International Relations

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 International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 8, Number 3, March 2020 (Serial Number 78)

Contents
Electoral Authoritarianism

Electoral Authoritarianism in Togo: How Has Foreign Aid Impacted the Democratization
Process in Togo From 2005 to 2010? 83
Edoh Agbehonou

Security

The Death of the Security Goddess Securitas: Brave New World 95

Emre Baysoy

Belt and Road Initiative

China-Egypt Financial Cooperation: Developments and Problems 104

MA Wenyuan, ZHAO Jun

Internet Technology

Internet Technology in Startup Businesses and Their Contribution to the

Development of Entrepreneurship in Greece 110
Nikolaos Raptis, Vasiliki Delitheou, Charalampos Trasanidis

Terrorism

The Origins of the War on Terrorism Paradigm 120

Alex Hobson
International Relations and Diplomacy, March 2020, Vol. 8, No. 03, 83-94
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.03.001
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

Electoral Authoritarianism in Togo: How Has

Foreign Aid Impacted the Democratization Process in Togo
From 2005 to 2010?

Edoh Agbehonou
Savannah State University, Savannah, USA

After four decades of military dictatorship, Togo is still facing a dilemma of whether to break with the past and take
a path of democratization or make changes in the continuity. The death of the former President Gnassingbe
Eyadema in 2005 was seen by the Togolese community at home and around the world as a window of opportunity
or a step toward the emergence of the political liberalization in the country. Unfortunately, with the backing of the
Togolese army, Faure Gnassingbe, one of the sons of Eyadema, was enthroned as the country’s new President since
2005. The international economic sanctions on Togo in the aftermath of the death of Eyadema, due to continuing
human rights abuses and violations by the authoritarian regime, have accentuated the already acute suffering and
poverty of the Togolese population. However, the 2006 Global Political Agreement reached between the traditional
political opposition parties and the government paved the way to the normalization of the international cooperation
with Togo and hence the lifting of economic sanctions by the international community. Drawing from Solow-Swan
growth model and a cross-national causality test of the development-democracy-growth hypothesis of Abbas
Pourgerami, this paper investigates the impact of foreign aid on the democratization process since 2005 and argues
that foreign aid played a paramount role in consolidating electoral authoritarianism instead of establishing a viable
democracy in Togo.

Keywords: Togo, foreign aid, political agreement, democratization, authoritarianism, human rights

Introduction
The Republic of Togo is located in West Africa between Benin to the east and Ghana to the west. Burkina
Faso is its northern neighbor. Alongside with Benin, Ghana, and other coastal countries in the region, Togo lies
close to the Atlantic Ocean, also known as the Gulf of Guinea. The country had been under two colonial
powers—the Germans from 1884 to 1914 and the French from 1914 to 1960. Togo became an independent
state on April 27, 1960. After a few years of democracy, the first democratically elected president of Togo,
Sylvanus Olympio, was assassinated in 1963. This was the very first coups d’état in Africa. The late strongman,
General Eyadema Gnassingbe, who claimed responsibility for the coup three years later, came to power and
installed a military dictatorship from 1967 and 2005. After the death of the dictator, on February 5, 2005, his
son, Faure Gnassingbe, was brought to power, first by the army and second by a controversial presidential

Edoh Agbehonou, Ph.D., Lecturer of Political Science, Department of Political Science & Public Affairs, Savannah State
University, Savannah, USA.
84 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO

election in which 400 to 500 people lost their lives and thousands were wounded according to the United
Nations (UN News, 2005).
Due to the democratic deficit in Togo during General Gnassingbe’s rule, the European Union (EU), the
country’s major foreign aid provider, has suspended its cooperation with Togo since early 1990s. A little
window of opportunity for the emergence of political liberalization in Togo which opened with the death of the
late president in 2005 has become a dream for the Togolese. Human rights abuses and violations continued
even with the son as the new president. The EU’s sanctions on Togo did not prevent Togo’s former colonial
power (France) from supporting the oppressive regime. This is well expressed by Amnesty International that
“France continues to provide substantial military and economic support to the country, which only increases the
feeling of impunity for the government members”. As living conditions continued to deteriorate, the ruling
party and the main political opposition parties were forced by the international community to sign a
comprehensive political agreement (CPA) in August 2006, an agreement which convinced the EU to resume its
cooperation with Togo.
For example, in 2008, Togo was able to receive US$32.9 million from the World Bank as contribution to
the Community Development Project (CDP), US$28 million to improve governance, transparency,
management of public sectors, to name a few. In addition, the World Bank reported that from 2005 to 2009 a
total of US$851,610,000 was given to Togo by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, which
include but are not limited to France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy, as the net bilateral aid or the
disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) (World Bank, 2010). Despite the flow of foreign aid
into the country, it was not among the fifteen percent of the Sub-Saharan countries that were reported in the
Freedom House’s 2008 survey as free or democratic (Freedom House, 2010).
This paper discusses the impact of foreign aid on the democratization process in Togo between the last
five years: 2005-2010. After a review of the literature on both foreign aid and democracy in Section I, different
theories and hypotheses are discussed in Section II. The paper also lays out and discusses recent aid projects,
agreements and loans in Section III. Strengthening civil society and community-based grants are presented in
Section IV. Section V focuses on the results which show the impact of the different kinds of loans and/or grants
accorded to Togo during the last five years. Finally, based on our findings, the concluding section of the paper
provides some policy recommendations on how democracy can be promoted and consolidated in Togo.

A Glance at the Literature

There has been a panoply of literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid and democracy. However, little
has been written on whether foreign aid promotes democracy or not. Researchers, such as Doucouliagos and
Paldam (2011), in their article titled “The Ineffectiveness of Development aid on Growth: Update”, found that
“on average, aggregate development aid flows are ineffective in generating growth” (p. 8). Doucouliagos
and Paldam (2006) argued that a larger portion of foreign aid is often used for public consumption while only a
little amount of the aid is used as investment to generate growth. This means that aid may be an indirect driver
of economic development, but not the direct one. Freytag and Heckelman (2011) asserted that aid
ineffectiveness may be imbedded in the lack of good governance in aid recipient countries.
Some scholars argued that aid should be directed at promoting democracy and economic development by
creating democratic institutions and better market institutions. This is the case with Scully (1992) who
supported the idea that freer markets, which must be considered here as better institutions, not only generate
 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO 85

higher growth as property rights are highly respected, but also they promote more equal distribution of wealth
or income, and to some extent, more democracy. The assumption is that aid is better used if it is used to put in
place a good institutional framework. Although Hodler (2007) argued that the higher aid effectiveness depends
on how good are the institutions that the use of aid helps develop, Murphy and Tresp (2006) thought otherwise.
Indeed, Murphy and Tresp (2006) contended that even if the institutional setting is favorable, aid does neither
generate growth nor enhance it.
Knack (2004) presented a multivariate analysis of the impact of foreign aid on democratization in a large
sample of countries during the period between 1975 and 2000. Using political freedoms and civil liberties as
measures of democracy, and two alternative measures of aid intensity—ODA as a percentage of gross national
product and as percentage of government expenditures―he finds that aid has no effect on democratization in
these countries. However, prior to his study on the impact of foreign aid on democratization, Knack (2001)
argued that countries which depend heavily on foreign aid experience a systemic corruption and low level of
bureaucratic quality. Similarly, scholars, such as Friedman (1958), Grossman (1992), and Maren (1997) argued
that there is a high probability that foreign aid undermines any prospect of democracy in aid beneficiary
countries. In his article titled “Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives”, Freidman states that foreign aid
is hostile to civil liberties and democracy, for the most beneficiaries of this aid remain the governments which
use foreign aid to strengthen their powers and develop the public sector of the economy in detriment to the
private sector. As the literature reveals, emergence and survival of democracy are less likely in countries where
the economy is dominated by the public sector. The more power a government has the less free and empowered
is the civil society.
Other research has shown that donors often attach foreign aid with conditionality in such a way that it
undermines recipient nations’ sovereignty. Conditionality is used here to mean pressure to reform policies of
governments in aid beneficiary countries. The perfect example of this is the implementation of the Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP) in developing countries. Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004) stated that “any
aid donor objective may thus be sought through three alternatives methods: selectivity; traditional ‘ultimatum’
conditionality; or new conditionality” (p. 219). Selectivity implies the reallocation between recipient
governments. Burnside and Dollar (2000) proposed that donors should rather adopt selectivity than
conditionality and argue that the effectiveness of aid is associated with the good policies of aid recipient
countries. Easterly, Levine, and Roadman (2003) disagreed with Burnside and Dollar’s argument on the linkage
between aid effectiveness and good policy. They, however, argue that aid effectiveness is not necessarily
associated with a good policy. But Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) after defining “good policy” as a relative
concept, recommended that the foreign aid should be allocated to recipient countries by taking into account
their existing economic policies and levels of poverty, altogether. In other words, “the marginal aid dollar
should flow to where its effectiveness is highest, under the joint influence of existing policies and levels of
poverty” (Mosley et al., 2004, p. 218).
From the literature on aid, Selbervik (1999) pointed out the existence of two generations of conditionality.
The first generation of conditionality, also known as economic conditionality, is introduced by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980s. Under this economic conditionality, recipient countries
must adopt a certain form of economic policies in order to be eligible for aid. The second generation of
conditionality, political conditionality, emerged in the 1990s. Under this second generation of conditionality,
the provision of development aid has been conditioned to political reforms that would pave way for the
86 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO

“promotion and fulfillment of human rights, democracy and good governance objectives” (p. 13). Selbervik
(1999) made an interesting distinction between negative conditionality (threats to terminate, or reduce aid flow)
and positive conditionality (promises to reward policy reform achievements). She then reveals the gap in the
literature and argues that the vast literature on aid focus only on the negative conditionality. The developing
countries in their quest for development aid have been forced to meet certain goals without consideration of
their own cultural, economic, and political realities. Grossman (1992) and Maren (1997) had demonstrated how
aid can be one of the root causes of political instability in recipient countries, such as Somalia (see for example,
Knack, 2004, p. 253).
While trying to investigate the relationship between wealth and democracy, Lipset (1959) and Moore
(1966) found that correlation between wealth and democracy exists only under some circumstances and other
circumstances there is no association between the two variables. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) also agreed with
Lipset and Moore on the conditional relationship between democracy and growth. Oslon (1982) argued that the
more a country becomes democratic, the more it diverts its investment spending to consumption. However,
Olson (1993) acknowledged that democratic regimes enhance economic growth better than autocracies, for in
democracies, elected officials have interests in the well-being of their constituencies since they are going to ask
for their citizens’ votes. The well-being of citizens is not of much concern for governments in dictatorial
regimes. This is to highlight the assumption that democracies are more likely to increase social welfare than
autocracies.
Plumper and Martin (2003) offered a model to explain why and how democracy affect economic growth.
In their model they place rational and self-interested governments at the center of their explanation. They
hypothesize that “If political participation is severely restricted, governments rationally choose rents as an
instrument to buy political support” (p. 29). As Plumper and Martin have argued, providing public goods
becomes the most efficient way for the government to maintain the status quo and hold on to power. They have
also argued that an increase in the level of democracy in countries that have autocratic political system is
accompanied with an increase of the gross domestic product per capita or per capita GDP until a certain level of
democracy beyond which governments tend to invest more in the provision of public goods at the expense of
private investment, generator of growth. This suggests two distinct relationships—a positive relationship
between government spending, and u-shaped relationship between democracy and government spending. On
the other hand, Barro (1996) found a non-linear relationship or inverse u-shaped relationship between regime
type and economic performance. This inverse u-shaped association between the two variables is known as “the
Barro-effet” (see for example, Plumper & Martin, 2003, p. 29). Benadou (1996) had demonstrated a mixed
relationship between democracy and economic growth. In his empirical research, he finds that, on the one hand,
he discovers that democracy has significant positive effects on economic growth and, on the other hand, he also
finds significant negative effects on economic growth.
Although the literature on aid effectiveness is vast, the topic of aid effectiveness is often discussed in a
broad term. Most scholars and aid researchers are rather interested in looking at whether aid promotes
economic development than investigating the relationship between foreign aid and democracy. Using the case
study of Togo from 2005 to 2010, this paper is expected to fill the gap in the literature by specifically focusing
on the impact of foreign aid on the democratization. Although this is not the first study on the association
between aid and democracy, this study contributes to the literature which is in its early stage.
 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO 87

Theories and Hypotheses

Before putting forward any theory and hypothesis, let us give some operational definitions of both the
concept of “foreign aid” and that of “democracy”. Foreign aid is a voluntary transfer of funds in most cases
from richer countries to poorer ones. It includes, but not limited to, technical assistance, military assistance, and
official development assistance (ODA), which comprises of humanitarian aid and debt relief. The focus in this
paper is on the official development assistance as foreign aid. Democracy is defined here as a system of
government where elected officials are expected to be accountable to people they represent. It is a system
which guarantees civil liberties and political rights or freedoms.
Indicators that measure civil liberties include, but are not limited to, freedom of press, freedom of
assembly and demonstration, freedom of political organization, independent judiciary, personal social rights,
and socio-economic rights. Political freedoms are measured by the extent to which the country’s current
legislators and executives, including the country’s President, are selected through free and fair elections in
which the opposition parties and civil society have participated. In addition, political freedoms are measured by
whether or not the country is free of military control and/or foreign control (Freedom House, 2011).
Rivera-Batiz (2002), in comparing democracies to authoritarian regimes, argued that “democracies allow
populations to peacefully and regularly oust inept, inefficient and corrupt government administrations, while
allowing people to keep more efficient, successful regimes, thus tending to make the quality of governance on
average higher in the long-run” (p. 226). As reviewed in the literature, democracies are more interested in the
well-being of their citizens than autocracies do.
Major aid donors have provided development aid to developing countries on the basis of growth
enhancing, and to some extent, of promoting democracy. Two main growth theories provide an explanation of
economic growth. These theories are the neoclassical growth theories and endogenous growth theories (Sakyi,
2011). Neoclassical growth theorists assert that technology is the main factor of economic growth. They
assume that the more technological capability a country has, the more it can increase its productivity growth.
Neoclassical growth theorists also assume that “capital accumulation only drives productivity in the short-run
(as capital suffers from diminishing returns in the long-run)” (Sakyi, 2011, p. 148). Neoclassical growth theory
is based on the Harrod-Domar Model. According to this model, when aid is used to build development
infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, dams, among other things, it will generate economic growth. This growth
theory is well formulated by Easterly (2002) who wrote: “Domar assumed that output (GDP) is proportional to
machines, so the change in out will be proportional to the change in machines, that is, last year’s investment” (p.
30).
On the other hand, endogenous theories stipulate that technological revolution emerges from innovations
of new ideas, without which economic growth will not be sustained. This is basically the idea of Nobel laureate
Robert Solow who argues that “investment in machines cannot be a source of growth in the long run … that the
only possible source of growth in the long run is technological change” (see for example, Easterly 2002, p. 47).
After conducting a cross-national causality test of development-democracy-growth hypothesis, Pourgerami
(1988) found that “the level of economic development determines the type of political institutions and the type
of political institutions impacts the rate of economic growth” (p. 123). Assuming that aid promotes growth, and
growth promotes democracy under certain circumstances as revealed in the literature, then we can deduce that
foreign aid can promote democracy under the same circumstances. From this aid-growth-democracy theory,
88 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO

this paper hypothesizes that if aid promotes democracy, therefore a recipient country’s democracy status
improves as its aid levels increase. And the null hypothesis (H0) derived from this is that there is no
relationship between aid and democracy in Togo. The next section presents a variety of aid projects and their
relevance in promoting democracy.

Aid Projects and Grants From 2005 to 2010

Most international donors suspended their provision of development aid to Togo even before the death of
the former Togolese President, Eyadema Gnassingbe, due to political unrest of the 1990s and the early 2000s.
Because of the flagrant violation of human rights by the dictatorial regime of Gnassingbe, the European Union
decided to cut any cooperation with Togo. The deteriorating economic fabric of the country forced the
Togolese government to seek the resumption of international cooperation. In 2004, the late President
Gnassingbe initiated a series of negotiations with the European Union. At the end of the negotiations, the
Government of Togo agreed to provide a framework to end the country’s political impasse which lasted for
over a decade. The framework happened to be known as the “22 Commitments” or agreements between Togo
and the European Union (GlobalSecurity.org, 2000-2020). The “Commitments”, not only were designed to
bring about the political liberalization and respect for human rights in Togo, but also have remained, amongst
others, the major aid project since 2005.
Although this is not a place to present all the 22 undertakings pledged by the government of Togo, but it is
very important to highlight some of the main points of the project that are of crucial to the returning of the
international donors and foreign investment in the country. These commitments include:
 A return to democracy through a resumption of dialogue with the traditional opposition and civil society;
 A revision of the electoral arrangements (voter registrations, formation of independent national electoral
commission, local and legislative elections, etc.);
 Strengthening human rights and fundamental freedoms (freedom of expression and press, freedom of
association, and freedom of movement);
 Strengthening the rule of law;
 Decentralization process, which include separation of the security forces from defense (Commission of the
European Community [CEC], 2006).
The implementation of the 22 undertakings or commitments was the precondition of the resumption of
Togo-EU cooperation. The Togolese government undertook a series of consultations with its traditional
political opposition under the mediation of Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso. The negotiations
between the Government of Togo and the opposition resulted in an agreement called a Comprehensive Political
Agreement (CPA), which was signed on August 20, 2006 (CEC, 2006). An opposition leader in the name of
Yaovi Agboyibor was appointed by President Faure Gnassingbe as the country’s Prime Minister. The latter
prepared successfully the 2007 legislative elections with no major incident. The Commission of the European
Community qualified these elections as the “first free and transparent elections” since the country’s
independence. The immediate implication of these first “democratic” legislative elections, according to the EU,
was the resumption of cooperation between Togo and the international community.
In 2008, the EU accorded a grant of 124.8 million Euros in an agreement called “The Country Strategy
and National Indicative Program 2008-2013”. This foreign aid targeted specifically the areas of governance and
support for economic and institutional reforms, support for economic recovery through infrastructure
 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO 89

development, and cancellation of payment arrears of external debts to the IMF. The EU has been also
supportive of strengthening the Togolese civil society, for democracy cannot emerge and sustain without a
strong civil society. In addition, France granted a sum of 100 million Euros bridging loans to Togo, loans,
which allow the Togolese government to pay off its arrears to the World Bank. Furthermore, France, through
the French development Agency (FDA), has provided the country with another US$3.9 in the form of grant to
develop its agriculture and clear its debts with the African Development Bank (API, 2008). Again, in the area
of economic recovery, the EU donated 12 million Euros to help Togo recover from the effects of the recent
global economic crisis and pledged an additional 27.6 million Euros, which is yet to be released for 2010
budget support (AllAfrica, 2010).
In order to help Togo hold transparent, free, and fair presidential elections on March 4, 2010, an EU
Election Observation Mission (EOM) composed of 30 long-term and 80 short-term observers was deployed to
the country. The long-term observers have been mandated to monitor the entire elections’ process, which
include preparations of voting materials, election campaigns, voting, and post-elections results and complaints.
The short-term observers, on the other hand, were just deployed to monitor the pulling day. To that end, the
European Commission donated 12.6 million Euros under the European Development Fund to support the
elections (Europa, 2010).

Strengthening Civil Society and Community Development Grants

Even though there is no United States Agency for International Development (USAID) presence in Togo
due to the fact that the United States has no bilateral development assistance program with Togo, under the
direction of the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Development Assistance Office oversees the programs as follows:
The Ambassador’s Special Self Help Program
It was a grass-roots assistance program designed by the U.S. Embassy of Togo to promote
community-based development which will help improve the living standards of Togolese people. It was in fact
one-year project with a maximum grant of US$5,000. A variety of income generating projects were selected
yearly throughout the country. As it was named, any self-help project was left to the community which must
control over the project future in terms of funding and management (Togo US Embassy, 2011).
Democracy and Human Rights Program
This program was funded by the Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF). It assisted small and
discrete local organizations which focused on democracy-based activities on human rights. Grants ranging from
US$10,000 to US$15,000 were awarded to these local groups so as to promote a vibrant civil society, an
independent judiciary, free, and fair elections, and the advocacy of human rights (Togo US Embassy, 2011).
The Ambassador’s HIV/AIDS Program
The grant allocated for this program was US$157,505. Currently, the program is operating under the
banner of Operation Haute Protection (OHP)―HIV/AIDS Prevention for the Togolese Military. The
subcontractor for this project was Population Service International (PSI) whose main objectives were to educate
and provide counseling to soldiers and their families in military bases in Togo on sexually transmissible
infections (STI). PSI also provided testing and treatment to those already infected with STI. In addition, PSI
worked in collaboration with other local organizations to provide support for people living with HIV/AIDS
(Togo US Embassy, 2011).
90 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO

Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)

HAP was set up to provide humanitarian assistance to needy people. The aim was to secure alliances in
order to achieve U.S. security interests in Togo. Construction or repair of public schools, medical clinics,
orphanages, installation and repair of water sanitation, among other things, were examples of humanitarian
assistance projects. US$500,000 was the maximum amount of money that was allocated to such a program.
This was the biggest projects among the six micro-projects that were under the sponsorship of the US Embassy
of Togo (Togo US Embassy, 2011).
Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP)
People living with HIV/AIDS, orphans, and vulnerable people, such as women and children were the
beneficiaries of DHAPP. The program was run by local nongovernmental organizations and community-based
groups of about 15 to 20 people eligible as beneficiaries. As with the Ambassador Self-Help Program, the most
grant allocated to DHAPP is US$5,000 (Togo US Embassy, 2011).
Gender and Disability Program
An amount of US$249,100 was allocated to community-based projects in Togo through the subcontractor
FETAPH, a Disabled Association Network in Togo, which sought funding through USAID West African
Regional Program based in Accra, Ghana. So far sixteen micro-projects had already started since 2009.
Although the Gender and Disability program with FETAPH was due to end in March 2011, nothing has been
said on whether it actually ended or not (Togo US Embassy, 2011).

Results
In 2008, after the comprehensive political agreement with the Togolese traditional opposition and the civil
society, President Faure Gnassingbe put in place a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) chaired by a
Catholic Bishop, Nicodeme Barrigah, to investigate the political violence from pre-independence year 1959 to
2005, a year of his first controversial elections and bring those who committed gross crimes to justice (Afrol
News, 2011). This move of the Togolese government was welcomed by the entire world, especially, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, the commission has not been able to publish or
release the result of its investigation. Impunity remained one of the main issues that are hindering the
consolidation of democracy in the country. Surprisingly, the chair of the TRC, was accused of playing the role
of Judah while he was forced to hand over to security forces the members of the opposition who were trying to
compile the elections results provided by their representatives at the election polls (IciLome, 2011).
The short-term consensus between the former rivals—the Togolese government and its political
opposition—brought some kind of confidence in the refugees who started to return home. According to UN
Refugee offices in the neighboring countries of Benin and Ghana, only 7,000 of the 40,000 refugees have not
yet returned home (Integrated Regional Information Networks [IRIN], 2008). However, other forms of human
rights violations and abuses, such as arbitrary arrestations and imprisonments of political opponents, restriction
of freedom of expression and freedom to protest, and extrajudicial killings, are still going on in the country.
Political prisoners are held in detention without trial and some are even denied family visits. For example, in
2009,
Vincent Sodji, member of the opposition Union of Forces for Change, was arrested in October in Badou, apparently
for possessing military uniforms and guns. He was held without charge at Atakpame civil prison in central Togo at the end
 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO 91

of the year. (Amnesty International, 2010, p. 323)

Even though freedom of speech is not as restricted as it was before the death of President Eyadema in 2005,
right to protest against the government remains, however, very restricted. Political marches and demonstrations
are only allowed on weekends, especially, Saturdays. Anyone who dares to protest or conduct political rally of
any kinds, was arrested and severely beaten by security forces (CVU, 18 March 2011).
Since 2005, Togo has been ranked 134 out of 178 countries by Transparency International (TI) with a
score ranging between 2.4 and 2.8. The corruption perception index (CPI) used by TI, scores countries on the
scale of 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the highest level of corruption and 10 indicating the lowest level of
corruption. Based on this scale of measurement, Togo scores very low. This means that Togo is still classified
among countries that are highly corrupt (TI, 2010). Although Togo has already ratified the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on July 6, 2005, it has yet to implement it (Akakpo, 2006, United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2011).

Concluding Remarks
In seeking the resumption of its cooperation with the European Union in particular, and with the
international community in general, Togo was asked to democratize its political system as a precondition. The
implementation of 22 undertakings by the Togolese government has convinced the EU to lift its sanctions on
Togo. Two main factors—the inter-Togolese dialogue between the government and its traditional political
opposition, and the launch of a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate past human rights violations
and abuses—have contributed substantially to the decrease in the country’s civil liberties rating from 5 in 2005
to 4 in 2010. The participation of all the political parties in the 2007 legislative elections, which according to
the European Union, were free and transparent, and the 2010 presidential elections, which were held in a
relatively peaceful atmosphere, have led to a slight drop in the Togo’s political rights rating from 6 to 5. The
scale used to measure democracy indicators by Freedom House ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the
greatest liberties, and 7, the lowest. Togo’s democratic status improves from not free in 2005 to partially free
(Freedom House, 2005; 2010).
The improvement in democratic status of Togo occurs when foreign aid has been used to finance a variety
of projects, such as strengthening civil society programs, revision of electoral arrangements, creation of
Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), election supervision and monitoring, to name a few.
Therefore, the improvement in the status can be credited to the provision of overseas aid by foreign countries
and organizations. The hypothesis set in this paper, that is, if aid promotes democracy, therefore a recipient
country’s democracy status improves as its aid levels increase, is confirmed by the findings. However, we must
critically ask ourselves whether it was really the provision of aid that gave the Togolese government the
incentives to change its behaviors and opt for political liberalization so as to pave a way for the emergence of
democracy or an eventual pressure from the international community that might hide behind the actual
donations.
If foreign aid is used appropriately to establish or strengthen democratic institutions, it may help promote
democracy if and only if there is a political will from aid recipient countries to be democratic. Additionally,
since the country’s CPI score was still very low (about 2.4 in 2010), effort should be made by the government
to improve such a score by implementing the United Nations Conventions against Corruption that it has already
92 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TOGO

signed and ratified. The Togolese government must not only adopt a top-down approach when it comes to fight
against corruption and bribery, it should also use a bottom-up approach which consists of introducing an
education program at all levels of its education system—primary, secondary, and tertiary—so as to educate
students starting from the early ages on the negative consequences of corruption and the potential benefits of
transparency and accountability, for accountability is key to the emergence and sustainability of democracy.
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of foreign aid and its impact on democratization process in Togo within a
period of five years. The author recognizes that five years period is insufficient to conclude whether a country
is democratic or not. Due to this limitation, further research and or studies, which will be expanded on a larger
period of time, are needed on the topic matter.

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International Relations and Diplomacy, March 2020, Vol. 8, No. 03, 95-103
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.03.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

The Death of the Security Goddess Securitas:

Brave New World

Emre Baysoy 
Namık Kemal University, Tekirdağ, Turkey

The term “security” comes from the word “Securitas”. Securitas was the Goddess of security and stability, in the
Roman Empire. In modern times, security is often described as the absence of threat and fear. However, this
conceptualization has perils of which Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World can be accepted as the most
extreme example. In such a world there is no need for the security goddess Securitas anymore. Everything is
automated from birth to death. There is no fear and nothing to be afraid of, but the price that is paid, is becoming
robotic in a totalitarian society. That is why a new conceptualization and a new definition of security can help
prevent and overcome this totalitarian problem. By analyzing the main themes of the BNW novel without going into
the details of the events and characters; the main purpose of this paper is to examine the issue of security and its
nature and to offer a new definition of security. Firstly, a very short plot of the novel will be given. Secondly, the
themes and ideas of the BNW will be discussed in terms of why it is a dystopia rather than a utopia. Thirdly, BNW
will be evaluated in juxtaposition with the concept of security. Finally, an alternative definition of the concept of
security will be offered in order to enhance its meaning and also to be able to prevent the coming of a possible
future like BNW.

Keywords: security, Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, security theory, future

Introduction
Brave New World (BNW) written by Aldous Huxley in 1932, is probably eno of the great philosophical
theorizations about the future of the society, “depicting a world in which people are totally designed and shaped
by their rulers, utterly lacking in individual creativity and where relationships and pleasures are shallow and
superficial” (Yeung, 2011, p. 1).
BNW depicts a future where there is no fear or threat. People are conditioned even before their birth in terms
of which socio-economic class they belong to, what their jobs will be, what their specific abilities and skills will
be. There are no families and moreover family life is despised. Feelings are manufactured and there are no
genuine personal emotions. By the help of the advanced technology, everything from birth to death is under
control. Therefore, there is nothing to be afraid of. When the fact that the simplest definition of security is
“being free from fear and threat” (Trager & Kronenberg, 1973) in BNW is considered, this ultimate goal of

Emre Baysoy, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Namık Kemal University, Tekirdağ, Turkey.
This article is a revised and improved English version of the conference proceeding presented at TASAM İstanbul Security
Conference: “New World Architecture of Economy and Security”, 07-08 November 2019.
96 BRAVE NEW WORLD

security is actually fulfilled. It is a situation in which Immanuel Kant’s (1903) “perpetual peace” is achieved1.
In such a world, there is no need for the Roman security goddess “Securitas” anymore. “In Roman
mythology, Securitas was the goddess of security and stability, especially the security of the Roman Empire”
(definitions.net). Another definition of Securitas is “tranquility in terms of peace of mind, the state of not being
worried” (http://www.hestories.info/greco-roman-world-glossary.html). In BNW, with the help of technology
and mind conditioning techniques, this ultimate state of being carefree is achieved. Securitas is dead in that
sense. But the question still remains, is this a desirable end?
Although BNW can be described as the perfect society, we should not forget that Huxley is a dystopian
writer (Beauchamp, 1991, p. 61) and his novel is an example of satirical dystopia (Schmerl, 1962, p. 331):
“Satire, which characterizes the expressions of a Utopian dilemma in a Dystopia, has thus given way to ethical irony
in works bearing intopian characteristics. Texts with intopian features apply ‘ethical irony’ in order to question the very
plausibility of absolute answers (Gary J. Handwerk, Irony and Ethics in Narrative, New Haven and London: 1985, pp.
16-17, 53, 203). Irony in Intopia aims at the increase of self-awareness through the undermining of existing conventions,
ultimately heading towards the formation of a future one. In intopian texts, ethical irony concerns not only abstract truth,
but also truth which refers to a concrete situation. This irony does not comply with a static situation, but aspires to awaken
the hero to a new understanding, and is concerned with a self-awareness related to a social reality. The ironical awareness
is not only internal and personal, or confined to a social organization, but also open to interaction, and it maintains a
dialogue with the other.” (Hadomi, 1991, p. 111)

BNW is said to be in between dystopia, “a bad place”, and utopia, a “good place that does not exist”, as
noted in the introduction to the 2007 edition of the novel (Panagopoulos, 2016, p. 304). So why is that? Why is
such a security conditioned society considered to be a “bad place” and why is it actually “insecure”?
This world has three fundamental components: society, equality, and stability. However, rather than being
the maxims of a peaceful society, these can be accepted as the manifestation of a “mob psychology”: “By the end
of the novel, all the efforts to free the individual from the grip of the World State have failed, destroyed by the
power of convention induced by hypnopaedia and mob psychology” (Higgins, Regina, & Warren, 2000, p. 109).
Including the author Huxley himself, the novel is accepted as a dystopia, “an imagined state or society in which
there is great suffering or injustice, typically one that is totalitarian or post-apocalyptic” (The Oxford English
Dictionary, 2020).
This paper will try to analyze the main themes of the BNW novel in relation with the phenomenon of security
in a conceptual way. By providing some basic information about the events and characters of the novel, the main
purpose is to examine the concept of security in relation with the novel. Firstly, a very basic plot of the novel will
be given. Secondly, the themes and ideas of the BNW will be discussed in terms of why it is a dystopia and why
the society it depicts can be considered as tyrannical. Thirdly, BNW will be evaluated in the light of some
characteristics of the security issue. And lastly, an alternative conceptualization of security will be offered in
order to enhance its meaning and also to find a solution to prevent the coming of a possible future like BNW.
1
In his essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, Kant offered some conditions necessary for the establishment of peace
among nations. If these conditions are fulfilled there will be an ultimate peace condition. The concept is especially important in
idealism which is one of the main paradigms in international relations. Kant’s requirements for perpetual peace are: 1—“No
Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War”, 2—“No Independent States,
Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation”,
3—“Standing Armies (miles perpetuus) Shall in Time Be Totally Abolished”, 4—“National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a
View to the External Friction of States”, 5—“No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another
State”, 6—No State Shall, during War, Permit Such Acts of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual Confidence in the Subsequent
Peace Impossible. For more information, see: https://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/kant-perpetual-peace-1795.html.
 BRAVE NEW WORLD 97

The Plot
The Brave New World (BNW) is a utopian and fantastic world that is created after a long war period and
an economic crisis. The novel starts with the expressions of the manager of the “incubation and conditioning
center” on how they educate children in this place. In the education process, they mainly focus on keeping the
population constant for social and economic stability and by the help of “biochemical technology” (Higgins et
a., 2000, p. 106), they train people who will accept and serve this world. BNW “depicts a society in which
babies are grown in jars, each genetically designed for a particular purpose and social rank” (Evans, 2003, p.
20). There are no diseases, wars, or poverty in this world; on the contrary, everyone is “happy”, technology is
advanced, and people are entertained all the time.
While the World State was founded on such an order, there is another society that continues its “old” way
of living and lives outside the modern world. This place is called the “Wild Region” and it is an area separated
from the World State by electric wires. Wild Region is the region where people who cannot adapt to the newly
established system of BNW live. This “Indian reservation” in New Mexico continues its life in a primitive way.
In this “savage” zone, certain crucial human values persist: “concepts of personal worth and honor and
responsibility, belief in the efficacy of striving and suffering” (Beauchamp, 1991, p. 61). So, the Indian
reservation is the total opposite of BNW’s Fordian civilization and functions as the analogous ideological
contrast of it (Beauchamp, 1991, p. 60). It is a region where divergent people are exiled.
“Community”, “identity”, and “stability” are the main mottos of BNW. People don’t have the right and
opportunity to become individuals in this world. The system puts a lot of emphasis on society rather than the
individual however every person’s needs and happiness are fulfilled in a controlled way. They also give people
a harmless drug called “soma” to prevent their thinking and getting depressed when people feel alone. In this
way, people take a short break for 10-12-15 hours according to the dose taken. So, they revoke people’s right to
think freely. That is why, BNW can be considered as a tyranny: “Control through reward poses a greater threat
to human freedom because, unlike punishment, it can be introduced unconsciously and continued indefinitely,
with the approval and support of the people being controlled” (Higgins et al., 2000, p. 111).
The psychological conditioning of characters in the novel is made by hypnopedia which in fact is a
subliminal persuasion (Higgins et al., 2000, p. 113). By the help of this method, people are automated, and they
just fulfill the role which is determined by the system itself. The education process involves a wide range of tools
and models, the aim of it is to train Alphas who are the intellectual leaders at the top of the social hierarchy;
Epsilons who provide physical power and labor and in between three other groups named Beta, Delta, and Gama
that will line up between Alphas and Epsilons. There are no limited resources, and everyone is “happy”.
In BNW, a basic social institution like the family is seen detrimental and obscene. There are no private
relationships and everybody belongs to everybody. In this way, they prevent people from having feelings for each
other. They remove the positive values like love, fidelity, and self-sacrifice from people’s life because these
feelings are unnecessary and dangerous for the people and society. People who are bereft of emotions also
become selfish and they are self-estranged without even realizing it.
Almost all of the characters in the novel have mixed feelings and ideas. Some of them think that
some practices of the new world are wrong. These people who know that they are lonely, want to become
individuals to protect their human feelings and they also want to love and to be loved. Other characters of the
novel represent the people who admire the new world. They enjoy living in the new brave world. They use
98 BRAVE NEW WORLD

special techniques to persuade people to accept and understand death. According to the BNW, “when the
individual feels, society reels” (Higgins et al., 2000, p. 106). “All the fetal conditioning, hypnopaedic training,
and the power of convention molds each individual into an interchangeable part in the society, valuable only for
the purpose of making the whole run smoothly. In such a world, uniqueness is uselessness” (Higgins et al.,
2000, p. 106).
The manager Alphas thinks that science should be used when it is necessary, and its use should be limited.
Therefore, they defend the notion that science does not have to be in continuous development. The two main
characters are Mustapha Mond2, the Controller, one of the ten men who runs the World State; and Bernard
Marx, an Alpha-Plus psychologist who constantly questions the social pressures for conformity. These two
characters’ ideas are in constant conflict throughout the novel. They discuss whether all the system of BNW is
necessary or not. While Mond argues that there is no more pain and so BNW is good for the humanity; Marx
insists that pain is necessary and people have the right to be unhappy: “…a worthwhile human life requires
suffering and danger, from which will spring nobility and heroism. The discomfort and the pain, John maintains,
are an essential part of freedom…” (Higgins et al., 2000, p. 92).
It is obvious that the book is pointing out a very basic relation between security and freedom. According to
this classical inverse relationship, freedom and security are contradictory in nature and societies should choose
one of them or give priority to one over the other. Each option has its pros and cons: “Control means comfort at
the loss of freedom. But freedom means the possibility of disease, starvation, and misery” (Higgins et al., 2000,
p. 90). However, another question to be asked is whether that kind of a world is really desirable. In a situation
of “being free from danger and threat”, how much security does this situation provide to the society? Or vice
versa, does this kind of situation create a false or misleading sense of security? What is the reason that this kind
of a future system can be described as “dictator behind the mask” (Gottlieb, 2001, p. 56)? To answer these
questions, it is necessary to focus on the nature of the phenomenon of security. In the next section, the relation
between security and freedom will be discussed in the context of the BNW.

The Conflict
If people let the government decide
what foods they eat and
what medicines they take
their bodies will soon be in as a sorry state
as the souls who live under tyranny.
Thomas Jefferson3

2
Ironically enough there is an argument that in BNW, Mustapha Mond’s character is inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who
was a prodigy and one of the greatest leaders of the world ever. Some claim that Mond’s early life when he was a free minded
man represents Atatürk. At the end of the paper this issue will be highlighted once more. See:
https://www.coursehero.com/file/p7knuca/Waston-Mustapha-Mond-from-Mustapha-Kemal-Ataturk-founder-of-Turkey-after-Wor
ld/, https://peutinger-gymnasium.de/html/lernen/brave_new_world/Mustapha_Kemal_Atatuerk.html,
https://huxleyswebblog.wordpress.com/category/characters/.
3
Whether Thomas Jefferson really said so is a controversial issue. However it is clear that Jefferson wrote: “The error seems not
sufficiently eradicated, that the operations of the mind, as well as the acts of the body, are subject to the coercion of the laws. But
our rulers can have authority over such natural rights only as we have submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never
submitted, we could not submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government extend to such
acts only as are injurious to others. ... Was the government to prescribe to us our medicine and diet, our bodies would be in such
keeping as our souls are now. Thus in France the emetic was once forbidden as a medicine, and the potato as an article of food.”
(Notes on the State of Virginia, Query 17, 1781).
 BRAVE NEW WORLD 99

In BNW, it is assumed that happiness, order, eroedom, and ecitsuo are all realized. In such a world a state of
utopic security is achieved in a perfect way. However, in general, as noted before Huxley agrees BNW is a
tyranny, it is a world that is not desired. Actually, it is a nightmare. Because, all things are automated even
freedom, and these concepts became tools of a “dictator behind the mask” (Gottlieb, 2001, p. 56): “There is a
static condition which is created by a biological ‘scientific dictatorship’ (BNWR 179) he [Huxley] foresaw
ruling the world in 2540 AD” (Panagopoulos, 2016, p. 302).
It is possible to say that BNW is actually a reproduction of Plato’s cave4 in a science fiction movie set.
Information is kept locked and access to knowledge is only available to certain people, to the Alpha managers.
In this “antique future” only practical sciences or “problem solving theories” (Cox, 1981, pp. 128-129) are
allowed in the name of totalitarianism. Therefore, independent science, research, and scientists are forbidden.
Because there is no information, there is no progress. “Similarly, in spite of the technological development in
BNW, human progress is missing” (Panagopoulos, 2016, p. 302). No one is trying to find what is right and
what is wrong in such a world. Hence, this so called new world is against human nature. Once again, actually it
is the mechanization of the whole society, even in arts:
“Huxley thinks of art, he is thinking of it primarily in terms of ‘techne’, the Greek word that also incorporates within
it the idea of ‘craft’ and ‘technical skill’. And this is the underlying link he sees between the arts and sciences, that they are
different means of controlling the environment—different types of power. The difference is that science is a far more
powerful ‘techne’ than art, in this respect, whereas art is also seen to fall under the category of cultural illusion, very much
like organized religion.” (Panagopoulos, 2016, p. 303)

Ironically, the only threats in this “secure” world are the “facts” and science, since they are the pursuit of
the reality. That is why it can also be argued that this new world is not “brave” at all. It is founded on fear and
iti braveness is artificial and fragile depending on “hypnopedia” and the drug soma.
As pointed out before, in the main maxims of BNW, “community”, “identity” and “stability” evoke the
ideals of French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. However, in such a world, it can be assumed that
“community” becomes an ant clan; “identity” means everyone is typically the same in their classes; and
“stability” means an eternally static situation. As the result, human beings become cognitively dehumanized
and alienated to themselves: “Totalitarianism, real or fantastic, seems to engender two kinds of servility: the
servility of fear, strikingly portrayed in Orwell’s 1984; and an unconscious, even a happy servility, perfected by
the methods of population production in Brave New World” (Schmerl, 1962, p. 332).
In short, in the name of security and stability, BNW does not need the security goddess Securitas anymore.
She is dead and everyone is happy in a hypnotized and drugged way. If security is defined to be fear and threat

4
Plato in his Republic, VII 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7, narrates a cave allegory from Socrates’s speech to a small group. Actually this
cave totally resembles to BNW. In Socrates words, “Imagine this: People live under the earth in a cavelike dwelling. Stretching a
long way up toward the daylight is its entrance, toward which the entire cave is gathered. The people have been in this dwelling
since childhood, shackled by the legs and neck. Thus they stay in the same place so that there is only one thing for them to look
that: whatever they encounter in front of their faces. But because they are shackled, they are unable to turn their heads around.
Some light, of course, is allowed them, namely from a fire that casts its glow toward them from behind them, being above and at
some distance. Between the fire and those who are shackled [i.e., behind their backs] there runs a walkway at a certain height.
Imagine that a low wall has been built the length of the walkway, like the low curtain that puppeteers put up, over which they
show their puppets… From the beginning people like this have never managed, whether on their own or with the help by others,
to see anything besides the shadows that are [continually] projected on the wall opposite them by the glow of the fire… If all this
were to happen to the prisoner, what do you think he would say if someone were to inform him that what he saw before were
[mere] trifles but that now he was much nearer to beings; and that, as a consequence of now being turned toward what is more in
being, he also saw more correctly?…”. (https://web.stanford.edu/class/ihum40/cave.pdf).
100 BRAVE NEW WORLD

oriented, it is possible to say that in BNW an ultimate and perpetual security condition is reached. However,
this is achieved at the expense of freedom and freewill: “As a result, built on a large foundation of identical,
easily manipulated people, the society thrives. Stability lives, but individuality—the desire and/or ability to be
different—is dead” (Higgins et al., 2000, p. 117). And so is the Securitas.

Resolution
At this point one can pose the question, if the future has a totalitarian potential, is there anything to prevent it?
What can the antidote to the technologically backed up society by totalitarian tendencies be? Maybe the answer
lies in defining security in a new way. An alternative conceptualization to a fear- and threat-oriented one can be
manipulative and become a leverage for an anti-democratic and totalitarian control.
First, it may be helpful to look some basic definitions and dimensions of the concept of “security”. As
noted before, “security” is defined as being free from fear and threat. However, a broader definition can be
made as the action of states and/or societies to protect their integrity in terms of land, people, and sovereignty.
Integrity and sovereignty can be seen as the main criteria to decide what constitutes a threat; internal or external
(Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 52). Adding to these, in order to talk about security, three components are needed. First,
there should be a “unit” (a state, a firm, an individual) that has an ability for perception; second, an
environment that is perceived; and third, the process of the perception itself (Baysoy, 2011, p. 104). As can be
noticed, perception has a critical role and a place in the issue of security. Without perception; without a unit
that can perceive; and lastly without an environment that is perceived, one cannot talk about the concept of
“security”. In short, if there is no perception then there is no security. Therefore, as a solution to BNW the act
of perception may help to provide an alternate conceptualization of “security”, while keeping in mind Huxley’s
proposition that “the only hope lies in the active mind”.
Here and now it is necessary to mention and remember one of the main characters of the novel, Mustapha
Mond. An Alpha Plus, gifted with an exceptional mind, he was a free minded scientist in his youth but later
became the highest controller of the BNW. It can be claimed that, especially Mond in his youth (as he tells in a
dialogue) was inspired by the leader of the Turkish Independence War and the founder of the modern Turkish
Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who was ahead of his time and made a lot of reforms in the Turkish social
system. However, unlike the inquiring scientist days of his past, Mond’s ideas and actions are actually just the
opposite of Atatürk’s. Maybe this ironic contradiction may provide a starting point for a new concept of
“security”.
Atatürk, has a saying that depicts and defines on which principles a society should operate “Türk; Öğün,
Çalış, Güven!” which can be translated as “Turk; learn, work and be confident!”5. The main proposition of this
article is that, the saying of Atatürk can be the foundation of a new definition of security. By applying this
definition, a dynamic and progressive concept of security can be obtained rather than a fear-oriented and
manipulative one.
In order to do so, it is important to highlight the word “Öğün” in a detailed way. Since it is a very old word,
although there is an ongoing debate about the meaning of the word, where some argue that it means “to praise”;

5
It should be noted that, there is a controversy about the meaning of “öğün”. Some scholars claim that it means “övün”; “to be
proud”. The author does is not an expert on Turkish etymology and the main aim is to find a starting point in terms of the security
issue. The argument about the root of the word “öğün” is out of the scope of this work. Still some examples and references will be
given in the text in support of “öğün” meaning.
 BRAVE NEW WORLD 101

“to boast” while some argue that it means “to learn”, the meaning in which it was used by Atatürk is not the
former, but the latter. Still, whether “öğün” means “to praise oneself” or “to learn”, it can be claimed that they
are related in meaning. In order to boast, learning and training to some level is required. In fact, both meanings
are complementary especially for the aimed new security concept. Since the main aim of this paper is to found
a new base for a new conceptualization of security, some etymological information will be given to clarify the
starting point within a limited context.
“Öğün” comes from the word root “öğ-” and “öğ-ünmek” and means “to learn”, “to think”, “to get
informed”, and “to gather information” in Turkish (Eyüboğlu, 1989, p. 110). Also in Sir Gerard Clauson’s
(1972) respected dictionary An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish, “ö-” means “to
think” (p. 2) and “öğ-” is described as “intelligence, mind” (p. 117). “Öğ-süz” means (-süz, being a negative
suffix) “witless, incapable of rational thought” (Clauson, 1972, p. 162). “Öğ-retmen” (teacher), “öğ-renci”
(student), “öğ-retmek” (to teach) all come from the same root “öğ-” (Clauson, 1972, p. 114). Furthermore it has
meanings like “to educate”, “to train”, “to aggrandize”, “to institutionalize”, and “to give a form” (Eyüboğlu,
1989, p. 110). Moreover, the two word roots “ok-”, “oğ-” both mean “security” (Clauson, 1972, p. 1). More
examples can be given as “öğ-üt”: “to advise”; “to counsel” (Clauson, 1972, p. 102); “öğren”: “to learn
something”; “öğret”: “to teach” (Clauson, 1972, p. 114) etc. However, the main aim is not to start an
etymological discussion but to find the leverage for a new security notion. As it can be seen, the word “öğün”
has really rich meanings and each of these meanings has a great potential to redefine and enrich the concept of
“security”.
In the light of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s saying and its meanings, instead of a fear- and threat-oriented
security conceptualization, it is possible to offer a multidimensional and dynamic security concept. This new
security concept depends on learning, training, elevating, analyzing, and creating concrete institutional bodies
while giving a distinct form to the security issues and phenomenon. Rather than a drugged and hypnotized
perception, only with a vigorous mind, a rational security notion can be achieved. Only with a vigorous mind,
the perceptive abilities of which are not drugged and hypnotized, can a rational security concept be conceived.
This new notion can help not only to prevent a totalitarian world but also to overcome any problems and/or
threats to states in particular and humanity in general.
Huxley, too, proposes a similar solution in order to prevent such “subliminal persuasion” (Higgins et al.,
2000, p. 113) which leads to a totalitarian world. Human intellect is the main solution:
“Still, Huxley insists, the only hope lies in the active mind, able and willing to make its own judgments. Individual
freedom, compassion, and intelligence—the very qualities missing in the dystopia of Brave New World—can guide the
fully conscious, fully human mind into a truly free, truly human future.” (Higgins et al., 2000, p. 114)

It is necessary to keep “one’s mind active and free… and individual freedoms must be exercised constantly,
or be lost” (Higgins et al., 2000, p. 109). Otherwise there will be a total slavery in the name of an illusional
security perception. This is the solution Huxley offers to his own pessimistic future world.
Atatürk’s saying underlines the fact that the search for security is never ending since the new problems
will inevitably arise in accordance with the human progress. That is why in Huxley’s words, “an active mind”
is needed to learn, study, take action and then the security can be achieved. Not just simply by defeating the
enemies or defeating fear which is very manipulative as can be seen in BNW. Finally, this way, security can be
secured in the name of humanity.
102 BRAVE NEW WORLD

Conclusion
Being free of concerns and protected is impossible because reality is much too complicated, and it changes
constantly and steadily. Actors change in terms of quality and quantity, actors’ objectives diversify, and
continuous risks, dangers and threats are transformed. For this reason, the term “security” has had a paradoxical
meaning since Ancient times. In the modern world, uncertainty increased even more. However, overcoming
uncertainty, whatever its cost may be in the name of security is maybe the biggest threat. The outcome may be
a disaster and it can lead to a dictatorship. Therefore, the fear- and threat-oriented concept of security has the
potential to undermine the freedom and intellectual development of humanity. Such a conceptualization of
security may become a god that controls every aspect of not only the political but also social, economic, and
even romantic life. That’s why although it is a futuristic novel, Brave New World is accepted as a dystopia and
not a utopia. Such a world is not desirable or eligible but unfortunately due to the technological advancements,
it is feasible. This situation poses a brave new threat not only to the states but to the humanity as well.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s saying, “Türk; Öğün, Çalış, Güven!”: (first) “learn, analyze, study”, (then)
“work” and (finally) you can “be confident”, has a potential to ensure that the Latin word Securitas-Security
notion is safe from fear and threat. Since, fear and threat oriented security can be manipulative, this new
security notion can be an antidote. Rather than a hedonistic and conformist understanding of security, an
approach which is based on being ready for the threats all the time with a proactive mind based on learning and
examining can help to preempt totalitarian tendencies. Not fearing the threats but instead, facing them with
human intelligence can be possible. As a result, any futuristic Platonic cave can be enlightened and a notion
based on knowledge and progress can secure the world. So all world societies can Learn, Work, and Be
Confident.

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International Relations and Diplomacy, March 2020, Vol. 8, No. 03, 104-109
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.03.003
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

China-Egypt Financial Cooperation:

Developments and Problems

MA Wenyuan, ZHAO Jun 

Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China

Since the formal establishment of strategic partnership, China and Egypt have continuously strengthened
cooperation in the field of finance. The two countries have achieved positive progress through signing memoranda,
establishing financial institutions, providing investment and financing support, and implementing the bilateral
currency swaps. However, given the lower level of financial inclusion and the lack of efficient investment and
financing systems, the two countries still face some difficulties and deficiencies, and it is difficult to achieve
in-depth financial cooperation. At present, Egypt, as a country along the Belt and Road, supports the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) launched by its biggest trade partner, China. Deepening China-Egypt financial cooperation plays a
significant role in both promoting the implementation of BRI and advancing China’s geopolitics, economic,
security, and strategic interests. China and Egypt shall increase the size of currency swap based on existent
cooperation, strengthen support for financial projects, build official dialogue platforms, and share achievements in
fintech. All the activities mentioned above may contribute to the overcome of challenges, mutual communication,
and the next phase of deepened cooperation.

Keywords: the Belt and Road Initiative, China, Egypt, financial cooperation, optimization countermeasures

Main Features of China-Egypt Financial Cooperation

With prominent geographic advantage, Egypt is an important strategic hub for land and sea routes between
Africa, Europe, and Asia. Egypt, the most populous country in the Middle East, is the third largest economy in
Africa and a core member state of regional organizations such as the African Union, Arab League, and the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. As the first Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with China,
China and Egypt have maintained friendly political relations for a long time but achieved little progress in
economic and trade cooperation. Since the formal establishment of strategic partnership between China and
Egypt, in 1999, the bilateral economic and trade cooperation has continued to expand, which prompted both
sides to start financial cooperation. However, the financial cooperation remained at a low level in the following
years. Driven by both Egypt’s Revitalization Plan and the launch and promotion of China’s BRI, China-Egypt
financial cooperation has begun accelerating in recent years, enabling both countries to establish financial
institutions in each other’s regions to start business. In January 2016, the two countries issued the Five-Year
Outline on Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between China and Egypt. With focus on

MA Wenyuan, Postgraduate, School of International Relations and Public Affairs & Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai
International Studies University, Shanghai, China.
ZHAO Jun, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai,
China. Contact: 02574@shisu.edu.cn
 DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS 105

financial cooperation, the Outline functions as a basic framework of the following cooperation (Xinhua News
Agency, 2016). At present, China and Egypt have achieved certain progress in financial cooperation.
First, China and Egypt signed memoranda and established financial institutions in each other’s countries
engaged in general financial business. According to relevant agreements signed by both sides, in 1999, the
National Bank of Egypt (NBE) which is the country’s largest commercial bank started to set up the Asian
Affairs Representative office in Shanghai, China. Since 2000, the China Construction Bank (CCB) and NBE
have established correspondent banking relationship. In September 2003, CCB and NBE signed a
memorandum of understanding for comprehensive business cooperation that will provide more complete
financial and information services for Chinese and Egyptian merchants engaged in trade and investment. In
May 2007, the China Banking Regulatory Commission approved NBE’s application of establishing a branch in
China. In December, the National Bank of Egypt Shanghai Branch was formally unveiled (China Network,
2007). In 2011, the China Development Bank (CDB) and Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. (CIB)
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to offer Chinese and Egyptian enterprises more
diversified credit support and financial services. In January 2013, CDB opened the representative office of
Cairo branch, China’s first branch in North Africa. In May, Bank of China (BOC), in association with CIB,
opened a Chinese business desk in Cairo to offer Chinese enterprises financial services such as investment
consultation, international settlement, account opening, and project loan. By the end of 2016, many solely
Egyptian-funded banks and Egyptian-foreign equity joint banks have provided Chinese Yuan (RMB) and
Egyptian Pound (EGP) exchange services, and their ATMs have accepted UnionPay cards. These banks include,
without limitation, Alexandria Bank, Ahli United Bank, Crédit Agricole Egypt, and BLOM Bank (Egypt).
Banque Misr has cooperated and signed agreements with a large number of state-owned banks like CDB on
letters of credit used in bilateral trade, remittance transfers, and other financial services. April 2017 has
witnessed the establishment of Banque Misr’s first representative office in Guangzhou, China (Southern Daily,
2017). Besides, on 22 June 2000, China Securities Regulatory Commission and the Capital Market Authority of
Egypt signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Securities Regulatory Cooperation, encouraging both
countries to further cooperate on basis of memoranda of understanding signed before.
Second, Chinese financial institutions provided Egypt with investment and financing support. China
offered loans to Egyptian banks, encouraged Chinese and Egyptian financial institutions and enterprises to
carry out financing cooperation, and assisted in Egypt’ s economic and social development plans and projects
with grants or interest-free loans. All the activities have facilitated the financing of many development projects
that Egyptians need. In 2009, CDB started its first business in Egypt and now cooperates with numerous local
financial institutions such as the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), helping Egypt increase its foreign exchange
reserves and promote the development of its industrial sector and SMEs. For example, in 2016, CDB provided
financing support and all-round financial services for the Jushi Egypt second phase project in addition to a loan
of 1 billion USD to CBE (Invest In China, 2016). Besides, the Dairut independent power project gained support
in financing and investment from Silk Road Fund and ACWA Power. February 2016 marked that CBD had
offered a loan of 1.425 billion USD to Egyptian financial institutions with 900 million dollars received by CBE
and 525 million dollars by NBE (China Investment Advisory Network, 2016). The credit granting project
launched for CBE witnessed the first time CDB granted a large amount of credit to overseas central banks. As
of May 2018, CDB had accumulatively granted USD 4.8 billion credit to Egypt projects, and invested and
financed nearly 3 billion USD in Egypt. CDB had given support to some representative major projects
106 DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS

including Egyptian interbank credit, construction of the China-Ethiopia Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation
Zone, fiberglass production line of Jushi Egypt, and 500 kV transmission line in Egypt (CRI Online, 2016). At
present, Chinese financial institutions have invested more than 7 billion USD in Egypt.
China also invested and financed major Egyptian projects through development financial institutions
targeted on developing countries such as the China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund), Silk Road Fund,
and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. For instance, in 2008, the CAD Fund and Tianjin TEDA Investment
Holding signed the investment agreement on Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone which was the first
industrial park CAD Fund had invested (China Trade News, 2016). In addition, the green finance has already
become an important part of China-Egypt financial cooperation. In January 2016, China State Construction
Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), which is one of the world’s largest green infrastructure builders has been
the first to obtain the franchise rights for the construction of important projects in the new capital of Egypt,
providing this green project with investment and financing support (Dai, 2020).
Third, the bilateral currency swap was done. On September 20, 2016, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE)
and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) reached a preliminary agreement on bilateral currency swap
arrangements, and signed the three-year currency swap agreement with a scale of 18 billion RMB
(approximately 47 billion EGP) on December 6, which will ease Egypt’s pressure on foreign exchange reserves
(Xinhua News Agency, 2016). Under the agreement mentioned above, Egypt can use RMB in transactions with
China which can use the Egyptian pound in return transactions.
Fourth, China and Egypt opened fintech cooperation. Recently, China and Egypt have taken corresponding
policies and measures to vigorously develop various services in fintech. In November 2019, at the 16th annual
global conference of the international financial forum (IFF) (F20 summit), China and Egypt determined the
content of fintech cooperation which included two levels (Global Network, 2019). First, at the regulatory level,
PBOC had issued relevant regulations and policies on the supervision of the fintech sector, while CBE was still
a blank in this regard. China can provide Egypt with existing regulatory experience. Second, at the application
level, China had such representative digital payment platforms as Alipay and WeChat payment, whereas the
coverage of Egypt’s banking system was relative limited, as well as many payment barriers to government
services. It was the fintech applications like mobile payments that Egypt needed. Furthermore, diversified
forms of financial businesses were also the important direction of fintech cooperation such as wealth
management and lending. The two countries may deepen fintech cooperation through direct business or indirect
investment. What is certain is that China-Egypt’s fintech cooperation and digital finance industries imply good
investment opportunities, development prospects, and vast development space.

Major Problems in China-Egypt Financial Cooperation

The China-Egypt financial cooperation is facing the following four major problems need to be solved.
First, there is abundant cooperation in development finance but insufficient cooperation in commercial
finance and relatively few branches established in each other’s countries. At present, only CDB, the
Representative Office of BOC, Silk Road Fund, and CAD Fund have investment and financing businesses in
Egypt. The four Chinese state-owned commercial banks have not set up branches in Egypt let alone daily loan
services, namely the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of
Communications, and China Construction Bank. As for Egypt, it has only two commercial banks in China. This
situation does not match the two countries’ positive economic relations and their relatively large trade volumes.
 DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS 107

Second, the financing channels are limited, and only a few entities have access to finance. Particularly, the
investment and financing system function at low efficiency. Since Egypt’s domestic financial policies are not
liberalized, the financing channels are not diversified, and the financing is inadequate. As a result, it is unlikely
to carry out cross-border financing, equity financing, financial lease, and onshore guarantees for offshore loans.
In addition, it is difficult for Chinese-funded SMEs in Egypt to get loans and finance.
Third, China and Egypt lack cooperation in insurance and securities. The agreement they reached has not
been implemented. China Securities Regulatory Commission and the Capital Market Authority of Egypt have
entered into the Memorandum of Understanding on Securities Regulatory Cooperation on 22 June 2000 to
encourage both countries to further cooperate on basis of memorandums of understanding signed before,
however, there has been no substantial progress on the cooperation.
Fourth, it is hard to deepen financial cooperation due to the lower level of financial inclusion in Egypt.
Plenty of Egyptian financial business is not open to international market. CBE hasn’t granted a new license to
commercial banks or insurance companies for several decades. Therefore, the only way for foreign companies
to enter Egypt financial markets is to acquire local banks or insurance companies. Chinese enterprises in Egypt
are supposed to focus on how to properly conform with the two counties’ accounting standards, as all Egyptian
tax authorities follow the Egyptian Accounting Standards to calculate an enterprise’s taxable amount of income.
From the first half of 2003, Egypt has begun to implement the Compulsory Foreign Exchange Settlement and
Sales System, requiring export enterprises and agencies that collect traveling foreign exchange to sell 75
percent of their foreign exchange earnings to bank (China Ministry of Commerce, 2011). Investors face
challenges in the investment of Egyptian projects, the use of foreign exchange to pay for imported products,
and in the repatriation of capital and profits.

Suggestions on Deepening China-Egypt Financial Cooperation

The Five-Year Outline on Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between China and Egypt
put forward three guiding opinions on the financial cooperation: firstly, encouraging Chinese and Egyptian
financial institutions and enterprises to carry out financing cooperation; secondly, strengthening cooperation in
banking supervision; promoting the timely signing of the memorandum of understanding on regulatory
cooperation between the two countries’ competent authorities, and supporting the existence of mutual banks
and sharing banking experience under applicable laws and regulations; thirdly, stimulating the two countries’
stock exchanges to further cooperation on basis of memoranda of understanding signed before. Based on the
three guiding opinions, this paper provides the following suggestions.
First, create a long-term plan for China-Egypt financial cooperation. The plan as well as some transparent
cooperation rules shall be formulated according to not only the features and demands of the economic and trade
cooperation between China and Egypt but also the requirements of BRI for financial sector in the field of
opening-up and cooperation. The two countries need to create a China-Egypt financial information exchange
system based on the cooperation and gradually establish a multilateral coordination mechanism for the two
countries’ financial policies.
Second, synergize the cooperation in development finance and commercial finance. The financial
cooperation between China and Egypt is mainly carried out through the cooperation with development financial
institutions represented by the BRICS New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk
Road Fund, and the China Development Bank (CDB). The cooperation with commercial finance institutions
108 DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS

shall keep the pace. There should be more encouragement for Chinese-funded banks and financial institutions
to set up branches in Egypt as a method to deepen financial cooperation. There should also be measures to
promote the establishment of a broader network of correspondent banking relationships between the two
countries and measures to expand bilateral cross-border settlement channels for domestic currency which is the
basis to start cooperation in trade financing, property rights supervision, demand draft, and commissioned
training.
Third, actively establish dialogue and cooperation mechanisms at various levels. On the one hand, boost
bilateral cooperation mechanism. Subject to bilateral agreements, China is supposed to further the two
countries’ cooperation in monetary and financial stability through in-depth cooperation arrangements such as
free trade agreements and bilateral currency swap agreements. The two countries shall formulate a cooperation
plan through negotiation and shall strengthen the communication of information, policies, cooperation projects,
and operating mechanisms to deepen the bilateral financial cooperation. Both China and Egypt should strive to
promote in-depth and diversified development of regional financial cooperation in financial enterprises,
services, markets, product innovation, and opening-up. On the other hand, develop the framework of
multilateral cooperation and exchange forums. China and Egypt have various communication channels. The
China Expo, China-Arab States Expo, China-Africa Economic and Trade Fair, and China International Industry
Fair are all communication platforms where China and Egypt can discuss financial cooperation (Financial
Information Network in China, 2020).
Fourth, strengthen financial support for China-Egypt key construction projects and continue to expand the
influence of RMB in Egypt. There should be more financial support for China-Egypt key construction projects.
The cooperation in bilateral domestic currency settlement and clearing should be carried out to facilitate the
connectivity between the two countries’ payment systems. There should be measures to actively promote China
UnionPay to cooperate with CEB and CIB in bank cards and measures to build platforms for bilateral insurance
cooperation.
Fifth, accelerate the development of China’s fintech in Egypt. China has a higher level of online payment
platform fintech than many developed countries. Moreover, China has established strategic partnership with
more than 180 domestic and foreign banks and with some international organizations like VISA and
MasterCard. In 2019, Egypt’s first fintech center, FinTech Egypt, was established in Cairo as a provider of
intellectual services for the country’s financial development (Fintech Egypt, 2019). Given that Egypt has 50
million users with young in the majority, the largest number of Internet users among the Arab countries, China
shall use financial infrastructure and scientific information technology management to accelerate the
development of mobile payments in Egypt to share fintech achievements; to promote the interconnectivity of
big data, and to help develop Egypt’s economy and finance.

Conclusion
The China-Egypt financial cooperation now remains in the initial phase which has achieved some progress.
However, it still faces many difficulties and deficiencies. To deepen the financial cooperation, the two countries
need to create a long-term plan and a high-level dialogue and cooperation mechanism, synergize the
cooperation in development finance and commercial finance, strengthen financial support for China-Egypt key
construction projects and accelerate the connectivity of fintech. In consideration of the strong economic
complementarity and profound foundation of cooperation between China and Egypt, the deepening of
 DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS 109

China-Egypt financial cooperation, to a certain extent, has benefited from the mutual need of material structure
and the role cognition of strategic partnership. It is certain that under the background of the synergy between
China’s BRI and Egypt vision 2030, financial cooperation will be a catalyst for further activating bilateral
cooperation between China and Egypt. The joint efforts of the two sides will promote a new round of
development opportunities and prospects for China-Egypt financial cooperation.

References
China Investment Advisory Network. (2016). China Development Bank Qingdao branch actively offered a loan of USD 1.425
billion to Egyptian financial institutions. Retrieved from http://www.ocn.com.cn/hongguan/201602/byvyd20101001.shtml
China Ministry of Commerce. (2011). The financial environment in Egypt. Retrieved from
http://eg.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ddgk/zwjingji/201108/20110807699526.html
China Network. (2007). The National Bank of Egypt will establish a branch in Shanghai. Retrieved from
http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2007-05/15/content_8254833.htm
China Trade News. (2016). The China-Africa Development Fund has made remarkable achievements in investment. Retrieved
from http://www.chinatradenews.com.cn/epaper/content/2016-06/02/content_3402.htm
CRI Online. (2016). China and Egypt accelerate the construction of Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone and implement
the concept of BRI. Retrieved from http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/fwydyl/zgzx/201601/20160101240487.shtml
Dai, Q. L. (2020). Green finance in Egypt. Paulson Institute. Retrieved from
https://paulsoninstitute.org.cn/green-finance/green-scene/green finance in Egypt/
Financial Information Network in China. (2020). The third China Expo was held in Cairo. Retrieved from
http://world.xinhua08.com/a/20200113/1907380.shtml
Fintech Egypt. (2019). Coming to life in 2019 is Egypt’s first FinTech Hub found in the heart of downtown Cairo. Retrieved from
https://fintech-egypt.com/about-us/
Global Network. (2019). China and Egypt enjoy a vast space of cooperation in the field of fintech. Retrieved from
https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/c36dc8/7RREyRQMs3S?p=2&agt=8
Invest In China. (2016). China Development Bank and Egyptian Ministry of Investment officially signed memoranda of
understanding on cooperation. Retrieved from http://mou.fdi.gov.cn/1800000628_18_2209_0_7.html
Southern Daily. (2017). Banque Misr’s established its first representative office in China, further strengthening financial
cooperation between China and Egypt. Retrieved from http://news.afrindex.com/zixun/article8862.html
Xinhua News Agency. (2016). The currency swap will boost bilateral trade and investment. Retrieved from
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-12/08/content_5144842.htm
Xinhua News Agency. (2016). The five-year outline on strengthening comprehensive strategic partnership between China and
Egypt. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-01/22/c_1117855474.htm
International Relations and Diplomacy, March 2020, Vol. 8, No. 03, 110-119
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.03.004
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

Internet Technology in Startup Businesses and Their Contribution

to the Development of Entrepreneurship in Greece

Nikolaos Raptis
Frederic University Cyprus, Limassol, Cyprus
Vasiliki Delitheou
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece
Charalampos Trasanidis
The University of Sheffield, South Yorkshire, England


This paper examines the impact of Internet technology on emerging businesses and its contribution to the
development of entrepreneurship in Greece. It emphasizes the importance of start-ups in the business ecosystem and
the creation of favorable conditions for the development of innovative business ideas. In addition, a theoretical
approach of basic concepts of the ecosystem of the startups is carried out which, in combination with the quantitative
research that follows, attempts to answer the question whether the development of Internet technology affects
entrepreneurship in Greece currently and in the future.

Keywords: entrepreneurship, innovation, Internet, startup ecosystem, technology

Literature Review
Theoretical Approach to Internet Technology
The Internet can be defined as a global-wide network, consisting of a multitude of other smaller computer
networks that are in constant communication through a common communication protocol called Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) or Internet Protocol (IP). Thus, through the use of the Internet, users have the ability to
browse the extended frames of a chaotic information base (Raptis, 2018, p. 16).
Nowadays country’s entry into the Information Society (IS) consist of a key strategic choice achieving
sustained economic growth and convergence with the economies of our European partners. Development of
Information Society has the potential transform Europa into a society and economy where advanced technologies
will be used for the improvement of living and working condition off all citizens (Delitheou, 2011, pp. 48-50).
As perceived full access to all the information provided by the web combined with the rational
management, each unit management is able to make better decisions regarding the strategies followed and, in
general, its policies of actuation and operation.

Nikolaos Raptis, ΜΒΑ e trepre eur h p v t n, B hel r’ , Scool of Business and Law, Fre er ver t
pru Limassol, Cyprus.
Vasiliki Delitheou, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Economic and Regional Development, Panteion University of
Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece.
Charalampos Trasanidis, Master in Management, B hel r’ , International Faculty, The University of Sheffield, South
Yorkshire, England.
 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION 111

The additional development of the Internet and the even greater familiarity of both businesses and
consumers with regard to its use will contribute to even greater growth and development of businesses, while
giving them the opportunity to strengthen their competitive advantage compared to other similar and
non-business enterprises acting both nationally and globally (Potts, 2014; Bridgwater, 2016).
Theoretical Approach to Startup Businesses and Innovation
The term “startup business” has been particularly concerned with the academic and business community
because of the difficulty of creating a generally accepted definition. Scientists and entrepreneurs (Steve Black,
Paul Graham) have given various definitions from time to time that identify some key features of a new
enterprise (Christopoulou, 2018, p. 5).
According to Neil Blumenthal, co-founder and co-managing director of Warby Parker, “the newbie is a
company trying to solve a problem where the solution is not obvious and success is not guaranteed” (EDCi
2016). Because of this, entrepreneurs should see opportunities in situations where others are at risk. Rapid
information has the effect of shortening the life span of opportunities, and entrepreneurs should be alert to any
innovation that could be introduced into the market even before demand exists (Trimi & Berbegal-Mirabent,
2012, p. 451).
But what is innovative nowadays? According to the Oslo Manual, innovation is defined as the production
process of a new or significantly improved and sophisticated product or service, the implementation of a new
process, a new marketing method, and even a new business strategy followed. In the context of the above
conceptual approach to innovation, the business unit that has made any innovations during its activity is
regarded as an innovation (Manual, 2005, p. 18).
Theoretical Approach to Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship is a complex concept and cannot be easily understood or assigned to a single definition.
This is perceived by observing that in the last few years, more and more academics and entrepreneurs are
engaged in and are trying to attribute the concept of entrepreneurship.
In 1890, Alfred Marshall was the first scholar who recognized the importance of entrepreneurship in the
production process. In particular, Alfred Marshall, in his work Principles of Economics, recognized that there
are four factors in the production process, which are land, capital, labor, and organization. The first three
factors are coordinated by the fourth, the organization. Entrepreneurship is therefore the driving force of the
organization or, in other words, the productive factor that establishes economic thinking and combines the other
three factors for the production process.
Later, Gartner (1988, pp. 11-32), through his behavioral view, pointed out that entrepreneurship should
investigate more about what someone is doing and not who is doing it. Thus, entrepreneurship is defined as the
phenomenon of establishing a business.
Nowadays, most scholars follow the theory of Shane and Venkataraman (2000, pp. 217-226)
which considers entrepreneurship as a distinct field of study of business opportunities, human resources,
which they wish to exploit and, at the same time, a process of discovery and their exploitation (Kakouris, 2013,
p. 8).
It is commonly believed that in modern democracies, decision-makers regardless level (central, regional,
and local), include devel pme t ue m g the pr m r er f r h ev g gre t egree f t ze ’
prosperity.
112 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION

In order this prosperity to be achieved apart from the traditional tools, methods, and procedures, they are
l “empl e ” v t ve tr teg e p l e me ns and measures, modern enterprises, actions of integration
in knowledge society, etc.
The relative strategy usually focuses er e f p ll r “ ju te ” t the p rt ul r t .
Indicatively, the following are being mentioned:
Creation of start-up non-profit companies functioning as enterprises accelerators (advises, provision of
infrastructure without charge, loans, supportive actions for the creation of patents, support of scientific and
technological laboratories, etc.).
Usual subject areas of action are environment, adjustment to climate change, sustainable transportation,
buildings energy upgr e re t f “ m rt t ” (with the involvement of local authorities, enterprises and
higher educational institutes, etc.), knowledge economy, better management of human resources, etc.
Apart from the above, new enterprises may also aim at the creation of enterprises of fibrotic networks,
easy access to Internet through electric power network, establishment of heat sensors, filters for air quality
control, exploitation of solid or liquid wastes, creation of Internet of things, etc.
To sum up, entrepreneurship is a conceivable, dynamic process by which individuals continuously identify
the economic opportunities that occur and exploit them to sell products and goods, but also create by applying
innovative ideas with which they are not only pursuing the exploitation of economic opportunities but are also
attracted they take the risk and like to see their premonition confirmed (Alexidi, 2014, p. 9).

Startup Entrepreneurship
Digital Startup Entrepreneurship in Greece
Nowadays, Greece has made significant progress towards the emergence and development of
startup entrepreneurship and innovation. However, to achieve this goal, more and more intensive efforts are
needed by all actors involved in the Greek business ecosystem, with the Greek government being the most
important.
Greece is lagging behind in digital new-generation entrepreneurship vis-à-vis other European cities, as
shown by the European Digital Cities Index. This indicator, which describes several cities across Europe that
support digital entrepreneurs, places Athens in 56th place among 60 European cities both in terms of the startup
and the readiness of start-ups for their next step (scale up, a stage which is indispensable for their viability
(EDCi, 2016).
2020 will be the year of entry of 5G, which will become the Trojan Horse for the implementation of a new
technological revolution that comes in the form of a tsunami. The predictions for 2018 by Gartner’s American
Technical Advisory show that the world will be united with a huge smart digital grid that will allow people,
devices, content, and services to interact. Artificial Intelligence is the biggest modern revolution since
electricity came to our lives and with the emergence of 5G networks, the so-called Internet of Things will
eventually be attained, according to Gartner’s forecasts (BBVA, 2017).
The future of Greece depends on its ability to establish sustainable growth through job creation. A report
that does not focus on public policies needed to bring about changes in the economic ecosystem of Greece, but
to cultivate a business culture that will showcase entrepreneurs and innovative ideas by exploiting the
opportunities of the 4th Industrial Revolution.
 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION 113

The Ecosystem of Start-ups

One of the key and important issues that every startup business is concerned with is the search for
financial tools. In order to encourage an idea to be implemented in business, an ecosystem for start-ups should
be organized and built up to provide material and intangible resources.
This ecosystem is formed by people, start-ups of all stages and by various types of organizations in a
physical and/or virtual location, interacting as a system that aims to create new start-ups. These organizations
consist of universities, financial institutions, support organizations (such as incubators, accelerators, and
collaborative sites), research organizations, service organizations (such as legal, financial services, etc.) and
large companies (Start up Common, 2019).

Figure 1. Startup ecosystem (Source: Start up Commons, 2019).

According to the European Digital City Index (EDCi), which provides information about strengths and
weaknesses of local ecosystems, the European city that holds the leading EDCi, indicating that it has the most
modern and digital ecosystem of start-ups in Europe, is London, with Stockholm and Amsterdam following.
Athens, on the other hand, holds a staggering 50th place in the 60 countries (Christopoulou, 2018, p. 35).
In order to normalize these at European level, Startup Europa coordinates EU’s work on interconnecting
all ecosystems of start-ups with a view to the coherence of the various EU initiatives through a link between
regional national ministries, innovation actors, and other stakeholders. In particular, over the last two years, 14
programs have been funded to bridge entrepreneurs of start-ups within the European Eco-system. The above
programs were immediately implemented in 700 startups, bringing them into contact with investors,
accelerators, entrepreneurs, corporate networks, universities, and the media.
114 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION

In this way, Startup Europa provides through the integrated ecosystem networks the ground for a
structured and efficient development of European enterprises and entrepreneurs (Startup Europa).

Methodology
The research case to be explored is a research part of the hypothetical question “The Internet Affects the
Progress and Evolution of Startup Businesses”.
Before examining the research case, we distinguish two sub-variables. On the one hand, we have the
independent variable, the Internet and, on the other hand, dependent variables, entrepreneurship and innovation.
The issue that we will be concerned with is the correlation of the independent variable with our two dependent
variables.
For primary data collection on the correlation of Internet use with entrepreneurship and innovation in the
business sector, a primary survey with a closed-ended questionnaire was sent between May 17 and May 21,
which was sent to 170 people via e-mail.
In conclusion, in conjunction with the secondary research conducted earlier, the research case aims to
answer the following research questions:
 Does the Internet contribute to innovative business ideas?
 Does the Internet contribute to entrepreneurship?

Quantitative Research Results

Research Results
This section presents the results of primary research by topic theme for readership facilitation. First, we
will look at the demographics of the respondents. In particular, Table 1 shows the results on the demographic
profile of the 170 participants in the survey. Sixty-eight point eight (n = 117) percent of the participants were
male and 31.2% (n = 53) were women. With regard to the age distribution of the sample, 61.2% (n = 104) were
aged 26 to 35, 15.3% (n = 26) were 18 to 25 and 15.3% (n = 26) were aged 36 to 45. A lower participation was
observed in subjects aged 46 to 55 (n = 6, 3.5%), over 55 years (n = 3, 1.8%) and subjects under 18 years of age
(n = 5, 2.9%).
Finally, 53.5% (n = 91) of the participants were bachelor graduates, 22.4% (n = 38) were postgraduates
and 13.5% (n = 23) were high school graduates. We had lower participation from college graduates (n = 13,
7.6%) and Ph.D. graduates (n = 2, 1.2%).
In the first thematic section, the answers given concern the contribution of Internet use to entrepreneurship.
Table 2 gives results on whether the Internet has helped entrepreneurship in general and whether the Internet is
helping to increase the number of start-up companies that are active. Of the 170 participants, 106 (62.4%)
consider that the Internet has greatly helped entrepreneurship and 19.4% (n = 33) consider the Internet to have
been an absolute help for entrepreneurship. On the other hand, just 1.8% (n = 3) consider that the Internet has
little helped entrepreneurship.
In addition, we can note that 55.9% (n = 95) of the participants believe that the Internet is a great
contributor to number increase of start-up companies that are active and 27.1% (n = 46) of the participants
believe that the Internet contributes fully to the growth of the number of start-ups of companies that are active,
while only one person feels that the Internet’s contribution to the increase in the number of start-up companies
that are active is low.
 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION 115

In Figure 2, we see that a percentage (n = 170) 45.9% (n = 78) believes that the rise of entrepreneurship on
the Internet is due to the low cost of setting up the company, 27.6% (n = 47) believe that the rise of Internet
entrepreneurship is due to easy access to international markets and 14.1% (n = 24) believe that the rise of
Internet entrepreneurship is due to customer service. A smaller percentage of respondents said the observed rise
was due to new business models (n = 10, 5.9%) and new products and services (n = 9, 5.3%).

Table 1
Demographics of Respondents
n %
Male 117 68.8
Sex
Female 53 31.2
Up to 18 years old 5 2.9
18-25 years old 26 15.3
26-35 years old 104 61.2
Age
36-45 years old 26 15.3
46-55 years old 6 3.5
Over 55 years old 3 1.8
High school 23 13.5
Vocational Institution 13 7.6
Bachelor 91 53.5
Education
Master 38 22.4
Ph.D. 2 1.2
Other 3 1.8

Table 2
Results if the Internet Has Helped Entrepreneurship and Whether It Has Contributed to Increasing Start-ups
Not at all A little Fairly Greatly Absolutely
How much do you think the Internet has helped n 0 3 28 106 33
entrepreneurship in general? % 0 1.8 16.5 62.4 19.4
How much do you think the Internet is helping n 0 1 28 95 46
to increase the number of start-up companies
that are active? % 0 0.6 16.5 55.9 27.1

Reasons of entrepreneurship
1.2growth on the Internet
5.3
5.9

14.1 45.9

27.6

Low establishment cost Easy access to international markets

Customer service New business models
New products and services Other (please specify)

Figure 2. Circular diagram illustrating why Internet entrepreneurship is rising.

116 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION

Figure 3 gives the results on what makes Internet entrepreneurship in Greece more profitable. Data
analysis revealed that 34.1% (n = 58) of respondents believe that increasing confidence of security and security
in online transactions will make Internet entrepreneurship in Greece more profitable.
In addition, 26.5% (n = 42) of the participants believe that in this direction the financing of new innovative
online business activities can help and 20% (n = 34) of the participants believe that gradual building of
structures and culture for innovation has to be done. Finally, 18.8% (n = 32) consider that the liberalization of
e-commerce services between enterprises or state-owned enterprises would help the Internet entrepreneurship
in Greece.

What do you think will make internet entrepreneurship in Greece more

profitable?

18.8
34.3

20

26.5

Greater confidence of Greeks in secure online transactions

Funding new innovative online ideas
Gradual building of business structures and innovation culture
Liberalization of online transactions between enterprises or state enterprises

Figure 3. Circular diagram with the reasons why Internet entrepreneurship in Greece will be more profitable.

In the second thematic paragraph, we will present the results regarding the contribution of using the
Internet to the entrepreneurship of innovative ideas. Figure 4 shows that 91.2% (n = 155) of the participants
agree that the use of innovative ideas on the Internet can positively affect entrepreneurship.
Important answers to entrepreneurship, innovation, and the Internet are taken from Table 3. Specifically,
the analysis of the answers revealed that 87.7% (n = 149) of the participants believe that if they had an
innovative business idea, the Internet would play a very important role in its implementation. In addition, 69.4%
(n = 118) of the participants believe that the Internet, to a very large extent or to an absolute level, is a tool for
developing the entrepreneurship and innovation of start-up companies.
Regarding whether the Internet is a tool for entrepreneurship and start-up innovation, 82.9% (n = 141)
think that the Internet is a very large or absolute tool for developing entrepreneurship and start-up
innovation-up companies.
Finally, 79.4% (n = 135) of the participants agree totally or very much that in the future, any innovative
business idea that will exist will be directly related to the Internet.
 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION 117

Do you believe that the use of innovative internet applications can positively
influence entrepreneurship?

7.1
Maybe

Sales No

Yes
91.2

0 20 40 60 80 100

Figure 4. Chart on whether the use of innovative ideas on the Internet can positively affect entrepreneurship.

Table 3
Table Showing the Results of Entrepreneurial and Internet Innovation
Not at all A little Fairly Greatly Absolutely
If you had an innovative business idea, how n 0 2 19 95 54
important role would the Internet play in its
implementation; % 0.0 1.2 11.2 55.9 31.
Do you think the Internet is a source of n 0 4 48 90 28
inspiration for innovative business ideas? % 0.0 2.4 28.2 52.9 16.5
Do you think the Internet is a tool for n 0 3 26 101 40
developing entrepreneurship and innovation
for start-up companies? % 0.0 1.8 15.3 59.4 23.5
Do you believe that in the future any n 3 1 30 68 67
innovative business idea will be directly
related to the Internet? % 1.8 0.6 17.6 40.0 39.4

Econometric Analysis
This section presents the results obtained by analyzing the data from the 170 respondents’ answers to the
survey. The results are presented in relation to the independent variable, Internet, as derived from the x2 control
with the help of statistical software SPSS version 23.
From Table 4, a general conclusion is drawn that correlation and the interaction of innovative
entrepreneurship with the Internet is important. More specifically, through the statistical representation, we
conclude that:
 The Internet is such a source of inspiration for innovative business ideas.
 In addition, there is a very strong correlation between the Internet and innovative entrepreneurship as to
the fact that the former is a very important lever for the development of the latter.
 Last but not least, there is a correlation of the Internet with the creation and implementation of future
innovative business ideas as the Internet is appropriate for their creation and development in modern times.
 Finally, however, there is a very small correlation of innovative web applications to the extent that they
have the potential to influence entrepreneurship in its evolution.
118 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION

Table 4
Table of Independent Variable, Internet and Entrepreneurship Innovation Results With SPSS Version 23
Internet
Pearson correlation 0.265**
Do you believe that in the future any innovative business
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
idea will be directly related to the Internet?
n 170
Pearson correlation -0.083
Do you believe that the use of innovative web applications
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.283
can positively affect entrepreneurship?
n 170
Pearson correlation 0.217**
If you had an innovative business idea, how important role
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005
would the web play in its implementation?
n 170
Pearson correlation 0.398**
Do you think the Internet is a source of inspiration for
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
innovative business ideas?
n 170
Pearson correlation 0.327**
Do you think the Internet is a tool for developing
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
entrepreneurship and innovation for start-up companies?
n 170

Conclusions
In the context of the above bibliographic as well as the research review, the extremely important role of
the Internet in the impact of innovative products and the establishment of Startups has been identified.
Additionally, it is perceived that the Internet provides each economic unit with a competitive advantage over its
similarities, resulting in a prominent position in the business sector.
The Internet tool is a stimulating injection into Greek entrepreneurship since new businesses that do not
have sufficient investment capital can start their business and apply their business innovative idea without the
need for a high initial cost of setting up and operating.
Equally important are the findings of secondary research that show that the Internet plays an important
role in technological revolution and in a change of mindset and culture in business, as the new data create
business opportunities to exploit the available human resources.
To sum up, and taking into account primary and secondary research, we can say that the case, the Internet
has an impact on the progress and development of entrepreneurship and innovation, but it is true that
entrepreneurship and innovation will be further strengthened in the future developing investment initiatives and
support structures to support it.

Suggestions
Nowadays, more and more major investment opportunities are being created and several start-ups are
seeking funding for their exploitation. However, more start-upper ’ organization and serious preparation is
needed before they reach the relevant investment funds to increase their chances of accepting their proposal.
Efforts for an integrated education for students and students on entrepreneurship and the concept of money
would also contribute positively to the creation of entrepreneurial culture.
In addition, the Greek business ecosystem of start-ups will have to capitalize on Startup Europa in order to
absorb larger investment funds and encourage new business models to raise Startups to make its economy more
competitive.
 INTERNET TECHNOLOGY IN STARTUP BUSINESSES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION 119

In conclusion, the existence of accelerator, incubator and corresponding financing tools (banks, business
angels, VC) in order to make Greece climb from the 56th position of Europe at the scale up stage to a higher
position with the aim of reducing the percentage mortality of startups and at the same time strengthen the
development stage, which is a barometer for the sustainability of start-ups.

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International Relations and Diplomacy, March 2020, Vol. 8, No. 03, 120-125
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.03.005
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

The Origins of the War on Terrorism Paradigm

Alex Hobson
Northwestern University, , United States


It is now widely accepted among scholars that a new national security paradigm emerged in the United States after
9/11. Th parad gm h ft acc mpa ed the Ge rge W. Bu h adm trat ’ dec arat f a “g ba war terr r”
and consisted of new interpretations of domestic and international law, new recognition of the threats posed by
non-state actors, and a stated determination to eradicate threats everywhere before they emerged. Yet most
ch ar h p ha eg ected exam at f th parad gm’ rg . t became d m a t after 9/11, but t d d t
originate then. Examination of these origins and the original context shows that the war on terrorism paradigm was
t created re p e t a cata tr ph c attack the Amer ca “h me a d”; rather t ar e ut f a x et e ab ut
U.S. capacity exert its will in the Third World. Its foundations were established long before its post-9/11 revival.
This paper places these origins within the context of U.S.-Middle East relations in the 1980s. It reads together the
public discourses of Lebanese Hizbullah and of U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz who, more than any other
U.S. official, promulgated the justifications for the war on terrorism, to show that the notion of a jihad aimed at
American power and of a war on terrorism had a basis in anxieties about the capacity of American power in the
M dd e Ea t. The art c e u e the auth r’ r g a tra at f the H zbu ah’ 1985 “Ope Letter t the
Oppre ed” a g de Ge rge Shu tz’ pub c pr u ceme t betwee the tart f the U.S. terve t
Lebanon in 1982 and the climax of the Iran-Contra scandal. It argues that provocations of the war on terrorism and
the war on terrorism itself emerged out of emotions connected to the efficacy of American power in the Middle
East.

Keywords: terrorism, counterterrorism, war

In the July/August 2018 issue of Foreign Affairs, in an article ent t ed “The L g Shad w f 9/11”, Robert
Ma ey a d J F er wr te that ce 9/11, “the U ted State ha bec me capt ve t a at a ecur ty
parad gm that e d up mag fy g the very fear fr m wh ch t wa b r ”. Like many other commentators,
Malley and Finer assume that this paradigm, what we m ght ca the “war terr r m” parad gm,
spontaneously came into being in reaction to al-Qa‘ da’ “p a e perat ” September, 2001. In fact, this
parad gm a d t c mpa parad gm, what we m ght ca the “j had aga t Amer ca p wer in the Middle
Ea t” parad gm, have ger h t r e . Th art c e exam e conceptualizations of political violence against the
United States circulating in the 1980s that were important in the construction of both paradigms.
In February 1985, a spokesman f r a rga zat ca g t e f “H zb A ah” ( tera y “Party f G d”)
(hereafter H zbu ah) de vered a “ pe etter t the ppre ed” at a pre c fere ce the Sh yāh
neighborhood of Beirut. In this lengthy letter, published at the time in the Lebanese daily newspaper al-‘Ahd,

Alex Hobson, Ph.D., Chabraja Center for Historical Studies Post-Doctoral Fellow, rthwe ter U ver ty, , United
States.
 ORIGINS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM PARADIGM 121

t auth r d rect y addre ed the dep ct f them e ve a “terr r t ”. “Amer ca ha attempted” read the text
of the letter,
by way of its analysts, to give the impression that those who work against its arrogance in Lebanon, and expose it as a
contemptible failure, and destroy its plans for the oppressed in this country, are nothing except a handful of fanatical
terrorists.

In the typical American caricature of overzealous Muslims in Lebanon, the letter continued, the e “terr r t ”
have “ th g t d except t exp de e tab hme t ffer g a c h , gamb g, e terta me t, a d the ke”.
the e d, h wever, a d the p ke ma , the e car cature f ed b dy, becau e “the w r d k w that he
who considers confr t g Amer ca … d e t have rec ur e t a yth g except the e … perat , wh ch
1
e gage t mmed ate y at t head”.
Examining H zbu ah’ “ pe etter” a g de what key U.S. p t c a a d ab ut “terr r m” ar u d the
same time helps us to see the parallel ways in which conceptualizations of political violence against the United
States on both sides were informed by deep anxieties about political relevance, potency, and national purpose.
By reading together the public addresses of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and H zbu ah’ “ pe etter”,
we can see that underlying these conceptualizations were anxieties, fantasies, distortions, and denials about
American power, and particularly the exercise of that power in the Middle East.
Hearing these voices together, we notice the parallel ways in which both sides were comfortable operating
within the conventional terrorist versus freedom fighter binary for understanding irregular political violence.
Both U.S. officials and Hizbullah spokesmen saw the use in making the terrorist versus freedom fighter
distinction. Hizbullah found it useful, for example, to deride any notion that what it was up to was “terr r m”,
or that it was made up of “terr r t ”. At the same time, the open letter expressed pride in the 1983 Beirut
bombings, of the U.S. embassy and the marine headquarters, crediting the latter act with kicking off a liberation
war Leba aga t the “u ju t” ccupat f the c u try by rae , the U ted State , a d Fra ce.
Likewise, we find Israeli politicians, like Menachem Begin and Benyamin Netanyahu, Reagan
administration officials, ke Shu tz, a d ther , mak g the “terr r t”/”freed m f ghter” d t ct d ffere t
terms. Indeed, what came to be called the Reagan Doctrine was premised on the neat distinction between
“freed m f ghter ” a d “terr r t ”. The administration supported “freed m f ghter ”, such as the Contras in
Nicaragua and the mujahidin in Afghanistan in their use of irregular warfare because they were on the right side
of that divide (Fanon, 2004/1961). Meanwhile, they inveighed against Hizbullah and PLO leaders because they
were on the wrong side of that divide.

George Shultz: Delusions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism as Strategy

Secretary of State George Shultz, the most prolific speaker on terrorism among Reagan officials, did not
ea y f t H zbu ah’ dep ct f U.S. a a y t . Far fr m d m g v e ce aga t U.S. f rce Leba a
the irrational outbursts of religious fanatics, Shultz understood these acts as a manifestation of a widespread
political strategy global in reach. In a series of speeches between the arrival of the marines in Beirut as part of
the multinational force in August 1982 and the nadir of the Iran-Contra scandal in 1987, Shultz self-consciously
conceptualized terrorism and how the United States ought to counter it (Netanyahu, 1986; Shultz, 1993).

1
“A -r ā aa -maft a - -mu ta ‘af ” February 16, 1985. My discussion of the open letter in this paper is based on my own
original and complete translation of the document.
122 ORIGINS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM PARADIGM

Shu tz’ exper e ce f 1983 br ught ab ut a ep pha y ab ut terr r m a d the da ger t p ed t

American power. His newfound insight was most exp c t y art cu ated h peech at ew Y rk’ Park
Ave ue Sy ag gue Oct ber 1984, e t t ed “Terr r m a d the M der W r d”, but he reiterated its themes
umer u t me . The crux f Shu tz’ reve at wa th : The terrorism seen around the world since 1968 that
spiked in 1983 ought not to be understood as disparate acts spurred by the availability of new technologies or
the pull of new causes. Rather it ought to be understood as a deliberate effort involving states and insurgents
across the globe to force the United States into retreat and to frighten it away from using its hard power in the
third world.
The eve t that cry ta zed Shu tz’ ep pha y terr r m were the ame e that H zbu ah g r f ed
the pe etter. Fr m Shu tz’ perspective, the Beirut bombings chillingly spurred the ominous conclusion
that international terrorism was increasing while the United States was becoming more and more the favored
target. Because of the number of Americans victimized in the Beirut bombings, 241, 1983 was, according to
Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] data on terrorism, the most deadly year on record. Yet the question of
whether th e b mb g ught eve t have bee u der t d a “ ter at a terr r m”, or as anti-colonial
resistance by an oppressed population under foreign occupation, or as something else, were impossible to
answer by referencing universally understood and accepted criteria, and simply did not arise for Reagan
officials.
D t rt pervaded Shu tz’ d c ur e terrorism. He inflated the number of international terrorists
ut there, ee h refere ce made t the 10,000 “terr r t ” Be rut 1982. He a had a te de cy t
exaggerate the degree to which this supposed network of terror states and non-state terrorists strategically
collaborated and operationally cooperated. Shultz emphasized, for example, the connections between the PLO
and the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which connections affirmed the terrorist threat that Nicaragua
supposedly posed to U.S. h me . Reaga , f r h part, referred t what he ca ed “Murder, c rp rated”,
Cuba, rth K rea, caragua, ra , a d L bya, wh ch he a d wa ru by the “ tra ge t c ect f “m f t ”
a d“ y tu e ” ce the Th rd Re ch. B th Shu tz a d Reagan expressed the fear that these misfits would
use terrorism to peck away at American power gradually but persistently, while the U.S. political class and
public remained complacent. This depiction of the threat transcended the cold war paradigm and presaged later
articulations of the terrorism menace and its implications (Sterling, 1981; Reagan, 1985).
There wa a deeper eve , h wever, up wh ch d t rt perated Shu tz’ d c ur e . He repre ed
political violence perpetrated by the United States, its allies, or those non-state actors supported by the United
States in insurgencies, such as the Contras or the Afghan mujahidin. Shultz showed no consciousness that the
U.S. government or any of its allies had ever engaged in what he called terrorism. The most brutal acts
perpetrated by U.S. allies in the preceding years, such as the 1981 massacre in El Mozote, El Salvador carried
out by U.S.-supported death squads, which killed over 1,000 pe p e a g e v age, r the Pha a ge m t a’
rampages in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut, under the protection of Israeli forces and with U.S.
acqu e ce ce, rece ved me t Shu tz’ dep ct f barbar m the m der age. A c u ter-discourse
on terrorism did emerge at the time. A number of leftist academics and public intellectuals exposed the Reagan
adm trat ’ de a a d the hyp cr y f t pre ccupat w th a arr w y demarcated “ ter at a
terr r m” wh e t rga zed what Edward Herma ca ed the “rea terr r etw rk”. Shultz made no effort to
refute these portrayals. Rather, he ignored them (Malkin, 2018; Anziska, 2012; Herman, 1982; Said, 1986;
Chomsky, 1988).
 ORIGINS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM PARADIGM 123

Regard e , Shu tz’ m ra zat about terrorism helped to rationalize an aggressive posture for the
United States in the world. The premise that international terrorism was part of a global strategy led to the
conclusion that U.S. national security managers in turn had to think strategically about how to combat it.
Lurking here was a heads you win, tails you lose argument. If the terror network sought to force the United
States to change its foreign policies in the third world, then thwarting the terrorists meant doing the opposite.
Within this framing, acts of violence perpetrated against U.S. forces indicated that the United States was
achieving its goals. Reagan appealed to this logic in his narration of the 1983 marine headquarters bombing, for
example. If, on the other hand, such terrorism declined, this too indicated the success of U.S. policies (Young,
2003; Reagan, 1983).
Despite these distortions, Shultz and other officials articulated key components of the war on terrorism
parad gm ver the e year . Shu tz t k the ead peak g pub c ab ut the U ted State ’ g g “war
aga t terr r m” m re than any other official. He suggested that the logic of deterrence applied in this war. If
the United States punished terrorists in one context, this would deter those specific terrorists, while also
deterring terrorists elsewhere. Underpinning this logic was the notion of the essential terrorist. It mattered little
that the terr r t m ght t be c ected a ywhere but U.S. ff c a ’ m d . Ju t a g f ca t, the “war
against terr r m” the pur u t f reta at a d preemption become interwoven. This interweaving could be
ee Reaga ’ rat a zat f the 1986 b mb g f L bya wh ch he v ked Art c e 51 f the U
Charter as a pretext, thereby portraying the raid as preemptive self-defense against an imminent attack. While
he d d , Reaga re terated the m ’ retr but ve qua t e , ay g h f k y way that f Qaddaf fa ed t
de t h upp rt f r terr r m, “we ha d t aga ,” u t he g t the me age (Reagan, 1986). By
constructing international terrorism as a threat that required preemptive national self-defense, and by imbuing
retribution for individual acts of terrorism with national purpose, Shultz and Reagan furthered construction of
the war on terrorism paradigm.
Shu tz’ ph b a-like obsession with international terrorism over these years in part suggested a broader
eff rt t u d the hum at uffered by the U.S. p t ca c a dur g rae ’ war Leba , e pec a y
including the marine terve t there. Of c ur e, the Reaga adm trat ’ pre ccupat w th
international terrorism predated these events, but earlier it fit more with the effort to reinvigorate the cold war.
Shu tz’ a x et e ab ut whether the mar e w u d be e ab ed to perform U.S. power were heighted by Israeli
generals and Sh ‘ m ta t a ke. the e d, a a re u t f what they c dered the w r t act f “ ter at a
terr r m” aga t “Amer ca c t ze ” h t ry, the adm trat wa f rced t w thdraw the marines
ignominiously. This outcome fed the anxieties that underlay the post-1983 U.S. “war aga t terr r m” m t
elaborately rationalized, justified, and articulated by Shultz.

Hizbullah’s Open Letter and the Fantasy of a New Islamic Anti-Colonialism

Wh e the auth r f H zbu ah’ pe etter addre ed t ge er ca y t the “ ppre ed”, they simultaneously
directed it at the United States as a taunt. At the time of its promulgation, those connected with Hizbullah held
U.S. hostages, including the CIA station chief, William Buckley (who died in captivity months later). U.S.
officials, such as NSC operative Oliver North, watched video footage of Buckley wasting away in captivity,
and fumed over their helplessness to do anything. In celebrating the 1983 bombings, the letter added insult to injury.
Yet while these facts might have allowed Hizbullah to close its case on the realities of American weakness,
instead the open letter painted a picture of American power as broad and encompassing (North & Novak, 1991).
124 ORIGINS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM PARADIGM

Perhaps what captured this projection of hegemonic omnipotence onto the United States best was the heading
ear y the etter that read: “Amer ca beh d a ur ”. Hizbullah held the United States responsible for
rae ’ behav r, wh ch at this point had produced thousands of civilian deaths, an ongoing occupation, and the
imprisonment of Sh ‘ de rae , w th rum r f t rture. The etter a he d the U ted State re p be
for the role its NATO allies played in Lebanon, in particular France and Italy; and it deemed the United States
c mp c t the behav r f Mar te p t c a . A f th d cated, f r H zbu ah’ p ke me , a d-style
colonialism. Indeed, the letter made little distinction between European colonialism through World War II and
American power after. To be sure, such representation of American power had a long history in the Arab world.
What made H zbu ah’ d c ur e unique was its seamless interweaving of this traditionally Marxist and Third
Worldist vocabu ary ab ut Amer ca mper a m w th Qur’a c v cabu ary.
W th t Qur’a c a guage, H zbu ah pre e ted the U ted State a the ep t me f the “arr ga t” e
wh had exp ted the “ b e ppre ed” the ame f e mater a t de gy r a ther. The “ pe etter”
thereby portrayed the confrontation with American power as part of an eschatological struggle that would only
be re ved w th G d’ he p.
We can think of the open letter as the first collective call to jihad against the United States by Arab actors.
Para e g Abdu ah ‘Azzam’ ca t j had Afgha ta , the pe etter H zbu ah pr c a med t t be a
“ b gat ” f r a Mu m everywhere the w r d t he p the ppre ed Leba expe the c zer ,
either as fighters or by e d g a d. T be ure, th wa a “defe ve j had” wh e ma amb t wa t
“ berate” Leba . But becau e the ca wa tra at a , deed g ba reach, a d becau e Amer ca
power was understood to likewise be global in its oppressive nature, it was far from clear what the limits to this
defensive jihad would be.
H zbu ah pre e ted t e f a the hub f a ecume ca berat trugg e v v g Su a d Sh ‘a,
Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition to addressing an expansively conceived umma, the imagined global
Mu m c mmu ty, the etter urged berat m veme t ma y ca e t f rm a “w r d fr t” f armed
strugglers, whatever their animating ideology. It was like an updated version of the Tricontinental, except that
now it was Ayatollah Khomeini rather than ChéGuevara who was idealized and whose words were depicted as
sacrosanct. Khomeini, like Guevara before him, had impeccable credentials as a rebel against American power,
having helped, as Guevara did, to overturn one of America’ fav red d ctat r h p the th rd w r d. Guevara
became a martyr for the cause; Khomeini, as H zbu ah u der t d t, wa a c du t f r G d’ gu da ce
earth. The etter d cated a wh ehearted embrace f Kh me ’ c cept f “ru e f the jur t” [wilāyat
al-faqīh], taking him to be the leader since he had brought the true Islamic revolution to fruition in Iran.
Conflicts lurked here that would be difficult if not impossible to resolve. If Islam was the true path and
Khomeini was the rightful leader, how could a unification of liberation movements include non-Islamic
m veme t that rejected Kh me m? f the am c rev ut wa de t ed t pread, h w c u d H zbu ah’
assurance to Christians in Lebanon that it did not seek to impose Islam by force be accepted?
But what form was this confrontation to take? What was jihad to look like in Lebanon in the 1980s? What
was martyrdom to look like? Here we come to the particularly contingent aspect of this history for which the
open letter offered no specific answers. Based on various actions taken by Hizbullah leaders over these years,
we can surmise that “c fr tat ” a H zbu ah’ eader u der t d t c uded k d app g, h tage tak g,
a a at , a d the h jack g f c mmerc a a r e ; t a c uded “martyrd m perat ,” what came t
 ORIGINS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM PARADIGM 125

be ca ed “ u c de b mb g” by cr t c . ther w rd , it included precisely those actions that U.S. officials like

Shultz obsessed over as the problem f “ ter at a terr r m”.
Yet H zbu ah’ eader expected that U.S. ff c a w u d be ut er ee g th g th way. H zbu ah
expected that the letter’ h ped f r g ba aud e ce w u d u der ta d that tact c , such as these were the only
ones available to an oppressed people fighting a liberation struggle against a brutal colonialism orchestrated by
multiple powers. The struggle in Lebanon, the letter led its audience to understand, was the latest iteration of
active resistance to Western colonialism valorized in the decolonization struggles of earlier decades. If
Hizbullah had to adopt new and more shocking tactics that was only because the nature of the colonial
oppression faced in Lebanon required new means to combat it.

Conclusion: Toward an Imperial History of the War on Terrorism Paradigm

The 1983 Beirut bombings, just as al-Qa‘ da’ “p a e perat ”, represented anomalous events from the
perspective of U.S. national security managers. As such they each provided the occasion for the reshuffling of
national security paradigms. These anomalous events took place in the context of the ongoing exercise of U.S.
power in the Middle East. H zbu ah’ pen letter held the United States accountable for, among other things,
rae ’ va a d ccupat f Leba , raq’ war ra , a d the de a f the r ght e f-determination
to the Palestinians. It promised continual resistance to these policies. The more U.S. officials experienced of
this kind of resistance as an indication of American impotence, the more alluring the war on terrorism paradigm
would become.

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