January 2018

A.C. No. 10689

ROMEO A. ALMARIO vs. ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
January 8, 2018

FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint filed by complainant Romeo A. Almario
(complainant) before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L. Agno (respondent lawyer), for notarizing a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) without the personal appearance of one of the affiants therein.

It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified because one of the affiants therein,
Francisca A. Mallari (Mallari), could not possibly have executed the same because she was in Japan at
the time the SP A was executed, as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration (BI); (2) that this SP A
was used in the said civil case to perpetrate fraud and deception against complainant resulting in the
filing of Criminal Case No. 452612-CR, for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Use of
Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia, (Pedia), the attorney-in-fact mentioned in the
SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer notarized the SP A although Mallari did not personally appear before
her; (4) that in the process of notarizing the SP A, respondent lawyer also accepted a Community Tax
Certificate (CTC), which is no longer considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer violated Canons 1 and 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, xxx
In her Answer, respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and offered the following
arguments:1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan and it was brought back to the
Philippines on July 25, 2006 by Mallari's son, Roman Mallari-Vestido; 2) The SPA was notarized on
July 26, 2006 for reasons of expediency, because therein defendants were pressed for time in filing
their Answer in the civil case, and that in any event, Mallari undertook to have the SPA acknowledged
before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006, (thereby giving it retroactive
effect). Respondent lawyer claimed that the aforementioned circumstances showed that she acted in
good faith in notarizing the SPA; 3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SP A with red ribbon before
the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006; 4) Neither fraud nor deception was
perpetrated as the parties in the said civil case executed a Compromise Agreement, which was
approved by the RTC; 5) Contrary to complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently accepted as proof of
personal identification in cases where no other proof of personal identification is available; and, 6)
That, if at all, it was complainant himself who defrauded the RTC when he stated in his verified
complaint that Mallari is a resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, even though
he knew that Mallari was in Japan at the time of filing of the civil case.
In a Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer liable for
violation of Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and recommended that she be suspended
for six months as notary public.
On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the finding and
approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in a Resolution dated May 3, 2014.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent lawyer liable for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Whether or not the penalty of six months as the IBP had recommended is proper.

HELD:
(1) YES.
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is notarized is underscored by
Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares
that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed,
and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that:

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document –

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
(Emphasis supplied)

These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal presence of the person/s
who executed a document, before notarizing the same. In other words, a document should not be
notarized unless the person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or physically present before the
notary public. The personal and physical presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the due execution
of the document.
This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, held that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act[;i]t is imbued with public interest x xx."
In cognate or similar cases, this Court likewise held that a notary public must not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed it are the very same persons who executed the same, and personally
appeared before him to attest to the truth of the contents thereof. The purpose of this requirement is to
enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.
In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer despite the absence of
Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari could not have personally appeared before respondent
lawyer in Muntinlupa City, Philippines where the SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 because Mallari
was in Japan at that time, as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration.

(2) NO.
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two months, instead of six months
as the IBP had recommended. We are impelled by the following reasons for taking this course of
action: first, the apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing the SP A in question; second, the civil
case wherein the flawed SP A was used ended up in a judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally, this
is her first administrative case since she was commissioned as a Notary Public in 1973. In addition,
respondent lawyer invites our attention to the fact that she is already in the twilight years of her life.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for
the aforesaid infraction for two months and WARNED that the commission of a similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely.

G.R. No. 210766; MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, DEL CASTILLO, J., January 8, 2018

FACTS:
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed a
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were
married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said
marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living
together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of
the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler; that
respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also
irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made
him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she could
expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support
her family as the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro Psych
Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr.
Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent: xx
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to
govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the instant
case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts. Xx
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land
where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal
property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts
that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments in shares of stocks, cars,
household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they came from
petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC.
Hence, this Petition wherein notably the petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the
fact that personality disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated
medically; that in this case the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of
his gambling problem is only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had
affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
(2) Whether or not the testimonies of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio and son Jose are meritorious.
(3) Whether or not Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders are generally
incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically.

HELD:
(1) NO.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological
incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a
job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family
home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their children."40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working at
a certain point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary
and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties'
relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying for a
job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their
marriage.42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized
summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's
share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9
million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover the family
expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family
budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills came
from this money.
(2) NO.
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not
specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity.
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could be
attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no
evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's
contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's conduct was
"dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which must
be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability
to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological
incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that the parties' child is
not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the spouses
were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until
long after his birth."

(3) NO.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are
generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice under Section
1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 192971, FLORO MERCENE vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MARTIRES, J.:, January 10, 2018

FACTS:
On 19 January 1965, petitioner Floro Mercene (Mercene) obtained a loan from respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of ₱29,500.00. As security, a
real estate mortgage was executed over Mercene's property in Quezon City, registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90535. The mortgage was registered and annotated on the
title on 24 March 1965
On 14 May 1968, Mercene contracted another loan with GSIS for the amount of ₱14,500.00. The loan
was likewise secured by a real estate mortgage on the same parcel of land. The following day, the loan
was registered and duly annotated on the title.
On 11 June 2004, Mercene opted to file a complaint for Quieting of Title against GSIS. He alleged that:
since 1968 until the time the complaint was filed, GSIS never exercised its rights as a mortgagee; the
real estate mortgage over his property constituted a cloud on the title; GSIS' right to foreclose had
prescribed. In its answer, GSIS assailed that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that
prescription does not run against it because it is a government entity.
During the pre-trial conference, Mercene manifested that he would file a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. There being no objection, the RTC granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In its 15 September 2005 decision, the RTC granted Mercene's complaint and ordered the
cancellation of the mortgages annotated on the title. It ruled that the real estate mortgages
annotated on the title constituted a cloud thereto, because the annotations appeared to be
valid but was ineffective and prejudicial to the title. The trial court opined that GSIS' right as
a mortgagee had prescribed because more than ten (10) years had lapsed from the time the
cause of action had accrued. The R TC stated that prescription ran against GSIS because it is
a juridical person with a separate personality, and with the power to sue and be sued.
In its 30 January 2015 decision, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The appellate court
posited that the trial court erred in declaring that GSIS' right to foreclose the mortgaged
properties had prescribed. It highlighted that Mercene's complaint neither alleged the
maturity date of the loans, nor the fact that a demand for payment was made. The CA
explained that prescription commences only upon the accrual of the cause of action, and that
a cause of action in a written contract accrues only when there is an actual breach or
violation. Thus, the appellate court surmised that no prescription had set in against GSIS
because it has not made a demand to Mercene.
Mercene moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its assailed 7 April 2011
resolution.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in considering issues not raised before the trial court;

(2) Whether or not the CA errred in disregarding the judicial admission allegedly made by
GSIS

(3) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the real estate mortgages had yet to prescribe.

HELD:
(1) NO.
Mercene assails the CA decision for entertaining issues that were not addressed by the trial court. He
claims that for the first time on appeal, GSIS raised the issue on whether the loans were still effective in
view of his nonpayment. A reading of the CA decision, however, reveals that the appellate court did not
dwell on the issue of nonpayment, but instead ruled that prescription had not commenced because the
cause of action had not yet accrued. Hence, it concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. The appellate court did not focus on the question of payment precisely because it was raised for
the first time on appeal. It is noteworthy that, in its answer, GSIS raised the affirmative defense that
Mercene's complaint failed to state a cause of action.

(2) Yes.
The Court agrees with Mercene that material averments not specifically denied are deemed admitted.
Nonetheless, his conclusion that GSIS judicially admitted that its right to foreclose had prescribed is
erroneous. It must be remembered that conclusions of fact and law stated in the complaint are not
deemed admitted by the failure to make a specific denial. This is true considering that only ultimate
facts must be alleged in any pleading and only material allegation of facts need to be specifically
denied.
A conclusion of law is a legal inference on a question of law made as a result of a factual showing
where no further evidence is required. The allegation of prescription in Mercene's complaint is a mere
conclusion of law.
In the same vein, labelling-an obligation to have prescribed without specifying the circumstances
behind it is a mere conclusion of law. As would be discussed further, the fact that GSIS had not
instituted any action within ten (10) years after the loan had been contracted is insufficient to hold that
prescription had set in. Thus, even if GSIS' denial would not be considered as a specific denial, only the
fact that GSIS had not commenced any action, would be deemed admitted at the most. This is true
considering that the circumstances to establish prescription against GSIS have not been alleged with
particularity.

(3) No.
In University of Mindanao, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, et al., the Court clarified that
prescription runs in mortgage contract from the time the cause of action arose and not from
the time of its execution.
In Maybank Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Tarrosa, 20 the Court explained that the right to
foreclose prescribes after ten (10) years from the time a demand for payment is made, or
when then loan becomes due and demandable in cases where demand is unnecessary.
Thus, applying the pronouncements of the Court regarding prescription on the right to foreclose
mortgages, the Court finds that the CA did not err in concluding that Mercene's complaint failed to
state a cause of action. It is undisputed that his complaint merely stated the dates when the loan was
contracted and when the mortgages were annotated on the title of the lot used as a security.
Conspicuously lacking were allegations concerning: the maturity date of the loan contracted and
whether demand was necessary under the terms and conditions of the loan.
As such, the RTC erred in ruling that GSIS' right to foreclose had prescribed because the allegations in
Mercene's complaint were insufficient to establish prescription against GSIS. The only information the
trial court had were the dates of the execution of the loan, and the annotation of the mortgages on the
title. As elucidated in the above-mentioned decisions, prescription of the right to foreclose mortgages is
not reckoned from the date of execution of the contract. Rather, prescription commences from the time
the cause of action accrues; in other words, from the time the obligation becomes due and demandable,
or upon demand by the creditor/mortgagor, as the case may be.
In addition, there was no judicial admission on the part of GSIS with regard to prescription because
treating the obligation as prescribed, was merely a conclusion of law. It would have been different if
Mercene's complaint alleged details necessary to determine when GSIS' right to foreclose arose, i.e.,
date of maturity and whether demand was necessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 29 April 2010 Decision and 20 July 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CV No. 86615 are AFFIRMED in toto.