunity to turn the excesses of the anti-corruption campaign against the prosecutors.
They would focus attention on the lack of evidence against arrested executives and
their mistreatment.
As liberalisation took hold, newspapers and meetings of the party expressed
different points of view. For example, the nomenklatura was very cautious about the
reforms but, at the same time, even this group was developing a more nuanced point
of view, as a result of new cleavages in society. Many members of the nomenklatura
took a liberal approach to certain issues, although fundamentally they remained
conservative at heart. In this way they advocated the principle of freedom of the press
since they were no longer dominated by the Kremlin; it offered them more room to
object to the anti-corruption campaign in the Moscow trade agencies. Of the 300 000
employees who worked in the Moscow trade agencies, almost all had committed
economic infractions. 19 Many executives had been arrested and many others feared
they would meet a similar fate if the anti-corruption campaign persisted. Likewise,
many party and government of cials who had been in connivance with these
executives wanted to discredit the prosecutors and, more generally, the Prosecutor
General’s Of ce.
The trade agency employees who had been arrested in 1983 and 1984 often
admitted their guilt. But in 1985, with the opportunities provided by perestroika,
many employees changed their testimony and proclaimed themselves innocent. At the
end of that year certain executives claimed to have testi ed as a result of threats,
intimidation and even violence. The ex-deputy mayor of Moscow declared that he had
testi ed under coercion.20 Two ex-of cials of the Inspection Of ce of the Russian
Trade Ministry denounced coercion against them by the prosecutors and repudiated
all their statements. Two ex-heads of Glavobshchepita (Chief Administration of
Public Catering) accused the prosecutors of putting undue pressure on them to get
testimony against Nikolai Tregubov, ex-head of Glavtorg, and Grishin.21 In the trial
of the ex-leaders of Glavtorg, Panakov and Skil, respectively ex-president of the
Tourist House and ex-director of the restaurant Sed’moe Nebo, were accused by the
prosecutors of bribing Tregubov. They accused the prosecutors of violence against
them and falsi cation of evidence. The judges found them not guilty and also rejected
a few other accusations of bribe-taking by Tregubov. 22
During this period as well, at meetings and conferences of the Moscow Party
committee, delegates and participants denounced the repression against their com-
rades. At the 19th Conference of the Communist Party certain delegates described the
anti-corruption campaign as a witch hunt. N. Chikirev, director of the Dzerzhinsky
factory, condemned the repression against the First Secretary of the Kiev District
Party committee. He accused Boris El’tsin of having pushed him to suicide with his
criticisms and with his campaign against corruption. 23 He even drew parallels with the
1316 LUC DUHAMEL
Stalinist period, claiming that evidence had been fabricated against him as well as
other of cials. Chikirev concluded with a question: ‘If we compare 1986 with 1936
how can it be better now?’.24
Sympathy for the trade employees behind bars came even from their successors at
the head of Glavtorg. These new of cials sent requests to the Moscow Party
committee to end the repression against their former colleagues. They paid visits to
the party committee and the soviet executive committee headquarters, asking of cials
there to free their former colleagues. They complained about the damage caused to
trade, the departure of competent people and the dif culty of recruiting new
employees and managers. They all threatened to quit if the situation continued.25
Among the reformers, some sympathy was expressed for the employees of
Glavtorg, mainly because of the abuses committed by the police.26 Liberals and
executives in the trade organisations had at least one point in common: hostility
towards the KGB. The campaign against corruption launched by the KGB at the end
of 1982 coincided with more repression against the dissidents. In 1985, however,
there were reformers in the Kremlin and their in uence was rising. Of cials appointed
at the head of the Soviet Prosecutor General’s Of ce were more aware of civil rights
and more determined to end abuses by law enforcement agencies.27 More important,
some KGB of cials who played an important role in the 1983 Moscow anti-corrup-
tion campaign ‘were dismissed, forced to retire, or even punished’.28 The KGB was
no longer associated with the ght against corruption, its section dedicated to
economic crimes was even abolished. The KGB men assigned to the head of the
Moscow MVD section were also dismissed.
The Prosecutor General sent a directive to his prosecutors ‘to strictly observe the
law concerning the investigations of of cials’.29 Later, another directive enjoined
them ‘to check the legality of the arrests of certain executives and of cials sent to trial
in these cases’.30 In April 1986 an investigation was underway to verify the
allegations of Shkil and Kananov. 31 While the new leaders adopted these measures as
veri cations of allegations of abuses committed by law enforcement agencies, at the
same time they wanted generally to use such circumstances to limit police preroga-
tives in society.
New disagreements in the law enforcement agencies concerning the Ambartsumyan

case
The cleavages within the law enforcement agencies had an impact on the Ambar-
tsumyan case. In autumn 1985 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Of ce had to react
to the report of the Moscow MVD Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of
Socialist Property and Speculation, which concluded that Ambartsumyan’s testimony
was credible. The Prosecutor General faced a thorny problem: if Ambartsumyan was
telling the truth, something would have to be done about the of cials he had accused.
He was not ready to deal with this matter. In November 1985 he asked his
investigators to check Ambartsumyan’s statements and respond to his request for a
reprieve. 32 The directive was treated as secret because it stated that ‘Ambartsumyan’s
testimony included concrete facts of bribery involving large sums of money to
of cials of the party, the Soviet, Glavmosplodoovoshchprom, the Soviet Minister of
Fruit and Vegetables, the All-Union Minister of Trade, the MVD and other bodies’.33
The question in the letter was not whether Ambartsumyan had given them bribes—it
was taken for granted that he had—but what to do with the compromising material.
The sense of the directive was that further veri cation of Ambartsumyan’s testimony
was necessary, although it was, on other levels, considered credible.
In fact, the Prosecutor General’s Of ce wanted to see whether the prosecutors in
the case were working properly, i.e. to check their methods. In reviewing the case, he
could see that since his arrest Ambartsumyan had been under inadmissible pressure
to cooperate with the police. In autumn 1984, more than a year after his incarceration
and after being sentenced to death, Ambartsumyan complained about how he was
being treated by the investigators:
For the second year, I am in a cell on death-row. A human being who has never been in such
a cell cannot understand my situation. Throughout this period, I have had no contact with
my family. I do not know whether my wife, who has already suffered three heart attacks,
is still alive. And what about my children and my grandchildren? Why such cruelty toward
me?34
Ambartsumyan had provided information on the bribes he had given to leaders of

Glavmosplodoovoshchprom in exchange for the promise that he would not be
sentenced. On that point, too, the KGB had not been fair: Ambartsumyan was
sentenced to 15 years in prison. 35 I. I. Sheremet’ev, the prosecutor appointed to
review the Ambartsumyan case, could hardly believe the testimony, because it
seemed to be the result of intimidation and stress tactics.36
Regarding Ambartsumyan’s credibility, it could also be argued that he was
seriously ill. In November and December 1985 he appeared to be unable to give
precise and accurate information; he seemed to have memory problems, he could not
con rm some statements he had given and he contradicted others. For instance, in
1983 Ambartsumyan accused Udachin, head of the Moscow Party Committee
Department of Trade and Maintenance, of accepting bribes, but in 1985 he said he did
not remember in what circumstances and how much the apparatchik had received.37
He stated in 1983 that he had given Kolomeitsev, chief of the All-Union Directorate
of Warehouses for Imported Fruit and Vegetables, 60 000 rubles but in 1985 he said
that the sum was 30 000. 38
Sheremet’ev feared that Ambartsumyan, having nothing to lose, would make false
declarations to avoid being executed: ‘… considering that he has been sentenced to
death, he would bear no responsibility for providing false testimony’.39 Of course, not
all prosecutors would believe the testimony of someone who was perceived as a
criminal and might only be trying to avoid execution. Sheremet’ev claimed that
accusations against certain party of cials illustrated Ambartsumyan’s willingness to
make false declarations to ensure his requests were granted: ‘… an appeal to seek a
pardon, a transfer to another cell and the opportunity to see his family’.40 In brief,
Ambartsumyan was possibly motivated by his willingness to please the investigators;
he would exaggerate the number and the importance of of cials to whom he gave
bribes so as to escape the death penalty.
Sheremet’ev submitted his report in March 1986, concluding that Ambartsumyan’s
testimony was not reliable and that there was no reason to delay his execution. The
1318 LUC DUHAMEL
Prosecutor General obviously agreed with the report; still, he did not have Ambar-
tsumyan executed immediately. In uential prosecutors, especially those who led the
campaign against corruption, were opposed to such a measure. They represented a
minority but nevertheless enjoyed support within the KGB and from El’tsin. As a
concession, the Prosecutor General allowed the prosecutors in charge of the campaign
against corruption in Moscow to continue questioning people involved in the
Ambartsumyan case until the end of September 1986. 41
In 1985, three years into the anti-corruption campaign, the All-Union Prosecutor
General intended to put an end to it. He was in agreement with most of the leaders
in the Kremlin, who believed that enough people had been arrested during the
campaign. Most important, the repression in the Moscow trade agencies had become
dysfunctional. The liberals in the Kremlin could hardly accept the methods used by
the law enforcement agencies, which were at the very least questionable. Employees
charged with corruption were now seen by many as victims of the Soviet system. The
reformers knew they had the support of the intelligentsia, whose priority was to
weaken the power of the police. What was unexpected at that time, however, was that
a signi cant portion of the nomenklatura levelled harsh criticism against the police.
This group, which had been decimated by the anti-corruption campaign, denounced
the investigative methods, the poor prison conditions and more generally the prosecu-
tors’ violation of civil rights. A continuation of the campaign against corruption could
isolate the new leadership in the political system and had already, at the end of 1985,
diminished support among liberals and conservatives alike.
Ambartsumyan’s revelations made him the most important suspect in Moscow at
that time. He claimed to have bribed more than 75 of cials.42 He was the rst suspect,
at least in Russia, to give such an accurate picture of corruption. The tradition in the
Soviet Union was that those who gave bribes were often convicted rather than those
who took them, since the recipients tended to be in uential or well-connected people
in the upper echelon. But the period from 1983 to 1984 was not ordinary for the
Kremlin: some leaders, such as Gorbachev, were willing to disclose cases of bribery.
It must be kept in mind that in 1983 the Communist Party had in Andropov a new
General Secretary, preoccupied with the internal political process of placing his men
in command in the different echelons of power. In Moscow, Andropov assigned
Gorbachev the task of renewing the leadership. In order to sack many of cials, he had
to nd reasons to do so, pretexts that Ambartsumyan’s testimony could provide.
Gorbachev was promoted to General Secretary after Chernenko’s death in February
1985. This was a setback for Grishin, who was not able to prevent his appointment. 43
The authority of the First Secretary of the Moscow Party organisation was seriously
weakened, and it was Grishin whom Gorbachev wanted to dismiss rst. Grishin’s
in uence had been declining, mainly due to investigations on corruption in the
Moscow network. Although the investigators found no evidence against him, they
collected enough proof to put many of his key executives behind bars for a long
time.44 At the end of 1985 El’tsin replaced Grishin as leader of the Moscow Party
organisation, considerably increasing the strength of the reform forces, which could
now more easily renew the Moscow leadership. One consequence was declining
interest in Ambartsumyan on the part of some reformers.
In the meantime, the appointment of El’tsin as the new boss of the party in the
capital created new dissension among the reformers. While most of the pro-
Gorbachev group at the end of 1985 saw more political risks than bene ts in
continuing the anti-corruption campaign, El’tsin represented another point of view.
The battle that he led against Grishin and his partisans in Moscow from the end of
1985 ensured that he was reviled by the elite. El’tsin had received information from
the KGB and prosecutors involved in the trade agency investigations that corruption
was rife among the Moscow Party leaders.45
El’tsin became aware of how this ght against corruption, which was popular
among the people and especially among the intelligentsia, was paying dividends.
Unlike Gorbachev, he thought that corruption was more rooted in the elite, in
particular among party of cials. He was also more critical about the possibility of
restructuring the party:
Why have we been unable for so many years to eradicate from our lives bureaucratic excess,
social injustice and abuses? Why, even now, is the demand for radical change getting bogged
down in an inert stratum of timeservers with party membership cards? Poor supervision over
the work of cadres, resting on one’s laurels for years and a lack of initiative on the part of
a number of party committee rst secretaries, increasingly frequent deviations and abuses,
the absence of self-criticism and genuine collective leadership here are the reasons for
slumps and failures in the work of entire regions.46
El’tsin relied more on the people for support than did any other leading party member.
His ability lay in appreciating the importance of a gradually emerging actor in the
political system, that of public opinion. The campaign against corruption helped him
considerably, by building political support among the people, a mounting political
force which he needed to ght the nomenklatura successfully.
El’tsin increased the in uence of the prosecutors who led the anti-corruption
campaign, furnishing them with reasons to continue their battle and encouraging them
to pursue their investigations of the trade agencies. In turn the prosecutors, who
considered their job un nished, provided ammunition for El’tsin, even if it meant
opposing the Prosecutor General’s Of ce. They were receiving reports from law
enforcement agencies that economic irregularities and malpractices continued in the
trade networks.
The new executives in the food sector seemed no better than their predecessors. In
1986 and 1987 in Glavmosplodoovoshchprom, 37 of the candidates proposed by the
director, Virichev, had been involved in embezzlement of socialist property and
bribery. 47 The candidates appointed as chief accountant and director of the Salary and
Employment Commission had been charged with corruption, 48 while both the rst
candidate and second candidate proposed as vice chairman were rejected for the same
reason.49 Misrepresenting the quality of fruit and vegetables was still a widespread
practice.50
Police reports also complained that the old mentality still prevailed among
employees in the trade agencies. According to them, ‘trade is the trade you know’,
and ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’.51 A commentary by the
leader of the anti-corruption brigade concluded that, in the trade organisations,
‘nothing has changed and for the majority things continue as before’. Another police
report deplored the widespread belief that ‘all society is guilty of irregularities’.52 The
1320 LUC DUHAMEL
prosecutors also attacked the support by artists and intellectuals of prosecuted

executives of the trade organisations.53
El’tsin faced strong opposition in the nomenklatura and in the party, opposition that
Ambartsumyan’s testimony could galvanise. Depositions collected by the KGB
contained enough evidence to indict several of cials suspected of corruption. One of
the most effective ways of discrediting El’tsin’s adversaries was to attack their
venality and thereby also discredit higher-echelon of cials who defended them or
closed their eyes to their illegal activities. If the prosecutors had succeeded in nding
evidence against many executives in the trade agencies or of cials in the government,
they had substantially less evidence to incriminate party of cials. Executives who had
already been sentenced were reluctant to accuse in uential people, knowing from
experience that their situation could become worse if they went in that direction. In
1979 the Russian Deputy Minister of Fisheries had accused leaders of the upper
echelon of the party of being involved in a caviar scandal; he was sentenced to death
and executed a few days later.54
Yurii Sokolov, director of Store No. 1 of the Moscow Gastronom trade organis-
ation, reacted to the death sentence by revealing the names of all the party of cials
to whom he had given bribes, hoping that his collaboration would save him. Instead,
he too was executed soon afterward, and all the documents, including the information
he provided about corrupt of cials, disappeared.55 Therefore, even in the Andropov
era, while denunciations of of cials were encouraged, it was risky to target the
high-ranking ones. Ambartsumyan was one of the few executives who incriminated
party of cials and high-ranking government cadres. No other executive was so critical
of the nomenklatura. For all these reasons, his testimony seemed fundamental for the
prosecutors, who did their utmost to keep him alive, knowing that the depositions that
he had given against of cials would become useless if he died.
In September 1986 the leaders of the brigade against corruption in Moscow thought
they had achieved a major success in nding testimony which corroborated that of
Ambartsumyan. It could now be proved that government of cials and above all party
of cials had accepted bribes from Ambartsumyan which took the form of gifts offered
each year on the main holidays (1 January, 8 March, 1 May and 7 November) The
prosecutors therefore questioned Ambartsumyan’s drivers and secretaries, who be-
came crucial witnesses, identifying many of cials or their homes where they deliv-
ered goods in short supply. 56
For the Prosecutor General’s Of ce, the drivers’ and secretaries’ testimony seemed
to con rm the credibility of Ambartsumyan’s allegations regarding the bribery of
many party and government of cials. Thus the reform-minded prosecutors had been
correct in their request to check Ambartsumyan’s testimony. The issue was raised in
order to give the prosecutors more time to continue their veri cation.
In this context, knowing that the prosecutors had until the end of September to
continue their questioning, special permission from M. A. Rekunkov, the Prosecutor
General of the Soviet Union, was sought to extend their deadline. Rekunkov wrote a
new directive, which appeared to be a vote of con dence in the prosecutors handling
the Ambartsumyan case. He insisted upon the man’s credibility:
… over a period of years, he [Ambartsumyan] systematically gave bribes to cadres of the
Dzerzhinsky District Party committee and the Dzerzhinsky district Soviet executive
committee … the Deputy President of the Babushkin Soviet executive committee … the
former director of the city planning commission … the deputy director of the evaluation
commission … a group of of cials of the Ministry of Fruit and Vegetables, of the Ministry
of Trade of the Soviet Union, and of cials of the Dzerzhinsky, Babushkin and Sokol’nikov
district MVD services …57
Ambartsumyan’s testimony, including that concerning convicted and former directors of

Glavmosplodoovoshchprom—Ural’tsev, Kuvaldin, Kogan, Mitrofanov, Petrikov etc.—was
con rmed objectively by the materials presented at these criminal proceedings … This
testimony attested to their credibility.58
What is most relevant, the Prosecutor General gave the prosecutors additional time:
With all that I said previously, and what is happening now concerning the checking of all
these facts and information, including Ambartsumyan’s testimony, I request that the matter
of the cancellation of Ambartsumyan’s death penalty be postponed until 1 January 1987. 59
But, almost at the same time, N. A. Bazhenov, the Deputy Prosecutor General of the
Soviet Union, unof cially informed the reform-minded prosecutors that no change in
the death sentence would occur and that no further time for their investigations would
be allowed.60 Furthermore, the Prosecutor General showed no intention of laying
charges against the party and government of cials accused by Ambartsumyan. The
of cials who had received bribes had been moved to other functions and duly
reprimanded; but tradition would be respected in that no charges would be laid against
them.61 Exacerbated by Rekunkov’s attitude, the battle between the pro and anti-
El’tsin factions reached a new stage.
The impact of the Ambartsumyan case on perestroika: revolt of reformist prosecutors

against the Prosecutor General
The prosecutors were aware of the effects the emergence of perestroika was having
on the judicial system. In 1983 they had been appreciated for their severity, but by
1986 times had changed. As we have seen, the prosecutors involved in the anti-
corruption campaign were encountering much opposition to their authoritarian meth-
ods. They were still intolerant of corruption, but they now had to insist that they were
committed to civil rights to maintain El’tsin’s support. The Ambartsumyan case gave
them the opportunity to build their reputation as prosecutors who defended the rights
of people treated unfairly by the law enforcement agencies.
El’tsin supported the reformist prosecutors and tried to consolidate their position.
He wanted limitations on the prerogatives of the law enforcement agencies, but at the
same time he wanted to gain support within these bodies; thus, concerning the
nomenklatura, he proposed a large role for the police, encouraging them to intensify
the battle against corruption. He promised to give the prosecutors all the powers they
needed to investigate, arrest and convict corrupt high-ranking of cials:
Many trade employees, including a few leaders, have been taken into custody for having
abused consumers and deceived the state by accepting bribes from their subordinates. The
press has informed the public. The journalists asked whether those who had protected these
1322 LUC DUHAMEL
criminals could be held accountable. B. El’tsin emphasised that a erce war against these
crimes would be waged until the end. All the culprits and their protectors, whatever their
ranks, would be punished. 62
The Prosecutor General’s Of ce had traditionally been a source of frustration for the
prosecutors, since in many cases they could not formulate accusations against party
of cials or against high-level of cials in general. Now, with perestroika, especially
the perestroika espoused by leaders such as El’tsin, the prosecutors leading the
anti-corruption brigade in the capital could hope that justice would prevail. Such a
position taken by El’tsin could only be welcomed by many members of the law
enforcement agencies. This position was timely, since the prosecutors could modify
their approach, adopting a vision more adapted to perestroika and minimising the
responsibility of trade employees, but identifying of cials of the Communist Party as
the main guilty parties. Such an interpretation could explain why corruption continued
to grow in 1986; the law enforcement agencies could not arrest the main persons
responsible for it. In this context, we can understand their attitude toward Ambar-
tsumyan, whose testimony could incriminate many party of cials. Finally, consider-
ing the Communist Party of cials the main targets also presented the advantage for
the prosecutors of diverting the public’s attention from their mistakes and abuses in
the indictments of many trade organisation executives.
To complicate the situation, in 1986 the conservatives remained a strong force and
at times seemed to be gaining ground. It was not beyond the realm of possibility that
they would return to power. If that happened, the leaders of the anti-corruption
brigade would have to pay for all the trade agency executives who had been put
behind bars. To avoid such an outcome, El’tsin and reform-minded prosecutors
needed supporters in the police to neutralise any attempted coup d’état, which could
originate from these forces. Speci cally, the pro-El’tsin faction sought support from
the KGB, which did not appreciate the attitude of the Prosecutor General’s Of ce, and
certain of cials in the Kremlin who wanted to weaken its place in society and in the
judicial process. The pro-El’tsin prosecutors criticised the decision of the Prosecutor
General’s Of ce no longer to allow the KGB to be involved in the battle against
corruption in Moscow. They denounced the removal of KGB of cials from the
investigation of the trade network:
Succeeding the KGB of cials [were] investigators who did not know the situation and who
had no experience in the ght against economic crime, since in March and April this section
of the KGB combatting economic criminality had been abolished. Who stood to bene t from
such a decision?
Who would deal with these matters? For many years the MVD department for combatting
the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation had been disorganised and incapable
of performing its function.63
The new investigators in the ght against corruption were portrayed as men of the
Brezhnev era, corrupt and incompetent:
… those who came from the KGB were excluded from the Moscow MVD section, and the
most serious loss was Sterligov, dismissed as director of the department for combatting
the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation. In their place were put these
investigators … for example, the current deputy director of these services, Alekseev, whom
we should ask for some explanation of the several years of inactivity on the part of the
department …64
Those investigators who are now in this department, such as Kipreev, Tomin and Anikin, are
largely responsible for the mistakes in the Brezhnev era and in ‘their’ previous districts had
criminal connections, such as Anikin, the leader of the Moscow MVD Investigation
Department. 65
The reformist prosecutors found 1986 a tough year. They were the main targets for
different forces in society, including conservatives, employees of trade agencies,
repressed intellectuals and even liberals. The prosecutors supported Ambartsumyan’s
attempt to avoid the death penalty, a request ultimately denied. The Prosecutor
General gave them until 1 January but it was not enough time. They were not allowed
to lay charges against several of cials accused by Ambartsumyan.
Oleinik believed he had enough arguments on his side to directly attack the
Prosecutor General on the Ambartsumyan case. He sent a directive to the staff of the
Prosecutor General’s Of ce containing a devastating charge against his chief. It was
unprecedented for a prosecutor to oppose his superiors, especially the Prosecutor
General. The accusations were serious: Oleinik not only repeated his assertions that
Ambartsumyan’s claims concerning the bribery of party and government of cials had
not been checked, but he even added that attempts had been made to conceal these
infractions:
The investigations concerning the cases of Ambartsumyan and the directors of Glav-
mosplodoovoshchprom were conducted at the beginning by the KGB, and then completed
by the Moscow prosecutor’s of ce. But certain statements by Ambartsumyan concerning
bribery of party and government of cials were not investigated. These materials were, in
practice, concealed. Moreover, N. N. Sirotkin, the former head of the Investigative Depart-
ment of Russia’s Prosecutor General, issued a directive, which was not in compliance with
the law, prohibiting criminal proceedings against some of cials accused by Ambar-
tsumyan. 66
Oleinik wrote: ‘I consider it profoundly inhumane to continue the interrogation of a

person awaiting execution’.67 To Rekunkov’s assertions that ‘Ambartsumyan’s sen-
tence is legitimate because he was involved in many cases of corruption …’68 Oleinik
replied: ‘That is incorrect. Ambartsumyan simply cooperated with the police, reveal-
ing all his crimes, contrary to the other of cials arrested …’.69 He blamed his
superiors for accepting the death penalty for Ambartsumyan, who was ‘only an
instrument in this organised system of corruption’.70 He added that it was unaccept-
able to impose the death sentence only in this case, when others had committed worse
crimes.71 Oleinik wrote that Rekunkov had acted ‘illegally’ when he rescinded a
previous decision to check Ambartsumyan’s allegations concerning bribery and to
study the request to reprieve him.72 He concluded that the Prosecutor General was
opposed to the principles of perestroika and that under such circumstances he saw no
other choice than to offer his resignation.73
A few days later, on 18 November, Oleinik and Burtsev took the initiative of
sending a letter to the Russian Deputy Prosecutor General asking for the postpone-
ment of Ambartsumyan’s execution. The letter was more moderate than the one
1324 LUC DUHAMEL
addressed to Rekunkov. It was written in legal form in an attempt to convince the

Deputy Prosecutor General with legal arguments. The request was not to cancel the
death penalty for Ambartsumyan but merely to postpone his execution. After
Rekunkov refused to cancel the death penalty, the two prosecutors hoped a more
modest request would be accepted. They expected more support from the Russian
Prosecutor General’s Of ce—where they worked—than from the Soviet Prosecutor
General’s Of ce.
Oleinik and Burtsev took up Ambartsumyan’s defence. They claimed that his
refusal to testify against certain high-level of cials was understandable, since he
could legitimately think that such testimony would accelerate his execution. They also
emphasised Ambartsumyan’s illegal treatment during his incarceration and interroga-
tion. The pressure tactics used on him could explain the contradictions in his
testimony. The two prosecutors demanded that he be questioned once again and
promised that irregularities that had occurred in the case would not be repeated: ‘…
In the case of a person who has been sentenced to the death penalty and is awaiting
execution, evidence can be accepted only if the methods of investigation have nothing
to do with illegal methods of obtaining testimony’.74
Finally, the two prosecutors made their main request: ‘This work necessitates no
less than two months of interrogations, confrontations and veri cation of docu-
ments’.75
The prosecutors obtained authorisation to question a key person, Kolomeitsev. His
superiors and accomplices were Kholod and Polyakov, both USSR Deputy Ministers
of Fruit and Vegetables. The prosecutors were convinced that these of cials had made
the biggest pro ts on the black market, but they needed more evidence to prove it.
They also believed that the of cials could eventually provide them with information
compromising other high-ranking party and government of cials.
On 25 November a confrontation was organised between Kolomeitsev and Ambar-
tsumyan. Accused of economic infractions, Ambartsumyan spoke like a reformer
denouncing Soviet trade: ‘A deep-rooted tradition exists in this system, do you
understand it? You have to pay your boss, you had to pay before me and after me you
will have to pay’.76 More so than in his previous testimony, he presented himself as
a victim of the Soviet system, a victim of extortion by high-ranking of cials:
They looked at our base, ate, drank and took things. There were orders to receive
delegations, but they did not know how to do it … the Deputy Minister Ivanov came …
another one who came was Ivanov, the boss of the administration of fruit and vegetables.
Tutuchkin, the head of the All-Union of ce of imported fruit and vegetables, also came.
They all came … They simply tormented me, they tormented me. To feed them, I had to
get things somewhere and I could not nd them in the sky. I was obliged to take bribes in
order to feed these crooks …77
Furthermore, he severely criticised the nomenklatura and even the Communist Party:
… at the fruit and vegetables of ce in the Dzerzhinsky district there was extortion from
above. You must give to the Moscow Party committee, here and there you must give, you
must give to Glavtorg and you must give to Glavmosplodoovoshchprom. The result of all
this is that I became the scapegoat, and they have to execute me to re-establish order in the
trade network.78
Ambartsumyan and the reform-minded prosecutors seemed to have reached a tacit

agreement. If Ambartsumyan had been a model executive in the Grishin era, for the
prosecutors he became more a martyr than a victim of the Soviet system. He suffered
considerable infringement of his rights after his arrest. Before 1985 Ambartsumyan’s
conditions of detention may have seemed ‘normal’ according to Soviet standards, but
they became unacceptable during perestroika. The prosecutors emphasised Ambar-
tsumyan’ honourable past and heroism during World War II. He was regarded as an
outstanding manager even by his enemies.79 The prosecutors promised to do their
utmost to save his life and to improve his lot. In return, Ambartsumyan cooperated
increasingly with the law enforcement agencies. He had repented to the point of
giving back 200 000 rubles received illegally. He emphasised that he had already
provided enough evidence to convict many of cials.80 Most signi cant for the
prosecutors was that he could incriminate additional, and even more in uential,
of cials. An investigator said of a conversation he had with Ambartsumyan shortly
after his confrontation with Kolomeitsev:
… Kolomeitsev is not the most important of cial to whom Ambartsumyan gave bribes.
There are more important people. Because of that, Ambartsumyan believed that these
high-ranking of cials to whom he had given bribes were aware that he could testify about
their criminal activities. They were interested in his death and wanted him executed as soon
as possible.81
Therefore, before giving further testimony, Ambartsumyan wanted assurances that he

would live:
Ambartsumyan asked me to tell you, Vladimir Ivanovich, that you should not be indignant
about his refusal to sign the report on the confrontation between him and Kolomeitsev. It
must be connected with his physical and psychological condition, because he does not know
whether he will be shot.82
To the Prosecutor General’s Of ce, Ambartsumyan’s criticism of the Communist

Party and the nomenklatura was unacceptable and provided a good excuse for
executing him without further delay. His last statements could only be interpreted
there as an opportunistic tactic to please his prosecutors and secure a positive answer
to his requests. Furthermore, Ambartsumyan asked the prosecutors to send a letter to
El’tsin, perhaps the man most hated by the elite, asking that the death sentence
imposed on him be overturned. The Prosecutor General also feared that Ambar-
tsumyan would accuse more party leaders if he remained alive.
To agree with reformist prosecutors concerning the type of evidence allowed
against party of cials could be devastating for the nomenklatura. Practices such as
giving free packages lled with delicacies to party and government of cials while
they were on holiday were widespread in the Soviet Union; thus, many members of
the nomenklatura elsewhere in the country could also face charges. Furthermore,
Ambartsumyan’s testimony created the impression that the elite was not only
dishonest but also immoral.83
In addition, the Prosecutor General doubted the good intentions of the leaders of
the anti-corruption brigade. How could these prosecutors, who had arrested thousands
of employees of trade agencies and were accused of sending many people to labour
1326 LUC DUHAMEL
camps without suf cient evidence, suddenly decide to defend an executive who
admitted to having received considerable bribes? Rekunkov decided to postpone
Ambartsumyan’s execution no longer, even if it meant contradicting the directive he
had recently written allowing the investigation to continue until 1 January 1987.
El’tsin did not try to save Ambartsumyan. He was interested more in the testimony
than in the individual; at the end of 1986 Ambartsumyan had already given all the
evidence he could to discredit El’tsin’s opponents. For El’tsin, who had denounced
the venality in Soviet society, Ambartsumyan was only one executive among many
who had committed major economic crimes and who deserved severe punishment.
During this time El’tsin was rst and foremost a communist of cial and only then a
reformer, and he would not, whatever the reason, defend Ambartsumyan after his
frontal attacks on the Communist Party and the Soviet system.
The campaign against corruption did not achieve Andropov’ s objectives. The
Soviet system was not improved; it was destroyed less than 10 years later. Andropov
did not realise how widespread the corruption was. In the Moscow trade agencies the
repression of thousands of employees arrested or accused had dysfunctional effects on
the Soviet system. Even the conservative elite criticised the authorities over the
repression. The main consequence of the criticism, coming from the liberals as well
as the conservatives, was to considerably weaken the law enforcement agencies.
Ambartsumyan made a signi cant contribution to the pro-El’tsin forces with his
testimony, which tended to prove that high-ranking party and government of cials
were involved in corruption. Ambartsumyan’s testimony helped the democrats dis-
credit the Communist Party and build considerable support in public opinion.
Particularly within the judicial system, his testimony promoted the cause of the
pro-El’tsin forces, providing them with arguments and ammunition to challenge the
preponderantly conservative forces in this crucial sector. But Ambartsumyan’s coop-
eration with the reformist prosecutors did not save him, since his harsh criticism of
the Soviet system was unacceptable to reformers and conservatives alike. This group
included even apparatchiki such as El’tsin, who at that time espoused a radicalism
aimed at saving the Soviet system rather than overthrowing it.
University of Montreal
1
Access to primary sources was possible thanks to one former senior of cial from the Russian
Prosecutor General’s of ce who was involved in the Ambartsumyan case. Studies on corruption in
the Soviet Union did exist, beginning in the 1970s, with John H. Kramer, who analysed the effects
of corruption on the Soviet political system in ‘Political Corruption in the USSR’, Western Political
Quarterly, 30, 2, 1977, pp. 213–225. In the 1980s we have Nick Lambert, ‘Law and Order in the
USSR: the Case of Economic and Of cial Crime’, Soviet Studies, 36, 3, 1984, pp. 366–385 and F.
J. M. Felbrudge, ‘Government and Shadow Economy in the Soviet Union’, Soviet Studies, 36, 4,
1984, pp. 528–543. The most recent and original contribution —at least in methodology of research—
is Ase B. Grodeland, Tatyana Koshechkina & William L. Miller, ‘Foolish to Give and Yet More
Foolish Not to Take; In Depth Interviews with Post Communist Citizens in Their Everyday Use of
Bribes and Contacts’, Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 4, 1998, pp. 651–677.
2
If there are many analyses of the approach to corruption, we cannot say the same about the
ght against corruption. One of the few scholars, if not the only one, to have studied this question
deeply in the ex-communist countries is Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corrup-
tion Campaigns and Legitimisation Crisis (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993). One reason for this is that
not many studies have concentrated on the role of law enforcement agencies in ghting corruption
in Soviet Russia. This could be explained by the fact that a literature existed mainly on the KGB, but
it focuses on its activities against the dissidents or its espionage in foreign countries.
3
Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain, translated from the Russian by Michael Glenny (London,
Jonathan Cape, 1990), p. 91.
4
Holmes, The End of Communist Power, p. 223.
5
Moskovskaya Pravda, 12 September 1986, p. 5.
6
‘Zayavlenie ot podsledstvennogo V. K. Roslyakova nachal’niku Sledstvennogo otdela up-
ravleniya KGB po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti podpolkovniku A. V. Tro movu’, 15 May 1983,
p. 4. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
7
‘Spravka o nekotorykh prichinakh i usloviyakh, sposobstvovavshikh razrastaniyu v
moskovskoi torgovle prestupnykh posyagatel’ stv na sotsialisticheskuyu sobstvennost’ , vzyatoch-
nichestva, korystnykh zloupotreblenii dolzhnostnym polozheniem v period 1969–1983 godov’, July
1986, pp. 2–3. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme
torgovli g. Moskvy.
8
According to Vladimir Oleinik, ‘Tezisy. Mysli po povodu polozheniya, v kotorom my okazalis’
i perezhivaem na rubezhe 86 g.’, Zakonnost’ i predvaritel’ noe sledstvie, March 1986, pp. 1–3. GARF,
Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
9
Ibid., p. 3.
10
‘Zayavlenie ot podsledstvennogo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana nachal’niku Sledstvennogo
otdela UKGB SSSR po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti A. V. Tro movu, st. sledovatelyu po OVD
UKGB po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti V. I. Bunakovu’ , 11 July 1983, p. 1. GARF, Prokuratura
RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
11
‘Zayavlenie ot podsledstvennogo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana nachal’niku Sledstvennogo
otdela UKGB SSSR po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti A. Tro movu’, 21 June 1983, pp. 2–6. ‘V
dopolnenie k zayavleniyu ot 21 iyunya 1983’, pp. 2–10. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela,
delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
12
‘Postanovlenie o vydelenii materialov iz ugolovnogo dela’, 10 January 1985. GARF, Proku-
ratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
13
Ibid.
14
Pravda, 17 April 1983, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXXV, 16, 1983, pp. 18–19.
15
Ibid., p. 18.
16
‘Spravka o sostoyanii rassledovaniya materialov ugolovnogo dela, vydelennogo v otdel’noe
proizvodstvo iz dela Glavtorga v otnoshenii dolzhnostnykh lits kontroliruyushchikh, sovetskikh i
partiinykh organov’ , 13 November 1986, pp. 1–2. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo
Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
17
‘Spravka po delu o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy’, L. Volk, sledovatel’
sledstvennoi brigady prokuratury RSFSR, pp. 1–3. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo
o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
18
More precisely, according to Rossiiskie vesti, 27 April 1995, p. 1, from 1980 to 1984 criminal
proceedings were instigated against 15 065 persons working in the trade organisations, including
2121 executives.
19
‘Spravka po delu o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy’, L. Volk, sledovatel’
sledstvennoi brigady prokuratury RSFSR, pp. 1–2. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo
o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
20
Vladimir Oleinik, ‘Spravka. Dopolneniya k analizu otdel’nykh yavlenii, obstoyatel’ stv, pro-
yavivshikhsya v kontse 1985 goda i v 1986 godu po nastoyashchee vremya’, 12 May 1986, p. 1.
GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
21
Ibid., pp. 1–2.
22
Ibid., p. 2.
23
Reported by Vladimir Oleinik, ‘Spravka’, 1988, p. 8. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye
dela, delo o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., p. 4.
27
Ibid., p. 6.
28
Among them were Gulin, Tro mov, Shalaev, Matveenko, Sharapov and Put’ko, reported by
Oleinik, ‘Spravka. Dopolneniya k analizu otdel’nykh yavlenii, obstoyatel’ stv, proyavivshikhsya v
kontse 1985 goda i v 1986 godu po nastoyashchee vremya’, 12 May 1986, p. 6. GARF, Prokuratura
RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
29
Ibid., p. 2.
30
Ibid.
1328 LUC DUHAMEL
31
Ibid.
32
V. Kravtsev, ‘Zayavlenie Zamestitelyu prokurora RSFSR, gosudarstvennomu sovetniku yusti-
tsii 3 klassa B. Namestnikovu’, 4 October 1985. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo
33
Ibid.
34
‘Zayavlenie ot osuzhdennogo Mkhitara Ambartsumyana’ , 25 October 1984. GARF, Proku-
ratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
35
‘When they required that I name the people I had given bribes to, they told me that I would
not be held criminally responsible for the infractions. In fact, I was sentenced to 15 years in prison
for bribery’ (shortly afterwards Ambartsumyan received the death penalty). ‘Prodolzhenie pokazanii
svidetelem M. Ambartsumyanom’ , 16 December 1985, p. 3. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye
dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
36
‘Postanovlenie ob otkaze o vozbuzhdenii ugolovnogo dela’, st. prokuror sledstvennoi chasti
Prokuratury RSFSR Sheremet’ev, 28 March 1986, p. 4. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela,
delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
37
Ibid., p. 3.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
‘Spravka o sostoyanii rassledovaniya materialov ugolovnogo dela, vydelenogo v otdel’noe
proizvodsto iz dela Glavtorga v otnoshenii dolzhnostnykh lits kontroliruyushchikh, sovetskikh i
partiinykh organov’ , 13 November 1986, p. 1. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo
42
Vladimir Oleinik & Y. Burtsev, ‘Raport v Prokuraturu gosudarstvenomu sovetniku yustitsii 2
klassa S. Emel’yanovu’, 20 October 1986, p. 1. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo
43
On the hostility of Grishin toward Gorbachev, see Novyi Vzglyad, 1992, 37, p.1.
44
For more information on Grishin and Tregubov see ibid.
45
Yeltsin, Against the Grain, p. 91.
46
Pravda, 27 February 1986, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXXVIII, 9, 1986, p.4.
47
‘Spravka’, 1986–1988, p. 1. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A.
Ambartsumyana.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid., p. 2.
51
‘Do i posle prigovora’ , April 1986, p. 6. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo o
vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
52
Ibid., p. 6.
53
Ibid., p. 21.
54
For more information on this affair see Zhores Medvedev, Andropov (Oxford, Blackwell,
1983), pp. 139–140.
55
‘Delo po uk-pi 83–11’, Verkhovnyi Sud RSFSR, 12 November 1984, p. 4. GARF, Prokuratura
RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Yurya K. Sokolova.
56
B. Kuznetsov, ‘Spravka o doprosakh Ambartsumyana v nastoyashchee vremya i o poka-
zaniyakh lits, na kotorykh on ssylaetsya’ , October 1986, p. 3. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye
dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
57
A. Rekunkov, ‘Po delu Ambartsumyana’ , October 1986, p. 2. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR,
ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
61
A. Rekunkov, ‘Po delu Ambartsumyana’ , October 1986, p. 2. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR,
62
Moscow News, 24 September 1986, p.2.
63
Vladimir Oleinik, ‘Spravka, Dopolneniya k analizu otdel’nykh yavlenii, obstoyatel’ stv, pro-
yavivshikhsya v kontse 1985 goda i v 1986 godu po nastoyashchee vremya’, 12 May 1986, p. 6.
GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo o vzyatochnichestve v sisteme torgovli g. Moskvy.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
67
Ibid., p. 2.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
‘Raport Prokuroru RSFSR, gosudarstvennomu sovetniku yustitsii 2 klassa S. Emel’yanovu’,
20 November 1986, p. 3. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambart-
sumyana.
75
Ibid.
76
‘Stenogramma ochnoi stavki mezhdu Ambartsumyanom Mkhitarom Adamovichem i
Kolomeitsevym Ivanom Nikolaevichem (Moskva, 17 November 1986)’, p. 2. GARF, Prokuratura
RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambartsumyana.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
For example, on the KGB high assessment of Ambartsumyan as a manager see Georgii
Dolgov, ‘Gnil’, Kriminal, 1991, 1, p. 38.
80
Ambartsumyan declared: ‘I said more to the investigators than what the investigators
expected’ . B. Kuznetsov, ‘Spravka o doprosakh Ambartsumyana v nastoyashchee vremya i o
pokaznykh lits, na kotorykh on ssylaetsya’ , October 1986, p. 1. GARF, Prokuratura, RSFSR,
81
‘Raport zamestitelyu nachal’nika sledstvennoi chasti prokuratury RSFSR, starshemu sovetniku
yustitsii V. Oleiniku ot V. Andreeva, sledovatelya sledstvennoi brigady Prokuratury RSFSR’, 26
November 1986, p. 2. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Mkhitara A. Ambart-
sumyana.
82
Ambartsumyan appealed to Vladimir Oleinik; see ibid, p. 3.
83
In his testimony, Ambartsumyan insisted on how alcoholism, laziness and lechery were
widespread among the nomenklatura. For example, see ‘Zayavlenie ot podsledstvennogo Mkhitara A.
Ambartsumyana nachal’niku Sledstvennogo otdela UKGB SSSR po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti
A. V. Tro muvu, st. sledovatelyu po OVD UKGB po g. Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti V. I.
Bunakovu’ , 21 June 1983, pp. 2–14. GARF, Prokuratura RSFSR, ugolovnye dela, delo Ambart-
sumyana.

Justice and Politics in Moscow 1983-1986: The Ambartsumyan Case

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Justice and Politics in Moscow 1983-1986: The Ambartsumyan Case

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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 52, No.

Justice and Politics in Moscow 1983–1986:

bureaucracy may provoke a hostile reaction, leading to a serious crisis of legitimacy

Ambartsumyan’s testimony and its threat to the Soviet political system

TREPELKIN M. YA. refrigerator n. 1—1000 rubles monthly 12000

Of cials of the Moscow Party committee

Secretaries of Dzerzhinsky and Babushkin district Party committees

Of cials of the Moscow Soviet

Of cials of the Moscow Soviet executive committee

Chairmen of district Soviet executive committees

Executives of Moscow Fruit and Vegetables Of ce (Glavmosplodoovshchprom)

Of cials of district Internal Affairs (MVD) sections

Source: ‘Zayavlenie ot podsledstvennogo Mkhitara Adamovicha Ambartsumyana k nachal’niku sledstven-

The directors of Glavmosplodoovoshchprom, Ural’tsev, Pospelov and others, Ambart-

The impact of perestroika on the campaign against corruption

New disagreements in the law enforcement agencies concerning the Ambartsumyan

Ambartsumyan had provided information on the bribes he had given to leaders of

prosecutors also attacked the support by artists and intellectuals of prosecuted

Ambartsumyan’s testimony, including that concerning convicted and former directors of

The impact of the Ambartsumyan case on perestroika: revolt of reformist prosecutors

Oleinik wrote: ‘I consider it profoundly inhumane to continue the interrogation of a

addressed to Rekunkov. It was written in legal form in an attempt to convince the

Ambartsumyan and the reform-minded prosecutors seemed to have reached a tacit

Therefore, before giving further testimony, Ambartsumyan wanted assurances that he

To the Prosecutor General’s Of ce, Ambartsumyan’s criticism of the Communist

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Of cials of the Moscow Party committee

Of cials of the Moscow Soviet

Of cials of the Moscow Soviet executive committee

Executives of Moscow Fruit and Vegetables Of ce (Glavmosplodoovshchprom)

Of cials of district Internal Affairs (MVD) sections

To the Prosecutor General’s Of ce, Ambartsumyan’s criticism of the Communist