International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN 2328-2134) Volume 6, Number 3,2018

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 6, Number 3, March 2018 (Serial Number 54)
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★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar); Poland);
★Abosede Omowumi Bababtunde (National Open ★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
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★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New Public Policy, Singapore);
Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of ★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Taranaki, New Zealand); Ukraine, Ukraine);
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany); ★Raymond LAU (The University of Queensland,
★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK); Australia);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA); ★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
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★Giuseppe Caforio (Torino University, Italy); ★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,Greece);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia); ★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan); Canada, Canada);
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International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 6, Number 3, March 2018 (Serial Number 54)
Contents
National Identity
National Identity as a Useful Tool for Setting Limits to European Integration 143
Danuta Kabat-Rudnicka
Economic Sanctions
Economic Sanctions: A Political, Economic, and Normative Analysis 152

Rachael Gosnell
Regional International Environmental Law
ASEAN Commitment to Sustainable Development in the Regional International

Environmental Law Perspective 171
Andreas Pramudianto
Tourism Development of Vietnam
Tourism With the Integration and Development of Vietnam—Southeast Asia 188

Huynh Quoc Thang
Southeast Asian Regional Economic Integration
Political and Economic Analysis of Southeast Asian Regional Economic Integration

Under China’s Rise-From Taiwan’s Perspective View 195
Rachel Sun, Shang-Yung Yen
International Relations and Diplomacy, March 2018, Vol. 6, No. 3, 143-151
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.03.001
D DAVID PUBLISHING
National Identity as a Useful Tool for Setting Limits to European

Integration
Danuta Kabat-Rudnicka
University of Economics, Cracow, Poland
The European Union law, a new order of international law, permeates the legal orders of the Member States,
binding not only states but also citizens. However, this permeation of the European Union law into the
constitutional orders of the Member States is not unconditional. One of the limits is the national identity,
understood as the constitutional identity. In legal terms, the concept of national identity is narrower than the one,
characteristic for the national tradition. And it is the constitutional identity that shapes the relationship between the
European Union and the Member States. The purpose of this study is to show the relationship between the
European Union legal order and legal (constitutional) orders of the Member States. It will focus on such aspects as:
national and constitutional identity, the concept of national identity shaped by the case law of the European Court
of Justice and the significance of constitutional identity in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts.
Keywords: national identity, constitutional identity, constitutional courts, Court of Justice, EU
Introductory Remarks
The European Union (hereinafter: EU) is an international organization of a special and a unique character.
It is characterized by its own legal order followed by the case law of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter:
ECJ/Court), common institutions, and a well-established value system. It guarantees fundamental freedoms and
rights of individuals, but first and foremost, it is a new and an autonomous legal order whose subjects are not
only states but also citizens. However, an ever deeper integration does not change the fact that these are the
Member States that are masters of the treaties. States—the high contracting parties, not only established the
Communities (and then the Union), but they also advanced integration processes when amending the
constituting treaties. So, these are the Member States that play the key role in deepening integration processes,
states with their political systems, institutions, values, legal traditions, and political cultures as well as
constitutions and constitutional courts whose task is to maintain the states’ constitutional orders.
Principles underlying the EU legal order, along with the principles developed by the ECJ, enable the
permeation of EU law into the legal orders of the Member States, thus making EU law a part of national legal
orders. According to the ECJ Community law (now EU law) which is supreme, i.e. it is not confined to the very
primacy, what in turn leads to collisions between EU law and laws of the Member States (including
constitutions), respectively to the clash between the ECJ and the constitutional courts of the Member States.
The ECJ justifies its decisions while referring to the necessity to ensure the uniform application of EU law,
Danuta Kabat-Rudnicka, dr rer. pol. habil, dr iur., professor, Economics and International Relations, University of Economics,
Cracow, Poland.
144 NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A USEFUL TOOL FOR SETTING LIMITS
whereas the constitutional courts claim that national constitutions enjoy the highest status and their task is to
guarantee the right implementation of constitutional provisions, thus setting limits to an uncontrolled
permeation of EU law into national legal orders. Initially, constitutional courts referred to the need to maintain
the right standard of protection of fundamental rights in the Communities (then in the EU), which would
correspond to the level of protection inherent to the Member States, whereas later the constitutional courts
challenged ultra vires acts of the EU institutions, and recently, they more and more refer to national identities
in the meaning of constitutional identities.
National identity on the EU ground has a slightly different meaning than the one, national traditions
prescribe. It is understood as a constitutional identity and shapes the relationship between the EU and the
Member States legal orders. However, what makes the national identity so often raised by the Member States is
the fact that national identity, in the meaning of an inviolate core of the Member States’ constitutions, is a
commitment the EU has assumed for itself 1.
The main objective of this study is to show the way the EU and national courts refer to the concept of
national identity what in turn shapes the relationship between the EU legal order and legal (constitutional)
orders of the Member States. For the purpose of this study, the following thesis has been adopted: The broad
meaning of national identity makes it a useful formula, enabling the Member States to effectively protect their
constitutional values, while setting limits for an uncontrolled permeation of EU law into national legal orders.
Protecting States’ Constitutional Foundations

States participating in integration processes, on the one hand, agree on joint exercise of competencies and
authority (even transfer or “renunciation” of some sovereign rights), whilst on the other, they are making efforts
to ensure that EU law does not enter an area exclusively reserved for them, in other words, they want to
maintain their constitutional foundations. In order to protect constitutional foundations, states developed ways
or what can be referred to as material anchors of judicial protection of states’ constitutional foundations to
which belong: sovereignty, fundamental rights, and constitutional identity (Wójtowicz, 2012, p. 103). Moreover,
the Member States are relying on the principle of attributed powers when questioning the ultra vires acts of the
EU institutions.
As just said, one of the anchors of judicial protection of states’ constitutional foundations is constitutional
identity. According to the Advocate General (hereinafter: AG), Miguel Poiares Maduro national identity
comprises constitutional identity of the Member States, what has been confirmed in art. I-5 of the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe and in art. 4 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU) as
amended by the Lisbon Treaty (hereinafter: TL), which states that the Union respects national identities of the
Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political, and constitutional. What is more, the EU is
obliged to respect constitutional identity of the Member States, an obligation, which has existed from the outset
and which forms part of the very essence of the European project, and which consists of following the path of
integration while maintaining the political existence of the states 2. And if respect for constitutional identity of
1
Cf. opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 8 October 2008 in Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio
Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias, case C-213/07 (2008) ECR I-09999, where in par. 31 we can read: “(…) European
Union is obliged to respect the constitutional identity of the Member States”, and in par. 32: “The Court has, indeed, expressly
recognised that the preservation of national identity ‘is a legitimate aim respected by the Community legal order’”.
2
Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias, case C-213/07 (2008) ECR I-09999, par. 31.
NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A USEFUL TOOL FOR SETTING LIMITS 145
the Member States can constitute a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the
obligations imposed by Community law (now EU law), it can all the more be relied upon by a Member State to
justify its assessment of constitutional measures; however, the respect owed to the constitutional identity of the
Member States cannot be understood as an absolute obligation to defer to all national constitutional rules, and
just as Community law takes the national constitutional identity of the Member States into consideration,
national constitutional law must be adapted to the requirements of the Community legal order 3.
According to Massimo La Torre, respect for national constitutional identities implies the assumption that
there is a European constitutional law and that such law is built upon national constitutional laws (Torre, 2014,
p. 423); what is more, national constitutional identity offers a shield with which to protect national constitutions
from self-generated integrative pressures (Torre, 2014, pp. 423-424). Constitutional identity can be understood
as the recognition of cultural and national distinctiveness by way of reflection on fundamental rights inherent to
a given society (Zirk-Sadowski, 2012). In turn, national identity not only refers to culture, language, or customs,
but is linked up to the state identity that results from the very existence of the state as a distinct entity
(Wójtowicz, 2012, p. 118).
Constitutional identity is a narrower concept than national identity, since it refers to the constitutional
values and state structures, whereas national identity comprises original, one can say pre-constitutional values
and/or elements, such as common language, customs, history, etc. In other words, on the one hand, we are
dealing with the civic whereas on the other with the ethnic concept of the nation.
National Identity Under EU Law

As has already been mentioned, respect for national identities in the meaning of constitutional identities is
now a commitment under EU law. For the first time, the reference to national identity was made in the Treaty
of Maastricht in art. F (1) TEU which says that the Union shall respect national identities of its Member States
whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy. And now, the relevant provision is
provided for in art. 4 (2) TEU (Lisbon), which states that the Union shall respect the equality of member states
before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional, inclusive of regional, and local self-government. Similar wording contains the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: CFR/Charter) where in the preamble we can read that the Union contributes
to the preservation and the development of common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and
traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organization
of their public authorities at national, regional, and local levels.
Leonard Besselink draws our attention to the fact that national identity does not necessarily coincide with
the identity of the state and the wordy formulation, which can be found in the TL emphasizes the political and
constitutional aspects (Besselink, 2010). So, to the extent that the TL focuses on state structures, there is a shift
in emphasis from national to constitutional identity (ibid.). Besselink also pays attention to the fact that the
provision of art. 4 (2) TEU qualifies the primacy rule of EU law and modifies the case law under Costa vs.
ENEL—the exception to the primacy of EU law (or precisely to the supremacy rule), which seems to be
restricted to issues of constitutional identity, what in turn suggests that constitutional provisions which are not
fundamental and hence do not contribute to the very identity of the constitution do not share in that privileged
3
Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias, case C-213/07 (2008) ECR I-09999, par. 33.
position vis-à-vis EU law (ibid.).

As just said, clarification (or rather explanation) of the meaning of the concept of national identity is the
task left to the ECJ. In the 1989 ruling, the ECJ observed that although Irish is not spoken by the whole Irish
population, the policy followed by Irish governments for many years has been designed not only to maintain
but also to promote the use of Irish as a means of expressing national identity and culture 4. The Court added
that the European Economic Community Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the protection
and promotion of a language of a Member State, which is both the national language and the first official
language, however, the implementation of such a policy must not encroach upon a fundamental freedom, such
as that of the free movement of workers, so the requirements deriving from measures intended to implement
such a policy must not in any circumstances be disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued and the manner
in which they are applied must not bring about discrimination against nationals of other Member States 5.
On the issue of national identity, the ECJ has also commented in the 1996 ruling. In the proceedings
before the Court, the government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg maintained that teachers must be
Luxembourg nationals in order to transmit traditional values and that in view of the size of the country and its
specific demographic situation, the nationality requirement is an essential condition for preserving
Luxembourg’s national identity 6. In turn, the Court observed that whilst the preservation of the Member States’
national identities is a legitimate aim respected by the Community legal order, the interest pleaded by the Grand
Duchy can, even in such particularly sensitive areas as education, still be effectively safeguarded otherwise
than by a general exclusion of nationals from other Member States 7, so the protection of national identity
cannot justify exclusion of nationals of other Member States from all the posts in an area, such as education
with the exception of those involving direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by
public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the state or of other public authorities 8.
As well on the issue of national identity, the ECJ has commented in the 2010 ruling. This time, it was the
Austrian government, which maintained that the provisions on the abolition of the nobility are intended to
protect the constitutional identity of the Republic of Austria, hence the law, even if it is not an element of the
republican principle which underlies the federal constitutional law, constitutes a fundamental decision in favour
of the formal equality of treatment of all citizens before the law 9. In this case, the Court shared the view of the
Austrian government and ruled that in the context of Austrian constitutional history, the law on the abolition of
the nobility, as an element of national identity, may be taken into consideration when a balance is struck
between legitimate interests and the right of free movement of persons recognised under EU law 10.
4
Judgment of the Court of 28 November 1989, Anita Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational
Educational Committee, case C-379/87, ECR (1989) 03967, par. 18.
5
Judgment of the Court of 28 November 1989, Anita Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational
Educational Committee, case C-379/87, ECR (1989) 03967, par. 19.
6
Judgment of the Court of 2 July 1996, Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, case C-473/93,
ECR (1996) I-03207, par. 32.
7
ECR (1996) I-03207, par. 35.
8
ECR (1996) I-03207, par. 36.
9
Judgment of the Court of 22 December 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, case C-208/09, ECR
(2010) I-13693, par. 74.
10
Judgment of the Court of 22 December 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, case C-208/09, ECR
(2010) I-13693, par. 83.
It must be clearly stated that national identity does not enjoy absolute protection under EU law but has to
be balanced against the principle of uniform application of EU law—the task that rests both on the ECJ and the
national constitutional courts as a part of a system of composite constitutional adjudication (Bogdandy & Schill,
2011, p. 1420).
Constitutional Identity in the Constitutional Courts’ Judgements

As has been said, the Member States, or more precisely, the constitutional courts, refer to constitutional
identity rather than to national identity. For the first time, the issue of constitutional identity was taken up by
the French Constitutional Council (hereinafter: CC) in the 2006 decision. The CC then said that the
transposition of a directive cannot run counter to a rule or a principle inherent to the constitutional identity of
France, except when the constituting power consents thereto 11 . So, there has been a narrowing of the
understanding of the concept of constitutional identity to the most salient or the most essential questions that
constitute the core of the constitution (Wójtowicz, 2012, p. 125). In turn, in the 2011 decision, the CC quoted a
formula already included in the 2006 decision 12 and in the 2010 decision on the priority question on
constitutional issues, the CC observed that in the absence of contestation of a rule or principle inherent to the
constitutional identity of France, the CC is not competent to control the conformity with the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of legislative provisions that are limited to the necessary consequences
of unconditional and precise provisions of the EU directive, so in such a case, only the EU court to which a
preliminary ruling has been referred to may control the conformity of the directive with the fundamental rights
guaranteed by art. 6 of the TUE 13.
On the issue of constitutional identity, it has also widely commented the German Federal Constitutional
Court (hereinafter: FCC). In the ruling on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty, the FCC observed that the
Basic Law (hereinafter: BL) grants the legislature powers to engage in a far-reaching transfer of sovereign
powers to the EU, however, the powers are granted under the condition that the sovereign statehood of a
constitutional state is maintained on the basis of an integration programme according to the principle of
conferral respecting the Member States’ constitutional identity 14. It must be said that in the German legal order,
constitutional identity is closely linked to art. 79 (3) BL, which protects the substantive core of the Constitution
from any change 15. Relying on this legal basis, the FCC claimed the right to review whether the inviolable core
content of the constitutional identity of the BL pursuant to art. 23 (1) third sentence in conjunction with art. 79
(3) of the BL is respected 16. The FCC further said that the empowerment to embark on European integration
permits a different shaping of political opinion-forming than the one determined by the BL for the German
constitutional order and this applies as far as the limit of the inviolable constitutional identity (art. 79 (3) BL) 17.
The FCC has also commented on the issue of constitutional identity in the Honeywell ruling. This time, the
FCC declared that it is empowered and even obliged to review acts of the European bodies and institutions with
11
Décision n 2006-540 DC du 27 juillet 2006 (Loi relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information),
19ème considérant.
12
Décision n 2011-631 DC du 09 juin 2011 (Loi relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité), 45ème considérant.
13
Décision n 2010-79 QPC du 17 décembre 2010 (M. Kamel D.), 3ème considérant.
14
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009 (Lissabon-Urteil), Rn 226.
15
Art. 79 (3) BL states: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation
on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible”.
16
17
regard to whether they take place on the basis of manifest transgressions of competence or on the basis of the
exercise of competence in the area of constitutional identity which is not assignable and where appropriate to
declare the inapplicability of such acts for the German legal order 18.
It should also be said that the FCC has been referring to the issue of constitutional identity in its much
earlier rulings. In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (Solange I) ruling, the FCC referred to constitutional
identity while stating that art. 24 BL nullifies any treaty amendment that would jeopardize the identity of the
existing constitutional structure, as well as that art. 24 BL does not cover the transfer of legislative powers to an
international organization, which would change the German constitutional identity, since this would require
changes to the Constitution 19. In a similar vein, the FCC has spoken up in the Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft
(Solange II) ruling. This time, the FCC referred to the limits that define the identity of the German
constitutional order. We learn from the judgment that the authorization under art. 24 (1) BL is not free from
constitutional restrictions, since this provision does not empower, by granting sovereign rights to
intergovernmental organisational entities, to nullify the identity of the existing constitutional order of the
Federal Republic of Germany 20. And as for to the recent financial crisis in the euro area, it must be said that the
FCC in the rulings concerning the financial aid for Greece 21 and the euro rescue package 22 has qualified the
budget autonomy of the German parliament as a fundamental part of the constitutional identity and declared the
Bundestag’s overall fiscal autonomy as inalienable (Huber, 2015).
In turn, the Italian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: ICC) has referred to the legal order (fundamental
constitutional principles) and the inalienable human rights, which set the limits for the interference of
Community law (now EU law) into the internal legal order. In the Frontini ruling, the ICC reserved for itself
the right to control the Community secondary law with the fundamental principles and values of the Italian
constitutional order qualifying them as norms of a higher status than the ordinary constitutional norms 23. And
though EU law may differ from ordinary constitutional provisions, supra-constitutional principles act as
counter-limits in relation to EU law, so the EU institutions cannot violate the basic principles of the Italian
constitutional order. In a similar way, this time in the Fragd ruling, the ICC set limits for the application of the
principle of primacy, which are fundamental constitutional principles and inalienable rights of individuals 24.
In turn, the Spanish Constitutional Court (hereinafter: SCC), having spoken up in 2004 on the
compatibility of the Constitutional Treaty with the Spanish Constitution, has broadened the meaning of the
integration clause materially. According to the SCC, art. 93 of the Constitution comprises impliedly also the
material limits of integration that cannot be violated which are: state sovereignty, fundamental constitutional
structures, fundamental values and principles, and above all fundamental rights 25.
On the issue of national (constitutional) identity, it has also commented the Polish Constitutional Court
(hereinafter: PCC). In the ruling on the European Arrest Warrant, the PCC emphasised that constitutional law
18
BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06 vom 6.7.2010 (Honeywell-Beschluss), Rn 55.
19
Beschluß des Zweiten Senats vom 29. Mai 1974, BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271 (Solange I), Rn 43.
20
Beschluß des Zweiten Senats vom 22. Oktober 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II), Rn 104.
21
Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 7. September 2011, 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10.
22
Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 18. März 2014, 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR
1440/12, 2 BvR 1824/12, 2 BvE 6/12.
23
Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 183/1973, 18 dicembre 1973, 9 considerato.
24
Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 232/1989, 13 aprile 1989, 3.1 considerato.
25
Declaración del Pleno del Tribunal Constitucional 1/2004, de 13 de diciembre de 2004, pkt 2 (BOE núm. 3, de 4 de enero de
2005).
cannot be ignored even if it is contrary to EU law 26. In turn, in the ruling on the constitutionality of the TL, the
PCC stated that constitutional identity is a concept which determines the scope of excluding from the
competence to confer competences the matters which constitute “the heart of the matter”, i.e., which are
fundamental to the basis of the political system of a state 27. According to the PCC, the constitutional courts
share, as a vital part of European constitutional traditions, the view that the constitution is of fundamental
significance as it reflects and guarantees the state’s sovereignty and the constitutional judiciary plays a unique
role as it regards the protection of constitutional identity of the Member States, which at the same time
determines the treaty identity of the EU 28. In the PCC’s opinion, the sovereignty of the Republic of Poland is
expressed in the inalienable competences of the organs of the state constituting the constitutional identity of the
state 29. The PCC also shares the view expressed in the doctrine that the competences under the prohibition of
conferral manifest a constitutional identity, and thus, they reflect the values the Constitution is based on 30. In
the 2013 ruling, the PCC stated that the conferral of competences should always be assessed from the point of
view of principles that shape the constitutional identity 31 and in the 2015 ruling, the PCC affirmed that
interpretation sympathetic to European law cannot lead, in any situation, to results contrary to the clear wording
of constitutional norms and impossible to agree with the minimum guarantee functions realized by the
Constitution 32.
In turn, the Czech Constitutional Court (hereinafter: CCC) in the first constitutional ruling on the TL
stated that respect for the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of the individual is the essence of the republic
and is thus beyond the reach of the constitutional legislator. The CCC also pointed out that the transfer of
powers of the Czech Republic bodies cannot go so far as to violate the very essence of the republic as a
sovereign and a democratic state governed by the rule of law, founded on respect for the rights and freedoms of
the human being and of citizens or to make a change in the essential requirements for a democratic state
governed by the rule of law 33. In a similar vein, the CCC ruled in the Slovak Pensions XVII judgment
confirming its earlier stance articulated in the Treaty of Lisbon I judgment. The CCC stated that it retains the
right to control the EU institutions in three cases: non-functioning of the institutions, protection of the material
core of the Constitution not only in relation to European law but also to the particular application thereof, and
finally function as ultima ratio, i.e., reviewing whether an act of EU bodies exceeded the powers that the Czech
Republic transferred to the EU under art. 10a of the Constitution 34.
The Constitutional Court of Hungary (hereinafter: CCH) also expressed its opinion on constitutional
identity—the concept which interprets as Hungary’s self-identity. According to the CCH, the constitutional
self-identity of Hungary is not a list of static and closed values, however, many of its important components are
identical with the constitutional values generally accepted today 35.
26
CT judgment of 27 April 2005, Ref. No. P 1/05, par. 4.2 and 4.3 part III (OTK ZU nr 4/A/2005, poz. 42).
27
CT judgment of 24 November 2010, Ref. No. K 32/09, par. 2.1 part III (OTK ZU nr 9/A/2010, poz. 108).
28
29
30
31
CT judgment of 26 June 2013, Ref. No. K 33/12, par. 6.4.1 part III (OTK ZU nr 5/A/2013, poz. 63).
32
CT judgment of 11 March 2015, Ref. No. P 4/14, par. 4.5 part III (OTK ZU nr 3/A/2015, poz. 30).
33
Ústavní soud České republiky, 2008/11/26-Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Treaty of Lisbon I), par. 97.
34
Ústavní soud České republiky, 2012/01/31-Pl. ÚS 5/12 (Slovak Pensions XVII) VII.
35
The Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5). AB on the Interpretation of Article E (2) of the Fundamental
Law, par. 65; https://hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_22_2016.pdf.
And also in the recent judgement, the Belgian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: BCC) commented on the
issue of national identity. The BCC stated that when the legislator gives assent to a treaty, it must comply with
art. 34 of the Constitution according to which the exercise of specific powers may be conferred by a treaty or
by a law on institutions of public international law, however, art. 34 of the Constitution cannot be considered as
conferring a blank check nor on the legislature when it gives its assent to the treaty nor on the institutions when
exercising the powers assigned to them; art. 34 of the Constitution in no way authorizes a discriminatory attack
on the national identity inherent in the fundamental, political and constitutional structures or the fundamental
values 36.
It must be said that despite some differences in emphasis and in the degree of the subject-matter
differentiation, the constitutional courts of the Member States share similar understanding of national
(constitutional) identity. In their common understanding, national identity requires the protection of the
statehood, the protection of the form of government and of the central principles of state organization (e.g.,
federalism, regional, and municipal self-government), the protection of democracy, of the rule of law, and of
the essence of fundamental rights (Bogdandy & Schill, 2011, pp. 1439-1440).
Concluding Remarks
The constitutional courts of the Member States have seized the opportunity that was the linkage in art. 4 (2)
TEU of national identities of the Member States with their fundamental political and constitutional structures,
and thus not only they fill the content of the concept of constitutional identity but also by transforming the
treaty national identity into a constitutional identity they justify their right to control both the extent of the
Union’s competences transferred and the way of using them (Wójtowicz, 2012, p. 128).
Another important observation is that we can see the change in the language used, namely, the narrative
referring to identity (and precisely to constitutional identity) replaces the narrative referring to sovereignty.
What’s more, the TL having reformulated the identity clause in art. 4 (2) TUE, thus codified national
constitutional identity (Faraguna, 2016). We can also speak about the Europeanization of the counter-limits by
art. 4 (2) TEU, what in turn implies the recognition by the EU of a constitutional core integrated by the
fundamental political and constitutional structures of the Member States that must be preserved (Callejón,
2017).
The concept of national identity being common to all Member States can be applied in a uniform way,
whereas the concept of constitutional identity can have (and does have) a variable content, thus individualizing
each and every state (Martin, 2012). And so, the German tradition focuses on eternity clause and the political
value of the right to vote, the French tradition on the essential characteristics of the state, whilst the British
tradition on a strict separation of powers (Konstadinides, 2015).
It must also be said that even long before the national identity clause was established, the ECJ could
justify non-uniform application of EU law while referring to the public interest permissible (or express)
derogations, such as public policy, public security, and public health. It also referred to legitimate interests such
as the respect for cultural diversity and the fundamental rights protection. And apart from the provision of art. 4
(2) TEU which qualifies the primacy rule of EU law, it can be equally well argued that it also qualifies the said
36
Cour constitutionnelle de Belgique, Arrêt n 62/2016 du 28 avril 2016, par. B.8.7;
http://www.const-court.be/fr/common/home.html.
derogations.
The broad meaning of the concept of national identity makes it a useful formula, which allows the
Member States to effectively protect their constitutional values by setting the limits to the uncontrolled
permeation of EU law into the national legal orders. The codification of national identity on the EU level and
its certain ambiguity allows the national constitutional courts to fill the content of the clause; what is more, the
very clause becomes the widest reference point for constitutional courts in the proceedings before the ECJ. And
as can be well seen, integration is an ongoing process that largely takes place in the courts common and
constitutional.
References
Besselink, L. F. M. (2010, November). National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon. Utrecht Law Review, 6(3), 42,
44, 48.
Bogdandy, A. V., & Schill, S. (2011). Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty.
Common Market Law Review, 48(5), 1420, 1439-1440.
Callejón, F. B. (2017, May). The dialectic relation between the national and the European constitutional identity in the framework
of European Constitutional Law. UNIO-EU Law Journal, 3(3), 19.
Faraguna, P. (2016). Taking constitutional identities away from courts. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 41(2), s. 498.
Huber, P. M. (2015). The Federal Constitutional Court and European integration. European Public Law, 21(1), 92.
Konstadinides, T. (2015, January). Dealing with parallel universes: Antinomies of sovereignty and the protection of national
identity in European judicial discourse. Yearbook of European Law, 34(1), 167.
Martin, S. (2012, July). The identity of the state in the European Union: between “national identity” and “constitutional identity”.
French Journal of Constitutional Law, 91, s. 26.
Sadowski, M. Z. (2012). Constitutional identity and European law. Natolin analysis, 1(53), 1.
Torre, M. L. (2014). A weberian moment for Europe? Constitutionalism and the crises of European integration. European Public
Law, 20(3), 423-424.
Wójtowicz, K. (2012). Constitutional courts and European Union law. Warsaw: Publishing House of the Constitutional Tribunal.
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.03.002
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Economic Sanctions: A Political, Economic, and Normative

Analysis
Rachael Gosnell
University of Maryland, Maryland, United States
The use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool dates back to the Megarian decree of 432 BC, but has long
been controversial. Economic sanctions are commonly employed by governments as a coercive tool to adjust the
behavior of a state actor that is in violation of international behavior norms, yet there remains concern as to the
effectiveness of applying economic sanctions and the extent to which sanctions should be applied. Further
questions arise regarding both the viability and morality of sanctions. This paper will examine case studies to
determine the moral, economic, and political impact of imposing sanctions on state actors. In doing so, this paper
will specifically examine the economic sanctions applied to South Africa, Iran, and Crimea. It will examine the
application of sanctions and the effectiveness in achieving established foreign policy goals, while also analyzing the
impact on innocents to determine the ethical implications of sanctions.
Keywords: economic sanctions, foreign policy, normative analysis, economic foreign policy tools
Introduction
Since the rise of the modern Westphalian nation-state, governments have sought methods to adjust the
behavior of other state actors to ensure adherence to both national and international interests. While foreign
policy tools have evolved greatly over the years, coercive and cooperative efforts are still at the forefront of
policy decisions. The rise of an established international order has permitted states to work cooperatively to
adjust the behavior of state actors that threaten interests or violate international norms. Economic sanctions
have become a heavily relied upon tool of foreign policy as states and multinational organizations seek to alter
the behavior of other state actors in a globalized world, yet they remain mired in debate. Prominent questions
surrounding the application of economic sanctions include not only viability―Do they actually work? But also
morality―Should they be used to coerce state behavior given the potential impact on innocents?
This paper will seek to explore economic sanctions utilizing case studies to assess the moral, economic,
and political impact of imposing sanctions. To determine this impact, the paper will examine different types of
sanctions against state actors as a foreign policy tool and determine implications from a normative perspective.
Case studies will present insights into the rationale for applying sanctions, as well as the costs of doing so
viewed from both a realist and liberalist perspective. An ethical analysis will then be applied to examine the
costs imposed from sanctions, with a primary focus being on sanctions applied by the US. These analyses will
then be examined for broader applicability as to the moral, economic, and political viability of economic
Rachael Gosnell, doctoral candidate, International Security and Economic Policy, University of Maryland, Maryland, United
States.
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 153
sanctions as a foreign policy option.

The usage of economic sanctions to achieve foreign policy objectives has become an increasingly popular
tool in recent years, but is not new. Hufbauer (2007) notes that sanctions date to at least 432 BC with the
Megarian decree issued by Greek statesman and General Pericles who sought to strangle the Megara economy
(Hufbauer, 2007). The US first administered economic sanctions prior to the War of 1812, targeting Great
Britain for the harassment of American sailors. Following the German invasion of Norway in 1940, the US
applied sanctions to prevent Nazi usage of occupied countries’ holdings and later extended sanctions to block
assets of the Axis powers while prohibiting foreign trade and financial dealings with these nations. Sanctions
were employed frequently during the Cold War to destabilize governments, particularly in Latin America.
Since the end of the Cold War, economic sanctions have been a widely used foreign policy tool both in the US
and within the international community. This paper will later examine more recent sanctions as specific case
studies, including Crimea, Iran, and South Africa to analyze the economic, political, and moral impact of
economic sanctions.
It must first be established what can be defined as an economic sanction, particularly noting what does and
does not fall within the scope of the policy tool. While there is some dispute as to the breadth and scope of the
definition of an economic sanction, and indeed, differing governments have a range of accepted practices that
may fall into the economic sanctions realm, there is a basic consensus on the broad definition. Economic
sanctions can be defined as “the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign and security
policy purposes” (Masters, 2017). Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) limited the definition, stating sanctions are
“deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade and financial
relations”. Doxey (1996) further defined international sanctions as “penalties threatened or imposed as a
declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligations”.
From these basic definitions, it is necessary to further explore what constitutes a sanction and what falls
beyond the scope of an economic sanction. While each nation-state maintains a unique definition, criteria for,
and application process of economic sanctions, this paper will focus primarily on the US government and
international organizations that have advocated for economic sanctions. This section will briefly explore the
sanctions process for the US and the UN, with a recognition that many other countries and organizations
(specifically the EU) also have significant economic sanctions programs, with differing definitions and
processes.
In the US, economic sanctions originate in either the executive or legislative branches. It is important to
examine the process for which sanctions may be applied in order to develop the foundation for a later
discussion on the ethics of economic sanctions. Congress may pass legislation imposing sanctions or the
President may draft an Executive Order declaring a national emergency in response to “an unusual and
extraordinary foreign threat” (Masters, 2017). This declaration invokes special powers pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act with regard to the announced threat for a period of one year,
though it may be further extended by the president or terminated by an Act of Congress. The president may also
use Executive Orders to modify sanctions.
The US State Department noted that economic sanctions should encompass the “deliberate,
government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations” (Office of
the Spokesperson, US State Department, 2014a). Sanctions may be comprehensive, prohibiting economic
relations with an entire designated country, or they may be targeted specifically against particular groups,
154 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
individuals, or industries (Masters, 2017). Haass (1998) further noted that sanctions designed to alter political
and/or military behavior may take varied forms: arms embargoes, foreign assistance reductions and cut-offs,
export and import limitations, asset freezes, tariff increases, revocation of most favored nation (MFN) trade
status, negative votes in international financial institutions, withdrawal of diplomatic relations, visa denials,
cancellation of air links, and prohibitions on credit, financing, and investment.
While policy is shaped by the president through discussions with his Cabinet advisors, particularly the
Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Treasury, and often the mandate of international organizations, such as the
UN, the State Department’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (SPI) is responsible for
“developing and implementing foreign policy-related sanctions adopted to counter threats to national security
posed by particular activities and countries” (Office of the Spokesperson, US State Department, 2014a). SPI
provides guidance to the Departments of Commerce and Treasury on sanctions implementation while seeking
international support of sanctions.
The US government utilizes three primary offices to regulate the application of approved sanctions, the
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the State Department’s Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
OFAC is responsible for administering and enforcing economic and trade sanctions, while BIS develops export
control policies. DDTC’s focus is on International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Figure 1. US sanction regimes (US Treasury Department via Council on Foreign Relations).
Though the framework for the application of economic sanctions is clearly structured within the US
government, sanctions programs vary tremendously in scope. Trade prohibitions may be broad or narrow in
focus and are applied to US companies, who may not directly or indirectly export or import goods, software,
technology, or services to or from a sanctioned country. Sanctions further restrict investments and contracts.
According to OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) and Blocked Persons, there are
approximately 5,500 current companies and individuals connected with sanctions targets. All US citizens and
permanent resident aliens, regardless of where they are located, as well as all persons and entities within the US
and all US incorporated entities and their foreign branches are required to comply with OFAC sanctions
regulations (US Office of Foreign Asset Controls, 2018). OFAC is predominantly responsible for administering
the 26 existing US sanctions programs currently in place. These include comprehensive sanctions regimes on
Crimea, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, with the remainder of the economic sanctions being
targeted sanctions against individuals and entities based upon criminal behavior or political crises. The below
graph depicts US sanctions programs in effect through 2015.
While the administrative and enforcement mechanisms for economic sanctions are well mapped out, less
clear is the mechanism for determining how and why to apply the sanctions. As discussed previously, sanctions
may be applied by either the executive or legislature branches of the US government. Sanctions are viewed by
the US government as a tool of foreign policy with which to compel specific behavior from the targets, while
minimizing damage to US economic interests. Yet, tremendous controversy surrounds the determination of
sanctions and subsequent application. While the goal, generally to compel a state or group to comply with
established international norms, often is one reached by consensus within the government and international
community, the decision to utilize economic sanctions vice another means of intervention stokes debate.
It must be established that economic sanctions are only one in a number of options available to the US
government. Other such policy options include diplomatic negotiations, military intervention (ranging from the
use of advisers and training staff to full-scale military operations); legal actions pursued through an
international arbitrator, conditional aid, or even moral suasion that seeks to pressure, but not force, an actor into
adhering to international norms. This latter option is often associated with the international community and an
adherence to liberalist ideals of institutionalism, to include non-binding UN declarations as well as democratic
indices, such as Freedom House, Polity IV, Transparency International, and Human Rights Watch.
Literature Review
Economic sanctions offer an alternative to military action to coerce a state actor, congruent to the classical
international relations concepts of realism and liberalism. From the realist perspective, economic sanctions may
be applied by a state actor when attempting to adjust the behavior of another state, as a tool to be utilized in
great power competition in a calculation of materialistic and strategic gain and loss. States may employ
unilateral sanctions seeking to diminish the relative power of a competitor by lessening their ability to enjoy
economic advantages both at home and abroad. As Haass (1997) noted, the likely benefits to US foreign policy
should be greater than the anticipated costs to both the US government and the US economy. This cost-benefit
calculation should compare favorably to the expected consequences of all other foreign policy tools, to include
military intervention, diplomacy, conditional aid, or even doing nothing (Haass, 1998).
The realist approach to sanctions would not consider the international norms at stake in the calculus. As
such, this realist view would preclude involvement with and from the international community unless there was
a demonstrable benefit of doing so.
While the US has shown no hesitation in enacting unilateral military action, it does exhibit a pattern of
adhering to more of an institutional approach when evoking sanctions. For this paper, liberalism refers to the
pursuit of a greater cause―the adherence to international norms, regardless or in spite of materialistic damages.
With this definition, economic sanctions may also be considered a liberalist approach to altering state actions
through the application or use of sanctions to shape behaviors. In this sense, sanctions would be discussed and
agreed upon by the international community and then enacted by state actors. The path for this action is through
an international organization, with the most impactful being the UN or the EU. In an effort to limit the scope of
this paper, the focus will be limited to the UN when discussing liberalist norms in relation to international
organizations.
The basis for UN sanctions is derived from the UN Charter (Chapter VII, Article 41), citing:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the UN to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations. (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 2013)
The UN employs sanctions through the Security Council, where sanctions resolutions must be approved
by a majority vote of the fifteen member-council and no vetoes from a permanent member. UN sanctions are
binding on all member states and are typically managed by a special committee and monitoring group. Yet, the
UN has no independent means of enforcement (though Interpol does assist some sanctions committees), relying
instead on member states. During the Cold War, sanctions were a rarity passed only against Southern Rhodesia
(1968) and South Africa (1977). Rhodesia was targeted with comprehensive sanctions in response to the
declaration of independence from the UK by the white minority regime; targeted sanctions on South Africa
were due to the apartheid system, regional military aggression, and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But since
1990, sanctions have been employed by the UN more than twenty times, primarily against parties in intrastate
conflict, such as Liberia and Yugoslavia. While cooperation within the organization is increasing, there remains
tension when differences arise between competing interests of major powers. Syria exemplifies this, as Russia
and China have vetoed four Security Council resolutions since 2011 that sought to sanction the al-Assad regime
due to human rights violations (UNSC, 2013).
Figure 2. UN sanctions (Security Council Report).
The Security Council has established principal objectives for the use of sanctions that fall within five
categories: conflict resolution, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, democratization, and the protection of
civilians, to include human rights. Sanctions committees, responsible for the administration of sanctions, are
established under Article 29 of the UN Charter and Rule 28 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the
Security Council. Nearly, all sanctions imposed by the UN have corresponding committees, to include all
sanctions currently enacted. These committees are responsible for monitoring, reporting, exemptions, and
managing designation lists; the committee membership reflects that of the Security Council, with the chair
being a permanent representative from one of the 10 elected member states. Decision-making within the
committees is made on a consensus basis (UNSC, 2013).
Sanctions imposed by the UN have evolved from comprehensive sanctions against states to targeted
sanctions; targets include diplomatic, travel ban, asset freeze, arms embargo, and commodity interdiction. The
13 active sanctions regimes include one or more of these; depicted in the below graph. Of interest, there are no
current diplomatic sanctions, though historically this category has been frequently utilized.
While it is clear that economic sanctions are being used by both state actors (i.e., the US) and international
organizations (i.e., the UN) as an alternative to violent action to coerce a state actor to adhere to established
international norms, there is no standardized procedure for the application of sanctions. The previous discussion
has clearly established that economic sanctions cover a broad spectrum of measures, both for the US and the
UN. Comprehensive sanctions are being used less frequently due to questionable impact, with targeted
sanctions being the preferred method of applying sanctions regimes. This is an important shift in sanctions
policy and must be further examined.

Biersteker (2013) noted that fundamental questions must first be asked before a government or
international organization can appropriately apply sanctions. These questions include:
1. What are the intended purposes?
2. What are the sanctions intended to achieve?
3. Are they trying to coerce a change in behavior?
4. Are they trying to constrain some party from having access to essential resources?
5. Are they really trying to send a signal?
Once the purposes of sanctions are identified, it is critical to determine who and what the targets are,
whether it is the government, leadership of the government, a faction in a conflict, or a terrorist group
(Bierstaker, 2013). It is also at this stage that the actor imposing sanctions must determine political, economic,
and moral implications for the imposition of costs on the designated actor. There is significant debate on both
the viability and morality of sanctions, a debate that this paper will further address at a later point.
In order to first exemplify that challenges, costs, and opportunities presented by sanctions, this paper will
examine specific case studies where sanctions were applied on either a comprehensive or targeted basis. Each
case study will present an historical overview, discuss the policy debates held on the application of a sanctions
regime in response to perceived violations of international norms, and examine the type, application, and
enforcement of sanctions. The paper will further examine normative considerations for the sanctions imposed,
including the implications of the sanctions regimes for innocent populations. The countries (Crimea, Iran, and
South Africa) selected for case studies represent a diverse mix of sanctions regimes and were chosen based on
several criteria to represent a broad spectrum of possible sanctions. These include: type of sanctions imposed,
year imposed as well as duration of regimes, impact on targeted actors and populations, and involvement of the
international community.
Crimea
The international community watched the growing Euromaidan protests in Kyiv in late 2013 with growing
concern. Political tensions within Ukraine erupted following the country’s sudden withdrawal from the Ukraine
and EU Association Agreement in November 2013, largely attributed to pressure from Russia. In late January
2014, Secretary of State Kerry and Assistant Secretary of State Nuland were dispatched to meet European
leaders to discuss the crisis. Nuland then traveled from Munich to Kyiv in early February to meet with
government officials, opposition leaders, members of civil society, and business leaders, seeking to encourage
agreement on a new government while planning for Ukraine’s future. The Secretary of State’s Office of the
Spokesperson noted the goal was also to fulfill “the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for democracy, respect
for human rights, European integration and economic growth” (Office of the Spokesperson, US State
Department, 2014a). The next month witnessed escalating protests and violence; Ukrainian President
Yanukovich fled to Russia on 25 February and the new government announced elections would be held in May.
Recognizing the interim government to be pro-Western, Russian President Vladimir Putin seized the
opportunity to further exert influence in the region. Russian separatists became active in the East and Russia
stoked tensions throughout the region. The Crimean peninsula was quickly flooded with Russian-speaking
military men; Putin initially denied Russian involvement, suggesting the men belonged to local defense militias.
It is widely accepted that they were Russian reservists with some active Russian elite special forces, known
locally as zelonyye chelovechki (green men) or zelonyye lyudishki (little green men) (Haines, 2016). Crimea
was effectively cut off from Ukraine by these pro-Russian soldiers and Spatsnaz units, who then took over the
Supreme Council of Crimea, or Crimean Parliament.
The Russian involvement was alarming to US and European leaders, who responded with a flurry of
diplomatic activity given the clear violations of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty and the Budapest
Memorandum. Kerry called upon Russia to meet its obligations under the Memorandum, advising direct talks
facilitated by the international community, and called for the deployment of international observers. The
Obama administration, with the support of Congress, sought to avoid direct involvement while demonstrating
resolve and commitment to international norms through diplomatic missions. Yet, these actions failed to deter
Russia. On March 6, 2014, the Russian backed Crimean Parliament voted to join Russia and set a referendum
to be held 10 days later. President Obama determined a bolder course of action to be necessary and issued
Executive Order 13660. Citing the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701), the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8
U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of Title 3, United States Code, Executive Order 13660 stated:
I, Barack Obama, President of the US, find that the actions and policies of persons including persons who have
asserted governmental authority in the Crimean region without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine that
undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security and foreign policy of the US, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
The Executive Order instituted targeted sanctions against individuals involved, suspended entry into the
US for those individuals, and prohibited donations, funds, and transactions with those persons, among other
prohibitions (Executive Order 13660, 2014). In an effort to assist the beleaguered Ukrainian economy, the
Commerce Department organized a Business Summit to facilitate US capital investment in Ukraine and aided
development of the Innovation Council to accelerate entrepreneurship and develop a legal infrastructure for
innovation. Exchange programs were also increased for Ukrainian students and young leaders (Office of the
Spokesperson, US State Department, 2014b).
The leaders of the G-7 (now excluding Russia) made a joint announcement on 12 March stating that a
Russian annexation of Crimea would violate: the UN Charter, Russia’s commitments under the Helsinki Final
Act, obligations under the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, Russia-Ukraine 1997
Basing Agreement, and Commitments of the Budapest Memorandum. It further called on Russia to de-escalate
in Crimea and other parts of Ukraine, urging the resolution of the crisis through the diplomatic processes (The
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014a). This announcement was of particular interest due to the
solidarity of the G-7 leaders and the strong wording towards the Russian Federation actions. European leaders
had previously been hesitant to take strong actions due to the economic ties with Russia; this statement made it
clear that the West was united against the Russian actions in pursuit on international norms. The US affirmed
concerns for the Ukrainian crisis at the UN’s 25th Session of the Human Rights Council on 28 March, though
gained no traction for UN sanctions due to the Russian veto power on the Security Council (Office of the
Spokesperson, US State Department, 2014b). Given the lack of Russian response, instead, the Crimean
referendum was used by the Russians to justify the annexation, the White House sought to impose further costs.
A new Executive Order was signed that expanded targeted sanctions and created new authorities to target
Russian government officials, with significant overlap to the sanctions released the following day by the EU
(Executive Order 13661, 2014). On March 20, a third Executive Order was released, yet again expanding
sanctions and aligning closely with the EU list; Bank Rossiya, known for providing services to senior Russian
government officials, was also targeted (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014c).
The sanctions imposed in the Crimea case were a realization of liberalist ideals, the enforcement of
international norms, and also realist concerns. In a zero-sum security dilemma, a gain in strategic interests for
Russia would result in a loss for the West. Credibility of commitment was also at stake, thus one may also
argue that the US instituted sanctions due to a realist cost-benefit calculation, while also adhering to liberalist
principles. Yet, the EU sanctions adhered more closely to liberalist ideals, as the countries had a much stronger
economic relationship with Russia. Until sanctions were applied, the EU was Russia’s largest trading partner
and many EU states depended on Russia for vital oil and gas resources. Yet, their recognition of the violation of
Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty by Russia compelled action; though realists would further add that some of the
states were motivated by concerns of an aggressive Russia emboldened by a lack of action and attempting
similar territorial annexations elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
Economic sanctions were initially (first three executive orders) targeted towards specific individuals in
Putin’s inner circle, seeking a minimal impact on innocents. Targeted sanctions were applied to be deeply
damaging to limited persons who held some level of responsibility for the annexation. Yet, there were some
ethical concerns in the seizure or freezing of assets in that no notification or due process was rendered.
Conversely, comprehensive sanctions have been determined to be harmful to broad populations of innocents
and may in fact serve to strengthen a dictator’s grasp of a regime, as exemplified in North Korea or Cuba. The
sanctions instituted in Crimea initially were designed to avoid these concerns, reflecting on recent literature that
indicates targeted sanctions to be more effective without harming innocents (Hufbauer, 2007). Weiss (1993, p.
499) noted that comprehensive sanctions targeting the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Haiti caused substantial
suffering by vulnerable groups. Yet, President Obama chose to enact comprehensive sanctions against Crimea
on December 19, 2014, blocking property of specified persons and prohibiting transactions with the Crimean
region (Executive Order 13685, 2014). Justification for the comprehensive sanctions stemmed from the
perceived lack of impact of the previous three EOs and Russia’s continued assistance on the annexation.
One must also examine the broader impact of the sanctions in Crimea. Despite the decision to initially
apply targeted sanctions, the immediate economic impact experienced by Russia was devastating―The Russian
stock market declined nearly 15% from 20 February to 17 March, with the ruble depreciating almost 3% to the
dollar (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014c). Russia’s GDP peaked in 2013 at just over $2
trillion, dropping to $1.2 trillion by May 2016 following a deep recession in 2015. Russian inflation reached
15.5% in 2015 (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2017). The international community had generally rallied
around Ukraine, or at least did not support Russia. The March 2014 UN Security Council vote to declare the
Crimean referendum illegal yielded 13 countries supporting the statement, with China abstaining in a break
from its normal support of Russia. The EU and US applied similar economic sanctions and received support
within their domestic populations.
Economic sanctions were supported by US military shows of force to include North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) exercises and sending a guided missile destroyer to the Black Sea. While it is impossible
to know with certainty the exact impact of sanctions versus other factors (particularly the massive drop in oil
prices that also occurred during this period), there was clearly both a direct impact of applying sanctions as well
as the indirect or secondary effects (i.e., third party countries hesitant to do business due to the US sanctions
applied) felt by Russia. Targeted Russian leadership did not suffer the entirety of these economic impacts. The
entire Russian population witnessed inflation and interest rates soar; their selection of imported goods from
Europe dwindled. Crimeans faced dramatic economic challenges as their traditional sources of revenue, tourism
and hosting the Black Sea Fleet, dropped precipitously. Ukraine restricted trade with the peninsula, causing a
rise in prices for basic necessities. Crimean pensioners no longer received their pensions from the Ukrainian
government, causing a loss in income before Russia agreed to resume payments. The economic costs imposed
for Russia’s decision to annex the Crimean peninsula impacted citizens in Russia and Crimea, innocents who
had little to do with the annexation.
Yet, Russia retains control of the Crimea peninsula to this day. While the US applied significant targeted
economic sanctions and later comprehensive sanctions, the objective of Russia respecting Ukrainian territorial
sovereignty has not been met. This is despite the significant international response in support of international
norms protecting territorial sovereignty, as supported by numerous treaty obligations committed to by Russia.
Though the West rallied around Ukraine, infusing significant economic aid into a beleaguered economy, the
impact of sanctions was ultimately limited. While the targeted sanctions may very well have halted further
Russian action, they have been unsuccessful at achieving their stated goal. Moreover, the sanctions imposed
had a far greater cost imposed on innocents, as the entire Russian and Crimean peoples paid a high economic
price for the wayward actions of their leadership. Crimea highlights the challenge of targeted sanctions, despite
carefully limiting sanctions and ultimately the sanctions reverberated through the Russian and Crimean
economies with tremendous effect. The expansion of sanctions further ensured that those guilty of the violation
of international norms―Putin and his close circle of advisors, would not be alone in shouldering the brunt of
the costs imposed. While long-term costs are still unclear, there is no sign that sanctions will be lifted in the
near future. The Crimean and Russian populations will continue to experience hardships, though there are signs
that the sanctions are stimulating internal infrastructure to produce that which can no longer be acquired from
abroad. This may result in a long-term improvement on both employment and availability of goods. Yet, Russia
maintains a very high human development rating from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
with an upward trend from 1990-2015, with scores of 0.733-0.804, earning a rank of 48 in the world. Health
outcomes for Russia in 2015 indicate life expectancy at 60 to be good at 18.4 years; similarly there are 43.1
physicians per 10,000 citizens. More than 94% have some secondary education and the unemployment rate in
2015 is 5.8%. The perception of well-being (overall life satisfaction) is six on a scale of 0-10, with 10 being
most satisfied. Gender inequality is relatively low, at 0.271 or a rank of 52. The domestic food price index is
4.3 with a volatility index of 5.2, indicating relative stability (UNDP, 2016). Overall, Russia performs in the
upper tier on the human development index, indicating little significant impact from sanctions. Popular support
for Putin has increased to more than 80% due to the “rally around the flag” effect, indicating that there are few
drivers for Putin to reconsider his decision to annex Ukraine’s sovereign territory despite the imposition of
economic sanctions (Birnbaum, 2016).
Iran
The US has imposed various economic sanctions on Iran since 1979, following the seizure of the
American embassy in Tehran. Carter imposed an escalating series of sanctions that began with banning Iranian
oil imports and led to blocking all Iranian government assets in the US (worth approximately $12 billion). By
1980, an embargo on US trade with Iran was in place, along with a travel ban. These initial sanctions were
lifted following the 1981 hostage release, under the Algiers Declaration, but embargos were gradually
re-imposed in the following years in response to violations of international norms. Following the 1983 when
terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Reagan administration imposed various restrictions as
a result of Iranian state sponsorship of terrorist groups. These included opposition to World Bank loans to Iran
as well as restrictions on dual-use technologies and Iranian imports.
In 1995, the Clinton administration banned all US participation in Iranian petroleum development and
subsequently broadened sanctions to encompass a total trade and investment embargo, with bipartisan support.
In 2005, the Bush administration issued a series of sanctions to freeze assets of firms and individuals believed
to be involved in supporting terrorist groups, destabilizing Iraq, or furthering Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
In 2006, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act expanded the president’s powers in the latter
category. Sanctions to include enforcement were continued under the Obama administration, with sanctions
applied for reasons as diverse as human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation.
In 2010, congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA)
that further targeted refined petroleum products imported into Iran through non-US firms, as Iran relied on
imports due to deficiencies with its own refineries. The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012 authorized sanctions on those engaging in censorship in Iran as well as further targeting transport and
insurance of Iranian oil. The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included even greater
restrictions on foreign banks conducting transactions with the Iranian Central Bank. In 2013, congress passed
the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act to further extend sanctions to affect foreign firms operating in
the transport or finance industries and supporting Iran’s oil, automobile, or precious metal industries (OFAC,
2016a).
While initial US sanctions were unilateral, by the mid 2000s, Europe had joined the US in expressing
concern for Iranian nuclear ambitions. Dual-use technologies were specifically sanctioned under UN
resolutions 1696 and 1737, signed in 2006. Much like with North Korea, the UNSC made clear its objective to
constrain the ability to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies and compel a return to the
international non-proliferation framework. The Iran sanctions regime has been strengthened three times, with
resolutions 1747, 1803, and 1929 in response to dismal International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports.
The UN maintained targeted sanctions against Iran in the form of a travel ban, asset freezing, and an arms
embargo to compel adherence to international norms in regards to nuclear non-proliferation. Travel ban
exemptions are granted on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian or religion grounds (United Nations, 2016).
This adherence to comprehensive and targeted sanctions represents a unique political consensus in that
sanctions span six US presidential administrations and receive bipartisan support in the US and multilateral
support abroad. Some success has been reached with Iranian sanctions. Many credit sanctions to be a factor in
the 1981 hostage release. The impact of more recent sanctions on the Iranian economy gave a significant boost
to presidential candidate Hassan Rouhani, who pledged to resume nuclear negotiations to achieve sanctions
relief. The combined US and UN sanctions imposed in response to nonproliferation efforts by Iran were
instrumental in Iran participating in the P5 + 1 talks and the eventual agreement reached in the form of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), finalized on 14 July 2015. On 16 January 2016, the IAEA certified
that Iran had complied with nuclear dismantlement requirements, thus triggering the revocation of applicable
Executive Orders and lifting of relevant (particularly secondary) US, UN, and EU sanctions (Katzman, 2016).
Economic sanctions are a defining pillar of US policy on Iran and have made a significant negative impact
on the Iranian economy. In 1992, before Clinton era sanctions were announced, the US was Iran’s sixth largest
source of imports at $748 million; by 2014, US exports to Iran had dwindled to $186.5 million, mostly from
food―particularly wheat. In 2015, the US imported only $10 million worth of Iranian products. The Iranian
rial declined more than 50% post 2010 sanctions, which are widely attributed to causing Iran’s recession.
Inflation in Iran was estimated to be between 50-70% from 2011-2013 due to the drop in currency value. The
Iranian unemployment rate had reached nearly 20% by 2014 (Katzman, 2016). Then, Treasury Secretary Jack
Lew stated in 2015 that Iran’s GDP was 15-20% smaller than it would have been had post-2010 sanctions not
been imposed. He further noted that US sanctions have cost Iran more than $160 billion in oil revenue since
2012 (Lew, 2015). Humanitarian-related effects of sanctions were observed in several areas, particularly
medicine with an inability to obtain Western-made medicines. Some of this was due to banks refusing to
finance such sales, even if not restricted by sanctions. Pollution is another area of concern due to the impurities
prevalent in Iranian refined products. The aviation sector is notoriously dangerous, with more than 1,700 killed
in aviation accidents since the 1995 trade ban; this, however, is difficult to pinpoint entirely on the lack of parts
availability (Katzman, 2016). The 2015 UN human development index notes a slightly positive trend for Iran
from 1990-2015, with progression from a score of 0.572 to 0.774, ranking 69 in the world with a high level.
Life expectancy for Iranians at age of 60 years is 19.4 years; yet there are only 8.9 physicians per 10,000
citizens. Education levels are comparatively low, at 67.7% with some secondary education, though this likely
reflects the high gender inequality (0.509 or a ranking of 118). Unemployment is high at 10.5% and food
security is also a concern, with the domestic food price level index at 4.5 and volatility high at 13.0. Overall life
satisfaction index is 4.7 (with 10 being most satisfied) (UNDP, 2016). It is likely that economic sanctions have
impacted quality of life of Iranians within the government as well as innocents.
Within the US government, there lacks consensus on the specific objectives of sanctions. Under the Trump
administration, targeted sanctions were re-imposed in Executive Orders 13382 and 13324 on 25 individuals and
entities in response to a controversial ballistic missile test (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
2017). In March, the US imposed sanctions against 11 companies and individuals for technology transfers,
sparking a counter sanction from Iran against 15 US companies for alleged human rights violations and
cooperation with Israel (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2017). The JCPOA specifically states
that sanctions that were suspended or lifted shall not be re-imposed on other bases (i.e., terrorism or human
rights). Both the Obama and Trump administrations made it clear that new sanctions to limit Iran’s military
power, human rights abuses, or support of terrorist groups may not violate the JCPOA. Congress has sought to
extend the Iran Sanctions Act, inserting a provision into the FY2017 NDAA requiring a quarterly report to
congress on the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran’s ballistic missile program (Katzman, 2016).
Economic sanctions imposed on Iran have been moderately successful in achieving limited aims.
Sanctions imposed during the hostage crisis are largely attributed to the release of the American hostages.
Those imposed with the support of the international community to expressly prevent the development of
nuclear weapons have also attained a high degree of success, causing economic conditions that forced political
leadership to negotiate with the P5 + 1 countries. Yet, other sanctions imposed for state sponsored terrorism
and human rights violations have largely been ineffective; Iran still actively does both. The suffering caused to
Iranian citizens has been noteworthy. Though not as impacted as the Iraqi population, with hundreds of
thousands of deaths attributed to comprehensive sanctions, the economic conditions of Iran have resulted in a
degraded quality of life and pursuit of happiness.
South Africa
The application of economic sanctions on South Africa is a widely studied, and at times controversial, case
in which the international community joined together to target an oppressive regime. The National Party came
to power in 1948 and instituted decades of Apartheid rule. While the UN had imposed an arms embargo in the
1960s and again in 1977 following a massacre of schoolchildren in Soweto, the focus of this study will be on
the significant sanctions applied in the 1980s due to the ongoing repression of apartheid. Reforms in early and
mid 1980s to the governance of South Africa were slow and substantially less than the international community
believed appropriate to meet international norms on basic human rights.
The economic siege on South Africa began in 1985, when Chase Manhattan Bank called in its loans due to
pressure to sever ties with the apartheid regime; other American and European banks followed suit. In 1985, the
European Economic Community imposed limited trade and financial sanctions on South Africa. The Reagan
administration was initially opposed to sanctions, but enacted a limited export ban to avert stronger
Congressional action. The political and financial crises that had gripped the country even prior to the institution
of sanctions intensified and a second round of sanctions were enacted in 1986. Congress passes the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, over-riding the veto of President Reagan to enact severe restrictions in
lending and import bans on iron, steel, coal, uranium, textiles, and agricultural products (Levy, 1999, p. 417).
Yet, Reagan’s veto speech alluded to the complexity of the decision, stating “Are we truly helping the black
people of South Africa―the lifelong victims of apartheid, when we throw them out of work and leave them and
their families jobless and hungry in those segregated townships? Or are we simply assuming a moral posture at
the expense of people in whose name we presume to act.” He likened sanctions to “declaring economic warfare
on the people of South Africa” (Reagan, 1986). Instead, he called upon capitalism―the “natural enemy of such
feudal institutions as apartheid” to not divest, but to increase investment. He noted a sugar import ban would
imperil 23,000 black farmers; natural resource sanctions would impact up to 500,000 black miners. Yet,
Reagan may have been focusing more on grand strategic concerns, however, given the struggles of the Cold
War and the value of an ally controlling the Cape of Good Hope.
Reagan, however, was in the minority. While there were other critics, such as the Zulu-based Inkatha
Freedom Party, who contended the main victims, would be destitute blacks who populated most of the
country’s nearly 50% unemployment rate and most of the international community strongly supported the
sanctions (Keller, 2013). The international community rallied against the oppressive apartheid regime, with few
exceptions. Many state and local governments as well as universities in the US even enacted their own
anti-apartheid statutes and divestments. Advocates argued that the impact on the white South Africans who
were less accustomed to economic hardship were instrumental in success.
There is little dispute that economic sanctions were costly to South Africa, though studies question the
exact impact. Hufbauer (2007, p. 246) noted that the annual cost of sanctions was approximately $354 million,
or 0.5% of gross national product (GNP). Trade restrictions were not applied on key industries like gold and
diamonds. Exporters were able to find new markets in the East for many of their products. External loan
finance and foreign investment, however, were particularly hard hit areas. By 1984 foreign loans were 70% of
total foreign liabilities, with foreign debt totaling more than $23 billion in 1986 (Levy, 1999). Direct foreign
investment in 1983 totaled $17 billion. Between 1985 and 1987, US imports from South Africa declined 35%
(Knight, 1990). Yet, there were unexpected impacts as well, with the economic impacts spilling over to
neighboring countries, including anti-apartheid countries, like Zambia and Zimbabwe. Isolated from world
military suppliers, South Africa instead built its domestic armaments industry into a world leader. South
African corporate giants flourished when American and European competitors divested, creating a vacuum in
competition. The economic state turned over to the African National Congress (ANC) at successive elections
was dismal (Keller, 2013).
The imposition of sanctions against South Africa saw substantial political gain achieved, without
life-threatening suffering. The black majority population tended to be supportive of sanctions despite concerns
that the population would be hard hit by unemployment (Weiss, 1993; Keller, 2013). In fact, this demographic
ultimately faced improved employment opportunities due to import substitution. The 2015 UN human
development index notes a slightly positive trend for South Africa from 1990-2015, with progression from a
score of 0.621 to 0.666, ranking 119 in the world with a medium level. South Africa ranks on the
multidimensional poverty index with 17.1% near multidimensional poverty and 1.3% have severe poverty. Life
expectancy at 60 is 16.1 years old, with only 7.8 physicians per 10,000 people. Those with some secondary
education include 74.9% of the population, but unemployment levels are very high at 25.1% in 2015. Domestic
food price level index is stable at 3, with a volatility index of 6.2. Overall life satisfaction is 4.9 (UNDP, 2016).
These numbers indicate that the application and removal of economic sanctions may not have had a tremendous
impact on South Africa, though it is difficult to determine with certainty as the UNDP human development
index began only in 1990.
While South Africa is often cited as an example of a successful application of economic sanctions, it has
factors which make it unique. Sanctions were imposed multilaterally by the international community, not just
the US. Many argue that Pretoria succumbed not due to international sanctions, but due to private businesses
adjusting their calculations even beyond government mandated sanctions, particularly on new loans and
investments. Hufbauer (2007) noted “economic sanctions can be credited with, at best, a modest contribution”
towards the political transformation that took place in South Africa. Research indicates that the divestment by
banks and investors, not mandated by sanctions, was the greatest factor in the regime conceding to international
pressures. Social pressures, such as prohibition of South African participation in international competitions
were also significant (Levy, 1999; Crawford & Audie, 1999). Sanctions never completely isolated South Africa
due to the ability to work through other, non-sanctioning companies and the lack of sanctions on “strategic”
commodities (Crawford & Audie, 1999, p. 12).
Conclusion
These case studies highlight broader questions of debate surrounding economic sanctions. Hufbauer,
Jeffery, and Kimberly (1990, p. 2) at the Institute for International Economics pioneered a survey on the
effectiveness of economic sanctions that determined an overall success rate of 34% for 116 cases from
1914-1990. Pape (1997) questioned even this low success rate, reexamining the data around the “successful”
sanctions and lowered the successes attributed to economic sanctions further to a paltry 4%. This stems from
the review that sanctions in and of themselves rarely brought forward desired changes (Weiss, 1993, p. 501).
While in some cases, notably South Africa, as discussed previously, the contributions can be significant, others
have a marginal impact, as seen in the first case study on Crimea. Yet, it is unquestionable that sanctions cause
pain and suffering to innocents, ranging from justifiable as in South Africa to intolerable in Iraq (Weiss, 1993).
It is this collection of secondary effects that tends to allude scholars. Economic data is well established and can
provide insights into direct effects, but there lacks a concerted effort to also capture socio-demographic,
socio-humanitarian and health data to quantify quality of life beyond the UNDP human development index.
Even with the ability to examine this data, one must also be mindful of the multitude of other factors that
come to bear. Weiss (1993, p. 502) noted that three variables are relevant when determining civilian reactions
to sanctions: The “rally round the flag” effect, where leaders use the shared sense of misery to broaden political
support and demonize the sanctioning country; the government seizes the opportunity to condemn opponents
and reward corrupt supporters by allocating scare resources; and whether sanctions increase or decrease the
viability of political opposition or reform. All of these can be viewed in light of the Iranian case study, but
elements of each were also present in Crimea and South Africa. Further, sanctions are known to cause both
short-term suffering and longer-term structural damage to the economic and political systems. This can be
captured when examining impacts on health, nutrition, basic infrastructure, and social services. Sanctions in
Iraq have been found to have caused more deaths than military action in Operation Desert Storm (Weiss, 1993,
p. 506). South Africa has suffered lingering effects from sanctions applied for years or perhaps even decades
after sanctions were lifted. While humanitarian concerns often lead decision-makers to choose sanctions over
military intervention, studies indicate that this rationale is in serious doubt (Pape, 1997; Weiss, 1993;
Biersteker, 2013).
Invoking humanitarian suffering to coerce a long-term policy change (i.e., non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons) may indeed cause more long term suffering and conflict. A 1999 study notes that post-Cold War
sanctions may have caused more deaths than the use of weapons of mass destruction (Mueller & Karl, 1999, p.
43). Indeed, Weiss (1993, p. 507) noted that “good feelings and self-congratulations have given way to less
Pollyannaish notions about the pluses and minuses of economic and military coercion”. In this sense, one may
argue that the use of sanctions is immoral, as the harm to innocents may never be justified. Indeed, the
long-term suffering of sanctioned populations has been clearly documented. Rarely does this suffering inspire
political reform internally (with the exception being South Africa), but instead often drives further political
support to the authoritarian leadership as exemplified by Putin’s rocketing approval figures after the Crimean
annexation and subsequent application of sanctions.
There is another side of economic sanctions that tends to be overlooked―the impact on the country
applying sanctions. Not only do sanctions reduce cooperation on broader interests (particularly for single issue
disputes, such as drug-trafficking or nuclear proliferation) and have the potential to damage global US interests
(as was Reagan’s worry with the application of sanctions against the geo-strategic country of South Africa
during the height of the Cold War), but there is a potential for significant economic damage at home. In 1995,
sanctions reduced US exports to 26 targeted countries by an estimated $15-19 billion, costing American
workers more than 200,000 jobs (Hufbauer, 2007, p. 3). This is a significant economic impact without factoring
secondary impacts―the loss of continuing sales and serve support, upgrades, replacement parts, et cetera. This
can be viewed through the Iran case study, as even the lifting of sanctions will cause impacts within the US
economy for years to come. Innocents are affected both in the targeted country and the country applying
sanctions. These innocents have a voice through their elected officials in the US, and generally approved of
sanctions in the case of South Africa, but often lack clarity of impact domestically and abroad.
Unilateral sanctions can put the sanctioning country at a distinct disadvantage, prohibiting US citizens
from pursuing economic opportunities that Asian and European rivals are free to develop. American companies
may be met with suspicion due to the proclivity of the US to apply unilateral sanctions, negatively affecting
long-term growth. International companies may seek to minimize the use of US-made components to avoid a
future sanctions problem, an issue particularly vivid in the technology and aircraft industry. Schaefer (1997)
noted that the haphazard application of sanctions since the end of the Cold War has cost the US economy at
least $15 billion annually, while lacking clear foreign policy gains.
Targeted or “smart” sanctions have become more popular than comprehensive sanctions, largely due to the
massive suffering invoked with the application of comprehensive sanctions. Cortright and George (2002, p. 22)
argued, however, that smart sanctions have a smaller chance of success, as they tend to be more easily
circumvented and carry less weight. This may explain the failure of the initial targeted Crimea sanctions and
also why President Obama and the EU chose comprehensive sanctions in December 2014 (though also with
little success in deterring Russia’s annexation of the peninsula).
Another challenge with sanctions is the often uneven application of sanctions. A common complaint of
unilateral sanctions is that they are not applied uniformly to all offenders. While the US sanctioned Iran for
human rights abuses and pursuing nuclear weapons, no such sanctions were issued for Saudi Arabia for human
rights abuses or Israel for nuclear weapons pursuits. This devalues the use of sanctions to uphold liberalist
ideals and instead makes the application of unilateral sanctions reflect the strategic interests of a country,
eroding the moralist arguments behind imposing sanctions.
This presents a moral dilemma if even targeted sanctions impose a massive humanitarian cost on innocents,
should they be applied? But if sanctions are not used, what other foreign policy tools can be utilized to bridge
diplomatic overtures and military action? Economic sanctions have long been looked at to fill the policy gap,
with British Ambassador to the UN from 1998-2003 Sir Jeremy Greenstock perhaps summarizing it best,
suggesting that the popularity of sanctions stems not from their effectiveness, but that “there is nothing else
between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government” (Marcus, 2010). This
thinking has guided many who call for instituting multilateral sanctions on Syria. However, with a Russian veto
certain on a UNSC vote, it is impossible to ensure true multilateral sanctions. Targeted sanctions could put
pressure on leadership, but could also have an unintended consequence of further strengthening the reliance of
al-Assad on Russian support and pushing Russia even further from embracing international norms. The Syrian
people are already experiencing significant hardships and one would need a strong case for the type of
multilateral, targeted sanction that could be applied without causing further harm to innocents.
Yet with the lack of strong evidence to support the effectiveness of sanctions, it is morally questionable to
use them, particularly unilaterally. Unilateral sanctions rarely achieve the stated objectives and have
measurable negative impacts on innocents. While they may lessen the risk of military intervention, this does not
mean the suffering sustained by the population will be less, in fact, the suffering may be much greater over the
long term. In this case, the means cannot be justified by the ends, as it is doubtful whether sanctions can
successfully achieve the desired ends. Even the most successful of cases, commonly highlighted as South
Africa, has tenuous ties linking sanctions to the end of the apartheid rule. The multitude of factors, including
social sanctions and especially private divestment, indicate that economic sanctions were not the sole reason. In
this sense, if one cannot prove with clarity that sanctions are effective, it is incumbent to reevaluate their usage.
Conditional aid, moral suasion, and cooperative engagement are all viable foreign policy options that present a
clearer moral argument.
Sanctions can be more effective if administered multilaterally and with a clear, limited objective. Targeted
sanctions should aim to impact as small a group as possible, ideally only those responsible for the violation of
international norms. While the Crimea case indicates that this may not be effective in the long-run, it also
provides a useful tool to effectively communicate intolerance of violations of international norms. If
implemented properly, the impact on innocents is greatly reduced, though it will remain difficult to remove
other economic factors (as is the case of the price of oil plummeting and depressing the Russian economy
during the imposition of sanctions). The doctrine of double effect―permitting harm to innocent people as long
as harm is not the specified intent, but proportional to the good sought to achieve has some merit. It is naïve to
believe that sanctions may be applied without harm to innocents, as these case studies have demonstrated.
Understanding the harm and working to limit it does make the use of sanctions morally permissible according
to some; yet the evidence for the lack of ineffectiveness of sanctions makes this claim without validity. With
Hufbauer and later Pape’s studies demonstrating very low rates of effectiveness, it is clear that the application
of unilateral and comprehensive economic sanctions should generally be precluded on the basis of both
effectiveness and moral grounds. Similarly, multilateral sanctions should be limited in scope and used to
enforce violations of international norms, not the pursuit of individual state interests. The effectiveness of
economic sanctions as a moral tool of foreign policy is low. Indeed, it must be remembered that Pericles’ first
application of economic sanctions against Megara was a catalyst for the Peloponnesian War.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.03.003
D DAVID PUBLISHING
ASEAN Commitment to Sustainable Development in the

Regional International Environmental Law Perspective
Andreas Pramudianto
University of Indonesia, Jakarta , Indonesia
The World Commission on Environment and Development in its report entitled “Our Common Future” has put
forward the idea of sustainable development which is also an important part of the development of regional
environmental law in Southeast Asia. In 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Nature and Natural Resources has put
sustainable development for the first time in ASEAN’s treaty. Sustainable development continues to grow through
the 1987 Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development agreed upon by the leaders of ASEAN. This research will
look at the importance of sustainable development as part of the regional environmental international law concept
and how it has grown in ASEAN today. The purpose of this research is to know the various international
agreements both soft law and hard law that puts sustainable development as an important element. The results show
that sustainable development has become an integral part of the regional international environmental legal system
in ASEAN. A provisional conclusion shows that ASEAN’s commitment to sustainable development has greatly
improved the success of implementing environmental policies at the ASEAN level.
Keywords: sustainable development, ASEAN, international environmental law regional, international agreements,
soft law and hard law
Introduction
ASEAN is one of the regional international organizations that has developed compared to the
establishment of this organization through the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. Over its 38 years, ASEAN has
operated without a formal charter (Severino, 2005, p. 3). The approval of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 has
asserted a more formal organizational position than simply gathering into a rule-based organization with legal
personality capacity and tends to be centralistic (LIN, 2010). With this change ASEAN will be able to make
various international treaties with other international legal subjects (Pramudianto, 2017, p. 267).
ASEAN, as an influential organization in Southeast Asia, is also experiencing problems, especially in
issues that are developing today. The issue of Rohingya conflict, the existence of ISIS (Islamic State) in the
Philippines, and the issue of South China Sea conflict are issues involving several ASEAN countries. In issues
such as the South China Sea conflict, it sometimes has sharp differences in its foreign policy, especially defense
and security. The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam are the countries that have spent their focus on
border issues in the South China Sea facing China as the superpower in East Asia today.
Andreas Pramudianto, SH, M.Si, lecturer, Study Programe on Environmental Science, School of the Environmental Science
and Departement of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Politic Science, University of Indonesia, Jakarta , Indonesia.
172 ASEAN COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Sustainable development as one of the vision of ASEAN seems to be experiencing obstacles in the effort
to achieve its goals. The South China Sea conflict issue, the Rohingya conflict, and the existence of ISIS in the
Philippines are an important obstacle in achieving sustainable development, especially in achieving the target
of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Defense and security is a crucial issue to be taken into account for
ASEAN in realizing sustainable development in the Southeast Asian region.
Sustainable development, which has been affirmed by the Environment and Development Commission
through its report of “Our Common Future” in 1988, has now grown much more meaningful. The
establishment of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) has provided a wider nuance
with much more developed dynamics today. UNCSD, which is the result of the 1992 Rio Summit, has
encouraged more serious efforts to achieve the Millennium Summit 2000 outcome that confirms the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 2000-2015 or its successor which is the result of UNGA ( United
Nations General Assembly ) 2015, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015-2030.
The problem is: Does ASEAN also have a similar commitment to the dynamics of global international
relations, especially in sustainable development? How does ASEAN address the existence of the concept of
sustainable development and how does ASEAN develop the concept of sustainable development in its dealings
through the resulting documents? Furthermore, will ASEAN be able to influence regional international law in
Southeast Asia through the concept of sustainable development? This paper will try to see ASEAN’s
perspective on sustainable development especially in developing regional international environmental law on
sustainable development.
The Road to Sustainable Development: Global Perspective

When the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) announced its report through
its publication entitled “Our Common Future”, sustainable development became an important direction for
world development at the time. This process can occur since the interests of development and the environment
have been a prolonged problem especially since the Human Environment Conference in Stockholm, Sweden in
1972, which underscores the importance of an agreement between the environment and development through
international legal norms. The important publication to follow up on the environmental and developmental
position through carrying capacity published by United Nations Environmental Programme and Worldwildlife
Fund (UNEP-WWF) was an interesting material to be discussed at that time.
On the other hand, international legal cases have laid the groundwork for the importance of sustainable
development, such as the case of Behring Sea Fur Case (USA v. UK, Arbitration, 1893) and Gabcikovo
Nagymaros Dam Project (Hungary v. Slovk, ICJ, 1993), and several other cases. (Marr, 2003, pp. 40-41).
These international law cases want to show that sustainable development has become an essential part of any
development activity/project/program.
Therefore, in 2000 at the Millennium Summit, states have affirmed its importance in the framework of
global development through Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Two years later in Johannesburg, South
Africa emphasized a more focused commitment to sustainable development through the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD). This summit provides direction for sustainable development and the
importance of synchronization with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Currently MDGs have ended and replaced by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The replacement
process is also related to the important documents produced in the Rio Plus 20 Summit, which is the document
ASEAN COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 173
“Future We Want”. This document makes one of the considerations for the Post-Agenda 2015. In the “Future
We Want” document, sustainable development is a prerequisite for achieving prosperity of the human race. In
September 2015, UN Summit has adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.
In various sustainable development agreements reached at the global level, ASEAN also plays a role
through its involvement in these meetings. Even the obligations that have been agreed upon in sustainable
development are also affirmed by ASEAN, one of which is stated in ASEAN Declaration on Environmental
Sustainability 2007 in Singapore:
Cognizant of mounting global concern over the environment and ASEAN’s obligations to its people in fulfilling the
aims of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), in particular to ensure environmental sustainability in the context of sustainable development.
Likewise in the ASEAN Yangon Resolution on Sustainable Development 2003 that strengthens ASEAN’s
commitment to the WSSD global agreement in Johannesburg, South Africa 2002:
Affirming that the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)
provides an effective framework for international and regional cooperation based on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities.
The declaration and resolution are non-legally binding soft laws, but have a strong and clear commitment
to ASEAN towards a global commitment to sustainable development as such ASEAN has a shared view of the
agreement reached at the global level on sustainable development.
The Importance of Sustainable Development for ASEAN

At the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, 2003, the ASEAN leaders adopted the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord II or Bali Concord II in which they resolved that an ASEAN Community shall be established
comprising three pillars, namely ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). After that, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
the 27th ASEAN Summit adopted the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, to chart the future direction of
the ASEAN Community into the next decade. The “Forging Ahead Together” succeeds the roadmap for an
ASEAN Community (2009-2015). The “Forgoing Ahead Together” document consists of the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, the ASEAN
Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025, the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, and the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025.
Severino (2005) said that ASEAN has gained recognitions of a regional entity and has, to a rising degree,
acted as one. Although according to Sridharan (2007), ASEAN has never aspired to become a supra-national
organization. Recognizing the importance of environmental cooperation for sustainable development and
regional integration, ASEAN has since 1977 cooperated closely in promoting environmental cooperation
among its member states (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017b). Environmental awareness and environmental
regionalism have evolved slowly and in three major phases (Elliott, 2011). In the first phase, ASEAN
introduced the first sub regional environment program (ASEAN Environmental Programme (ASEP I) which
mainly emphasized on securing the availability of natural resources for economic development. During the
second phase (from the late 1980s until the late 1990s), the focus shifted to transnational threats. The third
phase is characterized by the formation of formal relations within the community. In 1993, the ASEAN Senior
Officials on the Environment (ASOEN) agreed to develop the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action on the
Environment. The new action plan should shift focus towards sustainable development strategies.
For ASEAN, sustainable development is a must that is an important part of Southeast Asian society
development. The purpose of the establishment of ASEAN is the welfare of its people through three important
pillars of politic-security, economy, and social culture. The ASEAN Community Vision 2025 recognizes the
complementarity of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with ASEAN’s Community building
efforts to uplift the standards of living of her peoples. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
clearly states that “sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth is essential for prosperity. This will
only be possible if wealth is shared and income inequality is addressed”.
The new ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2025 has a strong emphasis on promoting
and ensuring one layer protection, as well as developing and adapting environmentally-sound technology at all
times. The term “sustainable” was a recurring theme throughout the 2025 Blueprint, from environmental
protection, social development, consumption and production, to responding to natural disasters.
ASEAN environmental cooperation focuses on 10 priority areas, which range from promoting
environmentally friendly technology and harmonizing policies and databases to promoting the sustainability
levels of cities and urban areas and protecting the sustainability of freshwater sources.
ASEAN has four key result areas of “Sustainable” Characteristic in ASCC Blueprint 2025 and 10 priority
areas of ASEAN Environmental Cooperation. Four key result areas are:
(1) Conservation and Sustainability Management of Biodiversity and Natural Resources;
(2) Environmentally Sustainable Cities;
(3) Sustainable Consumption and Production;
(4) Sustainable Climate.
Ten priority areas of ASEAN Environmental Cooperation are:
(1) Global Environmental Issues;
(2) Trans-boundary environmental pollution;
(3) Environmental Education;
(4) Environmentally Sound Technology;
(5) Environmentally Sustainable Cities;
(6) Environmental Policies and Databases;
(7) Coastal and Marine Environment;
(8) Nature Conservation and Biodiversity;
(9) Water Resources Management;
(10) Climate Change.
The other else, there are five key programmes including implementation of ASEAN Peat land
Management Strategy including the five-year International Fund for Agricultural Development-Global
Environment Facility (IFAD-GEF) project on rehabilitation of peat land forests in Southeast Asia,
implementation of ASEAN Environmental Education Action Plan, development of ASEAN Guidelines on
Eco-schools, and implementation of ASEAN Heritage Parks Programme, and ASEAN Environmentally
Sustainable City Award Programme.
ASEAN’s Documents on Sustainable Development

ASEAN as a regional international organization has also played a role in the dynamics of global
environmental issues. According to Severino (2005), ASEAN’s founding document was a two-page
“Declaration” as a Bangkok Declaration 1967. Most ASEAN agreements, even those that are technically
binding, have been dependent on the voluntary compliance of member state. Sustainable development that has
grown internationally is also followed by ASEAN with the agreements in a legally binding or non-legally
binding. Even before “Our Common Future” was published by World Commission Environment and
Development (WCED), ASEAN has agreed on the Manila Declaration on ASEAN Environment on 13th April,
1981. One item in this declaration confirms:
Further recognizing, that sustained development is dependent upon the continuous availability of natural resources.
The ASEAN Commitment was reaffirmed in the ASEAN Agreement on Nature and Natural Conservation
in 1985. The ASEAN Commitment on sustainable development is underscored in the notion that:
Conscious also, that the inter-relationship between conservation and socioeconomic development implies both that
conservation is necessary to ensure sustainability of development, and that socioeconomic development is necessary for
the achievement of conservation on a lasting basis.
Then in Article 1(1), it is reaffirmed on the fundamental principle which states:

The Contracting Parties, within the framework of their respective national laws, undertake to adopt singly, or where
necessary and appropriate through concerted action, the measures necessary to maintain essential ecological process and
life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, and to ensure the sustainable utilization of harvested natural resources
under their jurisdiction in accordance with scientific principles and with a view to attaining the goal of sustainable
development.
Although ASEAN Agreement 1985 is still not entered into force, ASEAN still has a commitment to
sustainable development. In further developments, ASEAN is strengthening itself in its commitment to
sustainable development. This was further affirmed in the Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development
signed by the ASEAN Minister of the Environment at the 3rd meeting on 30th October, 1987. In the
consideration section of the Jakarta Resolution 1987, it is affirmed that:
Conscious that the sustainability of development requires that development processes and environmental management
be conducted in an integrated manner.
This resolution also adopts the principle of sustainable development as stated in Section 1 of the
resolution:
I. That ASEAN member countries adopt the principle of sustainable development to guide and to serve as an
integrating factor in their common efforts.
In order to achieve this resolution especially in various ASEAN activities, the cooperation of various
stakeholders is needed. This is stated:
III. That ASEAN cooperation should encompass governments and government agencies as well as the private
business sector, professional associations, educational and academic institutions and non-governmental organizations.
In addition, the Jakarta Resolution 1987 also emphasises that in achieving sustainable development, it is
necessary to institutionalize this matter as stated:
V. That in affirming this Resolution, the ASEAN Environment Ministers are aware that the pursuit of sustainable
development would be best served by the establishment of a regional body on the environment of sufficient stature whose
task should include…
In 1990, ASEAN signed the Kuala Lumpur Accord and continued with some declaration and resolution,
such as Jakarta Declaration on Environment and Development 1997 and Kota Kinabalu Resolution on the
Environment 2000. In 2002, ASEAN agreed on regional treaty agreement, namely the ASEAN Agreement on
Trans-boundary Haze Pollution was signed on 10th June, 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In the same year,
ASEAN stated Joint Statement of the Ministers Responsible for Environment of the Member States of ASEAN
to the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002. This statement is a support for the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa 2002.
In 2003, ASEAN agreed Yangon Resolution on Sustainable Development and 2006 Cebu Resolution on
Sustainable Development. In 2007, ASEAN agreed on the ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability
which confirmed several things including:
Cognizant of mounting global concern over the environment and ASEAN’s obligations to its people in fulfilling the
aims of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), in particular to ensure environmental sustainability in the context of sustainable development;
Reiterating the need to build an ASEAN Community that is economically vibrant and environmentally friendly, so
that the present and future generations can enjoy a clean and sustainable environment.
The ASEAN Charter, signed in 2007, the opening section further emphasizes the importance of sustainable
development:
ASEAN … RESOLVED to ensure sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations, and to
place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the peoples at the centre of the ASEAN community building process.
In the Chairman’s Statement of the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits at Vientiane, on 6th-7th September,
2016 in the theme: “Turning Vision Into Reality for a Dynamic ASEAN Community”, there are two
commitments on sustainable development. These commitments are:
86. We adopted the ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to the 22nd Session of the Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP-22) and looked forward to fruitful
outcomes of UNFCCC COP-22 in Marrakesh, Morocco in November 2016 in ensuring the successful implementation of
Paris Agreement according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, in light of different national
circumstances and in support of sustainable development.
87. We adopted the ASEAN Joint Statement to the Thirteenth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD COP 13) which will be held on 4-17 December 2016 in Cancun, Mexico to articulate our
commitments to the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, and the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development in the conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity and natural
resources.
Continuing commitment of sustainable development, ASEAN was results some agreed, such as ASEAN
Declaration on Environmental Sustainability 2007, Singapore Resolution on Sustainability and Climate Change
2009, Joint Declaration on the Attainment of the Millennium Development Goals in ASEAN 2009, ASEAN
Road Map for the Attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 2011, Bangkok Resolution on
Environmental Cooperation 2012, ASEAN Joint Statement on the Implementation on Sustainable Consumption
and Production in ASEAN 2013, Declaration on ASEAN Post-2015 Environmental Sustainability, and Climate
Change Agenda 2015.
In the document of Vientiane Declaration on Reinforcing Cultural Heritage Cooperation in ASEAN 2016,
it has agreed:
Recognizing the 2030 United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), which highlights the
significant role of culture in two areas namely: (i) strengthening efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and
natural heritage and (ii) promoting a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural
diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development, both addressing tangible and intangible cultural
heritage.
In the ASEAN Joint Statement to the Thirteenth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD COP 13), it has statement:
Reaffirming our commitment to implement the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and achieve the Aichi
Biodiversity Targets; and to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), in particular Goals 14 and 15 on the conservation and sustainable use of coastal and marine resources, and
terrestrial ecosystems respectively;
Welcoming the recommendations of the ASEAN Conference on Biodiversity with the theme “Biodiversity for
Sustainable Development” held on 15-19 February 2016 in Bangkok, Thailand which included the need to accelerate
actions, mainstream biodiversity issues, strengthen partnerships and increase financing to address the region’s
biodiversity-related challenges.
In the ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP-22) to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it has stated:
Further Reaffirming that efforts to address climate change should be consistent with broader Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs).
After that, it has agreed:

6. Continue to explore means of further enhancing sustainable development efforts in the region under the CBDR
principles as entrenched in the Convention;
11. Request support for developing countries and least developed countries to pursue sustainable development
opportunities that can enable mitigation and adaptation efforts to be included in their (I) NDCs as appropriate, noting that
mitigation and adaptation efforts can have strong regional co-benefits which contribute, inter alia, to food, water, energy
security and local culture.
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Developments in the Korean Peninsula on 5th August, 2017
has agreed:
We strongly call upon the DPRK, as a participant of the ASEAN Regional Forum, to positively contribute to realize
the ARF Vision to maintain the Asia-Pacific as a region of lasting peace, stability, friendship and prosperity where States
and organizations, both within and outside the region work in a spirit of mutual trust, appreciation and respect to overcome
security threats and challenges and prevent escalation of potential conflicts with a view to creating an environment
conducive to sustainable development, social progress and improved quality of life for all peoples in the region.
In the ASEAN Joint Declaration on Hazardous Chemicals and Wastes Management on 26th April, 2017, it
has agreed that:
Recalling the ASEAN Vision of 2020 that envision a clean and green ASEAN with fully established mechanisms for
sustainable development to ensure the protection of the region's environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, and
the high quality of life of its people
The other statement has:

Acknowledging, the global commitment and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development particularly on
Goal 12 Ensuring Sustainable Consumption and Production Pattern.
Adhering the purposes of ASEAN enshrined in Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter, that is to promote sustainable
development so as to ensure the protection of the region’s environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, the
preservation of its cultural heritage and the high quality of life of its people.
Call upon non-ASEAN Member State Parties particularly developed Parties to the Basel Convention, Rotterdam
Convention, and Stockholm Convention to strengthen and deepen the cooperation with ASEAN towards the full
implementation of the conventions.
In the Chairman’s Statement 30th ASEAN Summit Manila on 29th April, 2017 with theme: “Partnering
for Change, Engaging the World”, it has statement:
99. We welcomed the signing of two ASEAN-EU programmes on sustainable use of peat lands and haze mitigation in
ASEAN as well as biodiversity conservation and management of protected areas in ASEAN.
101. We reaffirmed our commitment to the conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity and natural
resources in the ASEAN region. We looked forward to the full ratification of the ACB Establishment Agreement.
102. We noted the successful conduct of the Fifth ASEAN Heritage Parks Conference with the theme, “Innovations
for Enhanced Governance of ASEAN Heritage Parks,” on 24-27 October 2016 in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar that brought
together various actors of the ASEAN Heritage Parks Programme to review and exchange views on the progress of
ASEAN’s efforts in effectively managing ASEAN Heritage Parks and addressing biodiversity issues for sustainable
development.
ASEAN With Dialogue Partner and External Partner in the Commitment of Sustainable
Development
ASEAN’s relations with dialogue partners and external partners have been fortified and deepened in the
past one year through bolstering the existing frameworks and implementing the plans of action that are in line
with the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a). In the cooperation on sustainable
development, there are some commitments with dialogue partner. The commitments are:
ASEAN-Australia
The first ASEAN-Australia cooperation in 1974 has started through ASEAN-Australia Dialogue Relations
Towards a Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit. The Plan of Action (POA) builds upon the strong
cooperation between ASEAN and Australia. In 2015 Plan of Action agreed to implement the ASEAN-Australia
Strategic Partnership (2015-2019). This POA is to implement the goals and objectives of the ASEAN-Australia
Summits and the Joint ASEAN-Australia Leaders’ Statement on the 40th Anniversary. In this programme there
is support cooperation that builds the institutional capacity of AANZFTA (ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand
Free Trade Agreement) Parties and the ASEAN Secretariat and contributes to sustainable development
outcomes; support and promote conservation and sustainable management of ASEAN’s coastal and marine
environment.
ASEAN-Canada
The first dialogue ASEAN-Canada has started in the year on 1977. After this dialogue, there are some
meeting and joint activities. Recently, in June 2006 at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, the ASEAN-Canada has
agreed to a Joint Cooperation Work Plan that was being drawn up as a basis for future cooperation. In the Joint
Declaration Between ASEAN and Canada on Trade and Investment Jakarta, Indonesia, 3rd October, 2011, the
declaration desires to ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive in the furtherance of
sustainable development. In the Co-Chairs’ Press Statement of the ASEAN-Canada Commemorative Summit
on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-Canada Dialogue Relations at Manila,
Filipina on 14th November, 2017, the statement has reaffirmed the important role played by ASEAN and
Canada in building up the political-security, economic, socio-cultural, and people-to-people agenda of the Asia
Pacific region and agreed to continue strengthening our enhanced partnership for mutual benefit and in support
of global peace, security, prosperity, and sustainable development.
ASEAN-China
The first contact ASEAN-China was conducted in 1990. After this contact, there are some joint activities
in the environmental and sustainable development aspects. At Ha Noi, Viet Nam, on 29th October, 2010, the
ASEAN-China has agreed Leaders’ Joint Statement on Sustainable Development. In June 2016, the
ASEAN-China Strategy on Environmental Cooperation (2016-2020) was endorsed by the ASEAN-China
leader. The overall objective of the ASEAN-China Strategy on Environmental Cooperation (2016-2020) is to
strengthen ASEAN-China cooperation in priority areas of environmental protection by taking a coordinated and
integrated approach with a view to achieving environmental sustainability in the region. The others else of this
program is to implement the ASEAN-China Cooperation Framework for Environmentally Sound Technology
and Industry by building up a platform for information exchange, conducting demonstration projects, and
developing joint research on environmental technology, in support of the 10-Year Framework on Sustainable
Consumption and Production.
ASEAN-European Union
In the 7th March, 1980 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia has signed Cooperation Agreement between Member
Countries of ASEAN and European Community. The Article 3 stated the cooperation in the fields of science
and technology, energy, environment, transport and communications, agriculture, fisheries and forestry. In the
environmental field, there is a program for sustainable development achievement. ASEAN and the EU
launched two new programmes in March 2017 to further strengthen ASEAN-EU cooperation in environmental
protection and sustainable development, namely, the Sustainable Use of Peat Land and Haze Mitigation in
ASEAN and the Biodiversity Conservation and Management of Protected Areas in ASEAN region. EU has
also supported an ASEAN Regional Centre for the Biodiversity Conservation. In the Co-Chairs’ Statement of
the 20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting at Brussels, Belgium, 23rd July, 2014, the ministers supported the
inclusive and transparent approach of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda formulation process.
They welcomed the proposal of the Open Working Group for Sustainable Development Goals and the
recommendations of the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The ministers also
emphasised that the objectives of the new universal framework should reinforce the international community’s
commitment to poverty eradication and sustainable development. In celebrating the 40th anniversary of their
partnership, ASEAN-EU has statement on the Paris Agreement on reaffirming commitment to cooperation to
address the shared challenge of climate change. It has agreed to reaffirm our commitment to work together with
all stakeholders to combat climate change and its impacts, consistent with the broader outcomes and goals of
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
ASEAN-India
The first dialogue ASEAN-India in 1990. After that dialogue, India became dialogue partnership formally
in 1992. There is Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared
Prosperity (2010-2015) that ASEAN-India has agreed to intensify ASEAN-India development cooperation in
support of ASEAN efforts in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In 2012 India became
strategic partnership of ASEAN. The Plan of Action Dialogue Partnership focuses on security, economy,
society, and culture. There are five key areas of cooperation including connectivity, blue economy, digital age,
migration, and soft power (Chapman, 2018, p. 2). In the blue economy one emphasizes the importance of
sustainable development. The 2017 India-ASEAN cooperation is to strengthen ASEAN solidarity by working
together through environmental and sustainable development programs (en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/editor).
ASEAN-Japan
ASEAN-Japan Summit in the first time has held in 1977. After the summit, some dialogue and summit
was held and developed. For example, The Sixteenth Consultations between the ASEAN Economic Ministers
(AEM) and the Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan (16th AEM-METI Consultations)
was held in Da Nang, Viet Nam on 26th August, 2010. The ministers expressed appreciation on Japan’s
commitment to promote the “Asian Sustainable Chemical Safety” Plan. The technical cooperation on personnel
training and ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) research on chemical management system in ASEAN and East Asia
would contribute in developing sustainable society in the region. In the Chairman’s Statement of the 13th
ASEAN-Japan Summit at Ha Noi, Viet Nam on 29th October, 2010, the summit reiterated the importance of
sustainable development, including energy efficiency and energy conservation for sustainable development and
in this regard appreciated Japan’s initiatives, such as the Smart Community Initiative and the Asian Sustainable
Chemical Safety Plan. In the Chairman’s Statement of the 17th ASEAN-Japan Summit Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar
on 12th November, 2014, the summit looked forward to sharing scientific and technological know-how and
expertise on environmentally friendly technology in order to achieve low carbon growth in the region, one of
the key elements to achieving sustainable economic growth. In the Chairman’s Statement of the 20th
ASEAN-Japan Summit on 13th November, 2017, Manila, Philippines with theme “Partnering for Change,
Engaging the World”, the summit has noted the continued growth of cooperation on environmental issues,
particularly in addressing issues relating to environmental protection and sustainable development. In this
regard, the ASEAN leaders welcomed the ASEAN-Japan Environmental Cooperation Initiative which aims to
advance environmental cooperation in areas including climate change, waste management, biodiversity
conservation, chemical pollution management, wastewater management, and quality environmental
infrastructure development for sustainable cities, as well as cooperation in Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).
ASEAN-Republic of Korea (ROK)
ASEAN-ROK relation was elevated to full dialogue status in 1991. In the Joint Declaration on
ASEAN-Republic of Korea Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity at Ha Noi, Viet Nam on 29th
October, 2010, there are some cooperation and commitments on sustainable development. These cooperation
and commitments are to enhance ASEAN-ROK cooperation in environmental management including
integrated water resource management; environmentally sustainable cities; environmentally sound technologies
and cleaner production; biodiversity conservation; public awareness and education; sustainable use of coastal
and marine environment and trans-boundary environmental pollution. And other else is to strengthen
ASEAN-ROK cooperation on programes to mitigate and address the impact of climate change and promote
sustainable development. In the Chairman’s Statement of the 19th ASEAN-ROK Summit on 13th November,
2017 at Manila, Philippines with theme: “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World”, the summit looked
forward to further cooperation in the area of sustainable development, including the sharing of ROK’s
experience in combining rapid economic growth with poverty reduction, clean energy, green growth, and ICT
(information communications technology) in pursuit of ASEAN’s economic integration and poverty alleviation.
ASEAN-New Zealand
New Zealand became ASEAN’s dialogue partner in 1975. The partnership between ASEAN and New
Zealand reached a significant milestone with the adoption of the ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Declaration on
Comprehensive Partnership for 2015 and the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration at the PMC +1
Session with New Zealand on 22nd July, 2010 in Ha Noi. New Zealand regularly attends the East Asia Summit
(EAS) Environmental Track Senior Official Meeting or SOM to strengthen links between New Zealand and
ASEAN in areas of mutual interest, such as biodiversity conservation, natural resources management, green
technology development, environmental governance, sustainable development, chemicals and hazardous wastes
control, sustainable forest management, and climate change. Together with several ASEAN Member States,
New Zealand is also a member of the Asia Pacific Carbon Market Roundtable (APCMR) Forum.
(http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/Overview-ASEAN-New-Zealand-DR_as-of-April-2017.pdf).
ASEAN-Russia
Since 1991 the foreign minister of ASEAN and the Soviet Union has had several consultative meetings. In
October 1994 the Russian Federation suggested the establishment joint committee. For example, recently, at the
Russian Federation-ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Sustained Recovery and Development, was adopted in Ha
Noi, on 9th April, 2010 has welcomed the Russian Federation’s support for the ASEAN’s efforts to enhance
regional connectivity which will promote future peace and prosperity in the region. ASEAN welcomed the
participation of the Russian Federation in the regional integration processes, considering it as an important
factor of stability and sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific. It has determined to expand cooperation and
collaboration with all interested partners with a view to building long-lasting peace, stability, and security in the
region and create favorable conditions for global sustainable development in the interests of the international
community.
ASEAN-United States (US)
In the Joint Press Statement of the 16th US-ASEAN Dialogue at Washington DC on 29th November, 2001,
the dialogue had commitment on environmental and sustainable development in making the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002 a success. In the 11th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties
to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), US-ASEAN has agreed on Joint Statement of the ASEAN
Environment Ministers in promoting the aim to ensure conservation and sustainable management of ASEAN
biodiversity towards enhancing social and economic, and environmental well-being. In the Chairman’s
Statement of the 5th ASEAN-US Summit to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN-US Dialogue
Relation on 13th November, 2017 at Manila, Philippines with theme “Partnering for Change, Engaging the
World”, the summit expressed continued support for the Lower Mekong Initiative, which assists ASEAN in
advancing sustainable development, narrowing development gaps, and promoting regional connectivity and in
this connection, underscored the importance of promoting cooperation in sustainable development.

ASEAN-Plus Three
The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation process began in December 1997 with the convening of an
Informal Summit among the leaders of ASEAN and China, Japan, and the ROK at the side lines of the Second
ASEAN Informal Summit in Malaysia. APT Cooperation has developed Strategy Framework, especially on
food security and bio-energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation, sustainable forest management,
agricultural research and development, and human resource development. In the Chairman’s Statement of the
16th ASEAN Plus Three Summit at the Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam on 10th October, 2013, the
leaders have agreed especially Part 16 Chairman’s Statement. Part 16 said that we recognized the increasing
need to facilitate closer cooperation on environment and sustainable development and hence welcomed the
convening of the 12th ASEAN Plus Three Environment Ministers’ Meeting held in Surabaya, Indonesia on
26th September, 2013. The statement also welcomed the proposal to hold the 2nd ASEAN Plus Three Youth
Environment Forum with the theme “Youth and Sustainability” in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam in
November 2013. In the Chairman’s Statement of the 20th ASEAN Plus Three Commemorative Summit on
14th November, 2017 at Manila, Philippines with theme “Partnering For Change, Engaging the World”, the
leaders have agreed to adopt the APT Leaders’ Statement on Food Security Cooperation and reaffirmed our
commitment to work together to ensure food security, food safety, better nutrition, and equitable distribution as
well as promote sustainable development in the region.
ASEAN-Norway
The cooperation of ASEAN-Norway has started by accession of Norway to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia on 1st July, 2013 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. In first
the Joint Statement on ASEAN-Norway Partnership at Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, on 8th August, 2014, the
statement sought ways and means to support private-public collaboration that promotes sustainable agricultural
commodity production. Statement was also to strengthen socio-cultural cooperation in support of the
implementation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint as well as the implementation of
the ASEAN Roadmap for the Attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
ASEAN-Switzerland
Switzerland became as ASEAN sector ASEAN partner at the 49th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting or AMM
in Vientiane, Laos, in August 2016. Switzerland is the 3rd sector partner of ASEAN after Pakistan and Norway.
The 2nd ASEAN Meeting Joint Sectoral Cooperation was held in the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta on 15th
December, 2017. This meeting noted the good progress made in cooperation since Switzerland was conferred
the status of ASEAN’s sectoral dialogue partnership in July 2016. A plan is being developed on Practical
Cooperation Areas 2017-2021 with a view to supporting the implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision
2025 and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
ASEAN-Pakistan
Pakistan was accorded the status of sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting on 23rd July, 1993. The inaugural meeting of ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Sectoral Dialogue Relations was
convened on 5th-7th November, 1997 in Islamabad to launch the partnership. ASEAN and Pakistan have
undertaken cooperation in trade, industry and investment, science and technology, drugs and narcotics control,
environment sustainable development, tourism, and human resources development

ASEAN-Germany
Germany was conferred the status of development partner of ASEAN by the 49th ASEAN Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) on 24th July, 2016 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. The ASEAN-Germany Development
Partnership was institutionalized through the convening of the First ASEAN-Germany Development
Partnership Committee (AG-DPC) Meeting on 23rd January, 2017 at the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. A
Programme on “Protection of Biological Diversity in the ASEAN Member States in Cooperation with the
ACB” was launched in April 2015, which aims to protect the biological diversity, promote the sustainable
management of natural ecosystems, and improve the livelihoods of local population in the ASEAN region. In
the future cooperation, ASEAN-Germany has developed some programs such as technical and skills training,
tourism, green and renewable energy, sustainable development, promotion of small and medium industries,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, support for the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN
Connectivity (MPAC 2025) and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Work Plan III.
ASEAN-United Nations
ASEAN-UN has a Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the UN, which
was adopted by the leaders of ASEAN and the UN Secretary-General at the 4th ASEAN-UN Summit on 19th
November, 2011 in Bali, Indonesia. Through the implementation of this Plan of Action, both sides will also
work together to support the realization of the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together and the global 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development in a complementary manner and to strengthen collaboration in jointly
addressing emerging regional and global challenges. In this Plan of Action there are some programs including
support ASEAN in achieving peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to
justice for all, and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions through the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development; promote cooperation and collaborative efforts through joint development and
implementation of the ASEAN-UN Environment and Climate Change Action Plan 2016-2020 towards the
realization of the ASEAN Declaration on ASEAN Post-2015 Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change
Agenda as well as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate
Change; in the other else, support ASEAN’s efforts in promoting the integration of Sustainable Consumption
and Production strategies and best practices into national and regional policies or as part of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as ASEAN’s efforts for sustainable urban development including
promoting integrated resource management; strengthen collaboration for enhancing the well-being and
livelihood of the peoples in the region through sustainable development and poverty eradication; promote the
exchange of best practices, technical cooperation, and capacity building in monitoring and reporting on
Sustainable Development Goals; explore new partnerships to harness the private sector’s financial and
nonfinancial resources, science, technology, and innovation needed to implement the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development. In the Chairman’s Statement of the 9th ASEAN-United Nations Summit on 13th
November, 2017 at Manila, Philippines, the statement has looked forward to policy conversations at the
technical level on how ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) can support and contribute to the achievement of
the Sustainable Development Goals, primarily through the impact evaluation component of the AEC 2025
Monitoring & Evaluation Framework in realizing the vision of a people-centered and people-oriented ASEAN.
East Asia Summit
East Asia Summit (EAS) cooperation is progressing well in the six priority areas: energy, education,
finance, global health issues and pandemic diseases, environment and disaster management, and ASEAN
connectivity. Recently, in 2010 at the East Asia Summit, the foreign minsiters has agreed on Chairman’s
Statement of the East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers Informal Consultations at Ha Noi, Viet Nam, on 21st July,
2010 that affirmed the context of global uneven and risk-prone economic recovery. The ministers also were of
the view that the EAS participating countries can play an important role in the region’s efforts in restoring
financial stability and generating sustainable economic growth and development, and in further enhancing
regional financial cooperation.
ASEAN-Gulf Cooperation Council (ASEAN-GCC)
In the Joint Press Statement of the 2nd ASEAN-GCC Ministerial Meeting Singapore on 1st June, 2010,
the statement stressed the need for greater international cooperation to address the serious challenges of climate
change and the environmental deterioration that have had negative effects on socio-economic development. In
particular, we encouraged developed countries to support developing countries with adequate, predictable, and
sustainable financial resources, transfer of technology, as well as capacity enhancement to enable mitigation
and adaptation efforts by developing countries through effective institutional arrangements.
ASEAN-Pacific Alliance (PA)
The ASEAN-PA Framework for Cooperation was adopted at the 3rd ASEAN-PA Ministerial Meeting in
September 2016 in New York at the side lines of the UN General Assembly. The framework aims to enhance
cooperation based on mutual interest and to bring relations closer in the some areas including sustainable
development.
ASEAN-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
The Chair Statement Strengthening Partnership for Peace and Sustainable Development, in 13th ASEM
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 20th-21st November, 2017 at Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, has reaffirmed ASEM’s
cardinal values of equal partnership, mutual respect, and mutual benefit. The ministers emphasized the need for
closer engagement towards a stronger and more dynamic partnership in the process of addressing global issues
and the creation of a favorable environment for a stronger, more sustainable and balanced development. The
ministers underscored their firm commitment to promote and develop a stronger, more effective and fair
international system with the United Nations at its core and effective multilateral institutions for cooperation.
The ministers’ statement has also underlined that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents a
breakthrough in the international community’s collective approach towards achievement of sustainable
development by 2030. They underscored the need for all stakeholders to work on ambitious and integrated
implementation, including the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, domestically as
well as internationally. The ministers recalled the outcome of the 11th ASEM Summit and reaffirmed their
commitment to the ASEM Tangible Cooperation Areas, which advance the 2030 Agenda in the ASEM Context.
The ministers’ statement also expressed concern over negative impacts of climate change, environmental
degradation, and natural disasters on the sustainable development of ASEM partners. The ministers recognised
the role of strong political commitment to the full and swift implementation of the Paris Agreement in
coherence with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the
light of different national circumstances in order to foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions.
ASEAN-Other Organization
ASEAN has also cooperated with the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP), United Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and other else, such as, ILO (International Labour Organization),
UNICEF (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund), UNAIDS, UN Office Drugs and Crime,
etc. All of these organizations have conducted activities on sustainable development with ASEAN.
The Influence of Sustainable Development in Regional International Environmental Law in

ASEAN
There are three pillars of sustainable development that are economic, social, and environment. Sustainable
development has also relations with present and future generation. According the WCED (1987), sustainable
development is defined:
Sustainable development is development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.
Sustainable development is a global concept. There are some principles of sustainable development, such
as principle of environmental protection, principle of public participation, principle of access to information,
precautionary principle, etc.
As a global concept, sustainable development has applied by ASEAN’s norms and principles. ASEAN’s
clarity and commitment to sustainable development has been demonstrated in various legal documents, both
hard law and soft law. Pramudianto (2017, p. 269) affirmed that ASEAN to date has succeeded in developing
international environmental law through soft law and hard law. ASEAN has affirmed that commitment on
sustainable development in various levels of regional international law, starting from documents that are legally
binding and non-legally binding. But to do this, realization is required through programs and activities. Several
programs and activities that emphasize the importance of sustainable development have been implemented at
the national level.
As an example of sustainable development activities through the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable
City Award Program, it has provided incentives for ASEAN member countries, especially the ASEAN cities to
make sustainable cities. This award is able to positively affect cities to improve governance through sustainable
governance.
Studies claimed that the so-called “ASEAN Way” with its “principles of non-interference, consultation,
consensus, quiet diplomacy, symbolism, and organizational minimalism” lessened the control powers of the
ASEAN, particularly in terms of its efforts to address environmental challenges (Nguitragool, 2011, pp.
356-378; Macarayan et al., 2013, p. 2). The principle of non-interference and safeguarding member states’
sovereignty is continued at the cost of the environment (Koh & Robinson, 2002, p. 679). While ASEAN
environmental programmes and agreements are highly ambitious in their wording, they often lack effective
implementation and enforcement mechanisms. As a member state faces no serious consequences in the case of
non-compliance, incentives for implementation and enforcement are low (Aggarwal & Chow, 2010).
But, Ibitz (2012) in his research field of hazardous waste said that there is a strong need to establish
ASEAN community law to govern the association with principles that can be applied at the national level.
Without the adoption of a binding community law, ASEAN will not be able to develop into an effective and
successful community.
Although there is “ASEAN Way”, but the practice use of sustainable development has been generally
accepted by ASEAN countries. This is evidenced by the agreement of documents of soft law and hard law that
emphasize the importance of the concept of sustainable development and is used in many national laws in
ASEAN countries. For example in Indonesia, there is Act Number 32 Year 2009 on Environmental Protection
and Management. The part of consideration has affirmed that national economic development as such is
mandated by the State Constitution Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 held based on the principle of sustainable
development and environmentally friendly.
Conclusion
ASEAN has committed itself to its vision to fulfill sustainable development including implemented by its
member countries. ASEAN cooperation with full partners and non-full partners has been done since long
including in developing the concept of sustainable development.
The history of the founding of ASEAN is inseparable from the efforts to improve the welfare of the people
of Southeast Asia which has now merged in the ASEAN Community since the ASEAN Charter 2007 was
applied. ASEAN and sustainable development commitments as one of the vision of ASEAN, it is expected to
improve the life of ASEAN countries whose past role conflicts.
Sustainable development will be an important vision in the ASEAN Community so much encourages the
quality of life of ASEAN communities. This encouragement can be seen through ASEAN programs such as
sustainability cities. On the other hand, ASEAN documents that have encouraged sustainable development will
enhance the role of law, especially regional international environmental law.
Regional International Environmental Laws related to sustainable development are expected to flourish in
Southeast Asia. This will be in accordance with Principle 27 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 which states the
need for development of international sustainable development law. This principle affirms that:
States and people shall co-operate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the fulfillment of the principles
embodied in this Declaration and in the further development of international law in the field of sustainable development.
In order to development of the sustainable development concept, regional international environmental law
must take a initiative and implementation in regional of sustainable development law that must be applicable
with ASEAN principles and norms.
References
Aggarwal, V. K., & Chow, J. T. (2010). The perils of consensus: How ASEAN meta-regime undermines economic and
environmental cooperation. Review of International Political Economy, 17(2).
ASEAN Secretariat. (2017a). ASEAN Annual Report 2016-2017: Partnering for change, engaging the world. Retrieved from
http://asean.org/?static_post=partnering-change-engaging-world
ASEAN Secretariat. (2017b). ASEAN cooperation on environment: At a glance. Retrieved from
http://asean.org/storage/2018/02/50.-December-2017-ASEAN-Cooperation-on-Environment-At-A-Glance.pdf
Chapman, T. (2018). ASEAN and India: Five for the next five (ORF Special Report No. 57). Retrieved from
https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ORF_SpecialReport_57_ASEAN-New.pdf
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from the ASEAN way. Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law, 640-682.
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Hague/London/New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher.
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Severino, R. (2005). Framing the ASEAN charter: An ISEAS perspective. Singapore: ISEAS Publication.
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Documents
ASEAN Documents Series 2008, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.03.004
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Tourism With the Integration and Development of

Vietnam—Southeast Asia
Huynh Quoc Thang

Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Due to its intrinsic and functional characteristics, tourism can be viewed as a special activity that is both an agent
and a result, and is itself a concrete manifestation of the process of human the process of developing social life.
Especially in the context of industrialization, modernization, and globalization today, along with the “information
society and the knowledge economy”, tourism can both be an important cultural interchange channel, and can
become a “smoke-free industry” playing a key economic role. Through the development process of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially after the ASEAN Community (AC) was formed (October 2003)
with three pillars, especially with the initiative of the Asean Tourism Association (ASEANTA), in fact, it is proving
that... By the basis of history-culture and geo-economic conditions have opened up favorable prospects; in coming
time through proactive solutions, tourism may become a focal point associated with strategies to accelerate the
process of integration of Vietnam and Southeast Asia in order to contribute to the sustainable development of the
nation, the region, and the whole world.
Keywords: tourism development, integration process, Vietnam and Southeast Asia
Introduction
As a lecturer in Cultural Tourism in many universities and colleges in Ho Chi Minh City and many other
localities nationwide, as well as a member of Executive Committee—Head of Training Board of Tourism
Association of Ho Chi Minh City, the author from the perspective of combining culturology with touristology
wants to assert that tourism is not only a major economic activity and service in the revolutionary industrial age
4.0 but also one of the ways cultural exchanges, and economic importance in the trend of globalization is
expanding as today. For Vietnam and Southeast Asia, a long-standing historical-cultural region has been
associated with flesh and blood in many respects; nowadays in the context of the new age, tourism as the
dynamic social activity has played a vital role in shaping the integration of the region. The reality has been
clearly evident about this and will increasingly require even higher demands on the issue. The content of the
article aims to initially contribute to clarifying the situation and proposing solutions related to such problems.
The Integration Process Between Vietnam and Southeast Asia and the Real Status of
Tourism Activities
On July 28, 1995, Vietnam officially became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Huynh Quoc Thang, Ph.D., associate professor, Faculty of Cultural Studies, University of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
TOURISM WITH THE INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 189
(ASEAN). South East Asian countries, which have a special place in Vietnam, have many cultural similarities,
have close neighbors, traditions, and are closely associated in terms of security, politics, and economy.
ASEAN’s accession continues to further strengthen Vietnam’s bilateral and multilateral relations with its
partners inside and outside the region, contributing to improving and enhancing Vietnam’s position in
international relations, and facilitate Vietnam’s participation in regional and international integration with a
deeper and broader scale. In fact, the process of integration does not only promote economic, trade, and
investment relations, facilitate the consultation on development, transfer of science and technology, exchange
of knowledge and techniques..., it is also possible to directly open opportunities for the Vietnamese economy to
develop smoothly and enhance its competitiveness in all cooperation processes between Vietnam and ASEAN
in order to contribute significantly to the consolidation of peace, stability, and development of the region and
the world.
The ASEAN Charter officially came into effect on December 15, 2008. Vietnam is one of the early
countries to ratify and actively participate in joint ASEAN activities to bring this Charter to life. At the same
time, Viet Nam also actively contributes to the process of implementing the roadmap for building of ASEAN
Community (AC) with three pillars: political-security community, economic community, and socio-cultural
community. In line with that process, on the results of the completion of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),
ASEAN unanimously approved the master plan to step up efforts towards the formation of the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC). Until it was formally established on 31 December 2015, AEC had not only
continued to further promote intra-regional trade liberalization and attract foreign investment in ASEAN
countries to accelerate the process of regionalization, globalization, but also is accelerated increasingly
self-conscious, higher consciousness through cultural communication, political harmony of the communities in
the region. A part of the route formed AEC which is adopted at the ASEAN-14 Summit (February 2009), is the
development of tourism, one of the 12 priority areas for associating community members. From on the same
way, tourism activities can always be considered as one of the direct meaningful contributions to cultural
integration in the direction of the items of socio-economic contribution to the realization of ASEAN’s common
slogan: “One vision, one identity, one community” and even wider, it also is more for the sake of peace,
friendship, the environment of life, the human spiritual happiness.
In fact, in the past time, these objectives and contents have been one of the major orientations guiding the
entire tourism activities of the ASEAN Member States as well as members of the ASEAN Tourism Association
(ASEANTA). At the ASEAN Tourism Forum, held in Manila from January 18 to 22, entitled A Community for
Sustainability, Aileen Clemente, Chairman of the ASEANTA prevents conflicts and replaces opposing terms
such as “War on Terror” with the slogan “Peace Through Tourism”. The call is in the spirit that while terrorism
is a global issue, it is important that ASEAN members remain united in building good relations between their
neighbors and their relative culture and diversity.... In times of terror and terrorism, tourism plays an integral
role in ensuring that a better understanding of the people is needed. It is important that actions work together in
a coordinated way towards peace through tourism (Clemente, 2017, November). In that spirit, to celebrate the
50th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN, 10 ASEAN National Tourism Organization (NTOs) have jointly
developed a tourism product program called “VISIT ASEAN @ 50: Golden Celebration”. The program was
officially launched at the ASEAN Tourism Forum in Singapore on 18 January and lasts until 31 December,
2017. This is a “golden anniversary” program with 50 cross-border travel experiences to help travelers to visit
Southeast Asia including all 10 ASEAN member countries as a “channel” for exchanges and connections of the
190 TOURISM WITH THE INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
culture, economy, and society between the people in the region and the world (VISIT ASEAN @ 50: Golden
Celebration, 2017, December).
In the whole process of regional integration on socio-economic, with internal forces and cultural
achievements, after a long period in the war, Vietnam tourism has been overcome with many difficulties and
challenges to formally join the process of development with a new posture. The tourism industry of Vietnam
was formed very early, from the year 1960 in the North of socialism, even while the country is still divided war
so that tourism activities in this stage have no conditions for real development. After 1975, although basically
there was peace and unity, in the bureaucratic subsidy mechanism, the development of Vietnam tourism in
general was also limited. Only after 1986, with the way of “Doi moi”, in essence, the abolition of the subsidy
mechanism to move to market mechanism simultaneously with the policy of “Open door”, the process of
integration with the region and the world has the important conditions for Vietnam’s tourism to really take off
in the new stage. A landmark marking the official development of Vietnam’s tourism in the process of
integration with the region and the world is the Vietnamese Cultural and Sports Festival on the occasion of the
15th anniversary of the victory April 30 (1975-1990) and the 100th anniversary of the birth of President Ho Chi
Minh (1890-1990) as the National Liberation Hero—The World Cultural Celebrity—The United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) has just recognized. This is the first national
tourism festival of Vietnam by the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Tourism at that time in
collaboration with the People’s Committee of Ho Chi Minh City held in Ho Chi Minh City 1. With a short time
before April 30, 1975, and after May 19, 1975, a few days, the festival has attracted nearly 300,000
international visitors (including visitors of some Southeast Asia), which is unprecedented 2. Since then, through
many stages of development, along with the deepening integration of Vietnam with other Southeast Asian
countries, regional tourism has always been considered as a big and potential market. According to the latest
statistics, visitors from Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Singapore reached 1,461,172 arrivals, accounting for 14.59% of total international arrivals in 2016 3. It is
noteworthy that with the strength of a coastal nation running from north to south along with thousands of large
and small islands, stretched beaches, diverse ecosystems, and beautiful bays are famous on the tourism map in
the world, such as Ha Long Bay, Nha Trang Bay, Vinh Hy Bay, Lang Co Bay..., Vietnam has many favorable
conditions for the development of marine tourism; not to mention, Vietnam has a convenient location between
the two largest cruise tourism centers in Hong Kong and Singapore. Therefore, the 3,200 km long coastal zone
can be considered as a “big door” for Vietnam to have more potential and access to regional and international
tourism through the East Sea (Khánh, 2017, December). Looking at the overall relationship, Vietnam’s tourism
growth rate is the second highest in comparison with other countries in Southeast Asia. In the period 2011-2016,
Vietnam’s tourism grew by 11%, only lower than Myanmar (37%) and Cambodia (12%). In 2016, Vietnam had
the highest growth rate in the region (26%), while Indonesia was 16% (second highest), Philippines (11%),
Thailand (9%), Singapore (8%), Cambodia, and Malaysia (4%). However, besides the strength of cultural
resources and official tourism (grade 30), natural resources (34th), price competitiveness (35th), human and
1
This festival was held at Tao Dan Cultural Park (now Ho Chi Minh City Cultural Park). At that time, the author of this article
was a participant in the Festival Organizing Committee as deputy head of content.
2
Specific number of international visitors to Vietnam before (rounded): 1975: 36,000 visitors; 1980: 41,000 visitors; 1985:
51,000 visitors; 1989: 88,000 visitors (Source: Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Tourism, 1990).
3
Vietnam National Administration of Tourism—Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2017.
labor market (grade 37), Vietnam’s tourism still has many low ranked indicators: environmental sustainability
(class 129), quality of tourism infrastructure (class 113), priority for the tourism sector (ranked 101), and the
level of international openness (rank 76). In particular, the biggest constraints for Vietnam’s tourism sector are:
the quality of tourism infrastructure (113th); index of entry visa (rank 116th, lowest among ASEAN countries);
and government spending on tourism (114th) 4. Currently, Vietnam exempts entry visas for citizens of 22
countries, but Indonesia exempts 169 countries and territories, Singapore 158, Philippines 157, Malaysia 155,
and Thailand exempts citizens of 61 countries and territories. In addition, Malaysia has 35 representative
offices abroad; Thailand has 28 offices, Singapore 23 offices, while Vietnam has no representative office
abroad. Overall, the number of international visitors to Vietnam in 10 ASEAN countries is still low: In 2016,
Vietnam ranked fifth in terms of number of international visitors with over 10 million arrivals, equaling 31%
compared with Thailand (32.6 million), equal to 37% of Malaysia (26.8 million), 61% of Singapore (16.4
million), 83% of Indonesia (12 million) (Phuong, 2017, November). In such a general context, it is clear that
tourism in Vietnam is and will continue to struggle to make greater efforts to promote the integration process.
As a result, many tourism conferences of the government, localities throughout the country, and many
documents on tourism are issued.... Most recently, the Politburo—Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Vietnam issued Resolution No. 08-NQ/TW dated January 16, 2017 on tourism development to become a
spearhead economic sector with many concerns and major orientation is one of the important foundations to
further promote the integration and development process of Vietnam in the region and the world.
Basic and Orientation of Tourism Development in the Process of Vietnam—Southeast Asia

Integration
First, as we all know, Southeast Asian nations have a special relationship with many social and cultural
traits with South Asian countries (central is India) and Northeast Asian countries (central is China), but at the
same time it is a historical-cultural area with specific characteristics. In particular, through long-standing
research on geographic and historical relationships, many scientists often talk about “Southeast Asian cultural
and historical structure” of Vietnam and affirm “Vietnam is a miniature Southeast Asia”.
Vietnamese—Southeast Asian integration and development in all fields is therefore very meaningful and
strategic. Experiencing historical challenges, from war to natural calamities, economic and financial turmoil,
etc.... all show that “Southeast Asia exists as a ‘living body’ that each of the countries in the region is a part
organism that has an organic relationship to the body itself” (Huynh, 2006, p. 115). That is, when entering the
new century, new opportunities and challenges are opening up, tightening the cooperation for the
comprehensive and sustainable development of the countries in the region as well as for the entire region is
increasingly becoming one of the most meaningful, objective, and urgent social processes. Addressing the
development of tourism in the integration process of Vietnam and Southeast Asia is an important element
contributing to the implementation of this strategy and it has very clear historical, scientific, and practical
bases.
In order to implement the above strategy, a leading strength of Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries
should be thoroughly promoted as the potential capital of cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible with
4
In 2016, Vietnam spent only $2.5 million to promote national tourism destinations while Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia
spent about $100 million for this activity (Source: Vietnam National Administration of Tourism—Ministry of Culture, Sports and
Tourism, 2017).
many identities, unique, attractive no less than anywhere else in the world. In addition, the natural resources
and the human resources of Vietnam as well as the whole region in general are really an invaluable treasure of
pristine, primitive, high biodiversity (both vegetation, as well as human beings...), the richness of terrain,
geomorphology. In particular, the country in addition to the general features as mentioned above, there are
other ones about nature, people, history, culture. It has many unique features, especially a culture of culinary
special..., moreover, this country is considered as a place where the social environment is friendly and safe,
etc… These are the most important resources to develop tourism and in fact, tourism in Vietnam and Southeast
Asia is generally regarded as having great potential, high attractiveness, and dynamic development, which is a
very meaningful content for cooperative strategy and sustainable development of the whole region. Developing
tourism among Southeast Asian nations is one of the best ways to be able to create more and more
understanding and closer ties between peoples and countries in the region with the orientation of
through cultural tourism, aware of the inherent cultural values, it has become a major factor in the quality of tourism
products, as well as the most sacred “the cord bearing Human beings” that contributes to the tightening process of
collaboration and solidarity which are mutually beneficial, which is one of the most positive and immediate directions for
the communities in the region. (Huynh, 2006, p. 116)
That makes more sense in the context of countries in the region and the world which are and will be facing the
process of “Globalization” simultaneously with the “Global issues” increasingly fierce as the variable climate
change, war (terrorism, nuclear risk, etc.), poverty, and social disparity, etc. Tourism development (cultural
orientation) to create “doors” for peace and prosperity that having been expanded to contribute to
socio-economic development, protection of the natural and human ecological environment, preservation and
promotion of all biological and cultural diversity, contributing to the improvement of happiness and social
benefits and development of community life for each country as well as throughout the region ... all the work is
both practical and thoughtful a long time.
Secondly, the major objectives and orientations as mentioned undoubtedly pose the issue of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation among ASEAN countries in addition to the general socio-economic action plans based
on the “three pillars” as determined; it can also be associated with the strategy of exploiting and promoting
tourism as one of the effective solutions to accelerate and deepen the integration process in the region.
Accordingly, the development of tourism in each country contributes to the development of tourism in the
region and vice versa is important. At the same time, “assignment and decentralization of regional, national,
local (province, city) to both develop tourism on the spot and contribute to the development of tourism
throughout the region is doing the necessary” (Huynh, 2006, p. 117). Of course, other specific things from an
outsourcing perspective are that tourism development must begin with a concrete plan to implement
“Diversification and quality improvement for tourism product” 5 to build tour program and service system to
meet the needs of the tourism market combined with promoting the propaganda and regularly updating
information on this market. In addition, building relationships with partners (Outbound Travel Agents, Tour
Operator...) in countries around the region based on the sense of responsibility, reputation, handle all work
quickly, accurately...all are very necessary. From an insight perspective, the construction of the tourism
industry with tour operators and travel agencies includes all types of accommodation, restaurants,
transportation companies, entertainment services, shopping...need to invest more strongly in both quantity and
5
One of Vietnam’s National Tourism Action Plans since 2000.
quality; in it, the food service is both a strength and a problem that still needs to be more deeply concerned not
only with food security or organization...but also meet the needs of different types of food. For example, in
2016, the number of 1,461,172 visitors from Southeast Asian countries came to Vietnam; the most is Malaysia
(reaching 407,574, accounting for nearly 30%) of which a large number of people in the community of Islamic
but Islamic Halal restaurant system are only available in big cities (10 places in Ho Chi Minh City, 3 places in
Hanoi), other localities almost none 6. Therefore, it is necessary to invest in developing more Halal restaurants
in the key tourist areas.... In addition to the development of infrastructure, material and technical standards for
tourism, the construction of management staff, tourism operations, especially Tourguide professional suitable
for each customer of each market is very decisive.... Moreover, the promotion of investment promotion,
tourism promotion, building a national tourism brand on the basis of the tourism brand in the region in the
process of deepening integration with the region and the world is extremely necessary. One of the most
important experiences is the branding of tourism products; the image of local tourism must be based on the
characteristics of prominence and high characteristics while exploiting the specific characteristics of culture to
invest in hi-tech application for promotion activities, to exploit optimum information technology, modern
media and coordinate well with international partners in promoting tourism... For example, the film
Kong—Skull Island was filmed in Ninh Binh, Quang Ninh, and Quang Binh, and is being screened in many
parts of the world, making it an important contribution to the local tourism brand as well as to Vietnam tourism.
Similar but more profound meaning, the image of nature, the landscapes, and the traditional beauty of the local
people Phu Yen based on the basis of the “soul”, shines from the values of folk culture inherent in the movie
Yellow Flowers on Green Grass which has become a valuable brand of local tourism and tourism in Vietnam.
Thirdly, in the coming period, the coordination among countries in the region in order to enhance the
efficiency of the state management of tourism, the tourism marketing and promotion in a common market in
order to ensure a healthy and sustainable tourism business environment in the whole area can still be considered
as a “solid support” needed for the whole issue. According to such requirements, the inspection, survey, and
evaluation activities are conducted regularly to ensure that the quality of tourism services in each country will
need step by step towards the goal more and more consistent with the standards of the general price in a unified
tourism market of the region in the near future, proceeding to price stability in order to bring about the
increasing competitiveness of regional tourism compared to the regions other parts of the world. In addition,
other specific issues, such as extending visa procedures for travelers across the region, building a common
market for training and the use of tourism human resources... all need to be calculations coming as a part that
cannot be ignored in the overall strategy. At the same time, the development of community-based tourism in
order to facilitate the participation of local residents not only is preserving and promoting the value of natural
resources and human resources for tourism development, but also raising awareness and capacity to behave in
tourist communication for international tourists from countries in the region and around the world, creating and
protecting the best image of the country and its people of Southeast Asia in general and cultural beauty of each
locality in particular....
Conclusions
In general, during the integration process in the formation and development of ASEAN, Vietnam, in
6
Data are based on Vietnam National Administration of Tourism—Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism & Tourism
Department of Ho Chi Minh City, 2017.
comparison with some Southeast Asian countries, was one of the youngest members but also made a strong
mark for contributing to the Association’s continuous growth in both quantity and quality, in which tourism
activities of Vietnam is one of the factors that have increasingly active role. Due to its nature, tourism has been
affirmed as part of a strategy to accelerate the integration of Vietnam and Southeast Asia in order to contribute
to the development of the country in relation to the common development of the region and the whole world.
With the view of “Sustainable tourism development; preserve and promote the cultural heritage and traditional
values of the nation; environmental protection and nature...”, Resolution of the Politburo—Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Vietnam No. 08-NQ/TW, January 16, 2017 clearly defined goals:
By 2020, tourism has become a key economic sector, creating a driving force for socio-economic development;
having professionalism and having a system of material and technical bases which are relatively synchronous and modern;
high quality, diversified and branded tourism products bearing the national cultural identity, competing with other
countries in the region. Strive to 2030... Vietnam is a group of countries with leading tourism development in Southeast
Asia.
It is clear that such great orientations have placed Vietnam’s tourism at an important position in the sphere
of one of the “spearheads” not only creating economic breakthroughs but also a positive motive force of the
association process of Vietnam’s cultural and social integration with other countries in the region in a way both
competition and cooperation for development. It will also be very meaningful in line with the trend Vietnam
and ASEAN countries increasingly asserting their position in the economic, political, and social life of the
region as well as throughout the world through the process integrating and developing more and more deeply,
with higher quality and efficiency, in which tourism is a social activity with important role and position.
References
Binh, N. P. (2017, November 14). The relationship between Vietnam and ASEAN future. Retrieved from
http://www.dav.edu.vn/en/introduction/missions.html?id=316:so-19-he-viet-nam-asean-va-velvet-van-de-dat-in-a-lai
Clemente, A. (2017, November 25). Replacing the “war on terror” with “peace through tourism”. Retrieved from
http://www.aseanta.org/index.php/component/content/article/8-news-and-updates/28-aseanta-s-female-president-tells-touris
m-ministers-replace-terrorism-with-peace-through-tourism
Phuong, L. (2017, November 14). Where is Vietnam’s tourism in ASEAN? Retrieved from http://vietnamtourism.gov.vn/
index.php/items/24110
Thang, H. Q. (2006). Cultural tourism of Vietnam—Southeast Asia with strategic cooperation and sustainable development of the
region. In Proceedings of the Scientific Seminar ASEAN Community: From Idea to Reality (pp. 115-117). Open University of
HCMC—Statistics Publishing House.
Trang, K. (2017, December 25). Positive signals for the market of cruise ship Vietnam. Retrieved from
http://vietnamtourism.gov.vn/index.php/items/24187
Visit the ASEAN 50 Campaign @ to announce 50 tourism experiences for 2017. (2017, December 20). Retrieved from
http://www.esanta.org/index.php/component/content/article/8-news-and-updates/38-new-condolence-message-2
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.03.005
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Political and Economic Analysis of Southeast Asian Regional

Economic Integration Under China’s Rise-From Taiwan’s
Perspective View
Rachel Sun, Shang-Yung Yen

Feng Chia University, Taiwan, R.O.C.
This article seeks to answer why Taiwan has targeted Southeast Asia in its external economic strategy, and how the
China factor has influenced the development of Taiwan-ASEAN economic relations. Worried about the political
and economic risks inherent in Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on China, as well as Taiwan’s
marginalization in regional economic integration, Taiwanese presidents since Lee have all emphasized the need to
enhance trade and investment ties with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. While the
complementary natures of Taiwan’s and Southeast Asia’s economies place Taiwan in a favorable position to “Go
South”, sovereign disputes in cross-Strait relations prevent the island from negotiating bilateral or multilateral trade
agreements with ASEAN countries. The article argues that hedging is the most rational and viable option for
Taiwan to manage political and economic analysis of Southeast Asian regional economic integration and under
China’s rise. The article examines the four major components of this strategy, namely, economic pragmatism, direct
engagement, hard balancing, and soft balancing. The article goes on to assess the significance of each component
and details how Taiwan has pursued its hedging strategy towards Southeast Asian regional economic integration.
Keywords: New Southbound, ASEAN, hedging, FTA
Introduction
Despite having official ties with just 18 mainly developing countries in the Pacific, West Africa, and
Central America, Taiwan signed free-trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013. All other
investor-protection agreements it has with other countries were signed decades ago. Due to the diplomatic
dilemma of Taiwan, which leads to decrease in exporting, in addition, China’s economy has impact on
Taiwan’s economy and industry in the emerging of global economy integration era.
Taiwan has been waging heavy proportion of investment on China for many years. Therefore, the
government raised the Go-South Policy in 1993 and tried to decrease economic dependence on China by
strengthening economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, improving Asia Pacific regional economic
development, and setting down its own industrial advantages.
Since 1997, China has been developing close cooperative ties with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries and participating actively in regional affairs and conferences in Southeast Asia.
Rachel Sun, Ph.D. Program in Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Shang-Yung Yen, Ph.D. Program in Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, R.O.C.
196 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL
Since the Opening and Reform, China’s economic power and comprehensive power have increased
dramatically. However, the increasingly tightened interdependence also worries ASEAN states. In order to
counterbalance this asymmetric relationship, the ASEAN states manipulate power leverage to balance external
influences. The U.S. continues to increase emphasis on Asia Pacific and conduct strategic shift from the
rebalancing strategy to Indo-Pacific strategy, hence making Southeast Asia the platform for active great power
competition.
This article argues that Taiwan’s Southeast Asian regional economic integration policy has been shaped by
a delicate combination of various approaches best described as a multi-tiered, omni-directional hedging strategy.
The strategy is composed of four major components: economic pragmatism; direct engagement; hard balancing;
and soft balancing. Accordingly, Taiwan has made efforts to promote economic cooperation with Southeast
Asian and directly engage it in various bilateral arrangements to boost mutual trust and cooperation. At the
same time, it has also pursued a balancing strategy against China, which is composed of a “hard” component,
providing major stakeholder powers of Indo-Pacific, with whom these interests converge, and a “soft” one
aimed at promoting the New Southbound Policy to reinvigorate and diversify Taiwan’s economy. The soft
balancing component also involves Taiwan’s efforts to deepen its ties with foreign powers to counter undue
pressure from China.
The article is divided into three main sections. The first section provides an overview of ASEAN
economic tie with Taiwan, China, and U.S. respectively. The second analyses Taiwan’s hedging strategy, the
rationale and foundations of the strategy in the Taiwan context. The third investigates how the strategy has been
developed and operationalized by Taiwan.
Theory of Hedging
Even among the few who have attempted to develop the hedging concept and give it greater definitional
rigor, the notion of hedging in IR remains “problematic” (Goh, 2006). Richard Weitz (2001) employed scenario
planning to argue for a set of “shaping and hedging” strategies to address the issue of the U.S. response to
China’s rise. Weitz’s other important contribution was his application of the idea of hedging to great power
relations which was followed by similar approaches from other scholars.
Deficiencies in existing definitions, Goh (2006) defined hedging as a set of strategies aimed at avoiding
(or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward
alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. When hedging, states seek to “cultivate a middle
position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another”. However, when
pursuing hedging, a state oftentimes does not choose a middle position. Rather, it takes opposite positions.
Tessman and Wolfe (2011) defined strategic hedging as an insurance policy that helps states guard against
two possibilities: That relations between the hedging state and the system leader will deteriorate to the point of
a militarized crisis, and/or that the system leader will cease the provision of public goods that the hedging state
currently enjoys.
Many China’s neighbors have in recent years adopted a strategy of “looking to China for profit, the U.S.
for security”. It is essentially establishing negative correlation through reverse operation: On the one hand, they
intend to engage China and strengthen economic ties so as to share the dividends brought by the rise of China;
on the other hand, they would like to hedge against the uncertainties and risks brought by the rise of China by
strengthening military alliances or partnerships with the U.S. bolstering or establishing military alliances or
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL 197
partnerships with the U.S.

In essence, hedging is a strategy to enable states to deal with uncertainties in their partners’ future
behaviour by relying on a basket of policy tools that, while helping to promote bilateral cooperation, also
entails competitive elements aimed at preparing themselves against potential security threats posed by their
partners (Kuik, 2008). The policy tools available in this basket are virtually the same for every state and
situated anywhere along a continuum extending from pure bandwagoning to pure balancing. According to Kuik
Cheng-Chwee (2008), for example, these tools include limited bandwagoning, binding engagement, economic
pragmatism, dominance denial, and indirect balancing.
However, each country’s position on the bandwagoning—balancing continuum, as well as the significance
of specific tools used in the strategy, varies from country to country, mainly depending on their security
concerns vis-à-vis China (Goh, 2005). The diversity and convertibility of the tools enable states to easily move
back and forth along the bandwagoning-balancing continuum, depending on developments in bilateral relations
and changes in the international environment. The following two sections examine ASEAN’s economic tie with
Taiwan, China, and U.S. respectively and the foundations of Taiwan’s hedging strategy and its
operationalization.
ASEAN-Taiwan Economic Tie

The likely potential conflict that will erupt, in the region that involves China, is the Taiwan issue. China
will not sit by and watch Taiwan become independent as it always persists on the “one-China Policy”. While
political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a great interest in avoiding military conflict, hostility is
still a probability. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait poses a direct threat to the stability of the entire
region. The stability of the region is in U.S., China, and ASEAN members’ vital national interest.
Taiwan’s Economic and Trade Development in ASEAN
ASEAN and South Asian nations encompass 32% of the world’s population and have a combined GDP of
$5.1 trillion. Global Insight estimates that the annual economic growth rate for ASEAN and South Asian
countries will be between 4.9 and 7.4% from 2017 and 2021. The developed economies of Australia and New
Zealand offer safe, highly regulated investment environments.
Since 2008, ASEAN has become Taiwan’s second largest export market, second only to China, with 18%
of Taiwanese exports going to ASEAN. ASEAN has been the third largest source of imports to Taiwan since
the year 2000, second only to China and Japan, with 12% of Taiwanese imports originating from ASEAN
countries in 2016. Taiwan is also one of the largest investors in ASEAN countries, with cumulative investment
of US$87 billion in the 30 years up to 2016, making it second only to China. From 2011-2016, 51% of
Taiwanese investment in the ASEAN 6 countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Vietnam) was in the manufacturing sector, while 49% was in the service sector, according to Chung-hua
Institute of Economic Research (CIER) researcher Yang Shu-fei.
Taiwan’s Participation in the Trade Arrangements
Taiwan is a party to only five FTAs that have been signed and ratified. These are agreements with Panama
(2004), Guatemala (2005), Nicaragua (2008), El Salvador (2008), and Honduras (2008). As noted, on July 10,
2013, Taiwan signed its latest agreement with New Zealand and with Singapore.
Taiwan has been absent from the proliferation of Asian FTAs. The growth in Asian FTAs has underpinned
increased Asian economic regionalism. ASEAN countries have made important progress in liberalizing trade
under an ASEAN FTA. ASEAN has also negotiated a number of FTAs, who have commenced negotiations
towards a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and also part of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) negotiations, will give these countries preferential market access to the developed markets of
the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Additionally, successful completion of a
Korea-China FTA will strengthen Korea as a gateway for other countries to trade and invest with China,
competing with Taiwan’s ability to use Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (EFCA) to play a
similar gateway role.
For Taiwan to reap the full benefit from its growing services sectors requires reform. Liberalizing its
services market under an FTA would open the services sector to competition and lead to improved productivity.
Moreover, as services are often important inputs into the manufacturing and industrial sectors, increased
productivity in the services sector will flow through to the overall economy.
How Integrated Are China and Taiwan
Under President Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan has pursued ever closer economic integration with China. The
most significant vehicle for this is the Economic Cooperation and Framework Agreement (ECFA) which
entered into force on 12 September 2010. The ECFA, as its name suggests, provided a framework for further
negotiations aimed at liberalizing trade in goods, services, and investment.
For Taiwan, ECFA serves a range of goals. These include: economic growth; becoming a gateway for
foreign investment into China; stimulating increased purchases by Chinese companies of inputs from Taiwan,
thereby strengthening Taiwan’s position in the Asian supply chain; and helping transform Taiwan into a
regional industrial center.
According to some estimates, ECFA will increase Taiwan’s GDP by 1.7% and create 260,000 jobs. As
China is Taiwan’s number one trading partner and investment destination, ECFA should lead to further
strengthening of the bilateral trade and economic relationship and underpin the existing supply chain relations
outlined above.
ECFA has not been without domestic political challenges for President Ma and the Kuomintang. Concerns
remain that the closer economic integration that ECFA will usher in will make Taiwan increasingly dependent
on China and thereby give China greater leverage that could be used to achieve its goal of political unification.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (former director of the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office) claimed in a
speech at Brookings on September 20, “Gradual integration of the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] through
two-way interactions and cooperation will lead to ultimate reunification”.
ASEAN-China Economic Tie

Economic policy is obviously an important part of overall political calculus, and this piece argues that Xi
has three fundamental, short-term objectives for economic policy, each of which reflects the need to sustain a
positive domestic narrative about his leadership. The three narratives are: (1) The economy is growing stably
(at least up through the Party Congress); (2) Economic reforms are moving ahead; and (3) A revitalized China
is playing an increasingly important leadership role in global economic policy. Xi looks set to be able to
maintain the plausibility of all three of these narratives through 2017, greatly strengthening his political
position.
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), also known as China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, is a free
trade area among the ten member states of the ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China. The initial
framework agreement was signed on 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, with the intention to
establish a free trade area among the 11 nations by 2010. The free trade area came into effect on 1 January 2010.
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area is the largest free trade area in terms of population and third largest in
terms of nominal.
Economically, the ASEAN-China FTA has effectively linked China closer to ASEAN. The FTA will
enhance a sense of community within East Asia and lay the foundation for broad regional economic
cooperation ensuring peace and stability. This will result in the world’s biggest free trade zone. For both sides,
there should be net trade gains: Trade creation would offset trade diversion with ASEAN getting a slight trade
diversion while the same trade diversion would not be obvious for China. With China’s strong growth, it seems
that China would require more input imports and ASEAN could provide as an alternative source of inputs for
natural-resource based and intermediate inputs in an FTA.
Changes After 19th National Congress
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) embarked on its own “Game of Thrones” as delegates gather for its
19th National Congress in Beijing. A variety of posts will be filled for the next five years—including the vitally
important General Secretary of the CCP (President of the People’s Republic of China or PRC), as well as
members of the Standing Committee. These individuals will find themselves leading a massive organization,
which has more than 80 members, and running what is arguably the world’s largest economy. They will wield
considerable powers but the incumbent leader is unlikely to relinquish his grip on power.
Yet for all these technological developments, there are still significant challenges for China: rural poverty,
environmental degradation, and the economic turbulence generated by the “new normal”—China is now
transitioning from export-led economic growth to consumer-driven growth. The Xi-Li administration has
sought to tackle these problems as part of the “Chinese Dream”—or national “rejuvenation”—which aspires to
attain a “moderately prosperous society”. Recently, China’s neighbors have been unnerved by territorial
disputes in the South China Sea and by the steady advance of the PRC’s military.
Balance of Power in the Southeast Asia Region
China’s huge size and its rapid growth are enough to disrupt the balance of power in the Southeast Asia
region. It is natural to cast China as the regional hegemony. The international community welcomes a strong
China because a weak and insecure China would bring nothing but trouble to the region. Largely, China’s
relation with ASEAN clearly reflects realist bias where national interests and security are the main agenda.
As mentioned, China’s strategic culture is anti-hegemonic, and China will use force quite readily; China
persists, repetitiously, that defense is its policy. Thus, ASEAN members inevitably will maximize their
diplomatic and political instruments of national power into play. ASEAN countries recognized this; therefore, it
is not surprising that cooperation between ASEAN and China has grown tremendously in various areas after the
establishment of ASEAN-China Consultative Dialogue in 1994. The current economic performance of China
and ASEAN, and greater political stability, peace, and security as a whole in the region, is a reflection of the
current cooperation.
ASEAN-U.S. Economic Tie

The U.S. will continue to safeguard the regional balance of power and ensure open trade. Due to China’s
growing military and economic power, ASEAN prefers that the U.S. remains engaged in the region and act as a
counterbalance to China’s influence.
U.S. as a Balance of Power
The U.S. security concern in this region is to prevent the domination of an unfriendly power and assure
U.S. political access and influence. In addition to terrorism, the stability of this region is likely to be challenged
by several issues, such as those on the Korean Peninsula, the rising tension between China-Taiwan,
India-Pakistan, and at the South China Sea. Since ASEAN countries are no match for China’s superiority, the
role of the U.S. as an “honest broker” or balancer of security interests in the region is still relevant. ASEAN
realized that an effective antidote to a power is another power. The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Indonesia, have traditionally looked to the U.S. to keep a balance with China. For the nations in East Asia, the
U.S. remains the only power capable of influencing China’s behavior.
Over the past years, the U.S. has significantly increased its engagement of ASEAN and its member nations.
The region, which includes leading moderate Islamic countries, was quick to join the world in the war against
terrorism. U.S. exports to ASEAN are more than twice as large as its exports to China. Therefore, access and
participation in ASEAN markets is important to the economic futures of both the U.S. and ASEAN countries.
TPP Have Three Positive Impacts on China
The idea that TPP was “excluding China” has always been an exaggeration, and there was always the
long-run possibility that TPP would benefit China by encouraging a broader (competitive) opening of the
Chinese economy. In the short run, however, Trump’s withdrawal from the TPP, dissolved an economic
agreement primarily among like-minded allies, and inevitably benefitted China in its role as economic and
geopolitical rival of the U.S. While TPP was not directed against China, the end of TPP will have three positive
impacts on China and especially on Xi Jinping.
First, TPP would have improved the competitive position of some of China’s economic competitors,
especially Vietnam. Second, TPP would have oriented the economies of member countries more toward the
U.S. market. Third, TPP would have created a new template of international economic regulation. However,
even more important were provisions opening service sectors in which the U.S. has competitive advantage.
These rules naturally reflect American interests, and would have paved the way for broader multinational
agreements that incorporate the same rules. Trump’s cancelling of TPP was a gift to China.
From Globalization to Regionalization
After the worldwide crisis of 2008/9, global economic integration has slowed, but regional economic
integration has intensified, especially efforts toward free trade agreements in Asia. In the past, Taiwan’s rapid
growth relied on globalization. Today, it must thrive with regionalization. After all, in 2012, the mainland and
Hong Kong SAR accounted for more than 40% of all Taiwan’s exports. Without these export destinations,
Taiwan’s export-led growth would collapse.
In the future, much of global growth will be driven by the mainland and emerging Asia. The intensified
regional integration is reflected by the ongoing talks over the U.S.-led TPP and the RCEP which includes the
mainland. Meanwhile, ASEAN integration is accelerating. In addition to these regional trade blocs, talks
continue over bilateral free trade and investment agreements between different economies in Asia and the U.S.
or European Union.
Taiwan’s Hedging Strategy

Taiwan seeks to exploit conditions conducive to bilateral cooperation, especially in the economic sphere,
to promote its domestic development. On the other hand, competing claims in the South China Sea and China’s
increasingly threatening posture dictate that Taiwan must “struggle” with China in this aspect to best protect its
national interests. In effect, Taiwan has been developing the strategy with four major components in mind as
Figure 1:
1. Economic pragmatism, i.e., deepening bilateral economic cooperation to facilitate domestic
development.
2. Direct engagement, i.e., expanding and deepening various bilateral mechanisms to build mutual trust
and nurture cooperation, thereby shaping China’s behavior.
3. Hard balancing, i.e., providing major stakeholder powers of Indo-Pacific, with whom these interests
converge to deter China from aggressive actions.
4. Soft balancing, i.e., promoting the New Southbound Policy to reinvigorate and diversify Taiwan’s
economy, also deepening relations with major partners to counter against undue pressure from China.
Figure 1. Taiwan’s hedging strategy vis-à-vis ASEAN under China’s rise.
Figure 1 illustrates the components and the operational mechanisms of Taiwan’s hedging strategy vis-à-vis
ASEAN under China’s rise. It is obvious that the first two components—namely economic pragmatism and
direct engagement—tend to slide towards the bandwagoning end of the balancing-bandwagoning continuum,
while the remaining two components are situated towards the opposite end. The individual components of the
strategy will now be analyzed to highlight how Taiwan has operationalized this strategy.
Economic Pragmatism
Trade and investment ties with Taiwan have undeniably contributed to the economic growth of ASEAN
over the last decades. Despite its asymmetric nature, economic ties obviously thicken the network of bilateral
interactions, which serve as a cushion to absorb tensions arising from other domains of the bilateral relationship,
including those related to the South China Sea dispute.
In the process of Asia’s economic development, Taiwan has played a very important role by acting as a
resource consolidator and a provider of capital and technology over the past several decades. For example,
Taiwan is the third-largest investor in Thailand, with accumulated investment amounting to US$14.1 billion by
the end of 2016, and fourth in Vietnam (US$31.2 billion) and Malaysia (US$12.2 billion). Apart from the
suitable investment environment, there are many other reasons why Taiwanese companies perform very well in
the region, including Taiwan’s workforce talent, its good reputation, and its ability to provide a match for the
business demands of the New Southbound countries.
Taiwanese businesses have not only been doing very well, but are also striving to cultivate business roots
and engage local communities, in the process contributing to the economic and social development of many
New Southbound countries. Taiwan’s greatest advantage in heading south lies in its experience with
small-scale enterprises.
Taiwan’s distinct economic structure—mostly smaller business entities such as farmers, fishermen, and
small-scale enterprises—matches the economic structure of Southeast and South Asian countries. Taiwan’s
experience in successfully developing small-scale business structure is of great value to the countries in that
region.
Deepened bilateral economic ties tend to raise the stakes for all parties to the point that they may
ultimately favour a cooperative and stable bilateral relationship rather than an antagonistic one. Therefore, such
logic obviously still makes Taiwanese strategists consider economic pragmatism as an important component of
the country’s hedging strategy against ASEAN under China’s rise.
Direct Engagement
Engagement is the promotion of bilateral communication and mutual trust, thereby facilitating cooperation
and providing effective avenues to address conflicts of interests that may otherwise do serious harm to the
overall relationship. In effect, Taiwan has paid serious attention to building a network of engagement with
ASEAN through three major channels: government-to-government, party-to-party, and people-to-people
interactions. As explained below, these efforts have led to positive results.
The exchange of visits between high-ranking leaders as summarized in Table 1 to Table 3, between 2014
and 2016, Taiwan and Asia-pacific exchanged visits by top party and state leaders. These visits normally
witnessed the signing of agreements to promote bilateral cooperation in various fields. More importantly, they
helped set the larger political framework for bilateral relations. Apart from high-ranking visits, other important
cooperative mechanisms between the two governments have also been established. As shown in Table 4, in
addition to the key mechanisms mentioned above, there are also other arrangements through which Taiwan and
Asia-pacific engage each other in different aspects of their bilateral relationship. These engagements generate a
network of frequent interactions, thereby improving bilateral communication and minimizing the risk of
misunderstandings or misperceptions.
Table 1
Numbers of Taiwan Visits to Foreign Countries by Category in Asia-Pacific
Year Total Governmental officials Elected representatives Scholars Others
2016 755 435 96 36 188
2015 3,033 1,027 177 109 1,720
2014 1,804 921 140 127 616
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Table 2
Number of Foreign Visitors to Taiwan by Category in Asia-Pacific
Government officials Legislators
Legislators
Others (from
Presidents
Presidents
Ministers
Ministers
Ministers
Year Total
Speakers
Officials
Subtotal
Subtotal
other sectors)
Deputy
Others
Others
Prime
Prime
Local
Vice
2016 3,860 776 5 2 2 - 25 46 696 345 4 134 207 2,739

2015 3,371 941 5 - 1 - 18 76 841 313 7 134 172 2,117
2014 3,888 979 4 2 1 - 23 175 774 460 7 223 230 2,449
Table 3
Taiwan Participation in International Conferences and Events in Asia-Pacific
International conference
Year Total International events
Subtotal Governmental Private sector
2016 470 232 69 163 238
2015 1,385 1,123 103 1,020 262
2014 1,631 1,360 166 1,194 271
Table 4
Number of Bilateral Agreements and Treaties Signed
Agriculture, fisheries,
Navigation Investment Protection Technology/
Year Total Taxation husbandry, mining and Medical care Others
rights guarantees of IPR Culture
handicrafts
2016 36 2 2 - 1 3 4 2 22
2015 40 - 1 1 3 5 6 - 24
2014 43 - 2 1 - 7 4 3 26
Hard Balancing
The Indo-Pacific strategy is a preliminary idea for the U.S. to connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
region, constrain China’s rise from a geopolitical perspective, and safeguard its own leadership and interests in
the region.
The Indo-Pacific strategy is still a concept that needs to be constructed and the quadrilateral security
dialogue—the Quad formed of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia—is only the beginning of the
construction of the Indo-Pacific security region. Moreover, many scholars believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy
is simply the descendant of and an expansion on the Obama administration’s “rebalance” strategy. The
Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially an extension and deepening of the “rebalance” with the aim of strategically
linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Since the beginning of the current decade, the U.S. administration realized the inadequacy of the
“Asia-Pacific” to meet its geopolitical and attendant foreign policy objectives in Asia, for two key reasons. The
first was China’s expanding politico-military activities from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The
second was the imperative to incorporate New Delhi into the region-wide security architecture. “Indo-Pacific”
focuses on the security dimension of America’s geopolitical ends—primarily relating to China—that
necessitated a more robust collaboration with U.S. allies and partners. The “Indo-Pacific” construct provides
Taiwan a valuable opportunity to partner with the resident countries and major stakeholder powers of
Indo-Pacific, with whom these interests converge.
Soft Balancing
Taiwan’s attempt is to avoid economic dependence on China. President Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to
reinvigorate and diversify Taiwan’s economy. Currently, trade with China constitutes over 20% of Taiwan’s
total trade. The over $100 billion in cross-Strait trade is nearly double that of Taiwan’s second largest trading
partner, the United States, leaving the island nation heavily reliant on the Chinese economy. Tsai’s push for
new regional partners, called the “New Southbound Policy”, is similar but more strategic than the policies of
former President Lee and Chen. Like its forerunners, Tsai’s policy seeks to lessen the mainland’s dominance of
Taiwan’s trade, but it is more comprehensive and emphasizes building an extensive network of cultural and
interpersonal relationships throughout the region.
Furthermore, Taiwan’s trade with China is compounded by a contentious political environment. Unlike
other small nations that are dependent on large trade partners, Taiwan must also contend with its disputed
sovereignty, leaving it uniquely vulnerable to coercion from China.
Essence of the New Southbound Policy is to forge a new and mutually beneficial model of cooperation,
and create a sense of economic community. Rather than unilaterally setting up contract manufacturing bases in
ASEAN and South Asia as in the past, Taiwan will pursue bilateral partnerships and expand exchanges of
personnel, capital, technology, culture, and education with ASEAN, South Asian states, Australia, and New
Zealand. These efforts will forge a new and mutually beneficial model of cooperation and ultimately create a
sense of economic community. To build strategic partnerships that will create regional prosperity, the plan
outlines four tasks:
(1) Promote economic collaboration. Forge new partnerships by integrating with those countries’ supply
chains, connecting with their domestic demand markets. Taiwan will support the industrial capacities and
demands of partner countries through the five major innovative industries it is currently developing. And create
a collaborative platform for exporting infrastructure construction services and turnkey projects.
(2) Conduct talent exchange. With a focus on people, deepen bilateral exchange and cultivation of young
scholars, students, and industry professionals. Expand scholarships to draw more students from ASEAN and
South Asia. Establish a points-based system allowing residency extensions for eligible foreign professional or
technical workers in Taiwan. Help generation immigrants use their linguistic and cultural advantages to obtain
work certification and job opportunities.
(3) Share resources. Capitalize on Taiwan’s soft powers to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation
in culture, tourism, medical care, technology, agriculture, and small and medium-sized enterprises. Cooperate
on bilateral pharmaceutical certifications. Use film, broadcasting, and online games to market Taiwan’s cultural
brand. Ease visa requirements for tourists.
(4) Forge regional links. Systematize bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partner countries while
strengthening negotiations and dialogue. Promote multilevel and all-encompassing negotiations and dialogue.
Open dialogue and negotiations with China at a suitable time on relevant topics and cooperation matters.
Reallocate foreign aid resources. Build a comprehensive foreign aid mechanism.
Taiwan Operationalizing the Hedging Strategy

Further we investigate Taiwan’s tactics and means regarding the regional integration of ASEAN under the
rapidly changing international context: a global economy in disarray, highly uncertain and confrontational
regional politics, falling levels of domestic investment, a bottleneck in the transformation of the manufacturing
industry, difficulty expanding into international markets, and a continued overreliance on China as an export
market.
Two-Pronged “Southbound” Strategy
The “New Southbound Policy” and its “five innovative industries policy” to promote creative industries
have both been keenly anticipated. Taiwan government would open a series of service centers; one for each of
the 18 countries covered by the “New Southbound Policy”, and instructed the Financial Supervisory
Commission to set up a “southbound center” financing platform for Taiwanese businesses in need of capital
injections. Governments at all levels would have to divide responsibilities in a specialized manner as the
Cabinet sets out a plan for how state machinery would be used to implement the policies, establish key
performance indicators, and do promotional work.
When mulling the “New Southbound Policy” and the “five innovative industries policy”, perhaps thoughts
should be focused on how to best furnish Taiwanese businesses with a competitive advantage, based on the
principle of incremental innovation and complemented by disruptive innovation and the integration of new and
old industries. Exports to the 18 countries covered by the government’s New Southbound Policy increased by
14% in 2017 as Table 5. Taiwan’s exports to the 18 countries covered by the government’s New Southbound
Policy picked up more steam during the first year, reflecting the effectiveness of the initiative in driving the
local economy.
Table 5
Import and Export Trade Value Table Amount: Million U.S. Dollars
China New South (18)
Year
Trade Export Import Balance Trade Export Import Balance
2015 115,392 71,209 44,183 27,026 96,357 59,236 37,121 22,116
2016 117,868 73,878 43,990 29,889 95,954 59,415 36,539 22,876
2017 139,022 88,980 50,041 38,939 110,801 67,375 43,426 23,948
2018(01~02) 21,852 13,454 8,398 5,056 17,769 10,650 7,119 3,530
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Not Intended to Compete or Replace the One Belt, One Road

It is not a point-to-point or direct response. Taiwan had the (old) Southbound Policy in the 1990s under
(then) president Lee Teng-hui. At that time, there was no such initiative as One Belt One Road. Taiwan’s
direction (forward) is to have market diversification; Mainland China is only one of Taiwan’s most important
markets and investment opportunities. The New Southbound Policy is not a competition with the One Belt one
Road initiative.
The New Southbound Policy is not intended to compete or replace the One Belt, One Road. Taiwan has
transformed over years and accumulated knowledge, experience, willing to share hard-earned knowledge with
neighbors. In 2016, Taiwan-made products were ranked No. 1 in the world market; 23 were ranked among the
top three. These products were in the semiconductor foundry market, IC packaging and testing, high-end
bicycles, glass fiber cloth, green algae, functional textiles, and portable navigation device. Taiwan has lots of
natural disasters and lack of natural resources, but the government is investing heavily in human resource. That
is why Taiwan is called the economic miracle of Asia.
An Integrated ASEAN Would Attract More Foreign Investments
The New Southbound Policy is aimed at reducing Taiwan’s economic dependence on China. The number
of tourists visiting Taiwan from the 18 designated countries totaled 513,457 in the first quarter of 2017, up
33.26% from the same period in 2016. Taiwan’s trade with these countries 10% increases year-on-year. In
terms of educational exchanges, Taiwan welcomed 31,531 students from the target countries for the current
school year, up 9.7% from the previous school year.
An integrated ASEAN would attract more foreign investments and improve their economic
competitiveness through economies of scale and specialization according to comparative advantages of each
member states. China today has become an economic opportunity for ASEAN since Beijing has deliberately
changed its strategic engagement with ASEAN as China seeks stability and equilibrium for its own economic
development. In terms of the U.S.-ASEAN relations, the U.S.-ASEAN two-way trades totaled $120 billion last
year. With the growing importance of the ASEAN region, the U.S. role in this region is poised to increase in
the future.
Building Integration With China, From Goods to Services
In the summer of 2010, Taiwan and the mainland agreed on the EFCA. The preferential trade agreement
reduced tariffs and commercial barriers between the two sides and boosted bilateral trade to $197 billion last
year. From the standpoint of bilateral trade, the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) is a vital
follow-up to the ECFA. It would open Taiwan’s industries to mainland investment, while the mainland would
open industries to Taiwan’s investment.
While the CSSTA is just one of many proposed trade agreements to the mainland, it is a critical lifeline to
Taiwan. First of all, the CSSTA would allow Taiwanese businesses to broaden and deepen their economic
expansion in the mainland. Also, the ECFA focuses on goods, while the CSSTA stresses services. Goods are
important in the early stages of economic development, whereas services are vital in the more advanced stages
of development. The CSSTA supports Taiwan’s efforts to move higher in the value-added chain, while
boosting reforms that support the transition of the mainland economy from cost-efficiencies toward
innovation-driven competitiveness. Third, the CSSTA is vital to protect Taiwan’s current sources of
competitive advantage and build new sources of advantage. Finally, it also paves way for further economic
integration with other nations in Asia, which is critical to Taiwan’s future.
Conclusion
ASEAN has earned a growing recognition in international community, and has clearly demonstrated the
gains of political cooperation. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea are a major security concern not
only to the claimants but also to the international community. Above all conclusion is as below as follow.
Stabilized ASEAN-China Relation Should Help Stabilize the Asia-Pacific Region
ASEAN hopes to benefit from China’s modernization program by taking advantage of economic
opportunities. ASEAN states worry about whether it will use its newfound power to seek regional hegemony,
resolving territorial disputes by force and interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Nevertheless, lately,
China appears to have adopted a more accommodating attitude towards these disputes. China has demonstrated
the willingness for dialogue.
China and ASEAN future relations will be a mixture of cooperation on some front sand unresolved issues
conducive to tension on the other fronts. A stabilized ASEAN-China relation should help stabilize the
Asia-Pacific region, which is what both ASEAN and China seek to develop and prosper together. In summary,
the relations between China and ASEAN clearly reflect the dictum “there is no permanent enemies or friends
only permanent interest”. Hence, the U.S. is always welcomed as a counterbalance in the region.
Political Consensus to Support Economic Growth
There is no doubt that the relation between China (PRC)—the largest developing country and the United
States—the largest developed country is crucial to the world. In economic aspect, China and America are so
intertwined that their symbiotic relationship is described as “Chimerica”; however, divergence always emerges
between the two on political issues, in particular, the Taiwan issue. In a word, there is an increasing trend
toward closer economic and trade relations among the three parties, and there are still a lot of common interests
between the PRC and the U.S. as well as between Beijing and Taipei. A peaceful solution of the Taiwan
problem is also possible in a foreseeable future.
Political consensus is to support economic growth. Nonetheless, in Taiwan and elsewhere, economic
success is challenging without adequate political consensus. Conversely, political determination without
sufficient economic growth will only result in stagnation. What Taipei needs is a political consensus that
supports an economic pro-growth path; and that requires trade pacts with the mainland and the rest of the
emerging Asia.
Taiwan Economic Reform Including Liberalizing the Economy
Taiwan is now facing a range of new challenges that will test anew the capacity of Taiwan’s vibrant but
still nascent democracy to pull together to address important issues. For one, its exclusion from trade
agreements in the Asia Pacific region has undermined the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector and these
impacts will grow as regional supply chains increasingly bypass Taiwan as businesses invest elsewhere to take
advantage of these agreements’ trade preferences. Taiwan’s leaders must also overcome domestic challenges to
introduce needed economic reform including liberalizing the economy to greater international competition and
developing a competitive and innovative services sector—something increasingly important for an advanced
economy.
Participating in Trade Agreements and in Particular the TPP
In this environment, participating in trade agreements—and in particular the TPP—is key, not only for the
market access opportunities but as an impetus for the type of economic policies that Taiwan needs to adopt. But
joining the TPP will present its own challenges, including U.S. wariness about Taiwan’s capacity for the type
of reforms that TPP membership will require, and likely opposition from China. However, the importance to
Taiwan of participating in the growing sweep of trade liberalization in the Asia Pacific region is not a question
for Taiwan of “if”, but of “when”. Navigating these domestic political restraints and implementing domestic
economic reform while convincing China to support Taiwan’s participation in the TPP are the great challenges
going forward.
“New Southbound” Policy May Still Make Some Strides
While the complementary natures of Taiwan’s and Southeast Asia’s economies place Taiwan in a
favorable position to “Go South”, sovereign disputes in cross-Strait relations prevent the island from
negotiating bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with ASEAN countries. Given that President Tsai and
President Xi Jinping have not found a basis for political cooperation, the prospects for Taiwan to reach more
trade agreements with ASEAN countries remain dim. However, if the Tsai administration can mobilize
resources in the financial and tourism sectors, the “New Southbound Policy” may still make some strides.
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International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN 2328-2134) Volume 6, Number 3,2018

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International Relations

David Publishing Company

Aims and Scope:

David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

Economic Sanctions: A Political, Economic, and Normative Analysis 152

Regional International Environmental Law

ASEAN Commitment to Sustainable Development in the Regional International

Tourism Development of Vietnam

Tourism With the Integration and Development of Vietnam—Southeast Asia 188

Southeast Asian Regional Economic Integration

Political and Economic Analysis of Southeast Asian Regional Economic Integration

National Identity as a Useful Tool for Setting Limits to European

Keywords: national identity, constitutional identity, constitutional courts, Court of Justice, EU

Protecting States’ Constitutional Foundations

National Identity Under EU Law

position vis-à-vis EU law (ibid.).

Constitutional Identity in the Constitutional Courts’ Judgements

Economic Sanctions: A Political, Economic, and Normative

sanctions as a foreign policy option.

Figure 2. UN sanctions (Security Council Report).

policy and must be further examined.

degraded quality of life and pursuit of happiness.

ASEAN Commitment to Sustainable Development in the

The Road to Sustainable Development: Global Perspective

The Importance of Sustainable Development for ASEAN

ASEAN’s Documents on Sustainable Development

Then in Article 1(1), it is reaffirmed on the fundamental principle which states:

After that, it has agreed:

The other statement has:

this connection, underscored the importance of promoting cooperation in sustainable development.

environment sustainable development, tourism, and human resources development

The Influence of Sustainable Development in Regional International Environmental Law in

Tourism With the Integration and Development of

Huynh Quoc Thang

Keywords: tourism development, integration process, Vietnam and Southeast Asia

Basic and Orientation of Tourism Development in the Process of Vietnam—Southeast Asia

Political and Economic Analysis of Southeast Asian Regional

Rachel Sun, Shang-Yung Yen

Keywords: New Southbound, ASEAN, hedging, FTA

partnerships with the U.S.

ASEAN-Taiwan Economic Tie

ASEAN-China Economic Tie

ASEAN-China Free Trade Area

ASEAN-U.S. Economic Tie

Taiwan’s Hedging Strategy

Figure 1. Taiwan’s hedging strategy vis-à-vis ASEAN under China’s rise.

2016 3,860 776 5 2 2 - 25 46 696 345 4 134 207 2,739

Taiwan Operationalizing the Hedging Strategy

Not Intended to Compete or Replace the One Belt, One Road

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