International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 7, Number 9,2019

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 9, September 2019 (Serial Number 72)
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★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar); ★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
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Poland); ★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);
★Brian Leonard Hocking (University of London, UK); ★Phua Chao Rong, Charles (Lee Kuan Yew School of
★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New Public Policy, Singapore);
Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of ★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Taranaki, New Zealand); Ukraine, Ukraine);
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany); ★Raymond LAU (The University of Queensland,
★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK); Australia);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA); ★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
Cultures, Morocco); University, India);
★Ghadah AlMurshidi (Michigan State University, USA); ★Shkumbin Misini (Public University, Kosovo);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia); ★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,Greece);
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan); ★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
★Kyeonghi Baek (State University of New York, USA); Canada, Canada);
★John Opute (London South Bank University, UK); ★Timothy J. White (Xavier University, Ireland);
★Léonie Maes (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium); ★Tumanyan David (Yerevan State University, Armenia);
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The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
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International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 9, September 2019 (Serial Number 72)
Contents
Refugees and Resettlement
Viet Nam 1969/1970: Pacification as a Path to No-where 385

Gerald Waite
E-Government
The E-Government in Local Governance and Its Contribution to the Regional Development:
A Comparative Study 394
Vasiliki Delitheou, Maria Maraki, Charalampos Trasanidis
The Belt and Road
How German Experts Understand and Comments on China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative 407
ZHANG Lihua
Maritime Boundary
Kick Off Maritime Boundary Disputes: Published Maps, Not Drawn With Agreement,
Compatible to the International Law? 418
Emete Gözügüzelli
European Migrant Crisis
Transforming the European Migrant Crisis into Rural Developmental Opportunities:

The Case of Latvia 431
Olayemi Bakre, Nirmala Dorasamy
International Relations and Diplomacy, September 2019, Vol. 7, No. 09, 385-393
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.09.001
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Viet Nam 1969/1970: Pacification as a Path to No-where
Gerald Waite
Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana, USA

Refugees, their movements, and the problems associated with their survival and maintenance in combat scenarios
are a constant problem in the search for peace in war zones. In the American conflict in Viet Nam, the traditional
village structure with its communal character created the perfect situation for seminal revolutionary movements and
the ensuing conflict. These same villages then became targets for search and destroy operations and later wholesale
clearing operations in which entire populations were forced into resettlement. In Quang Nam Province, in Central
coastal Viet Nam, over 50% of the population or 500,000 people were in refugee status by 1969. The concept of
“pacification” in 1970 focused on putting people back on the land in their original village areas or a return to
normalcy for some of the population. This case study, by a former civil affairs officer, details movement of a
population in refugee status to a “return to village” project, as pacification and an attempt at creating a manageable
strategic population area. It failed on both counts. The mistakes inherent in this project illustrate some of the more
widespread problems which plagued the conduct of the conflict in Viet Nam. It also calls into question, the concept
of the military planning and execution of resettlement. The lack of a thorough understanding of local culture and
subjects involved by planners and project officers alike contributed to a village which neither replaced the original
nor survived as an improved model.
Keywords: Vietnam, Vietnam War, pacification, Vietnamization, refugees, resettlement
The Vietnamese wars of the last century, especially the French and American, can be more fully
understood as the inevitable collision of economic systems and the corresponding evolution of revolutionary
paradigms. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century and continuing to this day, economic
systems have been manipulated and changed by an ever-expanding market-economy. Authors such as Scott
(1976) and Wolf (1968) look at the broad scope of peasant revolution in Asian societies and create an analysis
that indicates that moral based revolts of the peasantry of the world are the inevitable outcome of resistance to
the forces of globalization. In “The Great Transformation”, Karl Polanyi (1944) claimed market expansion and
the organization of production in the development of the “self regulating market” produces great evils and if
left unchecked would be detrimental to society. He goes on to write that primitive subsistence societies are
organized in ways that do not permit hunger and as such are more humane than more advanced societies and
that the only means to assimilate people from these groups into the market economy is through the introduction
of starvation. Polanyi (1944) also referred to counter-movements which he terms as “interventionism” or forces
that checked the action of the free-market “in respect to the factors of production, labor and land” (p. 131). The
author suggests that these counter-movements surfaced in Southeast Asia in the form of rebellions centered
Gerald Waite, M.S. in Anthropology, Lecturer Emeritus, Research Fellow, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Ball State
University, Muncie, Indiana, USA.
386 VIET NAM 1969/1970: PACIFICATION AS A PATH TO NO-WHERE
around colonialism and the creation of a peasant subsistence crisis.

The colonial state with its ever increasing demands upon the peasantry; the transfer of traditional
communal-use lands from village to state, with the loss of the subsistence use of those lands; the rise of a
landlord class as opposed to the earlier “patron” model; and the increased emphasis on the cash economy in
every sector of peasant life, effectively demolished the reciprocity based nature of the communal Vietnamese
village and created the moral outrage necessary for revolution (Scott, 1976).1 These conditions coupled with an
insider/outsider consciousness on the part of the peasantry and the rise of nationalism at a state level, fueled
cooperative rebellion against the French colonials, and then their replacements, the Americans.
James Trullinger (1980) estimated that as many as 80% of the population My Thuy Phuong, a village
lying just South of Hue the ancient Imperial capital, supported the Viet Minh and later the Viet Cong (VC). As
soldiers in Vietnam, we were told of American military estimates ranging from 75% to 90% loyalty to the
Government of South Vietnam (GVN).2 Villages that were urban in their proximity to larger population bases,
such as Saigon, Hue, or Danang were more likely to be considered as friendly to the GVN and suffered much
less long-term damage to their traditional infrastructure. Trullinger’s (1980) study of My Thuy Phong and
Schell’s (1968) of a village named Ben Suc, about 30 miles from the city of Saigon,3 show the opposite
extremes of village survival. My Thuy Phong survived the war intact even though it had a deep allegiance to
the revolutionary front and few ties to the central government probably because it was close to Hue, on a
railroad and Highway 1, the only fully operational highway during most of the conflict (Trullinger, 1980). The
village Ben Suc, on the other hand, was completely destroyed and its inhabitants all moved or detained because
it was deeply rural and seen as uncontrollable. To use Jonathon Schell’s own words: “As though, having once
decided to destroy it, we were now bent on annihilating every possible indication that the village of Ben Suc
ever existed” (1968, p. 132). The author of this article observed that those villages close to Highway 1 survived
almost unscathed, while those removed even a short distance from the road could be termed a no-man’s land
and a free-fire zone. What follows is an account of one of the latter case villages.
Time and Place

Vietnam was divided into four sectors of military control during the American War. The northern-most
sector was that from Quang Tri, or at the demilitarized zone, south to a town called Tam Ky. This area was
designated “I Corps” and included the Imperial Capital Hue, and the autonomous city of Danang. During the
year of 1970, this author was a first lieutenant assigned to the 29th Civil Affairs Company in Danang. Civil
Affairs (CA) is that branch of the Army which deals with the problems associated with civilians in military
areas of operations. Every military unit of battalion size or larger size has what is termed a S5 or G5 office
charged with the responsibility of managing civilians and assisting with problems of civil control and
subsistence in military operations. The 29th Civil Affairs Company had the responsibility of providing CA
trained officers and enlisted men to all the operational (infantry) units in I Corps. As such, this author was
subsequently assigned to the First Marine Division G5 Office at Freedom Hill near Danang. During that tenure,
1
James Scott coined the phrase “Moral Economy of the Peasant” in his book of the same title however, other authors such Gerald
Cannon Hickey (1993), and Jonathon Schell (1968) address the ideas of exploitation, and their results in the Vietnam experience.
2
Figures for loyalty to the GVN and American cause were very high. “Tour 365” was the name of an American military
produced tour book for servicemen like myself and their families that stated 95%. The figures given were obviously optimistic but
none of us dared to think they could be that terribly inaccurate.
3
Saigon was the name of the capitol of South Vietnam. It is now known as Ho Chi Minh City.
VIET NAM 1969/1970: PACIFICATION AS A PATH TO NO-WHERE 387
he was assigned to a variety of projects in the 1st Marine Area of Operations (AO) often, as an advisor to
various units in the field. Most duties pertained to the movement of refugees and their medical and subsistence
needs. Beginning in June of 1970, that assignment shifted to a project entitled the Go Noi Island Resettlement
in which 1st Marine division wanted to move several thousand refugees from various camps in their AO to a
previously occupied inland island called Phu Ky or Go Noi.
Go Noi Island is an area of about 2,500 hectares completely surrounded by rivers, 25 km south of the City
of Danang, approximately in the middle of Quang Nam Province. Prior to 1965, it was one of the richest areas
in the central part of Vietnam. Primary sources of income were from raw silk production and rice agriculture
(Waite, 1970a). Between 1965 and 1968, Go Noi was an area hostile to the GVN and American forces in
Vietnam. Marines in Quang Nam Province nicknamed it “Dodge City”, an indication of its growing reputation
as a place of firefights and casualties (Gregg & Waite, 1970).4 The island lies in Dien Ban District, which was
labeled as the most contested area of I Corps (Hunt, 1995). The first major operation against the VC
infrastructure entitled Operation Meade River, took place in November 1968, as part of an Accelerated
Pacification Program. This operation manned with Marines, soldiers from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN), and national police, cordoned the area, interrogated the residents, and detained those who were
deemed possible guerillas. The rest were allowed to go home. The operation did not succeed in actually
securing the area, however, and by June of 1969, several major US Marine operations were directed at Go Noi
with the aim of depriving the VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) of its use. These multiple operations
mounted against the fortified villages of the island had little effect upon the deteriorating security situation
(Hunt, 1995).
Go Noi is actually quite close to Highway 1 and just a few kilometers from the provincial capital of that
time, Hoi An. It was connected to the surrounding land areas by two railroad bridges through the approximate
center of the island and a bridge, called “Liberty Bridge” by the Marines, at the west end of the island
connecting to a village called An Hoa and the Marine firebase located nearby. Highway 1 passed about 1 km
from the eastern-most tip of the island, and the easiest access from there was by canoe or sanpan. Even though
access sounds easy, it was not, and the island was remote and deeply rural, as it still is today. One Marine who
was involved in an operation called “Pipestone Canyon” on the island said they were told it was a rest and
relaxation (R & R) center for the NVA and VC (http://usmcwife.hypermart.net/gonoiisland.htm). That
operation did find regular units of the NVA on the island and encountered stiff resistance from those units as
well as the VC. The tactical situation of Quang Nam Province in 1969 required that such a large-scale staging
area for revolutionary forces be dealt with, or as the strategists would say, “the enemy should be deprived of the
use of that real-estate”. Go Noi was less than 5 km from the District Headquarters of Dien Ban, about the same
distance from the provincial capital in Hoi An and the 5th Marines Headquarters at An Hoa, 12 km from 7th
Marines at Fire Base Ross near Que Son, and within 122 km rocket range of the large US airfield at Danang.
This proximity allowed the VC and NVA almost unlimited access to those targets. The island had a pre 1965
population of about 17,500 people in 12 or more autonomous villages spread out over the island’s 11 km east to
west and averaging 3 km in width north to south. These villages were then further dispersed into hamlets
ranging in size from a few houses to a few dozen houses (http://www.marzone.com/maps/Map_6640.htm).5
4
I am the sole author of the Go Noi After-Action Report. It is, however, signed by my commanding officer Werner Gregg so
references to it will include his name.
5
These are my recollections coupled with 1965 maps available on the Internet.
Many of the people the author talked to who had originally come from the island said that people there were
quite prosperous and well established with many brick and masonry homes. Even though the author was never
physically on the island before it was cleared, the brick and mortar fragments left from the bombing would
seem to bear this out (Simonson, 2008).
In June 1969, The GVN and allied forces of Quang Nam Province decided to clear the population from Go
Noi and render the island useless to the opposition forces. Leaflet drops were conducted informing the people
that the area would be bombed and that they should leave. By July 1969, Go Noi was cleared of its original
inhabitants (Personal Communication, 2002). Artillery shelling and bombings, including many B-52 “arc-light”
missions, reduced the island to pulverized dust resembling a moonscape devoid of flora and fauna.
Resettlement
In April 1970, I Corps command and the GVN created a return to village project on Go Noi Island as a
joint project. First Marine Division was tasked with road building, engineer support, and civil affairs assistance
for the project. This author went to live on the island June 17, 1970, as the civil affairs officer. First Marine
Division had assigned a Marine engineer officer to the project, and the province chief had assigned a South
Vietnamese captain as the officer in charge of the project. There was also a civilian from the Agency for
International Development and its subsidiary Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS)
(Fritz, 1997). Initial plans called for the resettlement of 17,000 refugees on the island. This was approximately
the number of people dislocated from that area and spread out in various refugee camps in Quang Nam
Province.
Several facts became clear early on in this project that set the tone for later developments. Even though the
GVN numbers were large on paper, the refugees that were allowed back on the island were small in number.
The first hamlet, named Phu Loc, at the eastern-most point of the island was the only real focus of the project
and could accommodate no more than 2,200 people at best. It may have achieved a population that large at
some time during the project; however, most of the counts reflect a population of between 800 and 1,000
(Gregg & Waite, 1970). Even though the GVN initiated the project, most of the materials and resources utilized
were from 1st Marine Division and CORDS. The people who were moved back to the island had absolutely no
resources, no money, no food, no implements, no seed, and little hope. Individuals were randomly picked from
the refugee camps without regard to family affiliation or hamlet of origin, loaded in trucks and dumped in the
area of Phu Loc. There was a village chief, appointed by the District Chief at Dien Ban however, in dealings
with him, even though friendly and eager, he seemed to have no influence over anything connected with the
village. Another villager said that he was a well to do farmer from another village near Dien Ban who had no
connection to Phu Loc other than a political appointment from the district chief. Most of the people in Phu Loc
early on seemed to have little connection to the island. The project personnel tried to get people to help mark
pre-war gravesites so that roads could be plotted around them, but no-one knew of any. Several were
discovered as the area was mapped for roads and access to the village and the assumption at that time was that
the people of Phu Loc came from a different part of the island.
The need for security surpassed all other requirements in the construction of hamlets. Rather than the
traditional hamlet structure spread out in the fields, Phu Loc and later, a second village named Phu Phong, were
ordered on straight-line rows of houses that permitted open shooting lanes (fields of fire) between houses,
specific straight line boundaries that allowed easy visual access to the comings and goings of people in the
hamlet, and in the large expanses surrounding the hamlet cleared of any vegetation. The settlements took on the
appearance of the “Strategic Hamlets” of the Diem/Nhu era of the late 50’s (Hunt, 1995). These become
fortified hamlets of a different nature than the earlier island villages. The fortified villages before the island was
cleared included bunkers to protect the inhabitants against air and artillery attack. Many houses had bunkers for
the household and another bunker for the animals. Later, many of these houses were connected to tunnels that
were used by the revolutionary front. Carl Fritz (1997) noted in his online article about Go Noi that these
tunnels were actually lined with American cement. After the return, the villagers had bunkers as part of their
houses, but the village was considered fortified in that it had concertina wire around it, trip flares and claymores
in an outer perimeter, cleared fields of fire in every direction, and a heavily armed security contingent highly
visible at all times.
This was the era known as pacification for which the principle metaphor was “winning the hearts and
minds” (Hunt, 1995; Fritz, 1997). However, the real deal obviously could be seen in the number of people
carrying weapons. Phu Loc had security provided by a US Army Military Advisory Team (MAT) of six men
and an accompanying Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF) company of over 100, a Marine Combined
Action Platoon (CAP) of seven with a People’s Self Defense Force (PSDF) of 40 or so armed teenagers, a
detached Korean Marine company of 200, and various military types like the author, the Marine engineer, and
the South Vietnamese project officer. Many times in the five months living on the island, there were more
people carrying guns than hoes. In his foreign service reminiscences, Fritz (1997) stated that “one night the VC
came… old men, women, and children, armed with shotguns and grenades, met them at the perimeter of the
hamlet and drove them off” (p. 1). Anyone who ever lived in these villages knows that old men, women, and
children were not armed with anything other than an occasional pitchfork that had not been taken from them.
On the night in question, the regular military forces did most of the fighting, the Vietnamese captain got
wounded, med-evaced, and never came back to the island, The PSDF with their Thompson sub-machine guns
and other World War II arms disappeared in the night.
Clearing the island for habitation and farming was actually a bigger job than we first expected. The entire
ground surface was pockmarked with thousands of bomb craters. There was unexploded ordinance everywhere,
which had to be found and cleared before bulldozers could be brought over and used. Even though ground was
eventually cleared and leveled for growing, very few people had the resources to plant anything, and to this day,
it is unknown if the government ever redistributed any land to the people who moved to the island. It may have
stayed in the hands of the District Chief of Dien Ban or some of his friends. First Marine Division donated
irrigation pumps to the village, but no one tried planting any rice in the first year during which time the pumps
disappeared.
The second village of Phu Phong was started on the 10th of July 2 km west of the first village, but no land
was cleared other than for the village proper. No more than a hundred people ever tried to live there. Security
was not as good as the first village and the CORDS project officer was killed by a landmine in August, a death
which effectively terminated most of the building efforts.6 An announced visit by South Vietnamese President
Thieu to Phu Loc focused most of the attention on that village at the expense of Phu Phong. During the month
prior to that visit roads were surfaced, a school was built, flag poles erected, wells dug, and some fields were
6
My own brother-in-law, an Army pilot, told me that his squadron had destroyed the second village six months after I left
Vietnam because he had taken fire from it when flying over.
planted in vegetable crops although August was not necessarily a good month for planting anything. Funds
were located to purchase books for the school and it was in use during Thieu’s visit, but shortly thereafter, it
became a storage building for the district chief’s rice. There were 1,838 people living on the island during
Thieu’s visit but never that many people after that time (Gregg & Waite, 1970).7
In late 1970, the Hamlet of Phu Loc became a model for everyone who wanted to dabble in the
construction of resettlement hamlets. During the project and after the initial phase, which ended in October, the
project had daily helicopter visits from dignitaries and high-ranking military officers from all the services
represented. The only missing notable was the district chief of Dien Ban, and the project team assumed he
wanted to avoid us so that he did not have to sign the requisition for the five gallons of petrol he allowed the
project each day. The positive side of this was that materials were readily obtainable just for the asking during
the early stages of the project. The down side was that we spent far more time escorting dignitaries around our
“human zoo” as we called it, than we did actually doing real work.
No one at the site or in the government really put much thought into how people were going to live or
where food would come from. The Marines donated ship dunnage from the harbor in Danang and a Marine
engineer sawmill. The sawmill was used to cut lumber for the housing and sold it for $2,500 Vn. or about
$21.50 American for enough lumber to build a one room house. Since none of the villagers had any money, the
project officers set up village work crews with Marine and Province supplied funds where people could work
enough to get food and get the money to buy a house kit. People worked in the sawmill, and the only non-Viet
was a Marine who operated the saw itself. People worked in the village, helping construct houses and digging
wells. Much of the heavy work such as the construction of a “non-standard bridge”, roadways, and field
clearing were done by the Marines (Gregg & Waite, 1970).8 As a civil affairs officer, the author set up an
unexploded ordinance disposal program with money given by the Marines. It employed children of all ages to
find unexploded bombs and ordinance of all types which were then blown up in place. The kids were paid piece
rate with higher prices paid for larger bulldozer damaging bombs. This in turn generated another source of
income for many of the families in the hamlet and often some food, too. On days when we had some C-4 left, it
was used to stun fish in the many small ponds created by craters thus giving the kids some bonus protein to take
home (Waite, 1971b).
Aftermath
Go Noi Island was in many ways a model for resettlement. It was one of the first to move a large number
of people from refugee camps back to the land. It created home ownership once again for people who had been
deprived of their homes, and it created some land usage if not land ownership. The people who wound up living
in Phu Loc still have family there and at this point have land tenure. Phu Phong was not successful, in part
because of distance from the roads and because it did not get the flow of resources the first hamlet did. It does
exist now, under a different name, although the author does not know the specific history of its rebirth. American
forces departed Quang Nam in 1972 and with that, Go Noi was once again out of sight and out of mind.
Both hamlets lie in a flood plain, which has worsened in recent years because of environmental
degradation from the indiscriminate use of defoliants during the war years. One of the noticeable changes at
7
The purpose of this paper is not to criticize or point out shortcomings of the various groups involved but it is impossible to tell
the story without running into the inept comedy on the part of all of us who were involved in these projects.
8
I have no idea why I called it a “non Standard bridge”.
this time is that Phu Loc (renamed Ap Troung) has assumed a shape more like that of the older pre 1965 hamlet.
The Marine sawmill is still there but rusted solid from repeated soakings in the river. Many of the hamlet’s
dwellings are built up at higher than ground level and some of the lower concrete structures show water lines
from previous floods. Several houses have boats tied to them. Vietnam has a large number of very broad short
rivers that drain from the mountains the 20 or 30 km to the South China Sea. The Dien Binh River on the North
side of Go Noi was one km wide and relatively deep in 1970. Now it is 2-3 km wide and shallow, with, average
depth of 1 meter, and can rise 3-4 meters overnight. This floods all the low-lying areas like major parts of Go
Noi often with loss of crops and sometimes loss of life. The Marine Bridge that was constructed in 1970 was
washed out in 1997, and a new bridge opened late in 2002. During the intervening years, access to the island
was by ferry or walking the two railroad bridges. A cursory inspection of the island and subsistence shows very
little rice agriculture and a large reliance on melons, peppers, vegetables, and tea. This would indicate a move
away from subsistence agriculture and an increased immersion in the market economy through the production
of cash crops. Even though the island has yet to be electrified, there is an abundance of material goods, such as
radios, walkmans, mopeds, and bicycles. People made the comment that they were glad to be a little removed
from the government, but they did not look very removed from material culture.
Conclusions
The Go Noi Island resettlement project could indeed be called a success, not because it managed to put
people’s lives back together but because in fact it did not. Traditional economies in peasant societies, especially
in Southeast Asia, are reciprocal economies with safety mechanisms built in to ensure survival of the group.
The cash economy and market based insecurities are in direct opposition to peasant values of risk management
and risk sharing, which are the basis for the traditional village structure (Scott, 1976). Revolution occurs when
the traditional values are breached in such a way as to continually threaten subsistence. The colonial government
of Vietnam did just that. The depth and breadth of that revolution is little understood by the Americans
involved in it. They failed to understand that the revolution grew out of the peasantry itself rather than the
commonly held paradigm where revolution is fomented by the upper classes or communist agitators and flows
downhill to the working class. This concept alone may have been one of the important factors in the outcome of
the war. We went to Vietnam secure in our belief that Ho Chi Minh was the sole cause of the revolution and
that once the North was defeated all of the South would be compliant subjects of an Americanized capitalism.
The idea that revolution could come from the peasant class and that the nationalism of the ruling class was in
fact just the glue that held things together was beyond our scope and consequently a large part of our failure.
Americans evaluated the situation and sized things up with the rhetoric of democracy, free market, trade, and
most importantly security, never realizing that the most essential question was never asked: What did the
people need and how were those needs met previously? People like Colonel Corson in Mary McCarthy’s
“Vietnam” looked at the peasant as someone who needs enough money to survive. To him (Corson), “the profit
motive is the sole incentive capable of spurring anyone to productive effort” (McCarthy, 1967, p. 78). The
context surrounding this statement may over-trivialize the importance of it. The idea of profit motive and
incentive is the paradigm on which American capitalism is built and the creed of many ambitious Americans, of
which a Marine Colonel would certainly be one. However, it is antithetical to a peasant’s worldview.
Peasant economies and their accompanying mechanisms are deeply rooted to the land. The first order of
business in market economy assimilation is separating village inhabitants from their native environs. No one
closely involved in the war effort really understood what we were doing, but it could not have been done better
with pre-planning. The search and destroy operations and the refugee movements of the war effectively denied
the VC and NVA the use of real estate and just as effectively denied most of Vietnam’s rural peasantry the
same access. Polanyi (1944) wrote that separating man from the land is the first requirement of the market
economy, and that in “modern colonization…the social and cultural system of the native must first be shattered”
(p. 178). Americans repeated the 19th century process that had proven successful with Native American
populations. Removal and resettlement to secured areas hence, refugee camps, and resettlement hamlets in
place of the earlier reservation process, was deemed the answer to an uncontrollable security situation.
However, enhanced security and manageable hamlets were not the only outcome.
Once peasants were removed from the land, many of the mechanisms that supported their reciprocal social
organization were weakened but still present. The patrons and landlords were gone, no one in the camps had
more wealth than anyone else, and land ownership in name only is a liability if it cannot be farmed. Kin
structure still existed, but with resources being scarce in the camps, reciprocity was minimal. The final blow to
peasant culture came in the form of an indiscriminate scattering of people back to the land. Kin were separated
and neighborhoods no longer existed. The nuclear family was often dismantled because the men were detained
as potential guerillas or drafted into the GVN armed forces. People in resettlement hamlets were a mix of
people from all over and more strangers than an American sub-division. This put everyone at the mercy of the
market economy. Without the protective mechanisms of the original village and the reciprocity structures therein,
survival was dependant on the individual’s ability to find a way to support him/herself and whatever dependants
were with them. Crafts, cottage industry, vegetable farming, and wage labor where available, became the stock
and trade of people who had once supported their families entirely in the mono-culture of rice.
The structural layout of the village was also urban and foreign. Even in resettlement, people were still
separated from the land they had once lived on. The traditional layout in the area of Phu Loc was an elongated
cluster of houses following a footpath north to south in close proximity to individual landholdings. The
resettlement hamlet was laid out with only security in mind, and the cleared zone around the hamlet put
vegetable gardens and other land based enterprise about 0.5 km from the people who might have worked the
land. Because of this distance, people were reluctant to start gardens and rice.
Removal and resettlement then serve to limit revolt and to force peasant assimilation into the larger
economy. Scott (1976) called this “passive adaptation” (p. 205). Strategic hamlets and resettlement projects
only intended to address the revolt part of the equation. The idea of separating peasants from the land, limiting
their connection to it, and forcing the resulting assimilation process, came as an unintended consequence of
movement to a secure military outcome.
References
Brocheux, P. (1995). The Mekong Delta: Ecology, economy and revolution, 1860-1960. Journal of Political Ecology, 4(1), 12.
Chaliand, G. (1969). The peasants of North Vietnam. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd.
Fritz, C. R. (1997). An American civilian in the Vietnam War. Retrieved from
http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/1997/10/an-american-civilian-in-the-vietnam-war/
Gregg, W. E., & Waite, G. E. (1970). After action report, Go Noi Island Resettlement Project. Document Number AVII-CA-3,
Department of the Army, 29th Civil Affairs Company.
Hays, G. (2002). Civic action a true story: Marines fighting a different war in Vietnam. Lexington, Kentucky: Ronald E. Hays.
Hickey, G. C. (1964). Village in Vietnam. Forge Village, Massachusetts: Yale University Press.
Hickey, G. C. (1993). Shattered worlds: Adaptation and survival among Vietnam’s highland people during the Vietnam War.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Hunt, R. A. (1995). Pacification: The American struggle for Vietnam’s hearts and minds. Oxford, UK: Westview Press.
Jamieson, N. L. (1995). Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press.
McCarthy, M. (1967). Vietnam. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.
Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation. New York, Toronto: Farrer & Rinehart Inc.
Schell, J. (1968). The village of Ben Suc. New York: Vintage Books.
Scott, J. C. (1976). The moral economy of the peasant. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
Simonson, R. (2008). Every Marine: 1968 Vietnam, a battle for Go Noi Island. Westminster, Maryland: Heritage Books.
Trullinger, J. W. (1980). Village at war: An account of revolution in Vietnam. New York, London: Longman.
Waite, G. E. (1970a). Go Noi Island information report. Department of the Army, 29th Civil Affairs Company.
Waite, G. E. (1970b). Go Noi Island report. Department of the Army, 29th Civil Affairs Company.
Waite, G. E. (1971a). Critique of Opord 1. Department of the Army, 29th Civil Affairs Company.
Waite, G. E. (1971b). Ordinance collection program for land-clearing projects. Department of the Army, 29th Civil Affairs
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.09.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
The E-Government in Local Governance and Its Contribution to

the Regional Development: A Comparative Study
Vasiliki Delitheou
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece
Maria Maraki
Harokopeion University of Athens, Athens, Greece
Charalampos Trasanidis
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, England

The purpose of this article is to designate the impact of the implementation of e-governance in municipalities and to
suggest some proposals for further growth. More specific, in the first chapter, there is a theoretical approach of
e-governance by presenting its definition and describing the current situation of the progression of e-governance to
these municipalities. In the second chapter, it is presented a comparison between these municipalities about the
implementation and progress of e-governance among them. Finally, in the third and last chapter, there are the
conclusions and some proposals for future growth of e-governance to these municipalities.
Keywords: e-government, municipalities, local government, public administration
Introduction
The Internet was created at the last decades of 20th century but has been growing rapidly during since the
first decade of 21 century. The information and communication technologies (ICTs) are based on Internet and
they have created a global revolution and a radical change in numerous sectors of humans’ life. Their
implementation in public management started in decade of 90’s (Konstantinidou, 2016, p. 8).
At the beginning of 21st century, the governments of both developed and developing countries, recognizing
the success, development, and impetus offered by the Internet to the private sector, found that its use and
implementation in the public administration would add a remarkable and unprecedented added value to its
organizational processes, while at the same time redeploying the an existing operating system, which has found
dysfunctions, reliability, bureaucratic obstructions, and waste of resources (Kallinderi, 2006, p. 6). Through
e-government, public administration gradually moves to the digital age and it is in line with the new technological
trends that have prevailed in most areas of human activity, such as trade, trade, service provision, interoperability,
communication, etc.
However, this transition of public administration to the digital age and its attempt to keep up with the
technological requirements of modern times poses some very important risks, such as providing citizens with
Vasiliki Delitheou, Ph.D., Permanent Assistant Professor, Department of Economic and Regional Development, Panteion
University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece.
Maria Maraki, MSc., Harokopeion University of Athens, Athens, Greece.
Charalampos Trasanidis, Master in Management, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Sheffield, England.
THE E-GOVERNMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION 395
universal access to digital-electronic services provided by governments and public administrations of the
countries concerned, as well as the maintenance of the “digital” security of civilian citizens and the protection of
their personal data-narrative attacks (Konstantinidou, 2016, p. 9).
Total access presupposes the creation of conditions for equal citizen participation and easy use of electronic
services, while according to Sharma and Gupta (2003), privacy protection presupposes security policies and
standards that meet citizens’ expectations and create trustworthy relationships with the government.
It is therefore crucial to protect personal data for the implementation of e-government in developed and
developing countries
Theoretical Approach
Definitions and Theoretical Models
The term “governance” includes the term “government”. A “government” can be defined as any form of
central authority of an organized state that acts as the guardian of the legal order, in which collective decisions
are taken and, through a framework of rules, are followed by the governed (Heywood, 2014, p. 338).
E-government is the implementation and use of information and communication technologies by public
administration in general, both by general government services and also by the local government services. Its
aim and purpose is to improve the providing services to citizens, individuals, and professionals, as well as to
enhance democratic processes through their participation (Davies, 2015, p. 45). According to the declaration of
26 September 2003, the Commission of the European Communities states that e-government is a combination
of organizational change with the introduction and use of ICTs to further democratize processes, support to the
fullest extent of public policies as well as the optimization of services provided by governments and public
administrations of these countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 4).
With regard to the Greek Public Administration, in 2013, the former Ministry of Administrative Reform
and E-Government, and the current Ministry of Administrative Reconstruction, set out how e-government is the
form of governance that uses ICT to upgrade, modernize, and restructure the services offered by the public
sector, while adding an added value. As a result of these objectives, it is the most effective service of the citizen,
the meeting of his/her needs and his/her participation in the procedures (Ministry of Administrative
Reconstruction, 2013). According to the opinion of several scholars, the enhancement of transparency is
another key reason for the necessary reform of the public sector.
The success of e-government, according to Al-Sobhi et al. (2009), is influenced by three dimensions: (1)
the factors that affect its implementation; (2) the factors affecting its adoption and use by citizens; and (3) the
role of intermediaries in bridging the gap between implementation and adoption. In Greek, the “mediators” are
the Citizen Service Centers (KEPs), which have played an important role in bridging the gap between the
adoption of e-government and its use by citizens; according to Heeks (2008), most of the existing e-government
systems alone cannot solve the co-ordination between stakeholders.
In the Citizens Service Centers in Europe (e.g., Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Spain), there are
governmental organizations that run one-stop-shops for the public and train citizens on services provided by the
public administration (Department of Economic and Social Affairs [DESA] UN, 2012). In the Netherlands,
“one stop services” started their operations in the early 1990s (DESA UN 2012) and to date they offer
integrated services using ICTs.
396 THE E-GOVERNMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
The Present Situation of E-Government

Over the past decade, e-government and ICTs have evolved and are constantly evolving to a great extent
by governments and public administrations, especially in developing and developed nations. Of course, there
are differences, as mentioned above, in their implementation as each country follows the model that is similar
to and touches the strategic priorities it has defined (Konstantinidou, 2016, p. 36).
According to Tsoukalas (2004), information and communication technologies are applied either vertically
or horizontally to broad public sector entities. More specifically, ICTs applied on a horizontal basis are related
to interoperability, interconnection, and communication with these operators, while those applied on a vertical
basis are related to the competencies, requirements, and needs of the each player distinctly (Tsoukalas, 2004, pp.
36-37).
Apart from this separation, ICTs are distinguished in back office and front office services and systems.
Front office systems and services are addressed and serve the needs of the people, citizens, and businesses,
whereby a framework of interaction among these poles is created, while back office defines the services and
systems that process the results of and the data they derive from the operators with the public entities, as well as
those systems are also responsible for organizing the interoperability between these (Tsoukalas, 2004, p. 47;
Apostolakis, Lucis, & Halaris, 2008, pp. 27-28).
ICTs in public administration can be distinguished and depending on the audience they serve and address.
More specifically, there is a distinction in systems and models, which are related to government to consumer
(G2C), government to business (G2B), and among the broader government to government (G2G) (Apostolakis
et al., 2008, pp. 105-106).
Another very important distinction between ICTs systems in public administration is also the distinction
based on the type of digital services they offer, where they are divided into semi-automated, automated, and
personalized, where the citizens-users do not have the right to intervene, this right has only the members of the
public administration who are in charge of the respective competences (Tsoukalas, 2004, p. 44). According to
Konstantinidou (2016, p. 38), there are also: (i) electronic information services; (ii) limited online
services/services; (iii) vertical integration with web links of different systems; and (iv) horizontal integration
with web links of different functional units .
Finally, according to Assar, Boughzala, and Boydens (2011), there are five stages of the interaction
between ICTs systems with citizens and businesses, where the first stage is the provision of the necessary
information to citizens, the second stage is the one-way interaction, the third is the two-way interaction, the
fourth is the digital-electronic transaction with them, and the fifth and the last is the targeted actions.
Today most e-government systems are unable to resolve co-ordination between stakeholders: government,
citizens, and business (Heeks, 2008).
The Implementation of E-Government in the 1st and 2nd Grade of Local Government
Local government services are the broader public sector services with the most direct contact with citizens
and businesses. Based on this assumption, the improvement of the services provided by local authorities to
citizens and businesses can become a reality through the achievement of certain specific objectives. In
particular, some of these objectives are to create the necessary infrastructure for these actors to implement
e-government through the use of e-infrastructure, e-consultation and empowerment of citizens, and businesses
(e-democracy), improving the efficiency of e-commerce, providing information to the public through e-policy,
the interaction of these bodies with citizens and businesses-service and the Belg allowance management of
human and financial resources and the management of these bodies (Delitheou, 2011, p. 21). The KEDKE, with
a view to strengthening the position of the local authorities in the information society, has established a
structure for strategic cooperation with the first grade of local government (Koumiotis, 2011, p. 39).
However, according to Lambrou (2017), there are three main objectives of local government services
about e-government and these are:
1. Simplifying and modeling processes using ICTs, thereby achieving resource savings and reducing red
tape in these organizations. An example of the multidimensional implementation of ICTs, leading to the
simplification of public procedures, is the latest technology (scanners) that already have some public services.
These “smart” devices even work with a wireless network while photographing original documents while at the
same time able to store, send, or post these documents where required.
2. The development of e-government through the creation and implementation of ICT-based programs and
actions;
3. The implementation of the so-called “multi-level governance”, which will provide local authorities with
enhanced capabilities and competencies in the implementation of e-government, using, of course, ICTs
(Lambrou, 2017, pp. 50-51).
The first organized effort to use ICTs related to local government took place in 1997 with the creation of
the “ota.gr” website by the Athenian-Macedonian News Agency, which is still present. This site, through the
use of ICTs capabilities, offers opportunities to inform the general public on issues related to local government,
with the main objective of promoting and supporting the actions developed by these bodies, as well as the
creation a framework of reflection on these issues.
In 2000, the “Ariadne” program was launched pilot in its implementation and its main focus was on
enhancing the efficiency and the services provided by the 2nd and 2nd degree local authorities. The main action
of this program was to create around 1,000 one stop shops for these operators, offering multiple benefits to their
managers and to the entire Greek public administration.
In particular, these services have created immediacy in trade between citizens and local society
enterprises and their respective local government and, at the same time, functioned as an intermediate hub
between local government bodies and general government (National Interoperability Frameworks Observatory,
2014, p. 10; Apostolakis et al., 2008, p. 371). According to the NIFO (2016), only the first five JEPs in the
above mentioned form and capacity were launched in 2002, implementing the above actions with the use of
ICT.
Also, until 2002, with the creation of the “ASTERIA” program, an important effort was made to introduce
the ED through the use of ICTs to the local government of the island of Greece. This program has enabled these
municipalities, through the “Citizens’ Bureau”, to carry out all administrative procedures and services related to
citizens and businesses in the local community (General Secretariat for the Aegean and Island Policy). More
specifically, the executives of these offices were responsible for electronically requesting any request from
citizens and companies of the local community to the appropriate prefecture or other administrative department
that did not have their seat in their island of residence and to take them again the responses of these services on
the part of the citizens, thereby helping to avoid the movement of those in charge of these decentralized
services, and to reduce the costs and time by the public administration, but also by the administration
(Christopoulos, 2015, p. 75)
According to Delitheou (2011), undeniable is the fact that in the last few years, the first grade local
government services have made very important steps to progress towards digital transformation. As a result of
these efforts, most of these operators now have one, albeit rudimentary, Internet connection, with some of them
having high connectivity speeds and some others not.
Also, till today, several infrastructures have been created and deployed to support IT through the use of
ICTs to these organizations, regardless of the fact that some of these infrastructures are more or less
sophisticated (Delitheou, 2011). Characteristically, according to surveys carried out in 2011 at 170 local
authorities in the country, 54% of them have low Internet connectivity speeds, while in the case of those with a
population of less than 5,000, this figure is 82%. In addition, only 55% of these 170 operators provide
electronic public services, while 87% of them provide only information to the public and only 38% of them
offer the possibility for visitors to their websites to retrieve files and applications (Delitheou, 2011, p. 51).
Similar results are reported by Flak, Olsen, and Wolcott, (2005) who surveyed 30 municipalities in
southern and south-eastern Norway in 2005 and showed low implementation of the most advanced
e-government functions, although Norway is stable among top countries active in the ICT and Internet world.
Municipal websites provide more information and less interaction with the public.
In municipalities and communities, the biggest problem is the interoperability and communication between
them and the central government bodies, but also among them, as most municipalities do not have the necessary
digital-electronic infrastructures for handling and exchanging documents with these operators through the use
of ICT. Only a few of these municipalities have successfully developed some internal information systems that
can interconnect electronically various internal structures and services of these agencies (Tampakis, 2008, p. 52)
European Union Initiatives for the Development of E-Government in Local Authorities
The message sent by the European Commission to everyone is:
Connectivity for the benefit of all means that it will not matter where you live or how much money you earn. That is
why we propose today to equip every European village and every European city with free wireless Internet access in the
main centers of public life by 2020. (Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission)
Among the 10 priorities of the European Commission for the years 2015-2019 is the “digital single market”
where the primary objective is to help large and small businesses, researchers, citizens, and public authorities
make the most of new technologies, securing the necessary digital skills for all and funding research into
high-performance health and information technology in the EU
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_el).
At the local level, this period is promoted the “Free Wi-Fi for Europeans” program. Through WiFi4EU,
the European Commission wants to ensure free Wi-Fi connectivity for citizens and visitors in public places,
such as parks, squares, public buildings, libraries, health centers, and museums all over Europe. The goal of the
WiFi4EU program is to support the installation of modern Wi-Fi equipment in social life centers with a budget
of EUR 120 million for the period 2018-2020. Via the WiFi4EU gateway, municipalities across Europe are
invited to subscribe to and participate in the various calls (on average every six months) to allow them to
receive a free Wi-Fi hotspot voucher in their public spaces, public libraries, museums, public parks, squares, etc.
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/wifi4eu-2018-nov-05_en).
The European Commission has selected 2,800 municipalities―including 117 Greek―for a WiFi4EU
coupon of EUR 15,000 in the first WiFi4EU application form, which took place on 7-9 November 2018. It will
be noted that there will be three additional invitations, for which municipalities that have not received a
voucher can apply (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/preliminary-results-second-wifi4eu-call).
A Comparative Study Among the Local Government Departments on the

Implementation of E-Government
In recent years, more and more municipalities in the country have made significant progress in the
development of e-government through the use of information and communication technologies.
Municipality of Trikkaion
A more typical example of this is the Municipality of Trikkaion, which is the first smart city in Greece and
has been distinguished for three consecutive years (2009-2011) in the list of the 21 smarter cities in the world.
One of the first actions of the municipality in its effort towards digital transformation was the provision of
free Internet via Wi-Fi in most of the city. The so-called “e-dialogos” program, through which participatory
governance is promoted, has been created, providing citizens with the opportunity to shape the issues to be
discussed in the city council, including digital polls and polls, etc. (Spinellis, Vassilakis, Tsouma, & Pouloudis,
2018, p. 57).
Also, in municipality’s website, there is the “Demosthenes” platform, which is a special platform in which
the citizens have the opportunity to submit their complaints to the municipality (e-Trikala). The
“Tele-Providence” platform, which includes the provision of care and welfare to vulnerable groups through
telecare, is based on telemedicine and telecare systems (e-Trikala).
Another of the platforms that have been set up to serve the visitors of the municipality is “Trikala tourism”,
which provides all the necessary information that may interest tourists-visitors of the city, such as an electronic
list of city sights, digital maps, weather forecasts, etc. (e-Trikala). In addition, with regard to the movements
and in particular the means of mass transportation, the municipality has installed an advanced telemetry system
capable of providing reliable and accurate information to the public on the location of the buses and their
waiting time at the stops (e-Trikala).
In the near future, the municipality will also implement other innovative programs and platforms, such as
interactive parking system, issuing of certificates from the municipality by automatic machines, scattered in the
city, modernized lighting system, etc.
All these platforms and e-services were made with the contribution of the municipality’s development
company, e-TrikalaAE, through which the municipality managed to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and
develop innovative actions (Spinellis et al., 2018, p. 58).
Municipality of Platanias in Crete
In addition to the Municipality of Trikala (https://trikalacity.gr/), there are other municipalities that have
developed innovations in e-government through the implementation of ICTs. More specifically, the
Municipality of Platania (https://www.platanias.gr/) in Crete has created a special profile in the “Messenger”
application, which belongs to “Facebook”, which operates with artificial intelligence in the form of “bot”. This
“bot”, through artificial intelligence, is tasked and configured to respond to all Messenger users who send any
message to that service (Trasanidis, 2018, p. 49).
Municipality of Athens
As the largest city in the country, the City of Athens, which according to the latest census is the largest
population of the country, which amounts to 664,046 inhabitants (ELSTAT, 2018), has in recent years made
considerable efforts in the digital transformation of the provided services to its citizens, while developing a
number of pioneering programs and solutions (Spiliotakou, 2017). In this context, the Municipality of Athens is
developing a series of innovative actions in the areas of sustainable urban mobility, open data, and energy
saving while participating in a large number of European Union programs concerning municipalities
(Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 54).
Like the Municipality of Trikala, the City of Athens also provides free Wi-Fi hotspots to the public in
some of the city’s most central locations. Also, the City of Athens has created some digital applications for
mobile phones and tablets that provide important information on the best routes people and visitors can plan,
telematics systems on public transport and controlled parking spaces. In addition, an advanced geographic
information system (GIS) has been created that provides a wealth of information to the public about the
geospatial data within the city planning plan. Finally, an e-portal has been set up and operates within the City of
Athens website (https://www.cityofathens.gr), which provides information and data on various areas of the
municipality’s responsibilities as well as various electronic services to citizens (Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 54).
Municipality of Thessaloniki
Municipality of Thessaloniki (https://thessaloniki.gr) is the second largest in population of the country
with a population of 325.182 inhabitants (ELSTAT, 2018). Both in this municipality and in the City of Athens,
the great geographical and urban area as well as the large number of citizens and visitors create the need for a
better and faster service to the public in line parallel with the requirements of modern public administration,
which have as their central axis the course of public services towards digital transformation (Trasanidis, 2018, p.
53).
The website of the Municipality of Thessaloniki, according to Mitsiopoulos and Trasanidis (2017), offers
the possibility of two-way interaction between the visitors and the electronic services of the municipality.
A very important and innovative online platform on this site is the online platform “Improve My City”.
Through this online platform, registered users have the ability to submit complaints and complaints, as well as
to inform the competent services of the municipality about any kind of harm related to it and located within its
civil network.
The Municipality of Thessaloniki has achieved a significant progress towards digital transformation,
especially as the site “Municipality of Thessaloniki, E-Government Gateway”, registered users have access to
the open data, as well as many services and processes that are fully digitized, such as for example, is the
“improve my city” online application, the ability to appeal to the municipal police of the particular municipality,
the possibility of public complaint s the supporter of city, etc. However, the development and progress of
e-government in this particular municipality towards digital transformation remains the fact that most of the
provided electronic services of the municipality remain at the 1st and 2nd level of digital transformation, as it is
not required by these services authentication and identification of user information so that they move on to the
next step of these processes, but these processes do not work are entirely electronic (Mitsiopoulos & Trasanidis,
2017, pp. 26-27).
Municipality of Heraklion
The Municipality of Heraklion is a municipality that has been distinguished as one of the 21 smarter
cities-cities worldwide based on the Intelligent Community Forum headquartered in New York. Like the other
smart cities in Greece, the Municipality of Heraklion has free access points to the Internet within its
geographical boundaries as well as a municipal fiber optic network (Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 60). Additionally,
through the electronic platform “www.heraklion.gr”, there is a plethora of electronic services to the citizens as
well as a large number of geospatial data (Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 61). Finally, this municipality uses telematics
systems in its urban transport services to provide more accurate and reliable information to the traveling public
and undertake various actions to enhance sustainable and green development (Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 62).
Municipality of Kifisia
Another Municipality of Athens that provides a more comfort life to its citizens is the Municipality of
Kifissia. The “smart” applications it has adopted are:
 www.kifissia.gr (Portal of the Municipality) which offers municipal information, two-way communication,
and access to electronic services.
 www.kifissia.gr/kif/gdimoti (Public Office): Electronic submission of requests concerning daily routine
(cleanliness, electric lighting, street condition, etc.), real-time update of citizens on the development of their
request.
 https://www.kifissia.gr/sadk (Electronic Applications) (granting of Certificates, Certification, etc.):
Submission of applications without moving, taxisnet authentication.
 http://www.kifissia.gr/el/blog/kifissia-in-action (Kifissia in Action): Free digital mobile phone application,
Submit everyday requests directly from the mobile phone.
 Management System of the Social Service of the Municipality: Management of information and data of
vulnerable groups
 http://www.kifissia.gr/el/decisions (Decisions of Collective Instruments): Access from our computer or
portable device to decisions of the collective organs of the municipality.
 Electronic Protocol: An information system for the collection, recording and distribution of migrant
documents by whatever means they are produced, registered, or trafficked. It is used by the Protocol
Department and the three municipalities with on-line connection to the central server of the municipality.
 Smart benches: This is an integrated digital convenience station. They have built-in housings that convert
solar energy into electricity while having two USB ports, each capable of charging any electrical device and
one inductive charging port where wire-free charging can be provided if the mobile has inductive charging
technology.
 Use of the trust and use social platform in the Municipality of Kifissia. Through this platform, Kifisia’s
shops, businesses, and freelancers have the opportunity through their professional electronic accounts to
communicate their offers, discounts, and news, but also to participate in competitive procedures, making their
business competitive and present in the new conditions of digital reality. The success of the trust and use
platform in strengthening the local market in Kifisia confirms the golden prize it received in the recent Best
City Awards in the category “Economy-Development” and in the section “Viewing Local Entrepreneurship”
(https://enypografa.gr/?p=215828).
Municipality of Chalkida
Another Municipality of Greece, which has developed innovative and innovative systems based on
information and communication technologies, is the Municipality of Chalkida (https://dimoschalkideon.gr).
More specifically, the municipality has developed and installed an electronic intelligent lighting and controlled
parking system, facilitating and simplifying the services provided to citizens. Additionally, an electronic
platform is available on its website which offers a wealth of information and services, such as the ability to
make electronic payments and the online submission of complaints and complaints related to the particular
Municipality (Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 64). Finally, within the geographical boundaries of the municipality, a fiber
optic network has been created, through which free access to the Internet is offered to all citizens, while in the
municipality buildings alternative energy sources have been installed, thus enhancing the reduction of energy
consumption (Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 65).
Municipality of Larisa
Controlled parking via electronic system as well as the telematics system of city buses is also implemented
by the Municipality of Larissa (http://larissa-dimos.gr/el/). However, this municipality has created a digital
platform through which a great deal of information is provided on culture, economy, tourism, and other areas of
interest to citizens and visitors of the city (Website of the Municipality of Larissa). In addition, Larissa is the
first Greek city to join United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO’s) “The
Learning Town” program, through which its cities have the opportunity to train and develop their skills in new
information technologies (Spiliotakou, 2017, p. 67).
Municipality of Veria
The Municipality of Veria has also created an electronic portal that provides various information about the
Municipality within which an application called “Digital Shopping Center” has been created, through which
citizens have the opportunity to be informed about the prices and products of local businesses. Also, as in other
municipalities in the country and in the particular municipality, there are free Internet access points for the
citizens (Veria’s website, http://www.veria.gr/new).
Municipality of Ioannina
The Municipality of Ioannina, in the process of digital transformation, has created an innovative platform
for the provision of telematic services, which gives real-time the conditions prevailing in the traffic system of
the city and also provides real-time information for the free parking spaces within the city. In addition, the
municipality’s major innovations are the light-emitting diode (LED) lighting system, which is controlled by a
central electronic remote control system as well as an innovative control and monitoring system for waste
trucks through telematics systems (Municipality of Ioannina, https://www.ioannina.gr).
Municipality of Chania
The Municipality of Chania is located in a geographical area, which mainly attracts a large number of
tourists during the summer period, which is also a challenge for the municipality itself to upgrade and
modernize the services provided by it. In this context, the Municipality of Chania, through its website, provides
a plethora of electronic services, such as the electronic submission of complaints and complaints from citizens
to the particular institution. In addition to many of the aforementioned municipalities, advanced telemetry
systems, which provide all the necessary information about the public transport network as well as the
controlled parking areas, have been installed in order to provide more efficient and faster passenger services.
However, the most important innovation of the municipality, in addition to providing free broadband
connection to the public areas within the geographical boundaries of the municipality, is the installation of
“intelligent waste bins” with special sensors providing information through the use of ICTs for their
completeness, which is also a very beneficial solution for saving and managing waste (Municipality of Chania,
https://www.chania.gr).
Municipality of Kalamata
The Municipality of Kalamata has also developed telematics systems for informing drivers and passengers
using transport, providing free wireless Internet access to the greater range of the municipality and modernizing
the lighting system by installing LED lamps, thus saving large amounts of electricity (Municipality of
Kalamata, http://www.kalamata.gr/).
Municipality of Xanthi
The Department of Informatics of the Municipality of Xanthi in December 2014 designed, created, and
managed the so-called “Digital Mapping” within the framework of the Technical Program of the particular
Municipality (Municipality of Xanthi, https://www.cityofxanthi.gr/). This application provides all kind of
information on the progress of the municipality’s projects through digital maps, while creating an interactive
environment that is extremely friendly and user-friendly to the visitor (Delitheou, 2018, p. 149). Apart from this
implementation, there are a number of applications available on the site of this municipality, which offer
opportunities for public consultation and information for visitors and citizens of the city, while enhancing the
transparency and user participation of the site (Delitheou, 2018, p. 150)
Municipality of Kozani
The Municipality of Kozani uses e-government through ICTs in many of its providing services to citizens,
making this two-way interaction more direct, faster, and more effective. In particular, the municipality in
question, in addition to the services provided by the aforementioned intelligent cities, such as the provision of
geospatial data via ICT, the electronic control system for controlled parking, and the possibility of participation
citizens in the online public consultation (Municipality of Kozani, https://cityofkozani.gov.gr/web/guest/home).
The Municipality of Kozani offers some additional innovative electronic services, such as teleworking and
teleeducation, enabling citizens to work and trained electronic from distance. Finally, through the e-citizen
service, the inhabitants of the municipality have the possibility to electronically inform the institution of any
problems that occur within its geographical boundaries (Panagiotopoulou & Stratigea, 2014, pp. 21-22).
Municipality of Patra
The municipality has also developed a telematics system for informing passengers on arrivals and
departures of bus stops and the implementation of an electronic ticket for urban transport based on ICTs
(Municipality of Patra, http://www.e-patras.gr/).
Municipality of Loutraki-Perachora-Agioi Theodoroi
The Loutraki-Perachora-Agios Theodoros Municipality has developed the “Loutrakiplus”, which is an
innovative program for the development of the cyclical economy, entrepreneurship, employment, and social
cohesion. For the successful implementation of this program, members of the municipality cooperate with
specialized scientific and non-staff members in institutional cooperation with the European Union. As part of
this program, the digital platform “Loutraki Business” has been developed, which is an electronic guide for
local stores, thus enhancing their digital visibility (Municipality of Loutraki-Perachora-Agioi Theodoroi,
http://www.loutrakiplus.com/).
Municipality of Argos-Orestiko
The Municipality of Argos-Orestiko has developed an environmental protection program through
telemetry and remote monitoring systems for pumping stations and water reservoirs of the municipality. Also,
in municipal buildings and schools within the geographical and administrative boundaries of the municipality,
biomass is used as the main fuel (Municipality of Argos-Orestiko, http://www.argosorestiko.gr/).
Municipality of Eretria
The Municipality of Eretria implemented an automation and telemetry program for water supply networks,
aiming at the more efficient management and utilization of the municipality’s water reserves (Municipality of
Eretria, http://eretria.gr/)
Municipality of Voula-Vouliagmeni
The Municipality of Vari-Vouliagmeni replaced the old municipal lighting network, which consisted of
conventional lamps and in its place placed type lamps, creating a smart electric lighting network in this way.
This municipality has also set up a dedicated electronic citizens’ complaint platform for any matter concerning
this organization, but identifying the applicants’ data in order to ensure their authentication. Finally, through the
electronic services of the municipality, the visitor has the opportunity to be informed about the most important
points of interest within the geographical and administrative boundaries of the municipality through a dynamic
map which is connected and supported by Google maps (Municipality of Voula-Vouliagmeni).
Conclusions and Suggestions

It seems that the full development of ICTs and the establishment of e-government are not easy to achieve
in all Local Authorities and, respectively, the achievement of a better quality of life for citizens.
Initially to provide services that focus on the citizen and the business, while at the same time serving the
public administration by reducing its costs and reducing bureaucracy; reforms require strategic targeting,
political support, and a series of structural changes with major the organization and management of information,
interoperability to establish a commonly accepted framework for information security, institutionalize the user
identification, establish information management structures, assuming adjustment of established ways of
working, and to promote activities that will ensure the acceptance of the social partners, widespread access to
online services and the gradual reduction of the digital division.
Moreover, in order to enable local authorities to reach a satisfactory level of local government and service
of citizens, the importance of creating innovations is a catalyst factor. And in order to achieve their progress
and sustainability in the modern changing socio-economic environment and the constantly new technologies
that are a necessary prerequisite is the “change”, with the driving force of readiness. When there is readiness,
organizations are moving more steadily towards success.
The management of local government has to adapt and adapt its employees to the new challenges posed in
various areas of local government.
One area that can boost a municipality that has developed its e-services is entrepreneurship. Local
government will be able to direct the new entrepreneur or the entrepreneur who wishes to engage in
entrepreneurship by integrating them into either local or European programs that require information and
communication technologies, making their business competitive and present in the new digital reality
environment.
Most of the municipalities mentioned above provide some similar services based on information and
communication technologies, using and applying, in many cases, one municipality the successful example of
the other as a good practice. More specifically, all the above-mentioned municipalities have within their
geographical and administrative boundaries Wi-Fi hotspots for citizens, portals, e-services, and electronic
applications for mobile phones.
Most of these municipalities have dedicated electronic platforms through which citizens have the
possibility to file their complaints and to register various requests to these bodies. Also, many of them have
special LED light bulbs, telematics systems for informing the public about the arrivals and departures of public
transport, as well as special sensors that inform drivers for free parking spaces within the geographical
boundaries of the municipalities of them. In addition, many of these municipalities provide through their
websites geospatial data (GIS), optimal path planning for routes within their geographical boundaries, digital
public information plates, and a fiber optic network.
However, only some of them provide more extensive and sophisticated information based on information
and communication technologies, such as electronic payments, e-KEP, e-commerce, teleworking, and
teleeducation.
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D
DAVID PUBLISHING
How German Experts Understand and Comment on China's

“Belt and Road” Initiative
ZHANG Lihua
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
There are some positive and negative comments of the German experts from think tanks in terms of understanding
and commenting on “The Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI). They analyzed the risks and difficulyt of “The Belt and
Road” projects and thus proposed some suggestions on avoiding risks involved in the implementation of "The Belt
and Road".
Keywords: the experts of German think tanks, “The Belt and Road” Initiative, comments
In 2013, after President Xi Jinping proposed “The Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI), the trade, investment,
and engineering construction projects between China and European countries, especially Central and Eastern
European countries, have quickly advanced and started to achieve results. “The Belt and Road” Initiative has
gradually attracted the attention of European countries’ think tanks, and many articles or reports on “The Belt
and Road” have been published eversince.
This paper mainly researches the articles and reports on “The Belt and Road” Initiative published by the
experts of German think tanks from 2014 to 2018. Since Germany is one of the core members of European
Union, “In 2016, Germany had become China’s largest outward foreign direct investment country in Europe, in
2017, China once again became the largest trading partner of Germany” (Qi, 2018). Studying German think
tanks’ understanding and comments of “The Belt and Road” Initiative is of great significance, and it has
important reference value for Chinese enterprises to carry out the implementation of “The Belt and Road”
projects in Germany and other EU countries.
The author found 20 articles and reports on “The Belt and Road” published by seven German think tanks
online resources from January 2014 to February 2018, extracted from the well-known German think tanks, such
as Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the German Development Institute, German Institute for International and
Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP), the Institute of World Economics at the University
of Kiel, Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Schiller Institute, and website of the German Institute
of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Institute of Asian Studies. All these articles have been published after 2015,
as two in 2015, two in 2016, five in 2017, and 11 in 2018, respectively. The tendency shows that the experts of
German think tanks have been paying ascending attention to “The Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) since 2015.
From the articles, reports, and interviews published and analyzed by the author, German experts had both
positive and negative comments on “The Belt and Road” as well as in terms of their understanding. And indeed
some experts also analyzed the risks and difficulties of BRI and proposed some suggestions on risk hedging.
ZHANG Lihua, Ph.D., Professor, Director of Research Center for China-Europe Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.
408 HOW THE EXPERTS OF GERMAN THINK TANKS’ UNDERSTANDING & COMMENTS
Positive Comments
The Strategic Concept of “The Belt and Road” is Conductive to Building a New World Peace Order
LaRouche, the founder of Schiller Institute, pointed out, when she was interviewed by many media outlets
about China’s “Belt and Road”, that the New Silk Road would bring more civilization achievements to the
mankind, together with modern technology and that it was the beginning of a new era of human development.
In addition, the New Silk Road would bring a more humane trait to the present, while people would not use war
to resolve conflicts any more, but achieve common goals through closer communication. The New Silk Road
would be helpful to build a new order of world peace (Qi, 2018).
Schüler-Zhou from the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies believed that “The Belt and Road” Initiative was
one of the new signs of globalization. Ever since 2013, China has been adhering to the concept of flexible
economic integration with countries and regions, focusing on trade agreements. Countries will be connected
more closely through expanding regional and global infrastructure, improving the acceleration of trade and
investment flows. China is not only the defender of globalization, but it becomes gradually the creator of the
new globalization (Schüler-Zhou, 2017).
Two German experts affirmed the positive implication of China’s BRI to a world peace order.
“The Belt and Road” Initiative is of Common Interests to the Countries Along the Road as well as to
Europe
Sebastian Heilmann, Director of Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) pointed out that regions
covered by “The Belt and Road” Initiative were supposed to develop continuously in economy and participate
in global exchanges, and no political stability should be realized through military representatives or through the
provision of development assistance on a case-by-case basis. Either from the economic perspective or the
secure politics one, “The Belt and Road” Initiative was the primary common interest of China, Germany, and
Europe. He suggested that it should not only negatively record the diplomatic strategy announced by China or
refuse reflexively, yet positively use the proposal made by China, making it a booster for the deeper
cooperation of the two parties (Wu, 2015).
Gao Tingting, the researcher from SWP Asia Research Group said that the introduction of "The Belt and
Road Initiative" marked that the diplomacy of the new Chinese government was more confident and they were
prepared to expand their influence to the Eurasian region. Germany and Europe must notice the economic
potential of China in the Eurasian region. EU not only needed to develop a strategy different from that of the
Eurasian region, but also needed to have a dialogue with China on the “economic Belt of the Silk Road”,
particularly. She suggested Europe to establish a long-term special Sino-Europe “Belt and Road” dialogue
mechanism. This dialogue mechanism would help in two ways: On one hand, it would make the
communication in the big Eurasian region more convenient; on the other hand, China and Europe could find
specific cooperation areas within the framework of the dialogue mechanism. The institutionalization degree of
the relationship between China and Europe had already been high, and the Sino-Europe’s “Belt and Road”
dialogue mechanism should have detailed and specific objectives. Both parties could mutually develop
cooperation projects in the fields of infrastructure, agriculture, environmental protection and urbanization (Wu,
2015).
Bonn (2015), from German Development Institute, believed that “The Belt and Road” established a direct
connection with the “Investment Plan for Europe” of Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European
HOW THE EXPERTS OF GERMAN THINK TANKS’ UNDERSTANDING & COMMENTS 409
Commission since “The Belt and Road” planned to invest 315 billion Euros in Europe by 2017. The main
reason of Beijing’s proposal of “The Belt and Road” was its own interest. However, this did not necessarily
exclude the fact that it was in line with Europe’s interests. The concept of “The Belt and Road” was flexible
and malleable and it might be an opportunity for Europe.
Peter Wolff, from the German Development Institute, believed that under the background of the
slow-down or even the crisis of the global economic growth, China’s “The Belt and Road” Initiative aroused
people’s great interest in the project. The strategic vision of strengthening trade and investment flows brought
new vitality to new energy sources. From the development track of Asia, Europe, and other countries, it could
be seen that the potential benefits of “The Belt and Road” was that it would strengthen the competitiveness of
regional supply networks and reduce tariff, non-tariff, and transaction barriers, thereby reducing import
investment and costs. Since there were new policies in both emerging markets and developing countries, China
would turn to higher value-added activities to promote entrepreneurship and innovation and to maintain the
growth of productivity. “The Belt and Road” Initiative was seen as a structural shift in policy from macro
economy to economic policy (Wolff, 2015), as a result.
These German experts suggested that the implementation of BRI will benefit the economic development
of the countries along the route, including China and European countries, and the BRI would have positive
significances in the politics and security for China, Germany, and EU, too.
Negative Comments
The articles and reports published by German think tanks not only have positive comments on “The Belt
and Road” Initiative, but also have many negative comments with doubts and concerns.
“The Belt and Road” Aims to Strengthen China’s Influence in the Eurasian Region and it Challenges
European Values
Rudolf, researcher from Mercator Institute for China Studies believed that “The Belt and Road” Initiative
was not simply about to link China and Europe, but to build a cross-regional infrastructure network that
includes oil and gas pipelines, railways and deep-sea ports. This would be a long-term project and it would take
at least a few decades to build. China had strengthened the shift of its political and economic ambitions
overseas through this Initiative.
Peter Wolff deemed that the implementation of “The Belt and Road” in Europe and the access to German
and other European markets of Chinese state-owned enterprises through “The Belt and Road” project would
bring the will and ideology of the Chinese government to Europe, thus challenging the values and ideology of
Germany and Europe. And these would cause negative impacts on the parliamentary democracy system in
Germany and Europe. “The Belt and Road” showed that China was trying to expand its economic strength and
political influence as soon as possible. This seemed appealing to China’s shift from the traditional
non-intervention to its ambition - which was clearer and more confident, namely China seeks to shape the
world (Wolff, 2017).
These two experts are not only worried that the implementation of the BRI in Europe will boost Chinese
economic influence, but also it will spread China’s ideological values to Europe, forming challenges and threats
to Europeans. Indeed, the construction of the BRI in Europe will certainly expand China’s presences in Europe,
in terms of economic, political, and ideological dimensions. However, in the author’s opinion, these influences
may enhance the mutual understanding between China and European countries as well, as two sides could learn
from each other and then BRI could benefit from the development of both China and Europe, especially since
China and Europe have an excellent heritage in terms of their cultural values. The core values of freedom,
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Europe have positively contributed to the contemporary world
politics. China’s traditional values of harmony, peace, benevolence, integrity, and win-win cooperation also
matter for world peace and development, particularly since China and the EU have many common aspirations
and interests in the field of global governance.
“The Belt and Road” Aims to Solve China’s Own Economic Issues
The article of Patrick·Bessler (n.d.) published on the website of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung pointed out that
“The Belt and Road” project was to solve China’s own economic issues, for example, and that the excess
capacity of enterprises, energy problems, and the development of backward areas. “The Belt and Road” is a
way for China to reduce or compensate for the excess capacity of some state-owned enterprises for the last few
years of its economic boom. The excess capacity problem occurred before the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.
The Chinese government subsidized these industries more than before. Its purpose was to compensate for the
demand glides of Western countries. At that time, China invested at most 500 billion dollars on public
infrastructure such as railways and expressways through the economic stimulus plan. The competition among
local governments was also a factor for the expanding of excess capacity. Through fiscal subsidies, local
governments tried to construct industries with excess capacity that had been built and would be beneficial to
increase the local economic growth. Presently, the unused capacity of Chinese steel industry is twice than that
of the American steel production. Other industries such as iron, cement, aluminum, glass, coal, shipbuilding,
and solar panels have similar problems. Reported by International Center for Trade and Sustainable
Development (ICTSD), the excess capacity of some industries even exceeded 30%. The domestic demands
could hardly absorb the surplus. Due to the performance decline of several core purchasing countries, the
international demand did not ease the situation neither. Reducing excess capacity would mean to cut down from
a large number of persons employed. This is politically and socially costly for China, especially when the state
is in the midst of an economic transition. During the period when the economic growth declined, Beijing hoped
to remedy through investment in external infrastructure with Chinese materials and labor. However, it was
doubtful whether “The Belt and Road” project could achieve that purpose. The unilateral export of large heavy
materials for heavy industries could be complicated and not very profitable.
Peter Hefele (2017) believed that energy was the center of China’s “The Belt and Road” policy. It had
strategic significance for China to ensure a safe and reliable external energy supply for the Chinese market. The
political influence of energy investment far exceeded the capability of any legal system. Chinese investment
projects included exemptions from national energy/resource laws, which might create political resistance in
each countries, making future projects a source of security threats. China and other partners must make great
efforts to understand the complex interactions between investment and political, economic, and social dynamics.
International energy institutions should try to improve the international regulatory framework further to become
a platform that solves conflicts positively. China had pushed its “Belt and Road” plan to the great opportunity
of economic development and wealth growth. However, investment in infrastructure might not always
guarantee the economic and social progress. Central Asian countries must seriously study the opportunities and
potential risks of the domestic and cross-border conflicts related to the exploitation of natural resources. The
interests of Russia and major EU countries should also be considered to avoid as increasing geographical
strategic conflicts arise.
These German experts believe that the main purpose of BRI is to solve the overcapacity problem of steel
industry and energy demand in China, and thus the BRI construction only serves China’s own economic
interest. In fact, without BRI, China can also tackle the problem of steel overcapacity and energy problems by
expanding international trade and cooperation in infrastructure with developing countries. The purpose of BRI
is to achieve mutual benefit and win-win results through promoting economic, trade and cultural exchanges
between China, Asian and European countries by opening of transport routes in Eurasia. The common
prosperity of participating countries is the ultimate goal of BRI. There is a saying in China: “You are good, he
is good, everyone is good, I can be good”. This is one of the classic ideas of Chinese cultural tradition.
“The Belt and Road” Projects may Represent Competitive Threats to Germany
Patrick Bessler (n.d.) pointed out that nowadays, China was not a country under the rule of law. “The Belt
and Road” project was non-transparent, private, operating irregularly or even not according to rules, which
might pose a competitive threat to German resources, markets, talents, and employment. Compared with
Western countries, China was always indifferent to international conventions, local population and
environmental protection. That was also the reason that the implementation of China’s projects were more
successful on the African continent and in countries or in regions with weak rule of law. China’s projects had
been resisted in some countries because they did not always take into account the full needs of local
stakeholders. For example, most of the projects abroad of Chinese enterprises employed Chinese labor rather
than the local one. In addition, project failure, corruption and environmental pollution occurred frequently in
the cooperation between China and foreign countries was also of concern.
This expert expressed his concern about BRI in Europe from the perspectives of the rule of law, labor, and
environmental protection. This view is representative among German and other European scholars. However,
China is continuing to strengthen the rule of law. As the rule of law in China is under development, Chinese
companies that carry out BRI projects in EU countries more and more comply with EU law and the laws of the
host countries. With regard to the labor and environment protection issues, in recent years, Chinese companies
in Europe have changed their behaviors substantially to adapt to the European law and environment protection
regulation, like hiring more local workforce and adopting more environment friendly practices in operation.
China Tries to Push the Internationalization of Its Currency Through “The Belt and Road”
Some German experts deemed that another core motive for China’s implementation of “The Belt and
Road” Initiative was its desire to realize the internationalization of its currency, the Ren Min Bi (RMB). So far,
although the RMB had already become the fourth largest currency in the world, compared with USD and Euro,
as an international payment mean, RMB only played a minor role. That was because, among all the payment in
the world, USD took a proportion of 45%, Euro 29%, GBP 9%, while RMB about 2.8%, ranking fourth. China
wanted a change in this, and the Chinese government had been promoting the internationalization of RMB
through various channels. In 2010, Russia and China jointly announced their wish to use their respective
currencies for bilateral trade. In 2012, China and Argentina signed a currency swap agreement worth of about
5.5 billion dollars. China also signed an agreement with Turkey worth of 1.6 billion dollars. The infrastructure
investment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was also a step for the internationalization of RMB.
China was able to achieve further results in this respect in November 2015, and the International Monetary
Fund decided to include the Chinese RMB in the fund’s basket of reserve currencies to identify it as one of the
world’s major currencies, at least in the symbolic sense.
These experts also have certain concerns about the internationalization of the Chinese currency Renminbi.
However, with the development of China’s economy, the internationalization of Renminbi has become an
irresistible trend. This is the result of mutually beneficial trade cooperation between China and other countries.
Although the US financial groups are not willing to see this, such mutually beneficial cooperation approach is
difficult to obstruct.
Risks and Suggestions on “The Belt and Road” Project

Some articles published by German think tanks analyzed the difficulties and risks for the implementation
of “The Belt and Road” project.
Difficulties and Risks of “The Belt and Road” Project
Trade barriers and transaction costs. Peter Wolff (2015), researcher from the German Development
Institute, pointed out that the implementation of “The Belt and Road” project would face many difficulties, for
example, infrastructure, financial markets, trade facilitation, trade barriers, and limited regional cooperation.
The most significant impact of customs activities is the time and cost increased from moving across the border,
which might cover up the adverse impact of other agencies, and operators in raising border transaction costs. A
major challenge might be to unify standards. When establishing cross-border transport connections, such as rail
transport, a unified standard is required, which might take several years. And the unified standards would be
discussed for a long time prior to finally be determined.
Problems of sources of funds. Peter Wolff (2015) pointed out that in the next few years, “The Belt and
Road” projects might be of 240 billion dollars in total. Where does the source of fund of such a big investment
come from? The solutions to the financing challenge could only be public and private financing, and domestic
and international financing, faced complicated national conditions and specific projects. Regional and
cross-border projects faced special challenges. Due to the complicated and various financial systems of each
country, the fund issue was concerning. A challenging task was to pass the tax coordination, transaction
regulation, and credit rating. However, co-financing was limited by various conditions. The large-scale
infrastructure investment envisaged in “The Belt and Road” plan might have a big impact on financial markets.
“The Belt and Road” Initiative might stimulate China’s financial reforms and encourage policymakers to
further open national capital markets to global players, which might lead to more mobile and diversified bond
markets and be helpful to improve capital allocation. However, the investment of some eligible countries had
reached the debt limit. The high debt of China due to its rapid expanding of infrastructure investment was a
warning sign. Private investment might not flow into countries that faced debt crises. Restrictions on debt
financing might become a binding force for the investment of “The Belt and Road” project. National risks
might be the highest than private investors considered. Another problem was the high development cost of the
project. A large amount of additional preparatory projects should be funded in a short to medium term.
However, there was no source of funds for the development of the funded projects. It was scarce to have funds
through public funding or government grants. The development of countries along “The Belt and Road” was
limited and their backward governance conditions hindered the development of infrastructure construction,
trade and investment.
Patrick Bessler (n.d.) believed that the infrastructure construction projects of “The Belt and Road”
required a large amount of funds. And during the implementation process, the conditions in lack of funds might
occur. However, it was difficult for China to solve the problem unilaterally. And the funds of AIIB were
limited, too. The grand and abstract wish of “The Belt and Road” might be given up halfway due to lack of
funds, no profit, and huge financial risks. According to the report of China-Britain Business Council, the
infrastructure conditions of countries along “The Belt and Road” were lower than the global average. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) said that only seven countries in the 64 countries involved in “The Belt and
Road” were listed as the economically developed countries. PWCC estimated that by 2020, “The Belt and
Road” needed to invest five trillion dollars in transport infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
estimated that only in the Asian-Pacific region, there would be an annual deficit of 800 billion dollars in the
infrastructure investment.
Peter Wolff (2017) pointed out that the difficult situation of increased defaults in China’s financial sectors
meant that both state-owned enterprises and banks were more worried about new risks. Due to the excessive
financial expansion of the country, these expected loan defaults must be retained in new projects. In recent
months, with the help of the short-term emergency loan from Chinese state-owned banks, the credit default
threat of Pakistan was avoided. In a word, the incubation period of these infrastructure construction projects
were long, the cost and the mid-term maintenance cost were high, making it difficult to calculate the future
returns. Local infrastructure projects often were not qualified for the loan granting, and the low return rate was
another economic risk.
Political risks. Patrick Bessler (n.d.) pointed out the implementation of “The Belt and Road” project
would face many political risks. Some countries in West Asia and North Africa faced local wars and riots,
political turbulence, and social instability for example, the threats from military groups of Afghan Taliban,
terrorist attacks etc. Chinese enterprises had also been victims of such incidents many times before. In
November 2015, three employees from China Railway International Group were attacked by terrorists at the
Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, the capital of Mali. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which has a great
significance to “The Belt and Road”, also faced attacks from separatist forces for Xinjiang’s independence, and
Beijing had to deal with the issue of those separatists. It was reported that in 2014, the director of China Mining
Association, admitted that up to 2013 more than 80% of all China’s supporting mining projects abroad suffered
economic damage. According to the analysis of European Commission-External Relations, the opposition and
competitors within China were growing, which might cause unhealthy development.
Suggestions on Avoiding Risks
After analyzing the difficulties and risks for the implementation of “The Belt and Road” project, experts
from German think tanks put forward suggestions to overcome the difficulties and avoid risks.
Establish reasonable governance mechanisms. Some experts said that various platforms and
partnerships had to be established to realize “The Belt and Road” Initiative and reasonable governance
mechanisms must be established. Policy reform had to be carried out for the improvement of infrastructure in
the countries that hoped to get benefits. Financing institution platforms were needed to be established and
common standards for the improvement of the financing of the project development and governance of social
environment needed to be formulated. Therefore, China’s “The Belt and Road” Initiative needed a more
“multilateral” mechanism, which included the cooperation mechanism between private enterprises, and national
and local governments. The multilateral mechanism of “The Belt and Road” Initiative needed to expand the
scope participated by the government and private enterprises. The participation of local enterprises was an
important value chain for infrastructure investment and cross-border development. Supranational governance
system in appropriate forms should be established. As a new tool to introduce private capital for infrastructure
investment, banks should adopt innovative methods to develop capital market and make use of comparative
advantages to make complementary development.
Making reasonable methods and standards. Some experts suggested that a large amount of study time
must be invested to make reasonable methods and standards; to study the investment sustainability and the way
of sustainable growth. For example, what is a cleaner transportation mode? How to implement low carbon
urbanization? How does the new technology reflect departmental strategy and create cross-border value chains?
“The Belt and Road” Initiative should deal with these issues in an open, transparent, and comprehensive manner.
In case “The Belt and Road” Initiative becomes the standard rule for the sustainable growth for Asia and other
regions and countries beyond, the sustainability of the ambitious “2030 Agenda” would be greatly enhanced.
Rolf J. Langhammer (n.d.) believed that Germany should put the cross-border infrastructure investment on
the G20 agenda and provide its expertise to explicitly consider the sustainable development in three aspects
(ecology, social economy, and finance). The contribution of Germany to the cross-border infrastructure
construction agenda of the G20 would be all the expertise it had provided in the public and private fields to
ensure that the cross-border infrastructure investment projects launched by China meet the latest standards of
sustainable development of the ecology, social economy, and finance and support the international financial
market to accept these standards. These standards would also include transparency targets to cope with the risks
of corruption in the construction industry in all countries. In addition, Germany might use the rich experience
of the cross-border investment projects in the EU and Greater Europe to solve the challenge of the
dissymmetric distribution of benefits among partner countries. China-Germany cooperation could not only
balance the two goals of economic transition and sustainable development, but also support the multilateral
agenda on carbon emission reduction formally concluded at the Paris 2015 UN Climate Change Conference
COP 21·CMP11.
Implementing multilateral financing. Peter Wolff put forward the “multilateral” suggestions for the
financing of “The Belt and Road”. He believed that “The Belt and Road” was not only a single project, but
composed of many projects, including cross-border transportation, communication, and energy network, and it
should not be planned and realized by individual countries alone. The multilateral financing meant three things:
Firstly, a sustainable infrastructure knowledge platform should be established to help weak countries
absorb the latest knowledge on energy, transport, and communication networks from the perspective of
economic, social, and ecological sustainable development and incorporate them into their development plans.
In the 21st century, intelligent resources and conservation-conscious solutions were needed by the world to
achieve the sustainable development goals. So far, in the selection and planning of “The Belt and Road”
projects, the knowledge had not been systematically considered. Secondly, the common standard of project
bidding and funding: Transparency and fair competition should be promoted during the bidding process,
especially to make the local companies to participate in the project construction and operation. The
implementation of the project might be slowed down by the participation of local economy and civil society;
however, it was of great significance to the sustainable development and the development of local economy.
The competitions among financial institutions (multilateral and national development banks, export financing
institutions, and private financing institutions) should be standardized by the financing standards and the debt
sustainability of each country should be considered. Thirdly, regional integration and connectivity strategies in
other countries should be linked with the multilateral platform. India, Japan, South Korea, Iran, and especially
the EU were all pursuing cross-border and cross-regional integration strategies and investment plans (Wolff,
2017).
Conclusion
According to the articles and research reports on “The Belt and Road” published by German think tanks,
there are positive comments as well as negative ones. Experts have analyzed the difficulties and risks for the
implementation of “The Belt and Road” projects from aspects such as trade barriers, transaction costs, source of
funds, and political risks, and put forward suggestions on avoiding risks, which are of significant reference and
value for the Chinese government to fully consider the difficulties during the promotion of “The Belt and
Road”.
German experts are deeply suspicious of and vigilant in regards to China’s promotion of “The Belt and
Road” Initiative. In the author’s opinion, the reasons for their doubts and vigilance are mainly as the following:
First, German experts have a deep prejudice against China’s social and political system and ideology.
They believe that China is not a country under the rule of law, nor a Western-style democracy. There are still
many human rights issues in China. The expansion of “The Belt and Road” projects may bring China’s highly
centralized political system and ideology to countries along the road and the European region, thus impacting
the European parliamentary democracy, ideology, and core values. Therefore, they have sharp wariness of
China’s implementation of “The Belt and Road” project.
Second, some German experts are influenced by the “China Threat Theory” and they lack trust in China.
They believe that China’s promotion of “The Belt and Road” project is for its own political interests and
geographical strategies, for its own economic interests, and to expand its influence. They are worried that in
case China’s “The Belt and Road” project enters Europe, it will seize German markets in Europe and form a
competition against Germany, thus affecting the industrial production and sales of products of Germany etc.
Third, some German experts have a deep prejudice against China’s state-owned enterprises. They believe
that China’s state-owned enterprises are tools to carry out the will of the state, and they are willing to lose
money and pay economic costs in order to achieve the country’s political goals and realize China’s national
interests. China’s state-owned enterprises get various subsidies and loans from the country and their debts are
assumed by the state, and they are not the subjects that actually act according to the principles of market
economy. They undertake the construction projects of “The Belt and Road” with a strong political purpose.
These German experts have strong doubts against China’s state-owned enterprises.
These experts have some misunderstanding about China’s state-owned enterprise system. In fact, after
more than 30 years of reform, China’s state-owned enterprises have been decoupled from the government and
become independent legal entities that operate autonomously and are responsible for their own profits and
losses. Although in the field of public services, state-owned enterprises have received state financial subsidies,
in general, China’s state-owned enterprises are independent and market oriented. Their investment and projects
in Europe are operated in accordance with the rules of the market economy and achieve mutual benefit,
cooperation, and win-win results.
The social and political systems and ideologies of China are quite different from those of Germany and
other European countries, so it can be understood that German experts have a sense of precaution and distrust
towards China. Indeed, the construction of the “Belt and Road” in Europe will certainly expand China’s
influence in Europe, including economic, political, and ideological influences. But these influences maybe
enhance mutual understanding between China and European countries, and would learn from each other and
benefit from the development of China and Europe, because China and Europe both have excellent cultural
values. The core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Europe have made positive
contributions in the contemporary world. China’s values of harmony, peace, benevolence, integrity, and
win-win cooperation also have had a positive significance for maintaining world peace and development. China
and the EU have many common aspirations and interests in the field of global governance. Experts and the
public from both China and Germany should communicate more extensively in the cultural and ideological
fields, and learn the social systems and ideologies of one another in the spirit of “harmony in diversity” and
“inclusiveness with compatibility”.
“The Belt and Road” Initiative has profound ideological and cultural roots. The “harmony in diversity,
harmony generates and sameness stops, and harmonious coexistence” initiated by the core values of traditional
Chinese culture, such as harmony, benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and honesty, are fully
demonstrated by “The Belt and Road” Initiative. And the “policy communication, road connectivity, free trade,
currency circulation, and people-to-people ties” will generate a tremendous cooperation pattern of the
development momentum for surrounding areas, thus realizing the “extensive consultation, joint contribution
and win-win” of countries along the road.
Nowadays, the thinking model of individualist, philosophy of struggle, “jungle law”, power politics, and
zero-sum game should be abandoned in the international relations. All countries should coexist peacefully with
the principles of mutual respect, and equality and mutual benefits. The initiatives of “The Belt and Road” and
the concept of “building a community with a shared future for mankind” proposed by China reflect mankind’s
desire for a new world of peace and harmony. With the implementation of “The Belt and Road” Initiative, an
increasing number of people will know its intrinsic value and positive significance.
References
Bessler, P. (n.d.). China’s “New Silk Road”: Focus on Central Asia. Conrad Adenauer Foundation. Retrieved from
http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.43841/
Bonn. (2015, November 9). A new Silk Road—China’s soft power. Institute of German Development. Retrieved from
http://www.die-gdi.de/en/the-current-column/article/a-new-silk-road-chinas-soft-power/
Hefele, P. (2017, February 27). The regulation of energy investments along the “Belt and Road”. International Conference on
International Energy Law. Retrieved from http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.48043
Langhammer, R. J. (n.d.). Chinese-German G20 cooperation for sustainable infrastructure investment. Institute of World
Economics, University of Kiel, Germany. Retrieved from
http://www.global-economic-symposium.org/about-the-ges/council-for-global-problem-solving/recommendations/chinese-ge
rman-g20-cooperation-for-sustainable-infrastructure-investment/chinese-german-g20-cooperation-for-sustainable-infrastruct
ure-investment
Qi, X. (2018, July 12). German development report blue book (2018), based in Europe, looking at the world. Xinmin Evening
News.
Schüler-Zhou, Y. (2017, July 10). Warum Xi Jinping die globalisierung verteidigt. German Daily Mirror. Retrieved from
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/themen/china-2014/der-chinesische-traum-warum-xi-jinping-die-globalisierung-verteidigt/19980
932.html
Wolff, P. (2015, November 9). China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative: Challenges and opportunities. Institute of German
Development. Retrieved from

http://www.die-gdi.de/en/publications/mitarbeiter-sonstige/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-challenges-and-opportunities/
Wolff, P. (2017, May 15). Is China’s Silk Road initiative at a dead end? Institute of German Development. Retrieved from
http://www.die-gdi.de/en/the-current-column/article/is-chinas-silk-road-initiative-at-a-dead-end/
Wu, J. (2015, May 20). German think tanks positively affirm the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Economic Daily.
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.09.004
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Kick Off Maritime Boundary Disputes: Published Maps, Not

Drawn With Agreement, Compatible to the International Law?
Emete Gözügüzelli
Akdeniz University, Antalya, Turkey
Issues concerning on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone between Turkey and the Greek
Cypriot Administration (GCA) have been more controversial. This study answers the following questions: (a) What
is the main arguments of the Parties? (b) How the exclusive economic zone could be declared? (c) Does median
line applicable to the delimitation law without taken the related circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean? (d)
Can any maps on claimed exclusive economic zone borders publish without maritime boundary delimitation agreements,
officially? The main intent of the study is to evaluate the different perspectives of the Parties on maritime
delimitation and to evaluate the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone bounded by the European Union on the
European Asia and Europe Africa Interconnected Cable Network Projects maps in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Keywords: exclusive economic zone (EEZ), European Union, delimitation, median line, the Eastern Mediterranean,
the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA), Turkey
Introduction
The disputes concerned the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction zones of the Eastern Mediterranean as
between the Greek Cypriot Administration (hereafter the GCA) and Turkey continue. Turkey which had not
accepted the 1982 Convention is not legally related by the provisions of Convention on related issues. Whereas
the “Republic of Cyprus (ROC) (hereafter the Greek Cypriot Administration)” is not recognized by Republic of
Turkey, it is a part of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (hereafter the UNCLOS). The question
is too complex because that has not been found any solution to the Cyprus issue yet.
Eric R. Eissler and Gözde Arasil point out that while a military conflict is a distant possibility, it is likely
to continue the impasse (2014). Nicholas A. Ioannides, accusing Turkey activities in the western part of the
Eastern Mediterranean, evaluated Turkey’s delimitation and licensed agreements with Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on continental shelf as illegal (2014). Nevertheless, geopolitical analyst, F. William
Engdahl comments, “energy-rich resource management led to dispute between two main borders. One of
them, neighboring with Turkey and Southern Cyprus and Greece, the second between Israel and Lebanon”
(citied Newman, unknown). Charles Ellinas argues that South Cyprus is a part of UNCLOS that have the right
to use full sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean (2017). Andrew Jacovides accuses Turkey that “arbitrarily
and unjustifiably, declared an area in the sea west of parallel 38 16’ 18” to be its continental shelf, part of
which overlaps with part of the GCA’ exclusive economic zone and continental shelf” (2018) and points out
“Cyprus Republic” as a part of UNCLOS has the right to exercise its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Emete Gözügüzelli, Dr., Assistant Professor, Head of Public Law in IR at the Akdeniz University, Antalya, Turkey.
KICK OFF MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES 419
Achilles Skordas claims that

the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Agreement of February 17, 2003, between the GCA and Egypt is effected by the
median line of which every point is equidistant from the nearest point on the baseline of the two Parties, is consistent with
international case-law, customary law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. (2007)
Hence, the European Union’ policy supports the GCA’ claimed exclusive economic zone and cable and
pipeline projects by giving financial aid. On the other side Teoman Uykur states that
The case law suggests that the islands may or may not have limited border areas, depending on the particular
characteristics of any case. It has never been endorsed by international law on maritime restriction to cut off a coastal state
from access to open seas. This point becomes even more important when the islands are close to the mainland of another
country. (2014)
Turgut Kaymal mentions that “Turkey may be not a party to the agreement but has adopted practices of the
common law. In this context, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone practices have become
common law” (2017). Fuat Aksu takes the issue in the context of EU’s affect to Turkey and states GCA’ policy
of making exclusive economic zone agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean is an implemented de facto
strategy (2013). Kütükçü and Kaya claim that if “diagonal line” adopted by Turkey, it will increase Turkey’s
maritime jurisdiction (2016). Çağatay Erciyes stresses that “islands do not generate full maritime zones when
they are competing directly against continental land areas. Median/Equidistance line is not applied. Islands
receive partial or no effect/are enclaved or partially enclaved” (2012). Sertaş Hami Başeren explains the claims
of maritime jurisdictions of Parties and points out that crisis has being increased by the discoveries of
hydrocarbons (2013). Cahit Yayci examined the issue on delimitation of the area with historical value of the
importance of Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, taking into account the strategic and economic aspects
have been detailing the rights of Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction (2012).
All above mentioned studies do not examine the EU’s stance with its published maps such as EuroAsia
Interconnector Cable Project. The aim of this studies to fulfill this gap in the academic fields with concentration
on delimitation law. In this context, the paper begins with a review of the brief principles of delimitation rules
of maritime law in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, than focusing the dispute between
Turkey and the GCA on maritime jurisdiction concerns around increases tension in the Eastern Mediterranean;
drawing on arguments of both sides to assess the origin of problem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Final part
examines the maps of the EuroAsia and EuroAfrica Interconnector Cable Projects and analyzes the European
Union’ published maps related to the maritime borders of the Mediterranean. The author acknowledges in
addition to dispute concerns, linked with Cyprus problem, security and hydrocarbon activities but that is largely
outside the scope of this paper.
Article 74(1) and Article 83(1) of UNCLOS

Maritime boundary delimitation has been very crucial topic which creates the potential security risks and
threats on overlapping maritime boundaries. In other words, maritime boundary delimitation disputes in the
Eastern Mediterranean have demonstrated that the region remains an important zone for determining the
geopolitical and geoeconomic relations in world politics. Adjacent or opposite coastal states need to determine
their maritime space by bilateral or multilateral agreement to exercise their jurisdictions in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
420 KICK OFF MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES
In fact, the GCA draws the maritime boundaries with neighboring States; Egypt (2003) and Israel (2010)
caused the dispute as separately with Turkey and Lebanon. The subjects of dispute between the GCA v. Turkey,
the GCA v. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Turkey v. Egypt, Turkey v. Greece, Turkey v.
Libya, Lebanon v. Israel, Israel v. Gaza, Turkey v. Syria, Syria v. Lebanon, Egypt v. Israel, Israel v. Libya,
Greece v. Libya, and so on are still pending about the determination and delimitation of opposite and adjacent
maritime borders. “Each dispute in maritime delimitation has its own characters which makes it sui generis”
(Aksar, 2013).
Under the 1982 UNCLOS, three types of maritime delimitation are identified: delimitation of the
territorial sea (Article 15), delimitation of the continental shelf (Article 83), and delimitation of the EEZ
(Article 74). Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the UNCLOS state that
In order to achieve an equitable solution, maritime boundary the delimitation between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts in the exclusive economic zone [on the continental shelf] shall be effected by agreement on the source of
international law. This is referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). (UNCLOS,
1988, Article 74, Article 83)
As it can be seen, both articles formulate same rules for the delimitation that is governed for exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf, although there has been not defined mandatory principle that limits
methodology. I.C.J. Reports of 1985 states that “the two institutions, the continental shelf and the special
economic zone are interconnected in modern law; and ultimately, it is necessary to pay more attention to
elements common to both concepts, such as the distance to the coast” (Paragraph 33). However Courts note
that
the delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic
zone to be effected by agreement… in order to achieve equitable solution that statement of an equitable solution as the aim
of any delimitation process reflects the requirements of customary law as regards the delimitation both of continental shelf
and exclusive economic zones. (I.C.J, 1993, Paragraph 48)
In fact, the I.C.J. acknowledges that the principles of maritime delimitation in Articles 74 and 83 of
UNCLOS reflect Customary international law (Qatar and Bahrain Case, I.C.J., 2001, Paragraph 167; Nicaragua
and Colombia Case, 2012, Paragraph 139). These articles have provision that how overlapping boundaries
related to the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf for delimitation would be taken into consideration.
Many international court decisions (Libya and Malta Case, I.C.J., 1985, Paragraph 51; Eritre and Yemen Case,
1999, Paragraph 116; Romania and Ukrania Case, 2009, Paragraph 120) stress the equitable solution is main
target which makes it necessary order in its character. For that the maritime boundaries shall to be determined
by agreement with consistence of the rules of international law.
While, the international courts have not so far shared a fair list of related circumstances. Withal, the lists
of related circumstances are generally explained by geographic and non-geographic components. The following
components firstly were taken into consideration in geographical that are: the configuration of the coasts
(concave-convexity, opposition or advocacy, the general direction of the coasts), geography of the region,
coastal length difference and proportionality, the presence of islands, promontories, baselines, presence of third
States and regional practices; or the non-geographical components which are: geological and geomorphologial
factors, historical rights, economic factors, security interests, conduct of the parties, navigational (shipping
interests) factors, environmental factors, unity of deposits.
Results and Discussions: Claims and Conduct of the Parties in the Eastern
Mediterranean Over Maritime Boundary Delimitations
Does Median Line Alone Applicable for Delimitation?
The legal framework of the 1982 Convention creates jurisdictional regime to the maritime space. Some of
the Mediterranean States have signed and ratified UNCLOS, whereas, UNCLOS have not ratified by the Israel,
Turkey, Syria, TRNC, Palestine, even though Libya or Morocco which has signed but not endorsed. On the
contrary, Egypt, the GCA, and Lebanon are the sides of the UNCLOS in the Eastern Mediterranean.
GCA’ stance Turkey’ stance
Y N
Yes No
Reference only Median Line?
Compatible Uncompatible
“ICJ and other internaional courts taking the related/special

circumstances as factor for adjustment or shifting the
line in order to reach equitable result”
Figure 1. Dispute arguments on median line with arrow diagram.
The Figure 1 concentrated the perspective of both sides on the median line as shown by arrow diagram.
According to the arrow diagram firstly, GCA’s favour of median line is alone used in Eastern Mediterranean
without taking relevant circumstances. On the contrary Turkey does not favour of median Line as alone which
can be used in the Eastern Mediterranean. Both sides define their position in their domestic laws. Therefore, the
Egypt and the GCA’ claimed “EEZ Agreement of 17 February 2003” was the first signs of the maritime
delimitation dispute of the Turkey and GCA. Turkey, in written, expressed its objections and stated the
agreement was unfounded in the context of the international law.
The principle of “opinio juris sive necessitatis” where only median line without relative circumstances
could be applied in the Eastern Mediterranean has not been existed, which is not mandatory on Turkey
automatically. Coastal State rights on continental shelf are situated on its ab initio and ipso facto, stated article
77 of UNCLOS as upper sovereignty, for instance. Court states always “the land dominate sea” such as in 1969
I.C.J. Case or in 2001 I.C.J. Case, whereas “Cyprus” is an island State and unresolved issue continues. Hence
“post hoc is not proter hoc may only serve to unclear the real issue” (such as I.C.J. Case, 1969, Paragraph 40).
In fact, equidistance/median line method of delimitation cannot be drawn without taking into consideration
relevant circumstances.
Various methodologies shall be determined in accordance with equitable principles which stated in the International
Law Commission of the United Nations. The Commission addressed several other possibilities, as having if not superior
status, like delimitation by general direction of coasts, by agreement, by drawing lines of perpendicular to the coast and so
forth and so on. (I.C.J. Case, 1969, Paragraphs 48-51)
The Commission’ latter adopted the Committee Expert’ which brought an exception in favor of “special
circumstances”. This was not officially recommended. In the light of this report of Commission, it is clear that
the notion of equidistance or median line could not take alone which never really envisaged dismissing the
relevant circumstances. Hence Commission gave precedence to “delimitation by agreement in favour of
special/relevant circumstances” (North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Case, 1969, Paragraph 53). This makes
the status of the EEZ agreement of Egypt and “Cyprus” null and void because both sides did a delimitation
without taking into consideration relevant/special circumstances that creates the overlapping maritime borders
with Turkey. A code was of course concretized in Articles 83 and 74 of the 1982 Convention that equitable
result is necessary without giving details of the delimitation methodologies. 1982 Convention does not
crystallize any abuse of rights of other States. Any agreement between States must be in conformity with
Convention. The notion of relative circumstances is relative to the principle of equitable in the article of 74 and
83. Still unresolved controversies between Parties continue. On the other hand, with regard to those, States have
not started negotiations. Egypt’s unwillingness to negotiate Turkey, or Greek Cypriots’ unwillingness to accept
Turkish Cypriots as equal partner of the island as whole actions can only be problematical and remain
speculative. The essential point in this connection is that Turkish Cypriots also have its own governance that
there is no single authority on the island. Even though, Cyprus problem continues. Explicitly Turkey in practice
abstained from tension with Greek Cypriots but Greek Cypriots claimed it is “unique authority”.
Refashion the nature of the sea unacceptable. Turkey coastlines are in fact comparable in length; if the
equidistance or median line method is used, an inequity is created. In fact determination must be equitable
rather inequity. They are free to agree on a method or different methods if they wish to side. Several aspects
should be reckoned with other methodologies, because each geography by its coasts has distinctive character.
In this context, from geographical to the nongeogrphical aspect of the situation they must be evaluated. But
encroachment on maritime expanses or cut off effect would not be part of equitable result of delimitation. For
that in any delimitation, the Parties shall make some steps such as look to the geographical configuration of the
coastline of the country, the length of their respective coastlines, concave or convex coasts, and the baselines.
On the contrary, unity of deposit constitutes non-geographical circumstances. Another factor is
proportionality which delimitation effected according to equitable principles that stated in Truman declaration
which states “the maritime boundaries shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in
accordance with the equitable principles” (I.C.J. Case, 1969, Paragraph 47).
In the situation of a concave coast such as that of the Turkey on Eastern Mediterranean, different points on
concave coasts cause the continental shelf area enclosed and cutting off effect. The effect of coastal projections
ignored in the Eastern Mediterranean by the “Cyprus”.
Additionally, the “principle of nes inter alios acta” seems to be claimed by Turkey. Since the beginning of
the dispute of 2003, Turkey notified the UNSG that the agreement could not have any effect on the parts of the
Turkish continental shelf, accepted as null and void.
The Egypt and the GCA are in the same interests within the meaning of the median line, but not a priori in
international delimitation law. Geographical features present more than two delimitations are in question
because of the semi enclosed character of the Eastern Mediterranean geography. In fact, Parties up till now
have claimed up very distinctive positions. The GCA position supports the Article 6 of the Convention on CS
of 1958. The Greek Cypriot and Egypt are together with the view that a rule of median line without relevant
circumstances is binding on the Turkey Republic. Additionally both Parties claimed that agreement of EEZ
reflects erga omnes and must be accredited by Turkey Republic. The GCA advocates in its law also in the
absence of agreement that only median line or equidistance line could be used without taking into account the
relevant circumstances. Turkey rejects Convention’ compulsory stature for States which are not hand to the
Convention. Toward eight points settled on the median line between the GCA and Egypt overlapped with
Turkish continental shelf area, of which Turkey complains, would be avoided. Configuration of the Eastern
Mediterranean coasts constituted a relevant circumstances/special circumstances. For that “delimitation is not
the determination de novo of such an area” (I.C.J. Case, 1969, Paragraph 18).
Any dispute about boundaries which creates contentious, most convenient way dealing with this problem
will be on the grounds of international law, either by a customary law or by equitable result. The GCA claims
that Turkey is under a licit duty to settle for the application of the median line which resulted an agreement
between Egypt and the GCA. They claimed that this is suitable of the international law. Whereas, Pacta tertiis
nec nocent nec prosunt as a principle of international law shows that either to be UNCLOS or not to be member,
the rule is treaties (neither harm nor benefit) which does not create obligations or liabilities for a third State. No
person has no right to force the other to obey its own agreements. Whereas, dispute deals with the following
questions: Why the GCA and Egypt are unable to enter into negotiations? Why before the settlement of Cyprus,
Greek Cypriots act to draw maritime boundary delimitation lines with neighbors? Why Turkish Cypriots
consents do not take? Yet these factors show that if there is rule of law, why these steps create dispute? It
would however be ignoring the realities partly the reasons given above. As a result, it was revealed that the
median line was not decisive alone and each was negative or inconclusive. It would be thing to infer from the
violation of international law. Moreover, in the present dispute any such result would be nullified by Turkey
and Turkish Cypriots.
Arguments by the Parties

Greek Cypriot Administration’ Arguments1
Claim 1: “All EEZ agreements could only be drawn with equidistance or the median line, if not find any
special circumstances to modify the delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean” (A Law to Provide
Proclamation of the Exclusive Economic Zone Law, 2004).
Claim 2: “Cyprus as an island State has entitlement to maritime jurisdiction areas under the 1982 Convention”.
Claim 3: “The GCA uses its rights arising from Article 77 of the UNCLOS, that has the right in its
proclaimed in the EEZ and on its continental shelf such as, exploration and exploitation”.
Claim 4: “The wealth of the natural resources belonged to whole Cypriots”.
Claim 5: “UNCLOS is a part of the customary law and is binding upon non States parties to the
Conventions as well”.
1
All claims’ sources are shown in the references, in different part, named the Letters from GCA to UNGS.
Figure 2. Map 2: The claimed maritime zones of GCA (in white blue) and Greece (in dark blue). Source:
https://www.defence-point.gr/news/theodoros-karyotis-giati-lysi-einai-i-oriothetisi-aoz-me-tin-aigypto/aoz-egypt-gree
ce-karyotis.
Turkey Arguments2
Claim 1: “Egypt and the GCA’ ‘EEZ Agreement’ is null and void, 32 16’ 18” in regions falling beyond
the western part of longitude which Turkey has ipso facto and ab initio legal and sovereign rights in these
region”.
Claim 2: “Turkey mentions that there is no single authority on the island; the Greek Cypriots do not
represent the Turkish Cypriots, consequently Cyprus as a whole”.
Claims 3: “Without any solution of the Cyprus issue, the Greek Cypriot administration activities such as
exploration or delimitation maritime law are not valid in international law. For that GCA’ violates the TC’s
inherent fundamental rights and interests”.
Claim 4: “The revenue to be collected as a result of such a mutually acceptable arrangement shall be
beneficial for the economies on both sides of the island”.
Claim 5: “The Greek Cypriot’ last round of the international tender areas lies directly on the Turkish
continental shelf, which is not acceptable”.
Claim 6: “The delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean should be effected by agreement of all related
parties on the basis of the principle of equity so as not to prejudice the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of other
interested States/entities”.
Claim 7: “The concepts like land dominates the sea (I.C.J., 1969, Paragraph 96) and cut off effect are
shown as the essential principles of the international law”.
Claim 8: “It has never been sanctioned by international law on maritime delimitation to cut a coastal State
off from its access to the high seas”.
Claim 9: “In international court rulings are that islands do not necessarily generate full maritime
jurisdiction zones (continental shelf and/or exclusive economic zone) when they are competing against
continental land areas”.
2
All sources are shown in the references, in different part, named the Letters from Turkey to UNGS.
Comparing the arguments shows that there is blurry future about the maritime delimitation dispute
between Parties because political climate is so poor. Even though, there are any official claims over the cable or
pipeline projects which are planning lying through Turkish continental shelf.
EuroAfrica and EuroAsia Interconnector Cable Project Maps

“In 1988 the GCA approved the UNCLOS” (Law of 1988, No. 203) on 12 December 1988, efficient on 16
November 1994. With this step, the GCA pursued a policy to transfer the Cyprus dispute into the maritime
areas, and has started to take steps to advance international Conventions, in the maritime and coastal areas
ignoring the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, bereft of good will.
The GCA formulated the Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamation Law on 2 April 2004 and entitled its
authorities to proclaim exclusive economic zone. The relevant law stated that the exclusive economic zone
proclamation shall be 200 nautical miles (Article 3(1)), and in the event of overlap with other States’
boundaries, the agreement means shall be resorted to, and in if it fails, the delimitation shall be done by
measurements based on only median line or equidistance line principle (Article 3(2)). The GCA stated that,
with this law, they were entitled to exercise some economic rights on the living and non-living natural
resources in the maritime areas, on the seabed and subsoil within 200 nautical miles. After the formulation of
the relevant law, in 2003 they put the “exclusive economic zone agreement” they had signed with Egypt into
force. When the details of this legal regulation of the GCA are considered, it is seen that Article 3, in which the
delimitation is anticipated, states that a delimitation shall be possible in the case of overlap between opposite
coasts (Contiguous Zone Proclamation Law, 2004). This situation poses an obstacle for the British Bases and
the Turkish Cypriots in the delimitation lateral boundaries in the areas belonging to them, with regard to both
the Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamation Law and other laws referring to the issue.
The GCA made a new law reformulating in a combined way, named 2004 and 2014 Law which includes the
issues on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. “By this Law, there shall be proclaimed an
Exclusive Economic Zone, the outer limit of which is defined to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines” (Article 3(1)). Also, “Section III brings regulations regarding the exploring and exploiting the EEZ
and the continental shelf” (Article 7(1)). Also, “it is indicated that no person shall have the right to conduct
activities on the non-living resources in the EEZ or the CS, without licensing of the Minister of Energy,
Commerce, Industry and Tourism” (Article 8(1)). Along with anticipating substantial penalties, the statement in
the previous exclusive economic zone law that “all states have the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines” is
reformulated more stringently under this section and it is stated that “no person shall have the right to lay and/or
maintain any submarine cables or pipelines in the claimed ‘EEZ or the CS’, these could be granted by the
Minister of Communications and Works” (Article 8(1)), and “any event contravening this provision shall be
liable to strict penalties” (2(a)(b)).
For instance, GCA, Greece, and Egypt have signed the EuroAfrica Interconnector Agreement in 2017 and in
accordance with the relevant agreements, the relevant pipeline is passing through Turkey’s continental shelf
emerged as desired. In the above-mentioned 2004 and 2014 GCA law, the relevant consent regime is mandatory.
The same conditions are valid for the East Med Gas Pipeline project. Similar disputes are also applicable to the
EuroAsia Interconnected Cable Network Agreement (Greek-Greek Cypriots and Israeli). These attitudes
appreciated by European Union. Especially European Union (E.U.) published the routes of these cable project
maps as officially in their web sites.
Figure 3. Map 1: EuroAsia Interconnector Cable Project Map by E.U. (shown with maritime delimitation borders).
Source: https://www.euroasia-interconnector.com/at-glance/the-route/.
Above mentioned publication of EuroAsia which shows the maritime boundary delimitation is drawn with
blue dark lines which do not abide by the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. Because of Article 75 it is related of
charts and lists of geographical coordinates in UNCLOS. In accordance to this article
…The external boundary lines of the exclusive economic zone and the boundary lines drawn according to Article 74
will be shown in the scale or scale graphs to determine their position. Where appropriate, the list of geographic coordinates
of the points specifying the geodetic data can be substituted for such external boundary lines or boundary lines of
delimitation. (75(1))
Additionally, the Coastal State should define these charts or geographical coordinate lists and shall submit a
copy of these charts or lists to the Secretary-General of the United Nations” (75(2)). Whereas, there is no any
charts and graphics over the whole Eastern Mediterranean which agreed by regional countries including
between Turkey and Greece, the GCA and Turkey, the GCA and Greece, Egypt and Greece etc.
In this context, International Court of Justice made a clear expression how any maritime delimitation can
be drawn. For instance, the 1984 Case of International Court of Justice, related to Gulf of Maine stated that
The maritime delimitation between states with an opposite or adjacent coast cannot be carried out unilaterally by one
of these States. Such delineation must be sought and affected by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted
in good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a positive result. However, in the absence of such an agreement,
the delimitation shall be carried out by applying to a third party with the requisite competence. (Paragraph 112(1))
The Court’s judgment stipulates that no State or institution shall be able to publish maps in the Eastern
Mediterranean as if it had been maritime delimitation. For maritime delimitation, first the negotiations and the
settlement path should be followed in good faith. The Court clarified with Paragraph 112 (2) how the structure
of this agreement should be. In accordance to the Paragraph 112(2) of the Gulf Maine case, “In either case,
delimitation should be achieved by applying equitable criteria and using practical methods to ensure an
equitable result in the geographic configuration of the zone and other relevant circumstances”. In other words,
the states that will go the way of delimitation should act in the light of fairness principles and take into
consideration all the relevant situations and reach a just equitable result.
In the Case of 1982, the I.C.J. declared in Paragraph 87 that the first two lines were not expressly agreed
upon, but established initially by unilateral action. The Court would therefore observe at the outset that
an attempt by a unilateral act to establish international maritime boundary lines regardless of the legal position of
other States is contrary to recognized principles of international law, as laid down, inter alia, in the Geneva Conventions of
1958 on the Law of the Sea, especially the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention
on the Continental Shelf, which provide that maritime boundaries should be determined by agreement between the Parties.
(I.C.J., 1982, Article 87, pp. 52-53)
This principle has been preserved in the draft law of the Sea Law. The Case of 1951 points out that
the limitation of marine areas is always of an international dimension; it cannot depend solely on the will as stated in
the municipal law of the coastal state. While it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a one-sided act, only the
coastal State is entitled to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation for other States is subject to international law. (p.
132)
Undoubtedly, this strict nature of the delimitation leads to the need to adopt the appropriate procedure in the
maritime delimitation as a result of the negotiations of the parties in order to give fair opportunity to participate
in possible disputes. But this is not the meaning of unilateral borders which can be drawn without agreements.
Conclusions
In 2010, Professor Juan Luis Suárez de Vivero has prepared a report on maritime jurisdiction and fishing
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The report states that “In the Mediterranean basin, no state can
declare the maximum 200 nautical mile breadth of exclusive economic zone or fishery zone because at no point
is the Mediterranean more than 400 miles wide” (Vivero, 2010, p. 30). This perspective accepts the principle of
the supremacy of geography and is important in terms of describing that it cannot have an area of 200 nautical
miles that GCA and EU imply in its applications and which it foresees in its limitations.
Accordingly, without limitation agreements between the regional states, without the resolution of the
current disputes, the median line delimitation methodology will not be legally binding on the following map.
The related attitude of the parties is a political approach that highlights the unacceptable logic in law and
ignores the principles of international law.
The other subject is related to the defined way of the submarine cables on the condimental shelf by EU. In
accordance to Article 79(3) of the UNCLOS, submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf of any
state (Turkey) are dependent to the consent of the coastal State. This means that the Parties should receive a
consent from Turkey, because pipelines and cables are planning to pass through Turkish continental shelf. In
other words, when the provisions of Article 79 of the UNCLOS are considered, in the event of any passing of a
pipeline of another state such as through Turkey’s continental shelf, Turkey should be informed and her consent
should be sought. It is seen the condition that the consent and permission are necessary. If both parties are
planning to lie cables through Turkey’s continental shelf, they should be seeking permission and consent from
Turkey. Whereas, as it is seen that the GCA and EU are ignoring the international law which neither Turkey has
been informed nor her consent has been sought. This situation shall appear in the future as a separate controversy
between the parties in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although as regards the laying of pipelines, the GCA’ domestic
law stipulates that other states have to obtain consent from their respective authorities in laying any pipes or
cables. Unfortunately it does not show the same respect and good will towards Turkey. In sum, whole steps
followed by EU and the GCA, in other words either median line applications alone or lying cable and pipeline
projects through Turkey, are not in compatible with the international law.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.09.005
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Transforming the European Migrant Crisis into Rural

Developmental Opportunities: The Case of Latvia
Olayemi Bakre, Nirmala Dorasamy

Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa

The European migrant crisis has been accentuated as the most momentous challenge that the European Union has
faced since its establishment in 1993. The magnitude of this migration crisis is been amplified by political instability in
the Middle East, wars, limited economic opportunities, and climate change. Migration analysts have viewed this
“polycrisis” from an optimistic and pessimist perspective. The paper however pursues that of optimism and explores
how the integration of skilled political migrants can be integrated into shrinking Latvian communities with an agendum
to transforming the economically stagnated rural communities into viable rural spaces. The researcher interviewed
91 immigrants from nine countries to gain an insight into perception of political migrants amongst other variables.
Furthermore, inductive and deductive approaches were used in synthesizing pertinent information from official
records and reports on the above subject matter. A core emphasis of the paper was that the shrinking population of
Latvia will adversely impede its future economic development. Hence, the paper advocates a systematic integration
of skilled political migrants into the Latvian rural economy as an agendum to accelerating rural development.
Keywords: European migrant crisis, rural development, Latvia, shrinking population, political migrants
Introduction
The European migrant crisis has persuasively been accentuated as the most momentous challenge that the
European Union has witnessed since its establishment in 1993 (Poddar, 2016). The magnitude of this migration
crisis is been amplified by political instability in the Middle East, wars, limited economic opportunities, and
climate change (Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2018; Upadhyay, 2016). In accordance to the estimate put forth by the
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 59.5 million migrants are currently displaced. Amongst these
migrants, 19.5 million are refugees. A majoritant (1,011,700) of these migrants arrived the shores of Europe by
sea, while a few others (34,900) arrived by land according a 2015 estimate (PwC, 2017). Consequently, the
scale of exodus in 2016 further exceeds that of the previous years (Clayton & Hereward, 2016). Since 2015,
migration has become an integral concern on the European continent. Its integrality has played a domineering
role on the political scene, impacted policies; and forecasted to remain a main talking point for several years to
come (European Commission, 2016). The migration crisis has increasingly dominated public and expert
discourse due to the multifaceted array of opportunities and challenges intertwined with it (European
Parliament Research Service, 2016; European Commission, 2016).
Olayemi Bakre, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Public Management, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South
Africa.
Nirmala Dorasamy, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Public Management, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South
Africa.
432 TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN MIGRANT CRISIS INTO RURAL DEVELOPMENTAL
The migrant crisis is forecasted to be continuous as the root causes are yet to be adequately addressed. One
raging cause of the migration crisis is “war”. For instance, in the last 20 years, the Central and West African
region has witness 25 major conflicts. This has resulted to the forceful displacement of millions across this region
(United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund [UNICEF], 2017). The findings by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR’s] annual Global Trends Report also reveals that in the last
five years, a total of 15 conflicts have re-ignited or re-erupted among eight African countries (Burundi, Central
African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Mali, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Libya), three in Asian countries
(Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Myanmar), three Middle East countries (Yemen, Syria, and Iraq), and one European
country (Ukraine) (PwC, 2017). Amongst the afore-cited conflicts, the Syrian conflict is the largest driver of the
migrant crisis. As at 2014, 7.6 million Syrians were internally displaced, while during the same period, 3.88
million sought safe sanctuary in other countries (Chardon, 2016). The Aleppo crisis in 2017 further orchestrated
forced migrations. And more recently, the 2018 Crisis in the eastern Ghouta of Syria is assumed to further
instigate Syrians out of their domain. Contrary to “political migration” which is largely driven by war; other
instigators such as famine due to climate change; poverty and high incidences of joblessness and political
instability are amongst reasons “economic migrants” have left their home countries (Upadhyay, 2016; PwC,
2017).
The migration crisis has brought about a number of consequences in Europe. Over the last two years,
anti-migration sentiment has orchestrated xenophobic movements, populist discourses as well as nationalist
sentiments. This migration crisis has also served as a main weapon of campaign during elections particularly
among the far right politicians. Far right activists such as Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France, the
Alternative for Germany as well as Freedom Party of Austria have used the anti-migration narrative to win over
electorates over (Poddar, 2016). Some pro-migrant populace have also begun to shift their stance. This is
manifested particularly amongst the Nordic states which previously welcomed the migrants with open-hands.
The initial “open-hands” is gradually transforming into an increasing discontentment and demand for more
proactive border measures (Chardon, 2016). Also, the resettlement plan proposed for migrants by the EU is
vehemently opposed by the Hungarian government alongside other Eastern states, such as the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Poland (Faiola, 2016). The anti-migrant narratives have divergent tunes for two core reasons.
Firstly, the influx of migrants has surpassed an unprecedented peak. Secondly, most of the migrants who
arrived earlier are yet to be settled (Bordignon, Gois, & Moriconi, 2016). To suppress the migrant crisis, the EU
has invested surmountable amount of time in negotiations, meetings as well as allocating huge financial
resources. An estimated €350 million has been disbursed by the European Union and its member states under
the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The European Commission has equally donated a staggering €2.1 billion to
the same course, making the “migrant crisis” the largest humanitarian relief project. Additionally, €500 million
was allocated to the Syrian Trust Fund; €1 billion was disbursed to the Turkish Facility for Refugees; while
€1.8 billion was also allocated to the Emergency Trust Fund in Africa to mitigate the root causes of migration
(European Commission, 2016; Chardon, 2016; Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2018). Besides the European Union,
researchers in religious organisations and NGOs have waded into the non-ending migrant crisis.
Besides the monetary contributions by the European Union, other governmental and non-governmental
agencies, such as the United Nations, International Organisation for Migration, UNHCR, donor organisations,
research institutes, International Rescue Committee, and religious leaders (Pope Francis and Archbishop of
Canterbury) have equally waded in (Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2018). However, the voice of “business” has
TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN MIGRANT CRISIS INTO RURAL DEVELOPMENTAL 433
conspicuously been absent (Marcus, 2015). Marcus (2015) however argued that the exclusion of the business
sector has resulted to “missed opportunities”, and bases this assertion on the potentiality of businesses been able
recruit skilled and employable migrants, alongside offer vocational training programmes for migrants as an
agendum to fast tracking the integration of “well-deserving” migrants. Inconsonance to the afore-narrated
concerns, this paper explores strategies through which politically displaced migrants could be integrated into the
Latvian rural communities with the agendum of reinvigorating depopulated rural spaces.
The United Nations alongside the EU have held a series of Summits to address the migration crisis. However,
either entities have been able to articulate or envision a specific plan; or have specific commitments been made
towards the resettlement of migrants globally (Chardon, 2016; UNICEF, 2017). As articulated by the Human
Rights Watch, the summit on migrant crisis was “filled with speeches that veered from vapid platitudes
disconnected from real world challenges to get-tough pronouncements about securing borders and stopping
irregular migration” (Frelick, 2016). Thus, the secondary objective of this paper is to gain an insight into
circumstances, scenarios, and processes that unfold during the migrant crisis, while proposing pragmatic and
humane stratagem orchestrated towards the rural economy of Latvia. Hence, this veers the author to one
amongst the fastest shrinking populations across the globe―Latvia (Pužulis & Kūle, 2016; Central Statistical
Bureau of Latvia, 2017). This demographic remoteness―shrinking―is even more pronounced at countrysides,
such as Ķepova, Bērziņi, and Malnava (Pužulis & Kūle, 2016; Raugze, 2012). The countryside’s shrinking is
often attributed to “socio–economic structural changes and rescaling and consequent changes of former
economic, social and cultural linkages” (Poddar, 2016). This has demonstrated some adverse consequences on
the Latvian rural economy, and is forecasted to be exacerbated in the near future (Mangule & Akule, 2015).
In accordance to a report worked out by the Ministry of Economics (National Economy of Latvia), the
Latvian economy has the potential to double by 2030 (Mangule & Akule, 2015). However, a cogent
impediment to this prognosis is “lack of labour force” (Mangule & Akule, 2015). This is attributed to
emigration and low birth rate. Based on the prevalent trend, Mangule and Akule (2015) forecasted that the
Latvian population may decrease by almost 200,000 people (population decrease of 610 %) by year 2030; thus
opening vacancies for an estimated 200,000 job by 2030.
Consequently, “shrinking requires the need for a set of innovative; knowledge-, evidence- and place-based;
coordinated; pro-active; multi-disciplinary; spatial; economic and socially-targeted policy measures” (Pužulis
& Kūle, 2016). Thus, achieving such agendum may be through the integration of skilled migrants into the
Latvian society, as the proceeding sections of this paper explore such workability.
Materials and Methods

To achieve the objectives of this paper, a number of research approaches were utilised. Firstly, face-to-face
interviews were conducted with a total of 91 immigrants within the premises of the Department of Home Affairs
(Moore road branch), Durban, South Africa. The interviews commenced in October 2017, and lasted till
mid-February, 2018. The inclusive criteria set in this study were “political migrants”. Thus, migrants from nine
different countries were involved. These comprised of nationalities of South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Somalia, Cameroun, Rwanda, Pakistan, and Central Africa Republic. On the contrary,
economic migrants from countries, such as Lesotho, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Swaziland, Namibia,
Zambia, Angola, India, Bangladesh, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were excluded during the course of the interviews.
A number of migrants were non-English speakers, hence, research assistance who could speak Swahili and
French were employed during these interview processes. The questions posed during the interview centred on
four core themes. Firstly, to identify the skills and competencies of migrants (literacy, computer skills, languages
spoken, etc.); secondly, to identify the age demographic; thirdly, to enquire if migrants had prior farming
experiences or were accustomed to rural lifestyle; and fourthly, to enquire if they were willing to migrate to an
eastern European country should they find work opportunities. Alongside the interviews, results from literatures
on depopulation, rural communities of Latvia and Latvian agriculture were utilised. Inductive and deductive
approaches were used in synthesizing pertinent information. Furthermore, official records and reports were
retrieved from the Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia, Rural Support Service, Agriculture Data Service, Latvian
Investment and Development Agency, Eurostat―Statistical Office of the European Union as well as the
Ministry of Agriculture of Latvia. Analogical deduction and synthesis were made from cartographic materials
contained among some of the afore-cited documents. Through the variety of sources used, expert views were
sought by using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method. Confidentiality and anonymity of participants were
ensured throughout the course of the study. It has been proven empirically that confidentiality and anonymity
often contributes to truthfulness and honesty of remarks made among participants. More so, this was pursued as
a means to ensuring ethical standards. Prior interviewing the migrants, permission was sought from the
Department of Home Affairs, while the objectives of the research were communicated. Through the aid of
content and thematic analysis, the researcher was able to generate six significant themes which are further
elaborated in the discussion and result section.
Results and Discussions

The face-to-face interviews alongside document and report analysis was to explore, deduce, and fashion
how “skillful-politically” displaced migrants could be integrated into the Latvian rural communities with the
agendum of reinvigorating depopulated rural spaces. Thus, the discussions are within the ambits of the following
six themes―nexus between economic forecast and labour force; age demographics of migrants; shrinking rural
Latvia; decline of the agricultural sector; lack of information about skill and education of migrants; and lack of
synergy among stakeholders.
Nexus Between Economic Forecast Versus Labour Force
As earlier cited in this paper, the Latvian economy is forecasted to be doubled by 2030. In 2030, it is
further forecasted that an estimated 200,000 job openings will be available. With the current decline in Latvian
population, this presumptive prognosis may be far from reality. Thus, to initiate this forecast, a selective
employment-based immigration policy should be implemented promptly (Mangule & Akule, 2015). This could
be a win-win opportunity for both the Latvian rural communities as well as ambitious and “skillful-political”
migrants.
Age Demographics of Migrants
Majoritant of political migrants interviewed during the course of this study were within the 21-38 age
bracket. This age bracket corresponds with a high majority of migrants currently in Europe. As reported by
Bordignon et al. (2016), the age brackets of most migrants (asylum seekers) in Italy, Spain, and France ranged
between 18 and 34 years old. Male are overly represented amongst these migrants. This may be due to the
perceived risk of traveling risky routes which makes women vulnerable to migration experience (Bordignon et
al., 2016). Furthermore, most of the migrants interviewed were skilled, or semi-skilled, and had a minimum of
high school qualification (UNICEF, 2017). Considering the ageing population of Latvia, some of these skilled
migrants may be absorbed into the Latvian rural communities after a stringent and thorough selective
employment-based procedure. Table 1 reveals the age demographics of Latvia in years 2010, 2014, and 2015.
Table 1
Age Structure of Usually Resident Population
2010 2014 2015
Population―total 2,120,504 1,986,096 1,968,957
aged 0-14 300,294 297,720 300,260
aged 15-24 299,722 212,297 199,613
aged 25-49 736,717 681,427 675,763
aged 50-64 399,594 409,576 406,736
aged 65+ 384,177 385,076 386,585
Demographic burden 545 613 625
Average age of population, years 40.4 42.0 42.1
Note. Source: Adapted from Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2017).
Notable from above is the decline in working age population (15-24; 25-49). Thus, working age migrants
who are experienced agriculturist or farmers, qualified teachers, medical professionals, as well as
paramedic’s/care workers for the elderly may be useful among rural communities of Latvia.
Shrinking Rural Communities of Latvia
A population decline of 500,600 was recorded in Latvia between 1996 and 2016 (Central Statistical Bureau
of Latvia, 2017). While the population decline is notable in most regions across Latvia, it is more pronounced
among rural communities where populations decline by 20-25% in every five years (Raugze, 2012). The urban
population accounted for 68% by the beginning of 2016. An estimated 48% of this urban populace resided in
Riga. Though Riga is densely populated, the exact opposite is the case in several rural communities whom are
on the verge to becoming ghost spaces in the near future (Pužulis & Kūle, 2016). Shrinking has a number of
adverse consequences. Amongst these consequences are depletion of human capital (Audirac, 2014), under use
of infrastructure and services, brain drain (Bernt, Cocks, Couch, Grossmann, & Haase, 2012), and decline in
municipal taxes due to fewer taxes (Pužulis & Kūle, 2016). Furthermore, “shrinking” has been attributed to the
“negative socio-economic processes that have been observed in 52 municipalities” (Bulderberga, 2013, p. 163);
and could also result to loss of social, economic, or cultural function which has no close substitute (Pužulis &
Kūle, 2016). Hence, the issue of “shrinking” requires more pragmatic measures as to avert “ghost rural spaces”
in the years to come.
Decline of the Agricultural Sector
The current trend among rural communities of Latvia indicates that the “successors” or the next generation
will not be farming (Apine, 2016). Also, heirs of historic land owners are beginning to sell their property to
foreigners as a fast and easy means to becoming wealthy (Apine, 2016). This further puts a strain on the
agricultural sector. More so, the decline of enrolment for agricultural related courses at the Latvia University of
Agriculture is indicative of a retrogressive trend of the agricultural sector (European Commission, 2016). One
of the reasons for this is the “comparatively low prestige of the agricultural profession” (European Commission,
2014). Consequently, replacement and regeneration of academic staff members at the Latvia University of
Agriculture is of grievance concern. Among the 412 academic staff members, 45% are above 50 years, while
only 11% of Professors are below 50 years of age (European Commission, 2014). To address this ranging
deficit, qualified “politically displaced migrants” who are interested in agricultural related courses can be
enrolled for masters or doctoral degrees as an agendum to sustaining the agricultural sector in Latvia; while
also recruiting migrant lecturers at this institution of learning. The Latvian agricultural sector is further
challenged by low level of qualified personnel in agricultural related field; insufficient utilisation of innovative
solution, low competitiveness of farms and enterprises; underdevelopment of risk management systems;
inadequacy of energy infrastructure (European Commission, 2016; Skribane & Jekabsone, 2014). Interestingly,
during the course of the interviews, about one-third of “politically displaced migrants” did allege they possess
agricultural related skills. This attribute was a common feature among nationalities of Central Africa Republic,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroun, and Burundi.
Lack of Synergy Among Stakeholders
A number of NGOs, research institutions, donor organisations, and governmental and non-governmental
institutions are directly or indirectly involved in the migrant crisis. Unfortunately, the exclusion of an important
role player, business, has conspicuously been absent. The involvement of the business sector alongside NGOs
may have facilitated a job-match between host countries and refugees (PwC, 2017). More so, involvement of
such key players may have been helpful in training migrants in readiness for the labour market. Such training
may include teaching of the local language to politically displaced migrants, similar to that offered by
Jobführerschein in Germany which provided vocational courses and language lessons to 250 refugees (PwC,
2017).
Lack of Information About Skill and Education of Migrants
Similar to the centre where interviews of this study was conducted, Asylum Centres or Refugee Camps
often do not take key data on political or economic migrants. Upon arrival in Europe, pertinent data regarding
educational attainment and competencies of migrants are often not taken (Bordignon et al., 2016). Collating
such data may be helpful while formulating policies on migrants regarding concerns such social integration and
labour market (Bordignon et al., 2016). Such data collation may also facilitate the prompt integration of
politically displaced migrants into sectors or regions such migrants are employable without engendering fears
among the natives in the labour market.
However, due to resource constraint, the researcher was unable to involve other key stakeholders in the
migrant crisis. Furthermore, the views and competency level of 91 participants involved in this study may not
truly be reflective of a wider group of politically displaced migrants. Thus, future studies should include major
stakeholders as well as a larger group of politically displaced migrants from a variety of countries as opposed to
the nine countries used in the current study. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide solutions
to the current “polycrisis”, the next section provides some forward thinking and pragmatic measures aimed at
reinvigorating the shrinking rural communities of Latvia through the integration of skilled politically displaced
migrants.
Conclusion
The European migrant crisis has resulted into heated debates due to the complexity involved in receiving
as well as the integration of newly arrived migrants. This complexity has often been exhaustive and beyond the
resource of EU or its member states ability in crafting tailor-made agenda to addressing the on-going crisis.
Though the current flow of migrants into Europe has soft-peddled, the greater concern is how to integrate
many of the migrants. Instead of taking a breath of relief, the EU alongside its partners should orchestrate
formidable polices and stratagem for the short, medium, and long term. One of such formidable stratagem lies
in the integration of skilled political migrants into shrinking populations, such as the rural communities of
Latvia. This will no doubt serve as an antidote to the ageing population, while reinvigorating the rural spaces
through tailor-made agricultural developmental initiatives. Empirical and theoretical evidence both affirm
optimism towards the development of host country through the integration of skilled migrants (European
Commission, 2016). However, such integration process will require a thorough scrutiny procedure. This paper
however suggests that only a manageable migrant size ranging from 1,000-2,500 skilled political migrants
should be absorbed at the initial stage. Such migrants could be issued a one-year work permit, and with
restrictions in working in specific sectors and zones, so as not to create competition with the natives at the
labour market.
Considering the core demographic of politically driven migrants as predominantly working class (age
bracket); this provides an array of opportunities for the sustainability of depopulating rural communities of
Latvia. Integration of skilled-political migrants can boast competitiveness in the Latvian economy which is
lacking (Skribane & Jekabsone, 2014); boast consumption pattern and gross domestic product (GDP); revitalize
the declining Latvian agricultural sector; and making the forecasted economy growth a reality. Invariably, the
arrival of political migrants increases the EU’s public expenditure in the short-run (PwC, 2017). However, in
the medium and long term, the integration of migrants into the Latvian labour force will inversely impact the
fiscal system. Hence, such working migrants are able to contribute to welfare of the Latvian economy.
Furthermore, both the highly skilled and semi-skilled can contribute to the Latvian society. While skilled
migrants contribute to the teaching and health care professions; semi-skilled migrants can also work in the
labour intensive agricultural sector or provide care to the elderly population. Hence, the earlier governments
start harnessing on the positives attributed to migrant crisis, the earlier such crisis can be transformed into
developmental opportunities particularly among rural communities where the economies have been stagnated
for years (Skribane & Jekabsone, 2014).
However, as an agendum to transforming the European migrant crisis into developmental opportunities
(among the rural communities of Latvia), the following measures need to be taken:
 Restoration of trust in European Union’s actions between member states and EU citizens (Bordignon et al.,
2016);
 Changing the anti-migrant rhetoric through media;
 Deportation of non-qualifying migrants (economic migrants) who came through illegal routes;
 Tightening of borders through smart security approaches and negotiations with global military personnel;
 Forge more multi-lateral agreements such as the 2016 EU-Turkish deal with more countries, while
sustaining the present deals;
 Proactive involvement of the business community alongside other “migrant crisis” stakeholders;
 Address “push factors” (e.g., political instability and climate change) and “pull factors” (work
opportunities) through sustainable foreign, economic, and trade policies.
Should the afore-cited measures be put in place, illegal flow of migrants will be drastically abated; racism,
discrimination, and other cultural barriers could be averted. This also can orchestrate a tailor-made integration
of migrants. This stratagem may equally be cascaded among East European and other EU nations that are
experiencing shrinking in population due to the prominence of “age-populating”.
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank the immigrants from the nine countries who provided some valuable
insight, as well as the Durban University of Technology for their supportive role. Also, the author
acknowledges the inputs of Professor Geoffrey Harris, Dr. Joseph Olusegun Adebayo, and Dr. Siphamandla
Mathaba for reviewing this paper. The valuable efforts of the two research assistances are equally appreciated
for the great enthusiasm and support offered during the course of the interviews.
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Kick Off Maritime Boundary Disputes: Published Maps, Not

Achilles Skordas claims that

Article 74(1) and Article 83(1) of UNCLOS

GCA’ stance Turkey’ stance

Reference only Median Line?

“ICJ and other internaional courts taking the related/special

Figure 1. Dispute arguments on median line with arrow diagram.

Arguments by the Parties

EuroAfrica and EuroAsia Interconnector Cable Project Maps

Transforming the European Migrant Crisis into Rural

Olayemi Bakre, Nirmala Dorasamy

Materials and Methods

Results and Discussions

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