Compilation 6.01 Art. X PDF

Poli
Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.01 – Article X Page 1 of 42

Art. X o According to Abella, Almajose was the most qualified because she was the
only CPA
Sec. 2: San Juan v CSC (EM) • August 1988: DBM Undersecretary Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of
Reynaldo San Juan, petitioner Almajose
v. o 2 days later, San Juan wrote a letter to DBM Secretary Carague reiterating his
Civil Service Commission, Department of Budget and Management and Cecilia Almajose, respondents
request for the appointment of Santos to the position unaware of the ealier
G.R. No. 92299|April 19, 1991
Gutierrez, Jr., J appointment made by Cabuquit
• In the same month, DBM Regional Director Agripino Galvez told San Juan that Santos
Summary: The position of Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal has been emptied by the and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local
departure of its previous holder. Due to this, governor San Juan appointed Santos on an Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of local budget officer
acting capacity. Pursuant to EO 112, he subsequently suggested 3 nominees to the DBM to • November 1988: After being informed of Almajose's appointment, San Juan wrote
sit as the new PBO (including Santos). However, in the process, DBM Undersecretary Carague protesting the said appointment on the grounds
Cabuquit appointed another person named Almajose on the ground that she is the most o that Cabuquit is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO;
qualified (only CPA). San Juan contends that such cannot be done because the intent and o that Almajose lacks the 3 year work experience under Local Budget Circular
spirit of EO 112 requires that the governor be included in the appointment process – thus a No. 31; and
PBO cannot be appointed outside the list of nominees by a governor. SC ruled that while the o that under EO 112, it is the Provincial Governor that is supposed to have the
DBM was correct in not appointing those not qualified to hold the position, it cannot appoint power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
persons not nominated by the governor. In interpreting the law, the scales must be weighed • January 1989: Respondent DBM issued a memorandum ruling that San Juan's letter-‐
in favour of autonomy. That the appointing power of the governor is interpreted in a protest is not meritorious considering that the DBM validly exercised its prerogative
directory manner goes against the letter and spirit of local autonomy as protected by the in filling-‐up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the
constitution. prescribed requirements

The case: Issue: WON Almajose is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal? NO
• Petition for certiorari by the petitioner governor of the province of Rizal praying for In the event the Governor's nominees fall short of the required qualifications, can the DBM
nullification of Resolutions No 89-‐868 and No 90-‐150of the Civil Service Commission appoint a person absent in the list? NO
("CSC")
• Dispositive portion of Resolution No 89-‐868: Ratio:
o "WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to
dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Governor nominee failing the required standards not to be appointed
Rizal. Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as • According to San Juan, he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld." nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only
o Resolution 90-‐150 from his nominees. To support his case, he invokes Sec. 1 of EO 112 which
• Reiterates upholding the private respondent's appointment by provides that:
denying petitioner's MR • "All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
The pertinent facts: appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management
• March 1988: the position of Provincial Budget Officer ("PBO") for Rizal was left upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject
vacant by its former holder, Henedima del Rosario to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed
• April 1988: San Juan informed Department of Budget and Management ("DBM") under the administrative control and technical supervision of the
Region IV Director Reynaldo Abella that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting Ministry of Budget and Management."
PBO of Rizal • There is no question that under such provision, the petitioner's power to
• Subsequently, San Juan made 3 nominees for the position of PBO (including Santos) recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for
• July 1988: Director Abella recommended the appointment of Ms. Almajose as PBO of the position of PBO.
Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of said • Thus, in the event that the recommendations made fall short of the required
province (which included three nominees of the petitioner) standards, the DBM is expected to reject the same

May the DBM appoint a person outside the nominees proposed by the governor? no

Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy

Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.01 – Article X Page 2 of 42

• Before the promulgation of EO 112, BP 337 vested upon the governor the
power to appoint the PBO Being an LGU, the Province is only under the SUPERVISION of the President. Under Article
• On this basis, the petitioner contends that the intent of EO 112 is to X, section 4 of the 1987 Consti: The President shall exercise GENERAL SUPERVISION over
empower him to recommend nominees -‐ to make his local governments. The power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer
recommendation part and parcel of the appointment process to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is distinguished
• San Juan invokes Article X Sec. 2 on local autonomy to argue that the phrase from power of control, which is the power to alter/modify/set aside what a subordinate
"upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given officer had done in the performance of his duties, and to substitute the president’s
mandatory application judgment over that of the subordinate officer. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of
• The above is true general supervision of the President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that
rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed.
Local Autonomy
• When the law is capable of two interpretations (one in favor of Malacanang FACTS
and the other in favor of local autonomy), the scales must be weighed in favor The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros (Nat!) Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-‐A,
of autonomy which allocated Php4M of its retained earnings for hospital and health care insurance
benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. After public bidding, the grant
• As such, even as early as the 1935 Constitution, the President was not given
"control" over local governments. Rather, what was given was the power of was granted to Philam Care.
"supervision"
The Province of Nat Negros Occidental and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care
• Mondano lays down the difference
Agreement involving the payment of P3.76M representing insurance premiums. Thereafter,
• Supervision -‐ power to take such action or step as prescribed by law to
a post-‐audit investigation was conducted. The Provincial Auditor suspended the premium
make them (subordinate officers) perform their duties
payment because it was not approved by the Office of the President, because such
• Control -‐ power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a payment of premiums violated RA 6758, or the Salary Standardization Law (SSLaw).
subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to

substitute the judgment of the superior over the subordinate
The Province requested President Erap to lift the suspension, which he granted, but only in
• Today, the 1987 Constitution has even supported more local autonomy. the amount of 100k. The Provincial Auditor, however, ignored Erap’s directive and instead
• As such, when the CSC interpreted the recommending power of the issued a Notice of Disallowance, using his previous ground (lack of presidential
Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the authorization). The Province appealed the disallowance to COA, who affirmed the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy disallowance by the Provincial Auditor. COA ruled that under A.O. 103 and the SSLaw, no
government entity, including LGUs, is exempt from securing presidential approval granting
benefits to its personnel. COA also pointed out that the employees are already
Sec. 4: Province of Negros Occidental v COA (JT) beneficiaries of the Medicare Program as mandated by Congress (thus doble-‐doble na ang
G.R. No. 182574 September 28, 2010 benefits ng employees).
Petitioner: Province of Negros Occidental, as represented by Gov. Isidro Zayco
Respondents: Commissioners of COA; Director, Cluster IV-‐Visayas; Regional Cluster Directors; and the Provincial
Auditor of Negros Occidental COA then held the following persons liable:
Carpio, J. 1. all 1,949 officials and employees that benefited from the insurance benefits
2. former Governor Coscolluela (who signed the contract on behalf of the province)
RECIT READY: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental issued a resolution 3. Sanggunian Panlalawigan members who passed the resolution granting the
allocating retained earnings for hospital and health care benefits of the province’s officials insurance benefits
and employees. COA disallowed this, saying that under AO 103, prior presidential approval is
required before LGUs can grant benefits to its personnel. The Province countered that the The Province insists that the payment of premiums for the health benefits was lawful, since
grant of benefits was pursuant to the fiscal autonomy principle. The Supreme Court sided it was paid out of the Province’s retained earnings. Likewise, it contends that the act was an
with the petitioner Province. AO 103 provided those that are required to obtain presidential exercise of its powers under the “fiscal autonomy” principle, which allows LGUs to allocate
approval are government offices/agencies, GOCCs and governing boards. Such enumeration their own resources in accordance with their own priorities.
does not enumerate LGUs. Thus, the prior presidential approval provision is applicable only
to: departments, bureaus, offices, and GOCCs under the Executive Branch. So the Province
does not need prior presidential approval before it can grant benefits.



Respondents and COA however countered by saying that LGUs are still bound by the SSLaw • Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the
and are still subject to the scrutiny of the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) (Oh hello President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are
there secretary Abad.) Thus, the requirement of prior presidential approval is indispensable. followed and laws are faithfully executed.
o The President may only point out that rules have not been followed
ISSUE/HELD: W/N COA committed GADALEJ in the disallowance—YES o But the President cannot lay down the rules, nor can he modify or
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE Decision No. 2006-‐044 replace rules
dated 14 July 2006 and Decision No. 2008-‐010 dated 30 January 2008 of the Commission on o Thus, the grant of additional compensation (like the insurance
Audit. benefits contemplated by the case) does NOT need Presidential
approval for these to be valid.
RATIO
Let’s take a close look of AO 103 first. (no longer important…I think) COA did not clearly establish that the medical care benefits
• The main purpose of AO 103 is to prevent dissatisfaction and demoralization given by the government at that time (under PD 1519) were sufficient to cover the needs of
among government personnel. LGU employees
• The whereas clauses provide that the unilateral and uncoordinated grant of • Under CSC Memo Circular 33, LGUs are encouraged to establish a medical
productivity or incentive benefits in the past gave rise to discontentment check-‐up program for their officials and employees.
among government personnel • This, however, was inadequate because of not-‐so-‐good implementation
• Under the AO 103, all agencies of the government, including GOCCs and • Thus, the National Health Insurance Program was established under RA 7875
LGUs, are authorized to grant productivity incentive benefits up to the max • But, RA 7875 came after the resolution of the Province’s Sangguniang
amount of 2k pesos. Panlalawigan on the benefits.
• However, and as properly alleged by COA, all heads of government • Nevertheless, SC recognized that the insurance program under RA 7875 was
offices/agencies, including GOCCs, and governing boards are prohibited from still inadequate and have not reached certain geographical areas (like Negros
granting benefits and all forms of allowances without prior approval via Occidental).
administrative order by the Office of the President.
• Anyone who violates this shall be liable under existing admin and penal laws. In sum, since petitioner’s grant and release of the questioned disbursement without the
President’s approval did not violate the President’s directive in AO 103, the COA then gravely
However, a close reading of AO 103 would show that the Province did not violate the abused its discretion in applying AO 103 to disallow the premium payment for the
requirement of prior presidential approval. hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of petitioner’s officials and employees.
• Those that are required to obtain presidential approval are government
offices/agencies, GOCCs and governing boards
• The enumeration does not enumerate LGUs!
• Thus, the prior presidential approval provision is applicable only to:
departments, bureaus, offices, and GOCCs under the Executive Branch. Sec. 6: Alternative Center v Zamora (NO)
o This is pursuant to the Constitutional provision (Article VII, Section G.R. No. 144256. June 8, 2005|| J. Carpio Morales
17), which provides that the President shall have control of all Petitioners: ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. (ACORD), BALAY
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. MINDANAW FOUNDATION, INC. (BMFI); BARRIOS, INC.; CAMARINES SUR NGO-‐PO DEVELOPMENT NETWORK, INC.
(CADENET); dami sobra nag cut ako.
• Being an LGU, the Province is only under the SUPERVISION of the President. Respondents: HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. BENJAMIN DIOKNO, in his
[DOCTRINE ALERT!] capacity as Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. LEONOR MAGTOLIS-‐BRIONES, in her capacity as
o Under Article X, section 4 of the 1987 Consti: The President shall National Treasurer, and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT
exercise GENERAL SUPERVISION over local governments.
o The power of general supervision means the power of a superior Summary: President Estrada proposed the allotment of 121B as Internal Revenue allotment
officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions for LGUs. When the law was passed, the legislative set aside 10B as unprogrammed fund for
according to law. LGUs which will be released only when the conditions set under the GAA is complied with.
o This is distinguished from power of control, which is the power to The GAA requires that the original revenue targets can be realized based on the quarterly
alter/modify/set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the assessments made by committees named in the GAA. Petitioners are NGOs who question
performance of his duties, and to substitute the president’s the said scheme. The issue in this case is w/n the provisions on the unprogramed funds
judgment over that of the subordinate officer. violate Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Yes.



Whether or not the allocation of 10B as unprogrammed violate the constitutional injunction
The SC explained that the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically that the just share of local governments in the national taxes or the IRA shall be
release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature automatically released. Yes.
not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that
the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, Held:
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year
statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA,
Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words “as in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not
authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA. While Ratio:
“automatic release” implies that the just share of the local governments determined by law The petition is impressed with public interest.
should be released to them as a matter of course, the GAA provisions, on the other hand, • Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall
withhold its release pending an event which is not even certain of occurring. To rule that the nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being
term “automatic release” contemplates such conditional release would be to strip the term impressed with public interest.
“automatic” of all meaning. • In Batangas v. Romulo, the Court held that, the resolution of the case had already
been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including the LGSEF, for 1999,
Facts:
2000 and 2001, had already been released and the government is now operating
• President Estrada (The Guy with a big tummy, similar to JT’s but the latter kinda
under a new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for this Court to
looks more like Tinky-‐Winky) submitted the 2000 budget to the congress. The
resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant petition. Supervening events,
President proposed an Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the amount
whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a
of P121,778,000,000 following the formula provided for in Section 284 of the Local
decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. (Note this exception to
Government Code of 1992. The provisions states that, “Local government units
moot cases)
shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of

the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows: xxx (c) On the
The unprogrammed fund violates Sec. 6 of Art. X of the Constitution
third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).” • SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,
• The President approved the bill which eventually became the GAA of 2000. The in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
said bill included a budget of P111,778,000,000 for LGUs. • Petitioners argue that this provision was violated when it was made contingent to
• In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is the conditions laid down in the law. Respondents counter argue that the above
provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive,
the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon
amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the the release of the IRA. Respondent cited the discourse between Comm. Nolledo
President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment by and Davide on the provision.
committees which the GAA specifies.
• The Supreme Court clarified that although Commissioners Davide and Nolledo held
• On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs, along with three barangay officials filed different views with regard to the proper wording of the constitutional provision,
with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With they shared a common assumption that the entity which would execute the
Application for TRO, against Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora assailing the automatic release of internal revenue was the executive department. Davide
Constitutionality of the mentioned allocations. referred to the national government as the entity that collects and remits internal
• Petitioners argue that the programmed fund, which will be released only upon revenue. Similarly, Nolledo alluded to the Budget Officer, who is clearly under the
fulfillment of the conditions set in the law, violates local autonomy because it executive branch. (See full text for full discourse)
withheld 10B from LGUs, it effectively amended the Local Government Code, and • Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents
they violate the Constitutional provision on local autonomy. the executive branch of the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA,
but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the
Issue:
same.



• As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the • In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the court had to occasion to rule on an executive act which
just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature withheld the release of the IRA pending an assessment very similar to the one
not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To provided in the GAA. SC ruled that such withholding contravened the
hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which constitutional mandate of an automatic release.
define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the • Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution – the same provision relied upon
Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. in Pimentel – enjoins both the legislative and executive branches of
• If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the government. Hence, as in Pimentel, under the same constitutional provision, the
release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.
Constitution would have been worded differently.
Release is different from the just share as determined by law. Procedural matters (Just in Case)
• Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local • Respondents assail the petition because it was filed by cause-‐oriented
governments is qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release organizations, so they claim that the verification was not signed by the people
thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution which it seeks to represent. Hence, it must be treated as an unsigned pleading. SC
to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA. said that there were those individuals who are part of the Orgs who validly signed.
• In Batangas v. Romulo, the petitioner therein challenged the constitutionality of • Respondents likewise assail the standing of the petitioners. SC said that the GAA
certain provisos of the GAAs for FY 1999, 2000, and 2001 which set up the Local provisions being challenged were not to be implemented solely by the committees
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF). The LGSEF was a portion of the specifically mentioned therein, for they being in the nature of appropriations
IRA which was to be released only upon a finding of the Oversight Committee on provisions, they were also to be implemented by the executive branch, particularly
Devolution that the LGU concerned had complied with the guidelines issued by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the National
said committee. This Court measured the challenged legislative acts against Article Treasurer. The task of the committees related merely to the conduct of the
X, Section 6 and declared them unconstitutional – a ruling which presupposes that quarterly assessment required in the provisions, and not in the actual release of
the legislature, like the executive, is mandated by said constitutional provision to the IRA which is the duty of the executive. Since the present controversy centers
ensure that the just share of local governments in the national taxes are on the proper manner of releasing the IRA, the impleaded respondents are the
automatically released. proper parties to this suit.
• Petitioners cited several laws and IRRs to support their contention that the said
proscription by the Constitution applies only to the executive branch. SC said that,
“[w]hile statutes and implementing rules are entitled to great weight in Sec 8
constitutional construction as indicators of contemporaneous interpretation, such
1. Borja v Comelec (RR)
interpretation is not necessarily binding or conclusive on the courts.”
GR No. 133495 | 9/3/1998 | MENDOZA, J.
• In Tanada v. Cuenco, the Court held that the reason is that “the application of the Petitioner/s: BENJAMIN BORJA, JR.
doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the Respondent/s: COMELEC and JOSE CAPCO
interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory
provisions,” and that “except as to matters committed by the constitution itself to SUMMARY: This case explains the meaning of the three-‐term limit on local elective officials.
the discretion of some other department, contemporaneous or practical The then incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja, died. Thus, Jose Capco, who was then vice mayor,
construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful served the unexpired portion of the former’s term. He ran and was re-‐elected mayor in both
the 1992 and 1995 elections. He again filed a candidacy for mayor for the 1998 elections but
case.” Hence, “if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and
Benjamin Borja, Jr., also a candidate, sought for his disqualification on the theory that the
its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of
first time he served as mayor (when Cesar Borja died) should be counted, and thus, he has
public policy, it may be rejected.”
already served 3 consecutive terms in the contemplation of Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Consti and
• While “automatic release” implies that the just share of the local governments Sec. 43(b) of the LGC. The Court ruled that for service to be counted as one term for the
determined by law should be released to them as a matter of course, the GAA purpose of the 3-‐term limit, 2 essential elements are req’d: (1) the official must have been
provisions, on the other hand, withhold its release pending an event which is not elected to the position 3 consecutive times, and (2) he must have served three full terms. A
even certain of occurring. To rule that the term “automatic release” contemplates consideration of the proceedings of the ConComm give rise to two concepts: (1) service of
such conditional release would be to strip the term “automatic” of all meaning. term and (2) election. Service of term derived from the concern about the accumulation of



power as a result of a prolonged stay in office; Election derived from the concern that the time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”
Furthermore, records of the ConComm show that in discussing term limits, what they had in • Policies taken into consideration:
mind was those who are serving by virtue of reelection. A textual analysis supports this o To prevent the establishment of political dynasties
conclusion as well because Art. X, Sec. 8 speaks of: “the term of office of elective local o Enhancing the freedom of choice of the people
officials” and bars “such official[s]” from serving for more than three consecutive terms.” • To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned
The second sentence speaks about the “full term for which he has been elected.” To came to that office – whether by election or by succession by operation of law –
recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. question.
• The members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
FACTS preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
• Jan. 18, 1988: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-‐mayor of monopolization of political power.
Pateros for a term ending June 30, 1992. o Thus, they rejected the proposal of Com. arcia that after serving three
• Sept. 2, 1989: he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for
incumbent, Cesar Borja. local and legislative officials.
• May ’92 & ’95 elections: ran again for mayor, won both times. o Com. Monsod emphasized on “recognizing people’s power” to choose.
• He filed a COC for the May ’98 elections but this was contested by Benjamin U. o Com. Ople agrees with Monsod:
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, on the theory that the latter would " The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall
have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification on those
would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on
nd
• 2 Div. of COMELEC ruled that Capco is disqualified. consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional
• On MR, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-‐2, reversed the decision and declared Commission.
Capco eligible " The Commission achieves its purpose in establishing
! “In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-‐term safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It result of consecutive terms.
made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.” " We want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
• (Note: the election took place and Capco received over 16500++ votes while Borja continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the
only received 7700++ votes) President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a
proprietary interest in their position and to accumulate those
ISSUE: powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely
WN service of the unexpired term is counted in computing the three consecutive terms in Sec. or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a
8, Art. X – NO subsequent election.
" If we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too
much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much
RATIO: to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of
choice.
• Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides: “The term of office of elective local o This concern was echoed by other commissioners, too.
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three • Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive Constitutional Commission.
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be o The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office.
which he was elected.” o The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the
• This provision is restated in §43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160): right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be
“No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in preserved.
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of



• Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people o This is not so in the case of the vice-‐mayor. Under the local Government
should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all
• Not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports this ruling. officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers
o The first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein
and bars “such official[s]” from serving for more than three consecutive being only one of them.
terms.
o The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be • To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
deemed to have served his full term of office, states that “voluntary the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered • Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
which he was elected.” The term served must therefore be one “for position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
which [the official concerned] was elected.” • To illustrate consider these three scenarios:
• The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the o A is VM, becomes M because of the former M’s death. 6 months later, he
number of terms an elective official may serve. resigns and thereafter, runs and gets re-‐elected twice. Can/can’t run
• Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is anymore?
simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be " CAN.
considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary " only completing the service of the term for which the deceased
renunciation of office prior to its expiration. and not he was elected.
• Reference to Fr. B’s Art. VI, Sec. 7 commentary: ““if one is elected Representative " Also, his resignation = interruption.
to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, " Eitherway, he didn’t serve for a full term.
will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of o B is elected M. Twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year.
successive terms allowed.” Twice re-‐elected after. Can/can’t run anymore?
o So, why the difference? " CAN.
o The vice-‐mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. " He only served 2 full consecutive terms.
o The Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, o C is VM who becomes M by succession. Twice re-‐elected. Can/can’t run
therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. anymore?
• Petitioner also cites Art. VII, §4 and contends that by analogy, vice-‐mayor should " CAN.
likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the " He was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term
latter’s office and serves for the remainder of the term. but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
• The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the
Vice-‐President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be
qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four
years.
o The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, §8 on elective local officials 2. Adormeo v Comelec (KF)
throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. Petitioner: Raymundo M. Adormeo
o It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of Respondents: COMELEC and Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.
office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-‐ G.R. No. 147927 | February 4, 2002 | Quisumbing, J.
term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service
by automatic succession. SUMMARY: Adormeo and Talaga filed their COCs for Lucena City Mayor. Adormeo filed a
• Another reason for the distinction: petition to deny due course to or cancel COC of Talaga because he was elected and served as
o Vice-‐President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event mayor for 3 consecutive terms (1992, 1995, 2000 when he won the recall election, serving
of the latter’s death, permanent disability, removal or the unexpired term of Tagarao). Talaga averred that he was defeated by Tagarao on 1998,
resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so thus, NOT 3 consecutive terms.
is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for ISSUE: WON he served 3 consecutive terms? NO
Vice-‐President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. SC: Victory in the 2000 recall elections is NOT counted as 1 full term, thus, it interrupted the
continuity of service of Talaga. It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive



terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply. For nearly 2 years he was a RATIO:
private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 Adormeo: The unexpired portion of the term of office he served after winning a recall
elections. Further, victory in the recall election NOT a violation of Sec 8, Art X, as “voluntary election is considered a full term. To interpret otherwise, Talaga Jr. would be serving 4
1
resignation.” consecutive terms of 10 years, in violation of Sec 8, Art X and Sec. 43 of the LGC
Talaga Jr.: Term is NOT consecutive, during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen
FACTS:
• Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. are the only candidates who filed their certificates of Issue at hand was already answered in Borja v. COMELEC: To recapitulate, the term limit for
candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga was the elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
incumbent mayor. serve in the same elective position.
• Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was • Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in
re-‐elected in 1995-‐1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be
of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. made clearer by considering the following case or situation:
• 3/2/2001: Adormeo filed a petition with the Office of the Provincial Election o Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice
Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga, Jr. because he was elected and reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?
served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms (1992, 1995, 2000 when he won the Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
recall election, serving the unexpired term of Tagarao) which is a violation under o To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the
Sec. 8, Art. X understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people
• Talaga, Jr: NOT 3 consecutive terms, he was defeated on 1998 by Tagarao. Because should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power
of this, his years as mayor was interrupted. His service from May 12, may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not
2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and 18 days was not a full term, in the unduly curtailed.
contemplation of the law and the Constitution.
o Cites Lonzanida v. Comelec: 2 conditions to apply disqualification under Lonzanida v. COMELEC: This Court held that the 2 conditions for the application of the
Sec 8, Art X (a) that the official concerned has been elected for three disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for 3
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that he consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served 3
has fully served 3 consecutive terms. consecutive terms.
ST
• 4/20/2001: COMELEC 1 Division: Disqualified Talaga Jr. for the position of city
Accordingly, COMELEC’s ruling should be upheld. For nearly 2 years he was a private
mayor and his COC was withdrawn/cancelled.
citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
• Talaga, Jr. filed an MR: 3 consecutive terms means 9 continuous years. Tagarao’s
tenure from 1998 to 2000 could not be considered as a continuation of his To bolster his case, Adormeo adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, stating that in
mayorship. The recall election was not a regular election, but a separate special interpreting said provision that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term
election specifically to remove incompetent local officials. of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the
• Adormeo filed an Opposition: Serving the unexpired term of office is considered as purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.” As pointed out by the
1 term. The provision speaks of term not tenure. COMELEC EB, Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Rep. Unlike
st
• COMELEC EB: reversed 1 Division: NOT 3 consecutive years because he did not local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress.
win in the 1998 elections, he was only a winner of a recall election, victory in the
recall election was not considered a term of office, his loss in the 1998 elections is Victory in the recall election NOT a violation of Sec 8, Art X, as “voluntary resignation”,
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor Lonzanida v. COMELEC: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
ISSUE: WON Talaga had already served 3 consecutive terms in that office – NO interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.” The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-‐
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of public
1
respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in Comelec SPA No. 01-‐055 is Term of Office: (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. So Ordered. continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.



term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall
•
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is • Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA
an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-‐ proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public
1998 mayoral term concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of
even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire
PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the
Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA
3. Socrates v Comelec (CP) assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated
master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to
SUMMARY: There was a recall resolution issued by COMELEC. The issue in this case are:
examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the
whether the recall resolution was valid; whether Hagedorn can run (violation of the three
COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this
consecutive full terms). The recall resolution was valid. Hagedorn can run. In the case of
right. There is no legal basis in Socrates’ claim that respondents violated his
Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
re-‐election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate
• Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
re-‐election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election
elections in 2001.
on September 24, 2002.

Hagedorn was qualified to run.
FACTS
• The three-‐term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
• 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa
the Constitution, which states:
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). The PRA was
" Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
convened to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (“Socrates” for
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30, 2001.
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
• COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
• On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
term for which he was elected.
• Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated
• This three-‐term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running
" Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
• COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit.
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
was elected.”

• The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than
ISSUE
three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
• Whether the recall resolution was valid -‐ YES
determining the three-‐term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
• Whether one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election -‐ YES service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
RULING time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
The recall resolution was valid.



interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or 1. GR: COMELEC has no jurisdiction over post-‐election controversies (ie na.elec na si
consecutive terms. Latasa). BUT, SC can waive procedure when interests need it. Like in this case na
• After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-‐ sobrang novel ang issue
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular 2. Latasa cannot run for City Mayor. Why?
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any a. He has served 3 terms. The argument that the conversion was an
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition involuntary relinquishment of his office, so he didn’t serve it fully daw
for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an (look at doctrine, requisites for DQ). This holds no water. Hello, he was
immediate re-‐election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening made the acting mayor na man… so he served that term.
period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. b. Also, there was no break AT ALL. 1992-‐2001. Even with the conversion,
• Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the he was in hold-‐over capacity. So served that term.
nd
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-‐election for a fourth term following three 3. Sunga can’t be mayor… you must get PLURALITY of votes. 2 highest lang siya… so
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-‐ totes not entitled. Further, may succession na man of office, so si VICE-‐MAYOR na
election for a fourth term as long as the re-‐election is not immediately after the lang mag.take over.
end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-‐way in the term following
the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-‐ FACTS:
election after the third term. • Certiorari Rule 65, questioning the resolution of COMELEC en banc denying the MR
• Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-‐ of Latasa in his case with Sunga. The assailed Resolution denied due course to the
election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. certificate of candidacy of petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring him disqualified
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur Province in the May 14, 2001
• In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted, and if he
is not an immediate re-‐election after his third consecutive term which ended on has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation null and void.
June 30, 2001. The immediate re-‐election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn • Latasa was the Mayor of Municipality of Digos, winning the 1992, 1995, and 1998
from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. elections. Digos was converted into a component city and Latasa, pursuant to
Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-‐
over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the
city mayor.
• On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for
4. Latasa v Comelec (RC) the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and
G.R. No. 154829 | Dec. 10, 2003 | AZCUÑA, J. likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor
Petitioner: Arsenio A. Latasa of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of
Respondent: Commission on Elections, Romeo Sunga city mayor.
• On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city
DOCTRINE: An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due
local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against

been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely
has fully served three consecutive terms. represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor
of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three
SUMMARY: Latasa was the Municipal Mayor of Digos, serving 3 consecutive terms (1992-‐ consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
1995, 95-‐98, 98-‐2001). It was converted into a COMPONENT CITY. Latasa then ran again for
• COMELEC cancelled Latasa’s certificate of candidacy. MR was filed and was
the CITY mayorship in 2001. Sunga was another candidate. He sought to disqualify Latasa
unresolved until the 2001 elections.
because of the 3 term rule. Latasa was DQ’d. However Latasa filed an MR… while that was
• Latasa won the 2001 elections and was sworn in as Mayor.
pending he got elected. Then COMELEC en banc ruled on the MR, saying DQ nga siya. Hence
• 2002, MR was denied.
this petition.
• NOTE: In Latasa’s certification there was a statement: “I am eligible to run…

blahblah” tapos may FOOTNOTE: Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal
Court held that:
mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor. So kahit si Latasa may
doubts.



Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or
ISSUES: barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction? YES altered, without the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
W/N Latasa was qualified to run as city mayor after serving 3 terms as municipal mayor? NO political units directly affected.
W/N Sunga gets the seat? NO • It must be noted that Municipality and City of Digos is the EXACT same thing… it
just met the revenue requirements (stated in FOOTNOTE of this digest)
HELD: • So SC said that LATASA already served the 3 consecutive terms… so he couldn’t run
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. na… SC cited the following cases to illustrate this (first bullet is case cited, below it
is the comparison made to the case now):

RATIO: o Lonzanida v. COMELEC, petitioner was elected and served two
COMELEC Jurisdiction YES consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for

• Mamba-‐Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his
winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and
qualifications. An opposing party’s remedies after proclamation would be to file a filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that
petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor
o Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to the
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid order to vacate the post. During the May 1998 elections, petitioner
application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial therein again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor. A petition to
justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not disqualify him was filed on the ground that he had already served three
hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just. consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that petitioner therein
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May
LATASA’s eligibility as CITY mayor NO 1995 elections, and that said petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-‐1998
• The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of " In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt,
consecutive terms. duly elected as mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then
• An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by
local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official reason of the conversion of Digos from municipality to
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. office as municipal mayor since the said office has been
2
• Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city . For one, there deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very
is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting

2
as chief executive of the local government unit. He never
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. -‐ (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief
component city it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the executive of Digos.

following requisites: o In Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court was confronted with the issue of
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management whether or not an assumption to office through a recall election should
Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National
be considered as one term in applying the three-‐term limit rule. Private
Statistics Office. respondent, in that case, was elected and served for two consecutive
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units terms as mayor. He then ran for his third term in the May 1998 elections,
at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his opponent faced recall
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-‐created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land are shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, private respondent
island. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. won and served for the unexpired term.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-‐recurring income.



" For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
questioned on the ground that he had already served as mayor holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
for three consecutive terms. This Court held therein that inhabitants for a total of eighteenconsecutive years. This is the very scenario
private respondent cannot be construed as having been sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
elected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the • In Labo v COMELEC that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not
May 1998 elections was considered by this Court as an necessarily entitle the candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation
interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. For as the winner of the elections. As an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that the
nearly two years, private respondent therein lived as a private rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
citizen. The same, however, cannot be said of petitioner candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
Latasa in the present case. notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
o Socrates v. COMELEC, the principal issue was whether or not private candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and
respondent Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn had already served for three their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number
consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however, cannot be said of the
immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay present case.
officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory • This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the
Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor, Victorino votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate
Dennis M. Socrates. On August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his is later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared elected. The
disqualification was filed on the ground that he cannot run for the said same merely results in making the winning candidate’s election a nullity.
post during the recall elections for he was disqualified from running for a
fourth consecutive term. This Court, however, ruled in favor of
respondent Hagedorn, holding that the principle behind the three-‐term
limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of terms, and that 5. Ong v Alegre (RC)
there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his
third term and before the recall election. ONG v. ALEGRE (RC for CG)
• This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an G.R. No. 163295 and 163354| Jan 23, 2006 | GARCIA, J.
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order
to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular Petitioner: Francis and Rommel G. Ong
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow Respondent: Joseph Stanley Alegre and COMELEC
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of DOCTRINE:
the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three Assumption into office and serving the term counts as “service of full term”. In relation to
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly the doctrine that: An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned
inhabitants for a total of eighteenconsecutive years. This is the very scenario has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.)
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

nd
SUNGA should be Mayor, since he garnered 2 highest number NO SUMMARY:
Francis Ong and Alegre are political rivals. In 1998-‐2001 term, Francis “won”. But it was
• This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
found after the term that Alegre won. Francis was re-‐elected in 2001-‐2004. So now, in the
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order
2004 elections, Alegre claims Francis served 3 consecutive terms. COMELEC said yes, so
to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
cancelled. Rommel, Francis’ brother then substituted him… but he was likewise DQ’d
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
because of late filing. So now, brothers Ong question w/n COMELEC committed GADALEJ is
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
cancelling their certificates of candidacies. The issue boils down to W/N Francis served the
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of



full term for 1998-‐2001, which dq’d him. His contention is that it was Alegre who had legally the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
won the 1998-‐2001 term, so he hadn’t completed the term. SC said, tanga! You were mayor continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term,
for 1998-‐2001. Francis served all three years. It would ridiculous to say that it had been should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-‐
interrupted. The decision in favor of Alegre came in 2001 after Francis had served from term rule.
1998-‐2001. So yeah… • In Lonzanida v COMELEC, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
FACTS: elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won
• 2 petitions, first, Rule 65 questioning granting of MR by COMELEC en banc and and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his
then the other is an injunction to prevent the implementation of such MR/Ruling proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a
• Francis Ong and Alegre were candidates for the 2004 elections, running as mayor decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and
for San Vicente, Camarines Norte. Francis was the incumbent mayor. declared the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner
• Alegre wanted to DQ Francis because three-‐consecutive term rule, Francis having, Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office
according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998
elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to
three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. disqualify, under the three-‐term rule, was filed and was eventually granted. There,
• This isn’t the first time they met… to digress, the two ran against each other in the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to
1998, Francis won. But in 2001 (after Francis had served the 98-‐2001 full term) the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-‐1998
COMELEC declared Alegre the winner pala of the 1998 election. (bagal nila…) mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court
• Back to the 2004 elections… COMELEC said that the 1998-‐2001 term shouldn’t be pointedly observed, Lonzanida “cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995
counted because si Alegre yung legally elected mayor. On MR, Alegre won… so DQ to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated] his
na si Francis on May 7, 2004. post before the expiration of the term.”
• May 8 (next day), Rommel, Francis’s brother, filed his certificate of candidacy, well • The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For
after the actual deadline, as a substitute for his bro under the Nacionalista Party. one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for
• May 9 (a day before the may10 elections), Alegre filed another petition for the stated reason of “failure of election”, and, as a consequence thereof, the
cancellation against Rommel, which was granted so the canvassers didn’t count proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-‐elect was nullified, followed by an order for
Rommel’s votes. SO ALEGRE WON the 2004 elections. Hence the two petitions…. him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the
1995-‐1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a
ISSUE: result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the
W/N COMELEC committed GADALEJ? NO continuity of service.
Everything hinges on the issue of W/N Francis served the 1998-‐2001 term? YES • On the other hand, the failure-‐of-‐election factor does not obtain in the present
case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in
HELD: the continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-‐2001 term. Unlike
In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were already passé, Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never
Rommel Ong’s petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and academic. ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente,
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-‐2001 term.
dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-‐048 AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
• It is true that the RTC-‐Daet, Camarines Norte ruled that it was Francis’ opponent 6. Dizon v Comelec (RL)
(Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally G.R. No. 182088 | January 30, 2009 | CARPIO, J
elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was Petitioner: ROBERTO L. DIZON
without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARINO P. MORALES
of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was
only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was SUMMARY: Dizon filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance
under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction seeking the reversal of
nd
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the Resolutions of the COMELEC 2 Division, affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in relation



to his petition to disqualify and/or to cancel Marino P. Morales’ (Morales) certificate of covered under the aforementioned provision, the instant petition failed to allege
candidacy. Dizon alleged that if Morales were to be allowed to run for the position of Mayor any material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy.
th nd st
of Mabalacat, Pampanga, the 2007 elections would have already been his 5 term, in • The COMELEC 2 Division ruled that he was Mayor from 1995-‐1998 (1 term),
nd
violation of the three-‐term limit. He alleged that Morales was proclaimed as Mayor in 1995, 1998-‐2001 (2 term) notwithstanding the decision of the RTC because he was able
1998, 2001 and 2004 and had fully served all terms. The COMELEC Division and En Banc to exercise the powers and enjoy the position of mayor as caretaker or “de facto
rd
ruled in a similar manner. They based their Resolutions on a decision of the SC in the Rivera officer” until June 2001, and on 2001-‐2003 (3 term).
case involving Morales wherein he filed for a COC for the 2004 elections but was o The SC already held that he had violated the three-‐term limit under
th
subsequently held to have violated the term limits as it was already his 4 term. The SC Section 43 of the LGC. He was not considered as a candidate in the 2004
affirmed the decision of COMELEC. For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification Elections. Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and
brought about by the three-‐term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three allows him to run again for the same position in the May 14, 2007
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same Elections.
nd
position for the same number of times. The Rivera ruling served as Morales’ involuntary • The COMELEC En Banc AFFIRMED the ruling of the 2 Division.
severance from office with respect to the 2004-‐2007 term. Involuntary severance from o The COC for the May 2004 Elections was cancelled. As a result,
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an respondent was not only disqualified but was also not considered a
interruption of continuity of service. Such decision was effectively immediately which led candidate in the May 2004 elections.
Morales to relinquish his position and for the vice-‐mayor to assume the office from May o The three-‐term limit does not apply whenever there is an involuntary
2007 to June 2007. The assumption, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted break.
Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July " The Constitution does not require that the interruption or
2004 to 30 June 2007. This serves a gap for the three-‐term limit. Hence, the SC said that hiatus to be a full term of three years.
st
Morales joining the May 2007 election is again his 1 term. " What the law requires is for an interruption, break or a rest
period from a candidate’s term of office "for any length of
FACTS: time."
• Roberto L. Dizon is a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality of Mabalacat, " Latsa v. Comelec: the law contemplates a rest period during
Pampanga. which the local elective official steps down from office and
• Marino P. Morales is the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
Pampanga. the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
• Dizon alleges Morales was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, o The three-‐term limit is not applicable in the instant case for lack of the
Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully served the two conditions: 1) respondent was not the duly-‐elected mayor of
same. Morales filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the Mabalacat in 2004 primordially because he was not even considered a
same position and same municipality. candidate; and 2) he has failed to serve the entire duration of the term
• Dizon argues that Morales is no longer eligible and qualified to run for the same of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May
position for the May 14, 2007 elections under Section 43 of the LGC which states 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed
that no local elective official is allowed to serve for more than 3 consecutive terms term.
for the same position. • Dizon submits that the factual findings made in the Rivera case should still be
• Morales asserts that he is eligible and qualified to do so because he was not applied in the present case because Morales had, except for one month and 14
elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. days, served the full term of 2004-‐2007. Morales’ assumption of the mayoralty
o He avers that the Commission en banc in Atty. Rivera III and De Guzman position on 1 July 2007 makes the 2007-‐2010 term Morales’ fifth term in office.
vs. Mayor Morales, affirmed the decision of the RTC which declared Dizon raises the following grounds before this Court:
Anthony Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections. ISSUE: W/N Morales violated the three-‐year term limit when he won as Mayor in the 2007
• His term then should be reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor Election—NO.
of Mabalacat, and that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. Hence, the
three term rule provided under the Local Government Code is not applicable to HELD: The petition has no merit.
him. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated 14
February 2008 as well as the Resolution of the Commission on Elections’ Second Division dated 27 July 2007.
• Further, he argues that the grounds stated in the instant petition are not covered
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. He contends that even if it is



RATIO: o Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-‐2007
• Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution reads: because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the
o The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, term.
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such o Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered computing the three-‐term limit.
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for o Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for
which he was elected. purposes of the three-‐term limit rule.
• Section 43(b) of the LGC restated the above provision. • Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through
• For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the lengthy litigations. x x x In other words, he was violating the rule on three-‐term
three-‐term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same raising the technicalities arising therefrom."
position for the same number of times. o The SC replied by citing the Lonzanida v. COMELEC case, which states
• There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the that:
disqualification: " The delay in resolving the election protest, despite it taking
o (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive about three years to finish, cannot be imputed to the
terms in the same local government post and petitioner.
o (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. " There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due
• In the Rivera case, the SC found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in
for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June office.
2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. " Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to
o However, he was disqualified in the May 2004 elections because of the move for the early resolution of the election protest while it
three-‐term limit. was pending before the RTC or to file a motion for the
o Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for execution of the RTC’s decision declaring the position of mayor
the 1998-‐2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the vacant and ordering the vice-‐mayor to assume office while the
continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-‐2001 term appeal was pending with the COMELEC.
because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or " Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally
after the expiry of the 1998-‐2001 term. sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot
• Such ruling served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his
the 2004-‐2007 term. chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral
o Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the election.
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service.
o Such decision was effectively immediately which led Morales to
relinquish his position and for the vice-‐mayor to assume the office from 7. Bolos v Comelec (MT)
May 2007 to June 2007. G.R. No. 184082 March 17, 2009
o Such assumption, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, Petitioner: NICASIO BOLOS, JR.
interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. vs.
Responents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REY ANGELES CINCONIEGUE
o Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30

June 2007.
Summary: For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong
• The SC conceded that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for
Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and
the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1
2002. In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking,
July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as
• However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full
for the 2004-‐2007 term. term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007. Issue is Whether or
• Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term.



not there was voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay by petitioner when involuntary renunciation, petitioner’s service is deemed to have been interrupted;
he assumed office as Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have fully served his third hence, he is not barred from running for another term.

term as Punong Barangay, warranting his disqualification from running for the same position • In a Resolution dated March 4, 2008, the First Division of the COMELEC ruled that
in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. YES. After three petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis,
consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption of office as Sangguniang
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following Bayanmember of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, was a voluntary renunciation of the
the end of the third consecutive term. Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term Office of Punong Barangay.
as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, • Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a

assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his Resolution dated August 7, 2008.
office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office. Issue: Whether or not there was voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay by
petitioner when he assumed office as Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have fully
Facts: served his third term as Punong Barangay, warranting his disqualification from running for
• This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the same position in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed grave abuse of discretion YES.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions promulgated Ratio:
on March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008 holding that petitioner Nicasio Bolos, Jr. is • The three-‐term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of
disqualified as a candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, the Constitution, which provides:
Dauis, Bohol in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
Kabataan Elections on the ground that he has served the three-‐term limit provided determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
in the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
Government Code of 1991. considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
• For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong was elected.

Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, • David v. Commission on Elections elucidates that the Constitution did not expressly
1997 and 2002. prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby
• In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, leaving to the law makers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office exigencies of public service. The discussions in the Constitutional Commission
as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be "[a]s may be
served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, determined by law," and more precisely, "[a]s provided for in the Local

2007. Government Code." Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides
• Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of that barangay officials are covered by the three-‐term limit, while Section
Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang 43(c) thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5)
Kabataan Elections. years. The cited provisions read, thus:
• Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x
candidate for the same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the ground that he had already position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
served the three-‐term limit. Hence, petitioner is no longer allowed to run for the as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
same position in accordance with Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and concerned was elected.
Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160. (c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five
• The issue before the COMELEC was whether or not petitioner’s election, (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second
assumption and discharge of the functions of the Office of Sangguniang Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the sangguniang kabataan members who were elected
Bayan member can be considered as voluntary renunciation of his office as Punong in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of barangay officials.

Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol which will render unbroken the • Socrates v. Commission on Elections held that the rule on the three-‐term limit,
continuity of his service as Punong Barangay for the full term of office, that is, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: The
from 2004 to 2007. If it is considered a voluntary renunciation, petitioner will be first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
deemed to have served three consecutive terms and shall be disqualified to run for consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
the same position in the October 29, 2007 elections. But if it is considered as an determining the three-‐term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary



renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the • In fine, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated March 4, 2008 and August
consecutive terms. 7, 2008, disqualifying petitioner from being a candidate for Punong Barangayin the
• After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated March 4, 2008 and
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. August 7, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

• In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court stated that the second part of SO ORDERED.
the rule on the three-‐term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-‐term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant
their elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for 8. Aldovino v Comelec (JM)
the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned G.R. 184836 | December 23,2009
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and Brion, J.
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Petitioners: Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand Talabong
Respondents: Commission on Elections and Wilfredo Asilo
• In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for
Sorry for the long digest. Didn’t want to leave out anything. I’ll update this later on. I made the summary long and
three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. detailed so that you can recite on the concepts in a more detailed manner.
• What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
renounced his position as Punong Barangayduring his third term when he ran for SUMMARY:
and won as Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office. FACTS: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
• The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation by suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official
petitioner of his position as Punong Barangay. unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted
• The COMELEC correctly held: It is our finding that Nicasio Bolos, Jr.’s for the purpose of the three-‐term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set
relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation. consecutive terms: for the 1998-‐2001, 2001-‐2004, and 2004-‐2007 terms, respectively. In
• As conceded even by him, respondent (petitioner herein) had already completed September 2005 or during his 2004-‐2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
two consecutive terms of office when he ran for a third term in the Barangay suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. The SC,
Elections of 2002. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing
Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10, 2004 [elections], he was not the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his
deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to
municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and
Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-‐
that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such
and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s favour in its
knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-‐term limit rule did not
position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-‐2007 term because of the
voluntary. suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
• Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran
for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong three-‐term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary
Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office. renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
• In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law.
He instead relinquished his office asPunong Barangay during his third term when



HELD: NO. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.The best
local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years – during which
an official has title to office and can serve To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
describes that an officer may hold an office. equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of
term that the constitutional provision contemplates.
Asilo’s 2004-‐2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-‐imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term. Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may
Constitution when it granted due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy for a prohibited have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From
fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss
required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an
contemplation of law. elective office demands.

Preventive suspension is an Interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render
who has been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. Officials under prev therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-‐term limit rule.
suspension are barred from performing functions of his office and does not receive salary
BUT does not vacate and lose title to his office. Loss of office only results upon a finding of Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term
guilt or liability. The official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the prev and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-‐term limitation. It can pose as a
suspension is lifted. Thus, while there is temporary incapacity, no position is vacated. This threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of
is what happened to Asilo. a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed
officials’ service in office and they do not overlap. soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
• Preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention
served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his more potent than the voluntary.
office.
• Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his FACTS:
three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept – interruption of a term Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms (1998-‐2001, 2001-‐
– on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. 2004, 2004-‐2007).
• If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at
all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may The Interruption—In September 2005, during his last term, the Sandiganbayan preventively
occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case. The Supreme Court however
intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s order and he resumed performing the functions of
serviceduring an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of his office and finished his term.
service occurs after there has been abreak in the term.
In the 2007 election, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION and the THREE TERM LIMIT petitioners in this case sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-‐term limit rule demands that preventive cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms. His
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in candidacy for a fourth term would therefore violate the three-‐term limit under Section 8,
office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption Article X and Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160 (Local Gov Code)
because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from



COMELEC’s ruling—the Second Division of COMELEC ruled against petitioners and in favor of The LIMITATION under the first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative and is a
Asilo. It reasoned that the three-‐term limit rule did not apply because Asilo failed to render clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact
complete service for the 2004-‐2007 term due to the Sandiganbayan suspension order. The indication of what to "serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is
COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the ruling of the Second Division, hence this clear – reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may
petition. render.1awphi1 In other words, the limitation refers to the term.

ISSUES The second branch of Sec 8 relates to the provision’s express initiative to prevent any
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it
three-‐term limit rule; expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." This
contemplated in Section 43(b) or RA 7160 declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.

HELD: A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of
assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared service for a full term" for purposes of the three-‐term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory
DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase
fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo. "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional
intent.
RATIO:
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is
Note: The present case is not the first time the court ruled on the three-‐term limit but it is the to give up, abandon, decline, or resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as
first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective official’s term. The contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in
case of Borja v. COMELEC did mention preventive suspension as an example of interruption mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional provision,
BUT doctrinally, Borja is not a controlling ruling. It DID NOT deal with preventive suspension. cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office.
It dealt with the application of the three-‐term rule on the term that an elective official The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of
acquired by succession. surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title
to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-‐term limit rule, such loss of title is
Three Term Limit Rule not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the
The first branch of Section 8 of Article X fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an application of the term limitation.
elective official’s stay in office to not more than three consecutive terms.

The provision refers to TERM as a period of time—three years—during which an official has Relevant Jurisprudence (This is a long read, GO straight to the SUMMARY of RULES if you
title to office and can serve. need to a quick review)
• Appari v. Court of Appeals: The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and Lonzanida v. COMELEC-‐-‐ whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-‐term limit
definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as
office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final
office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized and executory judgment. The SC ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive
which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which terms) were not present. “The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
he was elected or appointed. attempt to circumvent the three-‐term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
• Gaminde v. COA: Term is the time during which the officer may claim to hold office same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
one another. term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before



the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal Socrates v. COMELEC-‐-‐ also tackled recall vis-‐à-‐vis the three-‐term limit disqualification.
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a fourth
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In this
did not fully serve the 1995-‐1998 mayoral term.” election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 ½ years
after Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated
THE RULING IS CLEAR: It is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of
renders the three-‐term limit rule inapplicable. candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the
ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to the recall election and was
Ong v. Alegre and Rivera v. Comelec—also involved the issue of whether there had been a therefore disqualified to run because of the three-‐term limit rule.
completed term for purposes of the three term limit. BUT in these cases, the FINAL
JUDGMENT of the electoral contest came AFTER the term of the contested office had The Court ruled in favor of Hagedorn stating that “After three consecutive terms, an elective
expired. Thus, the elective officials in this case were never really unseated. local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
• In Ong, despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to office, the Court held that refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of the consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
three-‐term rule because prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
1. The final decision that the third-‐termer lost the election was without practical immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
and legal value because it was promulgated after the term of the contested constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
office had expired. When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the
2. The official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or
from the start to the end of the term whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms.”
• The Court said that it would be absurd if the official who was validly elected (the winner
of the election protest; the one who opposed Ong) would be considered, under the Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
three term rule, to have served the term by virtue of a meaningless electoral protest following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
ruling (dahil it was promulgated nung expired na yung term). subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after
• In Rivera—the Court rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-‐way in the term following the
contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." The Court third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose third term.
defeated when an official fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run
Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution
perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely." prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.

Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-‐term limitation because of Latasa v. COMELEC-‐-‐ whether a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive
what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a
still gave full effect to the three-‐term limitation because of the constitutional intent to city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter
strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue
zealously it guards the three-‐term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The
interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception. Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of
the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor
Adormeo v. COMELEC-‐-‐ dealt with the effect of recall on the three-‐term limit – the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the
disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3
the official lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor
election covering that term. The Court upheld the COMELEC’s ruling that the official was not held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
elected for three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, Montebon v. COMELEC-‐-‐ the highest-‐ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position
the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his of vice-‐mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for
defeat in the election for the third term. councilor was whether his assumption as vice-‐mayor was an interruption of his term as
councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-‐term limit rule. We ruled



that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result • Interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who has been charged
seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood
official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the • Officials under prev suspension are barred from performing functions of his office and
elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-‐mayor by does not receive salary BUT does not vacate and lose title to his office. Loss of office
operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor – an interruption that effectively only results upon a finding of guilt or liability. The official is reinstated to the exercise
placed him outside the ambit of the three-‐term limit rule. of his position as soon as the prev suspension is lifted. Thus, while there is temporary
incapacity, no position is vacated. This is what happened to Asilo.
SUMMARY OF RULES: • Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an
The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-‐term limit rule is elective officials’ service in office and they do not overlap.
one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must o Preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people
have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the
interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict power of his office.
intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to o Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has
no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept –
standard of what does not constitute an interruption. interruption of a term – on the other hand, requires loss of title to office.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an • If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at
effective interruption of service within a term, as held in Montebon. On the other hand, all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office serviceduring an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of
holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a service occurs after there has been abreak in the term.
reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION and the THREE TERM LIMIT
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter Strict adherence to the intent of the three-‐term limit rule demands that preventive
occurs during an office holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in
his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term "failure to serve" cannot be office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption
used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from
service can be rendered so that none is really lost. exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.The best
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X – both by structure indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
and substance – fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to three replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary
renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is
of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of
the elective official’s voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does term that the constitutional provision contemplates.
not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or authority" that may occur
for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
Comelec: voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may
Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss
of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an
NATURE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION (IMPORTANT!!!) elective office demands.



Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render • The law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-‐in-‐charge
service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-‐Governor, and the
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-‐term limit rule. Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-‐term limitation. It can pose as a • On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials
a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed • Some history on the ARMM relevant to the case:
soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing o On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled
more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
an interruption. Muslim Mindanao.” A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as
required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially
assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-‐
9. Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate (KL) tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
G.R. No. 196271 | 02/28/2012 | Brion, J. officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than
Petitioners: DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, 90 days after its ratification.
in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS o RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI,
MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-‐SAIDI J. SAPI-‐E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the
Respondents: SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended”) was the next
BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic
Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,
ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the

regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
SUMMARY: The case involves RA 10153 which reset the ARMM elections from August 8,
of September 2001.
2011 to May 2013. It also granted the President appointive powers for constitutional
o Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140 -‐ on June
elective local officials in the ARMM. The case discusses the constitutionality of such law. The
22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled
SC upheld the law in toto. Relevant to our topic, the case emphasized that Section 8 of
under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite
Article X grants a 3-‐year term to elective local officials which cannot be extended nor
to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
shortened. The holdover option is not legal since it would extend the 3-‐year term and the
o RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The
COMELEC special election shall shorten the term. Plebiscite requirement in RA 9054
province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same
overbroad since a plebiscite is only required for amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic
date.
Act constitutionally-‐essential to the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects
o RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic nd
regional elections to the 2 Monday of August 2005, and on the same
Act.
date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA

No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
FACTS (from the 2010 main decision):
o Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
• On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was
th various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No.
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8 of August 2011, to the
10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
the country’s regular national and local elections.



ISSUES: which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require ratification through a
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with plebiscite.
national and local elections? YES.
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the
the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements? NO to all 3. creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional? NO. areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM? NO. to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and effective, questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices? NO. because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
powers over autonomous regions? NO.
While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides
RATIO: with the people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the
(a.) The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the
of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all amendments
to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective,
following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution. this would lead to impractical and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress by
impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably
there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down follow the holding of a plebiscite.
to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, (c.) The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established that elective
Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-‐year term limit
not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does
ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending
was enacted and ratified by the people. the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-‐year term limit by
inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local
(b.) A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended
the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM by holdover by Congress.
elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various
provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first laws. One significant difference between the present case and these past cases is that while
election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054. these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan
officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no case refers to local elective officials -‐ the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and
need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly -‐ whose terms fall within the three-‐year
of RA No. 9054. term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overbroad (important for Sec. 18 Art. X) Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that “[t]he creation of the autonomous basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply
region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists;
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]” We interpreted this to mean that only it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-‐essential to the creation
of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution



Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that Facts:
it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of BP Blg. 885 was passed which provided for the creation of the new Province of Negros del
its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the Norte. The new province was carved out of the already existing province of Negros
holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this decision, Occidental. Negros del Norte was formed out of the northern part of the province of Negros
absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the Occidental. The same law provided that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed
legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the new province only.
ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition on December 23, 1985 for the purpose of stopping
constitutional mandate of synchronization. COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioners allege that such law is unconstitutional and does not conform to the provisions of
(d.) More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections the Local Government Code regarding the requisites for creation of new provinces. On the
and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date. Even assuming that the one hand, the Constitution provides in Article XI, Sec. 3 (which is now Art. X, Sec. 10) that
COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can compel the “No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
elected officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the
and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do unit or units affected.”
this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, On the other hand, according to Sec. 197 of the LGC, “a province may be created if it has a
which limits the term of local officials to three years. territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least
five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the
Issues (e) and (f) have been discussed in previous topics. Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years,
and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or
provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this
Sec. 10 section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.”
1. Tan v Comelec (QN) Due to the Christmas holidays when the Court was in recess, the plebiscite pushed through
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
on January 3, 1986 despite the pendency of the case because no TRO was issued. Petitioners
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA thereafter supplemented their petition and still prayed that a writ of prohibition be issued
ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND against the COMELEC to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the
CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners, plebiscite. They alleged that there was still serious issues with the plebiscite conducted. For
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents. one thing, the plebiscite was only confined to the inhabitants of the territory which would
Alampay, J. cover Negros del Norte. The other residents of Negros Occidental were not included.
On the part of the respondents, the Solicitor General argued that the law should be given
Summary: A new law was passed which created the province of Negros del Norte which was the presumption of legality. The SolGen furthermore argued that there was no irregularity
carved out of the northern part of Negros Occidental. Such law provided that the plebiscite with the plebiscite held because the areas of Negros Occidental which would not form part
was to be held in the area of the newly proposed Negros del Norte, without taking the votes of Negros del Norte do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term “unit or units
of the other areas in the Negros Occidental. The SC ruled that such law and the creation of affected” as provided for in the Constitution. It invoked the case of Paredes v. Executive
Negros del Norte is unconstitutional. The plebiscite which was held was also declared to be Secretary. Such case held that when a barangay is to be separated from the municipality in
null and void. The Constitution provides that no new local government unit shall be created order to form a new municipality, the plebiscite need not be held in the entire municipality.
without the conduct of a plebiscite in the “area or areas” affected. Such phrase shall be The SolGen also moved that the case be dismissed because the issue was already moot since
construed to mean that the plebiscite should be conducted in the areas where the new the plebiscite already approved the creation of the new province (164,734 in favor, 30,400
province will be as well as in the province from which such new province will be carved out against).
from. The case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary as invoked by respondents was abandoned Issues: WON the creation of Negros del Norte is valid ! NO
by the Court for being contrary to the Constitution. Further, the Court also held that the Held/Ratio: WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
territory requirement in the LGC only refers to the land area and does not include the proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the
territorial waters of the proposed province. The area of the proposed Negros del Norte officials thereof are also declared null and void.
failed to reach the minimum of 3,500 square kilometers of territory as provided for in the
LGC. THE PHRASE “UNIT OR UNITS AFFECTED” SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN ITS GENERAL SENSE.



• The boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would be • Such measures were based on data by the National Census and Statistics Office.
substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there
can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
• The two political units of Negros del Norte and Negros Occidental would indeed be
affected by the creation of the new political units. 2. League of Cities v Comelec (CA)
G.R. No. 176951, 1777499, 17806 | February 15, 2011 | Justice Bersamin
o They will be affected in terms of a change in the borders, change in the Petitioners: (In all 3 petitions) League of Cities of the Philippines; City of Calbayog
land area, and a change in the economy of the province. (Seven out of 15 Respondents: Comelec + many municipalities and provinces
sugar mills in Negros Occidental are located in the territory of Negros del
Norte.) Summary: These are the last two cases concerning the 16 Cityhood Laws converting 16
• The alleged good intentions (of promoting autonomy of local governments) cannot municipalities into component cities. After twice reversing itself, the SC finally ruled that the
prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically laws are constitutional. When RA 9009 was passed increasing the income threshold for
directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected conversion to component cities from PhP 20M to PhP 100M, Congress made an exemption
and complied with. (PNoy should read that sentence.) that those who have pending conversion bills are exempt from the new requirement. This
• The Constitution explicitly provides that the plebiscite should be conducted in the created a substantial distinction, thus it did not violate the EPC. Substantial distinction lies in
unit or units affected. the capacity & viability of the 16 municipalities to become component cities of their
o As such, the plebiscite should have been conducted in the entire respective provinces (they are economic hubs, etc.). Also, the imposition of the income
province of Negros Occidental, not just the proposed Negros del Norte. requirement of P100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the
• The law creating Negros del Norte is indeed unconstitutional insofar as it provides sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data
that the plebiscite should be conducted only in the new territory of Negros del buttressed the figure. As regards the procedural propriety of the numerous MRs, the Court
Norte and not in Negros Occidental. said that when a motion for leave and allowed by Court, it is not a prohibited pleading
• The plebiscite held on January 3 is null and void. However, a new plebiscite cannot anymore. Principle of immutabiity and res judicata won’t apply since case was not final then
be conducted because there is no legal basis to do so. yet. In the final MR, the SC basically reiterated what was in the earlier Resolution.
• The creation of the province of Negros del Norte is thus without any legal basis
and must be erased. Facts:
• Consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines
THE CASE OF PAREDES V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY IS NOT AVAILING IN THIS CASE (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality
• The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court of the 16 laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city
then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not interpret the Constitution. (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites
• The said case should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. The case pursuant to the subject laws.
itself mentioned that when a municipality is to be formed out of barangays to be • First SC Decision (November 2008) declared unconsti the Cityhood Laws. MR and
separated from the mother municipality, all the voters therein are affected. second MR both denied. But in another Decision (December 2009), the SC reversed
• What is applicable is the case of Lopez v. COMELEC where it was held that it was itself. MR granted (2nd reversal, Aug. 24, 2010 Resolution)
constitutionally infirm when not all the residents of Bulacan and Rizal were • Considering that the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the
included in a referendum which asked if the people were willing to give up some constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and the novelty of the issues involved, SC
towns in the said provinces to Metro Manila. decides to hear this new MR of the Aug. 24 Resolution
• The case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary was explicitly abandoned by the Court
for being contrary to the Constitution. Issue: W/N the Cityhood Laws are constitutional ! YES! (reversed again!)
Held: WHEREFORE, the MR of the "Resolution" is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24,
THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS DEL NORTE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LAND AREA REQUIREMENT IN THE LGC. 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws—Republic Acts Nos. 9389, etc.—are
• “Territory” as used in the LGC refers to land area and excludes the waters. declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
o There would have been no need for the legislators to use the adjective
“contiguous” if they had intended the term “territory” to embrace not Ratio:
only land area but also territorial waters. The 16 Cityhood Bills don’t violate Art. X, Sec. 10 of the Constitution.
• The proposed new province of Negros del Norte would only cover a total land area • The tenor of the previous ponencias is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood
of 2,765.4 square kilometers. Provinces are required to have at least 3,500 square Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code
kilometers. (LGC), as amended by RA 9009, particularly ! Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. –a) A



municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
locally generated annual income, as certified by the DoF, of at least P100,000,000.00 for goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive & accountable
at least 2 consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the ff local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
requisites: LGUs shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities & resources.
o (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general • Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, & non-‐recurring income. municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by
• Prior to the amendment, LGC required only an average annual income of at least P20M enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
for the last 2 consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices. municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and
• Rationale for the enactment of R.A. 9009 (sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel) ! development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested
to avert the mad rush of municipalities converting to cities, by increasing the income by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless
reqt to 100M, which should be all locally-‐sourced. Before, city-‐aspirants include the pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
Internal Revenue Allotment (funds that came from the national gov’t) in the previous • As to the petitioner’s feared reduction in IRA because of the 16 munc’s conversion into
P20M amount. cities ! To be sure, petitioners are entitled to a "just share," not a specific amount. But
• While R.A. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency the feared reduction proved to be false when, after the implementation of the Cityhood
of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. (SC provided a table)
Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20 million • What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA shares
income requirement of the old Sec. 450, LGC. was based on a computation of what they would receive if respondent municipalities
• Based on the delibs, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during were not to become component cities at all. Of course, that would mean a bigger
the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement amount to which they have staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils down
of P100M imposed by R.A. 9009. to money and how much more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain
• Even without this exception, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and as municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national government for
capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They were centers cities.
of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of
agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. (All 16 MR AGAIN!!! (April 12, 2011)
were described) Facts: The League of Cities filed an MR of the previous decision. They contend that SC can no
• Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress. Congress has the power to alter or longer modify its judgment since it’s final & executory (res judicata). On the merits, same
modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. But it is also true that, in effect, the issues. EPC and right of LGUs to a just share in the national taxes.
Cityhood Laws amended R.A. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since
the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the municipalities from the amendatory R.A. Issue: W/N the earlier Resolution should be reversed. NO!

9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. Held: WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam MR is denied with finality.

The Cityhood Laws don’t violate Sec. 6, Art. X and the EPC Ratio:
• Earlier ruling said EPC was violated and that Sec. 6, Art. X was violated because the On propriety of the many MRs
Cityhood Laws infringed on the "just share" that other LGUs shall receive from the • LCP assails the jurisdiction of the SC in promulgating the earlier Resolution, claiming
national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them. that it’s final & executory. Contended that the SC violated rules of procedure, the
• Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we NOW declare that there was valid principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments.
classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the EPC. • SC ! We disagree. As a rule, a second MR is a prohibited pleading. Thus, a decision
• EPC provides a valid classification. Here, there’s a substantial distinction! becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first MR.
• Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second MR is granted by the
respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood Court, the Court therefore allows its filing. In such a case, the second MR is no longer a
bills during the 11th Congress. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to prohibited pleading.
respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of • The actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with
the law, not by R.A. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section the Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity attending
2 (a) ! Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the or tainting the proceedings. Also, the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of technicality in order to render just
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-‐reliant and equitable relief.



• On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply • LCP ! argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member
herein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events recounted herein indicates cities, considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for
that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with conversion at the time of their creation.
finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments and res • SC ! Argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income
judicata did not yet come into play. requirement of P20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential
government facilities, services, and special functions vis-‐à-‐vis the population of a
16 Cityhood Laws were exempted from coverage of RA 9009 component city. We also stressed that the increased income requirement of P100
• LCP ! Reiterate that the Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 6 & Sec. 10 of Art. X of Consti, the million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain
EPC, & the right of LGUs to a just share in the national taxes. viable as a component city.
• SC ! NO! Congress clearly intended that the LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws be • Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the
specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor
• The conversion bills of the respondents were all unanimously and favorably voted upon was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-‐effects that were likely to
by the Members of the House and the Senate. This shows that the exemption clauses arise.
ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the
clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the No violation of right to share under the IRA
coverage of R.A. No. 9009. • LCP ! Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes
• SC ! NO! The share of LGUs is a matter of percentage under Sec 285 of the LGC, not a
PhP 100M income requirement is arbitrary. specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of
• LCP ! Contend that the new income requirement of P100M from locally generated population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also
sources is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities
municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities.
converted into cities (Sta. Rosa, Navotas, San Juan, Dasmariñas, Biñan) • However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a
• SC ! The contention of LCP does not persuade. As indicated in the earlier Resolution constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city
59 existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100m becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of IRA entitlement
based on the figures by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that
cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the P100 million threshold received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and
income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably Section 286 of the LGC.
unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100m income requirement is not • The Cityhood Laws are not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The respondents
difficult to comply with. are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have
• Based on delibs in the Senate as to why a municipality wants to convert into a city ! demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are
Once converted into a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA
the share that it would be receiving over the internal revenue allotment than it would with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will
have if it were to remain a municipality. have to share with only around 120 cities.
• The municipalities cited by LCP as having generated the threshold income of P100m
from local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro
Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered
by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines,
including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions. This reality underscores the danger the Sec. 11: MMDA v Garin (HQ)
enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-‐located local
Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have Respondent: Dante Garin
more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-‐flung areas.
• There should also be no question that the LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to SUMMARY: Garin’s (a lawyer) driver’s license was confiscated since he parked illegally along
a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become Binondo and in lieu of his license, he was given a traffic violation receipt which was valid as
component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade temporary license. He wrote a letter to MMDA Chair Oreta requesting the return of his
and commerce, transpo, tourism, etc license, no reply was received so Garin filed a complaint before RTC. Basically, the case



revolves around the validity of Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 (Act Creating MMDA) on the grounds of
the undue delegation, violation of due process etc. Specifically, Garin said that there was no MMDA filed a petition before SC and said that Memo Circular is valid (since it was validly
IRR to implement Sec 5(f) and that in effect gave MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive passed in the presence of a quorum) and Garin (or the drivers in general) was not deprived
erring motorists of their licenses. MMDA said there was an IRR which is the MMDA Memo of the opportunity to be heard because under the rules, he can appeal and the judiciary
Circular TT-‐95-‐001 and there was no violation of Garin’s due process since he can appeal retains the power to determine the validity of confiscation. MMDA , to bolster its argument,
naman and has other remedies etc. Garin said the Memo Circular is invalid because there points out that under the terms of confiscation, the licensee has 3 options: 1) voluntarily pay
was no quorum when it was passed. RTC ruled in favor of Garin. Actually, this case has been the imposable fines 2) protest the apprehension by filing protest with the MMDA
rendered moot since new MMDA Chair Bayani Fernando implemented MMDA Memo Adjudication committee or 3) request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor’s
Circular 04 which makes use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket and sabi sa circular MMDA office.
can no longer confiscate driver’s license.
While this is pending, MMDA Chair Bayani Fernando implemented Memo Circular 04 –
But the Court made some pronouncements since the case/situation may happen again when outlining the procedures for the use of Metropolitan Traffic Ticket. So basically, erring
MMDA issues another circular similar to the previous one that authorizes the confiscation of motorists are issued MTT which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers can
driver’s license. SC held that the MMDA is not vested with police power. If you examine RA no longer confiscate driver’s license.
7294, you can see that MMDA’s powers are limited to administration, coordination,
implementation etc. There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, ISSUE: W/N MMDA Memo Circular TT-‐95-‐001 is valid? Na-‐moot.
let alone legislative power. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers the MMDA or
its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the So the Court answered this issue: WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could
general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.” All of its functions are administrative validly exercise police power? NO
in nature. Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 is understood by the lower court and by
the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ HELD: Petition Dismissed.
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise RATIO:
of police power. (Note: MMDA is not precluded naman from confiscating driver’s licenses as As can be gleaned from above, may supervening events na so the case of Garin was
long as there is a traffic law or regulation enacted by the legislature or LGU. MMDA is only rendered moot and academic BUT since MMDA is not precluded from re-‐implementing the
allowed to enforce such law but not to enact ordinances by itself.) previous scheme (or similar to it) that would entail confiscating driver’s license, the Court
deemed it proper to make the following statements:
FACTS:
MMDA confiscated Garin’s driver’s license for parking illegally along Binondo and was issued 1. License to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in
a traffic violation receipt (TVR) as a temporary driver’s license for 7 days. In the TVR, Garin the exercise of its police power
was directed to report to MMDA Traffic Ops after 48 hrs from date of apprehension. Basically, it is a privilege like license to operate cockpit, timber licensing
Moreover, it was stated that criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem after 30 days. agreements or legislative franchise to operate electric plant. Cited many cases but
Before expiration of the TVR, Garin wrote a letter to MMDA Chair Oreta requesting the the bottomline is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which
return of his license. Since Garin did not receive any reply, he filed a complaint before the has the power of and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles
court. Basically he assailed the validity of Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 (An Act Creating the MMDA). may be operated on the state highways
He said it constituted an undue delegation of legislative power since it allows MMDA to fix
and impose unspecified (therefore unlimited) fines and other penalties. Moreover, Garin 2. MMDA is not vested with police power (IMPORTANT)
argued that absent any IRR – such provision grants MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive • RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power and that ALL ITS
erring motorists of their licenses, pre-‐empting judicial determination of the validity of the FUNCTIONS ARE ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE
deprivation and thereby violating due process clause. MMDA, on its part, said that Sec 5(f) of • Cited MMDA v. Bel Air Case: (mini digest) MMDA claimed that it had
RA 7924 has IRR which is MMDA Memo Circular TT-‐95-‐001. So Garin now questioned the authority to open subdivision street owned by BelAir to public traffic
validity of such circular. because MMDA is an agent of the state endowed with police power in
the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. It argued that no
RTC: Held that MMDA Memo Circular TT-‐95-‐001 is void since it was created during a meeting ordinance was needed to open the Neptune Street to the public. SC held
of the Metro Manila Council wherein there was no quorum. It also held that the summary that MMDA is not a LGU or public corp endowed with legislative power
confiscation of driver’s license constituted an unlawful deprivation of property right (later, therefore it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
SC said it is not a property right but a mere privilege) without due process of law.



community. So absent an ordinance, MMDA’s order to open a street is • The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall “install
invalid and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and
• Police Power Defined: The power vested by the Constitution in the penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations,
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or revoke drivers’ licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for regulations
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the • Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
same. legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been
• (Police power) Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, delegated (the City of Manila in this case), MMDA is not precluded –
it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing and in fact is duty-‐bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
legislative power. But it can be delegated to LGUs etc. (just remember licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
undue delegation cases) management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
• Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
government units. With the passage of RA 7924 Metropolitan Manila education programs
was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and • This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-‐Air that the MMDA is a
the administration of "metro-‐wide" basic services affecting the region development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies
placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
• So MMDA’s powers are limited to formulation, coordination, people’s organizations, non-‐governmental organizations and the private
implementation, management, setting policies, administration etc. sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
• There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let • Some drama: “A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate
alone legislative power. There is no provision in RA 7924 that services with metro-‐wide impact that transcend local political
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic
inhabitants of Metro Manila.” management and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to
• The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." untangle the increasingly traffic-‐snarled roads of Metro Manila. But
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA’s enabling law, which
coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in
organizations, non-‐governmental organizations and the private sector this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast regulation arising from a legitimate source.”
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
• Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation
of the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Sec. 16: Ampatuan v Puno (RK)
the metropolis. DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-‐GENERALE
– versus –
• Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 is understood by the lower HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and alter-‐ego
court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate of President Gloria Macapagal-‐Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and on behalf of the President of the Philippines,
and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any other ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating in ARMM
G.R. No. 190259 | June 7, 2011
ABAD, J (yay!).:
3. Sec 5 (f) grants MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations (Important yung naka-‐bold) Summary: PGMA issued Proclamation 1946 placing Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
• Enumerates the “Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Cotabato under a state of emergency and calling out the PNP and AFP to prevent and
Development Authority.” suppress lawless violence therein. Later AO 273 and AO 237-‐A were issued delegating
supervision of ARMM from the President to the DILG. Petitioners question the issuances



because (1) it violates ARMM autonomy; (2) there was improper exercise of Emergency o The proclamation and AO’s did not provide for exercise of emergency powers.
Powers; (3) there were no factual bases for such issuances. SC dismissed the petition. (1) It
did not violate autonomy of ARMM since the President merely delegated her powers to Issue(s):
facilitate the investigations. “The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of 1. (!)WON Proclamation 1946 and the AO’s violate the principle of local autonomy
the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody (Article X)
for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-‐Governor, petitioner 2. WON PGMA invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule and PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence.
on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong 3. WON PGMA had factual bases for her actions
named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-‐Generale, Acting Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ARMM Vice-‐Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or Ratio:
operations of the ARMM.”
1. Local Autonomy
Facts: “The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the
• After the Maguindanao massacre, PGMA, on 24 November 2009, issued Proclamation principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President
1946 placing the Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato under a state of authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct
emergency. The AFP and the PNP were directed to undertake such measures, as governmental powers over the region.”
allowed by the Constitution and Law, to prevent and suppress lawless violence in the
said places. Court disagrees:
• On 27 November 2009, PGMA issued Administrative Order 273 (“AO 273”) “The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
“transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity
Later, Administrative Order 273-‐A (“AO273-‐A”) amended AO 273 due to issues raised in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-‐Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong,
over the terminology (the use of “transferring”) used and was replaced by “delegating” assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found
under the amending AO. in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
• Claiming encroachment of ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners who are (were) ARMM Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-‐
officials filed a petition for prohibition. Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of
o AUTONOMY: That Proclamation 1946 and AO’s empowered DILG secretary to the ARMM.”
take over ARMM’s operations and seize regional power, in violation of the
principle of autonomy under RA 9054 (Expanded ARMM Act) and the (VERBATIM FROM CASE, NOTHING MORE)
Constitution.
o CONTROL: That the President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise,
not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the 2. Emergency Powers
latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under
o EMERGENCY POWERS: That the President had no factual basis for declaring a Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City
of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. Hence, the SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other
deployment of troops and taking over ARMM constitutes invalid exercise of national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
emergency power President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
o PRAYER: That Proclamation 1946, AO 273 & AO 273-‐A are unconstitutional; it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
enjoin the DILG, PNP, and AFP from implementing them carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
• OSG’s Comment: resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
o Did not deprive ARMM of autonomy—restored peace and order next adjournment thereof.
o Issued the proclamation pursuant to “calling out” power as Commander-‐in-‐
Chief—She had the wisdom to call out based on intel reports The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
o There was proper delegation of supervisory power to the DILG—no blanket places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authority to replace and suspend officials; delegation was for facilitation of authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to
investigation prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly



vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the
President’s actions.
3. Factual Bases

The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from Sec. 18-19

the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that 1. Abbas v Comelec (VG)
the “President shall be the Commander-‐in-‐Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and consolidated with Mama-‐o v. Carague
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989 | CORTES, J.:
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x”
Summary: The Tripoli agreement, signed in 1976 provided for the establishment of
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise autonomy in southern Philippines. Later the 1987 Constitution provided for the creation of
of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the cordilleras. Pursuant to the Constitution,
acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the RA 6734 was passed. The implementation of RA 6734 which provides for the creation of
President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao is scheduled to cover plebiscite in 13 provinces and
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such 9 cities in Mindanao and Palawan. Abbas and Mama-‐o filed their respective petitions to
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to enjoin COMELEC from conducting plebiscite and declaring RA 6734 unconstitutional. ISSUES:
the President’s judgment. Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement – No; WON R.A.
emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution – No
the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged
that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows 1. There should be no conflict as the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim
that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too. Mindanao is stated in the Constitution. Any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No.
6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining
But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming that the Tripoli Agreement is a
explained the factual bases for the President’s decision to call out the armed forces. (1) binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of
Ampatuans and Mangudadatu are prominent families in Maguindanao with arsenal of armed the land. But as internal law, it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment
followers. (2)PNP and AFP had to prepare for any retaliatory actions from the Magudadatu of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the
clan. (3) Ampatuan has approx. 2,400 people with 2,000 firearms; Mangudadatus have 1,800
personnel with about 200 firearms; (4) Both clans have Special Civilian Auziliary Army of 2. RA 6734 is constitutional.
about 500 for Ampatuans and 300 for Mangudadatus; (5) Armed clashes between the two A. The creation of the region is not unconditional. The creation of the autonomous region
warring clans and their armed supporters could happen; (6) intel reports suggest a possible shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
involvement of Rebel Armed Groups (RAGs). units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor
of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued B. RA 6734 does not expand the scope of the autonomous region nor is violative of the
Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed EPC.
and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was - First, the Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine
movement in these places of both high-‐powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to which areas should constitute the autonomous region which guides the legislature.
the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.
to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental
loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and powers.
security in the affected places. - Second, equal protection permits of reasonable classification.
C. On the conflict of Islamic law v. Man made law. No actual controversy between real
Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn litigants exists.
the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. D. On the merging of Regions. There is no conflict between the power of the President to
merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or



merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
administrative regions. majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
E. On oversight Committee: The creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
result of the plebiscite. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen
effectivity. months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
FACTS Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
" The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation provide for legislative powers over:
of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the (1) Administrative organization;
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." (2) Creation of sources of revenues;
" These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and (4) Personal, family, and property relations;
Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare (5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional . (6) Economic, social and tourism development;
" The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of (7) Educational policies;
the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(MNLF) with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic general welfare of the people of the region.
Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
- It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
autonomy." " Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law
" In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for on August 1, 1989.
regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of ISSUES
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive 1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement – No
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant 2. WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution -‐ No
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." HELD: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
" To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions RATIO
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. 1. There should be no conflict as the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution Mindanao is stated in the Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. - Petitioners assume that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with binding international agreement.
the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed - But the Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty,
of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding
government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the international agreement.
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions " The SC finds does not find it necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the
of this Constitution and national laws. nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government
whether under public international or internal Philippine law.



" In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. determination, merge the existing regions.
- The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be " Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
what is so provided in the Constitution. shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
- Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority
the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a " The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included
binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not
of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2)
enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the
as the latter [SALONGA, citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there
v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
- Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE
a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-‐492 (1986)].
contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.
Meaning of “majority”
2. RA 6734 is constitutional. " As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim
" Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18].
autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the " The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a
outcome of the plebiscite. majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a
- In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim " In Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect
Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for
plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous
Constitution." region, which reads:
- The tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and
the favorable votes were obtained. geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
SC: the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
1. The questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of " It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend,
the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each
autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision clearly indicates of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the " For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the
constitutional requirements. totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that
2. There is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region
Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
Constitution and fills in the details, thus: the purpose."
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take " It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent
be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) units.
days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in " Mama-‐o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share
Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,



and other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of - The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that
the autonomous region. should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the
- He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one hand, and the national law on the other
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-‐Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law.
cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine " Islamic law v. Man made law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is
(9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected
cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. to any "man-‐made" national law.
- By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, SC: As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
the Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
constitution itself has prescribed to be limited. - In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are
" After assailing the inclusion of non-‐Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an
Mama-‐o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-‐Muslim areas in Mindanao alleged violation of religious freedom.
should likewise be covered. - The Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a
- He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-‐Muslim areas, its scope perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national
should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-‐Muslim areas in law.
Mindanao in order for the other non-‐Muslim areas denies said areas equal " Merging of Regions. They also question the constitionality of Article XIX, section 13 of
protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution. R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
SC disagrees: Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote
" First, the Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
which areas should constitute the autonomous region. administrative regions:Provided, however, that the President may, by
- Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's - According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge
discretion. regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
- Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic
This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
powers. which provides:
" Second, any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
carry with it the exclusion of other areas. and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
- Again, the areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region the political units directly affected.
constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be SC: R.A. No. 6734 refers to the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the
inquired into by this Court. National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
- Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification. administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of
- In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742].
392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from another - Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee cities, municipalities and barangays.
of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been - While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in
made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
Constitution itself. President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments.
C. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates - There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative
the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of
local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger



expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to Summary: A plebiscite was held pursuant to the constitution of the Cordillera Autonomous
administrative regions. Region. Only one province, Ifugao, said that they wanted to be a part of the CAR. COMELEC
" Oversight Committee: They also question the validity of the provisions in the Organic tried to constitute it based on the fact that Ifugao said yes, essentially making Ifugao = CAR.
Act which create an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous SC said this was not allowed, based on the law constituting the CAR. Art. X, Sec. 18, and the
region of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional Abbas case are here by way of contrast. That ruling, in interpreting the Consti provision,
government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. determined which provinces or bodies would constitute the new autonomous region. This
- Said provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices case deals with the situation where only one province said yes, thus making the new AR
and their properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a composed of only one province. This situation, as discussed below, will not fly.
schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer should be
accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only
government. province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
- Petitioners -‐ unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, FACTS
the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked with supervising the • On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would in effect Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-‐Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite
delay the creation of the autonomous region. held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
SC: Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent • The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that
units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao
effect. Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces
- The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to and city above-‐mentioned.
supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less • Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of
operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
transition period for the regional government. o On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the
- Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality President reiterating the COMELEC resolution and provided
" Considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and
city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of
Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably — then,
2. Ordillos v Comelec (LC) alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR."
Dec. 4, 1990 GR 93054 • As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting
Lots of Petitioners and Respondents: What you need to know: Petitioners question the constitution of the CAR from the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of
one province. Respondents, including COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice, are for it. (pasting full list below just in March 1991.: nad
case)
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON • Even before this resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a
MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-‐Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive
and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and
REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE
(This is what the CAR is replacing).
LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, • On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-‐
LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-‐A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL ratification of the Organic Act for the Region.
PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, o The COMELEC merely noted said petition.
RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; The
Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet • On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among
Officer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents. the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
ratification of the Organic Act.-‐ nad



• The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in o Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act
only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be
Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. constituted from only one province.
ISSUES: o Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government
• The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It
o declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the further provides that:
Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, " SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and
Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of
restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
funds for the purpose and Autonomous Region . . ."
o declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board " From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and province may constitute the autonomous region.
effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been o Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of
enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
constituent units. exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small
• Essentially – Can Ifugao, as a single province, constitute the CAR by itself? – NO. area.
o Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in
RATIO the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional
This petition is meritorious. assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the
" The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Autonomous Region. chanrobles virtual law library
" It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that: o If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera
o "Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an
and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies — the Cordillera
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics powers over the province of Ifugao.
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well o And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines,
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." population-‐wise, it would have too many government officials for so few
" The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that people.:-‐cralaw
"region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. " Article XII, Section 10 of the law (not the Constitution, take note) creates a Regional
o The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the
o This is supported by the fact that the thirteen regions into which the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector.
provinces. o he Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial
" Ifugao is a province by itself. Planning and Development Coordinator.
o To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, o The Board's functions are almost similar to those of the Provincial
municipalities, and geographical areas. Coordinator's
o It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and " If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such
cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to
characteristics. perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only
o The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.-‐ nad mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The
" The well-‐established rule in statutory construction that the language of the respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of
Constitution, as much as possible, should be understood in the sense it has in common a single province must, therefore, fail.
use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary " Further, Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) allotting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos
meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this (P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements
case. cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.



" These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably — can,
Autonomous Region was never contemplated by the law creating it. alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR."
" The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas " The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the
enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Cordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-‐Apayao and Baguio City, are supposed to determine whether and which —
o It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces o whether there shall be an autonomous region in the Cordillera and in Muslim
and city above mentioned. Mindanao and
o The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra, o which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in the two Republic
185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-‐Apayao, 214,000; Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of the
Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of Constitutional Commission, 487-‐492 [1986]).
these five provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census " The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall
" SC goes on to enumerate sections of the law which are inconsistent and incompatible comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the
with the idea of having a sole province compose the CAR. same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera.
o Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with o However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue
the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members coming from different on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera
provinces and cities in the Region. could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to
" Under the respondents' view, the Commission would have a constitute it.
Chairman and only one member. It would never have a quorum. o And as the SC has already discussed, it CANNOT exist with only one province.
o Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come " Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can
from various provinces and cities of the Region. validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
o Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various o The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the
indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Cordillera Autonomous Region.
o Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional " WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission
language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February
regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language. 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
" The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic
infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be
Region.:-‐cralaw still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
o To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only
violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but
would also be impractical and illogical.
" Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, is not applicable in the case at bar. 3. Badua v CBA (JG)
o The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase February 14, 1991 | J. Grino-‐Aquino
"by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units called for the Petitioner: SPOUSES LEONOR and ROSA BADUA
purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated: Respondents: CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION, CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, MANUEL TAO-‐IL,
" what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes AMOGAO-‐EN KISSIP, DALALO ILLIQUES, JUANITO GAYYED, PEDRO CABANTO, VICENTE DAYEM and DAVID QUEMA
approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, RECIT-‐READY: This case involves a land dispute between petitioner-‐spouses Badua and
as well as in the individual constituent units." private respondent David Quema. The land in dispute is a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba,
o The Secretary of Justice relied on this when he said that… Villaviciosa, Abra. Both parties alleged that they are owners of the two parcels of land.
" the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as Quema was prevented by Badua from cultivating the land, prompting Quema to file a case in
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. The said tribal court decided to give the land to Quema.
the majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. However, the spouses Badua did not immediately vacate the land. The spouses received
" And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces several warning orders from the tribe, causing them so much fear. So they filed this petition
and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province for certiorari and prohibition with the SC and alleged that the tribal court had no jurisdiction



over the land dispute. For their part, respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no • The Baduas likewise allege that they were denied due process or formal hearing
jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not a part of the judicial system. and that the tribal court has no jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the
ISSUE: Whether the tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration had jurisdiction over private respondent as neither of them are members of the Maeng Tribe.
the land dispute – NO • In their Comment, respondents alleged that:
It must be remembered that the creation of the Cordillera Administrative Region was o The Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the
rejected by all the provinces of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province. Hence, the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra.
Cordillera Bodong Administration as well as the indigenous and special courts do not legally o The tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong Association or Administration
exist. Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation Army.
Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, o The tribal court, or council of elders, is composed of prominent and
1987 Constitution). Thus, they do not possess judicial power and cannot render any valid and respected residents in the locality.
executory decision. The decision by the Maeng Tribal court is annulled for lack of o It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than the regular
jurisdiction. courts, without the intervention of lawyers.
• Respondents further contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the
FACTS: tribal courts because they are not a part of the judicial system.
• The petitioners, spouses Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba,
Villaviciosa, Abra. ISSUE: Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and
• In July 1989, they were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of executory decision in a land dispute -‐ NO
the Cordillera Bodong Administration in "David Quema vs. Leonor Badua."
• The factual background, according to the undated decision, is: HELD: Petition GRANTED. The decision rendered on February 18, 1989 by the Maeng Tribal
o In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Court in "David Quema vs. the Leonor Badua," is hereby annulled for lack of jurisdiction.
Villaviciosa, Abra, mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to Dra.
Erotida Valera. RATIO:
o He was able to redeem the land twenty-‐two (22) years later and • In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. The
allegedly paid the redemption price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Commission on Elections, et al., the Court en banc, found that in the plebiscite that
Jessie Macaraeg. was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the
o On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her by Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city of the
Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still alive. Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous
o However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly Region did not come to be.
in the possession of Vice-‐Governor Benesa. o Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it
o Because Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990
Quema filed a case in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
o The said tribal court decided to give the land to Quema. memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160,
• However, Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the land. and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive
• They received several warning orders from the tribe. Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly
• Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. repealed or amended.
• In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was arrested by the Cordillera People's • As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong
Liberation Army and detained for two days. Administration created under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the
• Thereafter, the Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs" indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the
(which may be treated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition) praying that: Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's
o (1) a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the respondents Liberation Army as a regional police force or a regional command of the Armed
from enforcing the decision of the tribal court; Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally
o (2) the respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power and exist.
hearing cases; and • Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the
o (3) the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under
Cordillera People's Liberation Army be clarified. R.A. No. 6766.



o Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under • IPRA: it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of
the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. ancestral domains. The MOA-‐AD’s manner of delineating the ancestral domain of
• Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure.
the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. • IL: the MOA-‐AD seems to grant to the BJE the right to external self-‐determination,
1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). which meand basically a severance from its parents state… some indications of this
They do not possess judicial power. are conferment of treaty making powers.
• Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, • The MOA-‐AD seems to promise an amendment to the Consti (termed “legal
they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring framework”) in order to conform to what’s given in this agreement. The President
together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and cannot sign an agreement promising amendments to the Consti
compromise.
• An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by Petitioners:
a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final Province of North Cotabato, City Government of Zamboanga, City of Iligan, Provincial
judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the Government of Zamboanga del Norte—all represented by their elected local officals (i.e.
local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the mayor, governor, etc.)
compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, Aquilino Pimentel III
annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Various interveners—cities, provinces, elected officials, organizations
• Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as
provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular Respondents:
courts today. Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,
represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR. (the latter
being the Presidential Adviser for the Peace process of PAPP)
4. NORTH COTABATO (MR) Nature of petitions: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008.
Acronyms
Recit-‐ready version
Just read the short facts hereunder because you know what this is about. This is our Consti II • GRP—Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
digest so there’s a little of every substantive issue. For the syllabus topic, skip over to the • MOA-‐AD—Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
bold and underlined parts of this digest. SUPER SHORT lang ang part on Organic Act. • MILF—Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Basically, the MOA-‐AD offends against the Organic Act of ARMM because the former lumps • MNLF—Moro National Liberation Front
together in the definition of “Bangsamoro people” all native inhabitants of Mindanao. But • BJE—Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
in the latter, Bangsamoro people are distinguished from tribal people. • PAPP—Presidential Adviser for the Peace Process
• ICCPR—International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Quick run down of other substantive issues and why the MOA-‐AD was invalidated under • ICESCR—International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
them: • UN DRIP—United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
• Right to info on matter of public concern: This is a self-‐executing provision; the
MOA-‐AD and its negotiations are of public concern. The LGC as well as EO 3 Facts
specifically mandate duty of public disclosure and consultation affecting peace
processes. Evidence presented showed that the required consultations did not
• July 18, 1997—GRP and MILF sign Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities,
happen
which contained their desire to pursue peace negotiations and avoid attacks while
• Art. X Consti: MOA-‐AD provides for associative relationship of BJE with the national
its ongoing. The following year they signed. Next year, signing of General
government; the Consti does not recognize association as a valid relationship
Framework of Agreement of Intent
• But MILF went on attacking various places in Central Mindanao anyway, so then
Pres. Estrada declared all-‐out war against them. When PGMA assumed the



presidency, she suspended the military offensive and sought to resume peace 1. ripeness
talks. 2. locus standi
• March 24, 2001—GRP and MILF met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, signing an 3. mootness
agreement to formally resume peace talks and suspend all military attacks Substantive:
• June 20-‐21, 2001—formal peace talks in Tripoli, Libya, out of which came the 1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
Tripoli Agreement 2001, containing agenda on such aspects of negotiation: consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed
Security, Rehabilitation and Ancestral Domain the MOA-‐AD?—Yes.
• August 5-‐7, 2001—second round of peace talks, leading to a ceasefire between the 2. Do the contents of the MOA-‐AD violate the Constitution and the laws?—Yes.
groups, but still there were many violent incidents between 2002 and 2003
• 2005—MOA-‐AD was crafted in its final form and set to be signed on Aug. 5 2008 Ratio
• North Cotobato and Vice Gov. Pinol filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition
invoking right to info on matter of public concern. The one filed by Zamboanga and Procedural:
its reps is to include Zambo from the BJE and also to declare MOA-‐AD unconsti. All 1. It is RIPE for adjudication
the other petitioners basically pray for the declaration of the MOA-‐AD as -‐ The unsigned MOA-‐AD doesn’t make the petitions unripe. Respondents
unconstitutional, to enjoin respondents from signing it, and if signed already, to contend that the agreement has not been signed and so acts have not been
enjoin them from implementing it. Respondents file motion to dismiss. executed, and rights have not been made demandable. However, because the
petitions allege abuse of authority by respondents by violating their duties
Important backgrounds under laws and Constitution, they make a prima facie case for Certiorari,
• MOA-‐AD: parties to it are the GRP and MILF; identifies as Terms of Reference two Prohibition, and Mandamus
local statutes—IPRA and ARMM organic act and several IL instruments. Its main 2. Petitioners have STANDING
body is divided into four strands -‐ LGU’s. The provinces and cities have standing because their local
• On territory: the core of BJE is defined as the present geographic area of ARMM. government’s would be directly affected by the territory changes
Outside of ARMM, other territories will be subject to plebiscite. BJE will have -‐ Tax payer. Those who comes as tax payers have standing because the
jurisdiction over natural resources agreement involves disbursing funds for what is allegedly an unconstitutional
• On resources: The MOA-‐AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic plebiscite
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to -‐ Senator Manuel Roxas. He has standing because he is seeking compliance
establish trade missions in those countries. with the Constitutionally mandated duty to disclose information to the public
• MILF -‐ All the rest have no standing, but because this issue is of TRANDSCENDENTAL
It’s a rebel group established in 1984 under the leadership of Salamat Hashim (now IMPORTANCE, the Court relaxes the rule on standing (So it came down to
dead), which used to be part of MNLF then headed by Nur Misuari. The former that.)
separated from the latter because MNLF started to become less Islamic-‐based and 3. Petitions NOT mooted
more Marxist-‐Maoist -‐ Insofar as release of MOA-‐AD, YES. Petitions are mooted only insofar as
• MOA-‐AD public disclosure of the document because the respondents eventually
It basically (1) recognizes the ‘Bangsamoro’ people, which were the original released the contents of the MOA-‐AD to the public
inhabitants of Mindanao, including adjacent islands. It (2) established the BJE (it’s -‐ All other issues, NO.
basically a mini-‐state), to which it gives authority over the Ancestral lands and Substantive:
domains of the Bangsamoro people. It discusses the (3) territory of the BJE as well 1. There was grave abuse of discretion
the plebiscites that need to be made. It also grants the BJE (4) freedom to -‐ Art. III, Sec. 7 ! Right to information on matters of public concern
establish trade relations with foreign countries. It also establishes an (5) o This has been recognized as a self-‐executory right. It is predicated
“associative” relationship between the BJE and the Philippine Government. on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of
public concern since the public has a legitimate interest in matters
(The meanings and relevance of these will be discussed more adequately as the of social and political significance.
issues are resolved ☺) " The MOA-‐AD is of public concern.
" Matters of public concern covered by the right to
Issues information include steps and negotiations leading to the
Procedural: consummation of the contract. Otherwise, the people can



never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, o The powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to local
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the governments and even to ARMM. The MOA-‐AD envisions a
public to expose its defects. relationship between the Philippines government and BJE as one of
-‐ Art. II, sec. 28 ! Policy of public disclosure ASSOCIATION—Implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
“Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts state, given these powers:
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions " The BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade
involving public interest.” relations with foreign countries
o Right to information on matters of public concern and policy of " the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the
public disclosure compliment each other (right of people #! duty BJE’s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN
of officials) and the specialized UN agencies
o Immediately executory but the Congress is directed to provide " the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine official missions
“reasonable safeguards” (no implementing statute needed, but bearing on negotiation of border agreements,
Congress does need to provide safeguards) environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
" E.O. No. 3 manifestly provides the mechanics for the duty pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between
to disclose information and to conduct public consultation the islands forming part of the ancestral domain
regarding the peace agenda and process. o the concept of association is not recognized under our Consti
" E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities o According to the MOA-‐AD, the present geographic area of the
of the PAPP, which includes conducting regular dialogues ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which
with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite are
partners to seek relevant information, comments, automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite. In
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and the Constitution, the creation of any entity requires a plebiscite.
timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive o It imparts treaty making power to the BJE when in the Consti, only
peace process the President is given treaty-‐making power
-‐ PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion by not carrying out the o Art. II, Sec. 22 promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
required consultations communities within the framework of national unity and
o Invocation of executive privilege untenable. Respondents’ development. The MOA-‐AD does not promote national unity.
invocation of the privilege will not stand against the explicit -‐ Violates statutory law, which are RA 9054, IPRA and the Organic Act of
provisions of EO No. 3 mandating consultation and dialogue on ARMM
national and local levels o Organic Act
o Local Government Code also requires national agencies and offices " Art. X, sec. 3 of the OA of ARMM is a bar to the adoption
to conduct periodic consultations with LGU’s, NGO’s and other of the definition of Bangsamoro peoples. The MOA –AD
peoples’ organizations before any project is implemented in their defines them as natives or orginial inhabitants of
respective jurisdiction Mindanao and its adjacent islands. It lumps together
" The MOA-‐AD is a program that unequivocally and tribal people and Bangsamoro people
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the " But the OA distinguishes between the Bangsamoro
Bangsamoro people, which could drastically result to the people and Tribal people. Tribal people are those whose
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their cultural and societal principles distinguish them from the
total environment. national community. Bangsamoro people are those who
-‐ IPRA does not grant any government agency authority to delineate and believe in Islam who have retained their own social and
reorganize ancestral domains by mere compromise or agreement political institutions. The MOA-‐AD lumps the two
o IPRA has a clear delineation procedure. In proceeding to make a together.
sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with o IPRA
the IPRA, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their " Has standards for delineation of ancestral land, such as
authority. application to the Ancestral Domain Office, perimeter
2. The agreement violates the Constitution, statutory law and international law maps, consultations, etc. The MOA-‐AD simply “fixes” the
-‐ Violates provisions under Art. X Local Government territory of the BJE by mere compromise or agreement.



-‐ Violates international law such as the ICCPR, ICESCR, and UN DRIP
o Basically, these laws allow indigenous peoples the right to internal
self-‐determination
o According to the UN DRIP, indigenous peoples have a right to
autonomy when it comes to internal and local affairs
o But external self-‐determination is the establishment of a sovereign
and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people
o Nothing in IL encourages any part of the state to dismember from
their parent state. A lot of the provisions in the MOA-‐AD point to
this
o The national government does not have a mandate to grant them
the powers they’re asking for in the MOA-‐AD (i.e. trade relations
with other nations, etc.)
-‐ The MOA-‐AD contains the suspensive clause: that its provisions will not come
into force until the necessary changes to the current “legal framework” are
effected
o This obviously refers to the fact that the Constitution and laws are
so incompatible with the MOA-‐AD
o What happened in effect is that the President promised to pursue
reforms in the Constitution to be able to carry out the provisions in
the MOA-‐AD—she does not have this power. She’s vested with the
power and duty to protect the Constitution, not to promise changes
to it.

Motion to dismiss is denied. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP-‐MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law
and the Constitution.

5. Datu Michael etc (SEE SUPRA SECTION 8!!)


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5. Datu Michael etc (SEE SUPRA SECTION 8!!)

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