University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

A Reassessment of Roosevelt's Role in the Panamanian Revolution of 1903

Author(s): Robert A. Friedlander
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1961), pp. 535-543
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
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 A REASSESSMENTOF ROOSEVELT'S ROLE IN THE
PANAMANIANREVOLUTION OF 1903
ROBERTA. FRIEDLANDER
Kendall College

ON MARCH 23,1911,TheodoreRoosevelt,
at the University
a Charter
facing Day audience
of California,bluntlydeclared: "I am interestedin the
Panama Canal because I startedit. If I had followedtraditionalcon-
servativemethodsI should have submitteda dignifiedstate paper of probably
200 pages to the Congressand the debate would have been goingon yet,but I
took the Canal Zone and let Congressdebate,and while the debate goes on the
Canal does also." 1 Manyhistorians and unfriendly criticshave acceptedthisboast
as an outrightconfessionof guilt.To some it is all the proofneeded to convict
Rooseveltof themostperfidious conductknownto international law and individ-
ual morality;to othersit is irrefutableevidenceof the AmericanPresident'sinter-
ferencein thedomesticaffairs of a sovereignstate.Though profounddisagreement
continuesoverthe exact natureof the Rooseveltrole,mostscholarsare apt to as-
signhimsomemannerofguilt,no matterwhat thedegree. Even his conscientious
defenders,by shyingaway fromthe specificact and talkingin termsof world
power,have contributed as much to theseaccusationsas theyhave to his defense
and honor.2
But the subjectof Theodore Rooseveltis one thatoftenleads to precipitate
judgments.It is the intentof thisarticleto demonstratethat the actionsof the
AmericanPresidentbeforeand duringthe PanamanianRevolutionof 1903 were
not inconsistentwith national honor,but ratherwere morallystraightforward
and legallyjustified.The impetuousstatementsof the outspokenPresidenthave
frequently obscuredthe more carefullychartedcourseof his actions. With our
currenthemisphericdifficulties settinga new low on the international scene,and
with the American positionin the Canal Zone, and elsewhere,undergoingan
"agonizingreappraisal"fromboth ends of the Caribbean, a re-evaluationof
Roosevelt'srole in Isthmianpoliticsmighthelp to clarifya historicpicturewhich
has heretofore cast unhappyshadows upon the Latin-Americanrelationsof the
United States. Certainly,the chargeof dishonorand conspiracyleveled against
Rooseveltand his government has played its part in furthering traditionalLatin
towards
hostility the Colossus of the North.
'New York Times, March 24, 1911. Italics my own. Roosevelt was not alone in assertingto be
the chief instrumentof revolutionarysuccess. M. Philippe Bunau-Varilla in a letterto Dr.
William G. Fletcherdated June25, 1938, added his claim, stating: "I made the Revolution
of Panama." See Fletcher,"Canal Site Diplomacy: A Study in American Political Geo-
graphy" (Ph.D. dissertation;Yale University,1940), p. 213.
2 Fletcher,op. cit., p. 173, states that "morallyand legally ... the Roosevelt policy must be con-
demned"; FosterRhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power (New York: Harper, 1954),
p. 74, labels Roosevelt's action "Yankee imperialismoverridingall opposing interests";
John Morton Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress,
1954), p. 62, calls the episode outrageous,based on "some good reasons but ... no com-
pellingones"; George E. Mowry,The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harper, 1958),
p. 154, talks of "indecent haste" and ethics which "stopped at the tidewater";and Samuel
Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policyof the United States (New York: Harcourt,Brace,
1943), p. 387, perhaps the most moderate view, seeks justificationin the necessityfor
"strategicimperialism."
535

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536 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Criticsare quickto pointto themeeting ofthePresident and hisSecretary

of StatewithM. PhilippeBunau-Varilla, former chiefengineer fortheoriginal
FrenchPanamaCanal firm and largestockholder in theNewPanamaCompany,
as evidencethattheadministration intendedto intervene in the Isthmus.The
Hay-Herrain treaty between Colombia and the United States was unanimously
rejectedby the Colombian Senate on August12, 1903," and relations between
thetwocountries deteriorated
rapidly thereafter. Although Roosevelt soon lost
patience and had givenup dealing with the "inefficient
bandits" and "black-
mailersofBogotai," theadministration did nothing, evenaftertheexpiration of
the controversial on
treaty September 12. Public opinionappeared to be split
overwhatstepsshouldbe taken,and theSenatewasgrowing restiveovertheap-
parentlack of policyformulation on thepartof theexecutive.By October9,
thedateoftheinterview withBunau-Varilla, certainalternativeswerebeingcon-
sidered, but none of them were actuallyknown to the Frenchman.
Sixdaysbefore theWashington meeting M. Bunau-Varilla had indirectly in-
formed thePresident ofimpending revolutionary movements in Panama through
a letterto Professor JohnBassettMoore,and vigorously restated thoseviewsin
personthefollowing week.4Duringthatdiscussion, Roosevelt unwittinglymade
reference to a "plan,"and Bunau-Varilla, this
putting alongside the trend of the
conversation and thefailureofProfessor Mooreto respondto a suggestive letter
of October3, now becameconvincedthatif a revolution wereto occur,the
UnitedStateswould immediately take advantageof the opportunity.5 Sub-
sequent interviews withSecretaryHay and Assistant SecretaryLoomis served to
confirm his convictions. According to his own the
account, engineer-turned-
revolutionist was assuredbySecretary Hay thattheUnitedStates"shallnotbe
caughtnapping," and that"ordershavebeengiventonavalforces on thePacific
to sail towardstheIsthmus." 6 Withthis"official" commitment Bunau-Varilla
was thenable to inform hisfellowconspirators thatforthcoming Americanpro-
tectionwas "as certainas ifa contract had beensigned,"'thuspavingtheway
forrevolutionary action.
The abovestatements havebeenusedas damning indictments, butmuchof
thetestimony restsupontheveracity ofM. Bunau-Varilla.Whatappearsto be
'Two significant abstentions marredthe solidarity of the proceedings.Upon theirarrivalin
Bogotaithe previousmonth,the Panamanianrepresentatives to the ColombianCongress
emphatically declaredthemselves in favorofseparation,ifthetreaty was notratified.And
takingleave beforethefinalballoting, theymade no secretof theirfutureintentions. See
E. TaylorParks,Colombiaand theUnitedStates,1765-1934(Durham: Duke University
Press,1935), p. 297.
4 Fletcher,op. cit.,pp. 156and 160. At one pointtheengineer flatly
predicted a revolution,
and
accordingto his memoirs,the President"manifested profoundsurprise."Cf. Philippe
Bunau-Varilla, Panama: The Creation, and Resurrection
Destruction, (New York:McBride,
Nast,1914),p. 311.
'The completetextof the lettercan be foundin Bunau-Varilla, op. cit.,pp. 306-10. The con-
versation betweentheauthorand Roosevelt withall itsimplicationsis describedpp. 311-12.
See also Fletcher, op. cit.,pp. 160-61.Fletcherstatesthatthoughthereis no documentary
evidencecorroborating the Frenchman's versionof thisconversation, it does appearto be
substantially correct.AlfredL. P. Dennis,Adventures in AmericanDiplomacy,1896-1906
(New York: Dutton,1928),p. 328,also agreeswithFletcher's conclusion.
*Bunau-Varilla, cit., 318; Dennis, cit.,pp. 329-30;Fletcher, cit., 161.
op. p. op. op. p.
'Parks,op. cit.,p. 398.

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 ROOSEVELT'S ROLE IN THE PANAMANIANREVOLUTION, 1903 537

concreteand damaging evidencecomesfromtwomorehighlyplacedsources -

thePresident and hisSecretary ofState. On September 3, 1903,Secretary Hay
metwithJ. GabrielDuque, editorof the PanamaStarand Herald,the most
prominent newspaper on theIsthmus.Hayletitbe knownthattheUnitedStates
wasnotgoingtoallowColombiatheopportunity ofblocking American ambitions
to achievea canal. He also added thatif a revolution did develop,hisgovern-
mentwouldinsiston maintaining freeand uninterrupted transit in accordance
withtreatyagreements. This policywould be equallyappliedto bothsides,
however - a factwhichis generally overlooked.8 On September 20,nearlythree
weeksbeforethepresidential interview withBunau-Varilla, theSecretary wrote:
"As to ColombiathePresident has nothing to say at present.Theyhave had
theirfun- letthemwaittherequisite number ofdaysfortheconsequent symp-
toms."9 Thisallusionis generally believedto havereferred to a proposedpresi-
dentialmessagerecommending seizureof the Canal Zone. Twelveyearsafter
the PanamanianRevolution RooseveltwroteSenatorW. J. Stonethatduring
themonthof October1903,he was preparing a message"on the basisthatit
wouldbe necessary forus to takepossession oftheIsthmus in viewofthescan-
dalousconductof Colombia."10 Five monthslaterhe wroteWilliamRoscoe
Thayerthat"ifthePanamanians had notrevolted, I shouldhaverecommended
Congress to takepossessionof the Isthmus by forceof arms;and,as youwillsee,
I had actuallywrittenthe first
draft of myMessage thiseffect."
to "
Buta closerinvestigation revealsa quitedifferent picture than thepremedi-
tateduse of nakedforce.Writing to JacobGould Schurmanon November12,
Rooseveltinvitedhimtoviewthefirst draftoftheproposedmessage, whichhad
been corrected byJohnHay and was nowrendered unnecessary bythesudden
changeof events.The draftwas datedfouror fivedaysbeforethe Isthmian
tending
uprising, toprecludeanysupposition thatHay andRoosevelt had knowl-
edge of the forthcoming crisis,althoughthe latteradmittedthat"formonths
we had knowntherewas a possibility of revolution."12 And on the sameday

thePresident repeatedthesubstance ofthisletterinanother toLawrenceAbbott,

addingthat"themessagewas drawnup on thesupposition thattherewouldbe
no outbreak, and thatI shouldhave to facetheproblemof digging the Canal
anyhow." 1
Roosevelt'sdraftis contained in hisAutobiography, and itdoesnotmention
takingtheIsthmus byforce.In fact,it doesnotevenhintat armedseizure, for
thePresident wascareful toleavethefinaldecisionin thehandsoftheCongress.
SThe Storyof Panama: Hearingson the RaineyResolution
beforethe Committee
on Foreign
Affairs of theHouse of Representatives(Washington,D.C.: Government Printing
Office,
1913), p. 360 (hereinaftercitedas The Storyof Panama). See also DwightC. Miner,
The FightforthePanamaRoute(New York: ColombiaUniversity Press,1940),p. 348.
'
Hay to Assistant AlveyA. Adee,citedin WilliamRoscoeThayer,
Secretary The Lifeand Letters
ofJohnIHay(2 vols.;BostonandNew York: Houghton 1915),II, 312.
Mifflin,
10J.FredRippy, The Capitalists
and Colombia(New York: Vanguard,1931),p. 101.
"Rooseveltto WilliamRoscoeThayer,July2, 1915,citedin Thayer,op. cit.,II, 328.
2
EltingE. Morison(ed.), The Lettersof TheodoreRoosevelt(8 vols.; Cambridge:Harvard
University Press,1951-54),III, 561.
~ JosephBucklinBishop,TheodoreRooseveltand His Time (2 vols.; New York: Scribner's,
1920),I, 289.

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538 THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLY

ApparentlyRoosevelt'ssecretsolutionwas to purchaseall rightsfromthe French

Canal Company,to go intoPanama, and thenbegindigging!If Congressdid not
approveof thisingeniousapproach,the Presidentdeclared that he would drop
Panama altogetherand "proceed at once with the NicaraguanCanal." 14 This
impetuousact-first-and-explain-laterpropositionwas not new to the frustrated
President.As assistantsecretaryof the Navy in May 1897 he held similarviews
withrespectto Hawaiian annexation,and favoredsendingthe Navy to Hawaii to
"hoistour flagover the island, leavingall detailsforafteraction."15 Although
thisapproachseems naive and even ridiculous,it was at least different.In fact,
Bogotaimighthave viewed a faitaccomplisomewhatpassively,since evictingthe
Americanswould have been a seriousprovocationwhichthe unsteadyMarroquin
regimecould not easilyundertake.
Whatever the meritsof the undeliveredmessage,its appearance ten years
afterthe eventdoes not constituteconclusiveproofof good intent. On the con-
trary,one virulentcriticquotes accusinglythe exultantshoutsof Dr. Amador,
soon to become chiefexecutiveof the infantrepublic: "PresidentRoosevelthas
made good.... Long live PresidentRoosevelt! Long live the AmericanGovern-
ment!"16 In reality,the explanationfor this Latin burstof enthusiasmlies in
the shrewdnessof M. PhilippeBunau-Varilla. Utilizingannouncementsof ship
movementsin the New York Times and the BaltimoreSun, and information
providedby JohnBigelowas to the probability of naval maneuversin Panaman-
ian watersat the end of October,the canny Frenchmanwas able to gauge ac-
curatelythe destinationof the American vessels,so that the outbreakwould
coincidewith theirarrival.1 As to the probablecourseof actionby the United
States government once the revolutionhad takenplace, Roosevelthimselfaptly
remarkedthat the Frenchengineerwould have been "a verydull man," if he
could not guess what was goingto follow.1s
But the United States Navy did not make the Panama Revolution,nor did
it createthe conditionswhichengenderedrebellion.The separatistidea had long
been a traditionon the Isthmus. Both forciblepersuasionand expedientcon-
cessionwere needed to securePanama's loyaltyto Colombia in 1830, 1841, and
1861. Danger of secessionwas alwayspresentand Panamaniandisorderswere a
continuingsourceof uneasinessin her relationswith Colombia.19As the Presi-
dent pointedout in his Annual Message of December 7, duringthe fifty-seven
yearsbetween1846 and 1903,fifty-three outbreaks,rebellions,and revolutionary
disturbancesoccurredin thatunhappyprovince. Furthermore, under the terms
of the Treatyof 1846 betweenNew Granada and the United States,the Colom-
bian governmenthad requestedthe aid of American troops"to protectits in-
" Theodore Roosevelt,Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography(2nd ed.; New York: Scribner's,
1921), p. 530. The Autobiographyand message firstappeared in 1913.
'5 Letterto AlfredThayerMahan, May 3, 1897. Morison,op. cit.,I, 607.
"
HenryF. Pringle,Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography(New York: Harcourt,Brace, 1931), p. 327.
"
Fletcher,op. cit., p. 165.
18 Mowry,op. cit.,p. 152.

' Parks,op. cit.,p. 397.

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 ROOSEVELT'S ROLE IN THE PANAMANIAN REVOLUTION, 1903 539

on the Isthmus"on at leastsix different

terests Use of American
occasions.20
troopsto keep the transitopen and maintainorderwas, therefore, not
definitely
an extraordinary is the outbreakof 1902,when the
event. Oftenoverlooked
Captain of the U.S.S. Cincinnatilanded marinesto preventinterference
with
thetransit, monthin thecabinof
settledthefollowing
and whichwaseventually
AdmiralCasey'sflagship!
JohnHay'smajorbiographer readilyadmitsthatthis
instanceof American"intervention"did "not appear to have greatlyoffended
the Bogota government," a usefulprecedentforfutureevents.
21 providing
Other factors considerableimportancewere the extentof unrestupon the
of
itselfin thesummer
Isthmus and fallof 1903,and theactivities
ofconspiratorial
groups,easily discernibleto anyone who cared to look. By Junedetailed fore-
casts as to what would probablyoccur were alreadybeginningto appear in the
Americanpress. The role of the representatives of the New Panama Company
in encouragingrevolutionary tendencieswas describedin detail by a numberof
journals. It was an open fact that the Governorof Panama, Jos6Domingo de
Obaldia,was one ofthedissidents,
and thatlargequantities
ofarmswerebeing
smuggledintotheIsthmus.22Throughout themonthsofSeptember and October
the WashingtonPost,New YorkHerald,and New YorkTimescarriedarticles
unrestin thearea. EvenDr. TomasHerran,theColombianCharg6
describing
d' Affairesin Washington,warnedhis government of the dangersinherentin a
revolutionary uprising,througha note writtennearly two monthsbeforethe
predicteddisaster.23
By September 1903theRooseveltadministration was fairlywell informed
as to the possibility
of successful
insurrection.WilliamL. Merry,Ministerto
CentralAmerica,foresaw revolution
in a dispatchdatedAugust30. Frommid-
Septemberto mid-NovemberSecretaryHay was continuallykept abreast of
current
Isthmiandevelopments
by EditorDuque, who tellingly
pointedto the
"veryintense"feelingforindependence."4The Presidentalso had put beforehim
in October a memorandumsubmittedby two armyofficers, LieutenantGrayson
M-P. Murphyand CaptainThomasB. Humphrey,
who on theirown initiative
20 Only fourinstanceswere cited by the Chief Executive: 1861, 1862, 1885, and 1900. See James
D. Richardson(ed.), A Compilationof the Messages and Papers of the Presidents(20 vols.;
New York: Bureau of National Literature,1911), XV, 6884-86. His message can also be
found in Papers Relatingto the ForeignRelationsof the United States, 1903 (Washington,
D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOffice,1904), pp. 260-78 (hereinaftercited as Foreign Rela-
tions). Seven instancesare mentionedin The Storyof Panama, p. 77, includingthreeinter-
ruptionsof the transit.
"
TylerDennett,JohnHay: From Poetryto Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1933), pp. 371-72.
The Governor had previouslybeen a delegate to the Colombian Senate, where he publicly
predicteda revolutionif the Hay-Herrin Treaty met defeat. The response of the Bogota,
governmentwas to appoint Obaldiai Governorof Panama - an act of considerablepolitical
ineptitude. See Chester Lloyd Jones,The CarribeanSince 1900 (New York: PrenticeHall,
1936), p. 317; Thayer,op. cit., II, 315.
Miner, op. cit., p. 349. The letter to the Colombian Foreign Minister,dated September 11,
3

1903, is cited in The Storyof Panama, pp. 361-62. As late as October 29, Dr. Herrin was
informedby SecretaryHay that the United States, in the event of revolutionor invasion,
would definitelyinterveneto maintainthe transit;and the Charg6 immediatelycabled this
warningto Bogota. Ibid., p. 384.
24 Dennis, op. cit., p. 322. The authorgoes on to state that therewas "practicallyno pro-Colom-
bian feelingin Panama," and that the revolutionappears to have been "a genuinelypopular
step." Ibid., p. 332.

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540 THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLY

had investigatedthe Panamanian politicalscene. They were convincedof the

unanimityof sentimenton the Isthmusagainstthe Bogotaigovernment, and that
revolutionwould followthe adjournmentof theColombianCongress.25 Roosevelt
interviewedthe two officers on October 16, and immediatelythereafter prepared
"to send shipsto the Isthmusso as to protectAmericaninterestsand the lives of
Americancitizens"in the event of a disturbance.26 This conversation,coupled
with thoseof M. Bunau-Varilla,convincedthe Presidentand his Secretarythat
an uprisingwas about to occur,and that theyhad merelyto wait upon events.
Actually,theycould not do otherwise- a point to which Roosevelt found it
necessaryto referin correspondencewith friends. Rejecting "underhanded
means,"he freelyadmittedthathe would be "delightedif Panama were an in-
dependentState," but a public admissionof this hope "would amount to an
instigationof a revolt,"and therefore he was forcedto keep silent.27
Perhaps the three men most qualifiedto defendthe propriety of the actions
taken by the United States governmentare the Presidenthimselfand his two
closestgovernmental associatesat the timeof the Panama crisis-- the secretaries
of State and of War. In a vigorouspassagewrittenfouryearsafterthe Berkeley
speech, Rooseveltclearlysummarizedhis position:
No one connected with this governmenthad any part in preparing,inciting,or encourag-
ing the revolutionon the Isthmusof Panama. Save fromthe reportsof our militaryand naval
given in full in the message of the Presidentto the Senate, and fromthe officialreports
officers
in the Department of State, no one connected with the Governmenthad any previous knowl-
edge of the revolutionexcept as was accessible to any person of ordinaryintelligencewho read
the newspapersand keptup a currentacquaintance with public affairs.'

As Secretaryof State, JohnHay publiclyand privatelygave unqualified

supportto the policyof his chief. Among Hay's papersWilliam Roscoe Thayer
foundno hintof remorse,and the Secretary'sconfidential statementsgiveadded
weight to this to
view.29 Writing James Ford Rhodes in December 1903, Hay
appeared puzzled over the strongcriticismof the administration'sactions. "It is
hard forme to understandhow anyonecan criticizeour actionin Panama on the
groundsupon which it is ordinarilyattacked.. I had no hesitationas to the
course to take, and have had no doubt ...
of the proprietyof it since."30
proper
Hay's biographers, on the otherhand, have tried to absolve the Secretaryof con-
demnationby disassociatinghim fromthe President'sactions. One biographer
claims that "in the earlierstagesMr. Rooseveltgave directionswhich Mr. Hay
carriedout; beforethe end, however,the Presidenttook the businessinto his
own hands; and has alwaysfranklyassumedentireresponsibility forthe decisive
2 A summary of thememorandum was submitted to Secretaryof War ElihuRootin December
1903,and is citedin Miner,op. cit.,p. 354.
20
Thayer,op. cit.,II, 316-17. Cf. Pringle,
op. cit.,pp. 320-21.
27Letterto Dr. AlbertShaw,October10, 1903. Morison, op. cit.,III, 628.
28Theodore Roosevelt, FearGod and TakeYourOwn Part(New York: Doran,1916),pp. 328-29.
29
Thayer,op. cit.,II, 321.
30Letterof December8, 1903,ibid.,p. 326. See also Dennett, op. cit.,p. 380. Dennettmakesa
strongpointof Hay'sinitialpreference fortheNicaraguanrouteand theSecretary's mixed
feelingsovertheunfolding eventsofthesummerand fallof 1903. Buthe also quotesHay,
in a letterto Elihu Root,February 22, 1904,approving "the perfectly regularcoursethe
President did follow... ." Ibid.,p. 380.

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 ROOSEVELT'S ROLE IN THE PANAMANIANREVOLUTION, 1903 541

stroke."Another dismissestheSecretary's roleas being"merely a chipdrivenon

thewavesofa 'cosmictendency.' " "3 TheodoreRoosevelt himselfina moment of
from
pique,resulting having read the privateedition of theLetters ofJohn Hay
and Extracts fromDiarywhichcontainedsomeuncomplimentary remarks con-
cerning thePresident, wrotetoHenryCabotLodgethatHay'svaluewas "almost
exclusivelytheusefulness ofa finefigurehead. He neverinitiated a policyorwas
ofrealassistance in carrying a
through policy ...." " But Roosevelt's statement
wasnothing morethana strong personal reaction, coupled with his acknowledged
tendency towardsexaggeration. The Secretary's letters,dispatches, and mem-
orandaall belie the interpretation put forth by his of
biographers complete
detachment fromRoosevelt's decisions.33Actually, Hay appearsto havebeenin
almostcomplete agreement withhim,and he notonlyfirmly supported butalso
partiallyformulated the administration's policiesregarding the Isthmus.
ElihuRoothad beensecretary ofwarduringthePanamaCrisisand was to
succeedHayintheDepartment ofState.Likehispredecessor, Rootbothpublicly
and privately was a stoutdefender of thePresident's actions.Speakingin the
temporary capacityofprivatecitizenbeforetheUnionLeagueClub ofChicago
on February 22, 1904,he ablyjustified thegovernment's role;and as a prominent
personindependent of the administration, his wordscarriedgreatweight.
Twenty-eight yearsafterthePanamaepisodein a lettertoPhillipC. Jessup, Root
further reflected:"Roosevelt's statement thathe had takenPanamawasthekind
of exaggerationthathe likedto make. He couldhave made a perfectly sound
technical presentation ofhiscase buthe had notpatiencewiththat.... But I
have alwaysfeltthathis actionwas right." " This is strongsupportfroma
distinguishedinternational lawyerwhoon occasionsharply criticizedRoosevelt's
policies.
The Berkeley speechofMarch1911wasdelivered during a touroftheWest
at a timewhentheRepublican partywas beginning to comeapartat theseams.
The former resident oftheWhiteHousehad oftencommented on theapparent
weakness ofhissuccessor, WilliamHowardTaft,in thedual roleofpartyleader
and chiefexecutive.At whatmoreopportune momentand in whatmoreap-
propriate mannercould Rooseveltpointout the difference betweenhimself--
the decisive,powerfulnationalfigure, and Taft-- the bumbling, ineffective,
factionalPresident? The Republicaninsurgents werelookingto Rooseveltfor
leadership,andhe lostneither opportunity noroccasionto contrast thepastwith
thepresent.Evenbeforetheendofhisterm,Roosevelt was consciously pointing
to the growthof presidential powerduringhis yearsof nationalleadership:
"WhilePresident I havebeenPresident, emphatically; I have usedeveryounce
' Thayer,op. cit.,II, 297. Dennett,op. cit.,p. 382.
" LetterofJanuary
28, 1909.Morison,
op. cit.,VI, 1490. The Hay paperswerein threevolumes,
editedbyHenryAdamsand Mrs.JohnHay. This collectionbecamethemajorsourcefor
WilliamRoscoeThayer'sbiography of theSecretary
of State. Ibid.,p. 1489n.
Hay'sletterto thePresident,
3 See especially datedSeptember13, 1903. The Secretary
definitely
putshimself on thesideofintervening "tokeepthetransitclear." Citedin Dennett,
op. cit.,
p. 377.
4 LetterofJuly 16,1931,citedin PhillipC. Jessup,
ElihuRoot (2 vols.;New York: Dodd, Mead,
1938),I, 403.

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542 THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLY

of power therewas in the office.. .. WhereverI could establisha precedent

forstrengthin the executive,as I did in . . . takingPanama . . . I have feltnot
merelythat my action was rightin itself,but that in showingthe strengthof,
or givingstrengthto the executive,I was establishinga precedentof value." 35
It is equally difficultto attack the administration's legal justification.The
grounds for intervention were twofold: the for
necessity maintainingthe transit
and the need to protectthe interestsof the United States,her citizens,and their
property.The ordersof the ActingSecretaryof the Navy were "to preventthe
landingof any armedforce,eitherGovernmentor insurgent. . . ." This was also
applied to the Panama Railroad, where the transport troopsof eitherparty
of
was expresslyforbiddenbytheAmericannaval commander.36 That therewas no
effort towardsconnivance,conspiracy,or deceit is self-evident.One carefulstu-
dent of the Panamanian controversy readilyadmitsthat with the departureof
Colombian forces"no oppositionremainedon the Isthmus."" Hay's refusalto
reversehis policyin responseto General Reyes' appeal can also be viewed as a
desireto avoid conditionssimilarto those which the United States had sought
to preventby landingtroopson the thirdof November. "It is not thoughtde-
sirableto permitlandingof Colombian troopson the Isthmus,"he wired Min-
isterBeaupr6 in Bogotai,"as such a coursewould precipitatecivil war and dis-
turb foran indefiniteperiod the free transit .. ." 8: Recognitionof the Pan-
amanian Republic threedays afterthe revolutionon the basis of the existing
"de facto government, republicanin form,and withoutsubstantialopposition
fromits own people,""3 was a trueassessmentof the situationand in line with
the traditionalAmerican policy of recognitionas it had developed fromthe
days of Thomas Jefferson. The fact that other nationsof Latin America and
Europe, such as Nicaragua,Peru,Costa Rica, the Triple Alliance and the yet-to-
be-consummated Triple Entente,promptlyrecognizedthe Republic of Panama
is oftenoverlookedbycriticsand commentators.
Some historianshave impliedthat otheralternativesremainedopen to the
Rooseveltadministration and thatIsthmian"intervention" was neithernecessary
nor proper. What thosealternativesrepresented, however,is nevermade clear.
Nicaraguahad alreadybeen difficult in negotiation,and therewas no guarantee
thatonce Colombia rejectedthe Canal treatyNicaragua would behave any dif-
ferently thanhersisternation.40As forthePresident,he made no attemptto hide
" Letterto George Otto Trevelyan,June19, 1908. Morison,op. cit.,VI, 1087. See also the quota-
tion on leadershipin Blum, op. cit., p. 139.
" ForeignRelations,p. 247. Miner,op. cit., pp. 361-62, 366. The Storyof Panama, pp. 81, 382-
83. These orderswere sent to the naval commandersin the vicinityof Panama and to the
American Consul at Col6n. A revolutionary group was, in fact,preventedfromlanding at
Col6n, but this was threedays afterthe United Stated had extended recognitionto the in-
fantrepublic.
a Miner, op. cit., p. 367.
s Telegram,Hay to Beaupr6,November 11, 1903. ForeignRelations,p. 228. The Colombian case
was considerablyweakened when General Reyes,speaking for the Marroquin government,
offeredthreedays afterthe Revolutionto declare martiallaw and approve the Hay-Herrin
Treatyby decree,if the United States would land troopsto reimposeColombian sovereignty.
See telegramof November 6, 1903, Beaupre to Hay. Ibid., p. 241.
"
Ibid., p. 233. The Storyof Panama, p. 60.
40 See Dennis, op. cit., pp. 311-12, for difficulties
encounteredwith Nicaragua.

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 ROOSEVELT'SROLEIN THE PANAMANIAN
REVOLUTION,1903 543

his personalfeelings, nor the probablecoursethathis administration would take.

Quick recognition added weightto the false assumptionsof Americanduplicity
and guiltharboredby some of the Latin-Americanstates,but it was in direct
accord with predetermined and publiclyannounced American policy,and was
underscoredby the speedy diplomatic recognitionPanama received from a
considerablenumberof states.
Rooseveltbelieved his actionsto be morallyright. In contrast,the actions
of Colombia both precedingand followingthe insurrection did nothingto en-
hance her claim to moral respectability.As to political profit,the egregious
Presidentwould have been a poor politicianindeed if he did not attemptto gain
some advantagefromeventson the Isthmus. It was no secretthat he viewed
the Panamanian affairas a desirablepoliticalissue. Writingto SenatorNathan
Bay Scott duringthe presidentialcampaignof 1904, Rooseveltcomplainedthat
Panama was not receivingproperattentionfromRepublicanorators. "Can you
not tell our speakersto dwell more on the Panama Canal? It does not seem to
me thatnearlyenoughstressis laid on this.. . . We have not a stronger card." 41
An unsympathetic biographer has written that Roosevelt'sBerkeleyaddress
was to cost the United States $25,000,000(a referenceto the Colombian treaty
of April 1921,granting Colombia indemnity withoutapology). It is truethatthe
speech raisedan issue which was afterwards subjectedto a closerscrutinythan
it had previouslyreceived,"2 but the issue was one of men and politicalmotiva-
tionratherthan legal and moralwrongdoing.If Roosevelterred,it was an error
in judgment-- a mistakein approach. If he was guiltyof anything, it was of talk-
ingtoo much,of intemperate statements, of an drive
egotistical to keep himselfin
the limelight,and of givingway to passion over reason,when confrontedby
formidablecriticism.Nevertheless,it should also be realized that his tempes-
tuousnatureruled out the morecautiouscourseof self-restraint.
In spite of his over-developedsense of egotism,the blunt-spokenPresident
could justifiablytake "solid satisfactionout of settlingthis Panama business."
In 1903 he thoughtit was the finestthinghis administration had accomplished
up to that point, "with the of
exception settling the anthracite coal strike."43
More thana half-century later,in the face of another Caribbean crisis,the nation
might well agree.

4' Letter of October 9, 1904. Morison, op. cit., IV, 978.

42 A directresultof the CaliforniaAddress was the Rainey Resolution (H.R. 32, 62nd Cong., 1st
Sess.), which initiatedhearingsby the House Foreign Relations Committee on the events
leading to the recognitionof the independenceof Panama by the United States. The hear-
ings were held in the firstyearof the Wilson administrationand were published under the
title,The Storyof Panama. The biographercited is Henry F. Pringle.
13
Letterto ArthurHamilton Lee, December 7, 1903. Morison,op. cit.,III, 665.

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