G.R. No.

193890 March 11, 2015

ESTANISLAO and AFRICA SINAMBAN vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

FACTS:
Danilo and Magdalena Manalastas (spouses Manalastas) executed a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) in favor of respondent China Banking Corporation over two of their real estate properties
in order to secure a loan from Chinabank the amount of P700,000.00, as working capital in their
rice milling business. During the next few years, they executed several amendments to the
mortgage contract progressively increasing their credit line secured by the aforesaid mortgage. The
spouses Manalastas executed several promissory notes (PNs) in favor of Chinabank. In two of the
promissory notes issued, petitioners Estanislao and Africa Sinamban (spouses Sinamban) signed
as co-makers. Chinabank, then, filed a Complaint for a sum of money against spouses Manalastas
and spouses Sinamban, before the RTC. The complaint alleged that they failed to comply with
their loan obligations. Spouses Sinamban averred that they do not recall having executed two
promissory notes and had no participation in the execution of one of the promissory notes. They,
however, admitted that they signed some promissory notes forms as co-makers upon the request
of spouses Manalastas who are their relatives; however they insisted that they derived no money
or other benefits from the loans. They denied knowing about the mortgage security provided by
the spouses Manalastas, or that the latter defaulted on their loans. Chinabank held an extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, giving the mortgaged lands to the highest bid of P4,600,000.00. The
Sinambans also refused to acknowledge the loan deficiency of P1,758,427.87 on the PNs, insisting
that the mortgage collateral was worth more than P10,000,000.00, enough to answer for all the
loans, interests and penalties. They also claimed that they were not notified of the auction sale, and
insisted that Chinabank manipulated the foreclosure sale to exclude them therefrom. By way of
counterclaim, the Spouses Sinamban prayed for damages and attorney's fees of 25%, plus
litigation expenses and costs of suit
Issue:
Whether or not Chinabank can seek payment of the deficiencies from spouses Sinamban
who, in the promissory notes, appeared to be solidary debtors.
Ruling:
Yes because if a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions
of Articles 1207 to 1222 of the Civil Code on joint and solidary obligations shall be observed.
Thus, where there is a concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and
the same obligation, Article 1207 provides that among them, "There is a solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires
solidarity." It is settled that when the obligor or obligors undertake to be "jointly and severally"
liable, it means that the obligation is solidary. In this case, the spouses Sinamban expressly bound
themselves to be jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable with the principal makers of the
promissory notes, namely the spouses Manalastas. Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that
"[t]he creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."
Article 1252 42 of the Civil Code does not apply, as urged by the petitioners, because in the said
article the situation contemplated is that of a debtor with several debts due, whereas the reverse is
true, with each solidary debt imputable to several debtors.
GV Florida Transport, Inc., Petitioner v Heirs of Romeo L. Battung
GR No. 208802, October 14, 2015

FACTS:
Battung boarded the bus of petitioner in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila. He was
seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the bus reached the
Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and
alighted to check the tires. At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood
up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified
Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was pronounced
dead on arrival. Hence, respondents filed a complaint on July 15, 2008 for damages in the
aggregate amount of P1,826,000.00 based on a breach of contract of carriage against petitioner,
Duplio, and Baraoay, before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103.

Respondents argued that as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety and security of passengers; and in case of
injuries and/or death on the part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at fault and, thus, should
be held responsible. As such, petitioner, et al. should be held civilly liable for Battung's death.

In their defense, petitioner, et al, maintained that they had exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law from common carriers. In this relation, they claimed that a
common carrier is not an absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung's death should
be properly deemed a fortuitous event. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, as
well as the payment of their counterclaims for damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable for damages arising from culpa contractual

RULING: No.

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Article 1755 of the
Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance, and precaution in the carriage of
passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances.
Where the injury sustained by the passenger was (1) in no way due to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the common
carrier and its employees with respect to the foregoing -- such as when the injury arises wholly
from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent-
there would be no issue regarding the common carrier’s negligence in its duty to provide safe and
suitable care, as well as competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the
presumption of fault or negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not apply.