CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2

(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

4. CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. V COMMISSION ON AUDIT

GR NO. 92585, MAY 8, 1992 
5. NHC v. COA
226 SCRA 55 [SEPTEMBER 2,1993]
FACTS:
In 1989, COA sent a letter to Caltex, directing it to remit its collection to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF),
excluding that unremitted for the years 1986 and 1988, of the additional tax on petroleum products authorized Facts:
under the PD 1956. Pending such remittance, all of its claims for reimbursement from the OPSF shall be held in Our government forged an agreement on financial cooperation with the Republic of Germany. The agreement
abeyance. The grant total of its unremitted collections of the above tax is P1,287,668,820.  empowered the NHA (National Housing Authority) and the KFW (Kreditanstalt Fur Weideraufbau) to be the
lender or the project sponsor of the Urban Housing Dagat Dagatan Project II.
Caltex submitted a proposal to COA for the payment and the recovery of claims. COA approved the proposal but However, despite all the negotiations and contracts, the project was not completed as scheduled. Thus, an
prohibited Caltex from further offsetting remittances and reimbursements for the current and ensuing years. extension of the contracts was made since the NHA did not appear to have much choice. Several extensions
Caltex moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition.  were made which triggered the difficulties experienced by the NHA.

ISSUE: Issue: 
Whether the amounts due from Caltex to the OPSF may be off-set against Caltex’s outstanding claims from said WON the COA has the authority to disallow a duly entered contract and substitute its own judgment or
funds  disposition in lieu of the decision of the management or governing body of the Govt. entities

RULING: Held:
No. Taxation is no longer envisioned as a measure merely to raise revenue to support the existence of In Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. COA, We recognized the authority of COA to disallow irregular, unnecessary,
government. Taxes may be levied with a regulatory purpose to provide means for the rehabilitation and excessive, extravagant or unconscionable (IUEEU) expenditures. We ruled: "Since the COA is responsible for
stabilization of a threatened industry which is affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the the enforcement of the rules and regulations, it goes without saying that failure to comply with them is a ground
State.  for disapproving the payment of the proposed expenditure."

PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, explicitly provides that the source of OPSF is taxation. A taxpayer may not The nature of the terminal phrase of the Dagat Dagatan project does not require the expertise of a foreign
offset taxes due from the claims he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be subject of compensation consultant and that the finishing stage merely requires simple advisory stage that can be undertaken by the NHA
because the government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes or DPWH in-house technical staff or at the most a local consultant. The postulates of our Constitution are not
is not such a debt, demand,, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off.  merely platitudes, in which we should honor only in rhetorics but not in reality. The power to contract in a foreign
load does not carry with it the authority to bargain away the ideals of our Constitution.
Hence, COA decision is affirmed except that Caltex’s claim for reimbursement of under recovery arising from
sales to the National Power Corporation is allowed.

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 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

7. UY, et al. V. COA 8. BUSTAMANTE V COA

GR NO. 130685, MARCH 21, 2000 216 SCRA 134, November 27, 1992

FACTS:  FACTS:         
Former Governor Paredes dismissed from service more than sixty employees, allegedly to scale down the Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of National Power Corporation (NPC). As such he was issued a
operations of the office. The Merit Systems Protection Board (under CSC) rendered a decision that the reduction government vehicle with plate number SCC 387. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board Resolution
in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordered the reinstatement No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use
of the workers. The Commission on Audit (COA) rendered a decision ruling that the back salaries of the workers of government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990,
have become the personal liability of the Governor because the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith. the petitioner received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from respondent Regional
Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance. The
ISSUE:  petitioner moved for reconsideration of the disallowance of the claim for transportation allowance which was
Whether or not COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally denied. 
dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a             
final decision of the CSC. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Commission on Audit which denied do due course. Hence this petition.
            
HELD:  The petitioner takes exception from the coverage of said circular contending that such circular did not mention
NO. The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or the NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it ( COA Circular No. 75-6)
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.  Payment of backwages to illegally
dismissed government employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or ISSUE:        
unconscionable.  Whether such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Further, Gov. Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA and it             
would be unfair to hold him personally liable for the claims of petitioners without giving him an opportunity to be Whether NPC takes an exception from such coverage of the said circular contending that such circular did not
heard and present evidence in his defense. mention NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it.

HELD:       
NO. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
            
NO. It is very patent that the circular is addressed, among others, to managing heads of Government-owned or
Controlled Corporations, the NPC being held under such category of corporations. We likewise cannot sustain
petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, usurped the
statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors for its leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of
Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to naught a
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 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the
Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditures or
use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC,
We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in 10. GANZON V. CA
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property. G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local
9. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said
G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002 orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave
misconduct.

Facts:                    suspend and remove local officials.
On 1986, Development Bank of the Philippines, the petitioner, signed a contract with a private firm. May 13,
1987, Commission on Audit, the respondent, found out about the said contract. And in effect, the  COA chairman
wrote the DBP chairman that COA auditors imposed instructions to prohibit any payment to private firm whose
operations and services were deemed illegal and unconstitutional.
July 1, 1987, DBP chairman sent a copy of DBP’s signed contract with Joaquin Cuanan & CO., to the COA
chairman which was signed four months earlier of March 5, 1987. The note sought for the concurrence of COA.
However, upon the pendency of the request of the concurrence, DBP paid the private firm of the sum amount of
P487,321.14, which is contrary to the instructions imposed by the COA.  On October 30, 1987, COA Chairman
issued a memorandum to prohibit payments to the private firm and making the persons personally liable for such
payment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not
exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the
President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere.
But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty
in sustaining him.

Issues: We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
1. Whether or not public corporation is under the jurisdiction of COA power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless
2. Whether or not DBP could be held liable for not following COA’s instruction to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling: As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to
The petition is granted. On May 20, 1989, the letter-decision which was promulgated by the Commission on all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
Audit is set aside; subsequently a temporary restraining order issued by the court imposing the said decision was purposes, his suspension permanent.
declared permanent.

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 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
11. DRILON V. LIM
235 SCRA 135 [ AUGUST 4, 1994]
Facts:
The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794
(Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances
and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to
submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind
the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no lessthan on the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubtis to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
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12. JUDGE DADOLE V. COA
393 SCRA 262, DECEMBER 3, 2002
FACTS: 
In 1986, petitioners as RTC and MTC judges stationed in Mandaue City received a monthly allowance of P1,260
each pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in 1991, it was increased to P1,500 for each
judge. However, on March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local Budget
Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local
government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on the said
DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the
amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest. However, it was
treated as a motion for reconsideration and was endorsed to the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office
No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the said motion to their Head Office with recommendation that
the same should be denied. Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition.
They argued, among others, that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by
dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges
stationed therein. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy
remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X
of  1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. 
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they
are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials
were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can
be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has
acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
ADDITIONAL INFO:
The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the
latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government
units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive
therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations.
13. TAN VS COMELEC
GR NO 73155 11 JULY 1986
Facts: 
Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 was enacted creating a new province in the Island of Negros to be known as the
province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on 03 December 1985. Patricio Tan filed a case for prohibition to
stop COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite and implementing the same. Due to Christmas holiday, this was not
acted upon and the plebiscite was held and ratified only to inhabitants of Negros del Norte excluding the rest of
Negros Occidental province. Petitioner move to stop the implementation of the said law is unconstitutional and
not in complete accord with the Local Government Codebecause:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite; and
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km.,
which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute.
ISSUE:
W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the
Consititution, which states that --
"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
Held:
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BP Bilang 885 declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province Negros del Norte and the
appointment of its officials were declared null and void. Pursuant to Article 11 Section 3, it si imperative to obtain
approval of majority of votes in a plebiscite in the units affected whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. The boundary of Negros Occidental would be
altered by the division of its exiting boundaries to create the new province. There is no way to reconcile in
holding a plebiscite that eliminates the participation of the two component political units.
14. TOBIAS VS ABALOS,
G.R. NO. L-114783 DECEMBER 8, 1994
Facts: 
Complainants, invoking their correct equally taxpayers as well as equally residents of Mandaluyong, filed a
petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known equally "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to live on known equally the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong as well as San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the human activeness is unconstitutional for violation of 3 provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the discipline ane nib rule. The nib provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to
HUC equally good equally the partition of congressional district of San Juan as well as Mandaluyong into 2 form
district. Second, it too violate Section five of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of
Representatives shall live on composed of non to a greater extent than 2 hundred as well as 50 members,
unless otherwise fixed past times law. The partition of San Juan as well as Mandaluyong into form congressional
districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided past times the
Constitution. Third, Section five of Article VI too provides that inside 3 years next the render of every census, the
Congress shall brand a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the criterion provided inward Section 5.
Petitioners stated that the partition was non made pursuant to whatever census showing that the minimum
population requirement was attained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)
Rulings: 
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the origin disputation of ane
discipline ane nib rule, the creation of a form congressional district for Mandaluyong is non a form as well as
distinct discipline from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural as well as logical consequence. In addition, a
liberal structure of the "one title-one subject" dominion has been invariably adopted past times this courtroom as
well as then equally non to cripple or impede legislation.
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

The minute disputation that the police pull violates the introduce confine of the release of representatives, the Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the
provision of the department itself exhibit that the 250 confine is non absolute. The Constitution clearly provides present petition for
that the House of Representatives shall live on composed of non to a greater extent than than 250 members, certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
"unless otherwise provided past times law”. Therefore, the increment inward congressional representation A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-
mandated past times R.A. No. 7675 is non unconstitutional. day period from the
approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
With regards, to the tertiary disputation that at that topographic point is no advert inward the assailed police pull B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
of whatever census to exhibit that Mandaluyong as well as San Juan had each attained the minimum twenty (20) day extensive
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into 2 legislative districts, unless otherwise proved information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
that the requirements were non met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular conducting the plebiscite.
congressional processes, including due consideration past times the members of Congress of the minimum Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806
requirements for the institution of form legislative district. unconstitutional
,contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section
450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution)
Cawaling vs. COMELEC which requires that
G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001 only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary component city"; and
G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality Sorsogon and the
of Republic Act No. (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the
8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite "one subject-one bill"
conducted pursuant thereto. rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city
8806, an may be created
"Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging
Sorsogon In The two municipalities, as
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
COMELEC a plebiscite in the Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification (2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of
proclaimed Bacon and Sorsogon in
order to create the City of Sorsogon
the creation (3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in
of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of Section 26 (1), Article VI of
the votes cast in the the Constitution
plebiscite. (4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

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 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
erroneous. The phrase A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-
"A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component day period from the
city" is not a criterion but approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
of the Constitution twenty (20) day extensive
allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
municipality or barangay in conducting the plebiscite.
accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806
new local government unconstitutional
unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units ,contending, in essence, that:
is recognized under the 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section
Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the 450(a) of the Local
requirements prescribed by Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution)
the Code which requires that
Cawaling vs. COMELEC only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001 component city"; and
Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of
G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001 Sorsogon and the
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the
of Republic Act No. "one subject-one bill"
8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
conducted pursuant thereto. Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. may be created
8806, an only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging
"Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And two municipalities, as
Sorsogon In The what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.
COMELEC a plebiscite in the (2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification Bacon and Sorsogon in
proclaimed order to create the City of Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in
the creation Section 26 (1), Article VI of
of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the Constitution
the votes cast in the (4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
plebiscite. Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the erroneous. The phrase
present petition for
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 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
"A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city" is not a criterion but
simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution
allows the merger of local government units to create a province city,
municipality or barangay in
accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely
new local government
unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units
is recognized under the
Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by
the Cod  Held:
15. CAWALING JR. V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 146319, OCTOBER 26, 2001
Facts:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806which created
the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. On August 16, 2000, former
President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging
The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."
The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification
proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as havingbeen ratified and approved by the majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval
of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional ,contending, in essence,
that:1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains
two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of
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BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.
the Constitution. Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created
only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No.
8806 has done.
Issues:
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order
tocreate the City of Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of
theConstitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional.
(1)Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or
a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by
which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units
to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the
creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government
units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter
which we are not
competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear
that "the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the
exercise of judicial
power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political
departments simply because
we feel it is unwise or impractical.”
3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the
City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the
creation of Sorsogon
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This
presumption is
rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of
the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that
every law, being the
joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to
ensure that it is in accord
with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law,
or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds
for nullity must be beyond
reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to
present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter
which we are not
competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear
that "the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the
exercise of judicial
power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political
departments simply because
we feel it is unwise or impractical.”
3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the
City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the
creation of Sorsogon
City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This
presumption is
rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of
the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that
every law, being the
joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to
ensure that it is in accord
with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law,
or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds
for nullity must be beyond
reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to
present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not
competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we
are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical.”
(3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon.
The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their
merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was

9
BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title
is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation.
(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a
becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and
the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This
Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other
words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that
petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A.
No. 8806.
16. MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
GR NO 133064 16 SEPTEMBER 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No.
8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the
lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City
of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the
petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition
because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide
whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
10
BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the implementation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City,
Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters
in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
17. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET AL.,
429 scra 736 May 27, 2004
Facts:
The petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the General Appropriations Act of 1999, 2000 and 2001
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each year the amount of P5B of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for
the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Likewise, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled “Establishing a Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization “ with the purpose of facilitating the process of enhancing the capacities
of LGU’s in the discharge of the functions and services  devolved tot hem by the national government agencies
concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code.
Issue:
May the Congress or the President impose conditions for the use of the IRA by the different local government
units?
Held:
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

The provision of the GAA for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are unconstitutional as they encroach on the fiscal
autonomy of the local government units in violation of the Constitution. And even if this case is already moot and
academic because said provisions have been implemented, there is a possibility that the same be incorporated
in the future GAA or it is capable of repetition and as such, it must be decided before another GAA is enacted. It
behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, bar and the public.

Likewise, the act of the President as embodied in EO No. 48 is unconstitutional because  it amounts to control to
local government units when the President’s power over local government units is confined to general
supervision, not power of control. The distinctions of the two powers were enunciated in Drilon vs. Lim, 235
SCRA 135. Thus:

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may in his discretion,
order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have any discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner of doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Section 286 of the Local Government Code is very clear since it provides that the share of each local
government unit shall be released without need of any further action, DIRECTLY TO THE PROVINCIAL, CITY,
MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY TREASURER as the case may be on a quarterly basis…and which may not be the
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
Finally, Section 2, Art. X of the Constitution expressly mandates that the local government units shall enjoy local
autonomy as well as Section 25, Art. II of the Constitution.
18. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued
by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372

SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned
and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will
reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services items, along the following suggested areas:
Xxx
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units
shall be withheld.

ISSUE:
11
BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

WON the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction
program in violation of the LGU’S fiscal autonomy and the withholding of 10% of the LGU’S IRA.
HELD:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner
of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President
consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as
an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country.
It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows the
President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget
and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be
upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which
orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
19. BORJA VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 133495, SEPTEMBER 3, 1998
Facts: 
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March
27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that
Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be
ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was
subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.  contested ballot, COMELEC declared Alvarez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and ordered
Issue: 
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder
of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.  Muli filed a petition to disqualify the former from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the
Held: 
12
BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.
No.  Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that  “…the term of office of elective local officials… …shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.  Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.”
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that  “…no local
elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.  Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”
The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.”  The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. 
Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of
the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his
voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
20. LONZANIDA versus COMELEC
(G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999)
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 8 1995 elections where he ran for the mayoralty position of San Antonio, Zambales
and was again proclaimed the winner. He then assumed office and discharged said duties therof. His
proclamation in the year 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who later on filed an
election protest. 
In the year 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections. After a revision and re-appreciation of the
petitioner to vacate the post.
On the 11th of May in the year 1998 elections again, Lonzanida ran for mayor wherein his contender Eufemio
ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. 
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated
before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short,
under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed” this comment
of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike
Issue:  government officials, there is no recall election for members of Congress.
Whether or not tit may be considered that the petitioner had served three consecutive terms, granting that he did
not finish his term in 1995. Neither can Talaga’s victory in the said recall election can be deemed as a “voluntary renunciation” under the
Constitution. It was only by virtue of the recall that he served Tagarao’s unexpired term. This did not amount to a
Held: third full term. 
NO. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995 to 1998 mayoral
term and became a private citizen. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation
of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his
tenure in office. The court set two conditions which must concur in order to disqualify an elective local official
from serving more than three consecutive terms such as that 1.)  the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post and that 2.) he has fully served three consecutive
terms. 

21. ADORMEO versus COMELEC 22.SOCRATES VS. COMELEC,

(G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002) G.R. NO. 154512.  NOVEMBER 12, 2002

Facts:  Facts:
Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and
elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a
petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Different petitioners filed their
three consecutive terms. respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall
election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth
Issue: consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms
Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. COMELEC’s First
Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to
Held:  run in the recall election.
NO. In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen.
The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.“ ISSUE: WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule
13
BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
HELD:
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruptionfrom being
joined together to form a continuous service    or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the same office following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibitionfor two reasons: 1) A subsequent election
like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates.
During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a
legal prohibition.
23. FRANCIS G. ONG vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
[G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006]
FACTS:
Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the
petition to disqualify Ong which was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995,
May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties
thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. The May 1998 elections, both
Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor, with Ong was proclaimed winner. Alegre filed an election protest. In
it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, but the decision came out
only when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as
mayor-elect. Acting on Alegre’s petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis’ certificate of candidacy for the May
10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the
said petition of Alegre. Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc issued, a resolution
reversing the resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified
14
BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.
to run for mayor in the May 10, 2004" ; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis’ name from the official list of
candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a
certificate of candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor as substitute
candidate for his brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the substitute certificate of candidacy of
Rommel Ong should be denied due course and the election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of
candidates.
ISSUE:
a) whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run
c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommel’s
certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.
HELD:
a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The three-term limit rule for elective local
officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served
three (3) consecutive terms. The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner
Francis from running for mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the
duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term
in contemplation of the three-term rule.
b) The ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis
from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post cannot be sustained.
c) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.
WHEREFORE , the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7,2004 of
the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for
reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was
proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that
declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his
favor should not be counted. 

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained
a different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of
Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?

24.(LATASA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 154829, 10 DECEMBER 2003)
Facts:  interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of
1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001
elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first
time for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to
deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive
terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the
2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
15
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Held: 
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will
govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the
range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post,
unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the
same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 2
(ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
ART. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.  On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose
those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as
a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would
then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants
for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order
No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.
Issue:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region
Held: 
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." 

25. ORDILLO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 93054, DECEMBER 4, 1990
Facts:  characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected
by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up
of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative
purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as
part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region,
it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible
should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are
to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this
case.

On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act
for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.
16
BUCAD, PRECIOUS CAMILLE P.