From Extractivism Towards Buen Vivir: Mining Policy As An Indicator of A New Development Paradigm Prioritising The Environment

Third World Quarterly
ISSN: 0143-6597 (Print) 1360-2241 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20
From extractivism towards buen vivir: mining

policy as an indicator of a new development
paradigm prioritising the environment
Robin Broad & Julia Fischer-Mackey
To cite this article: Robin Broad & Julia Fischer-Mackey (2016): From extractivism towards
buen vivir: mining policy as an indicator of a new development paradigm prioritising the
environment, Third World Quarterly, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1262741
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1262741
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Third World Quarterly, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1262741
From extractivism towards buen vivir: mining policy as an

indicator of a new development paradigm prioritising the
environment
Robin Broad and Julia Fischer-Mackey
School of International Service, American University, Washington DC, USA
ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This article analyses mining policy as an indicator of a larger Received 24 May 2016
question: are some Third World governments starting to steer away Accepted 16 November 2016
from plunder ‘extractivism’ towards a paradigm that prioritises the
KEYWORDS
environment? We begin with the cases of El Salvador and Costa Rica, Mining ban
which have major mining bans in place. We then present the results mining moratorium
of our research in which we find five other countries with noteworthy extractive industries
mining-policy shifts: Panama, Colombia, Argentina, Chile, and New environmental policy
Zealand. A sixth country, Honduras under President Zelaya, stands as water
a recent historical case of how sensitive such a policy change can be. Latin America
A key take-away from our article is that critical development scholars
and practitioners need to look more closely at the mining sector –
not simply to analyse case studies of specific mining protests and
resistances to extractivism, although these are of course important.
Rather, there is a need to investigate policy changes that just might
be indications that the era of unquestioning extractivism has
ended and that at least some governments are initiating policies
to incorporate environmental externalities, policies that suggest a
changing development paradigm in the direction of environmental –
and concomitant social and economic – ‘well-being’ as envisioned in
buen vivir.
Introduction
Could Third World governments steer away from plunder ‘extractivism’ towards a new model
of development that prioritises the environment? This article begins to answer this question
by zeroing in on mining-policy change as an indicator that an increasing number of gov-
ernments historically engaged in ‘extractivism’-based development are changing course
and prioritising environmental concerns.
As readers of Third World Quarterly are aware, the ‘development’ strategies of many low-
and middle-income country governments have long been grounded in extractivism – that
is, a focus on extractive industry exports. This goes back to colonial days. But the liberalisation
of trade and investment laws, with the resulting influx of foreign-dominated extractivism,
was formalised in the neoliberal Washington Consensus structural-adjustment policies that
CONTACT Robin Broad rbroad@american.edu

© 2016 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com
2 R. BROAD AND J. FISCHER-MACKEY
reigned in the 1980s and 1990s. Over the last two decades, this intensified thanks largely to
high metals prices and strong global demand for minerals and fossil fuels.1
On the other hand, ‘buen vivir’ – the ‘good life’ or ‘living well’ – has emerged as a counter-
vailing concept to extractivism. While sometimes used as a philosophical or political con-
struct, in this article we use it in its paradigmatic sense, as a name for a new sustainable
development paradigm related to critical development and post-development concepts
that focus on alternatives to the economic growth-centric development paradigm. The actual
term ‘buen vivir’ (and various Andean indigenous-language versions) has been employed
by social movements, activists, and governments from Bolivia and Ecuador to El Salvador
and across the Caribbean and in a growing academic development and theoretical literature.
‘Buen vivir’ is partly defined by its opposition to extractivist and neoliberal development
models. But proponents of buen vivir have also affirmed a broad set of positive values,
including ecological balance, equity, solidarity, diversity, quality of life, community-based
approaches, and various indigenous notions of living in harmony with nature.2 Thus, current
Salvadoran President Salvador Sánchez Cerén asserted in 2012 that buen vivir means ‘strug-
gling for social, economic, political and cultural well-being and a better relationship with
Nature, extending to all the capacity to achieve fullness of life’.3 But so too is it important to
note that many who fall under this buen vivir paradigmatic umbrella do not necessarily use
or know the term itself – however, their actions and goals place them within the buen vivir
paradigm.
As Unai Villalba explains, in a quest to ‘define a new development strategy able to over-
come a natural resource extraction-based economic pattern’, buen vivir must be ‘linked with
notions of “overcoming extractive industries …”’.4 Indeed, the term buen vivir gained renown
when both Ecuador and Bolivia incorporated it into their constitutions. Alas, both govern-
ments have turned increasingly to neo-extractivism of fossil fuels, even while proclaiming
themselves buen vivir proponents.5 Is this then a death knell to the idea that a Third World
government could possibly adhere to buen-vivir policies, putting non-economic growth
issues centre stage? Is it a sign of just how deeply embedded extractivism has become?6
The research conducted for this article suggests that there are indeed signs of hope,
indications of a weakening of the extractivism paradigm and the rise of a development
paradigm merging social and environmental concerns: the appearance of mining bans being
put in place primarily for environmental reasons. However, this shifting minerals policy is
happening largely off the radar screen of development scholars.
Our inquiry arises from field work that one of us conducted in El Salvador and Costa Rica.
As one of us has written elsewhere, the government of El Salvador has had a de facto mor-
atorium on industrial metallic mining since 2006–2007.7 As a result, there is currently no
industrial gold mining occurring in El Salvador.8 This is remarkable, given the country’s wide-
spread poverty and the relatively high price of gold. El Salvador’s mining ban at first appeared
to be an aberration, an ‘outlier’ deviating from the extractivism norm.9
However, largely off the development radar screen, the government of Costa Rica first
initiated an executive ban limiting mining in 2002. Beginning as executive-branch decisions,
the de facto ban was passed into law by Costa Rica’s Congress in 2010 and subsequently
upheld by the Supreme Court.10
Discovering that a second country had a mining ban led to our current inquiry: Are El
Salvador and Costa Rica ‘outliers’ in terms of mining policy, or do these two small countries
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 3
represent the beginning of a trend with broader significance? Are they, in fact, trend-setters?
Are there other countries pushing back against extractivism?
In this article, we begin with El Salvador and Costa Rica to acquaint our readers with those
cases. But we move from them to ask the question: Are there signs of similar mining-policy
initiatives in other countries?
In terms of methodology, the cases of El Salvador and Costa Rica are based on field work
by one of the authors in El Salvador in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2016, and Costa Rica in
2007 and 2014. That field work consisted largely of semi-structured interviews with govern-
ment officials as well as interviews and participant observation with individuals and repre-
sentatives of groups of organised civil society.11 This was supplemented by primary and
secondary sources that included government and corporate documents; especially in the
case of El Salvador, internal corporate communications were recently made public as part
of the submissions to the international tribunal where mining companies have sued
governments.12
In moving to answer the question of whether these two countries are outliers, what is
presented here is the result of a scan of global literature and news in both English and Spanish
on mining bans and moratoria, as well as consultations with academics and civil-society
groups working on related issues. We identified roughly a dozen countries where policies
of interest were or had recently been in place, or were in the final rounds of deliberation. We
next investigated those cases more closely using primary and secondary sources, including
mining laws. As we learned more about the specifics of each policy or initiative, we narrowed
our focus to the strongest cases. As documentation of many of these cases is limited, we
then attempted to verify our findings through email interviews and queries with relevant
local sources, in governments, in academia, and in civil-society organisations. This was par-
ticularly important in countries where actual implementation of what looked like significant
mining policy changes was in question, and also in countries with on-going high-level policy
debates. As readers will see, we ended up with a set of six countries – a fascinating range
– which are presented in the sections that follow. This review, while not as in-depth as the
previous El Salvador and Costa Rica work, allows us to conclude that these countries are not
unique, but rather may be trend-setters in terms of mining policy.
After laying out the contours of all eight countries, we proceed to reflect on them as a
collectivity. What is the take-away from these case studies? What do we learn about the
challenges governments confront when they reject the short-term benefits of mining in
favour of long-term ecosystem health and other benefits? The article ends with reflections
for future field work, for more in-depth inquiries into these other countries to further trace
the process by which mining policy came about, and to understand better the possible
routes from extractivism towards buen vivir.
Two case studies of de facto mining bans

The two countries that have taken the strongest actions against mining at the national level
both sit in the mineral-rich band of Central America, but otherwise have marked differences
in ecosystems and politics: El Salvador and Costa Rica. El Salvador is severely degraded
ecologically, whereas Costa Rica has its ecosystem largely intact. El Salvador has halted
mining under both right- and left-wing governments, whereas Costa Rica’s mining bans
have occurred under a string of centrist and more liberal governments. Costa Rica has a
substantially higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita than El Salvador, where poverty
is widespread.13
Yet both are small poorer countries that have stood up to large mining firms determined
to initiate mining activities. Both have said ‘no’ in a period of sustained high mineral prices,
hence giving up substantial export earnings. And both have sustained their de facto mining
bans despite costly lawsuits by mining firms in international tribunals.14
El Salvador
El Salvador’s move to stop mining is politically the most surprising of all the cases we exam-
ine, because it was initiated during the right-wing government of the Alianza Republicana
Nacionalista (ARENA) party in 2006 and 2007, and it has been sustained through the final
drafting of this piece.
Let us provide a brief chronology of relevant events, based largely on field work done by
one of the authors starting in 2010.15 Extractivism was central to El Salvador’s economy for
over a century, although mining diminished in the last quarter of the twentieth century due
to civil war and low mineral prices. However, Canadian mining companies entered El Salvador
in large numbers as gold and other mineral prices began to rise in the early years of the
2000s. Dozens of firms obtained permits from the government to explore for minerals.
Initially, some communities were intrigued by the promises of jobs and prosperity, and
assurances by mining officials that mining was safe. However, opposition increased after
community leaders decided to visit mining sites in neighbouring Honduras and witnessed
adverse health impacts from the toxic chemicals used in mining, and heard of human rights
abuses and the rise of conflict in mining towns. Local community groups in the mining areas
joined with national groups in 2005 to launch La Mesa Nacional Frente a la Minería Metálica
(National Roundtable on Metals Mining), and carried out education and advocacy around
the country opposed to mining.16 Their slogans: ‘Water for Life, Not for Gold,’ and ‘No to
Mining, Yes to Life’. By 2007, important leaders of the Catholic Church had come out against
mining, and a national poll showed over three-fifths of the public opposed to mining.17
The government’s minister of environment began to raise questions and the government
stopped issuing new mining permits in mid-2006.18 There has been a de facto moratorium
on mining ever since. In May 2007, the government officially announced there would be no
new mining concessions until the country carried out a strategic review of mining’s envi-
ronmental impacts.19
Presidents from the more progressive Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)
party were elected in 2009 and again in 2014; both announced while campaigning that
there would not be mining permits issued during their five-year terms. The strategic review
was conducted under the first of these progressive administrations, and it raised significant
environmental concerns with mining. Then, 2014 ushered in a new President who had pub-
licly embraced a development path that he referred to as ‘El Buen Vivir’.20
In 2009, Pac Rim Cayman LLC, owned by Canadian mining firm Pacific Rim, brought an
‘investor-state’ lawsuit against the government, claiming that it should have been issued a
mining concession but was discriminated against due to this de facto mining moratorium.
After seven long and costly years for the government of El Salvador, in October 2016, the
World Bank Group’s investment tribunal ruled that, as the government had argued from the
start, Cayman never fulfilled the requirements necessary to receive a mining concession.21
There is still a vibrant debate on mining, and the pro-mining forces thus far have blocked
efforts for an outright legislative ban on mining, but still the anti-mining forces have prevailed
in terms of the government’s overall de facto mining ban.
Elsewhere, we have looked at the factors that led this small country to take and maintain
this bold step.22 Three factors stood out. First, a wide range of civil-society groups, some in
potential mining areas and some national groups, came together to educate the public
about the adverse environmental and human rights impacts of mining. Their case was
strengthened by the fact that a large river system runs through the mineral-rich areas; its
watershed supplies drinking water for over half the Salvadoran population. Second, while
commercial mining goes back over a century in El Salvador, it was greatly impeded during
the bloody 12-year civil war in the country (1980–1992), so there was not a significant
Salvadoran business community wedded to mining, unlike the very large corporate mining
interests in countries like Honduras and Guatemala. By contrast, Salvadoran business inter-
ests that would have been hurt by mining-contaminated watersheds, such as agricultural
and tourism companies, were larger and stronger. And, finally, certain Salvadoran govern-
ment officials were moved by the scientific evidence of the adverse effects of cyanide-based
mining. Notable among such impacts: in El Salvador, as in many other of the world’s potential
mining sites, arsenic and sulphides are often released from the rocks along with the gold.23
All told, the momentum to continue the de facto moratorium remains strong, and should
continue at least until national elections in 2019. A 2015 national poll showed four-fifths of
Salvadorans opposed to mining, up significantly from 2007.24
Costa Rica
Costa Rica is known the world over as a biodiversity superpower. About four decades ago,
Costa Rica set a different development path focused on preserving that biodiversity and
building a vast sector of eco-tourism that is now a leading sector of the economy (albeit
there is still a strong agribusiness sector).25 Treasuring the environment became central to
the school curriculum decades ago, and the public is deeply supportive of environmental
protection.
In addition to biodiversity, Costa Rica has sizable gold reserves.26 In the 1830s, gold
accounted for almost half of the country’s exports. Prior to 2002, extractivism was central to
its development model; commercial mining – and the pollution and mining disasters that
accompany large-scale mining – were also part of Costa Rica’s record.
However, in 2002, President Abel Pacheco, with pressure from civil society, initiated an
executive branch ban on new open-pit mining.27 That ban held until 2008, when then-pres-
ident Oscar Arias gave the green light to Canadian mining firm Infinito Gold to build a giant
gold mine in the far north of Costa Rica in the tiny town of Crucitas. Arias argued that this
mine was in the ‘national interest’.28
Arias clearly did not anticipate the public reaction. Once Infinito began clearcutting the
site, an event that went viral thanks to a television news camera in a helicopter over the site,
a flurry of citizen groups, academics, and lawyers sprang into action.29 It is interesting to
note that this citizen activism was building at the same time that, a few hundred miles to
the north in El Salvador, La Mesa was organising against foreign mining firms. In contrast
with El Salvador’s largely rural, peasant base, the Costa Rican movement was comprised of
largely middle-class lawyers, media activists and others based in the capital San José joining
those in the large city of San Carlos, just south of Crucitas.30
After a two-year battle, from 2008 through 2010, the anti-mining forces prevailed in Costa
Rica. Enhancing the 2002 Pacheco executive branch ban, in 2010 Costa Rica’s Congress unan-
imously passed into law a ban on new open-pit mining and any mining using cyanide –
effectively banning new mining. Subsequently, various Supreme Court decisions on the
mining law and on the specific Infinito/Crucitas case culminated in the Court upholding the
ban while ruling against Infinito in 2014.31 Costa Rica is the one country in the world with a
mining ban that has been acted upon by all three branches of government.
Another six country case studies

We now turn to the other six countries. Among them are four countries – Panama, Colombia,
Argentina, and New Zealand – whose governments have changed mining policies to incor-
porate environmental concerns. Another country, Chile, is in the midst of high-level debates
over doing so. A sixth country, Honduras, under President Zelaya, stands as a recent historical
case demonstrating how sensitive such a policy move can be. We will look at each of these
six individually before examining them together analytically in the subsequent section.
(1) Panama: indigenous lands

The Republic of Panama is rich with minerals, but mineral exports were negligible prior to
2010. By 2012, however, gold had become Panama’s number one export.32 The rapid growth
of Panama’s extractive sector was not without controversy. Significant among these: years of
protests by the Ngäbé and Büglé indigenous peoples, whose land (as delineated by the state)
covers almost one-tenth of the territory of Panama and, according to a Panamanian mining
expert, contains the world’s ‘largest known unexploited copper deposit’.33 During one such
protest in 2012, police opened fire, killing two of the Ngäbé and Büglé protesters.34
The following month, as the pressure on the government spread to include the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights,35 the Panamanian government passed Laws 11 and 13,
restricting mining in a variety of ways.36 Law 11 prohibits (with limited exceptions) the
exploitation of mineral resources within the Ngäbé-Büglé indigenous comarca territory.37
Beyond stopping new mining, this could mean the annulment of existing mining concessions
located on the Ngäbé-Büglé comarca.38
However, the future of mining in Panama is far from certain. On one hand, loopholes in
the laws exist,39 and President Varela’s administration (which assumed power in July 2014)
has referred to the mining industry as one of four key sectors in his strategic plan for the
Panamanian economy.40 An April 2015 mining industry publication suggests that the gov-
ernment may try to overhaul its mining regulation system to further promote an extractivist
path. On the other hand, a mining industry reporter has commented that such a move would
likely lead to even more extensive indigenous protests41 – which might make the government
hesitant to pass pro-mining policies. The 2012 passage of Law 11 has already resulted in an
investor–state dispute filed at International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID); Dominion Minerals sued over a concession in the Ngäbe-Büglé area.42 The fact that
at least one mining company takes this new policy as having serious repercussions limiting
mining in Panama, and is ready to fight the government on the global stage, suggests that
the policy could have some teeth.
(2) Colombia: protecting the páramos from mining

Colombia is rich in minerals, from fossil fuels to gold and nickel. Gold was important to many
pre-Colombian cultures before Spanish explorers set foot on the continent. Since then, the
country has been heavily reliant on extractivism, ‘with growing importance of oil and mining
exports’, according to one expert.43 By the mid-2000s, in the words of risk-analyst James
Lockhart-Smith, the ‘floodgates’ for even more mining ‘were opened,’ and, as The Economist
phrased it in 2014, ‘foreign companies are still lining up to explore new prospects’.44
Colombia is also home to rich biodiversity and diverse ecosystems, including the páramos,
a unique high-altitude Andean ecosystem that provides 70 percent of the country’s popu-
lation with water.45 In 2010 and 2011, Colombia's Congress passed laws prohibiting mining,
oil and gas activities in the páramos. But in June of 2015, a law enacted as part of the 2014–
2018 National Development Plan created a loophole to the seemingly extensive protection
of the páramos against extractivism by exempting projects with licences and environmental
permits pre-dating the 2010 mining ban. In other words, the ban seemed to have been
narrowed to a ban only on post-2010 projects.46
However, members of Colombia’s Congress and the coalition ‘Cumbre Agraria, Campesina,
Étnica y Popular’ challenged the National Development Plan in Colombia’s Constitutional
Court, arguing that the 2015 law contradicted the state’s constitutional responsibility to
protect a healthy environment. The Court reached its decision in this case on 8 February
2016, ordering an end to all mining activities in the country’s páramos. The Court’s commu-
niqué explicitly states that the clauses in the National Development Plan which exempted
prior concessions from the ban ‘ignore the constitutional duty to protect areas of special
ecological importance [and] put at risk the fundamental rights of the entire population to
access good quality water’.47 It is estimated that 347 mining licences with environmental
permits will be invalidated.48
The implication of this is far reaching. Case in point: Canadian mining company Eco Oro
has already announced its intent to sue Colombia in an international arbitration venue (ICSID)
under an investor–state dispute settlement clause of the Canada–Colombia Free Trade
Agreement, unless an acceptable settlement is reached. Eco Oro specifically noted that it
was taking this action ‘as a consequence of the Constitutional Court’s decision of February
8, 2016, which has broadened the prohibition of mining activities in páramo areas’. As in the
Pac Rim/OceanaGold suit against El Salvador, Eco Oro did not yet have a mining concession
for its proposed Angostura gold mine, since it never fulfilled the requirements.49 If Colombia
continues to follow the Constitutional Court’s ruling, one can expect more such suits, pre-
sumably by companies that have already cleared the mining concession hurdle. Thus, while
some may argue that Colombia’s ban is of limited reach given its applicability only to the
páramos, it seems an indication that environmental concerns – notably for water – are lead-
ing the government to veer off of its extractivism-at-all-costs development model.50
(3) Argentina: provincial-level bans and national-level policy

Argentina is a natural-resource-rich country, with exports that include agricultural products
as well as minerals including copper, gold, silver, lead, and aluminium.
In Argentina, both the national government and provincial governments have some
authority over mining policy. Argentine law regulates mining at the national level but also
recognises its provinces’ ownership rights of natural resources inside their borders.51 Some
provinces have enacted their own mining bans, moratoria and chemical (cyanide) regula-
tions. Indeed, seven of Argentina’s 23 provinces – or nearly one-third – had restrictions in
place in 2015.52 Tierra del Fuego53 banned open-pit mining; San Luis54 and Mendoza55 banned
the use of cyanide in mining, thereby effectively outlawing open-pit mining given the cen-
trality of cyanide in separating the gold from the rock. Chubut,56 Córdoba57 and La Pampa58
have banned both open-pit mining and the use of cyanide in mining. Tucumán has enacted
other mining restrictions.59
On a national level, the Glacier Protection Act – which was passed in 2010 and upheld as
constitutional by the Argentine Supreme Court in 2012 – gave the federal government the
power to restrict activities, including mining, that are on or near glaciers, a key water source
for the population.60 According to a news report, the law requires
the national government to define what a glacier is, inventory the remaining glacial and peri
glacial areas in Argentina, prohibit any activities that destroy glaciers, ban mining in glacial and
periglacial areas, and require companies to provide environmental impact statements at the
national level.61
The implementation of the Glacier Protection Act requires cooperation from the provincial
governments. Where provincial officials remain heavily entrenched with powerful mining
interests, such as in San Juan Province, home to both Barrick Gold’s Veladero and the smaller
part of its Argentine–Chilean Pascua Lama mine, this can mean the law is bypassed or selec-
tively enforced. For example, San Juan officials carried out a glacier inventory that (according
to an academic expert) is ‘limited and imprecise, failing to include the geographical coordi-
nates and omitting a 15 km strip where most of the mining projects are located’.62 Therefore,
even where national laws are approved, implementation may be another challenge.
Apart from the Glacier Act and provincial laws, national economic policy is also important
to mining. The Kirchner administration (2011–2015) maintained currency and export controls
unfavourable to the mining industry; the Macri government, which took office in 2015, lifted
these controls as well as the 5 percent tax on mining exports.63 Whatever the impact of this
executive branch shift in mining policy, it seems highly unlikely that Argentina can return
to the era of ignoring environmental issues, and especially those related to glaciers and
water, given that these environmental concerns are being raised and debated at both pro-
vincial and national levels. As Argentine mining expert Asmaa Khadim concludes in an April
2016 article reflecting on the new Argentine ‘context of strong constitutional and judicial
protection for environmental rights’: ‘While constitutional entrenchment alone may not be
sufficient to achieve the protection of environmental rights, it appears to be a core founda-
tional step upon which an effective regulatory system may be built’.64
(4) Chile: new initiatives to ban mining in glacier areas

We next turn to Chile where, as of this writing, Congress is embroiled in debate over a bill
to ban mining in glacier areas.65 Chile’s economy has been historically heavily dependent
on extractive industries, with the ‘bulk of its export platform … comprised of minerals, agri-
cultural commodities, and the products of once-lush forests and fisheries’.66 In 2014, for
example, Chile stood as the world’s largest supplier of copper, which made up 92 percent
of Chile’s metal’s exports and 60 percent of Chile’s overall exports.67 At the same time, Chile
has over 80 percent of South America’s glaciers, which represent a unique ecosystem and a
key water source for Chile.68 Concern in Chile over mining in glacier areas goes back some
years, notably to Barrick Gold’s Pascua Lama mine, which straddles the Chile–Argentina
border.69 From this, a strong environmental and civil society coalition, La Coordinación de
Territorios por la Defensa de los Glaciares, emerged in Chile. By 2015, after a decade of pro-
test, concern had been elevated to a national and mainstream concern, with a glacier pro-
tection law now before Congress. The bill would ban mining and other commercial activities
in all glaciers in Chile’s national parks, as well as other areas designated as ‘Strategic Reserve
Glaciers’. If the bill passes, the next step will be for the Chilean government to designate the
Strategic Reserve Glaciers over the next five years.70
The specifics of the glacier protection law have been hotly contested.71 Environmentalists
are concerned that the current version of the bill will allow any person or company to petition
to annul the ‘Strategic Reserve’ designation of a given glacier.72 Moreover, the Executive
Branch’s proposed language for Article 5 of the bill for the Strategic Reserve Glacier desig-
nation has been criticised by environmental and other organisations since it does not inval-
idate existing permits to mine and/or to construct on protected glaciers. In addition, it fails
to protect some of the most important glaciers supplying water to citizens and agriculture,
and there is no provision for civil society to participate in the process of designating the
Strategic Reserve Glaciers.73 As of this writing, activists were still mobilising in attempts to
make the bill – and its protection of glaciers – stronger.74
It is too early to know what language the final bill will contain, or the scope of its impacts
on glaciers and mining, and it may well be that the proposed legislation is not acted upon
until a new President and Congress are elected (2018). But the very fact that the Chilean
Congress is debating such a bill is an indicator that Chile’s embrace of extractivism is not as
absolute as it once was.
(5) New Zealand: limiting seabed mining

In the case of New Zealand, we leave Latin America and turn to seabed mining. Seabed, or
deep sea, mining may become the new extractive frontier, facilitated by new technologies
and potential future increases in the costs of extracting land mineral deposits as supplies
diminish.75 The South Pacific Ocean has significant seabed deposits of gold, silver, copper,
and iron ore; over 1.5 million square kilometres are under lease for exploratory drilling in
the region, and the world’s first licence for operating a deep-sea mine has been granted by
neighbouring Papua New Guinea.76
Alongside such mineral richness, New Zealand’s marine ecosystems are also rich in bio-
diversity and the region is, in the words of a Guardian environment reporter, ‘geologically
significant, encompassing the world’s longest chain of submerged volcanoes and the second
deepest ocean trench, plunging to 10 km underwater – deeper than Mount Everest is tall’.77
Marine scientists and environmental activists have brought concerns about the impacts of
seabed mining into the mainstream, where apprehension about potential damage to large
and growing industries such as tourism and fishing may have made the public and the
government more inclined to implement protections.78
Standing out among the initiatives and polices implemented by the government of New
Zealand to protect its marine life and geological structures are bans on seabed mining in
certain areas including, notably, in one of the largest marine sanctuaries in the world: In
September of 2015, the government announced the establishment of the Kermadec sanc-
tuary. The sanctuary spans 620,000 square kilometres and expands an existing reserve sur-
rounding the Kermadec Islands. Prohibited within the sanctuary are all commercial and
recreational fishing and all oil, gas and mineral prospecting, exploration, and mining.79
Demonstrating its resolve to extend such environmentally conscious development policy
beyond the sanctuary, New Zealand rejected the first two applications to mine iron ore in
its seabeds in 2015.80
New Zealand’s concerns and limitations on seabed mining are significant in and of them-
selves. But, as one of the larger and more influential countries in the region, New Zealand’s
stand against seabed mining could lead other countries in the region to adopt more pro-
tections of seabeds in coming years.
(6) Honduras: extractivism to buen vivir to coup and back to extractivism

Were we writing this article a decade ago, during the presidency of Manuel Zelaya in
Honduras, that country would have been high on our list of governments seriously commit-
ted to moving from an extractivist model to buen vivir. In 2006, as MiningWatch Canada has
documented, then-newly elected President Zelaya put into effect a moratorium on all new
mining projects.81 Some three years later in May 2009, with the moratorium still in place,
Zelaya submitted a proposed mining law to Congress to ban open-pit mining and the use
of cyanide and mercury, while making local communities’ free, prior and informed consent
compulsory for new projects. However, a month later, an ‘old-fashioned coup’82 abruptly
ended Zelaya’s presidency. His proposed anti-mining bill, originally slated for August 2009
Congressional review, never came before Congress. Instead, the coup government reverted
to a development model of ‘business-as-usual’ extractivism.83 Indeed, according to one long-
time observer, ‘one of the main flashpoints of the conflict that led to Zelaya’s ouster was his
efforts to regulate resource extraction, namely mining, hydro-electricity, logging, and
biofuels’.84
The result? Commercial mining has increased significantly since 2009, with a 2013 General
Mining Law officially opening the doors to new mines.85 According to Cornell University
researchers: ‘Since the 2009 coup d’état against President Manuel Zelaya, 30 percent of
Honduran territory has been allocated to mining concessions’.86 The gold rush appears likely
to continue: As of May 2015, 950 sites were being evaluated for possible mineral exploitation,
18 of which were reserved by the government for state-led exploitation,87 and Honduras
leaped up in its ranking on the business-friendly 2015 World Economic Forum’s Global
Competitiveness Report.88
Meanwhile, the danger to environmental activists and those critiquing extractivist policies
has increased, earning Honduras the dubious distinction of being named the most danger-
ous country in the world for environmental activists.89 Noticed round the globe was the 2016
murder of Berta Cáceres of the indigenous Lenca people, who was a leader in the battle to
save the Gualcarque River from a massive dam project to provide electricity for Honduras’s
growing mining industry.90
Honduras is a reminder that the shift from extractivism towards buen vivir is riddled with
entrenched corporate opponents and is fraught with danger. However, as the other case
studies show, transformation is afoot in many parts of the world, particularly in Latin America.
Analysis: what do we learn from these case studies?

What do we learn from the above case studies in terms of the route from extractivism towards
buen vivir? What do we see in our case studies, when we bring them together, in terms of
common threads that may help explain the movement away from extractivism? A handful
of reflections emerge, plus a set of challenges.
Reflections on why these countries moved away from extractivism

By way of introduction to these reflections, it is important to note that, by and large, the
mining policy changes began as concerted efforts by civil society to stop and/or prevent
large-scale mining, from the time the sector was opened up by national governments. These
civil-society organisations range across multiple sectors – campesinos, indigenous peoples,
environmentalists, religious groups, and trade unions. Many of the world’s remaining min-
erals are located in remote areas on indigenous lands; and, in many countries, indigenous
peoples, both as individuals and as organisations, have been central to movements opposing
mining, often at great peril.91 The important role of indigenous peoples can be seen in our
case studies of Panama, Colombia, and Honduras, countries with large indigenous popula-
tions, as well as in such countries as Guatemala, Peru, and the Philippines.
Now, on to our further reflections.
First, water is central: The ‘pro-water’ framing prevalent among movements in these coun-
tries facilitated local organising and, as one of us has written elsewhere on El Salvador, was
key for galvanising broader support including national government support. This is not to
suggest that those at the centre of such campaigns were clever tacticians cloaking other
issues under the frame of water. Rather, the widespread concern over water is real, as seen
in Chile and Argentina with the water-supply role played by glaciers and Colombia with the
páramos supplying 70 percent of the country’s water.
Indeed, the centrality of water to life appears to be the Achilles heel of extractivism.
Witness the Salvadoran battle cry of ‘water for life’, or the 2004 Argentine citizens' document
‘More Valuable Than Gold is Water’.92 Such slogans reflect values and tenets integral to buen
vivir. So too is it clear that many of the social-movement leaders in countries standing up to
extractivism are advancing other key buen vivir tenets, including community control over
natural resources and locally based development alternatives, within their ‘pro-water’ policy
resolutions.
Second, scientific undergirding is vital: What we are seeing in these cases is not an empty
polemic against extractivism or for ‘good living’. The discourse countering extractivism is
rooted in science. For instance, beyond the general knowledge that water supplies are endan-
gered, scientifically grounded information about the adverse effects of cyanide on water
has been important. So too is this the case regarding the knowledge of arsenic embedded
in the rock and the reality of acid mine drainage.93 This scientific understanding has been
essential for undercutting the common corporate promises of environmentally good (or
‘green’) mining and limited environmental impact.
Third, identifiable and/or unique ecosystems can provide the fodder for environmental action:
This seems often to have been the focus of citizen activism and government action to protect.
In Chile and in Argentina, the unique ecosystems are around glaciers. Colombia’s focus is
based on its unique páramos. In El Salvador, the Lempa River and its watershed, which
provides water for over half of the country’s population, are well known. So too, with the
new frontier of seabed mining in New Zealand, does the pre-emptive protection suggest a
concern about specific types of biodiversity.
Fourth, individual projects may catalyse action: In some countries, one to two high-profile
environmentally destructive projects were of great consequence in terms of focusing public
concern and subsequent outrage. In Chile and Argentina, for instance, Barrick Gold’s mining
projects raised alarm about the environmental impact of mining on glaciers. In Costa Rica,
it was again two – one that provoked environmental devastation in Miramar, and the Infinito
Gold project, where clearcutting alone was enough to create national indignation. In El
Salvador, murders around Pacific Rim/OceanaGold’s El Dorado project and photos of red,
orange and yellow waste water in Commerce Group’s San Sebastian mine were instrumental.
Although we have not focused on it in this article, in many countries community resistance
and subsequent violence against community activists brought even more notoriety to con-
troversial projects.
And, finally, in some countries, the movement away from extractivism may be at a sub-
national level. In Panama, indigenous Ngäbé and Büglé activists have protected their territory
from extractivism through legislative processes. As we saw in the case of Argentina and the
policy initiatives of nearly one-third of its provinces, sub-national governments can be the
ones implementing mining bans. This interplay of provincial and national in Argentina, with
national seemingly having authority to ban mining in glaciers, is worth following.
On-going challenges
These case studies also provide lessons concerning the on-going challenges faced by gov-
ernments, the private sector, and civil-society actors who aim to end the reign of extractivism
and incorporate environmental considerations into mining policy. Honduras stands as per-
haps the best reminder that the shift from extractivism towards buen vivir is fraught with
peril. The challenges, in a nutshell, boil down to the entrenched interests of extractivism – the
political economy of mining, if you will.94 In many countries, the pro-extractivism interests
are strong and often deeply rooted in history. The 2015 elections which brought neoliberal
conservatives to power in Argentina remind us how strong neoliberal economic and political
interests are in favour of extractivism.
This neoliberal domestic political economy is reinforced by the global political economy
of mining. Global mining corporations are big and powerful and can wield enormous influ-
ence over the foreign and economic policy of mining-headquarter countries such as Canada,
Australia and the US. The fact that the US government moved from initial hesitation to
embrace the Honduran coup government is sufficient empirical evidence. This power is
institutionalised in such pro-corporate global economic governance as – key for our exam-
ples – investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) venues such as the World Bank Group’s ICSID.
Suffice it to say that suits have been brought against El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Panama,
and a mining firm has announced its intent to bring such a suit against Colombia. The increas-
ingly commented-upon corporate bias of ICSID multiplies the concern; witness the Pacific
Rim case in El Salvador that should have been thrown out because it had not fulfilled the
requirements for a mining concession, but the case was allowed to proceed.95 Moreover,
there are no similar global venues available for governments to sue companies for leaving
environmental (and social) havoc in their wake.
Given these challenges, a note of caution is in order. By the time of publication, it may
well be that one or more countries fall off of our moving-towards-buen vivir list. Moreover,
our point here is not to create a definitive list – just knowing the history of Honduras’s
‘experiment’ with an alternative way forward is enough to warrant such caution. Chile’s
proposed mining law may linger longer and not pass in this Congress or in the next.96 On
the other hand, other countries may be stepping up their challenges to the mining industry.
A notable example is the Philippines, where the election of President Rodrigo Duterte seems
to have ushered in movement away from extractivism: the new Minister of the Environment
and Natural Resources (herself formerly with the civil-society sector) shelved a controversial
mining project and began a review of all mining companies determined to be out of com-
pliance with environmental regulations. While it is too soon to add the Philippines to our
list, it is definitely a country that bears watching.97
But whatever the movement in and out of this list, our point is that governments are
rewriting mining policies – in big and small ways – which indicates a growing prioritisation
of environmental concerns.
Final words: what we still need to know

In this article we have documented changes in mining policy in eight countries to suggest
pro-environment and anti-extractivism changes in mining policy. We hope our article has
left readers with a conviction that something is definitely afoot in terms of a shift in mining
policy across the globe and especially in Latin America, and with a desire to probe more
deeply.
While in-depth field work was conducted in El Salvador and Costa Rica, there is a need
for field work on the other six cases.98 More extensive investigation, in both depth and
breadth, is needed to document, analyse, and compare the specifications of the regulations,
laws, and other government actions restricting mining in these countries. Likewise, there
should be more research on the implementation of the new laws and policies. In addition,
more research is needed to understand how and why mining policy changes occur, and to
further explore which strategies have been effective at changing course from an extractivist
path. In this regard, we need investigations more focused on the roles of indigenous peoples
in these different countries, both on their own as a catalytic sector and as leaders or members
of multi-sectorial coalitions.
Part of our argument is that critical development scholars and practitioners need to look
more closely at the mining sector – not simply to analyse case studies of specific mining
protests and resistances to extractivism, although these are of course of importance. Rather,
there is a need to investigate subsequent policy changes that just might be indications that
the era of unquestioning extractivism has ended and that at least some countries are initi-
ating policies to incorporate environmental externalities – policies that, as we have argued,
suggest a changing development paradigm in the direction of buen vivir.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Acknowledgements
Deep thanks to Broad’s frequent co-author John Cavanagh, who should really be considered a co-au-
thor of the El Salvador and Costa Rica sections, and who also served as a sounding board for our anal-
ysis. Thanks also to Nasiruddin Mahmud Chowdhury for his assistance on this manuscript, to Rachel
Nadelman and Adam Needelman for prior research assistance, and to AU research librarian extraor-
dinaire Clement Ho for sharing his constantly updated tools of the trade. We are extremely grateful
to Jamie Kneen, Payal Sampat, and (again) John Cavanagh who read through the entire manuscript
and provided useful feedback. So too do we appreciate the expert input of those who commented
on drafts of specific country case-studies: Javiera Barandiarán, Nicolas Boeglin, Agustina Giraudy, Sara
Larraín, Pamela Martin, Shreema Mehta, Jennifer Moore, Christian Peña, Manuel Perez Rocha, and
Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert. In addition, thanks are due to the anonymous reviewers and to the journal
editors, especially Shahid Qadir and Sean Rothman. Beyond those who read all or parts of this man-
uscript, we are profoundly indebted to the many people who took the time and effort (and, in some
cases, risks) to meet in the affected countries and communities, particularly in El Salvador. Co-author
Fischer-Mackey thanks the PhD program of the School of International Service. The conclusions, of
course, reflect the authors’ own views.
Notes on Contributors
Robin Broad is professor of international development, School of International Service,
American University where she is also affiliated with the Center for Latin American and Latino
Studies. In 2016, she was awarded the International Studies Association’s J. Ann Tickner
award for ‘someone who … consistently combines bravery in pursuing high-quality, pio-
neering scholarship that pushes the boundaries of the discipline’. She is currently an associate
fellow at New Economy Law Center of the Vermont Law School, a fellow at the Samdhana
Institute, and on the boards of Earthworks and Focus on the Global South. She is author or
co-author of books including Development Redefined: How the Market Met Its Match, Global
Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy, Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the
Environment in the Philippines, and Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the Philippines. For more details, see: http://www.american.edu/sis/fac-
ulty/rbroad.cfm.
Julia Fischer-Mackey is a PhD student in environment and development, School of
International Service, American University, Washington DC. She has worked as a research
and programme evaluation advisor in international development and research organisations
including Oxfam America and the Global Health Delivery Project at Harvard University, and
as a consultant to the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). Her field research
included case studies in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Mozambique, and her evaluation design
and management involved programmes in Senegal and Ethiopia and global advocacy cam-
paigns. She holds a BA from Brown University and an MA from the University of Sussex.
Notes
1.
While extractivism goes back to the colonial period, ‘neo-extractivism’ is a term used by
some to differentiate between extractivism as a neoliberal model and neo-extractivism as a
‘consolidated development project’ by a structuralist, socialist or capitalist government that is
‘using the revenue to improve living conditions’. Some Latin American countries follow such a
model. Burchardt and Dietz, “(Neo-) Extractivism – A New Challenge,” 468. The current article
uses extractivism as the broader umbrella term to capture all paradigms relying on mineral
and fossil fuel – that is, extractive industries’ – exports, while differentiating as needed between
neoliberal, structuralist and other paths. On these paradigmatic distinctions, see R. Broad,
“Responsible Mining”; see also Goodland, “Responsible Mining,” 2099–126.
2. For more on the evolving debate over buen vivir, see E. Gudynas, “Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow”;
and C. Kauffman and P. Martin, “Scaling up Buen Vivir.”
3. S. Sanchez Ceren, El Pais Que Quiero.
4. Villalba, “Buen Vivir vs Development,” 1427 and 1439. The term has also been linked to the Papal
‘Laudato Si’ as in Freeman, “El Buen Vivir.”
5. Villalba, “Buen Vivir vs Development,” 1434–6; Acosta, El Buen Vivir; Princen et al., Ending the
Fossil Fuel; and Pellegrini et al., “Demise of a New Conservation,” 284–91.
6. Burchardt and Dietz, “(Neo-)Extractivism – A New Challenge.”
7. Note: Final concession was mid-2006.
8. R. Broad and J. Cavanagh, "El Salvador Gold”; R. Broad, “Corporate Bias in the World Bank”;
R. Broad and J. Cavanagh, “Poorer Countries and the Environment.”
9. Thanks to Broad’s colleague Carolyn Gallaher for pointing out the outlier/deviant literature to
author Broad and to PhD student Rachel Nadelman. Nadelman has conducted further field
work and writing supporting the outlier thesis. See Nadelman, “El Salvador’s Challenge”; and
Nadelman, “Sitting on a Gold Mine.” Cf. Dawson’s suggestion of a ‘ban wagon’: Dawson, “Why
Honduras Should not,” 67–108.
10. Broad and Cavanagh, “Poorer Countries and the Environment.”
11. This prior field research and writing was done with co-investigator John Cavanagh; see
bibliography for Broad and Cavanagh 2014, 2015, 2015, and 2016. As the reader will note,
some of the information in these two case studies comes from that field work and interviews.
According to the agreements made with those interviewed, we cite by name only those who
are public figures in the debate and/or have given explicit permission to do so. By agreement,
the rest of the interviewees remain anonymous.
12. See note 14.
13. El Salvador falls into the World Bank’s ‘lower middle income’ country category, while Costa Rica
is in its ‘upper middle income’ category. According to World Bank data (http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD), in 2015 Costa Rica’s GDP per capita was $14,472 while El
Salvador’s was $8,096.
14. Notable among these is the World Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). Complementing the current article are ones analysing the global
arena and global corporate actors in the Pac Rim Cayman LLC case: Broad, "Corporate Bias in
the World Bank”; Anderson and Perez Rocha, Mining for Profits; and Tienhaara, “What You Don’t
Know,” 73–100.
15. In addition to the writings of Robin Broad and co-investigator John Cavanagh and sources
listed in other notes, the basic facts on the El Salvador case can also be found in Steiner, “El
Salvador: Gold, Guns,”; Moran, Technical Review; Almeida, Waves of Protest; see also McKinley,
Myths and Reality.
16. See www.stopesmining.
17. UCA, IUDOP, “Encuesta sobre conocimientos.”
18. From interviews and confirmed by documentation obtained by Nadelman, “El Salvador’s
Challenge.”
19. Pulgar-Vidal, “Mining Activity.” The Strategic Environmental Review was not done until the
next administration, that of Funes. See Broad and Cavanagh, “El Salvador Gold,” 177–8; Broad,
“Corporate Bias in the World Bank”; and Broad and Cavanagh, “Poorer Countries and the
Environment,” note 33.
20. According to interview; see also Freeman, “El Buen Vivir.”
21. ICSID, Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador; and Broad, "Corporate Bias in the World
Bank.” There were actually two cases, but the Commerce Group case concerned government
cancellation of a mining concession due to significant environmental damage. Commerce
Group lost this ICSID case based on the procedural point that it had an unfinished case before
the Salvadoran court. ICSID, Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic
of El Salvador. On the 2016 ruling, see Samson, “World Bank Hands El Salvador”; and Broad and
Cavanagh, "El Salvador Ruling.”
22. Broad and Cavanagh, “Poorer Countries and the Environment”; see also “Lawmakers Ban Open-
pit Mining”; and Leff, “Costa Rican Lawmakers Vote.”
23. When the rock is mined, arsenic is released along with the gold. In addition, the sulphide is
exposed to air and water and is converted to sulfuric acid. With each rainfall, the acid unleashes
toxic substances onto the land and into the waters – called acid mine drainage (AMD) or acid
rock drainage. Remediation is technically and financially challenging. Goodland, “Responsible
Mining”; see also Broad and Cavanagh, "El Salvador Gold,” notes 21 and 23.
24. The 79.5 percent response was for ‘Do you think that El Salvador is an appropriate country for
metal mining?’ UCA, IUDOP, "Opinions and Perceptions.”
25. See “Biodiversity in Costa Rica”; and “Tourists Flocked.”
26. In addition to Broad and Cavanagh, “Poorer Countries and the Environment," and sources cited
in other endnotes, sources for the basic facts of the Costa Rica mining include: Cartagena,
Metabolismo socio-natural, 1992–2007; DaSilva, “Silence is Golden”; Isla, “Struggle for Clean”;
and Spalding, Contesting Trade.
27. Earth Justice, “Costa Rica Bans”; and Engler and Martinez, “Harken Oil,” 11–2.
28. Dyer, “Costa Rica”; Schmidt, “Arias’ mine decree”; and DaSilva, Silence is Golden. The facts
surrounding Arias allowing the company to proceed are not yet known publicly. There have
been investigations and allegations in both Canada and Costa Rica, including allegations of a
USD 200,000 donation to the Arias Foundation. See Arias, “Costa Rica’s Ex-Environment Minister.”
29. Interview with Congressman Edgardo Araya, formerly San Carlos-based lawyer, San José, 16
July 2014.
30. Broad and Cavanagh, "Poorer Countries and the Environment.”
31. Interview with Nicolas Boeglin, Professor of Law, University of Costa Rica, 14 July 2014; and
“Lawmakers Ban Open-pit Mining”; see also Pablo Ortega’s 2001 documentary, El Oror de los
Tontos (caso Infinito Gold y Crucitas) at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKVS1wvvEU8. On
Infinito’s subsequent suit at ICSID, see ICSID, Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Republic of Costa Rica.
32. Jamasmie, “Panama Holds $200bn.”
33. Email communication from McGill University professor Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, to Robin
Broad, 19 May 2016. For more on the protests’ history and the formalisation of the comarca
title, see Whiteman and Mamen, "Examining Justice and Conflict.”
34. “Destacan lucha indígena”; and MiningWatch Canada, “Two Killed in Panama.”
35. MiningWatch Canada, “Two Killed in Panama.”
36. Associated Press, “New Panama Law Bans.”
37. According to McGill University professor Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert (communication to Robin
Broad, 19 May 2016): ‘In Panama, Comarca is a territory of indigenous self-governance under
specific law and statutes passed by [the] Panamanian state’.
38. “Destacan lucha indígena”; Durling, “Panama Mining 2016”; and MiningWatch Canada, “General
Congress.”
39. Note: Law 13 included a requirement that mining could be undertaken only by Panamanian
companies, but this has been ‘met’ by foreign firms creating local subsidiaries; some firms whose
concessions were given under Law 9 from 1997 have been exempted from Laws 11 and 13;
see “Royalties from Minera Panamá.”
40. Durling, “Panama Mining 2016.”
41. IHS Markit, “Panama’s Mining Reform.”
42. “Dominion Minerals Corp.”
43. Ocampo, “Performance and Challenges.”
44. “Mining in Colombia,” The Economist. Lockhart-Smith’s quote is also from The Economist.
45. The Court cited several definitions for páramos, including ones based on altitude, the permanent
snow line, and/or the limit of forest vegetation. The Ministry of Environment retains the right to
delimit the actual land that will be protected by the law, so the amount of land to be protected is not
certain as of this writing; “Colombian Court Bans Oil”; and “Constitutional Court Prohibits Mining.”
46. “Colombian Court Bans Oil.”
47. English translation of Constitutional Court communiqué quoted in “Colombian Court Bans Oil.”
48. “Decisión de la corte.”
49. “Organisations Condemn Eco Oro”; and “Eco Oro Minerals Notifies.”
50. This is supported by article cited from The Economist, “Mining in Colombia.”
51. Dawson, “Why Honduras Should not,” 88.
52. Rodriguez and Macias, "To Cyanide or not," 237–50. Another two provinces, Rio Negro and La
Rioja, repealed their bans. Source: Email communication from American University professor
Agustina Giraudy to Robin Broad, 9 May 2015.
53. “Pan American Silver Expects.”
54. “Factbox: Argentine Legislation,” Reuters Buenos Aires.
55. “Prosecutor of the Court Upheld.”
56. “Ley XVII Nº 127”; Pan American Silver corporate website; and “Mining Fraud.”
57. “Córdoba: High Court Ratifies,”
58. “La Pampa Bans Cyanide.”
59. “Factbox: Argentine Legislation,” Reuters Buenos Aires. Note: “La Pampa Bans Cyanide” states
that Tucuman has enacted restrictions on mining. According to “No ala Mina (‘No to Mining’),”
the Bajo de la Alumbrera mine, the largest open-pit mine in Argentina, borders the Tucuman
province.
60. Rey, “Argentine Court Rejects Barrick”; see also “Argentina National Glacier Act”; Taillant, Glaciers:
The Politics; and Khadim, “Defending Glaciers in Argentina,” 73–4. On water sources, see also
Acunya, “Corte Suprema Argentina.”
61. ‘Periglacial’ areas are those where the ice has recently retreated but water remains below the
surface. Rey, “Argentine Court Rejects Barrick”; and Sugarman, “Argentina’s Law of the Glaciers.”
62. Khadim, “Defending Glaciers in Argentina,” 69–70.
63. “Argentina Eliminates Mining Export.”
64. Khadim, “Defending Glaciers in Argentina,” 73–4, see also 65–75.
65. Taillant and Collins, "Cryoactivism.”
66. Carruthers, “Environmental Politics in Chile,” 347. See this article for more on Chile’s extractivist
path and the ‘environmental underside’; and, for a more historical view, see Collins and Lear,
Chile’s Free Market Miracle.
67. “Minería en Cifras”; Copper statistics from “Mining in Chile.” For more on Chile’s ‘natural resource
governance’, see Nem Singh, “Reconstituting the Neostructuralist State,” 1413–33.
68. Gonzalez, “Chile Has 24,133 glaciers”; Ortuzar, “Towards a Law”; and Bórquez et al., Glaciares
Chilenos: reservas estratégicas.
69. Li, “Defeat of Pascua.” Note: Both Pascua Lama and Codelco’s Andina 244 expansion project
(copper mining) raised concerns.
70. Ramirez, “Chile’s Glacier Reform.”
71. “Comisión de medio ambiente.”
72. Ramirez, “Chile’s Glacier Reform”; and “Chile debate el future.”
73. “Comisión de medio ambiente”; and Greenpeace Chile, “67% de glaciares desprotegidos.”
74. Correa, “Acusan que ley”; Gonzalez, “Chile Has 24,133 glaciers;” and Taillant and Collins,
"Cryoactivism.”
75. Jamasmie, “Seabed Miner Nautilus handed”; and Ferris, “Scientists Show Rising Concern.”
76. Jamasmie, “Seabed Mining Dreams Shattered”; Wedding et al., "Managing Mining of the
Deep Seabed”; and Deep Sea Mining Campaign of the Ocean Foundation, "Deep Sea Mining
Campaign.”
77. Milman, “New Zealand’s New Ocean”; and Government of New Zealand, Department of
Conservation, “New Zealand’s Marine Environment.”
78. Note that mining contribution to GDP is actually very small (roughly 1.7 percent), and fishing
and tourism are much larger. On marine scientists and environmental activists, see Wedding
et al. “Managing Mining of the Deep Seabed”; Deep Sea Mining Campaign of the Ocean
Foundation, “Deep Sea Mining Campaign”; and Kiwis against Seabed Mining, “What Is KASM?”
For more on New Zealand’s thriving tourist and fishing industries, see, respectively, Government
of New Zealand, “Economic and Financial,” 22 and 18.
79. Milman, “New Zealand’s New Ocean.”

80. Jamasmie, “Seabed Mining Dreams Shattered.”
81. MiningWatch Canada, “Honduran Mining Law Passed.”
82. Finnegan, “An Old-fashioned Coup.”
83. ’Business as usual’ is quoted from mining companies interviewed for Canadian Council for
International Co-Operation, Americas Policy Group, “Honduras: Democracy Denied”; see also
Moore, “Canada’s Promotion of Mining.”
84. Grandin, “Happy Bloody Earth Day.”
85. MiningWatch Canada, “Honduran Mining Law Passed.” See Business News Americas, a business
newspaper reporting on Latin America, for more on the mining rush into Honduras.
86. Blanco and Shenk, “Land Grabbing Is Killing.”
87. “Honduras: Mining Areas Reserved”; see also http://www.noalamina.org/latinoamerica/
honduras.
88. The country moved up 12 spots; “Honduras’s Increasingly Competitive Business.”
89. In terms of per-capita killings, according to Global Witness, “How Many More?”; and Grandin,
“Happy Bloody Earth Day.”
90. Broad, Cavanagh, and Eldridge, “Who Killed Berta Cáceres?” Within two weeks, one of Cáceres’s
colleagues, Nelson Garcia, was also murdered.
91. Global Witness, “How Many More?,” 12–3 and 16–7.
92. Khadim, “Defending Glaciers in Argentina,” 71.
93. See Goodland, “Responsible Mining,” 2099–126.
94. See also Bebbington et al., “Political Economies of Extractive,” 1–16; and Broad, "Political
Economy of Natural Resources.”
95. Broad, “Corporate Bias in the World Bank.” On the ICSID decision as of this writing, see Broad
and Cavanagh, "El Salvador Ruling”; and Samson, “World Bank Hands El Salvador.” Update on
Colombia and ICSID: According to Marketwired, Eco Oro Minerals Corp. "announces that it
filed a Request for Arbitration with the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes against Colombia (the ‘"Request for Arbitration’") on December 8, 2016.”
http://www.goldseiten.de/artikel/311675--Eco-Oro-files-Request-for-Arbitration-against-
Colombia.html.
96. Taillant and Collins, "Cryoactivism."
97. On Philippine mining prior to Duterte, see Broad, “Responsible Mining”; and Broad and
Cavanagh, “Strategic Fight against Corporate Rule.”.
98. Broad and Cavanagh. “Poorer Countries and the Environment.”
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From extractivism towards buen vivir: mining

Robin Broad & Julia Fischer-Mackey

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From extractivism towards buen vivir: mining policy as an

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

CONTACT Robin Broad rbroad@american.edu

Two case studies of de facto mining bans

Another six country case studies

(1) Panama: indigenous lands

(2) Colombia: protecting the páramos from mining

(3) Argentina: provincial-level bans and national-level policy

(4) Chile: new initiatives to ban mining in glacier areas

(5) New Zealand: limiting seabed mining

(6) Honduras: extractivism to buen vivir to coup and back to extractivism

Analysis: what do we learn from these case studies?

Reflections on why these countries moved away from extractivism

Final words: what we still need to know

79. Milman, “New Zealand’s New Ocean.”

Global Witness. “How Many More?” April 2015. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/

Li, F. “The Defeat of Pascua Lama.” NACLA, March 2016. https://nacla.org/news/2016/03/09/defeat-

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79. Milman, “New Zealand’s New Ocean.”