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Cayetano vs.

Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts:

- Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC.

- Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification as
provided for Section 1, Article 9 of the constitution in which the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: The contention is erroneous hence the petition is DISMISSED. The Court held that "practice of law"
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.. Atty. Monsod’s past work experience involves using knowledge of law as an
economist, manager, entrepreneur, negotiator of contracts, and legislator. Therefore the constitutional
requirement of 10 year practice of law has been satisfied.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA

FACTS:

- Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office issued a circular the latter issued scheduling an
examination for determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines
Patent Office.

- Petitioner Philippine lawyers association is assailing the constitutionality of such examination. They
contend that one who has passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice
law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office. Therefore, the examination is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

- Agrava argued that that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice
of law because includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of
actual practice and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further
condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office.
ISSUE:
Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the transaction of
business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other
laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. All
these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal
knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
As stated in 5 Am. Jur,
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure

of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and


conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.”
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, since much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.
PATRICK A. CARONAN V. RICHARD A. CARONANa.k.a. “ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN”A.C. No. 113116,
Promulgated: July 12, 2016
FACTS:
The complainant Patrick A. Caronan and respondent RichardA. Caronan are siblings born to Porferio R.
Caronan Jr. and NormaA. Caronan. Respondent is two years older than complainantbeing born on 1975.
Both finished their secondary education atthe Makati High School. Respondent enrolled at Pamantasan
ngLungsod ng Maynila (PLM) in 1991 where he stayed for a yearbefore transferring to the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA)before being discharged in 1993. Complainant obtained degree inBusiness
Administration in 1997 at the University of Makati. Alsoin 1997, Respondent moved to Nueva Vizcaya with
wife Rosanaand their 3 children. He never went back to earn a collegedegree. In 1999, respondent told
complainant that he enrolled in alaw school in Nueva Vizcaya. In 2004, their mother informedcomplainant
that respondent enrolled at the St. Mary’sUniversity’s College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Ecija using
thecomplainant’s name and college records from the University ofMakati. Complainant brushed these
aside for he did not anticipatethe consequences to him.In 2009, after complainant was promoted as a
StoreManager of the 7-11 store in Muntinlupa, he was ordered toreport to the head office of Philippine
Seven Corporation (PSC)and was then requested at the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI) in relation
to an investigation involving respondent, who atthat points, was using the name “Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan”. Hewas asked to identify documents showing respondent’s use of the
“Patrick A. Caronan”. It was then complainant was informed in acase of qualified theft and estafa in
which respondent wasinvolved.Respondent’s use of the name “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan”continues to
perpetuate crimes and commit unlawful activitiessuch as; almost victimizing fellow church-member’s
relatives,tricking someone into believing that he was authorized to sell aparcel of land in Taguig City
when in fact, he was not. Further, helearned that respondent was arrested for gun-running
activities,illegal possession of explosives and violation of Batas PambansaBilang (BP) 22. With this,
complainant was eventually forced toresign from PSC, hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent’s alleged use of the former’s nameand identity, and illegal practice of law.On
March 9, 2015, the IBP-CDB conducted the scheduledmandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear. IBPInvestigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera issued hisReport and Recommendation,
finding respondent guilty ofillegally and falsely assuming complainant’s name, identity andacademic
records.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name“Patrick A. Caronan” be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys; and (b)the name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted tothe Bar.
HELD: The IBP is correct in ordering that the name “Patrick A.Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of A

ttorneys. The respondent,Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan”, has failed topresent any
proof to prove his identify. The respondent admitted,upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that he is
married to RosanaHalili-Caronan. This diverges to the official NSO records showingthat “Patrick A.
Caronan” is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not toRosana Halili-Caronan. In addition, the photograph of the
respondent when he was arrested as “Richard A. Caronan” onAugust 16, 2012, shows the same person
as the one in thephotograph in the IBP records of “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan”. The IBP also did not err in
ordering that the name “RichardA. Coronan” be barred from being admitted in the Bar. UnderSection 6,
Rule 138 of the Rules of the Court, no applicant foradmission to the Bar Examinations shall be admitted
unless hehad pursued and satisfactorily completed a bachelor’s degree inarts or sciences. The respondent
never completed his collegedegree. He did enrol at the PLM in 1991, but left a year later andentered the
PMA where he was discharged in 1993 withoutgraduating. Clearly, respondent has not completed the
requisitepre-law degree.The Court does not discount the possibility of therespondent finishing his college
degree and earn a law degreeunder his real name. However, his false assumption of hisbrother’s name,
identity, and educational records renders him fitfor admission to the Bar. Respondent exhibited his
dishonesty andutter lack of moral fitness. The acts of the respondent do nothave a place in the legal
profession where one of the primaryduties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA


Facts: A verified complaint for disbarment filed by Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo
Medical Group, Inc., respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed
criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks.
Respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking site,
insulting and verbally abusing complainant. He called petitioner a quack doctor and imputed that she has
payola budget and would pay the DOJ, the media. He also called for a Boycott of the products of the
clinic and called it names. Petitioner filed the said complaint to the IBP. Respondent however claimed that
the complaint was filed against his constitutional right to privacy and his exercise of his right to freedom
of speech. Stating that the quoted statements were posted in his personal facebook account and that it
only is availble to his group of friends which the petitioner does not belong to.
IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of
law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his posts, considering that he had at least 2,000
"friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he
had filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence; therefore,
he can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been
established.
Issue: whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the
verified complaint
Held: The defense is untenable. Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and
facilitate users to generate and share content. The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts
maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However,
the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook
available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without
any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments
thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving,
thus deserving scant consideration.
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection
from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated. Neither
can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom
of speech and expression. Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.
While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously
protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the constitutional
right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others,
destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. A scrutiny of the Facebook remarks
complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the
reputation of complainant and BMGI.

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