International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 7, Number 12,2019

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 12, December 2019 (Serial Number 75)
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Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar); ★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
★Abosede Omowumi Bababtunde (National Open Resolution of Disputes, South Africa);
University of Nigeria, Nigeria); ★Menderes Koyuncu (Univercity of Yuzuncu Yil-Van,
★Adriana Lukaszewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland); Turkey);
★Ahmed Y. Zohny (Coppin State University, USA) ★Myroslava Antonovych (University of Kyiv-Mohyla
★Alessandro Vagnini (Sapienza University of Rome, Academy, Ukraine);
Rome); ★Nazreen Shaik-Peremanov (University of Cambridge,
★Ali Bilgiç (Bilkent University, Turkey); UK);
★András Mérei (University of Pécs, Hungary); ★Nermin Allam (University of Alberta, Edmonton,
★Anna Rosario D. Malindog (Ateneo De Manila University, Canada);
Philippines); ★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for
★Basia Spalek (Kingston University, UK); Applied Systems Analysis, Austria);
★Beata Przybylska-Maszner (Adam Mickiewicz University, ★Ngozi C. Kamalu (Fayetteville State University, USA);
Poland); ★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);
★Brian Leonard Hocking (University of London, UK); ★Phua Chao Rong, Charles (Lee Kuan Yew School of
★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New Public Policy, Singapore);
Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of ★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Taranaki, New Zealand); Ukraine, Ukraine);
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany); ★Raymond LAU (The University of Queensland,
★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK); Australia);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA); ★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
Cultures, Morocco); University, India);
★Ghadah AlMurshidi (Michigan State University, USA); ★Shkumbin Misini (Public University, Kosovo);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia); ★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,Greece);
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan); ★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
★Kyeonghi Baek (State University of New York, USA); Canada, Canada);
★John Opute (London South Bank University, UK); ★Timothy J. White (Xavier University, Ireland);
★Léonie Maes (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium); ★Tumanyan David (Yerevan State University, Armenia);
★Lomarsh Roopnarine (Jackson State University, USA); ★Zahid Latif (University of Peshawar, Pakistan);
★Marius-Costel ESI (Stefan Cel Mare University of ★Valentina Vardabasso (Pantheon-Sorbonne University,
Suceava, Romania); France);
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Poland); ★Yi-wei WANG (Renmin University of China, China);
The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.
International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 12, December 2019 (Serial Number 75)
Contents
European Crises
Continuities of Historical Crises and Discourses of Europe From the “Neo-Latin Past”
to the 21st Century 549
Isabella Walser-Bürgler
Strategic Partnership
The Romania-US Strategic Partnership and the Security of the Wider Black Sea Region:
Historical Landmarks 564
Ioan Codrut Lucinescu
Refugees
The Politics of Repatriation: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda, 2003-2017 573

Frank Ahimbisibwe
Public Investment
Public Investments as a Development Tool 592

Vassiliki Delitheou, Maria Vinieratou-Bosinaki, Constantinos GE. Athanassopoulos
International Relations and Diplomacy, December 2019, Vol. 7, No. 12, 549-563
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.12.001
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Continuities of Historical Crises and Discourses of Europe From

the “Neo-Latin Past” to the 21st Century
Isabella Walser-Bürgler
Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Neo-Latin Studies, Innsbruck, Austria

Europe and the EU have been facing many crises and challenges in recent years. From Brexit and rising nationalism
to economic problems and unanimous refugee policies, most of them remain unsolved. Instead of moving forward
with the European integration project, Europe seems to regress in many instances. Considering this turmoil, it
seems all the more important to historicize the affirmative discourse of Europe and to expand the knowledge of the
European unification process with novel insights into its history. Only if a broad understanding of its roots and
developments prevails, the conflicts of the present can be better evaluated and addressed. Particularly one set of so
far neglected sources from Europe’s past serves as guiding light in that respect: the early modern Europe literature
written in the Latin language. Between 1400 and 1800, Latin enjoyed a similar status in promoting scientific
discoveries, negotiating political affairs and generally communicating on an international level as modern-day
English. By offering a brief glance at some historically influential Latin texts from the early modern discourse of
Europe, this article will show that the early modern European crises strikingly resemble Europe’s current crises
despite the difference in political, social, and economic circumstances. The discourse of Europe has from the
beginning been a stable discourse, characterized by the same recurring questions for centuries. When used as
reference point for the crises of the 21st century, the prospects for the European integration look better than
presumed.
Keywords: European crises, discourse of Europe, European history, Europe in Neo-Latin literature, historicization
of Europe, Europe’s past and present
Introduction
Along with the term “Europe”, the eponymous continent has been known for more than 2,000 years. The
earliest mentions of Europe go back to Greek historiographers and geographers of the fifth century BC, who
used the term to demarcate the peoples living West of Asia Minor from the barbarian Asians. However, neither
during the Greek nor the Roman antiquity, notions of Europe as a conceptual entity existed (Schlumberger,
1994, pp. 7, 12).1 The same applies to the Middle Ages. Europe as a cohesive political or cultural unit beyond
an approximate geographical understanding was an inconceivable concept. Even though Charlemagne is often
referred to as the “father of Europe” (Detering, 2017, p. 57),2 his vision of “Europe” rather intended to revive

This article is based on a paper presented at the 26th International Conference of Europeanists, held on 20-22 June 2019 in
Madrid.
Isabella Walser-Bürgler, Ph.D., Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Neo-Latin Studies, Innsbruck, Austria.
1
Some literature seems to imply that, but without substantiating the assumption: e.g. Malitz, 2003; Jouanna, 2009.
2
This catchphrase is derived from an anonymous eulogy from the 9th century.
550 CONTINUITIES OF HISTORICAL CRISES AND DISCOURSES OF EUROPE
the Roman Empire than to build a supranational federation encompassing the entire continent (Asbach, 2011,
pp. 69-70). And even though the history of the crusades often conveys the picture of Europe as a self-contained
Christian unity driven by the same goals, the crusaders were nothing but a loosely assembled group of
individuals fighting for their own or their lords’ interests (Burke, 1980, pp. 22-23).
The situation changed at the transition from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern Period (c. 1400). All at
once, the view started to expand and “Europe” became visible to the public eye in all corners of the continent
and across all social classes. As a result, the term “Europe”—both in the vernacular languages and in Latin, the
lingua franca of the time—experienced such an increased use that the previously inexistent adjective
“European” had to be coined for the first time in history (Oschema, 2013, pp. 440-443). The words “Europe”
and “European” in turn were impregnated with ideas and discourses, which were fed by the realities of
contemporary life (military strife, peacemaking, confessional conflicts, economic interests, scientific
achievements, geographical discoveries, colonization, etc.). With the help of the newly invented printing press,
these ideas and discourses were quickly spread among the literate European reading public. Getting in contact
with them necessitated a subconscious reorientation among Europeans as to their relationship to each other and
as to their position in a global context. Ultimately, a certain sense of belonging emerged together with a novel
understanding of the space called Europe, which found expression in confident representations of collective
European identity. Although in sum many different concepts of European identity circulated during the Early
Modern Period and although Europe as an imagined community never turned into an actual reality before the
20th century, the notion of a collective European identity provided both stability and referentiality to people in
a time of constant change and upheaval (Anderson, 2006; Wintle, 2009). From a modern point of view, there is
nothing surprising about this observation. In the context of the Early Modern Period, however, it indicates an
unprecedented uniqueness, since before the 19th century continents did not conceive of themselves as
collective unities—apart from Europe (Pagden, 2002, p. 33).
Literary representations of Europe before 1800 have hardly been investigated (Detering, 2017, pp. 23, 35),
despite the important role literature played regarding the discourse of Europe and despite the impressive
quantity of texts dealing with continental policies. Particularly the Latin literature of the Early Modern Period
(usually labelled as Neo-Latin literature) needs to be mentioned in that context. From 1400 to approximately
1800, Latin served as the international language of communication and enjoyed a status similar to that of
English today. Scientists, scholars, lawyers, doctors, teachers, officials, noblemen, authors, and poets would use
Latin for their private and official communication, while most institutions, like the church, schools, and
universities, even constituted an exclusive Latin-speaking cosmos (Ford, Bloemendal, & Fantazzi, 2014;
Knight & Tilg, 2015; Korenjak, 2016).
Even though the Neo-Latin language and literature are still underexplored in relation to their former
significance, experts are by now fairly well able to assess the influence of Neo-Latin texts on the historical
continent-building. In various publications, Isabella Walser-Bürgler has highlighted the sheer quantity of
Neo-Latin texts defining and conceptualizing Europe from the 15th to the 19th centuries: From political
treatises, legal agreements, and journalistic texts to private letters, university orations, scientific texts, and the
belles lettres, the present and future state of the continent and its inhabitants was discussed in several 10,000
Neo-Latin texts (Walser, 2017; Walser-Bürgler, 2018a, 2018b). Put another way, the Neo-Latin discourse of
Europe was the main engine of Europe’s historical self-actualization. While the vernacular discourse of Europe
often emphasized national interests, the Neo-Latin discourse could house continental considerations in an
CONTINUITIES OF HISTORICAL CRISES AND DISCOURSES OF EUROPE 551
unparalleled manner.3 As a supranational language which belonged to every nation and no nation at the same
time, it did not only imply balance and shared identity, but also was naturally predestined to talk about
supranational matters (Walser-Bürgler, 2018a, p. 82). Hence, a polymath, like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646-1716), could still emphatically call Latin the “lingua Europaea universalis et durabilis ad posteritatem”
(“the universal and eternal language of Europe”) in 1711 (Schmied-Kowarzik, 1916, p. XXII).
Why is all this relevant for today’s understanding of Europe and the mechanisms of the EU?—Given that
Europe has recently been facing various crises, the historicization of Europe and the European integration
process becomes all the more important. Political scientists, pollsters, and policy advisers often turn to
predictions of a wide range of pessimistic scenarios regarding the future of Europe and the EU. Yet to
recognize the roots of the European unification and the paths the continent took over many centuries can help
explain the way opinions and ideologies work today. Most of what is considered modern European policies is
indeed not that modern and did not grow out of the 20th century post-war compensation, as is often insinuated
by political scientists. It is much older and finds original expression in the Neo-Latin texts of the Early Modern
Period. The question therefore rightfully arises whether there is anything that modern Europe can learn in its
current state of crisis from early modern Europe and the Europe discourse displayed in Neo-Latin texts. Even if
there might not be a simple answer to this question, there are at least a few aspects worth considering.
The article postulates three points: first, that certain issues and challenges have been existing for centuries
concerning the European integration process; second, that the discourse of Europe is in a way a relatively stable
discourse despite the apparent political, social, and economic changes of the last two centuries; and third, that
the way that these crises have been dealt with in the past can at least give us some direction in the midst of
contemporary turmoil. After all, the crises of the Early Modern Period, which do not ring unfamiliar to a
modern European’s ear, have proven to rather fuel than inhibit the European integration process. They notably
emerged in conjunction with the formation of Europe as a supranational entity. Similarly thus, the current crises
seem to be nothing but symptoms or by-products of the ever-evolving identity and policy discourse of Europe
and the European Union. As problematic as they might be, they serve as indicators of a Europe aware of itself
and in constant confrontation with itself to secure the European project. And just as the early modern past has
shown, the end of this development must not necessarily be marked by the demise but on the contrary by the
affirmation and strengthening of the European integration. For all the time during which the Europe discourse
was strong and the idea of a European community was kept alive, the European nations collectively tried to
come together or at least to improve their transnational policies. The continent only started to disintegrate in the
19th and 20th centuries, after the discourse of continental integration had quietly subsided in the face of an
unrivalled national discourse.
European Challenges and Crises

Present-day Europe is faced with many challenges and crises: nationalism and Euroscepticism, viz. the
strife for national sovereignty as a reaction to the EU’s centralization ambitions; Brexit as a related problem;
stagnant negotiations with Turkey in terms of a potential EU accession; the relationship of the three principal
3
Paradoxically, the history of Europe has so far mainly relied on vernacular source material. Neo-Latin texts have been
consistently overlooked despite the fact that they far exceed the entirety of material from the various European vernacular
languages. It is likely that the more Neo-Latin material is uncovered and investigated as Neo-Latin studies as a discipline grow,
the more changes the known history of Europe will have to undergo.
powers (Germany, France, still Great Britain) among each other and with the rest of the EU nations, viz.
conflicts of center and peripheries; the EU’s Eastern policies; the Crimea-Ukraine-Russia-crisis; the Eurozone
crisis; the refugee crisis; xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and terrorism as its concomitants; the rise of the
radical right and populist parties; the altered transatlantic relationship; Europe’s role as a global player; climate
change (crises overviews: Runciman, 2013; Kjaer & Olsen, 2016a; Castells et al., 2018; and monothematic
crises studies: Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Icoz, 2016; Krotz & Maher, 2016; Postelnicescu, 2016; Youngs, 2017).
However, crises in general and the particular crises mentioned are not a phenomenon of our modern
Europe, as Poul F. Kjaer and Niklas Olsen (2016b, p. xi) stated in the introduction of their collected volume on
theories of crises in Europe. Crises tied to Europe as a political body as well as narratives and analyses of crises
have been existing since the beginning of the Europe discourse and the first emergence of a European sense of
community in the Early Modern Period. In some ways, one could even say that Europe’s early modern crises
constituted a prelude to today’s crises. The only difference between the past and present crises pertains to the
political, social, and economic conditions on the one hand and the economic factor on the other to which
nowadays most policies are subordinated. Other than that, practically the same crises can be encountered in the
Early Modern Period (during these decisive centuries of conceptual continent formation) as today (the era of
concrete unification measures). The European integration thus has been rather characterized by recurrent
themes than time-dependent predicaments. The European context might have changed, but not so much its
problems.
Hereinafter two main areas of crises will be presented, which display the most prominent overlaps of early
modern European crises with present ones. The focus will be on the Neo-Latin discourse and its referential
value for the modern Europe discourse, instead of offering detailed analyses of the past and present crises
(which can be retrieved from many respective studies). The comparison should go to highlight the stability of
the discourse linked to the European integration in the sense that crises actually constitute a sign of a “healthy”
integration development. In concrete terms, the comparison will comprise the following questions:
 Do nations, like Great Britain, Russia, or Turkey, belong to Europe?
 Is Europe in danger of losing its Christian identity?
 Does Europe suffer from its division into a center and peripheries?
 What is the meaning of “Europe” as a peace project?
 How to deal with Euroscepticism and nationalism?
 Is Europe united in diversity or rather separated through diversity?
 Is Europe characterized by a specifically European set of values that sets the continent apart from the rest
of the world?
 What are potential symbols of Europe and how do they reflect the collective unification process?
Political, Religious, and Geographical Issues

Against the background of seminal issues, like Brexit, the EU’s Russian policies, or the accession
negotiations provisionally put on ice between the EU and Turkey, the affiliation of fringe nations, like Great
Britain, Russia, and Turkey, with Europe has recently entered the European supranational thinking (Adamishin,
2012; Icoz, 2016; Simms, 2016). Yet the question of whether the three respective nations belong to Europe or
not has already been of crucial interest in the Early Modern Period. Like today, an accordance was never
reached. The humanist John Barclay (1582-1621), for example, takes a holistic approach in his portrait of the
European nations entitled Icon animorum (“The mirror of minds”, 1614; Walser-Bürgler, 2017). As a Scotsman,
self-appointed cosmopolitan and adviser to the English King James I, he undisputedly ranks Britain among
Europe and confidently sets off describing its greatness (Barclay, 2013, pp. 106-107). Russia is likewise
integrated despite the nation’s submissive customs, its tyrannical form of government and a strict religious
organization coupled with a culture unfamiliar to the rest of Europe (Barclay, 2013, pp. 186-191). The German
political theorist Cyriakus Lentulus (1620-1678) on the other hand only includes Britain in his geopolitical
overview of Europe (Europa, 1650) because of its ancient Roman legacy, but otherwise remains mostly
indifferent about it (Lentulus, 1650, p. 20). In the case of Russia, Lentulus even expresses strong doubts as to
whether he should rate it among Europe or Asia. In the end, he offers an implicit answer by pulling every
aspect about it to pieces (the fields are barren, the Russians are cruel, the tsar is a tyrant, etc.) (Lentulus, 1650,
pp. 148-150).
The most controversial question of belonging pertained to Turkey. The catalogues of nations from the 16th
and 17th centuries would usually list the Ottoman Empire West of the Bosporus as European for geographical
and historico-political reasons (Detering, 2017, p. 65). Especially since Greece had been occupied by the
Ottomans but Europeans still felt the need to have it represented as the continents’ cradle, Turkey inevitably
had to be considered a part of Europe. This was a remarkable concession on the part of the Europeans, because
in contrast to Britain or Russia, the Ottoman power has been a serious threat for Europe for centuries, which is
why “the Turk” represented the unsurpassed concept of an enemy. Concrete examples of Turkey’s inclusion
apart from national catalogues come from Enea Silvio Piccolomini (1405-1464), the later pope Pius II, and
again from John Barclay. In both cases, the inclusion must be seen as attempts to “Europeanize” the Turks for
mitigating political ends. For Barclay (2013, p. 205) indeed mentioned that the Turks “think us [Europeans] and
call us dogs”, yet he does not fail to address their “humanity”, at the time an exclusive European attribute.
Piccolomini in his fictional letter to sultan Mehmed II, Epistola ad Mahometem (“Letter to Mehmed”, 1461),
even offers the rule over the continent to the sultan under the sole condition that he accepts Christianity as its
central religion (Piccolomini, 1990, p. 22). Another famous humanist, gives an influential counter-example:
The Spaniard Juan Luis Vives (1493-1540) argues in his dialogic treatise De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico
(“On conflicts in Europe and the war against the Turks”, 1526) that the Turks could never be called a part of
Europe, since they have nothing in common with the Europeans regarding their culture, their customs, their
religion, and their society (indeed a modern-sounding argument) (Vives, 1785/1964, pp. 468-469).
Linked to this issue are two further “crises” of Europe—both then and now: the question of Europe’s
Christian identity on the one hand and the dichotomy between center and peripheries. As to the former, religion
has never been a value-free aspect of the Europe discourse. Even today, the EU, though considered a secular
project in the first place, is characterized by subliminal religious arguments. An exemplary case marks the long
and heated discussion about whether to include or abandon references to Europe’s religious inheritance in the
preamble to the Lisbon Treaty (Mudrov, 2016). Similarly controversial is the case of the European Flag.
Despite official refusals, its most popular interpretations associate its symbolism with the signatures of
Christianity. Arsène Heitz, one of the flag’s designers, admitted in an interview for the Lourdes Magazine in
2004 that he had taken inspiration for the design from the Book of Revelation (12.1).4
The connection between Europe and Christianity goes back to early Christian doctrines, genealogically
4
The European Commission and religious values. The Economist, 28 October 2004.
deriving the origins of the European people from Noah’s son Japheth, who was commissioned to rule the part
of the world later called “Europe” (Detering, 2017, p. 13). When in 1453 Constantinople fell, the continuous
advance of the Ottomans towards the West turned the European nations into a madhouse, collectively fearing
the loss of their Christian roots (Malcolm, 2019). This in turn gave rise to a Christian-based anti-Muslim
discourse of Europe lasting until today, especially in the context of terrorism and migration. Quite like in the
slogans of present-day populists or in the writings of disputed figures like the German Thilo Sarrazin when
reacting to terrorism, the refugee crisis, or Turkey’s EU accession negotiations,5 many early modern thinkers
and politicians expressed their concerns over “the Muslim overrun of Europe”. Piccolomini, for instance, who
apparently was at variance with himself, has tried to incite the European princes at various councils to
collectively crusade against the Turks decades before his Epistola ad Mahometem. Most famously he has done
so in the oration he gave on 15 October 1454 at the Diet of Frankfurt, known today under the title
Constantinopolitana clades (“The fall of Constantinople”). Appealingly he uses the term “Christianity”
synonymously with “Europe” and justifies his call for a continental war against the Ottomans with the
argument that now “Christians have been slaughtered by Muslims in Europe, that is in our homeland”
(Piccolomini, 2013, pp. 495-496). Also, Vives in the abovementioned De Europae dissidiis warns of the
Muslim advance into Europe, as it could trigger the loss of global power and continental identity for Europe.
Waging war against the Turks in a joint European venture for him clearly seems to have been the most glorious
task of the century (Vives, 1785/1964, pp. 112, 478). Vives’ countryman, Andrés Laguna (1510-1559), took a
similar stance in his oration Europa heautentimorumene (“Europe, the self-tormentor”), which he delivered at
the University of Cologne in January 1543 in front of an audience split by the Protestant and Catholic
confession (Laguna, 2010). The oration was meant to reunite Christianity by focusing on the “common enemy”
(the Ottomans) and its destruction.
The dichotomy between the center and the peripheries of Europe is only partly linked to the continent’s
religious issues. For even though it is true that nations like Russia and particularly Turkey have been dismissed
as being European due to their religious orientation differing from the rest of Europe, the problem is way more
complex than to simply reduce it to religious matters. If one looks at the formation of the EU—from the first
timid steps towards the European Economic Community to the eastward enlargement and the Treaty of
Lisbon—a difference in political, social, and economic weighting can hardly be denied. Maybe this division has
even grown historically, because we already find it in the early modern Europe discourse. The closest bonds
existed among the Western European nations on the one side and the Eastern European nations on the other.
Between these two circles of power, however, there was only sparse exchange, while the North of Europe
practically lived in political seclusion (Müller, 1991, p. 62).
In sum, therefore, more Neo-Latin sources focus on the display of the Western part of Europe. Holistic
pictures like that of John Barclay are rarer; the peripheral nations of Scandinavia, East-Central Europe, and the
Balkan region are more often omitted than included in continental overviews. The center is most frequently
constituted by France, Germany, and Italy as the major powers of Christianity. In his aforementioned
geopolitical vision of Europe, addressed to the German Emperor Ferdinand III, Cyriakus Lentulus for instance
5
In 2012, for example, the Austrian Liberal Party (FPÖ) ran an election campaign in the Tyrol under the slogan “Heimatliebe
statt Marokkanerdiebe” (“Love of one’s native country instead of Moroccan crooks”), emphasizing the dangers of the Arab
culture for the Austrian “homeland”. Thilo Sarrazin’s populist books like Germany Abolishes Itself (2010) or Hostile Takeover:
How Islam Impedes Progress and Threatens Society (2018) have become international bestsellers.
pays disproportionately high attention to the German Empire. Not only does he dedicate more space to its
delineation compared to the rest of the nations, but also he locates its description right in the middle of the text.
The other 17 nations outlined are arranged around Germany. As Isabella Walser-Bürgler (2019) put it, “this
central position […] signals its [Germany’s] significance as the heart of Europe” (p. 339). Germany as the
center of Europe also plays an important role in a short poem about Europe entitled Lusus in Europae nationes
(“Facetious thoughts about the European nations”, c. 1600) by the Belgian lexicographer Cornelis Kiliaan
(1528-1607). The kind of Europe Kiliaan describes exclusively consists of the Western—partly also the
Scandinavian—area (Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Britain, Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden) (Kiliaan, 1614). Yet these were the nations he associated with the continent, they were the Europe
he was familiar with from his own political reality: These were the nations involved in the Eighty Years’ War
(1568-1648), the gory strife for Dutch independence he had known for all his life. The rest of Europe simply
was beyond his awareness due to his immediate and unchanging focus on the Dutch affairs (Walser-Bürgler,
2019, p. 326).
The context of war and peace in Europe brings us to another past and present issue of the Europe discourse:
the European integration as a peace project. As the former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt stated after the
failed first referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland in 2008: “Europeans […] are not united by flags and
anthems, but by fear of another war” (Drechsel & Leggewie, 2010, p. 8). This conclusion has not just held true
since the end of World War II but basically since the disintegration of the feudal system at the end of the Middle
Ages. The amalgamation of the single European nations to one continental entity in order to create a comprehensive
peace on the continent was part of many considerations in the Early Modern Period. Peace literature as a genre
of its own started to flourish after Erasmus’ (1466-1536) groundbreaking pacifistic treatise Querela pacis (“The
lament of Peace”, 1517). It was written on the occasion of a planned peace summit to be held in France, to
which all political leaders of Europe had been invited (unfortunately, the summit never took place in the end).
The text features the personification of peace (Latin: pax), who laments in a long monologue about the
diremption of Europe resulting from the number of the continent’s recent military conflicts (Erasmus, 1977).
But irrespective of the genre of peace literature, the Neo-Latin source material abounds in reflections on
the possibilities of a European peace. The solutions offered include many concepts ranging from ideas of a
centralized European universal monarchy ruled by one of the major dynasties to a loose federation of equal
nations. But while none of these peace visions came true, one peace project of European scope was at least in
parts implemented: the peace treaties of Münster and Osnabrück (also known as Instrumenta pacis
Westphalicae), which put an end to the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). Written in the Latin language to signal
equality among the political parties involved, it constituted a milestone in international relations at the time. For
not only did it change the political landscape of Europe and the way policies were negotiated on an
international level, which would eventually lead to the formation of the Jus publicum Europaeum in the 18th
century (Lesaffer, 2007). It also attempted to push forward a European peace by reconciling the main
contractors Germany, Sweden, and France, by incorporating all their European allies and international
mediators (the Holy See, Venice, and Denmark), as well as by integrating the continental peripheries in the East
(like Russia) (Wilson, 2009).6
6
The text of both Instrumenta is available online in the Latin original and in German translation on the homepage of the “Digitale
Westfälische Urkunden-Datenbank” (“Digital Database of Westphalian Documents”):
https://www.lwl.org/westfaelische-geschichte/portal/Internet/urkunden_datenbank/haupt.php?urlNeu=Ja (access: 19 December 2019).
Early modern international peace projects, like the Westphalian peace negotiations, often stood in the
service of the Europe discourse by meaning to prevent any form of aggressive nationalism. Legally binding
agreements on compensations for the political and economic losses a nation suffered through wars or the
putting on equal terms of the parties involved should relieve the transnational tensions. Many Europeans were
critically aware of the negative sides of nationalism in the form of national strife for predominance or pointless
hostilities against foreign nations. Similar to today’s political reality, proponents of a united Europe regarded
the unhealthy focus on one’s own nation as the key reason for conflict. In trying to promote the European
integration to guarantee a long-term peace, it was not unusual for many political theorists to go as far as to
literally demonize nationalist attitudes.
In his appeal for continental cohesion in the face of the Ottoman threat Juan Luis Vives, for example,
paints an intentionally deterrent picture of the hate Italians are filled with at the sight of transalpine people, the
Frenchmen feel when hearing an English word, or the Spaniards experience when dealing with French policies
(Vives, 1785/1964, pp. 454-455). Looking towards a supranational European peace agreement, Cornelis
Kiliaan advertises continental self-preservation instead of the nationalist drive for expansion in his
abovementioned Lusus by insistently describing all European nations as alike (Walser-Bürgler, 2019, p. 331):
Germans, Britons, Spaniards, Frenchmen, etc. come out as equally strong, clever, combative, and virtuous
(Kiliaan, 1614, vv. 20, 63, 120, 164). The point of this likening description is to convince the European
readership that waging war against each other would not make sense, as the outcome could only be a draw.
Nationalist sentiments thus are presented as senseless, whereas the idea of a European citizenship is proposed
as an attractive alternative. The anonymous polemic pamphlet entitled Oratio de praesenti Europae statu
(“Oration on the present state of Europe”, 1640), finally, pointedly denounces the reckless political interests of
all European nations in all corners of the continent. In an overawing manner, it even lists concrete examples of
nationalist policies gone wrong, which have put the entire continent at risk.
European Culture, Values, and Symbols

As many observations show, the motto of the European Union—“United in diversity”—is at conflict with
the realities of European life. Ideologically and theoretically cultural, ethnic, and political diversity is promoted
in a positive light. De facto, European diversity seems to separate more than it unites (Calder, 2011). The rise
of nationalism and an increased sensitivity towards problems tied to the idea of an inclusive European identity
have decisively shaped this imbalance between theory and reality. But then again, the issue is not new. For
centuries, Europeans have discussed about matters of diversity and how to make them work within one single
continental unity. In his Icon animorum, for example, John Barclay integrates the description of the single
European nations into a comprehensive European framework. Like no other Neo-Latin text known so far, he
constructs Europe by emphasizing its pieces and their uniqueness. According to his idea, Europe is composed
of a plurality of places, ethnic groups, cultures, and customs (Walser, 2017, p. 541). Barclay makes his claim
for the unifying grace of a politically, culturally, religiously, and ethnically diverse Europe even explicit in an
illustrative analogy: He recalls the feeling that once overwhelmed him when contemplating the surrounding
area from the top of a hill in Greenwich (Barclay, 2013, pp. 76-79). Not knowing which of the elements he
saw—the red roofs of the houses, the white cattle, the green fields, the blue rivers, the colorful boats—were the
most beautiful or in which order he could rank the sights, he came to the following conclusion: “[…] there was
nothing in the world so exactly beautiful, but at last would glut and weary the beholder, unless after that
manner (as this place was) it were beautified with contrarieties and change of endowments […].” (Barclay,
2013, p. 79). It is in this very sense that Barclay fathoms Europe. The continent’s value and significance solely
relies on the diversity of the nations, people, and customs it houses (Walser, 2017, p. 543).
While Cyriakus Lentulus’ Europa operates on a similar argumentative level, a different approach is
manifest in Cornelis Kiliaan’s Lusus. Lentulus emphasizes the dissociating aspects of the various nations
making up the entirety of Europe. In the true fashion of a geopolitical consultant, he is mostly concerned with
highlighting the nations’ idiosyncracies, splitting up the continent into several nationally unique unities (e.g.,
the geography of Switzerland is typified by mountainous regions, that of Poland by forests and swamps;
Scandinavia is strong on commerce due to its many ports on the coast; in Britain religion rules the daily and
cultural life) (Lentulus, 1650). These pieces of information are indeed useful for Emperor Ferdinand III, who
served as Lentulus’ dedicatee and whom Lentulus wanted to see installed as the ruler of Europe, viz. the
universal monarch of a composite continental monarchy (Walser-Bürgler, 2019, pp. 340-343). Lentulus
envisions Europe as a conglomerate of different nations with different characteristics and ethnic groups that can
only be glued together for the purpose of continental peace by the superior force of imperial power. Kiliaan on
the other hand completely dissolves any notions of European diversity in his homogeneous vision of Europe as
one synthetic entity. For it is not only in terms of their above-mentioned military and intellectual virtues that
the European nations described by Kiliaan appear to be alike. It is also their taste of art, their common past,
their customs, and their religiousness that render them indistinguishable. In Kiliaan’s opinion, diversification is
a dangerous separating factor, potentially triggering wars and fostering nationalist tendencies. Hence, it is only
present in Kiliaan’s political overview of Europe through the synonyms he applies to the identical
characterization of the respective nations (Kiliaan, 1614, vv. 17, 42, 137, 163). In sum, he turns Europe into “a
space without any major differences, consisting only of one set of common values and virtues” (Walser-Bürgler,
2019, p. 331).
Linked to this question of diversity and unity in the early modern Europe discourse was the question of
European values. For if it was not clear whether Europe constituted a versatile or rather uniform entity, the
existence of a set of specifically European values was not per se unambiguous. The problem is even more
critical today as Europe can no longer claim values characteristic of the entire Western society, like peace,
human rights, democracy, and rule of law or cultural tolerance, as exclusively European (Todorov & Anzalone,
2005). Furthermore, influential nations and global players, like the USA or China, have outpaced Europe for
decades now in terms of imposing values (e.g., in the scientific, technological or lifestyle sector) on the rest of
the world (Gareis, 2012). But the issue in general was already discussed in the Early Modern Period when
Europe all of a sudden was confronted with new worlds and civilizations discovered. The realization triggered
by new methods in cartography and land survey that Europe, the supposedly superior continent, was the
smallest in size, was additionally shattering for most sixteenth-century Europeans. Therefore, certain strategies
in promoting European values were developed that did not only justify Europe’s claim as the global power, but
that also fostered the sense of “Europeanness” among the European nations. After all, “values are normally
regarded as constituent parts of identity formation” (Mudrov, 2016, p. 1).
In many Neo-Latin texts, we thus unsurprisingly encounter a Eurocentrism based on Europe’s cultural and
civilizational achievements. Despite being the smallest continent, Europe was presented as the cradle and fount
of progress. The mention of the size of the continent in that context was meant to render its pioneering role
even more impressive. Particularly indicative of this trend were early modern cosmographies. This genre
flourishing in the age of world discovery and imperialism played a key part in the construction of European
identity (Wintle, 2009, p. 24), since the definition of territory was inevitably linked to notions of territorial
values. The Bohemian natural philosopher Kaspar Knittel (1644-1702), for instance, does not hide the fact that
Europe was the smallest of the known continents in his Cosmographia elementaris (“Elemental cosmography”,
1674). However, he does not only rank Europe as the most important among the continents, but Europe also
receives the most detailed description—pursuant to its cultural status in the world (Knittel, 1674, pp. 32-41).
In the eyes of the European public, it was European conquerors, missionaries, settlers, travelers, and
scientists that had brought civilization, literature, religion, science, and legal and political regulations to the rest
of the world. A common theme in this context is the mention of Europe’s ancient heritage. Europe was
considered the peak of civilization due to the outstanding achievements of the Greek and Roman cultures,
which have been absorbed and adopted both directly and indirectly by all the European nations. In accordance
with this world view, John Barclay traces the affirmatory diversity of Europe to the Greek and Roman past, on
the basis of which the individual European nations could start their self-realization. The European nations had
learned everything there is to know about art, literature, religion, culture, and politics from the Greeks and the
Romans (Barclay, 2013, pp. 86-89).7 The implication is clear: Since the other continents lacked this historical
link, they could never reach the civilizational status the European nations collectively attained. Naturally thus,
Europe came to teach the world. In a similar fashion, the German lawyer Leopold August Warnkönig
(1794-1866) praised Roman law as the forerunner and unsurpassed donor of the European law regulations in as
late as 1828 out of a sense of European superiority in his Oratio de iurisprudentia gentium Europaearum
(“Oration on the jurisprudence of the European nations”) (Warnkönig, 1828).8
The propagation of European superiority in the Early Modern Period did not only come from within
Europe. The early modern discourse of Europe negotiated outside Europe was congruent with the insider
perspective. The reason for that is apparent: Europeans would indoctrinate non-Europeans with European
values to civilize them. Eurocentrism thus even marked a global theme in pre-modern times.9 An interesting
case in that respect makes the travel dialogue De missione legatorum Iaponensium (“The deployment of
Japanese envoys”, 1590). In 1581, the Jesuit missionaries in Japan sent a few young Japanese students to
Europe with the order to get to know Europe better and to improve the reputation of Japan among the
Europeans. After their return to Macao, one of their Jesuit teachers (presumably the Portuguese Duarte de
Sande [1547-1599] or the Italian Alessandro Valignano [1539-1606]) published the reports of the Japanese
students in 34 dialogues. The dialogues present and discuss topics like the European geography, religion,
political systems (republics and monarchies), economic interests, customs, education, war and peace, culture,
history, art, and literature. The investigation of European values is at the heart of this discussion. The last
dialogue summarizes the main point (De Sande/Valignano, 2012, pp. 438-449): Europe might be small
compared to other continents like America or even nations, like China. Still, not the Chinese or the Americans
are the most powerful people in the world, but the nations and princes of Europe. Power and significance are
thus not contingent on the size of a geographical dominion. Notwithstanding the Japanese roots, one ought to
admit that Europe has to be the single outstanding part of the world,
7
On the special significance of the Christian religion as a European value, see the previous chapter.
8
Today, Roman law is still esteemed as the blueprint of law regulation in Western society.
9
This is a crucial difference to the contemporary Europe discourse. Yet the point that Europeans feed the discourse with notions
of values specifically tied to Europe remains the same.
the part on which God with most generous hand has conferred the most and the best good things. Accordingly it
stands out among all other regions for its climate, for the abilities, the industry, and the nobility of its nations, for its
organization of life and of government, and for the multiplicity of its arts. (De Sande/Valignano, 2012, p. 446)
Values surrounding the topics of culture and civilization as transmitted through Europe’s exclusive ancient
past built strong identification patterns in the context of the early modern Europe discourse. Still today,
Europeans acknowledge issues, like religious ideas, Western philosophy, forms of government like democracy
or the canon of literary genres as Europe’s legacy owed to the Greek and Roman culture. However, since
“Europe” has always been an imagined community until this very day—i.e., a concept rather than a concrete
reality (the EU is just one manifestation of this concept)—the European community is also in need of common
identification figures and stories embracing the continent in its entirety. This constitutes a problem in various
respects: First, images of Europe are not static expressions, but they change constantly against the background
of certain events, discourses, and their interpretations (Drechsel & Leggewie, 2010, p. 11). Second, Europe
suffers from what scholars have come to call a “myth deficit” (Schmale, 1997). Third, Europe is characterized
by a “defect of visual representation” in general (Drechsel & Leggewie, 2010, p. 7). A comprehensive political
figure, like the President of the United States or European national leaders, does not exist for Europe as a
whole—even though the EU has benefitted tremendously in the last years from the personality and political
approach of Jean-Claude Juncker (Peterson, 2017). Symbols the European integration relies on today
principally pertain to: the ancient myth of Europe and the bull (mostly used in caricatures and to express
Europe’s discord); Erasmus (both in the form of the educational program and a cultural memory of
Europeanism); the iconic parliamentary buildings in Strasbourg and Brussels; the European flag; the anthem of
Europe; and the Euro (Passerini, 2003).
The lack of symbols and myths to not only represent but also strengthen the European integration already
preoccupied the early modern contemporaries. As Walser-Bürgler showed recently, the ancient myth of Europe
and the bull—told by writers, like Moschus, Ovid, or Catullus—did not play any role at all for the Neo-Latin
discourse of Europe despite the obvious link to the ancient literary heritage (Walser-Bürgler, 2018a). As
potential reasons for that Walser-Bürgler determines five crucial factors: First, in antiquity the myth of Europe
and the bull was never put into a continental context, since—as outlined in the introduction of this
article—Europe was never conceptualized as an entity in political, cultural, or other terms. Second, the myth
contained various ambiguities, which was not considered an ideal foundation for a continent-spanning identity
narrative. Third, the mythical Europa was an Asian maiden brought to Europe (more specifically: only to Crete)
against her will. Fourth, Crete was a politically and culturally torn place in the Early Modern Period, alternately
belonging to the Mediterranean and the Ottoman cultural area without any clear connection to the entire
continent. Finally, the myth lacked the typical heroic elements and historical greatness the rivalling national
founding myths were endowed with, most apparently the brave and strong protagonist fighting destiny (Europa
acts like a weak innocent girl who eventually surrenders to her kidnapper).
The solution the early modern proponents of the European integration found regarding the lack of an
appropriate founding myth was to create substitutional “myths”. Those substitutional myths re-imagined
Europe by employing references to contemporary notions and events. Two representations rose to particular
prominence: the allegorical representation of Europe as a queen on the one hand and as a flying dragon on the
other. Both apply metaphors of the political body known today as the driving force behind the
conceptualization of Europe as a political and legal entity (Koschorke, Frank, de Mazza, & Lüdemann, 2007).
The representation of Europe as a queen was a popular symbol also in visual arts,10 but it gained a special
momentum in Neo-Latin literature. Following the two trends of representing the personified continent either in
triumphant or lamenting mode, early modern authors used their literary personifications of Europe to express
their ideas of the present and future state of Europe.
The German pedagogue Johann Lauterbach (1531-1593), for example, wrote a pastoral poem (Europa
Eidyllion [“Europe, an idyll”]) on the occasion of Ferdinand I’s coronation as Holy Roman Emperor in 1558.
Published immediately afterwards, it features the triumphant goddess Europa in a rustic scenery as she praises
her upcoming marriage with Ferdinand, which will bring her peace. Her rejoicing finally culminates in the
confident proclamation that as a queen she would thrive eternally on the side of the emperor (Lauterbach, 1558,
vv. 60-65).11 In other words, Europe is conceived as a universal monarchy ruled by Ferdinand of Habsburg; the
entire body of the continent is assigned to him. Lamenting representations of Europe seemed to have been even
more frequent than the triumphant. They serve as particularly immediate evidence of Europe’s struggle with the
continental integration as they usually present the personified continent in a state of unease, disease, or
desperation, appealing to the respective princes and nations of Europe to unite and make her whole again.
Influential texts are the abovementioned oration Europa heautentimorumene by the Spanish doctor Andrés
Laguna or the anonymous Querimonia Europae (“Europe’s lament”, 1625).12 Laguna, for example, depicts
Europa as a feverish, degenerated hag—literally calling her a “living corpse” at one point (Laguna, 2001, pp.
136-138)—who bemoans her fate: namely that her ‘children’ (i.e., the princes of Europe) have torn her apart
and put her in her present state of anguish.
The representation of Europe as a flying dragon exclusively appears in early modern Latin cosmographies.
Texts like the already mentioned Cosmographia elementaris of Kaspar Knittel, Introductionis in universam
geographiam […] libri VI (“Six books of introduction into the entire geography”, 1624) by the founder of
historical geography, the German Philipp Clüver (1580-1622), or Cosmographiae selectiora (“Rather exquisite
cosmographical knowledge”, 1646) by the Swiss philosopher Jan Caecilius Frey promoted the image of Europe
as a flying dragon (Clüver, 1624; Frey, 1646).13 This representation is meant to symbolize the power and the
cultural and civilizational superiority of Europe in relation to the other continents. The symbol of the dragon as
the world conqueror in this specific cosmographical respect worked like a continental coat of arms. For not
only were dragons characteristic animals of heraldic emblems signifying strength, foresight, and immortality.
Coats of arms and flags usually also constituted signs of affiliation to a particular community (Volborth, 1981).
Concluding Remarks
Based on these comparative observations between the two strongest periods of European integration—the
early modern centuries on the one hand and the 20th and 21st centuries on the other—it appears that Europe’s
(and thus inevitably the EU’s) current crises are not only recurrent themes in the history of the European
integration but also indications of its ongoing formation and self-realization. Contrary to opinions predicting
10
Her head is represented by Spain, the left arm either by Denmark or Britain, the right arm by Italy, the chest by France or the
German Empire and the Habsburg realms, while her long gown covers the regions of East Central Europe and her feet touch the
Ottoman Empire and Russia.
11
The text is discussed, edited, and translated into English by Walser-Bürgler (2018b).
12
Anon. (1625). Querimonia Europae […]. London: Stransby.
13
Its head is represented by Spain, its wings by Italy and Britain, its main body by all of Western and Eastern Europe, its tail by
the Scandinavian Peninsula.
the disintegration of the EU and the end of the modern European unification process, examples of the original
(i.e., both early modern and Neo-Latin) traces of the historical formation of Europe revealed the discursive
force of crises in the context of continent-building. Put another way, crises and the way Europeans reflect on
them can positively influence the continental integration process. They function as prolific by-products of
Europe figuring out itself.
The Neo-Latin examples given to illustrate this claim make for a representative descriptive comparison.
For when Europe started to become defined and conceptualized as a political, religious, and cultural entity in
the Early Modern Period for the first time, it was most extensively done in the supranational lingua franca of
the time, Latin. Moreover, the comparison included the discussion and analysis of contemporary crises that
were strikingly similar to our present-day crises. The reason for this resemblance might simply be that a
continental project like the European one will always be characterized by the same issues and patterns,
regardless of the age or the political and social circumstances. Given that the early modern crises—even though
they led to new problems and in some cases even military conflicts—accompanied the process of strengthening
the European idea, they can in certain respects serve as telling reference points for our present-day Europe
discourse. Europe only fell apart in the course of the 19th century after the discourse of Europe had broken off
in favor of an exclusive radical nationalist approach (which would eventually result in the catastrophes of the
two world wars). As long as Europe thus still envisions its togetherness and still contemplates its
“Europeanness”, the European project might be less at risk than is often assumed.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.12.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
The Romania-US Strategic Partnership and the Security of the

Wider Black Sea Region: Historical Landmarks
Ioan Codrut Lucinescu

“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania

The Strategic Partnership, launched in 1997 with the purpose of becoming an advanced mechanism of bilateral
cooperation between Romania and the United States regarding fields of strategic interest for both countries, is an
important element of maintaining peace and stability in South-Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea area. The
Partnership determined a substantial evolution of the bilateral relations based on an intense political speech, as an
important aspect for the regional security, and promoted democracy near the Euro-Atlantic community. Romania’s
relation with the United States, being focused on security aspects, proves its utility, considering that to this day the
North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union do not have a common strategic vision regarding the Wider Black
Sea Region. This is due to conceptual differences and to the fact that, unlike Central and Eastern Europe—where
the integrations of NATO and EU were linked, in the Black Sea area, the situation is different, having in mind that
only Romania and Bulgaria have been part of these structures. This study’s purpose is to present both the evolution
of this cooperation format between Romania and the United States in the last two decades and its relevance for the
new regional security system. In the circumstances in which the events in Ukraine in 2014 lead to unprecedented
tension (Post-Cold War) between the Russian Federation and the Occident, the USA’s involvement in ensuring the
security of the extended Black Sea Region gains even more relevance.
Keywords: Strategic Partnership, Black Sea Region, security, cooperation, Euro-Atlantic community, Russian
Federation
Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century, Romania’s geopolitical position is tied to the Wider Black Sea area,
whose importance is deeply rooted in history.
The challenges regarding this place’s security incorporate both old, unresolved issues and new ones.
Terrorism and its proliferation overlap on top of problems regarding organized crime, frozen conflicts, energy
insecurity, and difficult social transitions of the states in this area. The conflict in the Middle East generated
worldwide terrorism, political uncertainty in the Caucasus created difficulties for the transit of energy resources,
and the failed attempt at democracy in some states lead to undermining their relationships with the western
intelligence services (Maior, 2009).
In the 1990s’, Romanian diplomacy multiplied its efforts in the western capitals in order to demonstrate
the geopolitical significance held by the Black Sea and to consider Romania as a potential NATO and EU
Ioan Codrut Lucinescu, Ph.D., researcher, National Institute for Intelligence Studies, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence
Academy, Bucharest, Romania.
THE ROMANIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND THE SECURITY 565
member.
Furthermore, Romania’s long term security interests in the wider Black Sea a region target/aim at
improving democracy, economic growth, stability, and European integration, alongside enhancing of the
country’s importance as a local power.
Assuming the responsibility to contribute in the creation of a security climate, based on cooperation in the
area, as well as active support in elaborating a Euro-Atlantic strategy focusing on the Black Sea and the
Caucasus can also be found in the National Security Strategy of Romania (2006; 2015). The National Security
Strategy of Romania (Strategia Națională, 2015) highlights the fact that the country’s consolidation in the
Black Sea area by deepening the NATO and EU integration and the development of the Romania-US Strategic
Partnership (in every potential field) is the main external objective.
Due to the positive experience registered over time in managing certain complex security-related problems,
the cohesion and US attendance in the organization, NATO remains Romania’s principal external security
guarantor after joining the EU. Hence, a special relationship with the one current superpower, USA, has been
absolutely necessary in order to obtain the security goals pursued by the Romanian state over the course of the
last three decades.
Moreover, Romanian diplomacy has made significant efforts, ever since the mid-1990s’, in order to
become a reliable partner in its relations with the winner of the Cold War. The Romania-US Strategic
Partnership (1997) and its further development, culminating with a permanent presence of the US military
forces on Romanian soil, represent the natural progress of this trend.
The US Involvement in the Wider Black Sea Area

For the United States, the Black Sea represents a strategic corridor that supports the American global
consolidation policy in Central Asia, the main space of geopolitical competition between the great powers of
the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s former
counselor for security issues and one of the external politics “dark horses” in the last half of the century, has
guessed the geopolitical importance of the Central-Asian space. In his book, published in 1997, The Grand
Chessboard, Brzezinski says:
in the following decades, the most unstable and dangerous region—capable of throwing the entire global order in
chaos—will be that of the global Balkans (For the author). From an American interest point of view, the current
geopolitical layout in the main area of energy production is lacking... south of the Caucasus and in Central Asia, where the
new, independent, oil exporting states are still at the beginning of their political journey... the region is exposed to Russian
and Iranian influences. (pp. 139-141)
The American diplomat’s recommendations, in conjunction with the interests manifested by the American
energy companies materialized in the adoption by the US Congress, in August 1999, of the Silk Road Strategy
Act—SRSA; the document subscribes to the theory of helping “for the economic and political independence of
the southern Caucasus and Central Asia countries”, targeting the recreation, under western control, of the “Silk
Road”. In November 1999, during the OSCE reunion at Istanbul, the first American infiltration of the former
Soviet space projects was announced: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
(BTE) gas pipeline (Ougartchinska & Carré, 2009).
The American administration is aware of the fact that the influence and control degree exerted in the
Central-Asian space will determine both the evolution of the global contest between Washington and Beijing,
566 THE ROMANIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND THE SECURITY
as well as the relationship between the Russian Federation and the EU and NATO. The 9/11 attacks and
directing the US political and military actions towards the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the large
scale usage of the “energy weapon” by the Russian Federation as a main instrument of external politics in its
relations with the European Union (Cottey, 2007) determined the American officials to come up with a strategy
for promoting the US interests in the Wider Black Sea Region.
In fact, the answer to “Why the United States did structure their objectives in the Wider Black Sea Region
in a coherent strategy so late?” is given in 2006 by Mark Pekala, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs.
Until very recently, we, the United States government, hadn’t viewed the Black Sea Region as a region as such, as a
specific area for a specific set of policies. We have always been very active. We have worked for over a decade and a half
and more on the resolution of frozen conflicts. We’ve worked for that long and much more on promoting democracy and
civil society and the institutions of healthy government and healthy societies in these areas. We have tried to pursue
economic reform that leads to greater trade and greater prosperity, and certainly we’ve talked to countries in the region for
a very long time about energy. It’s not that we haven’t been active. We’ve been very active on all these fronts. But we
haven’t put it together into a clear set of Black Sea objectives and a Black Sea strategy. (Pekala, 2006)
This must be also understood because the Black Sea Region as a concept was launched by Ronald D.
Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, American researchers, in June 2004, in a study published in the Policy Review
magazine (Asmus & Jackson, 2004). The main reason for the newly found interest for this region, according to
the authors, is that of the radical changes suffered by the international security system after 9/11. The security
risk hierarchy priority was reconsidered, and major changes happened regarding the geopolitical and
geostrategic international importance, alongside the NATO and EU expansion, which bring the two
organizations in the region’s vicinity. The picture is completed by considerations regarding regional resources,
mainly energy, vital in order to ensure EU’s security (Asmus & Jackson, 2004).
Even if the term was introduced in the article, the configuration and structure of the concept are older. We
can confirm that the interest in this idea began around the year 2000, launched through studies carried on by
some of the most important European institutes for security studies and European defense (Herd & Moustakis,
2000).
In another article, “The Soft War for Europe’s East”, Bruce P. Jackson displays, in 2006, the American
vision of a “Great Black Sea”, where the support for democracy would counteract the revengeful ambitions
exhibited by Russia. In this space, the western objectives and values and those of Russia are not compatible,
says the American politician. Practically, in this context “the relationship between Russia and Europe in the
first decades of the 21st century will be defined for the first time, 150 years from the Siege of Sevastopol”
(Jackson, 2006, p. 105).
Following along with the westernization of the Black Sea basin, the American politics must promote
“geopolitical revisionism”, in order to change the current situation which clearly advantages the Russian
Federation and Turkey. These states developed regional organizations for the administration of the Black Sea
issues, which fundamentally and in terms of the solutions found in relation with the security threats remain
conservative mechanisms, pro-status-quo. Practically, in the opinion of Bruce Jackson the “geopolitical
revisionism” strategy aims to replace the classic system based on a balance of power specific to the 19th
century (the political, economic, and military control of the Black Sea, shared between the Russian and
Ottoman Empire) (Jackson, 2006, p. 105).
Overall, such a strategy aims to replace the influence of the two states with a regional co-operative and
independent system, composed of democratic states supported through efficient means by the US and EU. The
logic behind this construction lies in the creation of a regional structure, effective and viable, to protect the
young ex-communist democracies from the Russian threat. Another major component of this “geopolitical
revisionism” aims to challenge the standards that allow the perpetuation of a certain monopoly viewed as
anachronism for the 21st century by the American elite, such as the terms of the Montreux Convention from
July 1936, that establish the sole military control of the Narrows to be held by Ankara.
The subsequent geopolitical and geo-economical evolutions support the ideas put forward by Bruce
Jackson, the fragility of the post-soviet democracy being unable to assure the irreversibility of the democratic
reforms initiated and required by those societies.
The first fundamental document for the US policy in the Wider Black Sea Region—the strategy adopted
by the Bush administration in 2007—is the result of the initiatives and opinions of outstanding personalities of
the American public society, politicians, international relations specialists, economists, etc., expressed at the
stand/tribune/gallery of the Congress, as well as during prestigious think-tanks. All of these voices highlighted
the necessity of a more active involvement in the geopolitics and geostrategy of the region, asking the Bush
administration to elaborate a realistic strategy to strengthen the security and stability of the Black Sea basin.
In order to elaborate this strategy, the American scientific elite suggested more than one course of action
to be promoted by the American administration (Cohen & Conway, 2006):
 Enhancing the cooperation and coordinating the actions with the EU, which already developed political,
economic, and financial instruments through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP);
 Encouraging democratic and economic reforms in the Black Sea area;
 Stimulating the cooperation with non-NATO states as part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
 Supporting Romania and Bulgaria (new members of NATO at the time) through economic, political, and
military assistance in order for them to gain a more relevant role/position in the region, concomitant with
reinforcing the relations with Turkey;
 Political pressure on Russia for the purpose of lifting the sanctions laid down on Georgia and reviving the
multilateral conversations in regards to finding a durable solution for the “frozen conflicts” with the help of the
UN and OSCE;
 Extending the bilateral economic agreements with the Black Sea basin states for investing American stock
in the transportation infrastructure of oil and gas from the Caspian region to Europe.
In this regard, the American strategy aimed, consistently, to encourage the pro-western governments in
Georgia and Ukraine to adopt policies through which the reforming process of these states would gain an
irreversible character. The Russian military action from August of 2008 against Georgia, the one against
Ukraine in 2014, and the strengthening of Ankara as a regional power whose external political agenda is now
only partially connected to EU and NATO’s interests represent the growth that momentarily delays the optimal
progress of the American initiatives in the region.
The Romania-US Strategic Partnership

The Strategic Partnership, launched on July 11th, 1997, on the occasion of Bill Clinton’s visit to Bucharest
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs), aimed to ensure a consolidated framework of cooperation between Romania and
the United States in the fields of strategic interest for both of the countries, as following:
-military cooperation;
-collaboration on problems of regional security, such as stabilizing south-eastern Europe and the Wider
Black Sea Region;
-combat unconventional risks (asymmetrical).
The presence of Romanian soldiers in the Iraqi and Afghan warzones and the establishment of American
military installations on Romanian territory are the result of the external pro-American orientation in the last
decades. Furthermore, since January 2005 (reiterated until nowadays-2019), the Foreign Policy Strategy
presented by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has identified the Strategic Partnership as an essential
marker of external action.
On December 6th 2005, Condoleezza Rice, State Secretary of the US, signed “The Access Accord” that
regulated the deployment of the US army on Romanian territory, in accordance with the vision expressed in
Global Defense Posture Review. This document (adopted in 2004) represented the strategy of the Pentagon to
review its global military force as a consequence of the new global geopolitical realities: Moving the NATO
frontiers and the foreshadowed EU expansion in the Black Sea region, the apparition of “hot zones” in areas far
away from the European continent—Central Asia and the Middle East or supporting counter-terrorism acts
worldwide. A new type of military installations that embodied the concept of mobile, temporary bases, would
support the actions of the future military forces that will excel through “operational capacity, agility and
rapidity” (Popa, 2005, p. 23).
The Agreement that went into force on July 21st 2006 was aimed at a couple of locations (Mihail
Kogălniceanu airbase, Babadag training base, the training zones Cincu and Smârdan) that were going to be
used by the American forces. The US presence at the Black Sea was also consolidated through the signing of
agreements, similar to the situation Bulgaria was in April 2006: The Novo Selo shooting range, the Bezmer and
Graf Ignatievo airbases next to Plovdiv are used by Americans to this day.
The terms stated that Washington would be able to use Romanian and Bulgarian bases in order to train, as
well as to carry on multilateral drills in various formats, for provision supplies, and as transit points for the Iraqi
and Afghan warzones (Robson, 2009). Essentially, the US has the possibility to deploy 5,000-10,000 soldiers in
the Black Sea area, permanently or by rotation in both countries.
The new military installations are effective tools for implementing the American security and stability
foreign policy in the Balkans and the Black Sea regions, Caucasus and Central Asia or the Middle East.
On the other hand, these will be integrated in the US global base network, ensuring, along with the
military installations in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the security of
the Caucasian oil sources and their transport routes, countering the general threats caused by the export of
Islamic radicalism from the zones on the “evil axis” towards the ones suffering from latent interconfessional
conflicts, managing crisis and conflicts in Eurasia, the regional instability and worldwide terrorist risk factors
(Bidu & Troncotă, 2005, pp. 224-225).
The intervention of the American and NATO armed forces beyond the “safety zone in Europe” and into
“the zone of chaos outside of it”, according to Robert Cooper, American military specialist, will decisively rely
on the new response capacities in southeastern Europe; thus, at the Mihail Kogălniceanu base has stationed,
since January 2010, the Commander of Task Force East, from where American soldiers from both Romania and
Bulgaria are coordinated.
Especially important for the regional security is the installation in Romania and in the Black Sea basin of
the elements of the American antiballistic system. On September 17th 2009, Barack Obama announced the
decision to develop a gradually adaptive approach (Phased Adaptive Approach) for the American missile
defense system in Europe, which would protect in a more efficient way both the NATO forces deployed on the
continent and on US soil and its allies. Essentially, a new project is proposed, more realistic and easier to be
carried out than that of the Bush administration (The White House, 2009).
This approach presents a series of clear advantages in comparison with the former American
administration plan (for details, see U.S. Department of Defence):
-enhancing the system that defends Europe, considering that the threats of short or medium-range missiles
are growing;
-answering the current threats and incorporating new technologies, as the threats evolve (the SM-3 missile
system is lightly adapted and modified, the latest versions Block IIA having a range of over 2,000 km);
-covering the entire Romanian territory (and, finally, of all allied states); the Bush administration version
only ensures missile defense for a small part of the northwestern Romanian territory (Harnessing Strategic
Partnership).
The 24 SM-3 intercepts systems (Standard Missile 3) set up at the Deveselu airbase, along with the radar
system placed in Turkey (up and running in January 2012) will have to be capable of annihilating an eventual
long-range missile attack carried out by the Middle Eastern states against the territories of the NATO states
(NATO, 2011). The importance of the base is also given by the most modern defensive system of the US army,
brought to Romania in the summer of this year (2019), The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
(US to Deploy, 2019).
The Bucharest authorities promptly responded to the American proposal concerning Romania’s
participation in the gradual adaptive approach of the missile defense system in Europe, by approving the project
launched by the Supreme Council of State Defense on February 4th 2010.
The importance of this system for the Romanian security is highlighted in the National Defense Strategy,
where it is specified that “the bilateral project developed with the United States will represent a tangible
contribution to the development of the missile defense system intended by NATO”.
The decision taken by the Obama administration has a special political significance: a clear sign that the
US does not abandon the southeastern European states, assigning them an important role in the new
geopolitical configuration of the American global interests. Connecting the security policy of Romania,
Bulgaria on the southern wing, Poland, Czech Republic, and the Baltic States on the northern wing to
Washington, becomes much more efficient when the modern American infrastructure exists on the territory of
these states, and the US Government shall assume the privileges of ensuring the security of those societies.
President Donald Trump continues on the path of his predecessors because starting in 2017, billions of
dollars are assigned for transporting heavy equipment, armored vehicles, and other military paraphernalia, as
well as for building new installations on the states located on the eastern wing of NATO.
According to the statements of the American officials, it is “a long term response to the change of the
security environment in Europe. Moreover, it reflects the new realities, considering that Russia became a
geopolitical player whose actions are unpredictable” (Lander & Cooper, 2016, p. 1). And this response
becomes more and more believable given that the US military leadership adopts new methods and creates new
means to be able to counter the eventual hostile acts carried out by Russia through fast response and
intervention units.
Therefore, important American troop movements are happening from and to Eastern Europe, in order to
check the ability to transport heavy equipment to a potential warzone as Poland or the Baltic States. One such
deployment occurred in March 2019 when over 1,500 soldiers from the 1st Armored Division’s 2nd Brigade
Combat Team were given a week’s notice to travel from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Germany and fell in on
pre-positioned equipment to train in Poland. “The Army is working various ways to get after it”, says Gen.
John Murray, commander of Army Futures Command (World Defence News, 2019).
The American military presence and the integration of Romania in the missile defense project give the
Black Sea area as a whole and to our country especially an increased strategically importance, which was
unimaginable at the beginning of the 1990s’. The authorities at Bucharest highlighted the fact that the
involvement in the development of the American antiballistic defense system represents a reconfirmation of
“the special relationship with the USA”, the project contributing to the considerable enhancement of the
security degree of the country and of the European continent.
It is reminded that, when it comes to the bilateral collaboration in the field of security threats and
managing them, this already has a considerable “seniority”. It deepened due to the multitude of shared actions,
from legislative harmonization to those specific to the Iraqi and Afghan warzones. In addition, since December
2011, the at the time directors of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), George Cristian Maior, and FBI,
Robert Mueller, on the occasion of the meeting at Bucharest have highlighted the fact that cooperation and
dialogue, especially on the cyber intelligence field (domain in which the SRI is a national authority since 2008),
as well as regarding countering economical and financial criminality, diversified and deepened. It represents a
practical shape of the will of the two parts to strengthen the Strategic Partnership on security.
Beyond the official statements there are physical results, the information exchange between the two
intelligence services leading to the dismantling, in the recent years, of some networks of cyber criminality both
on Romanian and US territory, whose activity caused major damage to the American companies (Mueller,
2011).
The tight cooperation with the USA in the counter-terrorism field has a tradition, Romania joining the
principles of Proliferation Security Initiative, the American initiative meant to combat the proliferation of mass
destruction weapons through blocking illegal transfers on all transport pathways used by felons, in 2014
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).
This multidimensional cooperation was emphasized in April 2018, on the occasion of the visit of SRI
director Eduard Hellvig to the United States where he met with the leaders of the American intelligence
services. Obviously, this official visit is the expression of the close relationship between the Romanian
Intelligence Service and American security agencies; all the officials have stated their conviction that this
relation could contribute to the strengthening of Romanian-American cooperation within the framework of the
Strategic Partnership (SRI).
Another major accomplishment of the American involvement in supporting the Romanian efforts of
countering the new threats to the regional security is embodied by the establishment, on October 16th, 1999 at
Bucharest, of the Regional SECI Center for preventing and combating transborder criminality (Regional SECI
Center Combating Transborder Criminality). The main mission of the Center is that of enabling information
exchange between the security and intelligence structures of the member states (the participating countries to
SECI) with the purpose of countering organized crime with cross-border branching.
From October 2011, SECI Center has become SELEC (The Southeast European Law Enforcement Center),
which provides a multinational expertise to law enforcement authorities across the Southeast European region
offering the necessary platform for exchanging information and requests of assistance, supporting operational
meetings, joint investigations, and regional operations, as well as delivering quality analytical products. Besides
the 11 Member States, SELEC also has 24 partner countries and organizations and has established numerous
partnerships with other organizations, bodies, as well as with the private sector (SELEC).
The importance of SELEC lies within the fact that it represents the main regional instrument that directly
contributes to the support of the law enforcement authorities’ efforts in southeast Europe for countering
transborder criminality. The experience and results registered from the point of its establishment until now
recommend it as the prepared institution to offer specialized expertise to the similarly tasked structures within
the Black Sea Region as an area of interest.
Conclusions
The close relationship with the United States proves its utility, even more, considering that, not even today
NATO and the EU do have a joint strategic vision regarding the Wider Black Sea Region. This is due to the
conceptual differences, as well as to the fact that unlike Central and Eastern Europe, where the EU and NATO
integration were linked to each other, in the Black Sea area the situation is different, only Romania and
Bulgaria being part of the two structures.
Through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the EU wants to create a “circle of friends” around its
outskirts, including the Black Sea. Highlighting the fact that the region is a “pathway” to the energy-rich region
of the Caspian Sea and a barrier to the transborder threats, NATO promotes a “pathway/barrier” design for this
area.
Certainly, the US took the Strategic Partnership with Romania beyond some realities that established clear
barriers, as well as the difference of international status, compatibility, and political, economic, or military
capabilities. We can tell that this close relationship with the US helped Romania to transform itself from a
security consumer to a security provider in the Balkans and in the Wider Black Sea Region.
Furthermore, Bucharest valued the fact that the security of the Euro-Atlantic space is indivisible, because
the United States is also the ally and strategic partner of the European community.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.12.003
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
The Politics of Repatriation: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda,

2003-2017
Frank Ahimbisibwe
Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Mbarara, Uganda

Uganda hosts refugees from neighboring countries including Rwanda. According to United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2018, Uganda was the 3rd and 1st top refugee hosting
country in the world and Africa respectively. It hosted over 1.2 million refugees. In 2003, a tripartite agreement was
signed to repatriate 25,000 Rwandan refugees. Only 850 of them accepted to return and many of them came back
almost immediately to Uganda claiming insecurity and human rights violations in Rwanda. The Rwandan
repatriation was not devoid of politics. It was influenced by political interests of various actors: the international
community, regional geo-politics, Uganda, and Rwanda. This article analyzes the politics of repatriation of
Rwandan refugees by focusing on politics at international and regional levels as well as in Uganda and Rwanda.
Keywords: Rwandan refugees, repatriation, politics, Uganda, Rwanda
Introduction
According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019),
by the end of 2018, 70.8 million individuals were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict or generalized
violence. Out of 70.8 million, 25.9 million were refugees 1, 41.3 million Internally Displaced Persons and 3.5 million
asylum seekers.
Developing regions hosted 85 percent of the world’s refugees under UNHCR mandate (UNHCR, 2019).
Uganda was the 3rd and 1st top refugee hosting country in the world and Africa respectively. It hosted over 1.2
million refugees (UNHCR, 2019). The majority of these refugees come from neighboring countries and the
wider region, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia and
Eritrea, among others. By June 2018, around 15,517 of these were Rwandan2 who arrived during and after the
1994 Rwandan genocide (Office of the Prime Minister [OPM] & UNHCR, 2018).
Rwandan refugees are settled in Nakivale, Oruchinga, Kyaka II, and Kyangwali refugee settlements in
Uganda, while some are settled in urban areas (Karooma, 2014). Other Rwandan refugees are secondary
movers―those that came from neighboring countries, such as Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) following the forced repatriations of 1996/1997, and who faced persecution upon return because of their
previous flight and then fled to Uganda (Karooma, 2014). Rwandan asylum seekers (both Hutu and Tutsi)
Frank Ahimbisibwe, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning and Governance, Faculty of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Mbarara, Uganda.
1
Out of 25.9 million refugees, 20.4 million refugees are under UNHCR’s mandate and 5.5 million are Palestinian refugees
registered by United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
2
This number reduced from 25,000 in 2003 when the tripartite agreement of voluntary repatriation was signed.
574 THE POLITICS OF REPATRIATION: RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA, 2003-2017
continue to come to Uganda claiming persecution, human rights violations, and dictatorship in Rwanda.3 These
asylum seekers and secondary movers include “recyclers”4 who were repatriated to Rwanda from Uganda
during the period 2004 to around 2012 and moved back to Ugandan refugee settlements and urban areas.5
This paper argues that the Rwandan repatriation was not devoid of politics. Repatriation rather than being
a humanitarian act addressing the needs of refugees became an operation aimed at serving the political interests
of various actors: the international community, regional geo-politics, Uganda, and Rwanda. This explains why
repatriation has not solved the Rwandan refugee problem. This article analyzes the politics of Rwandan
repatriation by focusing on politics at international and regional levels as well as in Uganda and Rwanda.
Although there has been scholarly attention to repatriation of Rwandan refugees (Ahimbisibwe, 2011;
Karooma, 2013a, 2014; Whitaker,2013; Amnesty International, 1997b; International Refugee Rights Initiative,
Refugee Law Project & Social Science Research Council, 2010), there is little research focusing on the politics
of their repatriation in Uganda.
This study is based on two research visits carried out at different intervals in Nakivale and Oruchinga
settlements in south western Uganda. The first visit was undertaken from June 2010 to December 2011. A
second visit took place between June and August 2016. The study focused on Rwandan new caseload refugees6
and used a qualitative research methodology. Semi-structured and key informant interviews, focus group
discussions (FGDs), observation, and documentary evidences were the main research techniques. Purposive
criterion sampling was used to select the study respondents, namely Rwandan refugees, Rwandan and Ugandan
government officials, UNHCR, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) officials, as well as local hosts
around Nakivale settlement, Isingiro District. 7 In addition, “recyclers”8 were identified through snowball
sampling. Rwandan refugees and other categories of respondents answered questions on themes, like refugee
physical security, refugee rights and obligations, voluntary and forced repatriation, local integration,
3
This is based on personal interviews, observations, and interactions with new Rwandan Asylum seekers in Mbarara, Kampala,
Oruchinga, and Nakivale refugee settlements during the period June 2010 to August 2016. Rwandan asylum seekers include
government officials, genocide survivors, journalists, and students together with ordinary people.
4
The author has interviewed several “recyclers” living in Nakivale and Oruchinga settlements in Uganda.
5
According to Amnesty International, “Credible reports, including those collected during the organization’s recent research visit
to Uganda in September 2011, indicate that some Rwandan refugees have subsequently returned to Uganda after various obstacles
prevented them from successfully reintegrating in Rwanda”.
6
Rwandan new caseload refugees refers to Hutu that came during and after the 1994 genocide. Before them, Uganda hosted old
case load Rwandan Tutsi refugees who arrived in 1959 and the early 1960s. The majority returned to Rwanda after the genocide
while a significant number stayed in Uganda.
7
The first visit involved 162 respondents. One FGD, each with 12 Rwandans was organized in each of the three zones in
Nakivale: Base Camp, Juru, and Rubondo. In each of the zones, I interviewed 10 refugee leaders. I also interviewed 10 recyclers,
10 Isingiro district officials, 11 Officials from Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), 16 NGOs staff, 10 police officers, 36 local
hosts (six locals from each of the six sub-counties bordering Nakivale), one expert on refugee studies, and two officials from the
Rwandan High Commission in Kampala. In the second visit, a total of 182 respondents participated in the study. Four FGDs each
with 10 Rwandan refugees were organized in four zones of Nakivale settlement: Base Camp, Juru, Rubondo, and Kabazana. The
5th FGD with 10 Rwandan refugees was organized in Oruchinga settlement. I interviewed 10 refugee leaders from each of the
four zones in Nakivale. Ten refugee leaders were interviewed in Oruchinga settlement. Apart from the refugees, I interviewed 16
recyclers (10 in Nakivale and six in Oruchinga), 10 new asylum seekers (six in Nakivale and four in Oruchinga), six OPM
officials (four in Nakivale and two in Oruchinga), four Isingiro district officials, 34 local hosts (24 in Nakivale and 10 in
Oruchinga), 10 NGOs staff (six in Nakivale and four in Oruchinga), and two officials from the Rwandan High Commission in
Kampala.
8
Recyclers are Rwandan refugees who have been repatriated to Rwanda but have returned to Uganda claiming human rights
violations, insecurity, persecution, and inability to recover land and property in Rwanda.
THE POLITICS OF REPATRIATION: RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA, 2003-2017 575
resettlement, the so-called cessation clause and, in general, avenues to find durable solutions.9 The analysis
further makes use of secondary data, both scholarly articles and grey literature.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section deals with the search for a durable solution which was
voluntary and forced repatriation. Subsequently, the paper analyses the politics of repatriation. The paper
finally concludes with policy and methodological implications.
The Search for a Durable Solution

“Voluntary” Repatriation
There are three durable solutions to the refugee problem in the world today: voluntary repatriation to the
country of origin, integration into the first country of asylum, and resettlement to a second country of asylum.
Voluntary repatriation is the most favored one. This is where refugees return to their country of origin after
conflict to take part in the reconstruction process and nation building.
“In the early 1990s, the end of Cold War proxy conﬂicts in Africa and Asia reinforced the belief that
repatriation was the best and often the only way to bring refugee situations to an end” (Crisp & Long, 2016, p.
144). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata declared the 1990s as the “decade
of repatriation” (p. 144). During this period, more than 10 million refugees returned to countries, like
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua (Crisp & Long, 2016).
The repatriation process involves the ceasing of causes for flight, the signing of a tripartite agreement
between the country of origin, the country of asylum and UNHCR, the voluntariness of repatriation, refugees’
access to information about the situation in their country of origin, the registration of those intending to return,
their return in safety and dignity, and reception and reintegration in the country of origin.
However, voluntary repatriation remains problematic in situations of protracted exile, protracted conflict
in the country of origin, and favorable conditions in the country of asylum among other conditions.
Just like in other countries, voluntary repatriation has been the most emphasized and available durable
solution for Rwandan refugees in Uganda. Emphasis has been put on forcing these refugees to return. Local
integration is yet to be utilized as a durable solution (Ahimbisibwe, Ingelaere, & Vancluysen, 2017), while
resettlement remains a dream as there are no countries accepting large groups of refugees (Ahimbisibwe,
2015).10 In general, only 1% of the world’s refugees benefit from resettlement (Long, 2011). In fact, “given the
narrow quotas, the chances of being resettled is slim, and indeed many people in refugee camps think of
resettlement as akin to winning the lottery” (Jacobsen, 2005, p. 55).
Tripartite Agreement of 2003. The 2003 Tripartite Agreement (hereafter “the Tripartite Agreement”) was
between the Government of Rwanda, the Government of the Republic of Uganda, and the Office of UNHCR, and
it was meant for the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Uganda. From its preamble, the Tripartite
Agreement reiterates that “every citizen has the basic right to leave and return to his or her country as enshrined
9
The study observed ethical principles in research. The study was cleared by the Office of the Prime Minister and Isingiro
District in Uganda. During the data collection exercise, the respondents were briefed on the purpose of the study which was purely
academic. Their confidentiality, informed consent and voluntary participation were observed and respected.
10
Interview with a Senior Protection Officer, Office of the Prime Minister, Kampala on 1st June 2016, see Ahimbisibwe (2015).
Ahimbisibwe discusses durable solutions in the context of Rwandan refugees in Uganda where his findings indicate that
resettlement is not considered a durable solution since the number of refugees is so high and the Rwandan government has
promoted the notion to the international community that there is peace in Rwanda. Ahimbisibwe argues that this has made the
international community reluctant to resettling Rwandan refugees when their country of origin is “secure” and willing to welcome
them.
inter alia in Article 13(2) of the 1948 UDHR and Article 12 of 1966 ICCPR”.11
The Tripartite Agreement mainly lays down strategies and road map for repatriation of refugees. It is a sign
of good will and shows that the country of origin is ready and willing to receive refugees. It shows commitment of
the parties who sign, such as the governments of Uganda and of Rwanda, and the UNHCR about what is agreed.
It is relevant for refugees because it creates a legal basis for repatriation and is an indication of political will
(Karooma, 2013b).
Article 4(4) stipulates that “the Government of Rwanda undertakes the responsibility of ensuring the safety
and security of repatriating refugees returning to their country of origin, including in transit areas and during
transport movements”. In the same context, the Agreement, under Article 4(5), provides that “the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees shall in accordance with its mandate continue to provide international
protection to those refugees who opt not to repatriate”.
The Tripartite Agreement imposes obligations on the part of the host state (Uganda) in Article 3(1) that
it will undertake to enforce free will repatriation of Rwandan refugees and that it will ensure that refugees are well
informed about the security situation in Rwanda. It shall also ensure that they are able to freely decide whether or not to
repatriate without coercion or pressure.
Article 3(4) obliges Uganda “to ensure the safety and security of the repatriating refugees returning to their
country of origin, including transit areas and during transport movements”. The three signatories have obligations
of ensuring the voluntary return of Rwandan refugees in conformity with international law.
Tripartite Commission. The Tripartite Agreement provides for a Tripartite Commission (hereafter
Commission).12 It is made up of the contracting parties: the governments of Uganda and Rwanda and the
UNHCR. The Commission has roles and functions in ensuring the success of repatriation.13 It has held various
meetings in Kampala, Mbarara, and Kigali and issued joint communiqués and resolutions on the voluntary
repatriation of Rwandan refugees.
Sensitization campaigns. Sensitization campaigns have been used as a strategy in promoting Rwandan
refugee repatriation. Refugees are informed about the whole repatriation process and prospects of reintegration
once they return. Sensitization visits have been organized in Uganda’s settlements hosting Rwandan refugees.
These visits have included delegations of Rwanda, Uganda, and UNHCR officials. The delegations have
encouraged refugees to return, provided information on the repatriation process, conditions, and reintegration in
Rwanda. The information to refugees has been disseminated through media (print and electronic), as well as
through documentary films including videos and booklets on the political and socio-economic progress in
Rwanda (Karooma, 2013b).
However, the majority of the refugees have contested the information given to them. In a focus group
11
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Tripartite Agreement between the Government of Uganda and the
Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Voluntary Repatriation
of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda to Rwanda, signed on 23rd July 2003, on file with the author.
12
Article 6, Clause 1 states that “The Contracting Parties hereby agree to establish a Tripartite Commission for the voluntary
repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Uganda. The Tripartite Commission shall be responsible for planning and overseeing the
implementation of the voluntary repatriation operation”.
13
Article 6, Clause 3 of the tripartite agreement states that “The Tripartite Commission is responsible for planning and
monitoring the implementation of measures to facilitate voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees and the integration of
Rwandan returnees in their communes of origin. It shall ensure the implementation of the provisions of this agreement,
particularly those relating to returnee security and assistance. The Tripartite Commission shall periodically evaluate progress
made and difficulties encountered. It shall seek solutions and devise measures of implementation by consensus”.
discussion, refugees noted:

They brought video tapes to educate us on repatriation. They showed us the conditions in Rwanda and how they have
improved to enable us go home. However, I was not convinced because they only showed us the good things about
Rwanda when inside the rural areas things are different.14
Go and see, come and tell visits. Another strategy to promote repatriation has been the “Go and see,
come and tell visits”. This is where refugee groups are taken to see for themselves the conditions in the country
of origin. They are required to come and share their findings with fellow refugees in the settlements. Several
refugee delegations accompanied by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and UNHCR officials have been
organized to Rwanda. On return, the refugees have shared their experiences. However, the refugees noted that
they were taken to selected areas in Rwanda. They were not given a chance of visiting areas of their choice.
These visits were state managed aimed at painting a good picture of Rwanda. They pointed out that they were
not exposed to the other side of Rwanda which is dangerous and full of insecurity. They noted that they would
have loved to verify stories of arrests at night by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), disappearances
of civilians who are taken to unknown destinations, human rights violations and land disputes, among others.15
Despite the efforts of promoting voluntary repatriation, Rwandan refugees were reluctant to return. Since
2004, refugee returns remained low. The refugees returned as follows: 2004 (2,400), 2005 (1,591), 2006 (none),
2007 (2,732), 2008 (461), 2009 (5,583), 2010 (1,762), 2011 (19), and 2012 (157) (Republic of Rwanda, 2012).
However, one doubts whether all these refugees were voluntarily repatriated given the push factors that
have surrounded the repatriation. In other words, although, according to UNHCR’s and Ministry of Disaster
Management and Refugees (MIDIMAR) statistics, one may get a feeling that so many Rwandan refugees have
returned, the truth is that many were forced to do so.
Since the late 2000s, Uganda has forced Rwandan refugees to return. On 5th October, 2007, it was
reported that “Uganda security operatives on Wednesday night raided Kyaka II and Nakivale refugee
settlements and violently drove out thousands of Rwandan nationals” (Basiime, Butagira, & Gyezaho, 2007, p.
1). It was further reported that “reports indicate that up to 3,000 people were evicted but a United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official said 1,535 people were forcefully repatriated” (p. 1).
According to Harrell-Bond (2011),
on 14 July 2010, the Ugandan and Rwanda government police and military entered Nakivale refugee camps in
Uganda. Some 1,700 Rwandans were gathered together in Nakivale on the pretext that they were to be informed of the
results of their refugee status claims, but then found themselves being herded into lorries at gunpoint and to be returned in
Rwandan military lorries. (Harrell-Bond, 2011)
According to refugees’ investigations and report, 14 Rwandans died, families were separated, children were left
behind, and 17 recognized refugees were refouled (Harrell-Bond, 2011).
Since 2009, Uganda imposed a ban on cultivation for Rwandan refugees. “Since then, refugees have
become extremely food insecure and reported resorting to numerous coping mechanisms that, in turn, increased
their vulnerability” (Amnesty International, 2011). According to Amnesty International (2011), “such a ban
directly discriminates against the Rwandan refugees on the grounds of nationality and as such violates Article 3
14
Focus group discussion, Sangano Base Camp, Nakivale settlement on 10th June 2016.
15
Focus group discussion, Sangano Base Camp, Nakivale settlement on 10th June 2016; Focus group discussion, Oruchinga
settlement on 29th August 2016; Focus group discussion, Juru zone, Nakivale settlement on 30th June 2010.
of the 1951 Refugee Convention”. This ban on cultivation happened at the same time vigorous efforts for
promoting repatriation were put in place. Rwandan refugees were given a deadline of 31st July 2009 to
repatriate or else Nakivale settlement would be closed (Amnesty International, 2011). This deadline was
extended to 31st August 2009 (IRIN, 2009). “The ban on cultivation has been and is continuously being used as
a tool to force Rwandan refugees to return to Rwanda” (IRIN, 2009).
The Politics of Rwandan Repatriation

It is common government rhetoric to talk of the granting of asylum as a humanitarian act (Nabuguzi, 1998).
However, Loescher (1992) had observed that refugee problems are intensely political and their causes and
consequences are intimately linked to political issues. In addition, “the political interests of various actors play
an important role in making a large refugee population return to their home country, despite the problems they
may encounter in future” (Nasreen, 2004, p. 132). In the same vein, the Rwandan repatriation in Uganda was
affected by politics.16 The political interests of various actors played a role in their repatriation.17 It was a
product of political dynamics at the international, regional, and national levels both in Uganda and Rwanda. In
the next section, we look at political dynamics at the international level.
International Politics
Restrictive refugee policies. The Rwandan repatriation should be seen in a wider global perspective.
Today, the world is characterized by restrictive refugee policies and declining protection standards. Crisp (2018)
noted that states are increasingly violating the principles of asylum and refugee protection. He argues that this
tendency by states has been exacerbated by large scale refugee emergencies, growth of populism, xenophobia
and unilateralism, the events of September 11, 2001 and lack of an enforcement mechanism for the refugee
protection regime (Crisp, 2018). According to Whitaker (2013), “in the face of complex refugee crises around
the world, international organizations were increasingly caught between their humanitarian missions and
geopolitical dynamics” (p. 142).
During the 1990s and beyond, refugee movements were associated with security and political threats
(Loescher, 1992; Weiner, 1992; Krause & Williams, 1997; Wæver & Buzan, 1993; Ayoob, 1992). As a
response, host countries have adopted restrictive policies that include early/forced repatriation, denying asylum
seekers entry, deportations, anti-refugee legislation, among others.
The end of the Cold War is also associated with active promotion of repatriation as a durable solution to
refugees. According to Marita (2002), “the ending of the Cold War also saw the active promotion of
repatriation in current international refugee policy”. Stein, Cuny, and Reed (1995) argued that “in 1992 the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) declared a decade of voluntary repatriation and
there have been some major returns of refugees since then to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Angola, Somalia,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa and Rwanda” (Stein et al., 1995; Bakewell, 1996). Marita (2002)
reminded us that “as a global preference, it reflects the growing reluctance of rich as well as less well-endowed
states to support growing numbers of refugees”. Also, Chimni (2004) argued that the withdrawal of
burden-sharing among global partners has inadvertently led to involuntary repatriation as the only viable
solution to the global refugee problem. Involuntary repatriation is now accepted even when refugees are
16
Interview with a Protection Officer, Centre for Refugee Rights, Mbarara on 1 July 2016; Interview with a Refugee Law Project
Official, Kampala on 15th June 2016.
17
Ibid.
reluctant to return (Kmonpetch, 2016).

For example, “with the war in the former Yugoslavia we saw reinforced measures of restriction and
deterrence in Europe” (Marita, 2002). In 1991, Turkey refused to admit a large number of Kurdish refugees
fleeing northern Iraq. The US and its Gulf allies established “safe havens” inside Iraq. The Syrian refugees
have faced restrictions in their movements to Europe. Countries, like Hungary, have built fences around their
borders to limit refugees’ entry. In the USA, the Trump administration has imposed a travel ban on people and
refugees from six majority Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen). The Supreme
Court also approved a 120-day ban on refugees entering the US, allowing the government to bar entry to
refugee claimants who cannot prove the same ties to an American individual or entity (BBC, 2017). The US
president insisted his ban was necessary for national security and pointed to terrorist attacks in Paris, London,
Brussels, and Berlin as evidence (BBC, 2017). However, critics called the policy un-American and
Islamophobic, and said that this ban would not have stopped atrocities in the US perpetrated by American-born
attackers (BBC, 2017).
In Africa, a number of countries have put in place restrictive asylum policies characterized by forced
repatriation operations, denial of entry, closure of borders, anti-refugee propaganda, and violations of refugee
rights (Rutinwa, 1999).18 For example, Tanzania which used to be a friendly country to refugees forcefully
repatriated Rwandan refugees (Whitaker, 2013)19 and other asylum seekers in the 1990s and beyond. In April
2016, the Kenyan government announced its intention to close Dadaab, the largest refugee camp complex in the
world, announcing 30th November 2016 as the deadline (Crisp & Long, 2016). According to Amnesty
International (2016),
the extremely tight timeframe and the lack of any alternative options for Somali refugees has left open the prospect of
large-scale forced returns to Somalia, a country still riven by armed conflict. Such returns would violate international law
including the principle of non-refoulement, and would constitute a serious violation of the human rights of the refugees.
(Amnesty International, 2016)
There is evidence of the Kenyan government using threats, imposing deadlines and human rights violations to
force refugees across the Somali border (Amnesty International, 2016).
In West Africa, in 2000, the Guinean President Lasana Conte made a speech over national radio stating
that Sierra Leonean refugees should be arrested, searched, and confined to refugee camps which resulted in
widespread violence against them. There was evidence of forced repatriation and other violations of refugee
rights (Ahimbisibwe, 2015). In all the above cases, host countries were motivated by their national interests of
security and socio-economic and political considerations.
Therefore, the Rwandan refugee forced return operations in Uganda are part of the global trend of
restrictive asylum policies and decline in refugee protection standards.
Politics of funding. While analyzing the Rwandan repatriation in Tanzania, Whitaker (2013) argued that
“a third but related element underlying the December 1996 repatriation was the declining availability of
funding to support Rwandan refugee programs” (p. 148). She further notes that “to some extent, this factor may
have been even more important than regional security issues, particularly in explaining UNHCR’s
involvement” (p. 148). UNHCR depends on donor contributions for funding its field operations. Due to
18
For more discussion on African countries’ restrictive refugee policies, see Rutinwa (1999).
19
For more information on the Rwandan refugee repatriation in Tanzania see Whitaker (2013).
financial constraints, UNHCR was no longer able to fund refugee programs in the Great Lakes by 1996. The
USA and European Union, the biggest donors of the Great Lakes operations at the time were hesitant to provide
more funding for refugees. Instead they supported the idea of funding post conflict reconstruction efforts inside
Rwanda (Whitaker, 2013).
Like in Tanzania, the Rwandan repatriation in Uganda has been influenced by the decline in donor funding.
Just like other African countries, Uganda faces limited funding for refugee operations. This is caused by an
“ever deteriorating donor funding to refugee activities, exacerbated by US president Donald Trump’s in-ward
looking policies, turmoil in the European Union: two critical funders to human rights and refugee operations,
and partly the anemic global economy” (Musisi & Trombola, 2017). Human Rights First (2004) noted that
“Diminishing international support and a continuing lack of adequate ‘burden sharing’ with hard-pressed states
in the region has exacerbated the situation for refugees”. Amnesty International (2017b) pointed out this
challenge in the context of Uganda that: “By far the most significant challenge that Uganda’s refugee response
faces is the major shortfall in funding support from the international community” (p. 16).
It was reported in the Daily Monitor that “UNHCR in Kampala reported early this year (2017) that last
year (2016) they received only 40 per cent of the $251m (Shs 889 billion) requested for humanitarian assistance
and this year they will need about $558m (Shs 2 trillion)” (Musisi & Trombola, 2017). It was further reported
that
the World Food Programme’s (WFP) country director El Khidir Daloum told this newspaper that the number of
refugees they assist has “more than doubled in the last year, and WFP’s operation is under considerable strain to meet their
full food needs each month.” For the next six months, he said, they have a shortfall of Shs 226 billion ($64m). (Musisi &
Trombola, 2017)
A decline in donor funding has forced the Ugandan government, UNHCR and World Food Programme
(WFP) to cut on the food rations and other assistance given to refugees. A newspaper report raises the same
view. “The funding shortfall has had serious repercussions for the refugees. Since the situation became critical,
with refugee numbers swelling, the World Food Programme (WFP) last month was forced to cut food rations
from 12kg to 6kg per person” (Musisi & Trombola, 2017). Rwandan refugees have been affected by the
reduction in food rations. In one of the focus group discussions, they noted that
the conditions are not good generally because of inadequate food on the side of Rwandan refugees compared to others.
For example they give us 6 kgs of maize whereas other refugee nationalities get 15 kgs. We get less kg of maize and litres
of cooking oil compared to other refugees. They do not give us soya, soap, salt like other refugees.20
Although the majority saw these reductions as forms of forced repatriation and discrimination, the decline
in funding could have contributed to this state of affairs.
During interviews with OPM and NGO staff, they observed that food rations for Rwandans had been
reduced. They, however, stated that the policy to reduce food rations had been made considering the time
refugees have been in the settlement. Since Rwandans have been in the settlement for long, they were expected
to be self-reliant.21 They further argued that
funding for old case load refugees like Rwandans has declined as donors tend to focus on new case load refugees
20
Focus group discussion, Rubondo zone, Nakivale on 12th July 2016; focus group discussion, Kabazana village, Nakivale
settlement on 15th June 2016; focus group discussion, Oruchinga settlement on 29th August 2016.
21
Interviews with Office of the Prime Minister and NGO officials, August 2016.
mainly South Sudanese. The other reason is that a lot of attention is put on other refugee emergencies around the world,
mainly the Syrian refugee crisis.22
Finally, I have argued elsewhere that “reduction of food rations was meant to force Rwandan refugees to
repatriate since there was a belief that they were not returning because of the ‘better conditions’ in the
settlement” (Ahimbisibwe, 2016, p. 863). However, while the reduction of food rations could have been used as
a strategy to force refugees to return, it is also possible that this reduction was genuinely as a result of decline in
funding for refugee operations in the country.
Regional Politics
Regional security. Since the end of the Cold War, refugee movements have had effects on regional and
international security. Refugees traditionally seen as victims of wars and conflicts became security threats and
active participants in conflicts as fighters (refugee warriors) (Ahimbisibwe, 2013; Mogire, 2009). Also, refugee
camps turned into recruitment and hiding grounds for rebel groups. As a result, refugee movements
demonstrated the potential to internationalize and regionalize conflicts (Loescher & Milner, 2005). A few
examples show the refugees-regional (in) security nexus. In the Horn of Africa, “the Kenyan government views
its Somali refugee population as intertwined with the larger security issue of cross-border attacks by Al
Shabaab” (Lischer, 2017, pp. 85-97). These real and perceived security threats have influenced Kenya’s
treatment of the Somali refugees (Lischer, 2017).
Secondly, after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, more than a million Hutu refugees mixed with former
genocidaires and interahamwe fled to Zaire (renamed Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997). This refugee
influx greatly affected security in the Great Lakes region as these refugee warriors engaged in rebel activities
against the Rwandan government. This was followed by the invasion of DRC by the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) in an attempt to neutralize the security threats. The region witnessed extreme violence and wars that led
to the overthrow of Mobutu regime in DRC.
Due to this insecurity, regional governments responded by forcefully repatriating Rwandan refugees in an
attempt to avoid regional conflicts. As already noted in 1996, Tanzania ordered the forced return of hundreds of
thousands of refugees. Among the motivations for Tanzania’s response was the need to avoid getting embroiled
in Rwanda’s conflicts. Whitaker shares this view and argues that
rather than risking a military attack into its territory, or at least continued tension along the western border, Tanzanian
officials decided to send the refugees home, where Rwandan authorities could deal with them directly. In many ways, the
government decision was driven by the desire to avoid drawing Tanzania into a growing regional conflict. (Whitaker, 2013,
p. 148)
Tanzania’s example is similar to the Ugandan forced repatriation of Rwandans in the late 2000s up to
present. Rwanda at one time accused Uganda of arming the refugees living in Kibati23 zone of Nakivale
settlement. According to Human Rights First (2004),
In January 2003, newspaper reports began circulating that a Congolese rebel had arrived in Rwanda claiming that the
Ugandan government was training 500 anti-Rwanda rebels in Nakivale and another 1,500 in Kyangwari camp in Masindi
(the second largest concentration of Rwandan refugees in Uganda at the time). (Kampala, 2003, as cited in Human Rights
First, 2004).
22
Ibid.
23
Kibati comes from the words Ibaati or Amabaati, which in the local language means “corrugated iron sheets.” Few of the rough
shelters had such coverings.
Furthermore, there were accusations in early 2003 that there were interahamwe in Uganda. This prompted
the Rwandan government to seek permission to inspect Oruchinga and Nakivale refugee camps on allegations
that dissidents were allowed to train from there. On March 11, there were rumours of massive deployment on the
border with Uganda, which was denied by Rwanda but it confirmed that it would defend its security interests
(Kampala, 2003, as cited in Human Rights First, 2004). Rwanda continued to issue threats that it would attack
Kibati in Nakivale and forcefully repatriate the Rwandan refugees.
Human Rights First (2004) argued that
the response by the region’s governments to the situation of the Kibati group echoes the geopolitics of the Great
Lakes. As the Rwandan government urges return of refugees to Rwanda for purposes of ensuring its own security, and
identifying those who have still not been held accountable for serious abuses during the 1994 genocide, the security
implications of the continued sojourn of large numbers of Hutu Rwandans outside Rwanda are myriad. (Kampala, 2003, as
cited in Human Rights First, 2004, p. 23)
In fact, Rwandan refugees interpret the government’s call for repatriation as avoiding a violent return the same
way RPF did (Jaji, 2017).
Rwanda-neighbors relations. Loescher, Milner, Newman, and Troeller (2007) noted that protracted
refugee situations can influence diplomatic relations between states. Examples include Tanzania and Burundi in
early 2000s, Myanmar and Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal, Uganda and Sudan, among others (Loescher et al.,
2007).
Both the Tutsi and Hutu Rwandan refugees have been at the centre of Uganda-Rwanda relations. The
Museveni government in the 1980s was engaged in talks with the Habyarimana government aimed at looking
for a peaceful solution to the Rwandan refugees. Despite some progress, the issue was not resolved. The Tutsi
refugees with the support of Uganda armed themselves and attacked Rwanda on 1st October 1990. Earlier in
the 1980s, the Obote government found itself at logger heads with the Habyarimana government because of
Tutsi refugees (Mushemeza, 1998).
Currently, the issue of Rwandan Hutu refugees has brought together officials from both governments in
search of durable solutions. The Rwandan government views the Hutu refugees currently in Uganda and other
countries as diplomatic liabilities who portray a bad picture of Rwanda at a regional and international level. The
suspicion by the Rwandan government that these refugees are a potential military and political threat adds to
this diplomatic burden.
Furthermore, the forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees in the region can partly be explained by the
need to promote diplomatic relations. The participation of these countries in forced return of Rwandans was
partly due to the pressure from Rwanda. In fact, Amnesty International (1997a) in its report “deeply regrets that
under pressure from the authorities in Rwanda, neighboring countries and donor governments, UNHCR have
sacrificed basic principles of refugee protection”. In response to pressure, these countries have forcefully
returned refugees in the name of promoting friendly relations with Rwanda.
An NGO official noted:
Certainly the relationship between the two countries has an impact on refugees. Uganda is under pressure from
Rwanda to encourage and support the return of Rwandan refugees. If Uganda does not support repatriation, Rwanda might
think we want to destabilize them. If we side with Rwanda, the refugees’ rights and protection will be jeopardized.
Because of the need to promote bilateral relations, Uganda has chosen the latter option.24
Uganda’s Politics
Domestic security concerns. The Rwandan refugee repatriation can also be explained by Uganda’s
domestic security concerns. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Young Leaders Think Tank (2017) argued that
“refugees have been marked as sources of insecurity”. Milner (2002) made a categorization of direct and
indirect security threats.
First there are direct threats from “refugee warriors” and armed exiles causing a “spill-over” of conflict…. The direct
threat, posed by the spill-over of conflict and refugee warriors, is by far the strongest link between forced migration and
conflict. Secondly, there are indirect threats posed by refugees through altering either the levels of “grievance” or the
“opportunity structure” in a country of asylum.
Direct threats are those where refugees (refugee warriors) engage themselves in military or rebel activities
against a country. Such activities tend to regionalize conflicts and bring about interstate conflicts. Examples
include the RPF recruitment of Tutsi refugees in Ugandan camps. Other examples include the military nature of
Hutu refugee camps in Zaire and Burundian refugees in western Tanzania. In all these cases, the countries of
asylum faced retaliation from the countries of origin.
Under indirect security threats are refugees’ involvement in crimes, like theft, resource based conflicts and
competition for employment with the nationals (Milner, 2002). Using Milner’s categorization, while there is no
evidence of direct security threats of Rwandan refugees on Uganda, there have been newspaper reports of the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) recruitment inside Ugandan camps (Candia, 2014).
However, the Ugandan government has strongly denied any rebel recruitment taking place in camps.
Rwandan refugees pose indirect security threats on Uganda. It has been reported that the refugees have
engaged themselves in crimes. For example, the Minister of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees is on record as
saying “that group (deported Rwandan asylum seekers) had become a source of insecurity in the settlement. In
2010 a Rwandan rejected asylum seeker was arrested in Bushenyi with a stolen gun from a police post in
Nakivale refugee settlement” (Magara, 2010).
In another incident, a Rwandan refugee was killed by nationals in Ngarama sub-county25 which neighbors
Nakivale settlement because he was suspected of stealing a generator (Ahimbisibwe, 2015). Furthermore,
Rwandan refugees have been involved in land conflicts in Nakivale settlement against the Congolese refugees
and host communities (Government of Uganda, UNHCR & World Bank, 2016; Ahimbisibwe, 2017a; Bagenda,
Naggaga, & Smith, 2003; Refugee Law Project, 2004).
Therefore, Uganda’s forced repatriation of refugees in 2007, 2010, and beyond was partly due to her
domestic security concerns. There was fear that Rwandan refugees were a security threat. The constant
complaints and threats of attacks by Rwanda were a source of insecurity. Other sources have pointed out the
security and environmental burdens facing Uganda (Ahimbisibwe, 2018; Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung & Young
Leaders Think Tank, 2017).
Shift in Uganda’s policies. Uganda’s shift in policies is one of the explanations of Rwandans’ forced
24
Interview with a Protection Officer, Centre for Refugee Rights, Mbarara on 1 July 2016.
25
The researcher and his team were at the time doing data collection in Nakivale settlement and they heard about the murder of
this Rwandan refugee in Ngarama sub-county neighboring Nakivale. The Settlement Commandant and the Legal Officer of GTZ,
an implementing agency of UNHCR confirmed the murder of this Rwandan refugee man.
repatriation. Perhaps this shift is as a result of the protracted nature of this refugee case load and pressure from
their country of origin. Either way, this shift has affected their protection. It also reminds us of the changing
nature of African states’ refugee policies.
Although initially the Uganda government had no problem with Rwandan refugees, in late 2004, it got
concerned about the slow pace of repatriation. Government ministers started to issue threats urging refugees to
return.
According to the Refugee Law Project, in November 2004, Moses Ali, First Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees (as he then was), on a visit to Nakivale told a group of
Rwandan refugees: “You came here when you had problems at home and we granted you asylum. Today your
country is very peaceful, why don’t you want to go home?” (Refugee Law Project, 2005). In addition, Christine
Aporu, State Minister for Disaster preparedness and Refugees (as she then was), told Rwandan refugees: “Pack
your bags and go home. Rwanda is ready to receive you” (Refugee Law Project, 2005).
By 2009, the Uganda’s position to the refugees had become less receptive as evidenced by the threats, ban
on cultivation and deadlines to return. As Kabwegyere26 said,
If Rwandan refugees insist, we shall chase them or they can contact UNHCR so that they are relocated elsewhere.
This is the government position, UNHCR knows about it and they should arrange with Rwandan refugees and take them to
another country. This is not a holiday camp. These people were told that the conditions [in Rwanda] were conducive for
them to go back home. (IRIN, 2010)
In 2011, UNHCR recommended the invocation of cessation clause scheduled for implementation on 30th
June 2013 and later postponed. Another date for implementation was 31st December 2017.27 It was, however,
noted implemented.28
As already noted the shift in Uganda’s policies is partly due to pressure from Rwanda. A government
official noted that
Originally Uganda had no problem with Rwandan refugees. However, Rwandan has been pushing us to support the
cessation clause and forced repatriation. They argue that their country is now peaceful and willing to receive all the
refugees. At times we don’t agree but compromise on our positions and policy because of the need to maintain good
diplomatic relations.29
Politics in Rwanda
Rwanda is “peaceful”. The post genocide regime in Rwanda has aggressively promoted the view that the
country is peaceful and stable and that no one has any reason to remain outside as a refugee. This view partly
influenced Rwandans repatriation in Burundi, DRC, and Tanzania. The Rwandan regime partly wanted to avoid
embarrassment because of the non-return of refugees and claim legitimacy as a reconciling and inclusive
government (Whitaker, 2013). Whitaker (2013) argued that
a second view behind the Rwandan refugee operation was the adoption by policy makers of the view that the security
situation within Rwanda had improved. Rwandans no longer had a legitimate claim to refugee status because the
disturbances to public order at home had ended. (p.148)
26
Kabwegyere Tarsis is the former Ugandan Minister for Refugees and Disaster Preparedness.
27
Email Communication with the Principal Protection Officer, Office of the Prime Minister on 20th October 2016.
28
Phone Conversation with an official, Office of the Prime Minister on 20th March 2018.
29
Interview with Senior Protection Officer, Directorate of Refugees, Office of the Prime Minister, Kampala on 16th August
2010.
She further notes that “…the international community largely accepted the argument that peace and stability
had been restored to Rwanda, and thus it was safe for the refugees to return home” (Whitaker, 2013, p. 148).
This is the same view that has influenced Uganda’s policy towards Rwandan refugees. The Ugandan
officials supported the view that Rwanda was peaceful and there was no reason for them to remain outside as
refugees. A Ugandan official noted:
Rwandan refugees came here because of the genocide and the post genocide insecurity. These conditions no longer
exist in Rwanda. Their country is peaceful and stable with impressive socio-economic development indicators. I don’t
understand why these refugees don’t want to return.30
However, observers, NGOs, and scholars have challenged this view. The Institute for Economics and
Peace Global Peace Index Report for 2013 on the trend of peace in the world ranks Rwanda 135th out of 162,
which contradicts official accounts that it is among the most peaceful ( Rutayisire, 2013). This is partly
explained by the repressive nature of the regime which violates human rights both at home and abroad.
Rwanda’s location in a turbulent region with neighbors (Burundi and DRC) experiencing conflicts also explains
the poor peace ranking in the world (Rutayisire, 2013).
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported on human rights violations in Rwanda
which negatively affect peace in the country. For example, Amnesty International in its 2017 annual report
argued that “In the run-up to presidential elections in 2017, the environment for free debate and dissent
continued to be hostile” (Amnesty International, 2017a). The report points out harassment of opposition parties,
unfair trials, violations of freedoms of association, expression, and assembly (Amnesty International, 2017a).
Human Rights Watch (2017) had also reported on similar violations in the country. It notes that
The Rwandan government continues to limit the ability of civil society groups, media, and international human rights
organizations to function freely and independently and criticize its policies or practices. Military and police arbitrarily
arrested and detained people in unofficial detention centers, torturing and ill-treating some of them. (Human Rights Watch,
2017)
Similar views have been reported elsewhere (Kingston, 2017). The human rights violations undermine efforts for
peace and are a recipe for insecurity and violence as Rwandan history suggests.
Reyntjens, a leading scholar on Rwanda has warned that
if resentment, injustice and inequality are as widespread as consistent field data suggest, the metaphor that naturally
comes to mind is that of a volcano waiting to erupt. If that happens, Rwanda could once again see mass bloodshed that
spills across its borders. (Reyntjens, 2015, p. 32)
Post genocide reconciliation, justice and reconstruction. Rwanda has since the late 1950s witnessed
cycles of conflicts including the genocide in 1994. These conflicts have caused divisions, loss of life,
displacement, great suffering, human rights violations and negatively affected development. It is therefore
understandable that there is need to promote reconciliation, justice, and reconstruction.
There is a strong desire by the Rwandan government that all Rwandans living abroad should return and
take part in reconciliation and reconstruction of their country (Kingston, 2017). According to Human Rights
First (2004),
30
Interview with a Uganda Government Official, Office of the Prime Minister, Kampala on 1st June 2016.
the Rwandan government has been playing an unusually active role in encouraging the return of its refugee
population in exile. This reflects a desire to see the refugees return and take part in rebuilding their country, as well as vital
security and justice issues which flow from Rwanda’s history of genocide. (p. 26)
It is further noted that “a second goal is justice: preventing those who committed serious crimes in 1994 from
enjoying continued impunity by hiding under the cloak of refugee status abroad” (Human Rights First, 2004, p.
26).
While commenting on the recommendation for the cessation clause by UNHCR, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Government Spokesperson, Louise Mushikiwabo noted that “This stamp of approval from UNHCR
lights the path homeward for the estimated 100,000 remaining Rwandan refugees. We urge them to take their
rightful place in Rwanda’s journey of reconciliation, national renewal and socio-economic development” (IRIN,
2012).
This view of the Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister points to the government’s interest in the return of
refugees as part of the reconciliation and reconstruction processes. The non-return of refugees signifies an
unfinished project of reconciling and reconstructing Rwanda.
However, critics have argued that Rwanda is far away from reconciliation. Despite the reconciliation
efforts since the 1994 genocide, ethnic tensions remain below the surface (Kingston, 2017; Ingelaere, 2016;
Reyntjens, 2013). Mutual fear and suspicions remain between Tutsi and Hutu as Kagame’s government is still
seen as a government dominated by the former (Kingston, 2017; Ingelaere, 2016; Reyntjens, 2013). This reality
has been a source of fear for many Rwandan refugees, a reason they are not willing to return (Ahimbisibwe,
2017b).
Rwanda’s security concerns. The Rwandan repatriation is also a product of Rwanda’s security concerns.
This is based on the view that Rwanda’s refugees abroad are both a political liability and security threat. I have
argued elsewhere that
Rwanda regards all the refugees outside her territory as either enemies or potential ones given the history of the RPF’s
struggle that started in refugee camps in Uganda. President Kagame formerly a refugee in Uganda knows the potential of
refugees in fueling cross border conflicts. (Ahimbisibwe, 2016, p. 872)
A Human Rights First (2004) report shared the same view.

The Rwandan government can be understood as having two major preoccupations around the continued sojourn of a
large exile community outside Rwanda. The first is a fear that refugees who remain outside the country may be intent on
fomenting dissidence against the Rwandan government. This concern is rooted in very real experience. (p. 26)
International Refugee Rights Initiative, Refugee Law Project & Social Science Research Council (2010)
also pointed out Rwanda’s security concerns on its nationals living abroad. Thus,
President Kagame knows only too well, nationals outside of their country can be a political liability at best and a
security threat at worst. Some are also assumed to be génocidaires who should be brought to justice. In the context of his
own experience of political and military organization in exile―the RPF, the force led by President Kagame to fight his
way back into Rwanda, was formed by exiles in Uganda―President Kagame sees all too clearly the need, inter alia, to
prevent rebellion brewing from outside of the country. (p. 13)
The same view was confirmed by an official working with the Refugee Law Project31:
31
Interview with an official of Refugee Law Project, Kampala on 15th August 2010.
Obviously Rwanda is strongly pushing other countries to force all Rwandan refugees to return. Kagame knows very
well the implications of failure to repatriate refugees outside Rwandan territory. Remember there is an active rebel group
opposed to the Kigali government. Rwanda thinks that the Rwandan refugees in Uganda are a potential recruiting ground
for these rebels. Because of national security interests, Kagame has made refugee repatriation one of his foreign policy
priorities.
Due to security concerns, the Rwandan government has aggressively supported the repatriation of refugees
living in Uganda and other countries. These countries have been pressured to cooperate in achieving this
objective. Non-compliance by these countries in this regard is seen as betrayal and bad neighborliness.
Neighboring countries including Uganda have chosen to cooperate for the sake of good neighborliness and
peace at the expense of refugee rights.32
Rwanda’s image abroad. The Rwandan government is concerned about the permanent stay of refugees
abroad. President Kagame is quoted to have said that the Rwandan refugees living outside were traitors.33 This
can be interpreted partly to mean that the refugees were damaging Rwanda’s image abroad (O’Connor, 2013).
The International Refugee Rights Initiative, Refugee Law Project & Social Science Research Council (2010)
had raised the same view. They argue that “the Rwandan government itself has aggressively promoted the
return of all its citizens. There are a number of reasons for this, including most notably security fears and a
concern for the country’s public image” (p. 13). It is further stressed that
Indeed, there was a clear perception that the government’s motivation for persuading them to return was primarily to
promote Rwanda’s international image. Numerous interviewees talked of the government of Rwanda’s aggressive pursuit
of repatriation, which they saw as being motivated by the desire “to mistake the international community that Rwanda is
now okay”. (p. 21)
Other sources share the similar view of Rwanda promoting its image abroad as a reason behind the strong
support for refugee repatriation operations. Ogenga Otunnu said that the premature and ungrounded application
of “Ceased Circumstances” Cessation Clause (4C) has its roots in the advice of Tony Blair to Kagame’s regime
of terminating the refugee status of Rwandans as a stratagem to hide to the outside world what is going on in
Rwanda. The mapping report and political reckonings also were at the base of that prematurity in order to get
rid of possible witnesses who are still living abroad as refugees.34
Conclusion
This article has argued that the Rwandan repatriation was not devoid of politics. Repatriation rather than
being a humanitarian act addressing the needs of refugees became an operation aimed at serving the political
interests of various actors: the international community, regional geo-politics, Uganda, and Rwanda. This
explains why repatriation has not solved the Rwandan refugee problem. This article has analyzed the politics of
Rwandan repatriation by focusing on politics at international and regional levels as well as in Uganda and
Rwanda.
The insights in this article have policy and methodological considerations. From a policy perspective, this
paper has shown that repatriation is affected by political interests of states at international, regional, and
32
Interview with an official of International Refugee Rights Initiative, Kampala on 22nd August 2016.
33
Focus group discussion, Sangano Base Camp, Nakivale settlement on 10th June 2016; focus group discussion, Oruchinga
settlement on 29th August 2016.
34
Mutuyimana Manzi (undated), “The Wake of Prematurity of the Cessation Clause: Rwandan Government Orchestrating New
Forms of Serious Threats against Rwandan Refugees in Uganda”, on file with the author.
national levels. This means that repatriation has been politicized rather than being a humanitarian issue. There
is a need to look at repatriation as a durable solution for refugees and not states. Durable solutions like
repatriation should not focus on the needs of states but on those of refugees. It is important to listen to refugees
and get their point of view in designing solutions to their predicament. This will help in achieving refugee
centered durable solutions and protect their rights.
From a methodological perspective, this paper has focused on the politics of Rwandan repatriation in
Uganda. There is need for future research on the politics of repatriation of other refugee nationalities, like
Burundians, South Sudanese, Congolese, and Somalis. Such research should answer the following questions. Is
repatriation a humanitarian or political act? Under what conditions does repatriation become political? Does
politics affect other durable solutions like local integration and resettlement? How can we protect repatriation
and other durable solutions from politics? How do we ensure the humanitarian character of repatriation? Is
repatriation still a relevant durable solution in the contemporary world?
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International Relations and Diplomacy, December 2019, Vol. 7, No.12, 592-600
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.12.004
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Public Investments as a Development Tool
Vassiliki Delitheou
Panteion University, Athens, Greece
Maria Vinieratou-Bosinaki
University of Peloponnese, Tripoli, Greece
Constantinos GE. Athanassopoulos
Neapolis University Pafos, Pafos, Cyprus

The role of public investment and its substantial contribution to economic growth and the quality of life of citizens
is now being reaffirmed internationally, creating a trend towards enhancing the relative public spending. This paper
analyses this role at international and European level, while it examines especially the case of Greece; having
undergone a significant period of shrinkage over the years of the memorandums, the Public Investment Program
(PIP) has again shown a tendency to increase its resources and its importance. Greece makes an important reform
effort, which must take into account that, in order to keep track of current global trends and prospects, Public
Investment Programs are now called for to be reconciled with new development models as well as new,
internationally accepted rules of proper governance and financial management. In this context, they should also act
as catalysts for further supporting and strengthening private investment.
Keywords: development, investment, public management, economic growth, life quality
Public Investments and Their Contribution to Growth in General

According to one of the most prevalent definitions, found both in the literature and in the Eurostat working
papers, public investment is defined as total gross fixed capital formation, carried out by General Government
entities (Mehrotra & Välilä, 2006, pp. 450-452). Also, public investment is considered to be all fixed and
intangible investment activities of the state, which, in the context of the investment and economic and
development policies pursued, aim at redistributing the national income before the benefit of society as a
whole.
Internationally, there are four broad categories of public investments:
 Infrastructures, including transport and communications networks,
 Investments in human resources, particularly in the fields of education and training,
 Investments in technological progress, particularly in terms of research,
 Equipments and capital goods.
Vassiliki Delitheou, Ph.D., Permanent Assistant Professor, Department of Economic and Regional Development, Panteion
University, Athens, Greece.
Maria Vinieratou-Bosinaki, Ph.D., Department of History, Archaeology and Cultural Resources Management, University of
Peloponnese, Tripoli, Greece.
Constantinos GE. Athanassopoulos, Ph.D., President of the School of Law, Neapolis University Pafos, Pafos, Cyprus.
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS AS A DEVELOPMENT TOOL 593
Based on the above distinction, some authors call them “hard” public investments, those involving the
formation of infrastructure and capital, while in “soft” public investment, they include all kinds of expenditures
mainly related to human resources, such as spending on education, research and development (R & D), active
employment policies, and family support (Streeck & Mertens, 2011, pp. 1-4).
If appropriate and feasible, public investment is implemented through public-private partnerships.
Naturally, public investment does not produce both immediate, long-term benefits across the economy.
Their return is often difficult to identify, and is determined only in more general terms, through socio-economic
research and cost-benefit analysis. This is all the more true in the case of investment in human capital.
However, it is generally accepted that public investment is directly linked to the capacity of an economy.
Typically, without roads, communication networks and energy supplies, processes and activities of production
and trade would be impossible to implement (Lloyd, 1999, pp. 27-32).
It is considered by most scholars that public investment does not compete with the private sector but, on
the contrary, it is an important factor in increasing the size and efficiency of private investment. In many cases,
modern Public Investment Programs (PIPs) are used targeted, in a way that helps stimulate private business by
enhancing and/or providing new growth incentives, particularly in areas such as creating a whole infrastructure,
the development of the workforce, the minimization of business risks. In this respect, several targeted public
investments can be “correlated” with categories of incentives. Development incentives are one of the “tools”
that governments use to “generate” growth through, e.g., attracting private investment. Development incentives
are used to curb those factors that run counter to the intentions of private investors to undertake a new business
initiative, either due to a lack of sufficient funds or a lack of integrated infrastructure in a region or a lack of
skilled workforce, fears for low profitability of the funds to be invested, etc. (Marmatakis, 1969, pp. 320-330).
Development incentives, without altering free market mechanisms, aim at stimulating private business or even
orienting it towards desired directions and areas, e.g., to agriculture, to industry, etc., either to reduce the cost of
installation, or to produce the good, to minimize risk (Delitheou, 2018, pp. 211-215). Development incentives
are such as:
 Macro-incentives,
 Incentives to attract foreign investors,
 Incentives to move investors from region to region within the same country,
 Incentives to assist export,
 Labor mobility incentives.
Over time, studies carried out by international organizations, public and private bodies and research
institutions in Europe, America, and elsewhere have demonstrated the contribution of public investment to
increasing marginal productivity in the private sector, reducing the start-up, and running costs of businesses and
the formation of capital. Indicative is the following table, which summarizes the main conclusion of a series of
relevant studies.
594 PUBLIC INVESTMENTS AS A DEVELOPMENT TOOL
Table 1
Empirical Studies on the Impact of Public Investment on Private Investment and Growth (Makuyana &
Odhiambo, 2016)
Region/country Model
Author(s) Conclusion
and sample period specification
USA
Aaron (1990) Cobb Douglas Public capital had a positive impact on output.
1951-1985
USA Public investment is beneficial to economic growth
Aschauer (1989a) Cobb Douglas
1949-1985 process.
Sample of European
Aubyn and Afonso Vector Autoregressive Both public and private investments are crucial to
countries plus Japan,
(2008) (VAR) growth.
Canada, and USA
USA Output growth responded differently to the various
Batina (1998) Cobb Douglas
1948-1993 proxies of public and private investment.
Crowder and USA Vector Error Correction Public capital is more important to economic growth
Himarios (1997) 1947-1989 Model (VECM) than private investment.
USA Public investment in education is more important to
Cullison (1993) VAR
1961-1991 growth than in physical capital.
Evans and Karras USA
Cobb Douglas Public capital exerts negative impact on output.
(1994) 1970-1986
Portugal Public capital had positive and significant impact on
Lighthart (2000) Cobb Douglas
1965-1995 output.
USA
Lynde (1992) Cobb Douglas Profit increases with respect to public capital increases.
1958-1988
Lynde and Richmond USA Public investment important in cost saving and it
Translog cost function
(1991) 1958-1989 complements private capital.
Lynde and Richmond USA Public capital is significant to output growth and
Translog profit function
(1993) 1958-1989 productivity.
7 OECD countries Public investment in core infrastructure is crucial to
Munnell (1990) Cobb Douglas
1963-1988 growth.
USA Public investment stimulates private investment and
Pereira (2001a) VAR
34 observations growth.
11 countries
Pereira (2001b) VAR Public investment spurs private sector output.
1960-1990
Ram and Ramsey USA
Cobb Douglas Total public capital is significant to output.
(1989) 1949-1985
Netherlands Public investment is significantly important to output
Sturm et al. (1996) VAR
1853-1913 growth.
USA
Tatom (1991) Cobb Douglas Public capital not important to economic growth.
1949-1989
Vijverberg et al. USA The results were inconclusive owing to the presence of
Cobb Douglas
(1997) 1958-1989 multicollinearity.
Public and private investments are equally important for
USA
the Japanese economy while private investment
Yang (2006) Japan Cobb Douglas
contributes more to growth than public investment for
1957-1997
the U.S.A. economy.
Source: Makuyana, G., & Odhiambo, N. (2016), “Public and Private Investment and Economic Growth: A Review”, Journal of
Accounting and Management, 6(2), 25-42.
At the same time, many researchers also highlight cases where public investment can hinder market
operations. In particular, this is the case when public investment:
(a) Financed through government borrowing (hence it may be considered likely that the country will take
unfavorable budgetary measures for entrepreneurship, such as tax increases),
(b) Concerned sectors of the economy where there is competition between public and private investment
and/or,
(c) Included the high level of subsidization of areas of activity that prove to be counterproductive
(Makuyana & Odhiambo, 2016, pp. 29-31).

Since the 1990s, public investment, as a share of GDP, has gradually declined significantly in European
countries. Initially, this was linked to the systematization of the effort to consolidate and curb public spending
in European states (mainly through the expansion of the New Public Management theory and methodology),
and then to reduce spending to public investment was imposed by the financial crisis (Vinieratou, 2016, pp.
25-28).
It is significant that over the past decade, spending on public investment has dramatically decreased in
many Eurozone countries, with an emphasis on the countries of the European South, particularly affected by the
fiscal crisis and the implementation of the austerity programs. At the end of this period, it was again found that
the public investment deficit in the respective countries led to a shrinking of private investment and, on the
other hand, limited GDP growth in the euro area in general. This has led many researchers to recommend
measures to ensure that in the future fiscal consolidation is combined with strengthening public investment.
Figure 1. Public investment in Eurozone countries, as a percentage of total public expenditure. Source: AMECO
database, as in: Dreger, Ch., & Reimers, H. (2015), “The Impact of Public Investment on Private Investment in the
Euro Area”, Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 84(3), 183-193, ISSN 1861-1559, Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot.
In the current period, the trend of shrinking government spending on public investment is being revised
globally, as there has been a direct impact on the strong interaction between public and private investment. In
particular, it was found that the effectiveness of private investment in terms of growth in output, growth, and
job creation is directly dependent on the existence of adequate and targeted public investment interventions
(Dreger & Reimers, 2015, pp. 189-191).
Peripheral/Regional Programming and Public Investment Program in Europe and Greece

The drawing up of Public Investment Programs in most European countries in the 20th century was linked
to the concept and procedures of development/regional planning, the implementation of which has evolved in
particular since the 1929-1930 economic crisis, but also the two world wars (Vinieratou-Bosinaki, Touri, &
Delitheou, 2011, pp. 69-72).
In particular, problems such as the need to rebuild cities and countries, the uneven development of sectors
of the economy as well as of entire regions as compared to others, have made the need for public investment to
be underpinned by development programs based on economic growth models. These programs were
implemented on the basis of a set of rules concerning the criteria for the inclusion of projects to be financed, the
timing of implementation, and the measurement of the results of the projects as well as of the program as a
whole, through indicators. This is also the period of introduction of the concept of “regional policy” which
marks “a system of objectives, means and entities, combined in a program to achieve a balanced change of the
interregional structure of the economy” (Konsolas, 1997, pp. 65-70).
In the above direction, in Greece, a legislative attempt of the past that deserves to be noted is in 1964, DL
4355 “On the Responsibilities of the Ministry of Coordination”, which, in such an early period, faced the Greek
Public Investment Program (PIP) as a tool for development planning, identifying it not only on the basis of
budget entries, but as part of the “long-term Economic Development Program of the Country”, prepared by the
Ministry of Coordination and submitted to Governmental Economic Council. However, these arrangements
have not been implemented. On the contrary, in the years to come, the consolidation of development
programming, which was constantly evolving in other European countries, was overthrown by the Greek PIP,
through the restructuring of the ministries’ competences, to return to the 1980s through the mandatory
procedures of the European Structural Funds. From this period onwards, the procedures of the European Union
(initially with the Mediterranean Integrated Programs—IMP and later with the Community Support
Frameworks—CSF and the National Strategic Reference Framework—NSRF) “force” our country into
integrated institutional, programmatic, and managerial regulation of the way in which Community funds are
earmarked, leading to the establishment of development planning and the adoption of systems for their design
and management, by “entangling” this logic into the corresponding section a Public Investment Program
(Delitheou & Vinieratou, 2017, pp. 25-30).
This obligatory systematization of procedures only concerns EU funds and leads to the corresponding
regulation of only one of the two parts of the Greek PIP, i.e., the “co-financed” one. The so-called “national”
strand, which is not “touched” by the Structural Funds regulations, does not evolve accordingly, and to date, it
is clearly lagging behind in terms of the institutionalization of its procedures but also of its programmatic role.
In particular, the national part of the PIP continued until 2010 to be planned only on an annual basis, and
only as regards (a) the inclusion of new projects and (b) the exact amount of payments for the projects
involved.
In the recent years of the fiscal crisis, following the adoption of Law 3871/2010 and the establishment of
the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy Framework (MFSF), again starting with new international commitments of
our country, the rudimentary planning of the national PIP begins in the medium term and in particular at the
level of the project (Papadopoulos, 2014, pp. 21-25). Again, however, the attempted programming is purely
budgetary targeting and mainly involves ensuring the implementation of the national PIP in line with the
budgetary constraints of the period, resulting from the Fiscal Adjustment Program, but also from the budgetary
surveillance mechanisms established at the Eurozone level (Papadopoulos, 2014, pp. 46-48).
Consequently, the relevant arrangements do not meet the necessities:
 The institutionalization of multiannual development coordination procedures and the definition of priority
axes at central, sectoral, and regional level,
 The development of tools for monitoring the national PIP, either in whole or in part, as it is not foreseen to
use indicators to assess the impact of public investment on the economy and society.
The shortcomings highlighted above, especially in relation to the national aspect of the EDP, have already
been recorded in studies and proposals of public and expert executives for some 30 years, but no appropriate
measures have yet been taken to address theirs (Bitsikas, 1986, pp. 45-48).
The Public Investment Program (PIP) in Greece

In Greece, the establishment of the Public Investment Program, in its current form, starts with Law
2212/1952 (Government Gazette: 266/A/1952), “On the State Budget for the fiscal year 1952-1953 and the
following credits for the costs provided under the Works Agreements at the expense of Reconstruction funds”.
This law establishes a system of commitment of credits to the state budget for the implementation of works
contracts. In 1954, Law 2957 (Government Gazette 186/A18.8.1954) proceeded to an elementary clarification
(according to the time of the day) of the concept of public investment, categorizing it in construction works,
supplies, and studies. Subsequently, both the content and the context of the functioning of the PIP were
fragmentarily over the years, through various legislation, a variety of themes that occasionally regulated, e.g.,
the structure of a Collective Decision in which the approved projects, procedures funding, the competences of
stakeholders, were always without coherence and integrated planning.
In particular, according to Law 2957/1954, public investment in Greece may include (Papadopoulos, 2014,
pp. 21-23):
1. Buildings, reconstructions, and extensions of permanent or semi-permanent facilities or works,
including housing projects;
2. Supply of permanent equipment, machinery, and capital goods;
3. Surveys, studies, and expertise;
4. All administrative and general expenses directly related to the above cases. Currently, the financing of
such expenditure under the PIP is only possible if it is provided for by specific provisions.
The above definition of the concept of public investment, according to PIP up to our days, has been
enriched by including in the PIP also:
1. All but the costs of EU-co-financed programs. The projects borrowed by the European Investment Bank
(EIB).
2. Grants and subsidies to legal entities governed by private law associations, cooperatives, public limited
companies, and other legal entities as defined in Article 18 of Law 2515/1997.
3. Increases in share capital of state-controlled public companies (Public Utility Companies).
4. Other investment activities specializing in Presidential Decrees or Ministerial Issues.
The PIP is divided into two strands, based on the source of funding.
1. The “national”, financed purely from national resources;
2. The “co-financed strand”, which draws its resources from EU financial instruments and Greece.
The PIP finances the country’s development policy with projects that contribute to the growth of private and public
capital of the economy and supports the modernization of the country on a long-term basis. PIP 2018-2021 aims to
accompany the fiscal effort with development actions, contributing to strengthening the economy and supporting social
cohesion. The resources available in the period 2018-2021 (Medium Term Financial Strategy Framework (MFSF)) for the
achievement of the development objectives in the areas of infrastructure, entrepreneurship, human capital, local
government, for the completion of the National Strategic Reference Framework NSRF 2007-2013 and to meet the
absorption targets of the Corporate Compact for the NSRF Development Framework 2014-2020 amount to a total of 28.65
billion euros.
The main objective of the PIP 2018 is to allocate the pre-determined resources in such a way as to achieve the
maximum possible development result for the country to enter a stable growth path. The main budgetary objective for the
implementation of the Public Investment Budget 2018 is to achieve the absorption of the foreseen NSRF 2014-2020 and
other co-funded programs to ensure the inflow of Community assistance and the completion of the 2007-2013 projects
without loss of resources. It is also important to implement the programs and projects of the national section in order to
promote the development objectives of the Bodies financed by the PIP, taking into account any synergy and
complementarity with the co-financed projects. Necessary prerequisites for this are good planning and targeting. (The
Ministry of Economy and Development, March 2018)
The main institutional actors involved in the design and implementation of the national PIP are:
1. The Ministry of Economy and Development;
2. The Ministry of Finance and, in particular, its Treasury General Account State;
3. The Funding/Execution Bodies of the Public Investment Program, which is the Hellenic Parliament,
Ministries, and Regions.
In addition to the above, the Implementing Bodies of the Public Investment Program are:
1. The Regional Units;
2. The Municipalities;
3. The Legal Entities of the State and the Private Legal Entities;
4. Public Companies and Organizations.
The “National Development Plan” (Presidential Decree 147/2017, Government Gazette

192/Α/13.12.2017)
To date, the Public Investment Directorate (PID), the Ministry of Economy and Development, plays a
leading, central/coordinating role in the preparation and implementation of the Public Investment Program,
where the Funding Bodies (Greek Parliament, Ministries, and Regions) overall proposals for the projects of the
sectors and categories of their competence, taking into account the spending limits of the state budget.
The PID also has the central responsibility to fund the projects of the agencies by transferring the relevant
credits to their accounts.

The new “Ministry of Economy and Development Organization” (Presidential Decree 147/2017) reaffirms
as the operational objective of the Public Investment Directorate the “financing of the country’s development
policy through the implementation of the Public Investment Program”.
Subsequently, with Article 40, the new agency of the body, for the first time, establishes the Directorate
for the Administration of the National Public Investment Program, with the operational objective of “designing
and properly implementing development programs financed from purely national resources of the PIP”.
In particular, the responsibilities of the Directorate for the Administration of the National Public
Investment Program include, as a matter of priority:
 Designing the structure, content, and procedures of the National Development Program (NDP);
 The establishment and operation of the management and control systems of the National Development
Program and the programs it specifies, and;
 To set up a system for evaluating programs and projects funded by national resources using
methodological tools.
The provision of a special service for the preparation and management of a “National Development
Program” based on the resources of the national section of the PIP is undoubtedly a positive step towards
institutionally securing its program role; however, the necessary condition for the promotion of the
corresponding legislation on procedures concerning the NDP is fulfilled immediately.
OECD: Twelve Guidelines for Public Investment Programs

A feature of the “new era” that is being launched today for public investment, with international
recognition as a key tool for promoting private investment, market operation and improving the quality of life
for citizens, is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2014, a “Special
Report on the Efficiency of Public Investment at Levels of Governance” (OECD, 2014, pp. 11-12).
The text was based on comparative research and study of implementation rules and practices recorded in
the member countries of the organization regarding Public Investment Programs.
With a view to responding to new global challenges and international development standards, the OECD
formulates 12 “Guidelines” for the design and implementation of Public Investment Programs which, in
summary, include:
 Coordinating national and sub-national spatial levels, with a view to adopt an integrated strategy and
investment rules based on local priorities and comparative advantages;
 The use of investment-enhancing tools such as risk and impact studies, private sector involvement, and
focus on achieving achievable results;
 Developing a budgetary framework that is in line with the objectives set and based on a coherent
regulatory framework, as well as a transparent and efficient system of financial management.
Conclusions
The role of public investment and its substantial contribution to economic growth and the quality of life of
citizens is now being reaffirmed internationally, creating a trend towards enhancing the relative public spending.
In Greece, having undergone a significant period of shrinkage over the years of the memorandums, the Public
Investment Program has again shown a tendency to increase its resources and its importance (Ministry of
Finance, 2017). In particular, the modern investment and financial planning requirements of our country
highlight the role of the PIP in practice.
This finding, together with the requirements of the new economic environment created after the fiscal
crisis, makes it imperative to both modernize and reform the obsolete and often incomplete institutional
framework of the Greek PIP as a whole and to institutionalize programmatic design of the national branch in
particular.
This reform effort must take into account that, in order to keep track of current global trends and prospects,
Public Investment Programs are now called for to be reconciled with new development models as well as new,
internationally accepted rules of proper governance and financial management. In this context, they should also
act as catalysts for further supporting and strengthening private investment.
References
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International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 7, Number 12,2019

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International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 7, Number 12,2019

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International Relations

David Publishing Company

Aims and Scope:

David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

The Politics of Repatriation: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda, 2003-2017 573

Public Investments as a Development Tool 592

Continuities of Historical Crises and Discourses of Europe From

European Challenges and Crises

Political, Religious, and Geographical Issues

European Culture, Values, and Symbols

The Romania-US Strategic Partnership and the Security of the

Ioan Codrut Lucinescu

The US Involvement in the Wider Black Sea Area

The Romania-US Strategic Partnership

The Politics of Repatriation: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda,

Keywords: Rwandan refugees, repatriation, politics, Uganda, Rwanda

The Search for a Durable Solution

discussion, refugees noted:

The Politics of Rwandan Repatriation

reluctant to return (Kmonpetch, 2016).

A Human Rights First (2004) report shared the same view.

Public Investments as a Development Tool

Keywords: development, investment, public management, economic growth, life quality

Public Investments and Their Contribution to Growth in General

(Makuyana & Odhiambo, 2016, pp. 29-31).

Peripheral/Regional Programming and Public Investment Program in Europe and Greece

The Public Investment Program (PIP) in Greece

The “National Development Plan” (Presidential Decree 147/2017, Government Gazette

credits to their accounts.

OECD: Twelve Guidelines for Public Investment Programs

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