International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 9, Number 06, 2021

International Relations
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Volume 9, Number 6, June 2021 (Serial Number 93)
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Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
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★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
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International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 9, Number 6, June 2021 (Serial Number 93)
Contents
Foreign Policy
Central Asia’s Foreign Relations: A Comparison Between the Soviet and Post-Soviet Era 211
Enayatollah Yazdani
India’s Foreign Strategy From the Perspective of Geopolitical Logic 225

YUAN Xuezhe
Security Model
The Evolution of the EU’s Security Model Through the Lenses of the Balkans 232
Evanthia Balla
Democracy
A Prerequisite for the Successful Governance of COVID-19 in the United States:

Expansion of Liberal Democracy From Politics to Economy 244
ZHOU Zhifa, QU Pan, SHEN Yizhu
International Relations and Diplomacy, June 2021, Vol. 9, No. 06, 211-224
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.06.001
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Central Asia’s Foreign Relations: A Comparison Between the

Soviet and Post-Soviet Era
Enayatollah Yazdani
School of International Studies, Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China
Central Asia’s pivotal geographical position allowed it to play an essential role in relations among nations of
Eurasia in the Middle Ages, as the bridge between China and Europe. Yet, during the Russian and then the Soviet
rule on Central Asia, the region’s republics had no independent position in international community as foreign
relations were formed and managed by central government in Moscow. The collapse of the Union of Soviet in 1991
made salient the geopolitical, economic, and cultural importance of the five former Soviet Central Asian republics.
Accordingly, the republics reemerged as independent actors in the global interstate system and could play a role in
international affairs during the last three decades. This paper aims to compare Central Asia’s foreign relations in the
Soviet and Post-Soviet era.
Keywords: Central Asia, Russia, The Soviet Union, Foreign Relations and Eurasia
Introduction
Central Asia, consisting of five republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan, as a geopolitical region with great civilization, has had a long history, whose legacy after three
decades is still felt and continues to influence its politico-economic life and particularly its relations with the
global community. Yet, for about 150 years the region history has been associated with Russian and
particularly the Soviet history. Indeed, the Central Asia region had become part of the Soviet Union.
Accordingly, the region’s republics had no independent position in international community as they did not
have relations with other countries outside of the Soviet hemisphere. Foreign relations were formed and
managed by central government in Moscow.
After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the situation changed. The Central Asian republics again
rose to prominence in geopolitical and strategic calculations. In fact, the republics reemerged as independent
players in the global interstate system and their varied histories and geographies offering many different
possible opportunities and course of action. In addition to the regions geopolitical changes, some factors also
contributed to expansion of the republics’ place in international politics and outside powers’ influence and
competition in the region.
This paper aims to address the Central Asian regions position in the Soviet and post-Soviet era. It explores
how Central Asia as a closed region during the Soviet period changed its geopolitical position and became an
Enayatollah Yazdani, Dr., associate professor of International Relations, School of International Studies, Sun Yat-sen University,
Zhuhai, China. Email: yazdani@mail.sysu.edu.cn.
212 A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET ERA
influential actor in the global affairs. In addition the paper addresses factors which have played important role
in the globality of Central Asia.
Geopolitics of Central Asia: Preliminary Observations

Central Asia is part of the “Heartland” (Mackinder’s theory) and its pivotal geographical position allowed it
to play an essential role in relations among nations of Eurasia in the Middle Ages, as the bridge between China
and Europe (MacKinder, 1919). In the modern world, its importance grew as the great powers of the time (Russia
and Britain) sought power and influence along its borders (Rahimov, 2018). Yet, the Bolshevik revolution of
1917 and subsequent 70 years of Soviet rule closed the region to influences from the outside world, and
consequently the republics did not play any role in international relation. Yet, with the Soviet Union’s demise in
December 1991 the Central Asian republics again rose to prominence in geopolitical and strategic calculations.
Indeed, in the post-Cold War era Central Asia’s geostrategic importance and natural resource potential have
made it a focus of attention in Eurasian geopolitics (for a detailed discussion see Fuller, 1994). Any
consideration of its republics’ international politics has to be based on geopolitical, religious, economic, and
regional realities.
In fact, the emergence of independent states in Central Asia has both literally and figuratively changed the
map of Asia and affected the world, particularly the surrounding regions, notably the Middle East, South, and
West Asia. The region borders Russia in the north, Iran and Afghanistan in the south, China in the east, and the
Caspian Sea in the west (see Figure 1). This geographical location has made it strategically important.
Furthermore, it is located at the center of Eurasia, connecting Eurasia not only from east to west, but also from
south to north. More importantly, it is surrounded by four major world civilizations: Christian, Confucian,
Islamic and Hindu, and Asian powers, Russia, China, and India. In addition, the region lies at the strategic
juncture between four nuclear powers, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. In the meantime, another aspect of the
region’s geopolitical importance should not be overlooked, i.e., the rise of political and commercial competition
over the energy resources, namely oil and natural gas, and particularly the routes for export pipelines (for a
comprehensive discussion see Tokaev, 2003; Arvanitopoulos, 1997/1998).
Such a geopolitical position (see Figure 1), in fact, is a significant factor that has not only made the region
attractive to the outside world but also placed it at global challenge, especially after the events of 11 September
2001. In particular, if the clash of civilizations foretold by S. P. Huntington materialises as the latest phase in the
evolution of conflict in the modern world, the role this region could play is undeniable due to its special location
(Huntington, 1993; for the position of Central Asia see also Kadivar, 2002).
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET ERA 213
Figure 1. Central Asia’s geopolitical position map.1
Central Asia a Closed Region: No foreign Relations

The Central Asian region has had a long history, whose legacy after three decades is still felt and continues
to influence its politico-economic life and particularly its relations with the outside world. For more than three
thousand years this region has been a crossroads for major ethnic migrations. Central Asia was predominantly
peopled by nomadic and sedentary tribes, composed of a variety of ethnic groups. The Tajiks are closely related
to the Persians, Kazaks are of Turkic-Mongol stock, and also of Turkic stock are the Uzbeks, who also spread
across the then virtually nonexistent border into Northern Afghanistan; the Turkmens and Kyrgyz were also
Turkic, and all could reasonably be described as “backward”, especially technologically, compared to their
Russian conquerors (Baumer, 2018; Jukes, 1973, p. 35; Becker, 1968, pp. 67-83). In such circumstances it was
not easy for them to develop a counterpart to European nationalism. The entire region was run as two
governments, with roughly the present-day Kazakhstan being the “steppe” governorate, and the
rest—“Turkestan”—under the influence of the main oasis states, namely Merv (Turkman), Khiva (mostly
Turkmen and Uzbek), Bukhara (including Samarkand, a synthesis of Uzbeks and Tajiks), and Kokand (including
Tashkent, mainly Uzbek). Among them, the Emirates of Bukhara and Khiva were the major political and cultural
centers, and both were established in the early 16th century (Jukes, 1973, p. 35). Turkestan society was feudal,
overwhelmingly illiterate, and backward in its agricultural practices. Warfare between the nomadic tribes over
grazing land, and between the nomads and the settled areas was endemic. Slavery was institutional; the Turkmens
1
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/caucasus_cntrl_asia_pol_95.jpg.
in particular made a living by robbing trading caravans and raiding adjacent areas, especially Northern Iran, to
abduct travelers and inhabitants and sell them in the slave markets of Bukhara and elsewhere. From the religious
point of view, as discussed below, apart from the Pamiris, who were mostly Ismaili Shiite, the great majority of
Central Asians were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School of Islamic law (madhhab), one of four such schools
within Sunni Islam (Stacey, 2019; Jordan, 2012; Black, 2001, pp. 33-37).2
Furthermore, the region was a meeting place for the great civilizations of the ancient world and Middle
Ages—Persian, Indian, Chinese, and Islamic. After the diffusion of civilization westward and eastward, the most
convenient overland routes linking the Mediterranean world, India, Persia, and China led through Central Asia.
As long as these routes remained the principal arteries of trade and communication among the four major centers
of civilized life, Central Asia was assured a leading role in world history (Becker, 1968, pp. 3-24). The area has
also long been an arena of great-power rivalry at various time involving the Persian, Arab, Mongol, Ottoman, and
Russian empires, and also China along its eastern margins (Hunter, 1996, pp. 3-19).
For more than one and half centuries Central Asia was predominantly under Russian and then the Soviet rule.
In fact, for most of Central Asia’s history its politics have been shaped by Russia and the Soviet Union, at least as
much as by internal forces. Russia has had a long history of contact with Central Asia and the cultural, social,
economic, and political characteristics of the region were greatly influenced by Russian politics, economy, and
culture.
Russian rule in Central Asia was based on specific strategic, economic, political, and cultural imperatives.
Strategically, Central Asia became important during the 19th century. Indeed, in that period the conquest of the
region took place in the context of wider international struggles (Becker, 1986). Occupation of Central Asia
brought Russia closer to India, a British colony, a land of enormous economic potential, and a corridor towards
the world market. This southward advance alarmed the British government, so some British politicians began to
speak of a Russian threat to India, while Russia in turn characterised Britain as a real threat to its interests in the
area (Boulger, 1879; Anwar Khan, 1963; Johnson, 2003, pp. 697-743; for discussion of Anglo-Russian conflict
in Asia and Central Asia see Saray, 2007). This situation led both powers toward conflict. In this connection,
Central Asia played a strategic role for each to counter the other’s perceived threat by creating a form of strategic
diversion associated with cross-border subversion; this Anglo-Russian competition was known as the “Great
Game” (for detailed discussion see Hopkirk, 1994).3
The Russian revolution of October 1917 occurred within an ideological framework that opened the way for
new local elites and political bodies to emerge. The Central Asians had received the revolution with mixed
sentiments. Nationalist Muslims tried to use this opportunity to gain independence, but moderate Muslim groups
preferred to have the support of the new Soviet regime (Morrison, 2017; for discussion of the revolution of 1917
see also Miller, 2001).
Politically, republic’s communist party was part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
republics were ruled by political and financial power of the center. None of the Central Asian Republics until
1991 have experienced sovereignty, neither these states had a background of independent nationhood. Soviet
drawn boundaries and named clans for political comfort (Thite, 2020). In addition, the republics’ economic
2
The other three schools of Sunni Islam are the Shafai, the Hanbali, and the Maliki.
3
The term “Great Game” was coined by an official in the 19th-century British Indian Empire, referring to the major regional
powers’ competition to dominate Central Asia, where empires historically have rubbed together at the center of Eurasia. It was a
struggle for dominance over land and populations whose values lay in their location between the Russian and British Empires.
structure was determined by centralized Soviet planning. In fact, the region’s economy was tied to Moscow
because the USSR was a single economic space, in which all Soviet republics were to a greater or lesser extent
dependent on each other. Parts and raw materials for Central Asia’s industries were imported from elsewhere in
the USSR. The Soviet era also brought forced collectivisation and migration that deeply changed Central Asian
ways of life. Soviet resettlement programs and political expulsions brought large numbers of non-indigenes to the
region, while collective farming and agricultural quotas initially came close to destroying the local economies
and land. However, Soviet rule of Central Asia also brought some considerable progress, including the
development of agriculture and to some degree industry, and significant achievements in culture, science,
education, and public health, as discussed below (see Figure 2), and in addition, provided some access to wider
markets for Central Asian products (Freni, 2013; Kasenov, 1998). Askar Akayev, former president of
Kyrgyzstan, had said in this respect:
Those citizens of the Central Asian countries who possess good common sense and are free from nationalistic
prejudices are well aware of Russia’s positive role in developing the region. The Soviet epoch was really a sort of
Renaissance for Central Asia in terms of public health services, culture, education and science. (Akayev, 2003)
400
350
300
250
Growth
1960
200
1969
150
100
50
0
Kazakstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Tajikistan
Republic
Figure 2. Growth of industrial activity in the Central Asian republics, 1960-1969 (1940 = 100) (Data source: Jukes, 1973, p. 40).
Russian and Soviet rule in Central Asia widely affected the region’s culture, economics, and politics, and
created a relationship of strong dependency between the local nations and the Russian/Soviet state. The region’s
politico-economic and social structure was shaped in a centrist manner. Accordingly, during the Soviet era, the
Central Asian republics never gained the status of independent actors in international relations. Foreign relations
were directed by the central government, and the central leadership determined foreign policy goals and priorities.
Therefore, one can assume that Central Asia was in fact a closed region, with no position and no role to play in
international relations. Accordingly, the region’s republics had no access to the outside world as the foreign
relations were shaped by central government in Moscow.
The Post-Soviet Central Asia: A Move Towards Global Connectivity

The collapse of the Union of Soviet in 1991 made salient the geopolitical, economic, and cultural
importance of the five former Soviet Central Asian republics. As a result, Central Asia, a closed and
hard-to-reach region of Eurasia, once again achieved a significant position on Eurasia’s map, with increased
geopolitical and strategic weight of the region. The independence of the republics and Russia’s partial withdrawal
from Central Asia changed the geopolitics of the region from a closed area to one opening up to other interested
foreign actors. Accordingly, as mentioned earlier, a region that in the Cold War era remained in the background
of international politics after independent Central Asia attracted the attention of the global and regional powers.
On other hands, the Soviet Union’s breakdown changed the geopolitics of Central Asia, placing it firmly in a new
geopolitical and geoeconomic context. Accordingly, it started to gain prominence in the strategic objectives and
politico-economic ambitions of many outside powers (Anceschi, 2014). Indeed, Central Asia’s new situation, its
strategic location and enormous natural resources made it an area where some other states, such as the Russian
Federation, China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Israel, and the European Union (EU) also
vie for influence.
The republics became free to “pursue their own individual policy lines towards religion, politics, the
economy and anything else for that matter” (Olcott, 1994, p. 6). Geopolitically, Central Asia is important due to
its strategic position. Economically, as mentioned earlier, some of the republics, notably Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and to some extent Uzbekistan, sit on vast natural resources, notably oil and gas, as well as gold
and uranium are also present (for oil and gas reserves of the region see Table 1). These two important
characteristics have impelled regional and international powers to seek roles in the region’s republics, and exploit
their economic and political problems to gain influence. Consequently, these republics have become new fields in
post-Cold War international politics and economics (Ze, 1998). Under the new circumstances, the countries
found themselves in the interest zone of many regional and global powers, attracting widespread attention
because they have emerged at a point where the political, economic, and security interests of various powers
converge.
Table 1
Caspian basins proved and probable reserves (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012)
Country Crude oil and lease condensate (billion bbl) Natural gas (Tcf)
Azerbaijan 8.5 51
Iran 0.5 2
Kazakhstan 31.2 104
Russia 6.1 109
Turkmenistan 1.9 19
Uzbekistan (s) 7
TOTAL CASPIAN 48.2 292
Independence brought the formal establishment of foreign embassies along with rapid development of
communication between the republics and the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, Western Europe, and the
United States. Rivalry between various forces in the region added to friction and historical grievances within the
CIS (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 2004; Gladkyy, 2003; Menon, 2003; Hunter, 2003).
The Central Asian republics’ orientation to the outside world greatly affects the power and national security
planning of neighbouring and other interested states, principally the United States, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, India, and Pakistan. How these actors have acted in Central Asia can influence geopolitical
alignments in the region. It is also important to grasp how these states and others whose interest is acute though
less direct (for example, the EU, Japan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia), position Central Asia into their strategic
thinking (Bharti, 2020). In fact, the initial power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union has pulled
regional states and some international actors into an intensive competition for power and influence in the area.
Obviously, each has had specific objectives and the competition has economic, political, ideological, and
religious dimensions.
After independent the Central Asian leaders had strongly believed that they were part of a Eurasian
superpower, geographically in Asia, but culturally, politically, and economically part of Eastern Europe, and
realised that they needed to redefine their identity when the USSR ceased to exist, in order to position themselves
in the global community and develop their relations with it (Ayoob & Ismayilov, 2017; also for a more
comprehensive account of identity in Central Asia see Jo-Ann, 1992).
To further these objectives they needed to strengthen their independence, maintain sovereignty, and give
high priority to national consolidation and security (Vassiliev, 2001, pp. 31-37). Accordingly, their priorities
have appeared to be regime survival and economic restructuring, with foreign policy considerations relevant only
if they support these objectives (Tulyakov & Khakimov, 2021). Their poor economic performance, particularly
in the early years of independence, progressively convinced them that they needed help wherever they could get
it (Qazi, 2015). Furthermore, securing foreign investment to develop their oil and gas industries was an important
foreign policy issue, particularly for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In fact, to overcome their economic
problems and reduce politico-economic and military dependence on Russia, they opened their doors to interested
foreign states (Kakharov, 2004; Kliashtorniy, 2003; Anderson, 1997). In this connection, former Uzbek
President Karimov had stated: “Relying on their internal resources and possibilities, [the republics] are searching
for a solution to these problems with the support of interested parties in the world community” (1997, p. 29). At
the same time, the region’s economic and market potential has attracted the outside world’s attention, especially
the energy resources of the Caspian Sea, on which Kazakstan and Turkmenistan have coastlines. Olcott in the
early 1990s pointed out:
Now the outside world could be let in, and each of the leaders saw the arrival of the international community as his
salvation. Foreigners would help generate the capital that economic development required, through the purchase of energy
and other valuable raw materials, through international funding (in part through joint ventures) Soviet-era plans for
resource extraction as well as through the further expansion of these projects, and through the use of foreign aid,
international credits, and joint ventures to reform agriculture and to modernise and expand the industrial base. (Olcott,
1996, p. 5)
Since 1991 the Central Asian states have established diplomatic relations with many countries. In 1992 they
all joined the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Economic
Cooperation Organisation (ECO), while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan also joined the Organisation
of Islamic Conference (OIC), with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan following in 1995.4 In 1994 all joined the NATO
Partnership for Peace (PfP) (see also Table 2) (Akiner, 2000).5
Table 2
Participation of Central Asian Countries in Organisations for Regional Cooperation, 2002 (European
Commission, 2002, p. 5)
Country SCO EEC CSTO CICA ECO CACO PfP
Kazakstan X X X X X X X
Kyrgyzstan X X X X X X X
Tajikistan X X X X X X X
Turkmenistan* X X
Uzbekistan X X X X X
Notes. SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (with Russia and China); EEC: Eurasian Economic Community, ex Customs
Union (with Russia and Belarus); CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organisation; CICA: Conference on Interaction and
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (with Afghanistan, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, Palestine National
Administration, Russia, and Turkey); CACO: Central Asian Cooperation Organisation, ex Central Asian Economic Community. *
Due to its policy of neutrality, Turkmenistan has participated in few regional organisations such as PfP Partnership for Peace (with
NATO).
However, during the last three decades the close link between the individual states’ domestic policies and
foreign relations has also led each down different paths in international relations. For example, Kazakhstan’s
long border with Russia (6,846 km) and large Russian population, and Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian
military assistance during and after its civil war, have resulted in considerable interaction with Russia. Instead
Uzbekistan has tried to distance itself from Russia, and Turkmenistan has pursued neutrality (Gusev, 2019).
Nevertheless, the republics have devoted, and continue to devote considerable effort to forming and
implementing their foreign policies. And, for various reasons, Central Asia has been also of increased importance
to a considerable number of regional and extra-regional powers.
Indeed, for the post-Soviet Central Asian republics, one of the most important issues was to form their
foreign relations (Bremmer, 2006). Immediately after independence they were concerned to establish a positive
image in the eyes of the global community, and to promote their self-identity in the international arena, attain
membership of regional and international organisations, particularly the UN, establish relations with the outside
world, and gain political and financial support to consolidate their independence and reconstruct their economies.
Although independent itself could change the geopolitical map of the region and opened the republics to the
outside powers, some other factors also contributed to expansion of powers influence and competition in the
region. These factors include:
1. The region enormous of oil and natural gas, as mentioned earlier, particularly in Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan and to some extent Uzbekistan. Because of the energy wealth, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan have got a prominent space on the global hydrocarbon map. Kazakhstan has proven reserves
4
ECO is an inter-governmental regional organisation, which was established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey for the
purpose of sustainable socio-economic development of the member states. For more information see
http://www.ecosecretariat.org/; the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was formed in 1969 after the burning of the
al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, with the idea that Islamic governments should “consult together with a view to promoting close
cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired by teachings of Islam”. The
recent name is Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, consisting of 57 member states.
5
Tajikistan joined the program in 2001, the 27th country, and last former Soviet republic, to sign up for NATO’s Partnership for
Peace program in a ceremony on 20 February 2002, RFE/RL, Prague, 25 February 2002.
estimated at 30.0 thousand million barrels (3.9 thousand million tons) of oil and proven natural gas reserves of
35.0 trillion cubic feet (1.3 trillion cubic meters), which constitutes 1.7% and 0.5% of global proven reserves with
a reserve to production ratio (R/P) of 42.7 years and 40.7 years respectively. Turkmenistan has proven reserves
estimated at 0.6 thousand million barrels (0.1 thousand million tons) of oil and proven natural gas reserves of
688.1 trillion cubic feet (19.5 trillion cubic meters), which constitutes 0.05% and 9.9% of global proven reserves
respectively with a reserve to production ratio (R/P) of 7.4 years and more than 316.8 years respectively.
Uzbekistan has proven reserves estimated at 0.6 thousand million barrels (0.1 thousand million tons) of oil and
proven natural gas reserves of 42.7 trillion cubic feet (1.2 trillion cubic meters), which constitutes 0.05 % and
0.6% of global proven reserves respectively with a reserve to production ratio (R/P) of 25.4 years and 21.4 years
respectively (Wani, 2020).
With the region’s great natural and human resources and its central location in the rapidly integrating
Eurasian economic space, all neighbouring countries, but also Europe and the US, share common interests.
Nonetheless, interests also diverge, for example, intense attention is now focused on developing and creating
access to the energy resources of the region, especially the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Basin. Russia is
interested in maintaining its transport monopoly and preferential access to Central Asia’s oil and gas. The EU and
the United States want to see more diversified energy transport routes towards the West. China has been looking
to develop the pipeline infrastructure towards the East, and India and Pakistan are eager to tap Central Asia’s
energy resources towards the South (Linn, 2017). Such interests and competition over the region’s energy have
made Central Asia a new hub for global integration. On the other hand, with agreements on oil and gas extraction,
production and export, the Central Asian countries have succeeded in gaining political visibility on the
international stage, and in improving their position in the global economy.
2. Tajikistan civil war: In May 1992 political and social tensions in Tajikistan escalated to a devastating civil
war (Epkenhans, 2016). Indeed, in 1992, Tajikistan was engulfed in civil war, with different interest groups
vying for control of the state. The civil war lasted for about five years until June 1997. Russia considered
Tajikistan’s civil war a direct threat to Russia’s national security, and intervened in it. To the press and public,
Moscow’s officials spoke of fears that an opposition victory in Tajikistan would lead to the spread of instability
all over Central Asia. Accordingly, in order to prevent the spread of civil war to the rest of the area, Russia
became directly involved in the conflict, believing that if Russia were to “pull out from Tajikistan, a wave of
destabilisation may sweep through the whole of Central Asia, which [was] the underbelly of Russia” (FBIS: FSU,
1996, p. 17; Jonson, 1998, p. 54). Furthermore, the Kremlin was worried about Tajikistan’s long border with
Afghanistan (1,206 km), and accordingly signed an agreement with the Tajik government, by which Russia
would provide border guard in Tajikistan.
3. Central Asia as a part of the Islamic World: When the Central Asian republics became independent, it
was widely expected that their isolation from the Islamic World would end, and they would rapidly develop
relations (Voll, 1994). But it soon appeared that, although the region’s states have sought to expand relations
with some Islamic countries, they have not tried to play the “Islam card” in their foreign relations (Mirovalev,
2020; Akiner, 2000).
The Muslim world’s interests in Central Asia can be divided into three categories: political, ideological, and
economic (Robins, 1994). The motivations of Muslim countries in exploring the potential for new relations with
the Central Asian republics are mainly political, though Central Asia’s potential as a market and its resources of
oil and gas have also played a part. Some Islamic states have attempted to deal with the region through their own
ideological model; and there has been a kind of ideological competition between their political establishments,
Turkey emphasising its secular model, Saudi Arabia supporting strict Wahhabism, and Iran showing little interest
in political Islam (Robins, 1994).
The leading Muslim countries vying to maximise their influence in the region are Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
4. The events of September 2001 and the war on terror: The events of 11 September, the subsequent
anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan and US military deployment in Central Asia, had given a new geopolitical
and geostrategic importance to the region. Although Washington was attempting to extend its military influence
in the region long before 11 September, it became a strategic platform for the projection of US military power in
“Operation Enduring Freedom” elevating its strategic significance in the new post-11 September security
paradigm (Giragosian & McDermott, 2004).
Indeed, one can assume that the events of 11 September and subsequent war in Afghanistan brought the
world’s attention to Central Asia. These events had a significant effect on the political landscape of the Central
Asian states, which to varying degrees became Washington’s allies against Taliban rule in Afghanistan and the
Al-Qaeda terrorist network. The US military presence in the “heart of Asia” has renewed interest in its
geostrategic importance (Mackinnon, 2021). Accordingly, Washington identified vital national security and
economic interests in the region. Meanwhile, the region’s geopolitics are further complicated by stationing of US
military near the borders of China, Russia, and Iran. The war led to the establishment of two US military bases in
the region: Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan.
5. Attending regional organizations and programs: Regional organizations are established to foster
mechanisms of cooperation among states willing to develop their common belonging to a geographical space, a
geopolitical entity, or an economic bloc and enhanced their global position (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012, p. 5).
The Central Asian republics since independent have been and still are member of number of the regional
organization, including: Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) created in 1969, the Economic Cooperation
Organisation (ECO) established in 1985, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established in late 1991,
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) signed in 1992, the International Fund for Saving the Aral
Sea (IFAS) established in 1993, NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme in 1997, the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEc) established in 2000, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established in 2001,
Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) established 2002, Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
(CANWFZ) signed in 2006, the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) established in 2006.
Under the framework of the above organizations a fundamental step towards Central Asia globality has been
taken. Indeed, the membership of these organizations has provided an opportunity for the region’s republics to
shore up their legitimacy on both the domestic and international fronts (Moylan, 2013).
6. The role of globalization: Globalization, especially in last 30 years with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and combining with the world-wide socio-economic and political improvements, has accelerated. In particular,
under the leading nature of economical, technological, and cultural components, globalization has increased
gradually mutual interdependence between world nations and countries (Council for European Studies (CES),
2018; Elma & Gurbanov, 2012). In the late 1990s, observers believed that globalization could offer the Central
Asian republics “numerous benefits” in terms of economic, social, political, and international developments
(Jafalian, 2020). Globalization, indeed, has provided better opportunity for the Central Asian republic to
integrate to the regional and global affairs.
To sum up, the demise of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian republics led to the
send of the Soviet control on the region. Consequently, the region opened up to the international politics. This
situation provided an opportunity for the region’s republics to gain a position in the international arena and set up
relationship with most of the world countries. In addition, they became a member of many regional and global
organizations. Such membership has provided the republics with a gold opportunity to get politico-economic
help and assistance in order to resolve their problems. A the same time, due to Central Asia’s geopolitical and
geostrategic position and its enormous energy resources, the region has gained a vital place in many regional and
global power’s foreign policy, which led them to a competition known as a new great game. The New Great
Game refers to the conceptualization of modern geopolitics in post-Soviet Central Asia. This is characterized by
the competition between regional and global powers in Central Asian, and involves countries such as Russia, the
United States, China, India, EU, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and some other states (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. The New Great Game map.6
Conclusion
This paper demonstrated that during the Soviet Union the Central Asian republics never gained a chance to
establish relationship with the outside as the foreign relations was led by the central government in Moscow.
More importantly, Central Asia was a closed region and had no place in the Eurasia geopolitical map. Yet, the
Soviet Union’s disintegration provided the Central Asian republics with opportunities to establish their own
foreign relations. The paper argued that, in the post-Soviet era, due to the need for nation-state-building,
6
http://crp-infotec.de/asien-geopolitische-paramete.
international legitimacy, technical and economic assistance and security, the states have been attempting to join
the international community through establishing relationships with a broad spectrum of countries and joining
international and regional organisations.
In addition, the growing international attention to the area shows that it has gained considerably in
geostrategic importance following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The paper also explored how the region’s
geopolitical importance, energy resources, economic and political problems have caused the outside world to pay
attention to it and rush to establish relations with the independent republics during the last three decades. As a
result, Central Asia has become a field of geopolitical competition for regional and international powers which is
known as the New Great Game. This has contributed to the globality of Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. In
addition, as a result of the Soviet breakup, Central Asia became a place where several regional and global powers
engage simultaneously and for a variety of reasons. Therefore, Central Asia which once was closed and an
unreachable region opened up and integrated to the international community.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.06.002
D DAVID PUBLISHING
India’s Foreign Strategy From the Perspective of

Geopolitical Logic
YUAN Xuezhe
Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Zigong, China
As an emerging developing power, India has adopted economic diplomacy as the center, aggressive strategy and
maritime strategy as the main power strategy, pursuing the international order with “India seal” and constructing
the relations of big powers with “pro-West” tendency. This adjustment of India’s diplomatic strategy will bring
about a complex impact on China-India relations.
Keywords: geopolitics, India external strategy, the goal of great power
An Analysis of the Geopolitical Environment in India

The Definition of the Relevant Concepts of Geopolitical
Geopolitics is an important basis for the formulation of national defense and foreign policy and so on. The
basic point of view is that the formation and development of global or regional political pattern is influenced or
even restricted by geographical conditions. “Geopolitics” dates back to the late 19th century; it includes the
traditional geopolitics theory (the State Organism Theory, the Land Power Theory, the Sea Power Theory, and
the Marginal Zone Theory) and the modern geopolitics theory (the Clash of Civilizations Theory, the Natural
Power Theory, and the Network Power Theory). Diplomatic strategy refers to the policy, route and general plan
made by countries in the process of communication and intercourse with the aim of safeguarding national
interests; it mainly includes: politics, economy, culture, nationality and other aspects related to the survival and
development of the country’s strategy.
“India Is Strong” South Asian Geopolitics
The mainland of Asia is bordered by Iranian plateau, Indian subcontinent, Indochina, and China. The
Indian subcontinent includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan. Between the Himalayas and the
Indian Ocean are the Indus and Ganges River basins, and India’s strategic advantage over its neighbors in
South Asia is extremely obvious, both politically, economically and militarily, no other country in South Asia
can match India’s strength. In 2014, Molde FK said that turning the 21st century into the Indian century “will
take 10 years, not very long”.
Indian Geopolitical History Tradition Modern
India originated from the collapse of the British Empire. The loss of British Sea Power and the protest and
non-cooperation within India led to the withdrawal of Britain and the change of the geography of South Asia.

Acknowledgement: Fund: China India Pakistan Research Center Project of Sichuan University of Science and Engineering.
YUAN Xuezhe, Doctor, professor; tutor of master of politics, Marxism College, Sichuan University of Science and Engineer,
Zigong, China.
226 INDIA’S FOREIGN STRATEGY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GEOPOLITICAL LOGIC
India’s independence led to the partition of India and Pakistan, and then divided into Pakistan and Bangladesh,
which shaped the Indian subcontinent. India’s national strategy took shape during the Cold War after its
independence in 1974. In order to maintain its independence, India allied with the Soviet Union and demanded
concessions from the United States in order to obtain the best interests between the United States and the Soviet
Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, India lost its leverage with the United States. In 2001, al
Qaeda’s attacks on the United States brought relations between the United States and Pakistan to a boiling point,
and the United States and India agreed on their common interests, both of which demanded that Pakistan
intensify its efforts to combat extremist Islamist groups. India and the Indian subcontinent have agreed to fight
al Qaeda and counterbalance China, but the country’s basic geography has not improved and it has not really
unified. Although India is already building up its naval power, its basic interests and major tasks lie in the
integration of its ethnic, cultural and national identity. After all, India has not been a unified nation for long
enough.
India has the geographical advantage of dominating South Asia. Surrounded by the sea on three sides, it
occupies the vast territory of South Asia and provides the development space for the “greater India” strategy of
the Indian government. Based on India’s geopolitical strength and “greater India” strategic objectives, India is
concerned with both land and maritime security, with a particular focus on the sea.
The External Strategic Objectives of India’s Geopolitics

Strengthening Land Rights to Dominate the Pattern of South Asian Regional Affairs
The South Asian Strategy is the foundation of India’s Great Power Strategy. From the independence of
India, dominating the pattern of South Asia is the basic goal of its South Asia Strategy. Nehru has long had this
idea, but the scope of the expansion of the scope of the adjustment, hope that India to the Indian Ocean and
further development of Southeast Asia. South Asia is the cornerstone of India’s external strategy. The political
diplomacy and security strategy of every Indian government has a strong geopolitical color and a strong desire
to pursue the leading position in South Asia.
Strengthening Maritime Rights and Implementing the “Indian Ocean” Strategy
The Molde FK Administration regards the Indian Ocean as an important area of Indian diplomacy,
advocates “regional Tong’an District co-prosperity”, and hopes to become a “net security provider”. To realize
these ideas, the Molde FK Administration has taken a series of measures, such as consolidating relations with
the Indian Ocean island states, implementing the “monsoon plan”, enhancing the role of Indian Ocean
governance mechanisms, deepening relations with the Gulf states. We will strengthen maritime cooperation
with the United States, Japan and Australia. Ambitious as it is, the Molde FK Administration faces challenges
ranging from a navy that has yet to improve to maritime disputes with its neighbors. These challenges will
constrain the achievement of the Molde FK Administration’s Indian Ocean Policy objectives. The Molde FK
Administration adjusted its foreign policy after coming to power in May 2014, especially the Indian Ocean
policy. Molde FK’s strong personal character, coupled with the fact that his Bharatiya Janata Party has a
majority in the House of Representatives, laid the foundation for his Indian Ocean Policy. The Indian Ocean
Policy of the Molde FK Administration is not only related to the development of Indian Ocean Strategy, but
also affects the future trend of Indian Ocean situation and the change of Indian Ocean relations with other
countries.
INDIA’S FOREIGN STRATEGY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GEOPOLITICAL LOGIC 227
India’s Indian Ocean Policy is in flux. In the early years of independence, India mainly relied on Britain to
safeguard its interests in the Indian Ocean. After the British withdrew from the east of the Suez Canal in the
late 1960s, India began to attach importance to the Indian Ocean issue, hoping to fill the power gap left by the
British, actively develop its naval power, and support the Indian Ocean Heping District Initiative, to avoid the
Indian Ocean becoming a contest between the two superpowers. After the end of the Cold War, restoring the
historical influence in the Indian Ocean region has gradually become the mainstream thinking of Indian
strategists. The Molde FK Administration aims to create a maritime environment conducive to India’s rise, to
project a good and strong image of India, to expand its influence and to maximize its self interest. In terms of
the Indian Ocean concept, the Molde FK Administration came up with the following ideas. The Molde FK
Administration, by contrast, sees the Indian Ocean countries as India’s immediate and extended neighbours, an
important target of its diplomacy. In January 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India established a
separate department for the Indian Ocean region to deal exclusively with Indian Ocean affairs and to include
Mauritius and Seychelles among India’s neighbours. The Molde FK Administration has placed greater
emphasis on the Indian Ocean than the previous Singh Administration, and the Indian Ocean occupies a special
place in India’s foreign policy.
India plays an important role in the “21st century sea route of Silk Road”, and its strategic cognition and
policy stand are directly related to the construction process of the “21st century sea route of Silk Road”. As a
result of traditional geopolitical thinking and strategic distrust of China, India has doubts about the strategic
intention, content and prospects of China’s “21st century sea route of Silk Road” initiative and its influence on
India.
Strengthening Power Strategy Building a Leading Power
India’s foreign policy objective since independence has been to become a “sound of the underground
power”. India has always made it its goal to become a strong, unified, internationally respected and important
world power. Therefore, after independence, India took “great power status” as its diplomatic strategic goal,
actively participated in international affairs and embarked on an independent diplomatic path. But because of
its lack of power and concern for its national interests, India has been adjusting its diplomatic strategy in the
decades since its independence. From the beginning of the “non-aligned” movement in the 1950s to the
Sino-Indian War in the 1960s, this was a glorious period for India’s “non-aligned” diplomatic strategy. In the
1970s, when it was allied with the Soviet Union and dominated South Asia until the end of the Cold War, it
was a period of development when India turned its back on “non-alignment” and embarked on a diplomatic
strategy of alliance. “power diplomacy” was launched in the 1990s to develop nuclear weapons against
Pakistan, and after the 21st century, with its growing comprehensive national power, it actively engaged in
great power and all-round diplomacy, India’s international influence and status have also been greatly
enhanced.
India pursues the goal of great power. The Nehru Administration’s diplomatic strategy is deeply marked
by the pursuit of the dream of great power and great power. The foreign strategy of the successive Indian
governments has been constantly adjusted according to the changes of the domestic and foreign situations, but
all of them showed a strong desire to pursue the status of a great power. To this day has become the will of the
entire nation.
India’s Foreign Strategy Implementation

India Seeks an International Order Marked by India
As an emerging large developing country, India has personal experience and original observation on the
situation which has not been changed in a century. In the view of the Indian policy and strategic circles, the
world order formed after the end of the Cold War has undergone profound changes after the 2008 international
financial crisis, multi-polarization is an inevitable trend, and China and the United States will enter a long
period of strategic competition stage, there are more opportunities than challenges in a sea change. To this end,
India has profoundly adjusted its diplomatic strategy, abandoned some of its traditional diplomatic thinking and
principles, anchored its national position as a leading power, pursued an international order with “India’s seal”,
and constructed a relationship of great powers with a “pro-Western” tendency, and to maintain the regional
Monroe Doctrine in order to realize the vision of a new India. India’s diplomatic strategy and tactics are based
on India’s geopolitics and status and reality in the current international pattern, and aim at maintaining the
current international order in favor of India, and then realize the safeguard of India’s national interests. Against
the background of the common rise of China and India, with the advance of China’s “opening to the West” and
“Belt and Road” initiative, the geopolitical competition between China and India is becoming increasingly
fierce.
India’s External Strategy Focuses on the Economy to Reap Economic Benefits
The change of India’s foreign strategy not only is influenced by the changes of domestic and foreign
economic and political situation, but also reflects the change of India’s mode of thinking. Beginning in the
1990s, India realized that it had lagged far behind other Asian economies, including China, in terms of
economic development. With the gradual liberation from the shackles of socialism and the increasing pressure
to compete with other emerging markets, India’s diplomatic strategy has also stepped into some new areas that
it has never set foot in before. In the past, the core of India’s diplomatic strategy was to seek foreign aid, and
the goal of diplomacy was to seek to meet the government’s requirements for external financing and
development needs, the core of India’s diplomatic strategy is to seek foreign direct investment and access to the
markets of developed countries. India’s slow but successful economic reforms unleashed the country’s potential,
boosted its rapid growth and provided Base for improved relations with major powers, regional rivals Pakistan,
China and its neighbours.
The Implementation of India’s Foreign Strategy Shows the Logic Thinking of Geopolitics
India opposes the involvement of extraregional powers in South Asia. India has always appeared to be
overly anxious about other South Asian countries developing relations with the outside world, especially the
big powers, and has to block them. India is also opposed to outside powers intervening in conflicts in South
Asia. For example, in late 2004, after the Indian Ocean tsunami, the international community rushed to the
rescue, the United States deployed a large number of troops to the disaster area, and aircraft carriers into the
usually difficult access waters, the implementation of a rare large-scale rescue operation. In this regard, India
gave high attention and expressed dissatisfaction, while taking measures to respond to the rapid implementation
of relief to neighbouring countries. From India’s point of view, the United States’ actions were primarily
strategic and went beyond humanitarian relief.
As a regional power with the largest economy, the strongest military power and the largest political
influence, India plays a vital role in the 21st century sea route of Silk Road. However, due to the influence of
India’s strategic culture and great power complex and the strategic conflict between the two countries, India
lacks strategic trust in China. The Indian government and think-tanks are cautious and sceptical about the plan,
and the perception of India’s elite is biased, but most favour selective participation.
Under Modi’s government, India has entered an era of “strong government”. India’s foreign policy is also
influenced by this “strong government” mentality. India is thinking more about the strategic benefits of
strategic gaming with China.
External Strategic Review of India

India’s Geopolitical Strategy Is Characterized by Idealism, Realism and Constructivism
For the Indian elite, who fought against colonialism, broke away from British colonial rule and won Indian
independence on the basis of the first principles of enlightenment, idealism is natural. Nehru has shown
idealism in many ways, particularly in his dealings with India’s immediate neighbours, and India’s professed
foreign policy is marked by idealism. Since the 1990s, however, India has not espoused the idealism it once
championed, and has had to compromise on the harsh realities of a world in which India’s status had been
greatly reduced during the Cold War. India’s leaders are beginning to take a more pragmatic approach to
making the country strong and prosperous. India conducted a second round of nuclear tests in 1998. It signed a
nuclear deal with the Bush Administration in 2005. Under the agreement, the United States agreed to change its
domestic non-proliferation laws and to revise the international guidelines for nuclear cooperation, which are
favorable to India.
India’s foreign strategy has been adjusted: First, it is getting closer to the United States and Japan, and it
cannot rule out the possibility of elevating India-united states relations to the level of a quasi-alliance; second, it
is getting tougher with China in border disputes and actively implementing a “new forward policy”; third, India
is playing the “Taiwan card” more actively with China. These dramatic policy changes have led to the
intensification of India’s relations with China and some of its neighbours, as well as border confrontations,
clashes and even more extreme incidents.
In 2020, the sudden new crown epidemic combined with the world’s biggest change in a century, making
the world economy suffered a heavy blow. India believes the outbreak has accelerated the transformation of the
international order, intensified strategic competition between China and the United States, and accelerated the
reshaping of the global industrial chain. Indian strategists generally believe that the epidemic has weakened the
leadership of China and the United States in the transformation of the international order, and that India has a
responsibility and a chance to become a leader of the multilateralism. As a result, India worked hard during the
outbreak and even restarted the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation it had once shelved and
neglected, seeking to “anti-epidemic diplomacy” with the existing foreign strategy and domestic development
plans relative to the joint.
Under the new Crown Disease, India’s external strategy has three major directions, namely, to actively
participate in international cooperation for epidemic prevention and control, to increase its participation in
global governance through “reformed multilateralism”, and to integrate “anti-epidemic” diplomacy into the
indo-pacific strategy, taking South Asia, Indian Ocean island countries, the United States, Japan, India and
Australia “quadrilateral mechanism” as the main direction, the strategy of India and the Pacific will be pushed
forward in light of the prevailing situation. These new trends are not only an extension of India’s existing
foreign strategy, but also a long-term plan of India’s foreign strategy under the background of the new Crown
Epidemic and the game between China and the United States.
Challenges Facing India’s External Strategy
First, the challenges of strategic cooperation between the US and India are on the rise. First, the rise of
Hindu nationalism in India is eroding the “ideological” foundation of US-India cooperation. Over the past few
decades, there has been bipartisan support in the US and India for deepening bilateral ties, largely as a nod to
India’s democratic institutions, and “shared values” have been mentioned frequently in US-India interactions.
However, in recent years, the Indian government has promoted Hindu nationalism and adopted policies or
practices that discriminate against Muslims at the political, economic and social levels, which have aroused
many doubts in the United States, differences between the United States and India on the issue of “religious
freedom” are gradually emerging.
Second, the US-India cooperation “transactional” color is heavy; it is difficult to eliminate bilateral
differences. The United States and India have different views on Iran, Afghanistan, Russia and other issues.
The two countries have repeatedly stressed the indo-pacific strategy, but there are even differences on the
geographical scope, basic principles, and policy priorities of the indo-pacific strategy. For example, India
included the east coast of Africa in its indo-pacific strategy, while the United States’ indo-pacific strategy
ended in India to the West. While the US has made clear that its indo-pacific strategy is aimed at China, India
has continued to play the lute. While the United States has emphasized the maritime focus of military
cooperation, India remains concerned about land defense and wants to buy more land-based equipment. When
it comes to specific interests, the conflict between “America first” and “India first” is inevitable, which is
especially obvious in the field of economy and trade. The differences between the United States and India
around the WTO, trade barriers, digital tax and other issues are difficult to resolve in the short term.
The competitive aspects of China-India relations are becoming increasingly apparent. In general, the
policy toward China during the Molde FK Administration has become more competitive and adventurous,
which includes subjective factors, such as India’s increasing foreign adventurousness and deviation from the
Non-aligned Movement, and India’s consideration of strategic speculation between China and the United States,
there are also objective reasons for the overlapping of global and regional interests between China and India to
stimulate competition. The new crown epidemic has stimulated the institutional model competition between
India and China, and the reshaping of the global industrial chain has accelerated the decoupling of India’s
industrial chain from China and even the future manufacturing competition. In addition, India will participate
more actively in the substantive cooperation of the US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral mechanism, and the
intensification of the collision between China and India in the indo-pacific region, especially in South Asia, will
also stimulate the competition between China and India. India’s security precautions against China, economic
restrictions on China, and negative public opinion mean that China-India relations will face great volatility and
uncertainty, which in turn will hamper India’s foreign policy.
The Impact of India’s Foreign Strategy on China
India is used to looking at its relations with China from a geopolitical and national security perspective,
viewing China as a competitor rather than a partner, a solidified perception that has a direct impact on India’s
diplomatic strategic thinking towards China.
In the context of the adjustment of India’s “eastward policy” and the increasing complexity of the situation
in the South China Sea, the Molde FK Administration of India has kept China in check and strengthened
India-US relations and other political considerations, through actions, such as making public statements on the
South China Sea issue and stepping up military deployment, china is actively involved in the South China Sea
issue by deepening cooperation with its neighboring countries and coordinating its position with the United
States and Japan on the South China Sea issue.
China is regarded as the challenge of India’s rise and the threat of national security, which leads to the
strategic dilemma, the cooperative dilemma and the security dilemma of India’s China policy. After Indian
Prime Minister Molde FK came to power, he not only actively pushed India to integrate into the “Belt and Road”
economic circle initiated by China, but also took the initiative to talk to China and comprehensively promoted
India-China strategic partnership of cooperation, highlights new changes in India’s Molde FK Administration’s
China policy. To a certain extent, this change reflects India’s development needs and can accelerate the
interaction and development of India-China relations, thus effectively promoting the mutual benefit and
win-win of strategic interests of both sides.
Conclusion
India’s diplomatic strategy is based on India’s geopolitics and status and reality in the current international
situation. In the future, India’s external strategy will not fully keep pace with the United States and Japan, but
its hedging and cooperation strategy with China will be more comprehensive. The structural contradiction in
the geopolitics between China and India is relatively prominent. To promote China-India cooperation, India
needs to avoid the negative impact of geopolitical imagination on China-India cooperation, and promote the
development of China-India relations with a more confident and open-mind.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.06.003
D DAVID PUBLISHING
The Evolution of the EU‟s Security Model Through the

Lenses of the Balkans
Evanthia Balla
University of Évora, Évora, Portugal
As the world stage evolves, the EU has faced multiple security challenges in terms of instability and geostrategic
competition starting in its back yard. Since the end of the Cold War, the security model of Europe has been
evolving as a response to internal as well as to external challenges. The Balkans has since played a key role in the
European security system and governance. However, the Western Balkans remains fragile, and the external
pressures and internal divisions could deliver fresh instability to the region. Thus, this scenario forms a
fit-for-purpose case study to test the EU‟s future security model. It can be argued that the EU has the power of
adaptation and growth, although its internal malfunctions have scrutinised its influence in the region and beyond,
while other great powers urge to fill the power vacuum. As a result, a quantum leap forward in EU leadership
appears to be critical. This article first outlines the EU‟s deepening and widening security sector. Second, it
examines the weaknesses and strengths of the EU‟s current security model. It then observes the role and
perspectives of the region's key strategic allies and competitors: the United States, Russia, and China. Finally, it
discusses the EU‟s future model.
Keywords: European Union, Western Balkans, security, unity, power, world order
Introduction
The polycrisis which the European Union (EU) has been facing in the last decade(s) has generated an
intense debate on the bloc‟s relevance and power as a regional, as well as a global player. For its critics, the EU
has been viewed as a less credible actor, incapable of decisively responding to key international challenges. On
the other hand, advocates of the Union defend that it remains relevant, despite its multi-dimensional crisis,
especially due to its economic weight and humanitarian role in the world scene.
Key scholars have defined and discussed various concepts of “power” for the European Union. In
particular, the EU has been examined, essentially but not exclusively, as a “soft” (Nye, 2004), “humanitarian”
(Sjursen, 2006), particularly “normative” (Manners, 2002; 2009), “transformative” power (Grabbe, 2006), as
well as a “superpower” (McCormick, 2007).
1
In this study, power is observed in a holistic manner, in all these dimensions, as an “ability” and a “strength” ,
for the purpose of validating the European project‟s transformation and its shifting role in the new world order.
The Western Balkans forms a credibility test for the EU‟s regional and global actorness. The Western
Balkans is part of Europe, constituting a significant historical, geographical and cultural part of it. Indeed, as
Evanthia Balla, Ph.D., assistant professor, Department of Economics, University of Évora, Évora, Portugal.
1
See power defintion and meaning in Cambridge Dictionary online: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/power.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU‟S SECURITY MODEL 233
stated by the European Commission, the “prospect of full EU membership for the Western Balkans is in the
Union's very own political, security and economic interest” […] “Maintaining and enhancing this policy is thus
indispensable for the EU‟s credibility, for the EU‟ success and for the EU‟s influence in the region and
beyond—especially at times of heightened geopolitical competition” (COM(2020) 57 Final, p. 1).
Howorth (2016) also claimed that the “world is entering a period of power transition, at the outcome of
which some new form of global order (or disorder) is likely to emerge”. Thus, the Western Balkans forms not
only an enlargement test but also a geopolitical one.
In reality, the EU‟s internal constraints have so far scrutinised its global image and range in the region,
while other major powers rush to fill the gap. Indeed, Russia has managed to exercise an increased influence on
countries, such as Serbia and Montenegro, while successfully encouraging resistance to an increased North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion. Unlike Russia, China has no ethnonationalist links with the
region to build on. Nevertheless, it does have the economic weight and political ambition to further enlarge its
involvement in the region (Larsen, 2020). Furthermore, the United States‟ (US) shift of geostrategic focus in
the last years has increasingly facilitated those trends. The US and the EU have shared the same values and
interests in the Balkans, yet they are far from setting a clear and common strategy.
In this context, a series of key questions arise:
1. What has been the security transformation mode of the EU in the Balkans since the end of the Cold
War?
2. What have been its main fragilities and potentialities so far?
3. To what extent does the involvement of major powers in the region pose a challenge to existing
structures of world order?
4. What are the lessons to be drawn for the EU‟s future global model?
In order to answer these questions, the current work employs a qualitative analysis, mainly based on
document-based research. The documents collected, studied and used herewith are directly related to the
subject of the research.
As a means of testing the EU‟s regional and global power and its future model, a case study research
design has been employed, namely focusing on the changing security role of the EU in the Western Balkans.
The article focuses on the security transformation of the EU and its relevance and power as a regional, as
well as a global player, taking three steps into account. First, the article observes the changing dynamics in the
world order in the post-Cold War period and evaluates the EU‟s changing security responses, through the
lenses of the Western Balkans. Subsequently, it explores the challenges within the European project itself, as
well as in relation to the role and perceptions of its main strategic partners and competitors in the region: the
US, Russia, and China. Ultimately, it reflects on the future scenarios of the EU‟s model.
In reality, this article argues that the EU is in a constant security transformation mode. However, its
internal constraints have put its influence in the region and beyond to the test, while other major powers rush to
fill the power gap. Consequently, a quantum leadership leap forward for the EU seems crucial.
The European Union in a Constant Security Transformation

During the Cold War, the world seemed well defined and easier to be explained. It was a bipolar world,
mainly divided between two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States and their spheres of
influence and domain. Europe was also divided between East and West, besides being also “comfortably” and
234 THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU‟S SECURITY MODEL
respectively protected by those two superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, hopes for the birth of a new
era of prosperity and peace arose. This peace dismantled swiftly, as the world, and particularly Europe, came
under pressure due to a dramatic crisis in its backyard—Yugoslavia. The rapid escalation of the war and the
atrocities that accompanied the struggle involved most international players, bewildering the entire European
continent.
However, it was the United States and NATO that (re)acted, firstly militarily intervening in Bosnia in
1995 and then in Kosovo in 1999. On the other hand, the EU failed to speak with one voice and undertake
responsibility for the security of its own continent, revealing the weaknesses of the European security
architecture, besides the urgent need to develop a reformed and stronger one (Bradford, 2000; Gross, 2007;
Stavridis, 1994; 2001; Howorth, 2014; Becker, 2017).
The beginning of the new century was marked by the war on terror. The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington, and particularly the Iraq War, intensified academic concerns over
terrorism, religious fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, as well as an increasing
American unilateralist approach towards world politics (Kagan, 2004; 2008). Similarly, the rise of the powerful
and influential alliance of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa (BRICS), as well as an upward “middle power” activism seriously undermined the post-war liberal
world order (Cooper & Shaw, 2009; Gowan, 2012; Cooper, 2016).
Since 2011, this uncertainty has been deepened by the Arab Spring and the war in Syria, the rise of the
Islamic State and the terrorist attacks in the heart of Europe, besides the refugee crisis and the aggressive policy
of Russia in Ukraine and beyond. As Emmanouilidis (2012) pointed out, “[t]he world is in the midst of a major
transformative moment and the European Union and its members are under pressure to respond to the
fundamental changes and challenges „out there‟” (p. 83).
In this scenario of constant security transformations and challenges, the EU has managed to adapt and
reform, especially if one considers the novelty of the European construction in itself. However, in such a highly
unstable global system, the EU still lacks the power—and the will—to speak with one voice and adequately
respond to the pressures beforehand.
In terms of political and institutional powers, the EU has evolved as a “surrealistic” creature rather than a
conventional structure. The Union is a sui generis international organisation that combines both
intergovernmental and federal characteristics. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) instituted a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), opening the road for a series of developments to unravel, thus enhancing the Union‟s
objectives, instruments and achievements in the field. The Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) Treaties came to
pursue, though timidly, a more efficient decision-making process.
However, it was only with the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) that the Union was provided with a legal
personality and an institutional structure for its external services. The Lisbon Treaty came to enhance the role
of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission,
establishing a range of new actors and institutions, as the new permanent President of the European Council
and the European External Action Service (EEAS). It also upgraded the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP)—being now an integral part of the CFSP.
In reality, the EU can act as a sole power on a variety of external policies areas, such as signing
international treaties alongside sovereign states and acting as the world‟s largest contributor of foreign
development aid. The EU is the third largest economy in the world, after China and the US (Eurostat 84/2020).
Yet, the EU is not a nation-state but an international organisation. It is an edifice in constant construction. Thus,
it seems to be in a permanent evolutionary process. This reality has marked and dictated the European
responses to its regional as well as international tests.
By analysing the EU‟s role in the 21st century, Emmanouilidis identifies a lack of strategic orientation in
dealing with these quests, a gap in the EU‟s legitimacy and a stagnation in the European project itself. Hence,
the revitalisation of the integration project and the EU‟s ability to influence regional and global developments
are key steps to better respond to the challenges ahead.
Malfunctions’ Diagnosis in the Process

In practice, the EU has a complex political and institutional modus operandi that has long hampered its
ability to cope with geopolitical challenges in its neighbourhood and in the world (Vimont, 2015; Riddervold,
Trondal, & Newsome, 2021). It could be argued that the EU faces three main malfunctions.
First of all, the Union copes with a series of leadership gap issues. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has the main jurisdiction over the
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nevertheless, the Permanent President of the European Council and the
six-month rotating Council President and the President of the Commission also represent the EU in the world
stage. The foreign policy and diplomatic efforts of Member States operate in a parallel way, making this picture
even blurrier. Secondly, the decision-making process is essentially an intergovernmental model of governance.
Therefore, unanimity is the general rule for decision-making in the CFSP‟s and CSDP‟s frameworks. The
foreign strategic orientation of the EU is delineated by the European Council, composed by the heads of state or
governments of its Member States.
In the Council, there are only a few cases which qualify a majority voting (QMV). According to Article 31
of the TEU, there can only be four exceptions where
the Council shall act by qualified majority:
1. When adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council
relating to the Union‟s strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1),
2. When adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made
on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,
3. When adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,
4. When appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33.
[…]
The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority
in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2. (known as the “passerelle” clause).
Although the Treaty has provided some ways to sidestep unanimity and help drive CFSP‟s action, as those
above-mentioned, Member States have favoured the political consensus reached through unanimity.
2
In reality, the EU looks like an institutional and political “Lernaean Hydra” , with a growing number of
actors and processes in different aspects of its foreign policy.
The European Union has been in constant transformation, troubled by what Howorth also calls the “myth
2
According to the Greek mythology, Lernaean Hydra was gigantic multi-headed water-serpent. For each of her heads that would
be decapitated, two more were sprung forth.
of a European security autonomy”. Indeed, a third constraint of the European Union as a regional and global
player is its actual level of autonomy (independence) vis a vis the American power. Since its genesis, the
European project has sought to overpass the zero-sum game logic of security that had led to two World Wars.
Therefore, European integration was idealised as a collective peace and stability project. In practical terms,
specific endogenous and exogenous factors determined that endeavour. On the one hand, the need to commit
Germany not to use its future power to pursue military ends in Europe, and on the other hand, the US
statesmanship, namely the Marshall Aid and the creation of a transatlantic alliance to better counterbalance the
Soviet threat (Howorth, 2014; Renard & Biscop 2012; Biscop, 2021).
The Balkans Test—Enlargement and Geopolitics

NATO and the US have figured as the main security providers for most European Member States since the
genesis of the European Community at the time. Nevertheless, efforts at the European level to expand European
integration in the area of defence have utterly failed, as have the proposals for the creation of a European
Defence Community. Some steps in that direction were taken in the 1970s, through the new European Political
Cooperation, which allowed the development of a genuine system of cooperation in the field of foreign policy,
opening the road to the CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty and later to the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) that was the result of the Treaty of Amsterdam, currently the CSDP. However, in practice, the
Union‟s internal constrains determined a narrow view of its power and relevance in the regional and
international scene. This was mainly understood as a civilian power, mostly based on a politico-military
intergovernmental cooperation. The CFSP was an attempt to strengthen the EU‟s political power and influence
in order to match its economic weight, as expected for its Member States and partners (Renard & Biscop, 2012).
Nonetheless, this effort was still not proven to be enough to break the EU‟s significant dependence on the US
and NATO.
As previously mentioned, this dependence on the US was dramatically revealed in the case of the Balkan
wars of the 1990s. In the summer of 1995, after three years of massacres of hundreds of thousands of
civilians in Bosnia, the US took on the leadership role to end the civil war. In 1998-1999, NATO and the UN
intervened to end the crisis in Kosovo, while the EU appeared weak, far from the image envisaged in the
Maastricht Treaty. Ever since, the US has expanded its political presence in the Balkans through bilateral
political and security relations, as well as through NATO‟s membership. This premise was not necessarily
antagonic to the EU‟s strategy. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed plans to extend the stability
and security zone created and promoted by NATO to build a new Europe, which has been described as
“undivided, peaceful, and democratic” by Bill Clinton (Daalder & Hanlon, 2000). Such Europe is more likely
to be a partner of the US in meeting the many challenges of the global age, and much less likely to pose a threat
to the US‟ interests.
Daalder and Hanlon (2000) claimed that “[i]f one looks at the economic and military contribution that the
United States and Europe have made to peace and stability in the Balkans over the last decade, it is evident that
Europe has carried much of the load” (p. 166). Europe has spent in non-military assistance three times more
than the United States (nearly $17 billion vs. $5.5 billion). In reality, humanitarian and development assistance
were feasible priorities for the EU.
The fall of the Soviet Union, and particularly the Yugoslav wars, placed Europe in a position of
undelayable decisions. The need for a decisive momentum to reinforce its civilian and military capacities
seemed more urgent than ever before. Simultaneously, the EU‟s inability to speak with one voice further
revealed its weaknesses and formed an important test for its credibility. In the beginning of the conflict, while
Germany supported Slovenia‟s and Croatia‟s right to self-determination during the war in Yugoslavia, other
Member States, such as the United Kingdom, France and Greece resisted the German policy stance.
The EU‟s inability to formulate an appropriate response to the conflicts gave to a large extent a decisive
impetus to create the ESDP. Under the umbrella of ESDP, the EU made some notable advances in its regional
presence in the Western Balkans, mainly as a post-conflict stabilisation actor, contributing to security transition
and reconstruction operations. A series of missions were launched with that purpose: first of all, the takeover
mission from NATO‟s Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM/CONCORDIA), known as Operation Concordia, on 31 March 2003. This was followed by the EU
Police Mission (EUPOL) Proxima, on 15 December 2003, which in turn led to the launch of an EU Police
Advisory Team (EUPAT), on 15 December 2005. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), it has hosted two
missions: the EU Police Mission (EUPM) launched on 1 January 2003 and a military operation EUFOR Althea,
launched on 2 December 2004. Both missions are respectively takeover missions from the UN‟s International
Police Task Force (IPTF) and NATO‟s Stabilisation Force (SFOR).
The largest civilian mission so far under the CSDP has been the launch of EULEX Kosovo in 2008, aimed
at assisting the local authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions. EULEX
Kosovo and EUFOR Althea are two institutions still running CSDP operations in the Balkans. That makes
EUFOR Althea not only the largest, with some 7,000 troops at the outset, but also the longest EU military
operation. (Major & Mölling, 2020).
The EU‟s approach was not only a post-conflict stabilisation approach, focused on security, but also an
enlargement approach, envisioning a further integrated Europe. As early as 1999, a Stabilisation and
Association Process (SAP) was launched as the framework for the preparation of the Western Balkan countries
for their future EU accession. In the same year, a Stability Pact was setup as a broader initiative involving all
key international players. The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 and the European Council in
March 2003 stressed that the future of the Western Balkans is within the European Union. In order to further
strengthen the relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, the conclusions of the Council of 16 June of
the same year included an annex entitled “The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: moving towards
European integration” (10369/03 Presse 166). The Council clearly stated that “[t]he Western Balkans and
support to their preparation for future integration into European structures and ultimate membership into the
Union is a high priority for the EU” (ibid, p. 11), while also emphasising that the peace and success of such
endeavour depend on their own efforts. “The EU stresses that the pace of further movement of the Western
Balkan countries towards the EU lies in their own hands and will depend on each country‟s performance in
implementing reforms […]” (ibid, p. 12).
The 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki reiterated that all SAP countries were potential candidates for
3
EU membership . In June 2003, European Member States, together with the leaders of the Western Balkan
countries, reached an agreement on the Thessaloniki Declaration, releasing a joint statement once again
confirming the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries (Prifti, 2013, Munter, 2021/EP).
3
The SAP was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008.
Since then, the region has become closer to a full EU membership. In 2004, Slovenia became a member of
the EU alongside other nine countries from Central and Eastern Europe, and three years later, Romania and
Bulgaria joined. In 2013, Croatia also joined the EU. However, the other Western Balkans countries: Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo (European Commission. (2020),
despite having requested their accession to the EU between 2008 and 2009, remained far from achieving their
objectives. The EU has kept the process open, yet there has been a stalemate in the European project of
enlargement in the last decade. As Balfour and Stratulat (2015) pointed out, “[t]he shorthand for capturing the
impact of these developments on the Balkans is „enlargement fatigue‟, although symptoms and consequences
run deeper” (p. 19). The tools and methods of the enlargement process have been improving, although the
transition to an open market economy and multiparty democracy has been challenging. Between 2001 and 2008,
notable growth was achieved, although mostly based on a rapid market opening and economic integration with
the EU. European capitals mainly fostered domestic consumption rather than structural reforms and job
creation, which consequently led to the rise of public and private debts rather than development and reform
(Bonomi & Reljić, 2017; Bonomi, 2020; Plakoudas, 2020).
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the perspectives on the process of economic convergence of Western
Balkans countries towards the EU27 has been discouraging. Although economic ties remain key to the common
present and future—the EU was the main partner of the Western Balkans, for both exports (69%) and imports
(54%) in 2019 and in 2020, with manufactured goods making up 77% of EU exports to and 80% of EU imports
from the Western Balkans (Eurostat April 2021)—the six countries remain among the poorest in Europe. The
average GDP per capita for the six countries is half that of Central European countries and only one quarter of
that of Western Europe. Remarkably, the European Economic and Social Committee indicated that “[i]t is
estimated that full convergence with EU living standards could take as long as 40 years” (Press Release No.
19/2018).
At the same time, corruption and organised crime are some of the main problems that the Western Balkan
countries still face. Serbia and Montenegro have inclined to authoritarianism and declined in civil liberties over
the last years (CSS Analyses in Security Policy 2020). In this context, the enforcement of the rule of law,
state-building and better governance emerge as priority concerns in the region. Additionally, the last decade has
coincided with the beginning of a polycrisis era for the European Union itself. The Union has been at the
epicentre of a series of challenges, including the refugee crisis, the disintegration threat of Brexit and the
current global health crisis, with a still unknown duration, scale and impact on the European integration model
itself.
As far as Europe‟s security strategy is concerned, it has been driven by a reactive rather than a proactive
mode. Indeed, the first security strategy of the EU entitled “A Safe Europe in a Better World” was adopted in
2003 (15895/03) (Council of the European Union, 2003). This document was established in a period marked by
the beginning of the war against terrorism, following the devasted terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, the war in Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Those events brought terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction and failed states, regional conflicts as the most urgent issues of the agenda of the
21st century. The new 2008 version came to add cybercrime as well as climate change to the long list of 21st
century security perils.
The following years, a series of events—such as the Arab Spring and the unrest in the North of Africa and
Middle East, including the war in Syria and the refugee crisis it provoked, as well as the annexation of Crimea
by Russia—all further underscored the sad realisation that “peace and stability in Europe are not a given”.
Hence, because of and due to its own existential crisis—accompanied by a crisis of credibility towards the
European project itself—the EU has shown some paralysis, not having to exhibit great milestones in the
security and defence field. A new security strategy came only 13 years after the first document was published.
The “A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy” published in 2016 came to
bring some dynamic to the EU‟s political direction and priorities in this new area (European Union, 2016). The
Global Strategy, a document of a “principles-based pragmatism”, envisions a more secure Europe build on a
4
credible, reactive and cohesive union.
In line with this “fresh” start, the EU adopted a new enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans
countries in 2018. The strengthening of the rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime, are the
cornerstones of the EU-Western Balkans strategy of 2018 and the new accession talks framework of 2020. It
offered a schedule for Serbia and Montenegro to potentially join the Union by 2025, having also outlined the
next steps for accession for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia. In March 2020,
the European Council gave the green light to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania, besides
also introducing a new reformed “accession talks” framework. Yet, Bulgaria still maintains its veto on Skopje
starting accession talks over bilateral green zones of disaccord.
Given the geostrategic contiguity of the EU with such a “patchwork of nations” and “ethnicities that
overlap with territorial borders”, the significance of NATO‟s integration for stability has also been a key
stabilisation factor. Serbia and BiH are the only States that have not yet joined. The United States has
maintained a stronghold in the region since the end of the Cold War, especially as a means of countering
Russian influence, particularly Serbia that has traditional and close ties with Russia (Bagheri, 2020).
Larsen claims that “[t]oday, it is a region in which NATO and the EU compete for influence alongside
Russia and China” (Larsen, 2020, p. 1). Russia indeed has a strong presence in the Western Balkans—namely
in strategic sectors, such as energy, heavy industry, and banking—that offers an alternative to the European
way. The Balkan countries, such as Serbia, also receive Russian military equipment. The West‟s efforts to bring
the Balkan states into NATO and the EU have been calculated and dealt by Moscow as a plan to
counterbalance and control Russia‟s power projection in the region.
Russia‟s strategy is not based on the promotion of the rule of law, human and democratic values in the
region. It uses the card of identity politics, based on its historical and cultural links with some countries, as is
the common religious link with Serbia (Larsen, 2020; Bagheri, 2020). China has also stepped in with an
undeniable economic and investment potential that further complicates the geo-economic landscape and
undermines the EU‟s relevance as a key provider of economic growth and stability. Indeed, since the launch of
the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has financed several prominent projects in the
Western Balkans, from bridge construction to energy infrastructure. In diplomatic terms, the 17 + 1 (China and
Central and Eastern Europe Countries) initiative has expanded cooperation between Beijing and the CEE
member countries, including the Balkans. This expansion also has political and security implications.
4
It is important to note that the same threats are mentioned later in the internal security strategic documents of the European
Union. The first “European Agenda on Security”, adopted in 2015, prioritised interconnected and with a strong cross-border
dimension threats, such as terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime (COM(2015) 185 Final, p. 2). In the same line of reasoning,
five years later, the Commission launched a new EU Security Strategy “EU Security Union Strategy” (COM(2020) 605 Final).
Undeniably, the Chinese alternative does not require the fulfilment of any comprehensive reforms from those
states. Adversely, respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights, and respect for and protection of
minorities are essential for eventual EU accession to the EU.
However, all these are the challenges that eventually urge Europe to think about its future model more
than ever before and determine the mould inside which it will be evolving in the future.
Scenarios for the Future

The Union‟s unique power and influence in a wider European region is based on both material and non-material
elements. The combination of different types of resources and power means that the EU is undoubtedly the agent that is
best equipped for promoting the wellbeing of Europeans. (Raik, 2006, p. 79)
A debate based on the White paper on the future of Europe: Five scenarios (COM(2017) 2025 Final)
started in 2017. The document offered a picture of the state of the Union, depending on one of the following
five choices Europe can make in the future: to carry on, focusing on delivering a positive reform agenda; to do
nothing but the Single Market; willing Member States to do more together and only in specific areas; to do less
more efficiently; to do much more together (European Commission, 2017). The debate ended with the elections
of the European Parliament of 2019. However, the same questions still remain today.
Indeed, a Conference on the Future of Europe started in 2021, aiming at offering citizens a chance to shape
how the European Union will look in five, 10, or 20 years from now (European Union, 2021).
The Commission has drawn a relatively picture pessimistic.
In 1900, Europe accounted for around 25% of global population. By 2060, it will account for less than 5%. […]
Europe‟s economic power is also expected to wane in relative terms, accounting for much less than 20% of the world‟s
GDP in 2030, down from around 22% today. (COM(2017) 2025 Final, p. 8)
In addition, Europe is ageing fast, and life expectancy is reaching unprecedented levels. With a median
age of 45, Europe will be the “oldest” region in the world by 2030 (ibid, p. 10).
Instability in the EU‟s neighbourhood, increasing militarisation around the world, terrorism, large-scale
cyberattacks are some vivid illustrations of the common global threats and challenges the Union faces. At the
same time, although NATO continues to provide hard security for most EU countries, this is not a given for the
future.
Although a future model of the European Union is difficult to be drawn, it seems clear that the EU needs
to continue doing more and to do it together. “Soft”, “hard”, and “transformational” security power will need to
go hand in hand in the future.
Final Remarks
Europe‟s future model is in the making. Nevertheless, there are some important lessons to be drawn given
its current power projection, prospects in the Balkans and competition with major regional and global power in
the region and in the world.
In order to determine the EU‟s responsibility towards its neighbourhood, one needs to understand the
nature of the EU‟s capacity and power in the region. Hence, the primary European challenge in the Balkans is
the European Union‟s model itself. The EU is a project in the making which has been mainly built on its own
failures. Every brick leaders have been putting on the European construction that has been the result of a new
“emergency” situation. Yet, the EU needs to come to terms with some of its most high-pitched fragilities: a
rigid basically technocratic structure that lacks clear governance and democratic recognition. Thus, it lacks a
common voice and subsequently acknowledgement and relevance in the world stage.
Under this prism, the road ahead needs to begin by (re)thinking the future power of the Union. The EU has
the economic as well as the military potential to take that decisive step forward, from a successful “soft” power
as it is today, to a future credible power capable of assuming first and foremost the security responsibility for its
own citizens. The future of the Western Balkans will be revealing the Union‟s ultimate successes and failures in
that endeavour. The EU has engaged with the region since the end of the Cold War, in the framework of
stabilisation and security policies, as well as accession policies. However, the multi-crisis state of the Union,
besides the backward steps taken by those countries in the last years, has resulted in a “fatigue” that posed on
hold the overall development of the region.
Given the changing dynamic of the existing structures of the world order, including the US‟s shifting
interests, Eastern power‟s geopolitical affirmations and the multiple security threats that accompany that
process, the Western Balkans‟ integration into the EU remains a top priority for Europe‟s stability.
Nonetheless, the nature of the transformation of the region will strongly depend on the efforts taken by the
Western Balkan countries themselves. Undoubtedly, the EU‟s ability to accurately understand the interests and
role of external players, as well as its own urgent renovation needs, will determine its capacity to turn down
barriers and reach its true potentialities, in the Balkans and beyond.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.06.004
D DAVID PUBLISHING
A Prerequisite for the Successful Governance of COVID-19 in

the United States: Expansion of Liberal Democracy From
Politics to Economy
ZHOU Zhifa, QU Pan, SHEN Yizhu

Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, China
The failure of COVID-19 governance in the United States of America is closely related to its economic inequality.
According to the theory of error-tolerant democracy, after reflecting on the American financial crisis of 2008,
liberty should be redefined from mutual empowerment under the background of regulation, which means that rights
to liberty of entrepreneurs and financial capitalists in the public economy are empowered by the people, so they
should empower and benefit the people, corresponding to regulation and redistribution respectively. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, empowering and benefiting the people regarded as economic democracy has not been
realized for neoliberal policies, leading to insufficient public funds to help citizens badly hurt by the disease. To
restore the U.S. as the beacon of democracy, it should undertake the historical mission: expansion of liberal
democracy from politics to economy so as to reduce unreasonable economic inequality and protect rights to life of
more infected Americans.
Keywords: COVID-19, liberalism, liberal democracy, error-tolerantism, error-tolerant democracy, error-tolerant

market economy
Introduction
Faced with COVID-19, the American democratic system is under unprecedented pressure (Schmitt, 2020).
According to official statistics, the number of American people infected with COVID-19 has exceeded
46,000,000, and the death tolls due to it have exceeded 760,000 by the end of October 2021 (Worldometer,
2021). The crisis is a unique test of the legitimacy of political systems (Benton, 2020), especially when the
United States has the most powerful science and technology. Many Americans cannot get timely assistance and
die, as shown that liberal democracy—although democracy is still the most precious value of mankind—has
been unable to maintain the United States as a beacon of democracy. A four-nation survey by the Pew Research
Center in November and December 2020 finds that about two-thirds of adults in France and the United States
ZHOU Zhifa, associate professor, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, China.
QU Pan, postgraduate, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, China.
SHEN Yizhu, undergraduate, Xingzhi College, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, China.
Corresponding author: ZHOU Zhifa, who is committed to the construction of error-tolerant philosophy and social science
system, including error-tolerant political philosophy, error-tolerant pedagogy, error-tolerant economics, error-tolerant international
relations theory and error-tolerant sociology. Error-tolerant political philosophy (error-tolerantism and error-tolerant democracy)
and error-tolerant pedagogy have been preliminarily completed in the past 16 years. At present, I am committed to the
construction of error-tolerant economics.
A PREREQUISITE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL GOVERNANCE OF COVID-19 IN THE US 245
and about half in Britain believe that their political systems need significant changes or thorough reforms (Wike,
Silver, Schumacher, & Connaughton, 2021; Carr, 2020). Therefore, how to reconstruct liberalism and liberal
democracy to make them more universal has become an important historical mission of Western countries.
Karl Popper (1972) put forward the evolution of knowledge: ―…P1—TT—EE—P2…‖ (TT means trial
theory; EE means error elimination), among which trial and error is the basic method of science with
universality. In the process of constructing error-tolerantism and error-tolerant democracy (Zhou, 2018), trial
and error is directly integrated into the state of nature in the theory of Thomas Hobbes (1996), John Locke
(1967), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1924), et al. and we conclude that human ideas are conceived by trial-and-error
practices, and improved through subsequent trial-and-error practices (Zhou, 2018; 2019). If an individual or
organization can monopolize the qualification of trial-and-error practices, i.e., the right to trial and error (the
right to be wrong), then they have the opportunity to define various concepts of mankind by interests, such as
the connotation of the right to life and property, etc. In this sense, the right to be wrong, i.e., the right to liberty
in the innovative field has the nature of matriarchy: New ideas are born because of it, and old ideas die out
because of it. The right paradigm theory of error-tolerantism is the right to be wrong as an original right and
mutual empowerment theory—rather than natural rights theory and social contract theory—which divides
liberty into the right to liberty in innovative fields, the right to be wrong as an original right, and rights to be
right in non-innovative ones as sub-rights; rights come from mutual empowerment among people (Zhou, Tan,
& Liu, 2020; Zhou & Qu, 2021).
In terms of COVID-19 governance, error-tolerantism (Zhou et al., 2020) holds that the first defect of
liberalism is that Western media have criticized China for exercising the power to be wrong as an original right
in the governance of COVID-19 by turning to rights to liberty in the non-innovative fields as the subordinate
level in the context of non-COVID-19. The second defect is its failure to realize that the rational
implementation of the power to be wrong as an original power will produce new subordinate rights. The
number of people infected with COVID-19 in Wuhan dropping to zero indicates that new subordinate rights to
liberty, such as social distancing, mask wearing, health codes shown, etc. at public places, have been formed
and confirmed (People.cn, 2020), but most Western countries are reluctant to learn. Error-tolerantism regards
that the definition of liberty by liberalists lacks dynamics that lead to the confusion in American understanding
ideas of liberty and various illegal actions endangering public security, such as traveling, gathering, or
demonstrating without a mask wearing during COVID-19.
In addition, error-tolerant democracy constructed on error-tolerantism believes that the defects of liberal
democracy have contributed to the further spread of COVID-19. In an error-tolerant democratic society,
everyone has the equal right to be wrong as an original right and corresponding right to be right, as the first
time that people empower each other. For the sake of efficiency, people are willing to transfer the right to be
wrong and corresponding rights to the elites in political fields through a fair electoral system; meanwhile, they
should empower and benefit the people, as the second time that people empower each other. This is a way of
exchanging rights for rights: The right to be wrong is ―one‖, and after it is transferred, people should obtain
―many‖: the right to education, liberty in non-innovative fields, supervision, and other rights. Therefore,
error-tolerant democracy in politics can be defined as follows: In a modern nation-state, people authorize their
rights to be wrong as an original right and corresponding rights to be right to political elites by election, to
obtain corresponding profit and subordinate rights, such as the right to life, education, and criticism, etc. In the
process of managing state affairs, political elites have the power to be wrong and be right protected by law and
246 A PREREQUISITE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL GOVERNANCE OF COVID-19 IN THE US
perform their obligations of criticism, self-criticism and should ensure that errors can be effectively shared,
corrected, and searched at the systematic level and thus perfect the governmental organization (Zhou, 2018).
COVID-19 has a huge impact on liberal democracy. For instance, many leaders across the world are using
the virus to undermine democracy, such as reducing transparency, strengthening surveillance, and arresting
dissidents, etc. (Abramowitz & Rosner, 2020). But more importantly, the major defects of liberal democracy
from error-tolerant democracy are as follows: The essence of election is to transfer people’s right to be wrong
and corresponding rights to be right to politicians, but the separation and balance of powers do not evaluate
whether the president, governors, mayors, et al. have reasonably exercised the power to be wrong, so that they
could even abuse it in COVID-19 governance, and do great harm to people’s human rights without any
accountability or impeachment. Surprisingly, the death toll for COVID-19 in the United States exceeds 760,000,
but no official is responsible for it. Therefore, during COVID-19, governance as innovative fields, liberal
democracy has completely lost its ability to correct errors. On the other hand, the liberal part refers primarily to
a rule of law that constrains the power of government (Fukuyama, 2020), but it is far from enough because
liberal democracy has not systematically protected the power to be wrong of the President, governors, mayors,
et al. But democratic governors’ power authorized by election is deprived by President Trump through issuing
false information in COVID-19 governance and encouraging people to protest against anti-pandemic laws, such
as the stay-at-home order, which made it out of control (Zhou & Qu, 2021). Fukuyama (2020) had not realized
that this is not only the issue of restricting governments’ power, but also of the president’s deprivation of
governors’ legal power, as is a serious infringement and should become one of the important indicators for
impeaching the president.
Furthermore, the failure of COVID-19 governance in the United States is closely related to economic
inequality. COVID-19, like a Wake-up call, has raised the general question of economic inequality that has lost
its sense of fairness in redistribution and endangered American democracy (Solis, Franco-Paredes,
Henao-Martí nez, Krsak, & Zimmer, 2020; Schwartz, 2020). This article first reviews the relationship between
economic inequality and COVID-19; secondly, error-tolerantism and error-tolerant democracy reflect on why
the United States has not been able to change the severe economic inequality since the American financial
crisis of 2008, and ultimately hurts American rights to life severely during COVID-19. To solve the crisis, the
United States needs more democracy: expansion of liberal democracy from politics to economy according to
error-tolerant democracy, and the free market economy will be replaced by the error-tolerant market economy,
which helps the United States to explore a more just, reasonable and sustainable market economy.
Literature Review
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic inequality is closely related to high infection and
mortality rates, in which living conditions and job types play an extremely important role. Front-line workers
need to be in close contact with others and cannot maintain social distancing, so they have to take greater risks
(Waller, Hodge, Holford, Milana, & Webb, 2020; Almagro & Orane-Hutchinson, 2020; Adams-Prass, Boneva,
Golin, & Rauh, 2020; Pepinsky, 2020). Many workers in grocery stores have experienced stress and anxiety at
work, and some of them to stay at home or quit their jobs (Bhattarai, 2020; Kantamneni, 2020). In the first half
of 2020, up to 310,000 cases and up to 5,200 deaths across America are caused by the spread of COVID-19
from livestock farms to surrounding counties (Maxmen, 2021). Furthermore, COVID-19 not only exposes
severe inequalities in American society but also exacerbates them, because the virus itself is well suited to
exacerbate these inequalities (Afsahi, Beausoleil, Dean, Ercan, & Gagnon, 2020; Nassif-Pires, de Lima Xavier,
Masterson, Nikiforos, & Rios-Avila, 2020). Before a reliable vaccine appears, who, athlete or nurse, should be
tested first? Common sense tells us that nurses engaged in dangerous jobs should be the first, but actually, the
rich, celebrities, and athletes take priority over nurses. The profit-oriented U.S. policies have greatly magnified
the harm of COVID-19, which shows that its governance system is in a state of logical chaos (Babb, 2020;
Packer, 2020; Afsahi et al., 2020). Richard D. Wolff (2020) revealed that the root cause of capitalism’s inability
to deal with COVID-19 lies in the corruption and income inequality in the healthcare system, and this had
existed long before the pandemic broke out. Finian Cunningham (2020) also argued that the real disease is the
inequality of American capitalism, in which tens of millions of workers and their families face poverty,
unemployment, hunger, and homelessness.
Low-income communities, especially those with a large population of ethnic minorities, are more severely
affected by COVID-19. In Louisiana, about 70% of the death tolls are black, but the black only make up
one-third of the state’s population (Eligon, Burch, Searcey, & Oppel Jr, 2020), as has shown that political
inequality in the United States originates from and exacerbates social inequality (Wright & Merritt, 2020;
Gilman, 2020). Similar phenomena also exist in Michigan and across other parts of the United States (Wilson,
2020; M. A. Raifman & J. R. Raifman, 2020). Less than 30% of workers can work at home, and the ability to
work at home varies by race and ethnicity. Compared with non-Hispanic and white workers, Asian workers are
most likely to work from home, but for Hispanic and black workers, only 16.2% and 19.7% of them can work
remotely respectively (Gould & Shierholz, 2020; Chamberlain, 2021; Millett et al., 2020), because the
proportion of these groups in the front-line service sectors, such as public transportation, cleaners, security
guards or delivery drivers, is often too high, and there are fewer opportunities for them to require sick pay or
other social benefits (Waller et al., 2020). Many scholars have closely linked the outbreak of COVID-19 in the
United States with racism that has penetrated the entire American social structure for a long history and limited
opportunities for people of color to obtain health and wealth during the virus (Godoy Wood, 2020; Laster Pirtle,
2020; Doubek, 2020; Wright & Merritt, 2020). In Alabama, Oregon, Delaware, New Mexico, and South
Dakota in predominantly Hispanic and Indigenous American counties, most black counties tend to have fewer
tests available than white ones (Strassmann, 2020). Unfortunately, the government’s response to COVID-19
often fails to take into account disproportionate and differentiated impacts on marginalized communities, nor
does it consider the gender and inclusive dimensions of democracy and governance in response to containment,
tracking, and mitigation measures (CEPPS, 2020; Jealous & Sarbanes, 2020). When explaining that 70% of
African Americans account for the death toll in Louisiana, Senator Bill Cassidy blames it on obesity and
diabetes in black Americans and ignores economic inequality (Weir, 2020). So, Laster Pirtle (2020) also
concluded that racial capitalism is the root cause of racial and socioeconomic inequality in the COVID-19
pandemic in the United States.
Although American economic inequalities have been systematically reflected and criticized since the 2008
financial crisis (Stiglitz, 2012; 2019), neoliberalism has once again become the focus of reflection and criticism
when COVID-19 attacks the United States in 2020 (Desai, 2020). The triumph of neoliberalism has resulted in
the largest inequality in human history, where the 26 richest people in the world have occupied wealth
equivalent to half of the world’s population. Therefore, Lent (2020) regarded that American should abandon
neoliberalism which has pushed the whole society to a cliff and America’s value needs to be redefined and its
core human values of fairness, mutual aid, and compassion should be paramount for a national government.
The institutionalization of selfishness (Frankford, 2020), such as reduction of social policy expenditure (health
care and public health services) and privatization of medical services, has greatly weakened the American
ability to deal with COVID-19 (Navarro, 2020). The corruption, indifference, and incompetence of the Trump
administration have exacerbated the structural deficiencies of American neoliberalism and failed to take the
pandemic seriously (Warf, 2021). Liberal democracy, which shares the connotation of liberty with
neoliberalism, is burdened with unresolved social inequality, and the long-term existence of social inequality
has, in turn, exposed the fragility of the liberal democratic system. COVID-19 further divides the United States
and does not make ordinary Americans feel that the United States is a unity (Carr, 2020).
Ashford, Hall, Arango-Quiroga, Metaxas, and Showalter (2020) proposed reforms against inequality, the
core of which is to increase government functions, such as government provision of essential goods and
services, education, health, housing, food, etc. by income and wealth transfers to facilitate an equitable increase
in purchasing power. Different from neo-liberal opposition to redistribution, Stevenson (2020) had suggested
that the rich pay their taxes more than ever on the background of the COVID-19 pandemic, which embodies
economic democracy. Similarly, Liz Theoharis (2020) required that the government use far-sighted social and
economic policies to solve the problem of poverty to establish justice, promote the welfare of the whole people,
and improve society from the bottom. The government’s role in the distribution process, the connotation of
public services, etc. should be changed (The Editorial Board, 2020; Mohmand et al., 2021; Saez & Zucman,
2020; Eisinger, Ernsthausen, & Kiel, 2021). Julia Lynch (2020) insisted that additional income support and
personal protective equipment guarantees in the short term, as well as a more equal distribution of income in
the long term, be required to mitigate social inequality, lowering society’s vulnerability to a global pandemic,
like COVID-19.
Although many commentators believe that COVID-19 has sounded the death knell of neoliberalism (Lent
2020), Chang and Loeppky (2020) still noticed that the 2008 financial crisis and COVID-19 do not and
probably will not promote a substantial shift from neoliberalism in the United States, because neo-liberal
Democrats want to keep playing identity politics ping-pong with Trump-like Republicans indefinitely, which
allows them to avoid addressing inequality and poverty through extensive economic redistribution programs
(King, 2020; Baroud, 2020). So, Cathy O’Neil (2020) worried that an Occupy Wall Street 2.0 will be staged
after COVID-19 because the needs in poor and stigmatized communities are not only chronically unattended
but dismissed as politically required.
To save democracy, African Americans should be protected without the systematic shortage of housing,
health care, wealth, and education (Cohen, 2020), and voter suppression and money in politics should be ended
to build a more inclusive and ethnically just society (Jealous & Sarbanes, 2020; Flanagan, Tattersall, Stears, &
Rogers, 2020; Iacoella, Justino, & Martorano, 2021) notice that unequal counties with low trust in political
institutions but higher social trust and citizen participation at the beginning of the pandemic are also more
likely to experience more protests in response to stricter policies. Afsahi et al. (2020) had realized that
COVID-19 as an objective lesson has required the full democratization of American political, social, and
economic relations. For David Litt (2020), the American representative government is no longer as
representative as it used to be. In the past four decades, the response of American leaders to the public interest
has been greatly reduced. The pandemic has reminded American people that personal responsibility and private
initiatives can flourish only when they recognize each other’s equality and freedom and protect each other from
existential risks (Bollyky & Kickbusch, 2020). Moreover, the lack of protection for disadvantaged groups will
generally damage the common interests and cause irreparable harm to liberal democracy. The brutal reality is
that medical resources are increasingly scarce during COVID-19 and countries in Europe and the United States
require the disabled to make sacrifices (Afsahi et al., 2020). But for Coy (2021), although the COVID-19
pandemic has made American society worse, it is an opportunity for it to address inequality seriously.
Error-Tolerant Democracy: Liberal Democracy Needs to Expand From Politics to

Economy
One of the main reasons why the United States has failed to contain COVID-19 after sacrificing more than
760,000 lives is that extreme economic inequality plays an important role (Baroud, 2020), which is directly
related to neoliberalism as American mainstream values. Neoliberalism has created two worlds in the United
States where the rich 1% and the poor 99% (Stiglitz, 2012) are separated from each other and cannot promote a
sense of linked fate as Americans that is critical for effective pandemic response (Lynch, 2020). The formation
of the divided worlds is attributed to neoliberal austerity policies by dramatically reducing social policy
expenditures, privatizing health services, etc. (Frankford, 2020), and has greatly weakened the ability of Italy,
Spain, and the United States to respond to COVID-19 (Navarro, 2020). From the 2008 financial crisis to the
outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the United States has 12 years to reflect or even rebuild neoliberalism and its
policies; however, the financial crisis has not become an opportunity for rebuilding American core values.
Finally, the severe economic inequality promoted by neoliberalism has pushed the entire American society to
the top of the cliff (Lent, 2020). COVID-19 requires the United States to help each other, especially the rich to
help the poor, as embodies the values of fairness, mutual aid, and compassion (Lent, 2020), which is opposite
to neoliberalism.
Error-tolerantism and error-tolerant democracy believe that classical liberalism and neoliberalism, which
understand liberty from atomic individuals, are no longer suitable for the needs of the contemporary American
era. Instead, liberty should be interpreted from the perspective of mutual empowerment (Zhou, 2018). Although
there are no votes in a market economy, error-tolerant democracy holds that the right to be wrong and
corresponding rights to be right exercised by business men, such as entrepreneurs and financial capitalists, are
empowered by the people, so they need to empower and benefit the people, which is regarded as the
error-tolerant market economy and consistent with economic democracy (Johanisova & Wolf, 2012).
Empowering the people by businessmen corresponds to regulation and benefiting the people corresponds to a
reasonable redistribution system can reduce severe inequality. Unfortunately, this transformation from the free
market economy to the error-tolerant democracy is very difficult to occur in the United States (Yamin &
Norheim, 2020), because American traditional values are highly individualistic, emphasizing individual rights,
minimizing social obligations, and skeptical of the federal government (Levin, 2017; Fukuyama, 2020), so
that sacrifices made by individuals for the common good are demonized (Warf, 2021). But for error-tolerant
democracy, neoliberalism’s refusal to empower or benefit the people is an infringement, i.e., it allows the top 1%
in the United States to maximize profits by violating human rights of the bottom 99% (Stiglitz, 2012).
Although after the American financial crisis of 2008, the Democratic Party has not yet realized that
changes in the concept of freedom have led to the need for a profound theoretical response to the entire
American values, President Obama recognizes that the combination of rising inequality and deceasing mobility
has posed a fundamental threat to the American dream (Stiglitz, 2019). Obama has not understood liberty from
mutual empowerment, but has tried to empower and benefit the people. An Affordable Care Act enacted in
March 2010 known also as ACA or Obamacare is meant to benefit the people, which helps solve one of the
most critical problems in social inequality of America—the unavailability of decent health care to the people
(Stiglitz, 2019). In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States promulgated the ―Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010)‖ marks the transformation of its financial system from
deregulation to strict regulation. Stiglitz (2012) explained that the lack of regulation from the perspective of
externalities will cause hurt or benefit others, but for error-tolerantism and error-tolerant democracy, the
concept of liberty needs to be further understood from the perspective of mutual empowerment that means
business men’s empowering and benefit the people by Obamacare, etc. Error-tolerant democracy notices that
when COVID-19 attacks America in 2020, Obama’s economic democracy is saving American lives, because
the rate of virus infection is lower by an average of 32% in counties that are part of states covered by the
Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (Chamberlain, 2021; Beusekom, 2021; Brown & Ravallion,
2020; Tan et al., 2021).
However, even confronted with the 2008 financial crisis, American entrepreneurs and financial capitalists
have still done their utmost to maintain the legitimacy of neoliberalism. Even if ―Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act‖ was issued, they fully resist it and try to obtain the right to be wrong
and corresponding rights to be right without any regulation. For instance, financial capitalists instruct many
lobbyists to lobby all regulators to persuade them not to regulate banks. According to statistics, each U.S.
congressman is targeted by 2.5 lobbyists on average (Stiglitz, 2012). Error-tolerant democracy argues that
lobbyists help financial capitalists undermine the principle of mutual empowerment, which is an organized
violation of American human rights and is therefore illegal and should be banned. The landmark event for
financial capitalists to compete for the right to be wrong and corresponding rights to be right—without
empowering or benefiting the people—is the lifting of restrictions on the number of donations to presidential
candidates. In cities United v. Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court lifted the expense limit of
enterprises or trade unions to boost or attack candidates running for political office in 2010. In McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court removed the limit on the total amount of individual
contributions to candidates and national party committees in 2014 (Menon, 2019). Any U.S. presidential
candidate, with his political agenda involving ―empowering the people that means promoting strict regulation;
empowering the people that means promoting reasonable redistribution‖, such as Bernie (Funabashi, 2020),
cannot obtain huge financial support and consequently loses the campaign. Moreover, financial capitalists
control the staff of the Federal Reserve, and only those who agree with their views to deregulate can be
appointed, otherwise they will be rejected (Stiglitz, 2012). Although Obama’s means is to promote economic
democratization that empowers and benefits the people to reduce inequality, all the measures to punish Wall
Street, including the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Act, are widely advocated but are
of no practical use (Yong, 2019). Stiglitz (2019) sadly discovered that when American market power and
wealth are highly concentrated, it cannot achieve real democracy, because it violates the basic principle of
empowering and benefiting the people.
After the 2008 financial crisis, liberal democracy fails to understand freedom from the perspective of
mutual empowerment, and thus refuses to extend democracy from politics to economy. In this context, the
United States ushered in the ―Occupy Wall Street Movement‖ that lasted more than six months (Anthony,
2021). In response to the current level of inequality, some defenders claim that although this inequality is not
inevitable, any measures taken will be too costly. They believe that a high degree of inequality is inevitable if
capitalism is to create miracles, and even a high degree of inequality is a necessary feature of the economy.
After all, those who work hard should and must be rewarded (Stiglitz, 2012). The key point is how to
understand the concept of liberty. Understanding liberty from an atomic individual, every successful person
gains wealth because he exercises his natural right to liberty, and does not need others’ consent (Hayek, 2011),
so there is no need for him to empower or benefit the people. Not surprisingly, over the last four decades,
American leaders are far less responsive to the public interest (Litt, 2020). Understanding liberty from mutual
empowerment, then, entrepreneurs and financial capitalists have the right to be wrong as an original right and
corresponding rights to be right empowered by others’ people, so empowering and benefiting the people are
reasonable, otherwise they would not even have the right to work hard. With the goal of holding elites
responsible and making a more democratic, free and humane society (Devega, 2020a), understanding liberty
from the perspective of mutual empowerment is possibly more reasonable.
President Obama failed to fully promote the economic democratization of ―empowering and benefiting the
people‖, and the American people are undoubtedly frustrated with his policies, followed by extreme
disappointment with liberal democracy, which has given birth to populism in the United States (Bonikowski,
2016). Error-tolerant democracy regards that the reason why Hillary Clinton lost to Trump in the 2016 general
election is precisely her value of liberal democracy limiting democracy to the political field, as has shattered
her dream of becoming the first female president in American history. Finally, the American people who partly
refuse to trust liberal democracy have chosen Trump, the representative of populism, as the president of the
United States. But how has the Democratic Party reflected on its failure in the 2016 election? It has created a
―Russiagate‖ to impeach President Trump as a scapegoat to defend its failure (J. Valenta & L. F. Valenta, 2017),
rather than realize that liberal democracy can no longer restore the American dream.
The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 has once again fully tested the American value of liberal democracy.
COVID-19 governance requires economic democracy: Everyone has the freedom to avoid being threatened by
COVID-19; every infected patient should be treated equally, and there should be no distinction between the
rich and the poor, which means that the Trump administration needs enormous public funds to save the
American people (Stevenson, 2020), and has to undoubtedly impose high taxes on the rich for public interests.
In other words, if the Trump administration lacks huge public funds during COVID-19, then it almost does
stand by in the whole pandemic period and abandon its governance. Unfortunately, from Trump’s taking office
in 2017 to the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the Trump’s Economy is not only unable to help Americans
actively fight it, but it is greatly undermining the government’s ability to contain it.
Specifically, in February, 2020, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2021 systematically
summarizes the Trump Economy that consists of the proven pro-growth pillars of tax cuts, deregulation, energy
independence, and better trade deals (OMB, 2020). For deregulation, the president emphasizes that after three
years in office, the deregulatory-to-regulatory action has resulted in a total of $51 billion in net regulatory cost
savings, and this is in sharp contrast to the $420 billion in net regulatory costs imposed by the Obama
Administration during the same period (OMB, 2020). Trump’s deregulatory policies are closely related to his
understanding of liberty from atomic individuals. The Trump administration, such as his initial White House
general counsel, Donald McGahn, his appointees to the U.S. Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett
Kavanaugh, sees regulation as an infringement of civil and corporate freedom, especially Donald McGahn
claims that the ever-growing and irresponsible administrative state is a direct threat to individual liberty
(Rampell, 2020). Error-tolerant democracy, understanding liberty from the perspective of mutual empowerment,
notes that the powers of entrepreneurs, financial capitalists, et al. are empowered by the people, and the
government should assume the role of empowering the people. Hence, the government cannot simply be
regarded as a threat to liberty (Zeleny & Thee-Brenan, 2011), and can also be the defender of individual liberty,
because it regulates business men on behalf of the people. When President Trump mentions saving money
through deregulation, he may have undermined the principle of mutual empowerment, thus constituting a
violation of human rights. So, Trump’s task is to improve regulation more effective rather than deregulation.
Although President Trump did not do as well in deregulation as he boasted (Coglianese Sarin, & Shapiro,
2020), error-tolerant democracy witnesses that since the 2008 financial crisis, the core concept of liberty in the
United States has not been systematically rebuilt, and eventually deregulation as a violation of human rights is
unimpeded in the United States. Similarly, the Trump Economy promotes tax cuts, and the result is that wealth
flows from the bottom and the middle to the top (Stiglitz, 2012), which violates the principle of mutual benefit.
In detail, the budget firstly proposes to cut $1 trillion in Medicaid and ACA over a decade, and the cuts will
increase over time; the budget proposes drastic cuts in plans to meet the basic needs of families, which will
increase poverty and difficulties, because the Trump Economy refuses to benefit the people when America is
the richest. The budget would permanently extend the 2017 tax law’s tax cuts (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
2017) for individuals, including those that confer large benefits on high-income taxpayers and heirs to
multi-million-dollar estates, so the biggest winners from the 2017 tax law are non-Hispanic white households in
the top 1%, who are receiving more tax-cut dollars from it than the bottom 60% of households of all races
combined (Van de Water, 2020). From the perspective of error-tolerant democracy, tax cuts and deregulation
are systematically allowing the top 1% to pursue the maximization of profits by infringing on the human rights
of the bottom 99%, but they have proudly become two of the four pillars of Trump’s Economy (Rasmus, 2020).
During COVID-19, Trump’s above-mentioned policies have not only made most American people poorer, but
directly exposed them to it without the ability to resist it (Van de Water, 2020).
Trump’s refusal to empower or benefit the people is in line with the tradition of the Republican Party since
the 2008 financial crisis. From 2010 to 2018, the Republican Party had tried, in vain, dozens of times to void
the ACA during its control of the House of Representatives (Cassady, 2020). The large-scale layoffs during the
COVID-19 pandemic made at least 40 million people jobless or file for unemployment claims (Hellmann, 2020;
Warf, 2021). The number of uninsured persons soared. They could not pay for their health care or had to
postpone their medical care due to financial reasons. Not only do they face risks themselves, they also pose
risks to other Americans (Norrlöf, 2020), especially the elderly or disabled are abandoned for limited medical
resources (Afsahi et al., 2020; Packer, 2020). President Trump has tried to deliver a more responsive, agile, and
efficient government (OMB, 2020), but it is impossible for him to establish such a perfect government, because
tax cuts and deregulation means refusing to empower or benefit the bottom 99%.
Error-tolerantism and error-tolerant democracy regard that the historical mission of the United States since
the 2008 financial crisis is that democracy needs to expand from politics to economy. If the United States
completed this transformation, deregulation and tax cuts for the rich as the two pillars of the Trump Economy
would be illegal. When COVID-19 spreads, the policies of deregulation and tax cuts turn to hurt American
health, i.e., 46,000,000 infected with it, and infringe on American people’s rights to life, i.e., 760,000 deaths.
The consequences of refusing to empower or benefit the people are significant: the top 1% have become
wealthier and more powerful in a short period than they were before COVID-19 began, and the poorest people
in the world may take more than 10 years to recover (Devega, 2020b; Berkhout et al., 2021). Therefore, after
COVID-19 is over, the United States will continue its neoliberal policies, which means that the 1% refuse to
empower or benefit the people, and the bottom 99% will feel further frustrated. So, the American government
has not demonstrated its ability to avoid a crisis similar to COVID-19 in the future.
Conclusion
The need for a profound political reform in the United States has gradually become a consensus (Wike et
al., 2021). The question is how to change it? An important reason for the failure of the American COVID-19
governance is economic inequality, and the initiator of economic inequality is the core value of the United
States ―the free market economy guided by neoliberalism and liberal democracy‖. Therefore, reconstructing the
core values of the United States means rebuilding ―the connotation of the market economy and democracy‖.
Error-tolerantism and error-tolerant democracy come into being under this background.
In terms of rebuilding the connotation of the market economy, we hold that the United States should shift
from the perspective of natural human rights to mutual empowerment to define the concept of liberty, and then
put forward a new concept of ―the error-tolerant market economy‖: In the economic field, everyone has the
equal right to be wrong and corresponding rights to be right. For the sake of efficiency, everyone is willing to
transfer his right to be wrong and corresponding rights to be right to anyone, such as entrepreneurs, financial
capitalists, et al., who is engaged in economic activities through fair competition. Therefore, in the public
economy, everyone’s rights to be wrong and corresponding rights to be right are empowered by others, then he
should empower and benefit the people, which corresponds to regulation and reasonable redistribution
respectively. So, who will bear the responsibility of empowering and benefiting the people? The government is
the preferred organization. The governance crisis of COVID-19 in the United States proves that neoliberalism
simply denies the function of government, the provision of social justice, which means it has prevented the rich,
big entrepreneurs or bankers, from empowering and benefiting the people. Since taking office, President
Obama has introduced regulatory bills and ACA as Obamacare, etc., aiming at empowering and benefiting the
people. But the Republican Party, entrepreneurs, and financial capitalists have successfully undermined
Obama’s economic democratization path. Especially, President Trump has comprehensively promoted
neoliberal policies, denying empowering the people—deregulation, denying benefiting the people—reduction
of public expenditures and taxes on the rich, etc. (Primrose et al., 2020). As a result, during COVID-19, the
United States lacks necessary public funds and is unable to protect ordinary people, and has caused serious
casualties, which has constituted a violation of American rights to life.
Error-tolerant democracy believes that if American politicians want to rebuild people’s trust in them, they
should respond to the changes in the theoretical connotation of liberal democracy due to changes in the concept
of liberty since the 2008 financial crisis from both theoretical and practical aspects. Otherwise, after the
pandemic is over, ―Occupy Wall Street Movement‖ version 2.0 more massive and angrier (Politico Magazine,
2020) may also be staged. Martha Roby (2020) had vowed to say that COVID-19 is not allowed to shake liberal
democracy, but he just limits democracy in the field of politics. Similarly, Larry Diamond (2020a) regarded
that democracy is still the best form of government for protecting human rights and improving human
well-being despite the threat by COVID-19. Generally speaking, scholars have concentrated on the traditional
democratic concept, such as the delayed primary elections, assembly and voting, etc, which is very important
but not enough for nowadays’ COVID-19 governance (Milligan, 2020). The inequality of the United States in
the COVID-19 era requires that the United States appropriately promote economic democracy without
damaging its scientific and technological leadership. Afsahi et al. (2020) reminded that to defeat COVID-19,
the times have come to struggle for the full democratization of our political, social, and economic relations, as
is consistent with the change of American liberty concept which leads to democracy from politics to economy
since the 2008 financial crisis. Bernie Sanders’ strong showing twice in the U.S. Democratic presidential
primary has proved that economic democracy is a major trend that both parties in the United States need to take
seriously (Funabashi, 2020).
But actually, the door of ―economic democratization‖ brought by the COVID-19 crisis to the United States
will be soon closed (Saith, 2011; Afsahi et al., 2020). In the first 20 years of the 21st century, the United States
may waste the historical opportunities of the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19, and refuse to
rebuild values. Without a fundamental transition in American politics behind socio-economic inequality and
political polarization, it will be more divided and violent in the future (Baroud, 2020; Diamond, 2020b).
Error-tolerant and error-tolerant democracy argues that only by extending democracy from politics to economy
without damaging the originality of the United States as a capitalist country can the American dream be
restored. Excessive emphasis on the redistribution system may also hurt the American ability to develop high
technologies and innovative management models. Today’s U.S. has over-ignored economic democracy and
caused damage to U.S. social stability, and will eventually harm the originality of the United States.
Furthermore, error-tolerant democracy holds that empowering and benefiting the people is an important part of
economic democracy, but it does not mean that the United States is following the path of socialism. The
capitalist system helps the United States to maintain its innovative vitality, and it only needs to promote a
reasonable redistribution system, narrow the gap between the rich and the poor, and use the dollar hegemony to
restore manufacturing. Then, the United States may get out of the predicament and rebuild its glory, but its
values may no longer be the same as the free market economy under the guidance of neoliberalism and liberal
democracy.
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International Relations

David Publishing Company

Aims and Scope:

David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

India’s Foreign Strategy From the Perspective of Geopolitical Logic 225

A Prerequisite for the Successful Governance of COVID-19 in the United States:

Central Asia’s Foreign Relations: A Comparison Between the

Geopolitics of Central Asia: Preliminary Observations

Figure 1. Central Asia’s geopolitical position map.1

Central Asia a Closed Region: No foreign Relations

The Post-Soviet Central Asia: A Move Towards Global Connectivity

Figure 3. The New Great Game map.6

India’s Foreign Strategy From the Perspective of

Keywords: geopolitics, India external strategy, the goal of great power

An Analysis of the Geopolitical Environment in India

The External Strategic Objectives of India’s Geopolitics

India’s Foreign Strategy Implementation

External Strategic Review of India

The Evolution of the EU‟s Security Model Through the

The European Union in a Constant Security Transformation

Malfunctions’ Diagnosis in the Process

The Balkans Test—Enlargement and Geopolitics

Scenarios for the Future

A Prerequisite for the Successful Governance of COVID-19 in

ZHOU Zhifa, QU Pan, SHEN Yizhu

Keywords: COVID-19, liberalism, liberal democracy, error-tolerantism, error-tolerant democracy, error-tolerant

Error-Tolerant Democracy: Liberal Democracy Needs to Expand From Politics to

Maxmen, A. (2021). Inequality’s deadly toll. Retrieved from https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-021-00943-x/index.html

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