International Relations

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International Relations and Diplomacy. 8(2020). Copyright ©2020 by David Publishing Company

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★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar);
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Poland);
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Zealand);
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★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK);
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★Menderes Koyuncu (Univercity of Yuzuncu Yil-Van,
Turkey);
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★Nermin Allam (University of Alberta, Edmonton,
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★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for
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★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);
★Phua Chao Rong, Charles (Lee Kuan Yew School of
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★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
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★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
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★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
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 International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 8, Number 2, February 2020 (Serial Number 77)

Contents
Creative Economy

Three Tales of Capitalism and Creative Economy 39

Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus

Migration

France’s Strategy on Migration Issues in the Mediterranean 45

Kazunari Sakai, Gilles Ferragu

Deep Ecology

Getting Deep About Deep Ecology 55

Anthony F. Tresca

Political Violence

The Role of Violence in Russian Politics and Machiavelli’s Perspective 63

Tereza Smejkalova

Political Violence in Nigeria: The Role of the Church 72

Oti Alaba Rotimi
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2020, Vol. 8, No. 02, 39-44
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.02.001
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

Three Tales of Capitalism and Creative Economy

Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus

ESPM-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil


The aim is to examine how the creative economy develops in shareholder, state, and stakeholder capitalism. In the
shareholder capitalism, the creative economy is headed by large companies in cooperation with governments,
which replicate pregiven formulas of governance with no consideration of local specificities, and reinforces the
exclusion of small and medium-sized creative enterprises. The state capitalism has the government authorities as
the main drivers of the creative economy’s growth, which is usually connected to their political interest in
preserving authority and manipulating the population. In the stakeholder capitalism, companies should pay their fair
share of taxes, show zero tolerance for corruption, uphold human rights throughout their global supply chains, and
advocate for a competitive level playing field. These elements create the specific conditions for a more diversified
set of actors leading the initiatives dedicated to the development of creative economy.

Keywords: creative economy, shareholder capitalism, state capitalism, stakeholder capitalism

Introduction
There are three kinds of capitalism debated by the academic community and the decision-makers. The first
is currently the dominant model: the “shareholder capitalism”, which first gained ground in the United States in
the 1970s and was embraced by most Western corporations and governments in the following decades. It holds
that a corporation’s primary goal should be to maximize its profits. During its heyday, profit-seeking companies
unlocked markets and created jobs, but the advocates of the shareholder capitalism neglected the fact that,
together with financial-industry pressures to boost short-term results, the single-minded focus on profits
reinforced the shareholder capitalism’s disconnection from the real economy, which makes this type of
capitalism no longer sustainable. The second model is “state capitalism,” which gives the government the power
to set the direction of the economy and dominates many emerging markets. The third is the “stakeholder
capitalism”, which sees private corporations as trustees of society to today’s social and environmental challenges.
In the “stakeholder capitalism”, executives and investors recognize that their own long-term success is closely
linked to that of their customers, employees, and suppliers (Schwab, 2019a).
The concept of “stakeholder capitalism” was first described in the 1970s, and, after the creation of the World
Economic Forum, its attendees started to debate the concept and signed the 1973 Davos Manifesto, which
explored the companies’ main responsibilities toward its stakeholders. However, the ways to link environmental
and societal benefits to financial returns have been controversial in many debates in Davos since then. In 2020,
many world leaders and businessmen saw the opportunity to ensure that the stakeholder capitalism becomes the
new dominant model with a new Davos Manifesto, which indicates that companies and governments should pay
their fair share of taxes, show zero tolerance for corruption, uphold human rights throughout their global supply

Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, PhD, Professor, ESPM-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
40 THREE TALES OF CAPITALISM AND CREATIVE ECONOMY

chains, and advocate for a competitive level playing field, particularly in the platform economy. The
environmental, social, and governance goals should be included as complements to standard financial metrics,
and salaries should align with the new measure of long-term shared value creation. Large companies should also
seek to harness their core competencies and maintain an entrepreneurial mindset, but work with other
stakeholders to improve the state of the world and bring it closer to achieving shared goals, such as those outlined
in the Paris climate agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda (Schwab, 2019a; 2020).
While the debates about the three types of capitalism have grown in importance, the “creative economy”
started to gain prominence as an engine for development. The expression refers to the diversified set of activities
based on individual and collective talent or ability, which encompasses a great range of sectors, such as crafts,
fashion, the audiovisual, music, and book industries, as well as the new software and games sectors (Miguez,
2007). The creative economy has been present in the three kinds of capitalism presented above, but the involved
actors and their purposes in the development of creative industries may be different.
The aim of the article is to examine how the creative economy develops in shareholder, state, and
stakeholder capitalism. In the shareholder capitalism, the creative economy is headed by large companies in
cooperation with governments, which replicate pregiven formulas of governance with no consideration of local
specificities, and reinforces the exclusion of small and medium-sized creative enterprises. The state capitalism
has the government authorities as the main drivers of the creative economy’s growth, which is usually connected
to their political interest in preserving authority and manipulating the population. In the stakeholder capitalism,
companies should pay their fair share of taxes, show zero tolerance for corruption, uphold human rights
throughout their global supply chains, and advocate for a competitive level playing field. These elements create
the specific conditions for a more diversified set of actors leading the initiatives dedicated to the development of
creative economy.

The 1973 Davos Manifesto and the Trends in the Global Economy
The 1973 Davos Manifesto brought a code of ethics for business leaders. The code indicated that the purpose
of professional management was to serve clients, shareholders, workers, employees, and societies, as well as
harmonize the interests of the stakeholders. The management had to satisfy its clients’ needs, give them the best
value, and translate new ideas and technological progress into commercial products and services. In this context,
the competition among companies is the usual and accepted way of ensuring that clients receive the best value
choice. The management also needed to serve investors by providing a return on the investments, higher than the
return on government bonds, and employees by ensuring the improvement of real income and the humanization
of the workplace. Finally, it had to use the immaterial and material resources at its disposal in an optimal way, as
well as expand the frontiers of knowledge in management and technology and guarantee that its enterprise pays
appropriate taxes to allow the community to fulfil its objectives. The profitability was conceived as the necessary
means to enable the management to serve clients, shareholders, employees, and society (Schwab, 2019b).
Since then, the world has faced many challenges and the global economy has shown some important trends
which have had implications for companies and policymakers. One of the trends indicates that, in the last ten
years, global leaders took rapid action to mitigate the worst effect of the financial crises, but this alone has not
been enough to boost productivity growth. An over-reliance on monetary policy may have contributed to
reducing productivity growth by encouraging capital misallocation, with banks becoming less interested in
lending to businesses, favoring firms that are not credit-constrained and prioritizing fee-generating and trading
 THREE TALES OF CAPITALISM AND CREATIVE ECONOMY 41

activities. A sound financial system was not able to compensate for poor physical infrastructure, just as the
adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT) could not compensate for the lack of
entrepreneurial and innovation ecosystems. The second trend indicates that, with monetary policy running out of
steam, policymakers are revisiting and expanding their toolkit to include a range of fiscal policy tools, structural
reforms that stimulate innovation and responsible and inclusive businesses to thrive and public incentives in
infrastructure, human capital, research and development, and green procurement (Schwab & Zahidi, 2019).
The third trend is the investment, by policymakers, in developing skills in the light of ICT adoption if they
want to provide opportunity for all in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The purpose is to achieve a balance
among technology integration, human capital investments, and the innovation ecosystem to enhance productivity.
With the right skills and training, workers may turn into the agents embracing, driving, and realizing the potential
of technology, rather than being displaced by it. The fourth trend is the greater preoccupation of policymakers
with the speed, direction, and quality of growth. Although sustained economic growth remains the driver of
human development and living standards, it does not necessarily build shared prosperity and the transition to a
green economy. The fifth trend is the need of visionary leadership to place all economies on a win-win trajectory
for growth, shared prosperity, and sustainability (Schwab & Zahidi, 2019). However, some countries adopted
different economic models that did not follow the five trends. In each kind of capitalism, the development of the
creative economy took diverse perspectives regarding the involved actors and their main purposes.

The First Tale: The “Shareholder Capitalism” and the Creative Economy
The expression “shareholder capitalism” refers to an economic system in which the dominant corporate
forms are legally independent companies that can pool capital from many shareholders with limited liability. The
system is complemented by an open stock market to trade these shares freely. The measure of a company’s
success in this system is the extent to which it maximizes shareholder value. Corporate governance has been
based on maximizing the shareholder value, while financial markets have become more complex, with shares
increasingly seen as assets to be traded rather than as long-term investments (McCann & Berry, 2017).
In the light of these practices, large creative economy groups brought the conceptual and practical
convergence of individual talent and new media technologies (Hartley, 2005) and mobilized creativity not only in
the allocation of resources, but the decentralization of economic activities and the use of multiskilled teams.
Many creative companies saw in the equity market a net source of investment capital. The creative goods and
services produced by these groups may have infinite variety, while their consumption occurs in new regimes of
symbolic distinction. Consumers generate economic value in the light of the construction of their identities from
goods and services because of the experience brought from their symbolic and intangible elements (Bendassolli,
Wood Jr., Kirschbaum, & Cunha, 2009). Many large creative companies state that they respect the environment
and the human rights, create better work relations, and communicate with the consumer in better ways to
understand their specific demands.
However, the capital markets have become unfit to meet the economic, social, and environmental challenges
as they have turned into vehicles for value extraction at the expense of the productive economy. The equity
market ceases to be a net source of investment capital for companies and drives societal inequality and the
pressure on economic growth. The “shareholder capitalism” also undermines the ability of companies to reinvest
their own profits. The stock market has become a vehicle for extracting value from companies, not for injecting it.
The shareholder capitalism also helps to drive environmental destruction with risky short-term behaviour, such as
42 THREE TALES OF CAPITALISM AND CREATIVE ECONOMY

fossil fuel extraction, which ignores long-term environmental risks (McCann & Berry, 2017).
In the shareholder capitalism, creative economy is oriented towards the formal creative industries, headed
by initiatives developed by large companies and governments, which replicate pregiven formulas of governance
with no consideration of local specificities, and reinforces exclusion of small and medium-sized creative
enterprises. It may also establish and consolidate precarious work relations and show no respect for human rights,
which perpetuates the predatory workforce exploitation—such as the exploitation of slave work by great fashion
companies—and aesthetics models in its production, which marginalize and segregate difference. The notion of
“hyper-consumerism” as the need for the new goods and services becomes faster, promotes environmental
devastation and breaks down traditional institutions (Lipovetsky, 2004).

The Second Tale: The “State Capitalism” and the Creative Economy
Bremmer (2010) defines “state capitalism” as a form of bureaucratically engineered capitalism in which the
state dominates markets primarily for political gain and governments manipulate market outcomes for political
purposes. Although this kind of capitalism may not be the most efficient means of generating prosperity, it serves
political and economic purposes, puts expressive financial resources within the control of state officials, and
allows them the access to cash to safeguard domestic political capital and the international leverage. It may create
barriers to the flow of ideas, information, people, money, goods, and services within countries and across
international borders. States such as China and Russia deploy state-owned enterprises in many industries. The
2008 global recession has accelerated the trend of state involvement in markets as governments spend billions
stimulating growth and bailing out vulnerable domestic industries. Many governments impose new restrictions
on the access to certain foreign markets for some companies, and politicians are more interested in bolstering
their political capital by serving political benefactors, powerful industries, and interest groups (Bremmer, 2010).
In many societies in which state capitalism operates, individual freedoms were restricted by the government
and police apparatus, but this did not mean that the creative economy was unable to develop in these places.
Although many states in this kind of capitalism considered themselves to be “democratic”, most forms of
freedom of expression and instruments of political engagement were weakened, and the mechanisms of popular
participation were either unknown in the context of serious educational deficits or were repressed by authorities,
particularly in times of crisis. In addition, the access to high value-added creative goods and services remains
restricted to the elites, especially those linked to information and communication technologies (Jesus, 2017).
In the state capitalism, the presence of “creativity”—usually understood as the expression of the human
potential in activities that generate tangible products and the ability to manipulate symbols and meanings in the
search for innovations (Bendassolli et al., 2009)—does not necessarily presuppose the existence of democracy or
its full experience by the population to foster the multiplicity of ideas for creative production or even the solution
of social issues. The propelling elements of the creative economy in state capitalism do not necessarily involve
the effective coordination of efforts among different levels of government and citizens. The stimulus to creative
sectors can be frequently linked to the maintenance of national cohesion and repressive elements by government
that create, through artistic, cultural and creative productions, official narratives that aim to generate meanings of
the population’s belonging to the place, divert people’s attention away from political mobilization, and build a
better international image. In this sense, the creative economy does not usually arise from the spontaneous
mobilization around initiatives and proposals. In authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries where state
capitalism operates, the creative economy initiatives typically come from government plans with no expressive
 THREE TALES OF CAPITALISM AND CREATIVE ECONOMY 43

popular consultation at the time of their formulation, and mobilization around creative sectors is imposed or
forced by top-down initiatives in the form of government decisions or policies.

The Third Tale: The “Stakeholder Capitalism” and the Creative Economy
The concept of “stakeholder capitalism” refers to a kind of capitalism which aims to overcome income
inequality, societal division, and the climate crisis. In the 2020 World Economic Forum, it was established as a
way of addressing the world’s greatest challenges, from societal divisions created by income inequality and
political polarization to the climate change, and shows its interaction with a circular, shared, and regenerative
economy. Building on the 1973 Davos Manifesto, the 2020 Davos Manifesto sets out that businesses should serve
the interests of all society rather than simply their shareholders and includes fair taxation, zero tolerance for
corruption, executive pay, and respect for human rights. Stakeholder capitalism is not only about maximizing
profits, but about using capabilities and resources in cooperation with governments and civil society to address
the key issues of this decade (WEF, 2020).
The purposes of a company in the “stakeholder capitalism” are to engage all its stakeholders in shared and
sustained value creation and serve employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and society at large
through a shared commitment to policies and decisions that strengthen the long-term prosperity. The company
accepts and supports fair competition and a level playing field and keeps the digital ecosystem in which its
operations are reliable and trustworthy. Its customers are fully aware of the functionality of the products and
services and treated with dignity. The company respects diversity and strives for continuous improvements in
working conditions and employee well-being and ongoing upskilling and reskilling. It also provides a fair chance
to new market entrants, integrates respect for human rights into the entire supply chain, and continuously expands
the frontiers of knowledge, innovation, and technology to improve people’s well-being (Schwab, 2019c).
In the “stakeholder capitalism”, the creative economy companies act as stakeholders—together with
governments and civil society—of the global future. Corporate global citizenship requires a company to harness
its core competencies, entrepreneurship, skills, and relevant resources in collaborative efforts with other
companies and stakeholders to improve the state of the world (Schwab, 2019c). In this sense, the “stakeholder
capitalism” creates specific conditions for a more diversified set of actors leading the economic and political
initiatives dedicated to creative economy, including small and medium-sized enterprises and a range of
professionals which compose the “creative class”, which are responsible for economic development in specific
territories because they aggregate talent, technology, and tolerance (Florida, 2002; 2005). The presence of a
“creative class” may stimulate public participation and social innovations for solutions to urban problems
(Landry, 2008). The creative economy may effectively recognize the relevance of human capital in integrating
sociocultural and economic goals and opportunities based on creative entrepreneurship (Howkins, 2001).

Conclusion
Although the tale of “stakeholder capitalism” may bring the ideal conditions for the full potential of creative
economy as the engine for the socioeconomic development, there are still many obstacles to turn many of its
proposals into reality in many parts of the world. The concentration of creative industries in specific areas of
some countries or cities may reinforce contrasts within their territory (Figueiredo, Jesus, Robaina, & Couri, 2019).
In many places around the planet, there are also inadequate regulatory frameworks to manage potential conflicts
between the creators’ financial remuneration rights and the public access to knowledge, as well as the gaps
44 THREE TALES OF CAPITALISM AND CREATIVE ECONOMY

related to knowledge and skills because of the crisis of education systems, with no effective stimulation of critical
thinking and the students’ talent. The changes in the capitalist system did not happen homogeneously in time and
space, especially those regarding public policies, financial constraints, and technical capacities.

References
Bendassolli, P. F., Wood Jr., T., Kirschbaum, C., & Cunha, M. P. (2009). Indústrias criativas: definição, limites e possibilidades.
RAE, 49(1), 10-18.
Bremmer, I. (2010). The end of the free market. London: Penguin Group.
Figueiredo, J. L., Jesus, D. S. V., Robaina, D. T., & Couri, C. L. (2019). The development potential index of creative economy for
Brazilian federal state capitals. Creative Industries Journal, 12(2), 185-203.
Florida, R. (2002). The rise of the creative class: And how it’s transforming work, leisure, community, & everyday life. New York:
Basic Books.
Florida, R. (2005). Cities and the creative class. New York: Routledge.
Florida, R. (2017). The new urban crisis: How our cities are increasing inequality, deepening segregation, and failing the middle
class—And what we can do about it. New York: Basic Books.
Hartley, J. (2005). Creative industries. In: Hartley, J. (Ed.), Creative industries (pp. 1-40). Oxford: Blackwell.
Howkins, J. (2001). The creative economy: How people are making money from ideas. London: Penguin Press.
Jesus, D.S.V. (2017). Saudade de mim: patrimônio cultural e economia criativa no Rio de Janeiro. In J. L. Figueiredo, and D. S. V.
Jesus (Org.), Cidades criativas: Aspectos setoriais e territoriais (pp.157-178). Rio de Janeiro: E-papers.
Landry, C. (2008). The creative city: A toolkit for urban innovators. London: Earthscan.
Lipovetsky, G. (2004). Os tempos hipermodernos. São Paulo: Barcarolla.
McCann, D., & Berry, C. (2017). Shareholder Capitalism: a System in Crisis. New economics foundation website. Retrieved 22
March 2020 from https://neweconomics.org/uploads/files/NEF_SHAREHOLDER-CAPITALISM_E_latest.pdf
Miguez, P. (2007). Economia criativa: uma discussão preliminar. In G. M. Nussbaumer (Org.), Teorias e políticas da cultura:
visões multidisciplinares (pp.95-113). Salvador: EDUFBA.
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from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/why-we-need-the-davos-manifesto-for-better-kind-of-capitalism/
Schwab, K. (2019b). Davos Manifesto 1973: A code of ethics for business leaders. WEF website. Retrieved 21 March 2020 from
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Schwab, K. (2019c). Davos Manifesto 2020: The universal purpose of a company in the fourth industrial revolution. WEF website.
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al-revolution
Schwab, K., & Zahidi, S. (2019). 5 trends in the global economy—And their implications for economic policymakers. WEF
website. Retrieved 21 March 2020 from
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International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2020, Vol. 8, No. 02, 45-54
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.02.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

France’s Strategy on Migration Issues in the Mediterranean

Kazunari Sakai
Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
Gilles Ferragu
University of Paris Nanterre, Paris, France

The Mediterranean Sea is recognized by France as the most important adjacent area and also the gate to Africa,
France’s vast sphere of influence beyond the Mediterranean. The political turmoil here since the Arab Spring has
begun, especially emergence of a flood of refugees coming to the EU, was a serious problem for France. The
current situation of EU, which is shaken over the acceptance of immigrants and refugees, is grave for France,
having a strategic pillar which is to raise the own presence in global politics by obtaining the leadership in the EU.
France sets out to put the migration and refugee issues to rest, to maintain EU’s political power and to seize the
initiative in the EU. This article will analyze such a national strategy of France focusing on the process from

Chirac’s administration to Macron’s .

Keywords: France, diplomacy, EU, migration, Mediterranean

Introduction
The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia in late 2010, brought about political change towards
democratization in many countries in the area from North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, and abrupt political
changes took place around the world, creating a significant number of immigrants and refugees. Immigrants
and refugees from North African countries, such as Libya, have crossed the Mediterranean, whilst from Syria
they have targeted the EU via a land-based route through Turkey. The EU member states that have served as
the geographical points of entry for this large-scale influx of migrants were Italy and Greece, but migrants
travelling via Italy have often moved on to neighboring France (although this may not necessarily be their final
destination). When the first such “wave” surged out of Tunisia in 2011, France was forced to deal with the
sudden increase of migrants and refugees, and blocked the operation of the railways across the Italian border in
order to prevent this influx1. Although this was a temporary measure, the Italian government responded by
saying that France’s response was in violation of the Schengen Agreement, and this can be seen as the
beginning of a debate on the EU’s response to the migrants and refugees, including how to maintain the
Schengen Agreement thereafter.
France has long been a host country for immigrants (Sakai, 2016), with many immigrants residing in
locations such as Paris, the capital city, and Marseilles, France’s second-largest city which faces the
Mediterranean. The gateways for the large-scale movement of immigrants and refugees accompanying the Arab

Kazunari Sakai, PhD, Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of Intercultural Studies, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan.
Gilles Ferragu, PhD, Associate Professor of International History, Department of History, University of Paris Nanterre, Paris,
France.
1
Le Monde, 19 Avril 2011.
46 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Spring have indeed been Italy or Greece. However, for France, which has a history of accepting immigrants,
and which similarly borders the Mediterranean, the migration issue in the Mediterranean has by no means been
somebody else’s problem. With regard to immigration policy in France, there has been research from a
sociological perspective, such as that of Wihtol de Wenden (2017) and Wieviorka (2014), and research on
historical narratives by Rabaud (2014), as well as empirical studies by Chérigui (1997) and Henry (2012) on
France’s Mediterranean policy. However, in the setting of the Mediterranean, there has been no comprehensive
political analysis on the phases of immigration issues that have predominated for France in terms of its
Mediterranean policy, after identifying events influencing EU’s processes of developing policies on
immigration and refugees. Therefore, in this paper, we examine France’s strategy in relation to the migration
issue in terms of its impact on policy formation at the EU level on the migration issue based on its
Mediterranean policy, while attempting to form a comprehensive picture of the positioning of the migration
issue in the Mediterranean, a region where France’s priority in terms of policy has been placed.

Geopolitical Phases in the Mediterranean and Changes in the French Response

France’s Perspective on the Mediterranean
The east-west axis extending from France has established stability and security in the east which had once
been a source of threats by promoting European integration through cooperation with Germany, and has
strengthened stability in the west by enhancing its transatlantic relations through its partnership with North
America. The axis extending south into Mediterranean and vertically intersecting with this is linked to Africa,
forming a sphere of influence throughout the colonial era, and has further geopolitical importance in opening
up the way to Asia via the Suez Canal. It is this Euro-Mediterranean cooperative framework (“intégration
euro-méditerranéenne”) that has structured the axis extending to the southern Mediterranean (Dufourq, 2014, p.
71). The Mediterranean can be understood as a place with two features. Firstly, as an “intersection” (carrefour),
and secondly as a “bridge” (passerelle); the former description encourages solidarity and the expansion of
common interests, whilst the latter supports the coordination of the northern Mediterranean (i.e. Europe) in the
development of the southern Mediterranean and the constructive framework of the “Euro-Mediterranean”
(Dufourq, 2014, p. 72).
What elements may we refer to as the “common interests” mentioned above for this case? In a broad sense,
it is political stability and economic development of the area, with the purpose of creating a “win-win”
relationship between Europe and the southern Mediterranean by each actor providing their unique resources in
order to achieve this. One example of such a scheme is the development of the southern Mediterranean,
wherein advanced technology from Europe, oil assets from the Gulf states, and labor from Africa are combined
(Dufourq, 2014, p. 74).
In the case of France, one could focus on the “5 + 5 Dialogue”2 promoted by the President François
Mitterrand in the late 1980s as a specific framework for the convergence of these benefits. We may recall that
the President had issued a proposal to the National Assembly in 1958 to create a “Franco-African Community”

2
France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Malta from European side, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya from southern
part of Mediterranean. Established in 1990. Ministère des affaires étrangères, “Méditerranée—Dialogue 5 + 5: quels objectifs
pour la 13e réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères de la Méditerranée occidentale?”
<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/afrique-du-nord-moyen-orient/evenements/article/mediterranee-dialogue-5-5-qu
els-objectifs-pour-la-13e-reunion-des-ministres-des> Last access: 17 September 2018.
 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 47

as a space for projecting French power3. As a leader of the French Socialist Party, Mitterrand was trying to
strengthen bilateral relations with southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, based
on the ideological cooperation of the socialist parties in each. However, when he took office in 1981, he
changed this vision and instead aimed to build a multilateral framework of “Euro-Africa” in the Mediterranean.
This was a prelude to the pursuit of an expansion of power by France, and also a major change in the direction
of the relationship between France and the southern European countries (Chérigui, 1997, p. 131). The new
vision of Mitterrand in relation to the Mediterranean was, of course, related to pursuing the national interests of
France, but it was also an escape from the restraints of socialist ideology and was part of the institutionalization
of multilateral regional cooperation in order to achieve comprehensive peace and prosperity over a range of
factors ranging from the economy to national security. A speech by Mitterrand in Tunisia on October 27, 1983
provided an outline of the kind of international coordination he was aiming for in the Mediterranean. In the
speech, Mitterrand explained that, as the expansion of the European Community (EC) into southern Europe
progressed, issues in Europe had become issues in the wider Mediterranean, and that not only France but also
the entire EC would become a partner in dialogue with Tunisia (and other North African countries). He further
explained that point at issue in region was in addition to the economy, peace, and institutionalization of
Mediterranean institutions (Chérigui, 1997, pp. 134-135). Mitterrand thus emphasized the issue of peace and
security. When the 5 + 5 Dialogue resumed during his term in office in 2001 after several years of interruption,
in 2004, Mitterrand created a security sector within the framework. However, the 5 + 5 Dialogue was also
subject to a backlash from participating countries, saying that France’s national interests had been prioritized
(Chérigui, 1997, pp. 147-159).
The Historical Reason to France’s Response4
The Fifth Republic, in which Mitterrand served as president, began under the period of President De
Gaulle in the late 1950s, but since De Gaulle, successive administrations had struggled to strengthen the
material and ideological relationship between France and the Arab states. With regard to immigration, France
had long been an immigrant host country. Since other southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, and
Portugal turned to host countries in the mid-1980s and began to work on immigration acceptance policies, in
principle, France maintained an initiative for responding to accepting immigrants from southern Mediterranean
countries until the 1980s (Chérigui, 1997, pp. 114-116).
Pompidou, who became president in 1969, saw the need to develop and take the lead in “the hinterland of
Europe” (hinterland européen) to strengthen France, and developed a philosophy in Mediterranean policy that
“historically and geographically France has been given the role of being the extension of [the hinterland of
Europe] and the Mediterranean and Africa”. Efforts were made to strengthen and maintain a privileged
relationship with the three countries of Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco), and to strengthen France’s
longstanding influence while protecting the interests of Europe in the Middle East (Colard, 1978, p. 283).
Subsequently, Mitterrand, who assumed office after Giscard d’Estaing, engaged in the Mediterranean
through appointing an “advocate of the third world” (Henry, 2012, p. 44) and promoted the institutionalization
of cooperative relationships. In the EU, France took the lead role in this process, with French people occupying
posts in the European Commission (EC), which plays a central role in EU-Mediterranean relations. In this role,

3
Le Monde, 5 Fevrier 1958.
4
See Sakai, 2015, pp. 64-66.
48 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

France strengthened the relationship between EC/EU and Mediterranean countries while furthering agreements
on developmental cooperation with former colonies (Henry, 2012, p. 44). However, these movements to
expand France’s presence in the Mediterranean stalled when faced with the reality of the size of the US
influence (Chérigui,1997, p. 49)5. Nevertheless, Mitterrand and his successor Chirac promoted the 5 + 5
Dialogue, whilst the Barcelona Process was launched as a comprehensive system led by Chirac in 1995 (the 5 +
5 Dialogue is recognized as a complement to the Barcelona Process by the Mediterranean countries). France’s
expectation during this period was that it was necessary to strengthen the Mediterranean strategy on the back of
tensions and conflicts in the Sahel region and Syria, in order to alleviate these conflicts and counter the
prevalence of smuggling and irregular immigration. Furthermore, in order to make effective use of France’s
available military, diplomatic and financial resources, it was also necessary to link the essential strategic area of
European strategy with this Mediterranean strategy. Thus, with the aim of overcoming the stagnation of the
Barcelona process, strengthening the common identity of the Mediterranean countries, and stimulating regional
cooperation, the Sarkozy initiative leads to the creation of the Union of the Mediterranean (Union pour la
Méditerranée) in 2008, which has consistently sought to maintain and improve France’s presence in the
Mediterranean region (Nabli, 2015, pp. 230-231). The 5 + 5 Dialogue has also been continued in parallel with
the Mediterranean Union, and in November 2015, a Mediterranean summit on the issue of immigrants and
refugees was held in Malta, with leaders from EU and African countries participating. Subsequently, a meeting
of foreign ministers in the 5 + 5 Dialogue, held in Marseille in October 2016, promoted prompt implementation
of the action plan issued at the Malta summit6.
With François Mitterrand, and even more Nicolas Sarkozy, we can find the idea that France must link its
Mediterranean and North African policy to Europe. For his part, Jacques Chirac rather developed relations with
the Arab world, by accentuating friendly relations with personalities in power, but also by recognizing certain
memory problems such as recognition of the Algerian war of 1999.

France’s Strategy and Response: Focusing on Recent White Papers on Defense

In this way, France has been strengthening its responses to the Mediterranean. In this context, what stance
does this constitute regarding immigration in particular, and how can we understand what steps are being taken
by France as a whole? Additionally, what kind of involvement has France shown with regard to immigration
policy which is particularly linked with the EU’s response? In this case, based on the recognition that France is
strongly concerned with immigration and refugee issues based on the logic of enhancing security (Sakai, 2015),
we may assume that France has expanded its response to the Mediterranean to that end. Focusing on defense
white papers issued since 1994 after the end of the Cold War, we will examine changes in the concept of safety
and in the meaning of “borders”.
From the Final Years of Mitterrand to Chirac: Focusing on 1994 White Papers on Defense
The first white paper on defense7 was issued after the end of the Cold War in 1994, which was also the
end of President Mitterrand’s administration over two terms and fourteen years from 1981. The white paper,
issued four years after the end of the Cold War following the Malta Declaration in December 1989, indicates a

5
On American attitude of intervention in the Mediterranean, see Nabli, 2015, pp. 205-218.
6
“Relevé de conclusions”, 13e réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères du “Dialogue 5+5” en Méditerranée occidentale,
Marseille, France, 28 Octobre 2016, p. 7.
7
Livre Blanc sur la Défense 1994. (1994), La documentation française. Hereafter LB 1994.
 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 49

perception that the Cold War was not entirely a thing of the past, and much of its content reflects security
characteristics of the Cold War era (Lecoq, 2016, p. 136). In addition to this there is some mention of terrorism
as a “new threat” (LB, 1994, pp. 30-31), but there is no specific mention of the Mediterranean or migrants.
However, since the Barcelona Process was spearheaded by Chirac in 1995 immediately after publication of this
white paper, it seems that the urgency and importance of addressing the issues in the Mediterranean region
emerged at this time (at the latest) within the French administration8.
Subsequently, with the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 as a turning point, the perception
of the Ministry of the Armed Forces was also that “the security of the country and foreign security are
now linked”, and that “the nature of defense is generally amplified by the link between domestic threat and
external threat;” 9 thus, clearly presenting public order and national security in seamless alignment, and
beginning to show a relative decline of the significance of national borders. Intelligence agencies also
proceeded with a reorganization that transcended the boundaries of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of
the Interior following the inauguration of the Sarkozy administration in 2007 (Lecoq, 2012, p. 697; 2016, pp.
138 & 141).
The Sarkozy Administration: Focusing on 2008 White Papers on Defense
When Sarkozy was serving as Interior Minister in the Chirac government, he maintained a strict stance
against immigration. As a result of this, in 2005 there were riots in areas settled by second- and third-generation
north African immigrants outside Paris. With regard to immigration law, Sarkozy introduced the concept of
selective immigration, whereby workers with a high educational background, a high level of technical skills,
and high potential income are actively selected, thus indicating a tendency to rejecting applications from people
with poor academic backgrounds and skills, mainly North African immigrants.
A white paper in 2008, formulated by Sarkozy as president, emphasizes changes in the nature of defense
and security, and clarifies new threats, such as terrorism and organized crime. These threats were understood to
be pervasive across borders, and a recognition of the continuity between internal security and external security
was shown (Lecoq, 2016, p. 137). The entire conceptual framework had changed from “defense” (la défense) in
1994 white papers, to “defense and national security” (la défense et la sécuriténationale) in 2008 (Lecoq, 2016,
p. 143). This was based on the fact that traditional military “defense” alone could not cope with the threats
encroaching on France, which can be seen as prioritizing the need to take a wide range of measures to ensure
security. Against the backdrop of threats such as terrorism and organized crime, “the recognition of continuity
between domestic security and foreign security” was brought to the foreground of the EU’s “regional security
strategy” in 2010, which may have been a reflection of France’s own strategy. The perspective of a
“transborder threat” can be considered a reflection of an underlying sharp increase in the international
migration of people crossing borders both within the EU and elsewhere.
The Hollande Administration: Focusing on 2013 White Papers on Defense
Hollande, who had been the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, won the presidency in 2012 by
defeating the incumbent Sarkozy. Whilst Mitterrand was his political mentor, Hollande was dealing with issues,
including those relating to immigration, in an international environment that was different from that of the
Mitterrand period. The Libyan war of 2011 posed the problem of the border: the Libya of colonel Gaddafi

8
La Méditerranée d’une rive à l’autre. Entretien avec Jacques Huntzinger (2009). In Questions internationales, No. 36.
9
Notes EMA/DAS No.787 DEF/EMA/ESMG et No. 5017 DEF/DAS du 29 Novembre 2002.
50 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

traditionally managed the Sub-Saharan migrants, its fall opened a problem accentuated since by the Iraqi and
Syrian crises. In a white paper issued in 2013, the concept of “defense and national security” (la défense et la
sécuriténationale) was mentioned as in the 2008 white paper. Therein, (1) protection, (2) deterrence, and (3)
intervention are presented as the three pillars of the strategy. Subsequently, in response to a request from the
government of Mali, in order to counter the penetration of Islamic extremists in the African-Sahara region in
Mali, Hollande engaged in military intervention in 2013, as well as participating in Syrian air strikes in 2015 in
the turmoil following the Arab Spring.
The 2013 white paper contains the phrases “double demand/single task/various means” (double
impératif/une mission/des moyens). The “double demand” refers to the defense of Europe by Europeans, and
national security that extends across borders. “One task” refers to the defense of France in the context of a new
alliance, and a new military hierarchy between major countries (Lecoq, 2016, p. 143). Although there is no
explicit statement regarding immigration issues, as in the 2008 white paper, the broader concept of “defense
and national security” continues to be pushed forward. In that sense, we may perceive a continuation along the
same path in relation to the transborder threat associated with the increase in the international migration of
people, as indicated in the 2008 white paper, and the fact that it is seen as essential to regard national security
and public order as a seamless entity for that purpose.
Under these circumstances, regarding Mare Nostrum—a refugee rescue operation carried out by Italy from
a humanitarian perspective in response to accidents involving refugee ships sailing from North Africa to the EU,
which were frequently occurring in the Mediterranean—Interior Minister Cazeneuve under the Hollande
Administration appreciated the rescues and said, “We will be able to introduce humanitarian measures to the
fullest extent.” However, he also said, “If this can’t be controlled at the [migrant’s] origin, it won’t serve any
purpose;”10 thus, in evaluating humanitarian relief activities by Mare Nostrum, there were also strong concerns
about the arrival of irregular immigrants in France. Besides this, Cazeneuve also insisted on the need for
FRONTEX to strengthen border controls in the Mediterranean.
The Macron Administration: Focusing on 2017 White Papers on Defense
With the terrorist attack on the Charlie Hebdo headquarters in January 2015, and the simultaneous terrorist
attacks on Paris in November of the same year triggering the instigation of martial law, domestic public opinion
linking terrorism and migrants also became more widespread, with the Front National led by Marine Le Pen
also demonstrating a rise in popularity. Macron was seen as existing beyond the framework of established
major political parties, gaining firm support in the form of bringing together the political Left and the Right,
and was elected president in 2017.
A white paper issued in the autumn after the establishment of the Macron Administration emphasized the
continuity of security and defense, as in 2008 and 201311. Looking at the application of this in different regions,
in the case of African countries, France shares much of its history and interests with Africa, and constant
stabilization of the (governmental) capabilities of countries on the African continent is described in the white
paper as having vital importance in the management of immigration and terrorism (LB, 2017, p. 64). The white
paper also highlights the urgency and importance of security against the penetration of Islamic fundamentalist

10
Libération. fr, 1er Septembre 2014
<http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2014/09/01/migrants-noyes-en-mediterranee-cazeneuve-veut-un-sursaut-europeen_1091627>,
Last access: 8 August 2018.
11
Revue stratégique de Défense et de sécuriténationale, (2017), La documentation française [Hereafter LB 2017], p. 21.
 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 51

forces such as Boko Haram in the Saharan region (in G5 Sahel countries such as Mali), emphasizing the serious
impact on the neighboring countries of the Maghreb to the north, and by extension the impact on France and the
EU via the Mediterranean (LB, 2017, pp. 21-22).
As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, southern Mediterranean countries have stated that they are
unable to control movement of people in addition to controlling their own territory, and with the growing threat
of jihadists in Libya, it has played a central role in the migrant and refugee crisis and the risk of terrorism (LB,
2017, p. 24). The eastern Mediterranean is a region that has become highly militarized through the
strengthening of Russia’s strategic presence, the rise of China, and the acquisition of modern military force by
countries in the region (LB, 2017, pp. 24-25). Meanwhile, the western Mediterranean claims that the lack of
cooperative structure is preventing the lessening of tensions in the region (LB, 2017, p. 25), demonstrating the
vital importance of France in the Mediterranean region as a whole, as well as the increasing instability and the
need for a prompt response. In particular, there are fears that the rapid destabilization of nation states in the
southern Mediterranean could threaten the security of the EU, which could lead to a refugee crisis and the
emergence of jihadist extremists in the eastern Mediterranean and Libya (LB, 2017, p. 25).
The Interpretation of Unconstitutionality by the Conseil d’État Regarding the Introduction of the “Safe
Third Country Repatriation” Rule
In the process of standardizing the anti-refugee measures being promoted in the EU, the introduction of a
rule of “repatriation to a safe third country” has been discussed as one of the measures to mitigate the influx of
irregular migrants. A “safe third country” is a concept (UNHCR, 2017, p. 500) that is applied if a person could
have applied for international protection but did not do so in the country where he/she was staying before entry,
or when protection has been sought but its status has not been determined. Through repatriating asylum
applicants in countries where they have gone (other than their country of origin and the country in which they
are currently staying), where they will not be under threat of persecution or torture, in order to ease the conflict
within the EU that is becoming more intense over the burden of accepting asylum applicants, the EU intends
for refugee screening to be carried out in countries on the Mediterranean coast such as Turkey, Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia, and initiating repatriation to these same countries12. If this concept is introduced, France
will also automatically repatriate asylum seekers to a “safe third country”.
However, on May 16, 2018, the government’s administrative and legislative advisory body and the highest
administrative court, the Conseil d’État (State Council), interpreted this as being unconstitutional. According to
this interpretation, “For France, more precisely for the OPFRA [France’s Department for the Protection of
Refugees and Stateless Persons], ruling not to accept asylum applications via a safe third country conflicts with
the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1946 Constitution, which has been passed on to the 1958
Constitution.” That is, the clause stating that “all those who have been persecuted because of activities
undertaken for the sake of liberty have the right to asylum in the territory of the Republic” fundamentally
prohibits the repatriation of asylum seekers. Were a policy of automatic repatriation to be initiated, this would
mean that France was failing to accept those who must be protected as as stipulated by the Constitution13. This
response in France is expected to have an impact on the introduction of rules for the EU as a whole. However,
for France as well, a dilemma has emerged between promoting enhanced security in relation to the migrant

12
Voulu par l'UE, le principe “pays tiers sûr” est jugé inconstitutionnel par le Conseil d'Etat. (2018). In Le Monde, 14 Juin 2018.
13
Ibid.
52 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

issue as evidenced by changes over time in the white papers on defense, and the principles of the preamble of
the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic.

Conclusion
This article has examined how France has been involved in the process of policy development at the
European level over the issue of migrants in the Mediterranean.
Given the development of geopolitical conditions and global environmental change, the priorities for
France are diversifying and gradually changing. Thus, it is important to take a look at the whole situation as
presented in the figure below. The left of the figure shows the European (EU) response, while the right of the
figure lists the responses from outside of Europe (EU).
The Mediterranean, which is the main area examined in this paper, is an area which France has prioritized
in terms of foreign policy. In this area, the framework is gradually being reorganized away from Africa towards
the Mediterranean, and the institutionalization of cooperation at the regional level and strengthening of
cooperative relationships with related countries are being promoted. In a region where the US presence has
been in relative decline since the Cold War, stability, security, and prosperity have been pursued against the
backdrop of unstable political circumstances in the Middle East and North Africa, and the promotion of
cooperation between the EU on the northern Mediterranean side and the southern Mediterranean countries (that
is, development from the Barcelona Process to the Mediterranean Union) has been recognized as essential to
that end. In addition to this, in order to deal with issues unique to the Mediterranean, it is essential to strengthen
ties with southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, and strengthening individual ties with these
countries has become an aim of France.

Figure 1. Migration issues in France’s strategy in Euro-Med environment.

In addition, while aiming to improve France’s presence as a major country in terms of defense within the
EU, enhanced security in relation to the migration issue at EU level has been promoted as an effective
 FRANCE’S STRATEGY ON MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 53

implementation policy. Enhanced security has been promoted in relation to various issues, including
immigrants and refugees, in response to changes in the international environment, and a seamless continuity
between internal and external security has been established as a strategy for the EU, especially since its Internal
Security Strategy of 2010. This is the same concept that was manifested in France’s 2008 white paper on
defense, and it seems likely that the formation of the strategy in France had considerable influence on the EU.
The process of dealing with migrants and refugees stands between the contradictory vectors of
humanitarian acceptance and a repulsion to excessive acceptance. This point has emerged as a new issue in the
form of friction with constitutional restrictions predicated on France’s historical and legal openness. While
working with Germany as a driving force in promoting EU integration, and continuing to work with Germany
in initiatives to maintain cohesion with the EU, there are signs that the migrant issue may lead to a string of
domestic political changes in France, such as the rise of the National Rally (Rassemblement National) led by
Marine Le Pen, who contested for the presidency with Macron, although this is not currently as acute an issue
as in Central and Eastern Europe.
However, there is no doubt that the migrant issue is a core issue for France in all phases of its development
in relation to the EU, the Mediterranean, and globally. In addition to France’s historical background of
accepting many immigrants and achieving economic development after World War II, when developing
diplomacy that makes full use of normative power or soft power underpinned by the EU, France must not
abandon its attitude of closeness with immigrants and refugees and undermine its values of humanitarianism
and anti-discrimination. As the issue of immigrants and refugees has become a global issue, rather than just a
national or regional issue, this has become an essential point in maintaining and improving France’s presence
on a global level. Seeing the rise of populism symbolized domestically by the Rassemblement National as a
“venting” of public opinion (albeit not one leading to insurrection), priority has been placed on taking a central
role along with Germany in policy decisions at EU level, and the concept of responding in a way that
incorporates the national interests of France into measures by the EU as a whole has gradually taken root over
the course of approximately 20 years from Chirac to Sarkozy, through Hollande up to the Macron
Administration.

Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank the JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) Core-to-Core
Program “Research on the Public Policies on Migration, Multiculturalization and Welfarefor the Regeneration
of Communities in European, Asian and Japanese Societies” (FY2016-2020) and also the JSPS Grant-in-Aid
for Scientific Research (B) (16H03588) for conducting this research.

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International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2020, Vol. 8, No. 02, 55-62
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.02.003
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

Getting Deep About Deep Ecology

Anthony F. Tresca
Trinity University, San Antonio, United States


Despite being a philosophical group since the late 60s/early 70s, Deep Ecology has failed to produce the type of
change necessary to effectively combat the climate crisis. This paper examines Deep Ecology’s more spiritual/philosophical
approach to climate change, including: their history, their advocacy for biocentric equality, and their focus on
cultivating an ecological consciousness. The paper then examines major criticisms with the movement and finds that
all critics come to a unifying and damning conclusion about the movement: Deep Ecology does not offer a realistic
solution to the fast approaching climate crisis. Yet, Deep Ecology’s inability to solve the climate crisis does not mean
the philosophical movement is a failure and bad; instead, it just shows that Deep Ecology in combination with other
more tangible steps should be taken to effectively combat the current climate crisis. Reformist groups, led by former
Deep Ecologists, like Social Ecology and Green Anarchism, still maintain many of the core principles of Deep
Ecology; however, they include a stronger focus on how to take direct action in order to combat climate change. The
reformist approach provides the best—and most realistic—solutions to the current global climate crisis.

Keywords: Deep Ecology, shallow ecology, biocentric equality, social ecology, climate change

On November 26, 2019, the United Nations issued bleak finding in their Emissions Gap Report for 2019.
The UN’s report confirmed that—despite warnings from numerous scientists—countries had failed to halt the
rise of greenhouse gas emissions; in particular, the two largest polluters, the United States and China, had
actually further increased their emissions in the last year (Sengupta, 2019). The executive summary of the
report states that countries have “collectively failed to stop the growth in global GHG emissions, meaning that
deeper and faster cuts are now required” (United Nations Climate Change-Summit 2019, 2019). The United
Nations’ recommendation for deeper changes seems to open the door for a movement that has “deep” in the
name: Deep Ecology. Despite its existence since the late 60s/early 70s, Deep Ecology has failed to produce the
type of change necessary to effectively combat the current climate crisis. While Deep Ecology, as advocated by
Bill Devall and George Sessions, has not failed as an intellectual movement, Deep Ecology lacks the necessary
depth to solve real global problems—thus, other more realistic solutions to the climate crisis are needed.

What Is Deep Ecology?

The study of ecology was ushered into the cultural zeitgeist during the 1960s. Other individuals, such as
Aldo Leopold, contributed to the movement earlier; however, it was not until the 60s that the public became
aware of the science of ecology and its relevance to environmental matters (Sessions, 1987). It was during this
“Age of Ecology” that the Deep Ecology movement began to emerge. Despite ecology’s growing relevance, it
was mostly limited to scientific discourse; this all changed when distinguished Norwegian philosopher of

Anthony F. Tresca, Undergraduate, Political Science, Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas, United States.
56 SOCIAL FEAR AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS

science and linguistics, Arne Naess, delivered and published his lecture entitled “The Shallow and the Deep,
Long-Range Ecology Movements” (Sessions, 1987).
In his now famous lecture, Naess attempted to describe a deeper, more spiritual approach to “Nature” and
how to better understand ecology (Devall, 1985). Naess argued that while it was positive that the scientific
community was taking ecology seriously, they fundamentally misunderstood what the true problems were.
Naess asserted that the scientific community was wrongly focusing on “shallow”, pragmatic reformist solutions
to problems such as pollution and resource depletion which were merely symptoms of the environmental
disease (Sessions, 1987). This approach, Naess argued, was anthropocentric and would only serve to benefit the
health and prosperity of people already living in developed countries. Instead of focusing on short range,
“shallow” solutions, Naess advocated for a long range, “deep” movement that would include a “major
realignment in our thinking about humans and nature consistent with an ecological perspective” (Sessions,
1987, p. 112). In this lecture, Naess both defined Deep Ecology and laid the groundwork for what would
develop into an incredibly influential movement.
Naess would go on to work with other key thinkers, such as Devall and Sessions, to further articulate the
Deep Ecology movement; between both their independent and collaborative works, these three thinkers crafted
a detailed description of Deep Ecology. The main argument of the movement is to persuade people to begin
cultivating an ecological consciousness within oneself (Devall, 1985). In order to develop an ecological
consciousness, one must go through a “process of learning to appreciate silence and solitude and rediscovering
how to listen, it is learning how to be more receptive, trusting, holistic in perception and is grounded in a vision
of nonexploitive science and technology” (Devall, 1985, p. 8). The self-realization that comes from being
ecologically conscientious will, Deep Ecologists argue, naturally lead one to adopt the mindset of biocentric
equality.
Biocentric equality is the belief that all things in the biosphere have an equal right to life and right to
achieve their own individual form of self-realization (Devall, 1985). Being biocentrically orientated means that
one would take no actions that would impede on any organism’s ability to secure their vital needs. The term
“vital needs” was left intentionally vague so that the definition could be adjusted later based on differences in
climate and other factors that change what is vital to surviving in a given location (Devall, 1985). Biocentric
equality removes the need for dominance; instead, its practices focus on the interconnectedness of all things
(Devall, 1985). Through the ecological consciousness one has fostered, biocentric equality positions one to live
in harmony within nature and accept their place as a singular individual that exists in something much larger
than themselves.
In order to reach ecological consciousness, Deep Ecologists demand that one must reject the dominant
tradition and embrace the minority tradition. The dominant tradition—also described as the dominant
paradigm—includes:
the belief that “economic growth,” as measured by the Gross National Product, is the ultimate measure of Progress,
the belief that the primary goal of the governments of nation-states, after national defense, should be to create conditions
that will increase production of commodities and satisfy material wants of citizens, and the belief that “technology can
solve our problems”. Nature, in this paradigm, is only a storehouse of resources which should be “developed” to satisfy
ever increasing numbers of humans and ever increasing demands of humans. (Devall, 1987, p. 300)

Deep Ecologists seek to break people away from the dominant paradigm, and shift society towards the
minority tradition. The minority tradition is not unrestrained chaos or unregulated individualism; rather, the
 SOCIAL FEAR AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS 57

minority tradition would resemble a harmonious self-regulating community (Devall, 1985). In order to achieve
this tradition, it requires one to reject the status quo; as such, the world as described by Deep Ecology would
look radically different from the one that currently exists.
The difference in Deep Ecology’s goals is what ultimately separates the movement from reformist
environmentalism. Deep Ecologists acknowledge that reformist environmental groups have been helpful to the
planet by temporarily saving some nature reserves and parks; similarly, both groups even agree on the problems
and the urgency required to address the climate crisis. Despite the overlap, Deep Ecologists argue that reformist
groups are not doing enough because they only work towards changing public policy (Devall, 1985). Deep
Ecologists believe that reformist groups are stuck operating—and ultimately affirming—the dominant
paradigm just like the scientists that came before them (Devall, 1987). Thus, in the eyes of Deep Ecologists, the
solutions that reformists offer are “shallow” and will not foster an ecological consciousness that will lead to
biocentric equality (Devall, 1987). For “deep ecologists the balance has long since been tipped in favor of
human. Now we must shift the balance back to protect the habitat of other species” (Devall, 1985, p. 127). In
order to achieve this shift in the culture, Deep Ecology demands that we move away from anthropocentric
solutions and towards solutions that value all life, rather than just humans.

Deep Ecology’s Critics

Deep Ecology is a highly controversial and deeply divisive movement. The philosophy advocates for a
new world that would be organized in a strikingly different manner than how it is currently orientated (Devall,
1987); this radical nature that is inherent in Deep Ecology has left the movement open to attacks from a
plethora of sources. Deep Ecology has strong opponents on both the political left and right (Sessions, 2006).
Critics of Deep Ecology vary in the manner in which they oppose the philosophy: some critique Deep Ecology
for being too radical, while others summit that Deep Ecology does not go far enough. However, the
commonality that exists between all of the criticisms of Deep Ecology is that the philosophy does not offer a
realistic solution to the fast approaching climate crisis.
Luc Ferry, a French philosopher and politician, offers a scathing criticism of the more radical nature of
Deep Ecology. Ferry is a staunch humanist; this has led him to pose multiple objections to the notion of
granting non-human beings legal rights. He believes that “law is always for men, and it is for men that trees or
whales can become objects of a form of respect tied to legislation—not the reverse” (Ferry, 1995, p. 139). Ferry
argues that while extending rights to all in the biosphere sounds like a reasonable proposal, it does not logically
make sense because “the biosphere gives life both to the AIDs virus and to the baby seal, to the plague and to
cholera, to the forest and to the river. Can one seriously claim that HIV is a subject of law, equal to man?”
(Ferry, 1995, p. 140). While all in the biosphere are important—and there certainly should be actions taken to
protect nature—all things in the biosphere are not legal subjects and do not need/warrant representation as such
(Ferry, 1995).
Ferry also attacks Deep Ecologists’ non-anthropocentric solutions as fundamentally flawed and inadequate
to address the climate crisis (Ferry, 1995). For Ferry, the concept of biocentric equality is a foolishly trite
notion because it allows humanity to ignore their responsibility and ability to protect nature (Ferry, 1995). Deep
Ecologists view humans as being no more important than any other organism within the biosphere; Ferry
argues that this is problematic because it removes all agency from humanity to solve the problems that they
have created within the biosphere (Ferry, 1995). Ferry acknowledges the seriousness of the issues that Deep
58 SOCIAL FEAR AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS

Ecologists raise; however, he does not believe that solutions will “appear on their own, as if part of the natural
evolution of things, without our having to mobilize collective thought and action” (Ferry, 1995, p. 127). Instead,
Ferry advocates for the integration of an ecological perspective within a democratic framework in order to
utilize humanity’s institutions to solve the problems.
Dr. Ariel Kay Salleh poses radically different qualms with Deep Ecology than Ferry by critiquing the
philosophy from an ecofeminist perspective. Salleh takes grievance with Deep Ecology on both a logical
ground and challenges their tacit methodological approach. Deep Ecology claims to want to move away
from anthropocentrism and toward biological egalitarianism; thus, removing man’s desire to dominate
nature. However, “the master-slave role which marks man's relation with nature is replicated in man’s relation
with woman. A self-consistent biological egalitarianism cannot be arrived at unless men become open to
both facets of this same urge to dominate and use” (Salleh, 1984, p. 340). Salleh argues that if we continue to
ignore the sexism that still currently exists within humans, it will be impossible to achieve true equality for all
beings.
Though Deep Ecology claims to advocate for diversity—they even include diversity in their basic
principles (Devall, 1985)—they will be only partially successful “if the ecologist continues to ignore the
cultural inventiveness of that other half of the human race, women” (Salleh, 1984, p. 341). Salleh calls out the
hypocritical nature of the philosophy; while it rejects the exploitation of some by others (such as nature by
man), “sexual oppression and the social differentiation that this produces is not mentioned by Naess” (Salleh,
1984, p. 341). Women have once again been lumped in with everything else; by ignoring the specific problems
of women, the philosophy shows that it is not truly interested in achieving biocentric equality for all—namely,
for women.
Similarly, by keeping women and their issues out of the philosophy, Salleh argues that Deep Ecology’s
definition of “pollution” is not fully representative of the problem. The objectivist attitude that is present
throughout ecological writings—as well as the tacit mind-body dualism which shapes this—means that the
philosophy’s comprehension of “pollution” is framed exclusively in external material terms. While
ecofeminists acknowledge that pollution in terms of its material sense is a pressing problem, the female
consciousness is equally concerned with eradicating “ideological pollution, which centuries of patriarchal
conditioning have subjected us all to” (Salleh, 1984, p. 342). Women are more motivated to change this system
and address ideological pollution because, unlike men, women do not receive an ego gratification from the
patriarchal hegemony that is still present.
Finally, Salleh questions the purpose and effectiveness of Deep Ecology. Deep Ecologists’ proposals are
centered around theories of complexity, not complication principle; for example, just because urban life is more
complicated than that of nature does not make it more complex holistically (Devall, 1985). Deep Ecology
favors a more complex economy that is supported by division (Devall, 1985). Salleh argues that there are
serious problems of implementation attached to this overly idealistic worldview. The philosophy’s references to
expanding “soft future research, the implementation of policies”, and increasing the “exponential growth of
technicalskill and intervention”, collapse the movement into the “shallow” ecology paradigm and its human
chauvinist ontology (Salleh, 1984, p. 342). Salleh accuses Deep Ecology of falling prey to the masculine sense
of sense-worth that has become deeply entrenched in the scientific community that makes it “very hard for men
to argue persuasively without recourse to [vague] terms like these for validation” (Salleh, 1984, p. 342). The
inflated sense of self-worth that Deep Ecologists’ possess has led eco-feminists to dismiss Deep Ecology as
 SOCIAL FEAR AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS 59

being more of a “self-congratulatory” reformist movement rather than one that has any chance of getting
anything done (Salleh, 1984, p. 344).
Former Deep Ecologist, George Bradford, comes to a similar conclusion: Deep Ecology is not nearly as
deep as it says it is. Bradford was initially optimistic of the movement and saw it as possibly being able to
positively change the culture; however, now he finds it deeply “troubling and depressing that a movement so
courageously and persistently involved with direct action to defend the earth can simultaneously exhibit
reactionary, inhuman politics, and survivalist posturing” (Bradford, 1989, p. 35). In particular, Bradford is
shocked how such a self-proclaimed “enlightened” movement can remain blind to the interrelation “of capital
and the state with the planetary megatechnic work pyramid that is devouring nature” (Bradford, 1989, p. 35).
By ignoring these connections, Deep Ecologists continue to protect the real sources of the environmental
problem: capitalism, the state, and technology.
While Deep Ecology claims to be asking the deeper question, Bradford argues Deep Ecology fails to
recognize that any real solution would also require a deeper analysis on human society. Instead, Deep Ecology
takes politics in a capitalist democracy as a given and offers confused suggestions for how to take “direct action”
within the already established system (Devall, 1985). Direct action is reduced to lobbying
and—presumably—to electoral politics: nowhere “is this ‘working-within-the-system’ centrism questioned; it
is simply assumed” (Bradford, 1989, p. 11). Similarly, Deep Ecology harbors an overly simplistic view that
countries will just agree to nonviolence in order to secure nature against the devastation of war; this reflects
their naïve understanding of how international politics and the global economy work (Bradford, 1989).
Deep Ecology acknowledges that everything in the biosphere is connected; this view makes it highly
ironic that they fail to make the connection between the global corporate-capitalist systems and the
environmental crisis. By failing to critique capitalism, Deep Ecology squanders the opportunity to provide a
clear and authentic path to combating greedy corporations that are currently destroying the Earth. Bradford
ultimately argues that: “anthropocentrism or not, humans are the only beings in a position to wage effective war
against the empires and articulate an earth-based culture and a renewal of the land” (Bradford, 1989, p. 12).
Deep Ecology fails to be deep enough to provide real answers on how to solve the climate crisis because they
ignore that only humans currently have the power to fight against human systems that are destroying the planet.

Deep Ecologists’ Response

The critiques against Deep Ecology did not go unchallenged; Devall, Sessions, and other disciples of the
philosophy have written extensive responses to the criticisms. One of the most striking commonalities about
their responses is the new-found urgency that Deep Ecologists now write with. When Deep Ecology was in its
early days, those in the philosophy seemed optimistic about the future of the planet; however, now they are
much more pessimistic in their writings. Both Devall and Sessions admit that the climate crisis has (instead of
decreasing) gotten much worse. Devall was hopeful that when the movement got started in the 1970s—a
decade proclaimed “the decade of the environment”—things would change for the better; however, reports
have confirmed that Earth is deteriorating at a much faster rate than previously anticipated and that, for many,
life is going to get much worse (Devall, 2001). Sessions similarly points to damning reports that, he claims,
prove what Deep Ecologists have been saying would happen to the Earth for years (Sessions, 2006).
Despite Deep Ecologists’ acknowledgement that problems have gotten worse, they largely fail to present
tangible ways for the philosophy to adequately address the problems. In fact, Deep Ecologists seem mostly
60 SOCIAL FEAR AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS

content to dismiss critics of their solutions as being unenlightened and being too “ecologically illiterate” to
understand what they were seeking to achieve (Session, 2006, p. 123). In fact, the chief responses to criticisms
of the movements have been a simple reaffirmation of the core tenants of the philosophy. Devall dismisses the
efforts of reformist groups to change public policy and practices as being “useless” without the paradigm shift
that Deep Ecologists propose (Devall, 2001). Sessions similarly writes off the ecofeminists’ critique of the
movement as not being helpful because ecofeminism’s “allegiances lie more with leftist emancipatory politics
than with the ecology movement” (Sessions, 2006, p. 149). Sessions insists that only Deep Ecology has the
power to change the culture, not ecofeminism or the suggestions they offer.
While both Devall and Sessions attempt to counter criticism, they fail to address the real complaints critics
have with the movement: the tangibility of Deep Ecology to orchestrate a paradigm shift of the scale needed to
save the planet. Deep Ecologists inability to present a coherent plan on how to implement their paradigm shift
comes from an identity crisis within the movement. Deep Ecology attempts to do two incompatible things at
once:
1. Avoid having to be able to provide a solution on how to fix the climate crisis by presenting Deep
Ecology as a mindset (Devall, 2001).
2. Present Deep Ecology as the only solution to the climate crisis and dismiss all other solutions as being
too “shallow” to fully address the problem (Sessions, 2006).
Ultimately, Deep Ecology is really only able to succeed as being a guiding force for how to change ones’
mindset. The philosophy offers clear and specific manners in which individual people can follow their
philosophical movement, but fails to show the way in which such a large paradigm shift could be implemented.
Deep Ecology’s inability to solve the climate crisis does not mean the philosophical movement is a failure and
bad; instead, it just shows that Deep Ecology in combination with other actions should be taken to effectively
combat the current climate crisis.
Treating Deep Ecology as an intellectual movement—rather than a blueprint to save the planet—is a
stance that many supporters of the philosophy have championed. Two Deep Ecologists, Tony Lynch and
Stephen Norris, argue that Deep Ecology can actually stay relevant and be successful if understood as an
aesthetically driven philosophical movement. Lynch and Norris argue that Deep Ecology “should be
understood in its primary sense as an aesthetically grounded critique of modernity and the corrupt mindfulness
it generates and demands” (Lynch & Norris, 2016, p. 65). These authors argue that Deep Ecology is more about
awakening consciousness within individuals than it is about proposing a solution to the larger problem of the
climate crisis. When understood in this manner, Deep Ecology “is not at all threatened by the metaphysical and
ethical concerns that trouble its critics so much as it is characterized by them, properly understood” (Lynch &
Norris, 2016, p. 75). Deep Ecology has its place and purpose; however, that purpose is not solving the overall
problems that face our planet.

The Rupture Within Deep Ecology; and, Where We Go Now

How to properly address the climate crisis is one of the most important and pressing questions facing the
Earth. If Deep Ecology is not deep enough to provide solutions, what is? This question is not a new one for
many former Deep Ecologists who have long known that Deep Ecology alone would not provide the answers to
solving the larger problems gripping the Earth. In fact, conflicts from those within the movement have been
commonplace since the 1980s; during this time, fights at ecology conventions were commonplace between
 SOCIAL FEAR AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS 61

Deep Ecologists and various reformist groups (Sale, 1988). These reformist groups have taken many of the core
principles of Deep Ecology, but do not focus their work on changing individuals’ mindsets; instead, they focus
on how to enact real change (on a global scale) in order to save the planet. The various reformist groups, such
Social Ecology and Green Anarchism, provide the best—and most realistic—solutions to the current global
climate crisis.
Social Ecology provides a nonviolent approach on what steps to take in order to reduce humans’ negative
impact on the Earth. Social Ecological groups were the first to reject Deep Ecology as a viable option for solutions
(Sale, 1988). Social Ecology rejects Deep Ecology because it has no explicit social analysis; this means that the
movement fails to address key issues of: class, injustice, capitalism, race, and imperialism. Instead, Deep
Ecology “tends to regard humans collectively and hence tar the whole species for environmental degradations
with a brush that would be more appropriately aimed at specific social institutions and systems” (Sale, 1988, p. 672).
The Social Ecology movement seeks to take actions that both directly address environmental issues, such as stopping
logging and pollution, as well works to fix social rifts in society caused by religion, the state, and capitalism
(Parson, 2007). They use specific direct action aimed at institutions and mass organization to advocate for and
create change (Parson, 2007). Social Ecology has been instrumental in the formation and implementation of
practices for environmental activist groups like Earth First! and Earth Liberation Front (Parson, 2007).
Green Anarchism approaches the climate crisis in a radically different manner; the movement is centered
almost entirely around how best to take direct action against the climate crisis through all means possible.
Green Anarchism contends that “civilization, as well as domestication, is responsible for environmental
destruction and human subjugation” (Parson, 2007, p. 5). In their view, all social systems—including work,
morality, education, etc.—have only served to pacify humanity. To Green Anarchists, this domestication has
removed two essential things from life: spontaneity and passion. Since domestication is what green anarchist
believes is the root source of all human conflict and strife, they are willing to take any action to undermine and
destroy civilization to free humanity to act in a less constricting manner (Parson, 2007). The movement has
been deeply influential: it has increased the youth dropout rate, broadened the anti-globalization movement, and
helped legitimize radical environmental movements (Parson, 2007).
While both Social Ecology and Green Anarchism approach the climate crisis from two vastly different
perspectives (Social Ecology from inside the system and Green Anarchism from outside the system), the thing
they have in common is their tangibility. Both movements acknowledge that humans live in a society and this
has led to problems like overpopulation, industrialization, and others that have negatively impacted the planet.
Similarly, they both emphasize the importance of not just changing individuals’ mindsets, but also taking direct
action to combat the climate crisis now. Deep Ecology may dismiss both groups as only taking “shallow” steps
to solve the problems; however, tangible, pragmatic, and realistic solutions are key to ensuring that humanity
does not permanently destroy the Earth. Changing people’s mindsets and awakening ecological consciousness
within people is an important task, but just not as pressing as taking real steps to save the planet. It is
impossible to achieve Deep Ecologists’ goal of making humans ecologically conscious if all of humanity is
dead. This is why greater emphasis on direct action and real change—as advocated for by Social Ecology and
Green Anarchism—is more necessary than Deep Ecology to address the current climate crisis.

Concluding Thoughts
The Earth is being destroyed at an unprecedented rate. In order to save the Earth for, not only future
62 SOCIAL FEAR AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS

generations of humans, but all life, serious reforms are needed. At its conception, Deep Ecology seemed primed
to be the group to provide the necessary deep reforms. However, as time went on, Deep Ecology showed that it
could not deliver answers on how to quickly and globally implement the goals of their movement. So, while
Deep Ecology is still valuable as an intellectual movement and could be viewed as an ultimate goal for society,
the movement is not the answer to how we are going to solve the current climate crisis. Instead, we must turn to
reformist groups—like Social Ecology and Green Anarchism—to take direct actions against the systems which
have ravaged the Earth. Humans have undoubtedly negatively affected the Earth; however, unfortunately,
humans are also the only ones capable of reforming the flawed institutions and systems that perpetuated the
Earth’s destruction. If we ever want the opportunity to achieve ecological consciousness, it is imperative that
we first take real, tangible actions (like those proposed by reformist groups) to ensure that there is a planet to
become ecologically conscious of.

References
Bradford, G. (1989). How deep is deep ecology? With an essay—Review on woman’s freedom. Ojai, CA: Times Change Press.
Devall, B. (1987). The deep ecology movement. Natural Resource Journal, 20(2), 299-322. Retrieved from
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol20/iss2/6
Devall, B. (2001). The deep, long-range ecology movement: 1960-2000—A review. Ethics & the Environment, 6(1), 18-41.
Devall, B., & Sessions, G. (1985). Deep ecology: Living as if nature mattered. Layton, UT: Gibbs Smith.
Ferry, L. (1995). The new ecological order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lynch, T., & Norris, S. (2016). On the enduring importance of deep ecology. Environmental Ethics, 38(1), 63-75. Retrieved from
https://www.pdcnet.org/enviroethics/content/enviroethics_2016_0038_0001_0063_0075
Parson, S. M. (2007). Eco-anarchism rising: The earth liberation front and revolutionary ecology. Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, La Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada. Retrieved from
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p176520_index.html
Sale, K. (1988). The cutting edge: Deep ecology and its critics. The Nation, 246(19), 670-675.
Salleh, A. K. (1984). Deeper than deep ecology. Environmental Ethics, 6(4), 339-345. doi: 10.5840/enviroethics1984645.
Sengupta, S. (2019, November 26). “Bleak” U.N. Report on a Planet in Peril Looms Over New Climate Talks. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/climate/greenhouse-gas-emissions-carbon.html
Sessions, G. (1987). The deep ecology movement: A review. Environmental History Review, 11(2), 105-125.
Sessions, G. (2006). Wildness, cyborgs, and our ecological future: Reassessing the deep ecology movement. The Trumpeter:
Journal of Ecosophy, 22(2), 121-182. Retrieved from http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/906
United Nations Climate Change-Summit 2019. (2019, November 26). Retrieved from
https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/reports.shtml
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2020, Vol. 8, No. 02, 63-71
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.02.004
D
DAVID PUBLISHING

The Role of Violence in Russian Politics and

Machiavelli’s Perspective

Tereza Smejkalova
Anglo-American University, Prague, Czech Republic

Niccolò Machiavelli is famously known and interpreted in political science for his realism. His recommendations
for The Prince are stated in various forms, particularly in terms of the role of violence in politics. However, his
intentions are much more restrictive and prudent than it seems at the first sight. Violence is a necessity in political
life, but it needs to be properly justified, otherwise it does not benefit either the ruler or the ruled. He endorses
violence but conditions it by prudence and lack of cruelty. Excessive cruelty leads to hatred and citizens’ hatred
would lead to limitations of power of the ruler/prince. “The prince must aim to be feared without being hated”. On
this basis, I will present a case study of the use of violence by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his considered
“spheres of influence”, particularly in the territory of Georgia in 2008 and analyse through Machiavelli lens,
whether the use of violence can be considered to be justified as Machiavelli writes, “yet it cannot be called virt to
kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be treacherous, pitiless, irreligious. These ways can win a prince power but
not glory”.

Keywords: Violence, Machiavelli, Russia, Georgia, Coercion

Introduction
NiccolòMachiavelli is famously known and interpreted in political science for his realism. Some authors,
such as Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, referred to Machiavelli as the most important author in terms of
defining the state. The state is a mixture of will and force, or force and morality. In the most famous work of
Machiavelli, the Prince, Machiavelli declared that there are two means of fighting: “one according to the laws,
the other with force, the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts” (Hoffman & Graham, 2013, p. 15).
Machiavelli argued that the first is often not sufficient to maintain power, so that “it becomes necessary to
have recourse to the second” (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 58). The state was seen as analogous to the mythical
creature, the centaur, which was half-human and half-beast. Gramsci embraced this argument even though he
focused more on the legal and moral aspects of the state. The state is linked to force and violence but equally
important is law, morality, fundamental rights, and freedoms (Gramsci, 1971, p. 170 in: Hoffman & Graham,
2013, p. 15)
The work of Machiavelli is thus engaged with the relationship between the violence and politics in the
political community (Frazer & Hutchings, 2011). There is a necessary and mutual connection between politics
and violence, however, there is a distinction between cruel violence and the so-called virtuous violence (Frazer

Tereza Smejkalova, Ph.D., Chair of Political Science, School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Anglo-American
University Prague, Prague, Czech Republic.
64 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE

& Hutchings, 2011). According to Machiavelli, political violence is not just violence per se. Machiavelli begins
The Art of War with the following observation:
“For all the arts that are ordered in a city for the sake of the common good of men, all the orders made there for living
in fear of the laws and of God, would be in vain if defences were not prepared” (Machiavelli, 2003 [1521]: preface, p. 3).

Violence is a necessity in political life. But it has to be pursued for the sake of the common good and it has
to have a good end in itself. In addition, it needs to be properly justified otherwise it does not benefit either the
ruler or the ruled. Machiavelli endorses violence but conditions it by prudence and lack of cruelty. Excessive
cruelty leads to hatred and citizens’ hatred would lead to limitations of power of the ruler/prince. “The prince
must aim to be feared without being hated” (Baker, 2009, p. 312).
On this basis, I will present a case study of the use of violence by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his
considered “spheres of influence”, particularly in the territory of Georgia since 2008 and analyse through
Machiavelli lens, whether the use of violence can be considered to be justified. As Machiavelli (2003 [1521])
writes, “yet it cannot be called virt to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be treacherous, pitiless,
irreligious. These ways can win a prince power but not glory” (p. 311).
First part of the paper will focus on Georgia and its geostrategic significance for Russia and how military
conquest would be viewed through Machiavelli lens. The second part will analyse different coercion tools used
by Russian leadership (Vladimir Putin).

Georgia and Its Significance

Relations between Russia and its southern neighbour Georgia have been characterised by tension and
mutual mistrust, following Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Notable areas of contention
have included separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the presence of Russian military bases on
Georgian territory and transit routes for hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea region. Russia has been very
coercive in its diplomacy towards Georgia. It is unhappy with Georgia’s pro-Western tendencies and since
1991, Moscow has sought to exert pressure on the country and maintain its influence in the South Caucasus
through a variety of means. The military conflict in August 2008 was merely as the logical culmination of
Russian strategy, an extension of policies that served to reinforce Russia’s coercive diplomacy efforts in the
other former Soviet states, notably the Ukraine (German, 2009, p. 225).
The 2008 crisis in Georgia is a manifestation of a deeply rooted conflict. The Georgia conflict is
geopolitical, reflecting in particular Russia’s position on the international stage, reaction to the West’s
recognition of Kosovo in 2008, enlargement of NATO to the East, which Russia considers to be a breach of
agreements made during the negotiation in 1990 on German reunification, and Russian misgivings in other
areas such as the NATO missile shield. It is also reflecting the perceived risk of losing Russia’s influence on
Southern Caucasus, where it has strategic interest (the oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan and Central Asia)
and proximity to the troublesome Northern Caucasus with Chechnya and the forgotten war in Dagestan (EEAS
Analysis, 2012a).
Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 war between
Russia and Georgia has made it more difficult to find a solution to the Georgia conflict. Such solution would
probably be easier to find if it was part of a broader geopolitical engagement with Russia (EEAS Analysis,
2012a, 2012b).
 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE 65

The conflict between Georgia and the breakaway areas of Abkhazia (ABK) and South Ossetia (SO) and
the respective perceptions of the populations should be viewed on the background of not only the war in 2008,
but also the wars in 1991-1992 between Georgia and SO and in 1992-1993 between Georgia and ABK during
which all sides committed human rights violations towards the civilian population, including ethnic cleansing
that resulted in large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). About 250,000 Georgians fled from ABK
and SO to Georgia during those wars, after which there was no longer a population majority of Georgians in
ABK. In comparison, the short war in 2008 resulted in 30,000 IDPs from only SO Ossetia/Abkhazia
relationship—which has to be factored into the analysis (EEAS Analysis, 2012b).
The use of violence in case of Georgia would be through Machiavelli lens justified as it can be perceived
as the external threat. There are two different roles of violence for two different types of situations, i.e. threats
from the external and internal enemies. If there is a threat to the political community from the outside, there is a
much greater scope for violence and its cruelty.
In Machiavelli’s world, the geopolitical situation involved a high degree of insecurity, stemming not only
from the terrain but also from the multiplicity of actors and enemies, “the countryside outside the city [was]
more threatening and the propensity of other powers to make war, invade, lay siege and spoil more immediate”.
(Frazer & Hutchings, 2011, p. 59). In several works of Machiavelli’s, the references to threats and insecurity
are clearly made: “In the Florentine Histories the parties to the raids and alarms are families and houses, who
are fighting for dominance in the city setting; war has its focus enriching oneself (whether one is a family, a
party or a city state) and impoverishing the enemy” (Machiavelli, 1988b [1525], book V, ch. 1 and passim in
Frazer & Hutchings, 2011, p. 59). The Discourses, defines the place and defence of cities—the city is a built
structure, its people and its hinterland, and of course its divisions and its government. This work is in mainly a
reflexion of the conditions of stable domination by a prince or by a republican government, including the
maintenance of the proper army and the right kind of conduct in war whether one is attacking or being attacked
(Machiavelli, 1970 [1531], book II, pp. 20, 27; book III, p. 39 in Frazer & Hutchings, 2011, p. 59). The Prince,
could be studied in the similar manner. The successful ruler has to conduct himself in such a way as to maintain
order inside the city, and crucially must not be pusillanimous or disorganised in war. Conquest has to be
managed appropriately (Machiavelli, 1988a [1532], ch. III) and military organisation and the need for military
competence and valour are continuous themes (Machiavelli, 1988a [1532], chs XII-XIV, chs XX-XXI, ch.
XXIV in Frazer & Hutchings, 2011, p. 59).
Concerning the idea of conquest and war, it is worth noting that Italian fascist considered Machiavelli as a
founding founder of fascist theory. Fascism drew upon prejudices and stereotypes that are rooted in tradition. It
saw itself as resurrecting the glories of the Roman Empire and Rocco, an Italian fascist saw Machiavelli as the
most important person to refer to in this regard. Thus, expansion towards Georgia and “colonisation” of areas
that belong to the Russia to its sphere of influence would be according to Machiavelli considered as justified. In
addition, the area has enormous geopolitical significance and Vladimir Putin and Russian leadership has been
very conscious about that fact.
The Caucasus region is an area of growing importance in the contemporary security environment,
particularly given regional instability and the potential threat to Western economic interests posed by its energy
resources and transport infrastructure.
The region constitutes a vital land bridge between Asia and Europe, physically linking the Caspian Sea
region and Central Asia with the Black Sea and Western Europe. Its role as a critical link between East and
66 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE

West is demonstrated most vividly by its increasing importance as a transport and communications corridor,
and most prominently as a transit route for hydrocarbons from the landlocked Caspian Sea region to
international markets (German, 2009, p. 225).
Georgia is considered as the most pro-Western of the three South Caucasus states. Since its independence
in 1991 Georgia has tried to maintain an autonomous foreign policy aimed at staying away from the Russian
sphere of influence. After the 2003 Rose Revolution President Mikhel Saakasvili’s government has been
engaging the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the US and has consistently been showing its desire to integrate with
the West. Integration into both NATO and the EU remains Georgia key priority. This is reflected in the
dedicated sections in the country’s National Security concept and its Foreign Policy Strategy (German, 2009, p.
225).
President Vladimir Putin has insisted that Moscow will continue trying to influence affairs in former
Soviet states, dismayed at perceived Western attempts to “manufacture democracy” in what it considers to be
its own “strategic backyard”. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, has expressed his view that
“Washington is infiltrating the post-Soviet space ever more actively: Ukraine and Georgia are graphic examples”
and warned that if either country becomes NATO member state there will be a “substantial negative
geopolitical shift”. (German, 2009, p. 226).
In an attempt to counterbalance Western influence, the Kremlin has adopted a strategy of coercive
diplomacy. Moscow has been seeking to reassert its waning hegemony by attempting to manipulate separates
conflicts in Georgia as foreign policy instruments. Vladimir Socor has identified what he describes as the
Russian policy paradigm of controlled instability in the region, the ultimate goal of which in his opinion is to
thwart the integration of the South Caucasus into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (Vladimir Socor,
2004 in German, 2009, p. 226).
Russian actions in Georgia are not about coercing just the government in Tbilisi. Its actions are intended
for a much wider audience, including other former Soviet states, but also the ethnic Georgians in the separation
republics.
Since 2008 the international community has witnessed an unprecedented ethnic cleansing of Georgians in
the villages of South Ossetia, in the adjacent villages of the Gori and Kareli Districts, as well as in Kodori
Gorge/Upper Abkhazia (Ministry of Justice Georgia, 2008). And the Georgian Foreign Ministry has accused
Moscow of provocative actions and persecutions of ethnic Georgians in the Gali district of Abkhazia since then
(News Agenda GE, 2019).
Let us consider more in detail the tools of coercion, including the use of violence against the government
and the people of Georgia. These tools will be then analyzed through Machiavelli lens, whether such a coercion
would be justified or not.

Tools of Coercion
Since Georgia gained independence in 1991 there have been a series of crisis in Russian-Georgian
relations, reflecting the latter’s increasingly close relationship with the West. Moscow has utilized a variety of
means to maintain its influence over its southern neighbour and attempt to coerce it. Most important is the
military presence and use of violence. Then it comes the economic pressure, psychological pressure (depriving
of people of language and of other rights in Georgia and the separatist territories). To each coercive measure I
will add analysis from Machiavelli’s perspective and whether these measures are justified or permissible.
 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE 67

Military presence would be through Machiavelli’s lens perfectly justified, if it remains uncruel and with a good
purpose. As Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev confirmed repeatedly, military presence in separatist regions
is there to help and protect the citizens (The Economist, 2008). On the other hand, ethnic cleansing, economic
intimidation, and psychological pressures are tools of violence that cannot be considered as justified for a
glorious Prince. It would be unacceptable to use such measures because it would not lead to citizens’ respect
but rather the opposite.

Military Presence and Use of Violence

The efficacy of Russia’s coercive diplomacy vis a vis Georgia is underpinned by its considerable military
presence in the Caucasus region. Not only does it have troops on the ground in Georgia, it also has a
considerable military presence in neighbouring Armenia and across the border in the North Caucasus.
Until later 2007, Russia maintained military bases on Georgian territory, a hangover from the Soviet era.
In 1999 former Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to an OSCE facilitated deal, which obligated Russia to
hand back its four bases in Georgia before 1 July 2001. Only two bases were returned within this deadline. A
new framework was drawn up in 2006, according to which the remaining two bases were to be completely
vacated by the end of 2008. Moscow completed its withdrawal ahead of schedule, in November 2007. However,
only a matter of months after the last Russian servicemen and military equipment had been withdrawn from
Georgian territory, its interference in the separatist regions (which belong to the territorial integrity of Georgia
according to the international law) increased dramatically (German, 2009, p. 227).
In 2008 the Russian Federation has strengthened its position in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with
more than 20,000 troops on the ground and hardened the border by electrified barbwires. The situation has
been worsening ever since and even though the EU has negotiated a ceasefire agreement according to which
the Russians should withdraw its troops from the separation territories to their positions before the conflict,
it has not been fulfilled. The situations on the boundary lines are now more than restricted than on the
borders.
Military presence would be according to Machiavelli acceptable as it could be portrayed as a colonised
territory that is according to its geopolitical significance needed. As Machiavelli writes, “yet it cannot be called
virt to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be treacherous, pitiless, irreligious. These ways can win a
prince power but not glory”. (Machiavelli, 2003, Ch. 8).
Machiavelli justified war and military force in inter-state conflict by reference to the historical reality, the
necessity, and the value of the state itself. There is disappointment, from the perspective of this value-freighted
state, with the people who constitute it, corrupted as they are by commerce and consumption. In order to justify
the extraction of value, by way of force, from these people, the state must be freighted with historical value and
ethical significance, over and above those very people. The point is that for Machiavelli, “the question which
stirs us as we think beyond the grave of our own generation is not the well-being human beings will enjoy in
the future but what kind of people they will be.” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2011, p. 68).
Just as he was aware of torture from personal experience, Machiavelli was aware of and incorporated into
his ethics the human capacity for corruption, violence, and waging war. In order to establish a new political
order, he saw arms as necessary. In chapter 19, for instance, he argues that a prince should not follow the
example of the benevolent emperor Marcus in “maintaining power that is already established and secure”, but
the example of the more brutal emperor Severus “in the courses of action that are necessary for establishing
68 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE

himself in power” (1532/1988, p. 72 in Cosans & Reina, 2017, p. 280). In chapter 6, Machiavelli includes
Moses as a leader who used arms, presumably referring to stoning and the death of the first born (Exodus 12:
29-34) when he claims:
“If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus and Romulus had been unarmed (diarmati), the new order which each of them established
would not have been obeyed for very long, as happened in our times to Friar Girolamo Savonarola.” (1532/1988, p. 21 in
Cosans & Reina, 2017, p. 280)

This is a proof of very strong connection between politics, military power, and violence. Military
occupation was seen from Machiavelli’s perspective a necessary tool for maintenance of power. Looking
through this lens, Putin’s use of military resources in Georgia and its breakaway regions would be considered
as justified in order to establish as Machiavelli calls the new order.
However, actions that go beyond “necessary” military presence, that restrict rights of Georgian citizens are
in my view not justified. In the Prince, Machiavelli has declared that the people want to be neither oppressed
nor commanded by the aristocrats (grandi), but he strongly suggests that the people are more willing to be
commanded by a good prince (McCormick, 2012, p. 722). In the Discourses, Machiavelli abandons altogether
the notions that the people resist command by the grandi. In fact, he explicitly enjoins the grandi to command
an armed citizenry in military areas rather than oppress an unarmed populace within the confines of their own
city. In short Machiavelli clearly distinguishes between oppression, on the one hand, which the people
rightfully resist, and government or command on the other, which they tolerate and even welcome, when
performed well (McCormick, 2012, p. 722).
These aspects of oppression which would not be tolerated by Machiavelli are characterized in the
following chapters. They include ethnic cleansing, economic pressure, psychological pressures, and other
intimidations.

Ethnic Cleansing
Numerous international organizations and NGOs have been continuously reporting the ongoing grave
human rights violation in Georgia by Russian federation and South Ossetian authorities. Two reports of Human
Rights Watch speak about the large-scale of systematic attacks on the civilian population of Georgian ethnicity,
namely that its researchers had:
“witnessed terrifying scenes or destruction in four villages that used to be populated exclusively by ethnic Georgians.
According to the few remaining local residents, South Ossetian militias that were moving along the road looted the
Georgian villages and set them on fire…” (Human Rights Watch, 13 August 2008)

The second report concerning the role of Russia with regard to those “terrifying scenes” says that “Russia
is obligated to ensure the safety and well-being of civilians in the areas under its de facto control but civilians
are clearly not being protected”. (Human Rights Watch, 28 August 2008).
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “expressed concern over reports of new forcible
displacement caused by marauding militias north of the Georgian town of Gori near the boundary line with the
breakaway region of South Ossetia” (UNHCR, 26 August 2008). According to UNHCR this group of newly
displaced persons consisted of:
“elderly people who had remained in their homes throughout the conflict but had now been forced to flee by armed
groups. The newly displaced said that some had been beaten, harassed and robbed, and that three persons had reportedly
 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE 69

been killed. The marauders were reportedly operating in the so-called buffer zone established along the boundary line with
South Ossetia.” (UNHCR, 26 August 2008)

Despite many witnesses and reports, the international community ignores the situation in the territory of
Georgia and ignores such fundamental restriction of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Such restriction
clearly leads to citizens’ hatred and would not be supported by Machiavelli.
Following chapters explore other ways of intimidation and pressures, i.e. economic and psychological
pressures.

Economic Pressure
Russia has consistently exerted economic pressure on Georgia as a means of maintaining leverage,
exploiting the fact that it remains the key economic and military power in the country. Many key Georgian
enterprises are in the hands of Russian investors, including critical infrastructure such as mobile telephone
communications and energy. In the summer of 2003 electricity monopoly UES acquired Georgia’s principles
power distributed ironically from American power company AES, provoking serious political controversy and
public anger (German, 2009, p. 229).
Reflecting the Soviet legacy, Russia was also one of the principal markets for Georgian products,
particularly wine, and mineral water, two of the Georgian wine exports, mineral water, and other articles.
Economic intimidation has proved to be a very successful way from Moscow to exert pressure on Georgian
civilians and therefore exploit domestic political tensions in Georgia, undermining the government. Diplomatic
spats between the political elites in Moscow and Tbilisi do not have the same impacts on economic pressure,
which serves to reinforce Russia’s pervasive influence on the minds of the civilian population (German, 2009, p.
230).
Economic intimidation clearly creates hatred and not only fear. Thus, such a tool would not be considered
appropriate for “virtuous prince” according to Machiavelli.

Psychological Pressures in Separatist Regions Accompanied by Borderisation Activities

“Borderisation” activities, i.e. building fences and barbwires on the Administrative Boundary Lines
(ABLs), from the side of breakaway regions with a great support of the Russian federation are highly discussed
issue. “Borderisation” is criticized by the Georgian government as it goes against the status quo. Boundary lines
slowly become borders and the entities are clearly more and more disconnected from the territory of Georgia.
They also become a major obstacle for crossing ABL confidence building measures.
“Borderisation” activities along both ABLs have had an adverse impact on dialogue efforts, people-to
people contact and have further entrenched positions. They have also affected the Incident Prevention and
Response Mechanism process as SO participants refuse to discuss the issue point blank. The Georgian
opposition has employed rhetoric around the erection of fences to undermine the Government of Georgia’s new
engagement initiatives (EEAS Archive, 2018).
The South Ossetian ABL is currently fenced completely with few exceptions. The ABL with Abkhazia has
still worked to be done. It is also noted that SO ABL has been done in much more professional way with clearly
more financial help from the Russian Federation than the Abkhazian ABL. Ukrainian crisis has also speeded up
the “borderisation” efforts in Abkhazia and in the last months since the beginning of 2015 the length of fence
has allegedly tripled and a barb wire was installed (Interviewed EUMM mission representative in 2017).
70 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE

Another aspect that is connected to borderisation is the language issue. The rights of ethnic Georgians in
both ABK and SO have come gradually under increasing pressure in the educational sphere. “Restrictions on
teaching of ethnic GEO students in areas predominantly inhabited by ethnic Georgians continued. By
September 2017, grades 1 to 6 in all schools were being taught in Russian.” (EEAS Archive, 2018). At the
same time, commuting across the boundary lines for educational purposes became increasingly difficult since
the closure of the three controlled crossing points has been accomplished.
In South Ossetia, access to mother tongue education for the ethnic Georgian population living in
Akhalgori district also came under threat from September 2017. De facto laws modelled on the ABK template
replaced Georgian with Russian as the language of instruction from grade 1-4 with immediate effect. This
deprived children of the right to education in mother tongue, but also seriously damaged the quality of
education as the reforms were ill prepared and apparently poorly implemented (EEAS Archive, 2018).
These pressures from the side of Russia would not be justified by Machiavelli, as these prevent people
from having the right to move freely and the right to access to their mother tongue. These intimidation tactics
together with ethnic cleansing and economic pressures produce in my view an unprecedented level of hatred in
the citizens’ minds and would not constitute a virtuous prince according to Machiavelli’s vision.
As it was mentioned above, the second source of power Machiavelli refers to in The Prince, and is often
overlooked when discussing Machiavellian leadership, is the goodwill that the people can develop towards a
prince and his family if he governs them well over time. “The relationship a good prince and ruling family can
acquire with their people allows power to emanate from the bottom up”. (Cosans & Reina, 2018, p. 7).
Machiavelli sees that people’s goodwill given to the prince is proportionate to the level of his power. This
is especially evident in his discussion of how to avoid being overthrown in a conspiracy. In offering a calculus
of the power dynamics involved in any potential conspiracy he claims:
“In short, for conspirators there are only fears of discovery or betrayal, and the dreadful prospect of punishment; but
the ruler has the prestige attaching to his office, together with the laws and resources of government at his disposal, as well
as help from allies, all of which will help him to survive; to which if the general goodwill of the people be added, it is
impossible (impossibile) that any would be rash enough to conspire.” (1532/1988, p. 65 in Cosans & Reina, 2018)

The Prince clearly examines the relationship between moral goodness and legitimate authority and sets out
principles for pursuing power, order, peace, and fortune. It also identifies freedom as an essential characteristic
of a society. Free society would never allow ethnic cleansing, economic intimidation, and restriction of its
fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus, in the eyes of Machiavelli, such a behaviour of the ruler (Vladimir
Putin) would not be tolerated and would lead to conspiracy against him.

Conclusion
Machiavelli could consider Vladimir Putin as a perfect prince who is capable of using violence with a
good and justified purpose. However, with regards to recent events and demonstrations, it is clear that Vladimir
Putin is viewed very critically by the Georgian and also Russian citizens. There is not only fear but also hatred
that is according to Machiavelli unacceptable source of power and reason for violence.
In the case of Georgia and the breakaway regions I proved that Vladimir Putin would not be regarded as a
good Prince through Machiavelli’s lens. Military power and presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and other
areas in the region would be in order to consolidate the power and could be justified. But ethnic cleansing,
 RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MACHIAVELLI’S PERSPECTIVE 71

economic intimidation, and psychological pressures that limit fundamental human rights and freedoms do not
constitute people’s willingness to respect and honour the ruler.
As Baker (2009) stated, “Machiavelli is urging the prince to strive not just for power but for glory. Glory,
however, only accrues to the virtuoso prince—the prince who is truly admirable. And admirability depends not
just on what one achieves but on how one behaves. Thus, as in all coherent ethical outlooks, there is a
systematic interplay between considerations of character, action and consequence.” (Baker, 2009, p. 312)

References
Baker, J. (2009). Violence for equality: Lessons Machiavelli. Global Crime, 10(4), 306-319.
Cosans, C. E., & Reina, C. S. (2018). The leadership ethics of Machiavelli’s prince. Business Ethics Quaterly, 28(3), 275-300.
European External Action Service (EEAS) Analysis (2012a). (1) EU-Georgia relations facts and figures.
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eap_factsheet_georgia_eng.pdf
European External Action Service (EEAS) Analysis. (2012b). (2) EU-Georgia relations. Internal document. Unpublished.
European External Action Service (EEAS) Archive. (2018). EU monitoring mission analysis on “borderisation”. Internal
document. Unpublished.
Frazer, E., & Hutchings, K. (2011). Virtuous violence and the politics of statecraft in Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Weber.
Political Studies, 59, 56-73.
Hoffman, J., & Graham, P. (2009). Introduction to political theory, 2nd ed. Routledge.
Human Rights Watch. (2008, August 13). Georgian villages in South Ossetia Burnt, Looted.
Human Rights Watch. (2008, August 28). EU: Protect civilians in Gori District, security of civilians should be central to summit
discussions on Russia.
Machiavelli, N. (1998). The prince. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Machiavelli, N. (2003 [1521]). In G. Bull (Trans.), The prince. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
McCormick. (2012). Subdue the senate: Machiavelli’s way of freedom or path to tyranny? Political Theory, 40(6).
Ministry of Justice Georgia. (2008). Ethnic cleansing of Georgians resulted from Russian invasion and occupation since August 8,
2008. Retrieved January 11, 2019 from https://www.osce.org/odihr/34091?download=true
News (Agenda.GE). (2019). Foreign Ministry calls on occupation forces “to cease illegal activities” in Georgia. Retrieved January
11, 2019 from https://agenda.ge/en/news/2019/2383
The Economist. (2008). Georgia and Russia: The war erupts in Georgia. Retrieved December 10, 2019 from
https://www.economist.com/node/11909324/all-comments
Tracey, G. (2009). David and Goliath: Georgia and Russia’s coercive diplomacy. Defence Studies, 9(2), 224-241.
UNHCR. (2008, August 28). Reports of lawlessness creating new forcible displacement in Georgia. Retrieved 14 April 2020 from
https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2008/8/48b424f94/reports-lawlessness-creating-new-forcible-displacement-georgia.html
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2020, Vol. 8, No. 02, 72-81
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2020.02.005
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DAVID PUBLISHING

Political Violence in Nigeria: The Role of the Church

Oti Alaba Rotimi

The Redeemed Christian Bible College, Main Campus, Redemption Camp, Ogun State, Nigeria

In Nigeria today, it seems that politics is synonymous to violence. Though there are many political parties with
different ideologies in the country, some of them are found to engage in actions or words intended to hurt people. In
fact, they go to the extent of using dangerous weapons to inflict injuries on perceived political opponents. In this
respect, this paper establishes the fact that there is political violence in Nigeria and also examined some of the
factors responsible for violence in Nigeria politics such as political environment, ethnicity or tribal politics,
intolerance, the insincerity of our political leaders, and electoral fraud. In the same vein, critical criticism as a result
of deep hatred for a party or person may also engender political violence in the form of words or utterances. The
consequences of such political violence are enormous in every aspect of our national life, which would need the
intervention of the church as a voice to save Nigeria and the world from the state of violence and the
insurmountable problems attached. Though the church in this country has been playing significant roles, more has
to be done to make a positive impact especially among the youths who are the leaders of tomorrow and
unfortunately the instruments being used for this political violence. This paper adopted a qualitative research
method, while data were collected through secondary sources and internet materials.

Keywords: politics, violence, the church and Nigeria

Introduction
There is no gainsaying about it, that political violence is prevalent in Nigeria. In fact, in the nation today,
politics is synonymous to violence. We are yet to reach a stage where political tolerance is fundamental to
peaceful coexistence. In Nigeria, there are many political parties with different ideologies on how to govern the
country. There are struggles to gain influence and assume power by all means. They are all struggling to gain
influence and get power by any means. These struggles for power result in violence. When one political party
does not get what it desires, its members get involved in actions or words intended to hurt members of other
political parties. Also included are attacks with the use of dangerous weapons like knives, guns, etc. to inflict
injuries on perceived political opponents or critical criticism borne out of hatred for the person and political
ideology of other person or political party.
According to Samuel, history is full of conflicts and violence, while some are recorded in history books,
others have almost gone into extinction. He opines that some of these wars/violence were political in nature and
others had an ethnic and religious undertone.1 But violence is still a continuous phenomenon. Violence, with the
inclusion of political violence, is relatively a common type of human behaviour that occurs throughout the

Oti Alaba Rotimi, PhD, Lecturer, The Redeemed Christian Bible College, Main Campus, Redemption Camp, Ogun State,
Nigeria.
1
S. W. Kunhiyop, African Christian Ethics. Kenya: WorldAlive Publishers, 2008, p. 107.
 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 73

world.2 Although, people of any age could be involved in political violence, older adolescents and young
adults are mostly involved. The effects are enormous on those who witness or experience it, but youths are
especially susceptible to its harmful effects.3
Unfortunately, various programmes established by the government and non-governmental organisation
aimed at preventing and eradicating political violence have been unsuccessful. Hence, the writing of this paper
bothers what the church in Nigeria can do to stem the tide of political violence.
In view of these, the church in Nigeria has to develop an understanding of the nature of this violence and
how Christians should respond to them. Therefore, the need arises for the church to answer the questions about
her attitudinal position to the use of violence as a means of resolving political conflicts, and in the same vein,
how the church and individual Christian should respond to oppression and injustice by the government or the
politicians. These are pertinent questions steering Church leaders, members, politicians, and other stakeholders
on the face. Therefore, in this paper, we set out to clarify some key terms, discuss the major causes of political
violence, examine the effects with references, and finally explain what role the church should play in curbing
political violence in Nigeria.

Concept of Political Violence

The word “politics” was derived from the Greek word polis which literally means city-state. Ancient
Greek society was divided into a collection of an independent city-state, each of which processed its own
system of government in its own terms which suits each city-state. In the light of this, politics is defined as a
system of a social organisation centred upon the machinery of government.4 Politics can be referred to as
opinions about the ways country is governed which are never the same. On the other hand, according to
Encyclopaedia Brittanica, violence is described as an act of physical force that causes or is intended to cause
harm which may be physical, psychological, or both.5
Yusuf Turaki defines violence as the use of force to injure or wrong someone else, which may be
perpetrated by individuals, groups or institutions and is not necessarily physical. People are subjected to
violence whenever they are denied justice, equality, freedom, and human dignity. Such violence often springs
from tribalism, colonialism, sexism, religious bigotry, and greed (Jer. 22:17).6 He was of the opinion that,
institutional violence is the result of structural evil, that is evil that has permeated a system, institution, or
society, while individual violence comes from evil in individual hearts.7
Therefore, violence involves spoken words or actions that are put in place with the aim of injuring
someone. In this sense, it includes attacks with the use of various dangerous weapons to inflict injuries on
perceived political opponents and critical criticism resulting from hatred for a person or party and their political
ideology. In a way, it involves words or utterances. Furthermore, Ukanna defines violence as a physically

2
Kristine M. Jacquin, Violence Behaviour, https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence, 2019.
3
Kristine M. Jacquin, Violence Behaviour, https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence, 2019.
4
T. O. Bakare, Politics! What a Dirty Game! African Christian Perspective on Politics in Relation to Pauline Letters in
Christianity and African Society: A Festschrift in Honour of Pas. (Dr) Gabriel Oladele Olutola at 80, Ed by Samson A. Fatokun,
Ibadan, Nigeria: Bookwright Publishers, 2013, 358.
5
Kristine M. Jacquin, Violence Behaviour, https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence, 2019.
6
Y. Turaki, Violence, in Tokunboh Adeyemo (Ed), Africa Bible Commentary: A One-Volume Commentary Written by African
Scholars, Nairobi, Kenya: WordAlive Publishers, 2006, p. 1043.
7
Y. Turaki, Violence, in Tokunboh Adeyemo (Ed), Africa Bible Commentary: A One-Volume Commentary Written by African
Scholars, Nairobi, Kenya: WordAlive Publishers, 2006, p. 1043.
74 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

injurious expression of conflict.8

Thus, political violence is the use of physical force so as to damage or injure a person or persons or their
property for political reasons. It is a pointer to the fact that there are instability and chaos within a political
system. Ukanna in the word of Anifowose, also defines political violence as the use of threat of physical
activity carried out by an individual or individuals within a political system against another individual or
individuals, and/or property, with intent to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to
property; and who’s objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and
effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of
power that has some consequences for the political system.9
Therefore, the above definition portrays that, in any political violence, political process restructuring must
be intended. In this regard, political violence aims at directly or indirectly influencing the decisions of the state,
controlling the state decision making machinery, attempting to change the entire state structure, and crippling
the state. For instance, a military coup attempts to replace a civilian government with the military or the
military government with another set of military rulers within the existing state and political system. Terrorism,
for instance, attempts to weaken the state and cause the terrorist groups to assume more prominent positions
and wield considerable influence in the state decision process.
Ukanna also opines that political violence belongs to the realms of unconventional political behaviour. But
then, it is the political process in the conventional arena that gives rise to injustice or inequality between groups
that engender conflict which results in violence. People employ the instruments of violence to make their
grievances heard and influence the government decisions on some important social issues that affect their
lives.10

An Overview of Political Violence in Nigeria

Political violence seems to be a common phenomenon in Nigeria political history because political power
is one of the ways to access wealth. Therefore, more often politics becomes “a do-or-die affair”. Politicians
resort to violent methods like the use of political thugs which has become a common occurrence across the
country in their desperation to get to the corridor of power or retain their political power. Jobless youth are
employed by politicians or their supporters to disrupt electioneering campaigns and steal ballot boxes on
election days.11 Political violence in Nigeria has taken many forms and shapes which include: homicide (the
killing of an individual by another person), assault (physically attacking another person with the intention to
cause harm), robbery (forcibly taking something from another person), rape (forcible having sexual intercourse
with another person), military coups, gang armed clashes, pre-election, election, and post-election violence,
etc.12 These are usually the practice in Nigeria political violence whenever and wherever it occurs. In recent
times, it includes terrorism and spates of kidnapping all over the country.

8
B. I. Ukanna, State-Society Interactions: A Conceptual and Comparative Introduction to Political Sociology, Lagos, Nigeria:
Concept Publications Limited, 2010, 482.
9
B. I. Ukanna, State-Society Interactions: A Conceptual and Comparative Introduction to Political Sociology, Lagos, Nigeria:
Concept Publications Limited, 2010, 482.
10
B. I. Ukanna, State-Society Interactions: A Conceptual and Comparative Introduction to Political Sociology, Lagos, Nigeria:
Concept Publications Limited, 2010, 482.
11
Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/04/10/testing-democracy/political-violence-nigeria, April 10, 2003.
12
Kristine M. Jacquin, Violence Behaviour, https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence, 2019.
 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 75

A contemporary examination of political violence in Nigeria also shows that Nigeria has not been the best
example of a peaceful electoral process.13 It all began in the early years of our independence and it is
unfortunate that instead of the tempo decreasing, it has been on an increasing spate since then. According to
Akinniyi, there were series of political violence that has taken place in Nigeria since independence; for example,
after the elections conducted immediately after independence in the 1960s, in the Western Region, following
both federal and regional elections conducted in 1964 to 1965, rift between Awolowo and Akintola, political
violence in parts of Northern Region, especially between supporters of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC),
the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and Action Group. He was of the opinion that, the Nigerian
civil war of 1967-1970 can also be categorised as political violence, while a national election conducted in
1983 witnessed massive post-election violence following the declared landslide victory of the National Party of
Nigeria (NPN) in Oyo and Ondo states that was considered to be the stronghold of the Unity Party of Nigeria
(UPN). He reiterates that political violence includes the several killing of politicians like Dr Harry, Funsho
Williams, Bola Ige, and Dipo Dina to mention few14.
The reports of political violence are so numerous that Human Rights Watch cannot verify whether every
incident was in fact politically motivated. Over the last couple of years, a great deal of violence was associated
with jockeying for position within the political parties.15 While government officials and leaders of several
political parties have made public statements condemning political violence, political parties and its candidates
have sometimes accused their opponents of participating in political violence with little apparent basis, which
exacerbates tensions that could lead to violence between their supporters.16

Causes of Political Violence in Nigeria

Most researchers seem to agree on the fact that political violence is multi-causal, that is, it comes as a
result of the combination of factors, including those originating in the violent person’s social or cultural
environment and those representing immediate situational forces.
At this juncture, we shall take a glance at some of the causes of political violence in Nigeria as follows:
The first one has to do with the Nigeria political environment, which may be referred to as political culture or
tradition of the country since the first republic. Nigeria politics has never been a peaceful type. It has often been
characterized by violence. Hence, the youth of yesteryears, who are now leaders of today had cultivated the
idea that politics devoid of violence cannot be practised in Nigeria. There is a belief that thuggery and
intimidation must be used in order for someone to succeed in Nigeria politics.
Secondly, ethnicity or tribal politics has created a deep gulf in our politics. The first republic political
parties were divided along the tribal inclination and that was why each tribal party had dominance in its
respective region. Even up till now, it has been an impossible task totally removing tribal politics. Thuggery
and violence have been the order of the day in the quest to grab power at the centre, the resultant effect of
which is the destruction of lives and properties.
The third one is intolerance. In a way, this is the major cause of violence in the politics of this nation.
Members of party A find it difficult to tolerate actions of members of party B which culminate in sentiments

13
http://placng.org/legist/political-violence-the-boiling-point-of-nigerias-democratic-experience/, 2019.
14
Omobolanle Joseph Akinniyi, https://www.academia.edu/10250378/_Nigeria_and_political_violence_.
15
https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/04/10/testing-democracy/political-violence-nigeria, April 10, 2003.
16
https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/04/10/testing-democracy/political-violence-nigeria, April 10, 2003.
76 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

rage and undesirable attacks. Their inability to tolerate one another for any reason, results, in most times, in
violence of serious magnitude. Many at times, lack of trust and unhealthy rivalry coated with selfish interest
and jealousy result in the assassination of political opponents or within a party. This is the height of the
violence, which we are still witnessing even in this present political dispensation. This, of course, does not
portend a good future for this country, with the youths who are the future leaders being recruited for these
dastardly acts.
Fourth, the lack of sincerity by political leaders is another factor. Majority of these political leaders are
insincere in the sense that they are not honest in the expression of their feelings to their followers. In a way, they
are hypocritical. During their political campaigns, they cajole the people in order to secure their votes, but they
ended up doing something contrary after winning the election. This eventually develops to frosty relationships
between the ruled and the rulers, hence, violence in form of physical attacks, destruction of properties,
kidnapping, as currently being witnessed across many of the states in Nigeria, becomes the reaction of the
electorates. The leaders feast sumptuously with impunity, while people who voted them into power are
neglected, impoverished, and abandoned to their fate. Therefore, the apathy developed towards people’s
welfare makes the electorate to take the law into their hands by dealing with the leaders through violence.
Moreover, another cause of political violence in Nigeria is an affront of the rule of law. This is as a result
of autocratic tendency. The leaders are rulers to themselves. Judicial pronouncements are spurned at will.
Justice is denied and human right records are at its lowest ebb. The separation of powers among the three tiers
of government seems not to be recognised by the executive arm of government. This kind of attitude may result
from one violence to the others.
The last one is electoral fraud. This has been an age long problem in the politics of this country. The
people’s votes are not counted. Candidates are selected, rather than being elected. This results in annoyance
with the immediate violent reaction resulting in maiming and destruction in various degrees. Electoral officers
are always being used and manipulated by the power that is to perpetrate evil. Electoral arrogance and carefree
attitude are exhibited by these electoral officers because of the support they enjoy from the executive. In the
long run, these same people are commended for a job well done.
In conclusion, the utterances of our leaders also usually spark violence. They say some very intuitive and
inciting words in a bid to ensure their continuity, perpetuation of injustice, and cover up lies. Politics ought not
to be taken as “a do or die” affair. Everybody must be encouraged to contribute his/her quota in a free and fair
manner in order to aid the development of the country irrespective of sex, tribe, education, and socio-economic
background.

Effects of Political Violence in Nigeria

Regardless of its cause, political violence has negative impacts on those who experience or witness it. In
this same way, it has never solved any problem in Nigeria, but rather added problems to the country. It does not
lead to permanent resolutions of any political conflicts, but rather creates more problems than existed before.
According to Akinniyi, the effects of political violence in Nigeria are always of great magnitude negatively
such as: destruction or loss of many lives and destruction of public and private properties including churches,
mosques, and other institution worth of millions of Naira. He reported that, the 2011 post-election violence was
most intense in Kaduna where the highest number of deaths and destruction was recorded, with figures released
by the Nigeria Police, which indicated that 401 people were killed, 1,435 private houses, 987 shops, 157
 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 77

churches, 46 mosques, 45 police properties, 16 government properties, 437 vehicles, and 219 motorcycles burnt
and destroyed. He further reported that, in Bauchi State, protesters destroyed INEC offices in Itas-Gadau,
Jama’are, Bauchi, Dambam, and Misau Local Government Areas. The protesters either looted or destroyed
properties including about 500 laptop computers, 13 power-generating sets, file cabinets, and other properties
from the offices.17 Kunhiyop also asserts that political violence causes chaos and instability, and never a
product of peace.18
Furthermore, Kunhiyop adds that violence produces more casualties and bloodshed than non-violence
approaches that achieve the same result. He opines that the use of violence to accomplish some objectives or
settle some disputes (religious, ethnic, or political) always results in bloodshed and unnecessary loss of
innocent lives and property.19 So is the case in Nigeria, with millions of lives and properties being lost to
political violence? It is counter-productive and self-defeating. In the real sense, the desired results which are
peaceful coexistence would have been achieved through non-violent approaches in form of dialogue and
diplomacy. The 2011 post-election violence forced more than 65,000 people to flee their homes.
It makes some people perpetrate evil under the disguise of protest, riot, and demonstrations, that is, during
any political violence, an unspecified number of female members of the society are always raped, molested,
and assaulted by irate youths.
Also, globally, political violence affects the bilateral and diplomatic relationship between other countries
and Nigeria, with a serious decline in the number of tourists visiting the country at that time because of fear of
being killed, kidnapped, and molested.
In the actual sense, political violence affects every sector of society, for instance, educational activities are
brought to a halt leading to disruption in the school calendar, which in turn leads to an extension in the year of
study of students. This attracts more expenses from the parents and students are exposed to social vices like
drugs addiction, alcohol, armed robbery, prostitution, among other vices during the period of their staying at
home.
Commercial activities also are seriously affected in the sense that, political violence causes a reduction in
economic output because the environment becomes insecure for business persons and investors.
It is therefore, believed that whatever the effect, the church still has roles to play in order to reduce the
effect on the barest minimum and on forestall future occurrences, hence the discussion on the role of the
church.

The Role of the Church in Ameliorating Political Violence

Though, churches in this country have been playing some positive roles in stemming the tide of political
violence, more has to be done in order to make a more positive impact in society. On this note, the church,
being a group of believers who have been called out of darkness to the light of God (I Peter 2:9), must not
relent in her efforts to make Nigeria politics free of violence. Therefore, a variety of programmes must be
developed by the church to prevent political violence in individuals who have already shown a tendency toward
violence and in the congregants generally.

17
Omobolanle Joseph Akinniyi, https://www.academia.edu/10250378/_Nigeria_and_political_violence_, 2019.
18
K. S. Waje, African Christian Ethics, Kenya: WorldAlive Publishers, 2008, pp. 113-114.
19
K. S. Waje, African Christian Ethics, Kenya: WorldAlive Publishers, 2008, pp. 113-114.
78 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

Engaging the Youth in Political Education

In the first instance, the youths, who are the major player in the political violence in this country, must be
groomed by the church for a leadership position in the larger society. The youth in any society is the sustenance
of society in order to ensure continuity. The church should create programmes for them where they can be
spiritually prepared for the larger society and thus contribute their quota as Christians in any position they find
themselves in the secular world. Church programmes must be tailored to help them grow and consider
themselves as agents of transformation than agents of destabilisation and violence.
Truth Telling Among the Church Leaders to the Politician
Secondly, the church has the role of telling the political class the truth even if they frown at it. The church
must stand on her feet. They should be strong and courageous to tell the leaders the truth. The idea of saying “it
is well” when “it is not well” should be discouraged. Obijole opines that the church has prophetic function to
the state which involves a declaration of the mind of God to the state and her citizens and rebuking the state
when it acts unjustly and turns against God (II Sam. 12:1-14; Dan. 3:20-27; 17-28). This shows that Nigerian
church leaders should toe the steps of prophets like Jeremiah, Isaiah, Amos, Elijah, Elisha, and others in the
New Testament like John the Baptist, who was beheaded for speaking the truth. Also, those heroes and heroines
of faith who laid down their lives for the truth and their boldness are good examples for our church leaders to
follow. Whenever Christian leaders are faced with compromise and disobedience, they must choose to obey
God rather than men without resulting in political violence (Acts 5:29).20
Obijole reiterates that, the church has pastoral duties over the state, which are as follows: to provide
teaching and directions to the leaders and those being governed (Matt. 28:19-29), to encourage Christians to be
good citizens who obey the state and pay their taxes (Rom. 13:1-7; l Pet. 2:13), and to see that the state and her
citizens do nothing contrary to the word of God. According to him, Apostle Paul, in Romans 13, opines that the
goal of every Christian should be to work toward making the state better.21 This can be done by being a good
example of service and influence in society. In this wise, the amalgamation of the church and state should
benefit all and sundry.
Parental Responsibility
Parents, in particular, have a serious responsibility to lead their wards to Christ, because charity they say
begins at home. Hence, Christian parents should be role models to their children in matters of faithful service
unto God, that is service at home, church, and public life. They should be taught to know the right values for
hard work, to avoid getting to the top through bribery and corruption or cutting corners, to advise them against
the wrong imitation, like cultism, immoral dressing, smoking, alcoholism, and the likes.
Furthermore, fervent prayers make things happen. The church must pray regularly for peace and an end to
political violence in society. Every individual Christian must not be involved in any activity that can breach the
peace of society. According to Obijole, the church has a priestly function to perform to the state, which
includes prayers for those in authorities and for the protection and healing of the nation (I Tim. 2:1-3).22

20
O. O. Obijole, “Christianity and Governance: A Critical Review of Romans 13:1-7 in the Nigerian Context”, Religion and
Governance in Nigeria, Religious Studies Series, Volume 4, 2012.
21
O. O. Obijole, “Christianity and Governance: A Critical Review of Romans 13:1-7 in the Nigerian Context”, Religion and
Governance in Nigeria, Religious Studies Series, Volume 4, 2012.
22
O. O. Obijole, “Christianity and Governance: A Critical Review of Romans 13:1-7 in the Nigerian Context”, Religion and
Governance in Nigeria, Religious Studies Series, Volume 4, 2012.
 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 79

Despite the omnipotent and Omniscient nature of God, He has chosen Christians to use the weapon of prayer to
positively change and influence the world. In James 5:16, Apostle Paul urges Christians to pray for the leaders
in government, believing that their fervent prayer will be result oriented.
In line with this, the church could also organise seminars, workshops, and other such avenues that would
enable congregants and people in the society shun violence and embrace peace always as Christ has taught
them. In all, Christianity is not violent but peaceful. The Bible, many times, enjoins Christian to seek good and
not evil, to seek peace, and be at peace with everybody. Therefore, the peace that Jesus gives is not that of the
world but the one that passes all human understanding which shall always be available for them. The future is
guaranteed for the man of peace (Psalm 37:37) and not a man who engages in violent behaviour. Christians are
not only to seek peace but to pursue it (I Peter 3:11). In this wise, violence in any form is bad.

Christian Education on Politics Without Violence

Christians must be taught not to be involved in political violence because Christian’s “warfare” is
carried out by means of spiritual “weapons” such as faith, prayer, and the preaching of the gospel.23 Christians
are called to be “in the world” but radically “not of the world”. This implies a total refusal to use the
weapons of violence, even if suffering and death result.24 In our violent world, the most compelling general
stance from the biblical standpoint will be that of active peace-making and a commitment to non-violent
ways of resisting violence and evil thereof. Violence tends to beget more violence; there has not appeared any
war to end all wars. Christians should follow their Lord in bearing the cross and trying to break the cycle of
violence.25
Christians must search for creative and redemptive ways of mitigating conditions which provoke or
encourage anger, pride, envy, and violence. They may help the potentially violent to discover non-violent ways
of expression. They can often defuse rage with a caring, empathetic listening ear.26
Christians can protect and honour life with their words. The church should say “no” to the abuse of the
youth, the weak, and the aged, police brutality and all other forms of excessive force in our world, as well as to
the popular media which glorify violence. Saying “no” to political violence may need to be accompanied by a
demonstration of good behaviour by church members, involvement in politics, and political campaigns, and
legislative reforms from members voted for.27
Christians’ non-support for political violence should be expressed in words and actions, which creates safe
places for both the victim and the violent.
In conclusion, if churches carry out their search for the will of God in the context of the scripture, prayer
and community peace, make a whole-hearted effort to find a none-violent, peaceful response coupled with all
that have discussed above, then their likelihood of sowing peace in a politically violent world will be greatly

23
David J. Atkinson, David F. Field, Arthur Holmes, Oliver O'Donovan, ed, New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral
Theology, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995. 878-879.
24
David J. Atkinson, David F. Field, Arthur Holmes, Oliver O'Donovan, ed, New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral
Theology, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995. 878-879.
25
David J. Atkinson, David F. Field, Arthur Holmes, Oliver O'Donovan, ed, New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral
Theology, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995. 878-879.
26
David J. Atkinson, David F. Field, Arthur Holmes, Oliver O'Donovan, ed, New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral
Theology, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995. 878-879.
27
David J. Atkinson, David F. Field, Arthur Holmes, Oliver O'Donovan, ed, New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral
Theology, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995. 878-879.
80 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

increased. Christians should know that political authority is a necessary feature of human society, with a
positive role in God’s purpose for this world.

Christian Participation in Politics Not Violence

Christians should participate in politics which include exercising one’s rights to vote and be voted for,
speaking out against any wrongdoing by those in power, and holding leaders accountable for their actions
without necessarily resulting to violence. According to James, moral bankruptcy, corruption, poverty, disease
and ignorance, all clearly call for Christian participation in politics. African Christians need to understand that
the destinies of their nations rest on their political participation. As the Bible says, “When the righteous are in
authority, the people rejoice, but when the wicked bears rule, the people mourn” (Prov. 29:2). People will enjoy
life when the righteousness is in authority, but suffer under wicked regimes.28
The Bible makes it clear that God abhors violence (Gen. 6:11, 13; Mal. 2:16). He instructs us to avoid it
and to turn from it (Ezek 45:9; Jer. 22:3). Jesus pronounced a specific blessing on those who brought an end to
violence (Matt. 5:9). By contrast, Jesus calls on us to meet violence with peace (Rom. 12:17-21), the sword
with forgiveness, evil with good (Luke 6:27-31), and wrath with love. Jesus and the apostles modelled
non-violence by not retaliating when they suffered violence (1Pet. 2:20-24).29

Conclusion
The frequent use of violence to settle the incessant political conflicts that have been happening in the
country has not proffered any solution. Instead, it has resulted in hatred and more violence. The solution to all
these continuous political imbroglios in Nigeria is the non-violence that Jesus practised and instructed His
followers to practice. Their refusal to use violence does not mean that they are passive or cannot fight, but it
portrays that violence should not be a way of life or means of settling political conflicts. Only love for the
enemy as instructed by Jesus Christ, and determination not to use violence as a means for resolving conflicts
can help us to live in peace and harmony in Nigeria.
According to Kunhiyop, the effectiveness of non-violent responses to oppression and injustices has been
demonstrated worldwide with the following examples: In South Africa, Steve Biko and Nelson Mandela stood
for non-violence but active resistance to the oppressive apartheid regime. Also, in the United States of America,
Martin Luther King Jr. was the major spokesman for non-violence but active resistance to racial segregation. In
the same vein, Ghanaian adopted a non-violence approach to solve the political crisis.30
In conclusion, the government and the church have mutual responsibilities. The church should no longer
compromise her role but should rather take up the active responsibility of preaching the truth without any bias
especially to those politicians who are master minders of political violence in the country by pretending to
serve the interest of the people.31 The church should also work on her members, so that they would be of good
examples to the outside world and a real epitome of godliness. However, the government has the full

28
T James A. Kantiok, Christian and Politics, in Tokunboh Adeyemo (Ed), Africa Bible Commentary: A One-Volume
Commentary Written by African Scholars, Nairobi, Kenya: WordAlive Publishers, 2006, p. 1001.
29
Y. Turaki, Violence, in Tokunboh Adeyemo (Ed), Africa Bible Commentary: A One-Volume Commentary Written by African
Scholars, Nairobi, Kenya: WordAlive Publishers, 2006, p. 1043.
30
S. W. Kunhiyop, African Christian Ethics, Kenya: WorldAlive Publishers, 2008. pp. 107-125.
31
T. O. Bakare, Politics! What a Dirty Game! African Christian Perspective on Politics in Relation to Pauline Letters in
Christianity and African Society: A Festschrift in Honour of Pas. (Dr) Gabriel Oladele Olutola at 80, Ed by Samson A. Fatokun,
Ibadan, Nigeria: Bookwright Publishers, 2013, pp. 357-363.
 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 81

responsibility of ensuring good and reputable governance, and the church is to stand as a check, thus, ensuring
that government complies with the directives from God which must be passed across without bias but rather
with painstaking thoroughness. By the time both work hand in hand, they would achieve the same goal that
would definitely lead to having a God-fearing society.

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pauline letters in Christianity and African society: A festschrift in honour of Pas. (Dr) Gabriel Oladele Olutola at 80. Ibadan,
Nigeria: Bookwright Publishers.
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Commentary Written by African Scholars. Nairobi, Kenya: WordAlive Publishers.
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Governance in Nigeria, Religious Studies Series. Ibadan: University of Ibadan.
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Scholars. Nairobi, Kenya: WordAlive Publishers.
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